TERRORISM: WHY? IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT IT

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA A FICUCIELLO

22 MAY 85
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
In order to effectively combat terrorism, we must first understand it and identify its motivations and its objectives. Even giving terrorism a broad definition—which would be gradually focused on the political configuration of the phenomenon, both domestic and international—the terrorist process consists of a violent "action" on certain "victims," thus producing a strong "emotional reaction" in the chosen environment, intensified by means of information and publicity, in order to obtain "socio-political results."
An appropriate strategy must be aimed at nullifying the effects of terrorism; thus it has--above all--to deny socio-political impact by strengthening the targets (e.g. governments) in order that they can keep a strong stand; secondly, the emotional reactions have to be minimized by building up a more confident environment and protecting and rescuing the victims; thirdly, the terrorist groups must be weakened by all possible legitimate means.

Another condition for success is that a policy of dissuasion/deterrence must be established, by demonstrating that terrorism doesn't work, that governments are able to keep control, and also by harassing, with available and not-unpopular measures--state-sponsored terrorist methods. Lastly, escalation of violence must also be prevented.

In conclusion, two broad recommendations are made.

The first, rather theoretical, aims at improving the social/political "system" to which we and the terrorists belong, maybe that some social injustice connatural to the "system" would be identified as the main spark which initiated the terrorist process, and amended.

The second is more practical and applies to the education of the society, taking into account the relative unsuccess of terrorism; the aim is depleting any significance of terrorism, both as a means in the political struggle and as a social plague: in fact, its impact is so little that it wouldn't be compared to anything more than "measles" for a modern democracy.
TERRORISM: WHY?
IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT IT

An Individual Study Project

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Nowadays, talking about and discussing terrorism is almost a fashion which can draw the attention and admiration of otherwise bored audiences at parties or during weekly clubs and conventions.

Studying terrorism, instead, further than being an almost moral imperative to everybody concerned with national security, is an overwhelming and often frustrating, serious task. It is a difficult job, as usually is the case when the phenomenon under study is still in its lively process, thus making the analysis rather demanding and complicated, due to the amount of data to be collected and to be constantly updated. The synthetic process for any evaluation, then, is never finished: thus any assessment is only true in its logical or particular frame, and may often be very vulnerable to subsequent rebuttal and denial.

A second factor of frustration is the amount of studies, reports, etc., that public offices and officials, politicians, scholars and experts of any kind produce at a daily rate, in any size and by any media: from articles in newspapers to interviews in TV series, from specialized journals to books.

Therefore, the reader of this paper is warned not to look for anything very special: in these few pages some personal reflections are collected, and some questions are just re-asked on many of the often "deja vu" issues. The objective of these thoughts is therefore not to carry out a complete analysis of terrorism, but to search for
strengths and weaknesses of it in order to identify possible modes of
defense against it and possible chances to defeat it.

These thoughts have stemmed and matured together with the expo-
sure, as a common citizen, to the phenomenon of terrorism, especially
in its domestic configuration in Italy. They have also been chal-
lenged and refined by confrontations with other people's ideas—with
and outside the U.S. Army War College—both verbally and mostly as
written in a variety of sources. Some of those sources make up the
annexed bibliography, both because of the critical, basic information
they provide and for being particularly challenging or supportive of
the theory expressed in this paper. No reference or mention instead
is made to quantitative data or statistics, because data may mislead
dramatically if not carefully analyzed. Also data, though impressive,
don't have "the strength of ideas"—provided the "ideas" are sound.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Andreas Baader's great idea: a criminal deed is already in itself a political deed.

*Der Spiegel*, 7 February 1972

When I strike the first bourgeois I encounter, I shall not be striking an innocent.

A French anarchist of the late 19th century.

Nobody is innocent.

Emile Henry, Anarchist
Late 19th century

One can say it only with a bomb. When—-to take one case among many—on 13 September 1974, a bomb exploded at the office of the Algerian airline in Marseilles, no one claimed responsibility. Presumably it would be clear to everybody concerned that the deed was done by or in the name of Europeans who had left Algeria twelve years before. Probably it was also evident that no nonviolent mode of expression would have seemed adequate to the strength of the feelings and judgements to be conveyed.

Nathan Leites
"Understanding the Next Act," 1979

Writing is shit, now let's make revolution.

Ulrike Meinhof
Konkret, 1972

Work on their nerves through... small damages.

George Habash to Oriana Fallaci
*Life*, 22 June 1970
We shall burn citrus plantations, demolish factories, blow up bridges, and cut off communication lines. The revolution will last a year, two years and more, up to twenty or thirty years.

A Palestinian in the mid-60s.

We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare.

Secretary George Shultz
25 October 1984

We may be on the threshold of an era of armed conflict in which limited conventional warfare, classic guerrilla warfare, and international terrorism will coexist . . . .

. . . War may cease to be finite. The distinction between war and peace may dissolve.

Brian Michael Jenkins
"The US Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma", April 1985

I do not accept that there is nothing we can do about terrorism.

Paul Wilkinsons
Christian Science Monitor,
31 January 1985
CHAPTER 2

IDENTIFYING TERRORISM

Like a book held to the nose, terrorism is difficult to read, and the vague impression of the print is dark.

Noel C. Koch, Defense, March 85

Many definitions of terrorism have been and are being given by all kinds of sources; some of them reflect the need of a reference for the development of other concurrent or consequent issues (e.g., for statistical purposes, for the purpose of sharing responsibilities among different boards/institutions within the government or within the international arena, etc.). Other definitions are just academic exercises to illustrate the phenomenon, in the most comprehensive way or with the most grasping wording, according to the general aim of the academic effort itself.

A DEFINITION

The following definition is just a tool for discussion and a starting point for a tracking shot on terrorism: "the systematic and indiscriminate use of violence—or the threat of it—as a leverage to influence behaviors."

It is systematic because it is methodical, it develops according to a plan, it is not casual and not unintentional; and, in fact, it is part of a declaratory strategy set by an established organization in order to fulfill an ideology or a political design.
It is **indiscriminate** because it has no rules about the mode of exertion and about the environment, and, what is worse, it makes no distinctions between innocent and culpable or unarmed and armed victims.

Terrorist actions tend to influence the **behavior** of those groups of people or institutions that have a direct or indirect impact on the "system" that terrorism wants to upset. Negative propaganda and great emotional and socio-political pressure are the main tools by which the "elites" in general, and the "policymakers" in particular, are urged to modify the "system." Also, the public opinion is influenced in order that, both as a source of psychological pressure itself and as comprehensive of the driving force of the voters, it affects the policymakers—or even substitutes them—thus making the "system" eventually change. Within the public opinion also some malcontents may exist, from whom the terrorists would try to get some sympathy or political support, though vague, indirect, and lukewarm, thus increasing pressure on the policymakers.

Why is violence being used? Because it raises two of the most powerful feelings in the human nature: horror and fear. The former gives latitude to the propaganda of the issues, and the latter provides for psychological blackmail against the freedom of thinking and reacting. Therefore, violence is by far the most effective means to raise the masses' consciousness of certain issues. Surely it is more immediate and shocking than other means available in a democratic inventory, like the exchange of ideas through words, speeches, books, etc. Furthermore, violence—resorting to and relying on primitive
instincts—is even more successful when the masses are uneducated, naive, and unprepared.

The definition just proposed is on purpose very broad, especially because it doesn't want to forget some examples of terrorism other than the present ones, which history instead could record (e.g. religious terrorism by the "Saint Inquisition", the "Terror" during the French revolution, today's "balance of terror" in nuclear strategy, etc.). But the definition will automatically narrow as this conversation goes on and the spectrum will easily focus on the political terrorism.

On the other end, however, whereas defining terrorism is difficult, the next step is just a matter of observation: listing the main

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM

First of all, the terrorist act induces a great emotional impact, either for the disproportionate violence used, or for the skill and the surprise performed by the terrorist group.

The victims are cleverly selected in such a relationship with the terrorists' aim and with such an accurate timing, that their "symbolism" is easily recognizable in the specific situation.

Great publicity is sought and provided - often predicting the act itself - both for the terrorist group and for the intended aims of the act.
Ambiguity reigns in the whole process, especially in the possibility of bargaining/negotiating and in the negotiating process itself.

Momentum is also maintained - in both time and space - by several means and actions, in order that a condition of constant pressure be established and reinforced.

Organization and structure are rather well set up, especially in major terrorist groups, on different functional levels and areas of responsibility (from directive to executive, from political to operational).

All groups declare a genuine or presumed ideology, as opposed to the target policy and in order to show the public that a better social system is achievable.

Support - mainly indirect and covert - is given to terrorist groups by other organizations or countries whose political interests rely on disorder and instability.
CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM

"It's a message passed on to the ruling class...."
British Angry Brigade, late 1960's

"We throw the bombs aimed at the apparatus of oppression also into the consciousness of the masses."
Horst Mahler-Rote Armee Fraktion, 1971

"It doesn't matter what cause these people are professing. Terrorism is a violation of the fundamental rights of democratic citizens."
Paul Wilkinson, 1985

Understanding terrorism, its roots, its motivations and its objectives is a step of paramount importance for the success of the struggle against it. And, as when dealing with any other enemy, we must study it both from our perspective and from that of the terrorists' as well. But it is also necessary that the resulting ideas and concepts be quite clear.

For the sake of clarity, therefore, it's convenient that some reference points be set at the very beginning of any reasoning on terrorism, in order not to increase the too many words already used and misused on the issue.

SOME TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATIONS

"Such distortions [about what the word 'terrorism' means] are dangerous, because words are important. When we distort
In fact, to give the general public the right information in an understandable way, all the media should be encouraged to use a standardized terminology. This requirement should particularly apply to the specialized literature; the professional writer should at least make clear - especially to a professional audience - the meaning of the words he uses.

As a possible example, in this paper the use or the threat of violence is named the "act"; the "victim" is the objective of the violent act and applies both to persons (e.g. the kidnapped hostage) and to installation (e.g. the bombed embassy); the "target" instead is the institution whose behaviour is meant to be changed (e.g. the national government, the United Nations, the NATO community, but also a big business company or a political party or a family ....). The "acting group" is the terrorist group in the broadest sense, while the "system" identifies the sets of political relationships, social rules, organization, values and interests which are peculiar to any human group activity or installation, e.g. a state, or a coalition of states. The "environment" is seen from a politico-military prospective as the stage where the interaction "system" - "terrorist group" takes place.
A complete study on terrorism would examine at least all the above mentioned parameters: the consequent analysis would result in extensive lists of categories and cases, and eventually help in understanding the phenomenon, thus polishing also language and ideas. Here only some basic issues are addressed, with the intent of both clarifying the essence of the discussion and stimulating the reader in raising enlightening questions.

For instance, we may see two kinds of environments where terrorist acts are performed: warlike environments and "no-war" ones. The former include both conventional military operations and unconventional ones like revolutionary warfare: in these environments, calling the violent acts terrorism could be a mistake, as they might better qualify as techniques of warfare, like in partisan warfare, sabotage, fifth column ambushes, guerrilla, etc.

It is instead in a no-war environment that political terrorism shows up, and suits very well our definition from the previous chapter.

The "acting group" can be "independent," from the standpoint of ideology, resources, means, organization, etc.; in most cases, instead, it is connected with other groups, is supported or backed up by some political parties or even sponsored by them or by foreign states. The matrix of the group may be clearly and declaredly political, as in most cases; but there are also times when the matrix is different - racial, religious, fanatical - or unclear and confused. The larger terrorist groups, however, usually display a composite
situation: they may profess an independent ideological or political aim, but at the same time, they have close connections with other terrorist groups, either domestically and internationally; they may also develop a vast network and, by their own activities, become almost self supportive in the economic field; many, however, enjoy some support (aids of any kind, training, harboring, etc.) from foreign states - which, in turn, exploit the outcome of terrorism as a means of political pressure and international instability. This consideration leads to another interesting issue:

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

"Terrorism is, "par excellence", an international problem.... There is no pure case of domestic terrorism." Paul Wilkinson, January 1985

"Systematic sabotage of American targets, from consulates to factories and officials, would be actions whose functions is to unmask the enemy in the eyes of the masses, thus indirectly to transmit a political line."
Jamil Rodriguez, Brazilian Terrorist, 1971

Everybody would agree that terrorism is nowadays an international problem; but we could argue that other phenomena are also labelled as "international problems". Crime itself belongs to this category and international laws and bilateral agreements provide some means for dealing with it: INTERPOL, cooperation, intelligence, extradition, etc. are just a few examples. It's a pity instead that sometimes,
dealing with terrorists, some States are more inclined to view the
political facet prevailing the criminal, thus they are more willing to
grant them political asylum instead of extraditing them to the State
where the crime would be punished.

A different issue, however, is that of defining "international
terrorism," although this problem is immaterial until the
international law doesn't issue specific rules on how to deal with it
(many would maintain that given the evidence of crimes most terrorist
acts have, the international law could be easily applied to terrorism
anyway, as mentioned above). At any rate, I would argue that the
current criteria - nationality of the acting group and territory where
the act is performed - are not enough to identify "international
terrorism," unless the aim of the act is also taken into account: a
terrorist act is "international terrorism" if it affects the
international system, i.e. if it affects a subject of international
right in its international relationship.

Though "the aim" gives the terrorist act domestic and
international relevance, it also gives clues on what would be the
targets and the victims. For instance:

- if the stability of a State political systems is the declared aim
  of the terrorists, then we must expect that their target would be
  the state institutions and the internal public opinion; we would
  eventually expect an act of domestic terrorism, whose victims
  would be selected among prominent citizens (as representative of
  the "system") but also among innocent public, in order to cause
  embarrassment to the "system" when confronted with the public
  opinion;
- if the position of a State in the international arena is what the terrorists want to jeopardize, then the connotation of terrorism shades from domestic to international according to the emphasis given to the two environments; targets would be that State's foreign policy on certain issues and the public opinion both national (to oppose the government policy) and international (to shake that State's credibility or influence); victims would be chosen among personalities, institutions, or ordinary people connected with the "target policy;"

- if the international stability is put at stake, then we would assist at international terrorism, whose targets would be the international institutions or those of an appropriate State, either leader or centerpiece in the international arena; victims would be selected among any possible "symbol" of the "target system".

At this point another important question may be raised:

IS TERRORISM PART OF A TOTAL WAR?

"The urban guerrilla, the first phase of revolutionary war, is indispensable for enlarging the 'possible consciousness' of the European proletariat."

Paolo Curcio – Brigate Rosse, 1975
"The overall objective [of international terrorism] is clear: deter and disrupt policies and actions which could bring moderation, stability and peace...."
Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 1985

As mentioned earlier, terrorism may be a technique for particular forms of warfare in a warlike environment; this is even more true in insurgency and revolutionary war.

Taking that for granted, next question is if terrorism is also a special mode of warfare itself, a bloody technique in a global strategy of indirect approach. This intriguing hypothesis would make not little sense when we think of the communist theory of universal revolution. Many would maintain that some incidents of international terrorism prove and reinforce this assumption; particularly, numerous evidences are reported of alleged Soviet support to terrorism, mainly indirect and covert, by means of surrogates - States and groups.

But, from a more realistic point of view, others would argue that as a matter of fact the Soviets are still faithful to their traditional effective policy: they are just exploiting every opportunity that terrorism provides to weaken or at least to annoy and hinder the western democracies by feeding world instability.

In fact this assessment appears to be the most likely, as there is no real evidence that any power - not even the Soviets - are yet able to pull the strings of such a complex phenomenon like terrorism and to use it as a strategic tool in the political struggle for power.
CHAPTER 4

COMBATTING TERRORISM

"As we fight this battle against terrorism, we must always keep in mind the values and the way of life we are trying to protect. Clearly we will not allow ourselves to descend to the level of barbarism that terrorism represents. We will not abandon our democratic traditions, our respect for individual rights and freedom, for these are precisely what we are struggling to preserve and promote. Our values and our principles will give us the strength and the confidence to meet the great challenge posed by terrorism."

Sec. George Schultz, 1984

As for war at large, three are the main components of a counter-terrorism strategy: dissuade/deter, resist and defeat aggression, avoid escalation.

But unlike war - where an enemy is identified - in counter-terrorism we have to fight a comprehensive phenomenon, which presumes an enemy but also involves other factors, including the objectives themselves of terrorism. Therefore, before going into details and in order to be more specific, let's recall what terrorism is all about and, particularly:

THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM

"I wanted people to think: that guy's willing to go to jail - these nuclear plants must be heavier than I thought."

Samuel H. Lovejoy (after having sabotaged a nuclear plant at Montague, Mass.), 1974
The process of political terrorism consists of three main components: the violent act, the emotional reaction to such an act, and the social/political effects resulting from the combined pressure of the act and the reaction.

Each component is important, but we must realize that the emotional reaction and the effects are far more critical than the act itself. This assessment is valid from both the terrorists' and the defending society's points of view, because reaction and effects are closely related to the aim of the terrorist act.

Hence the "targets" are more important than the "victims" and the "act" itself. The importance of the "act" is not negligible, anyway—especially from the terrorist's point of view—being the first step initiating the process. In fact, either mode of violence (use or threat) must be carefully chosen, planned and executed; above all, the victims and the declared reasons must be very timely selected, in order that the linkage with the aim-target be evident and, therefore, the emotional impact be most effective.

But it is the "target" that ultimately yields the results expected by the terrorists. Therefore, if we—with Calusewitz—want to find a center of gravity for our strategy, this—if any—is to be seen in the target area.

This concept is also underpinned by a very simple and practical consideration, which stems from the "defensive" and vulnerable nature of the society and from the unpredictability of the terrorist attack: there is a great practical difficulty (or even incapability) of
protecting, defending, rescuing all the possible victims, as they are too many and not always identifiable. The targets, instead, are more predictable, even in the numerous facets of the modern social-political life; with no fear of stating the obvious or being heretical, we may agree that most targets of modern political terrorism are to be found among only two – though wide – categories: PUBLIC OPINION/POPULATION(S) and STATE INSTITUTIONS/POLICIES.

Back to operations, then!

DISSUADE/DETER

"A strategy of terror is unlikely to produce changes in liberal societies even while it may produce tactical success".
Michael Stohl, 1983

The best dissuasion tool is given by the fact that terrorism doesn't work: no concessions are made, no ransoms are paid, no changes in policy are derived. Dissuasion works if the records show that governments are able to keep a strong stand against any sort of violence, without endangering the democratic institutions; it works also, if governments can build confidence in the population – and in the would-be-terrorists – that the only effective way of solving socio-political problems is through the democratic institutions. This is of course a question of credibility, which dwells only in a sound political system.

Deterring the terrorists is rather difficult, because they are eager to pay any price (whatever the category they belong to);
therefore in this case the concept of "high cost" must be combined with that of "no results", as dealt with in a next step.

Some deterrence instead might be waged in the typical way against State sponsored terrorism and namely by harassing the sponsor States and the groups. This could be done by diplomatic measures, by bureaucratic and economic sanctions, by the threat of military force if convenient or necessary.

_NULLIFY EFFECTS_

"Terrorists means discredit their ends."
Sec. George Schultz, 1984

This is the most critical component of the strategy, because it shows capabilities and credibility of the system, and therefore it affects also the other two components.

Nullifying the effects of a terrorist act means - above all and ultimately - to deny the socio-political results sought by the terrorists. This objective can only be achieved if the "target" is strong enough not to modify its behaviour as a consequence of the violent act.

Secondly the emotional reaction to the violent act must be reduced to a very minimum: this can be obtained by operating on the target and on the victims, by improving physical protection and rescue capabilities; above all, the public opinion - national or international - must be educated and informed, in order that an
automatic process of awareness and self confidence may develop in
direct opposition to the negative emotion generated by the terrorists.

Lastly the very act must be minimized, in the likelihood to break
out, in the capabilities of the acting group, in the surprise effect
on the defense/society, in the further existence of the acting group.
Intelligence is the key-factor in this struggle, but also necessary
are an integrated and flexible organization, a loyal cooperation -
domestic and international, sound planning and standard operational
procedures, realistic training and effective technology.

The above mentioned missions (deny socio-political results,
control emotional reaction, weaken the terrorist group) result in a
series of preventive, reactive and follow-on measures, which are both
defensive and offensive, and affect in different weight the three
basic factors: the TARGET, the VICTIM and the ACTING GROUP. Most of
those measures/policies (°) have already been implemented by the U.S.
government and by other governments as well: the success achieved in
some fields are evidence of soundness of thought and effectiveness of
tools; but much is yet to be done in such matters as cooperation and
joint efforts. This leads in fact to the third component of the
strategy, which is still more a question than an answer.

(°) A synoptic table of the necessary measures is at next page, taken
from the separate annex.
# Combatting Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
<th>REACTION</th>
<th>FOLLOW-ON</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATE P.O.P. PLANNING S.O.P. COORDINATION</td>
<td>NO CONCESSION STRONG STAND MINIMIZE MEDIA</td>
<td>PROPAGANDA KEEP POLICY IMPROVE &quot;SYSTEM&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTIM</td>
<td>INCREASE • PHYS. SECURITY • AWARENESS PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td>PROTECT/ REINFORCE/ RESCUE</td>
<td>TECH CAPABILITIES TRAINING REASSURANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTING</td>
<td>IMPROVE C³I FLEX. ORGANIZ. COOPERATION (DOM + INT'L)</td>
<td>SEEK CONSENSUS/ GEN. BLAME CAPTURE ACTORS IMMEDIATE TRIALS</td>
<td>INT'L LAW SANCTIONS THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION</td>
</tr>
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"Without international cooperative effort, the terrorists and those behind them will continue to be successful, which will encourage others to utilize terrorism to achieve their political and ideological goals."

U.S. Department of State - Current Policy No. 667, 1985

Several statistics show that, in order to produce sufficiently high emotional impact on a public opinion rather accustomed to violence, terrorist acts have become more and more spectacular and lethal. The very countermeasures adopted in every field are a challenge to the terrorists: for achieving some results, they will have to develop and employ new, more powerful and more sophisticated techniques and tactics. Even resort to nuclear-biological-chemical weapons is a possibility: perhaps not by the actual employment but as a blackmailing threat. This would be possible either by stealing the weapons or by "borrowing" them from the State sponsoring terrorism, or - in the case of the major terrorist groups - by acquiring the weapons from an unscrupulous State.

It is apparent, therefore, how important international cooperation is in this field: this form of terrorism would be dangerously destabilizing the global balance of power, and the subtle game of deterrence would be much jeopardized. Therefore a vital interest, for many countries - including the super powers, whose policies would be endangered by a newcomer who acts irrationally and who has little capability of controlling the weapons - it is a vital interest that the NBC weapons don't proliferate.
A second set of countermeasures is to protect sensitive targets and victims - like NBC weapons/resources - against possible attacks, and to establish appropriate S.O.P.s for subsequent rescue.

Another means, perhaps the fundamental, is to educate the public, in order that anyone can understand the phenomenon without panicking; that everybody realizes that terrorism is a sort of modern "pestilency" but has little or no effect if everybody strives not to become a contributor to the emotional reaction and to the possible blackmail for socio-political changes. This attitude should be reinforced by the optimistic realization of the many successes in combatting terrorism, which occurred in several nations and in numerous circumstances, and which lead to a stalemate and to a descalation of terrorist activities.
"An imperfect reading of the Western democracies has led others, from time to time, to confuse forebearance with fragility and humanistic values with vulnerability. In the nature of the present problem, terrorist acts are always well known, while our own successes are almost always silent. They will almost always continue to be. But we have not defaulted, we are not helpless, and we have no doubt, as terrorism can have no doubt, of the outcome."

Noel C. Koch, 1985

WHY TERRORISM?

"...to provoke the latent fascism of society, to bring it to light, to force society to unmask itself...."

Ulrike Meinhof, RAF, 1970

"In the ultimate conflict between the classes only guns count."

Horst Mahler, RAF, 1971

"It was intended to impress the public, the enemy and us, too...."

A. Tupamaro

"How do they make it plausible to themselves that their acts serve the attainment of their goal?"

Nathan Leites, 1979
This may well be the most important question of any study on terrorism, and also the one which cannot be answered but by other questions.

Most of these questions stem from the analysis of the terrorists' behaviour and from what they declare as their motivation: existence of social injustice? importance of improving the society by democratic ways? just fanaticism or crazyness? or the necessary step toward revolution?

Some kind of answers might be looked for by following two basic hypothesis: first, there must be some fault in the political system - domestic or international - which is perceived as vital by some group of people; second, these people perceive that there is no better or no other way to foster the needed change than by violence.

Let's take for instance that some grievances are felt in a given "system", because of human faults or because of social or political injustice provided by the system itself, or because of the behaviour of the key players (e.g. the government, or a State) in shaping the "system" (e.g. domestic institutions, or international relationship). Perhaps the "group" who feels like suffering from that injustice is politically too small or is anyhow impotent to promote the estimated changes by the means available within the "system" itself; or maybe the system doesn't provide suitable means or doesn't admit changes; or the "group" doesn't trust the "system" at all and doesn't envision any possibility of improvement as achievable from inside the "system" itself.
Thus the "group" resorts to violence, because it feels that its emotional impact on the environment would provide - at a low cost - the psychological political pressure which eventually will lead to the needed change.

TWO SETS OF RECOMMENDATIONS

"Democracy offers the opportunity for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. We must oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any case is the enemy of freedom."
Sec. George Schultz, 1984

If we are still following those two given hypothesis we may agree that basically two would be the avenues of approach for our battle: one leads to the "system" itself as a possible cause of grievance and a ground for possible improvement; the other aims at terrorism as a real threatening evil for the society and as a successful means of effectively solving problems in today's political world.

Then the first recommendation is: "fix the system and strengthen it."

In fact some faults might be identified, either in the domestic institution or in the foreign policy, and recognized as a possible spark for initiating the terrorist process. Amending those faults wouldn't mean being affected by the terrorist threat: instead, it would prove once again the value of a democratic system and its ability of self improvement. Moreover, the system must be
strengthened (e.g. stability of domestic political situation, consensus of the population, etc; or consistency of international policy, balance in international relationship, etc.) in such a way that even a great psychological pressure wouldn't affect the decisions of the policymakers in times of crisis, thus making the system less vulnerable to terrorist acts.

The second recommendation is to deplete any significance of terrorism. This is mainly achievable by educating the society, the public opinion, the media, the people at large; which means showing that terrorism doesn't work, that the only outcome of terrorism is a better awareness of the people and a stronger confidence in democratic means; realizing that the terrorists themselves often recognize that the use of violence didn't produce but discredited to their cause; understanding that, as a crude analysis of statistics, the very casualties of terrorism are quite outnumbered by those of other crimes and by those of road accidents; and concluding that as a social disease terrorism is nothing more than the measles that modern democracies have to suffer and overcome in order to be immunized in their development and growth.
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Kelly, James. "We Have Only to be Lucky Once," Time, 7 January 1985.
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NEWSPAPERS Continued.


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets, 1983. (HV6431.45)


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS Continued.


A set of twenty-three tables is enclosed as a separate annex to the paper. These very simple tables summarize the concepts described in the text; they can be used as such or as viewgraphs, to facilitate and improve understanding and interest on the issue, both when reading this paper and in case of subsequent briefings, reports, discussions.
INDISCRIMINATE - MAKING NO DISTINCTIONS

MODE OF EXERTION

ENVIRONMENT

INNOCENT/UNARMED OR CULPABLE/ARMED VICTIMS
TERRORISM

IDENTIFYING

UNDERSTANDING

COMBATTING
A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

SYSTEMATIC AND INDISCRIMINATE
USE OF VIOLENCE

—OR THE THREAT OF IT—

AS A LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE
BEHAVIOURS
WHY VIOLENCE?

IT IS MORE POWERFUL THAN OTHER MEANS—E.G. WORDS, BOOKS, ETC.—IN RAISING THE MASSES’ CONSCIOUSNESS OF CERTAIN ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IF THE MASSES ARE UNEDUCATED, NAIVE, UNPREPARED.
SYSTEMATIC =

- METHODICAL
- ACCORDING TO A PLAN
- NOT CASUAL OR UNINTENTIONAL

ORGANIZATION

IDEOLOGY OR POLITICAL DESIGN

PART OF A DECLARATORY STRATEGY
SOME CLASSIFICATIONS OF TERRORISM

ACCORDING TO:
- ENVIRONMENT
- TARGET
- VICTIM
- ACTING GROUP
...ENVIRONMENTS

WARLIKE

MILITARY OPS

REVOLUTIONARY

PARTISAN WARF.
SABOTAGE
FIFTH COLUMN
GUERRILLA

"NO-WAR"  ---->  "POLITICAL TERRORISM"
TERMINOLOGY

USE/THREAT
OF [VIOLENCE] = [ACT]

OBJECTIVE OF V. = [VICTIM]

AIM = [TARGET]
...AIM/TARGETS

STABILITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEM/STATE INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNAL PUBLIC OPINION

VICTIMS...

- PROMINENT CITIZEN (REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "SYSTEM")
- INNOCENT PUBLIC (EMBARRASSMENT TO THE "SYSTEM")

DOMESTIC

POSITION OF A STATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA/STATE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL P.O.P.

INTERNATIONAL

PERSONALITIES OR INSTITUTIONS OR PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH THE TARGET STATE

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

ANY POSSIBLE "SYMBOL" OF THE "WRONG" SYSTEM
VIOLENT INCIDENTS
IN A "NO-WAR" ENVIRONMENT
TERRORISM =

PART OF TOTAL WAR?

- EXPLOITABLE OPPORTUNITY: MAYBE

- FORM OF "INDIRECT APPROACH": NOT YET
...ACTING GROUP

"INDEPENDENT" - "STATE SPONSORED"

OPENLY POLITICAL - INDEFINITE OR COMPOSITE
- TERRORISM DOESN'T WORK
- GOVERNMENTS MAINTAIN STRONG STAND
- HARASS STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM
- SANCTIONS (MILITARY ACTIONS)
- DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

DISSUADE/DETER
NULLIFY EFFECTS

- DENY SOCIO-POLITICAL RESULTS
  STRENGTHEN TARGET
  (NOT TO MODIFY BEHAVIOUR)

- MINIMIZE EMOTIONAL REACTION
  PROTECT/RESCUE VICTIMS

- MINIMIZE ACT/THREAT
  WEAKEN ACTING GROUPS
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM

- Emotional Impact
- Symbolism (Victims/Target/Timing)
- Publicity
- Ambiguity
- Momentum
- Ideology
- Organization
- Support
COMBATTING TERRORISM

- DISSUADE/DETER
- NULLIFY EFFECTS
- AVOID ESCALATION
TERRORIST PROCESS

ACT/THREAT

EMOTIONAL REACTION

SOCIO-POLITICAL RESULTS
AVOID ESCALATION

- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (DESTABILIZING THREAT)
- PROTECT SENSITIVE TARGETS/VICTIMS (E.G. NBC RESOURCES)
- EDUCATE PUBLIC (MODERN "PLAGUE"...NOT HOPELESS)
## COMBATTING TERRORISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Acting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATE P.O.P. PLANNING S.O.P. COORDINATION</td>
<td>INCREASE • PHYS. SECURITY • AWARENESS PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td>IMPROVE C'I FLEX. ORGANIZ. COOPERATION (DOM + INT'L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CONCESSION STRONG STAND MINIMIZE MEDIA</td>
<td>PROTECT/ REINFORCE/ RESCUE</td>
<td>SEEK CONSENSUS/ GEN. BLAME CAPTURE ACTORS IMMEDIATE TRIALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPAGANDA KEEP POLICY IMPROVE &quot;SYSTEM&quot;</td>
<td>TECH CAPABILITIES TRAINING REASSURANCE</td>
<td>INT'L LAW SANCTIONS THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS

- FIX THE "SYSTEM"
- STRENGTHEN IT

DEPLETTE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRORISM: IT IS JUST THE MEASLES OF DEMOCRACY
WHY TERRORISM?

- EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE?
- DEMOCRATIC IMPOIENCE OF CHANGING THE SYSTEM?
- CRAZINESS?
- NECESSARY STEP TOWARD REVOLUTION?
TERRORISM: WHY?

IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT IT

Basic Color Code

- Intervention more difficult because of prevailing terrorist initiative

- Intervention likely to succeed because we can seize initiative very soon
TERRORISM: WHY?

IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT IT
END
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