REGIONALISM AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN ANALYSIS OF ASEAN’S POTENTIAL TO ASSUME A SECURITY DIMENSION (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

UNCLASSIFIED E J CORCORAN 10 MAY 85 F/G 5/4 NL
REGIONALISM AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN ANALYSIS OF ASEAN'S POTENTIAL TO ASSUME A SECURITY DIMENSION

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD J. CORCORAN, PA

10 MAY 1985

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013
Regionalism and the Defense of Southeast Asia: An Analysis of ASEAN's Potential to Assume a Security Dimension

The basic question is whether or not the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the potential to become a viable defense alliance. The search for an answer required an analysis of the historical development of regionalism in Southeast Asia, a search for the opportunities and challenges facing ASEAN, an examination of the security threats to the ASEAN states and an assessment of the influence of external powers in the region. The history of regionalism in Southeast Asia has been marked by a series of unsuccessful attempts to achieve regional cohesion in an area which is characterized by diversity and discord.
While ASEAN has been far more successful than other regional organizations, its success has been largely confined to public diplomacy and cultural interchange. Beneath the surface, economic cooperation among the ASEAN states has been limited and potential areas of conflict remain unresolved. The ASEAN states oppose Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and the growth of Soviet influence in the region, however, individual ASEAN states do not share a common perception of the long term external threat to the region. Despite ASEAN's expressed desire for Southeast Asia to become a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," ASEAN will continue to be subjected to tensions from external, as well as internal sources. ASEAN lacks the political unity and collective defensive strength to become a viable, independent alliance. Under the circumstances, the ASEAN states can best protect their territorial, political and economic interests by continuing to increase interregional defense cooperation while maintaining existing bilateral defense relationships with the United States and expanding defense cooperation with other free world Asian nations.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

REGIONALISM AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF ASEAN'S POTENTIAL TO ASSUME A SECURITY DIMENSION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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10 May 1985

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR(S): Edward J. Corcoran, LTC, PA

TITLE: Regionalism and the Defense of Southeast Asia: An analysis of ASEAN's Potential to Assume a Security Dimension

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 10 May 1985    PAGES: 59    CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The greatest challenge facing the governments of the developing countries in Southeast Asia is their need to meet the "rising expectations" of their people. In recent history, many of the Asian countries profited from US expenditures associated with the Vietnam War, thereby accelerating the economic aspirations of the populace while disrupting the social fabric of their traditional societies. The violence associated with the war in Vietnam and the existence of externally supported domestic insurgencies contributed to a regional sense of vulnerability. Today, the countries in the region have become a focal point for political confrontation among the major military powers in the Pacific. Faced with an uncertain future, Southeast Asia's leaders have adopted positions of solidarity which they hope will foster a climate conducive to the peaceful development of their societies.

BACKGROUND

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 with the avowed purpose of promoting economic and social cooperation among its members; however, its political nature has always been anti-communist. In its early years, economic cooperation among the ASEAN states was impeded by the competitive, rather than complementary nature of the economies involved. Political self interest inhibited efforts toward significant economic and social achievements. It appeared that ASEAN might be the final casualty in a series of efforts to achieve regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.
The withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1975 served to unify the political will of ASEAN. The specter of a communist victory in Vietnam overrode purely domestic considerations. Member states began to quietly inject the defense equation into ASEAN's "raison d'etre." Recent developments in Kampuchea and the Philippines have further heightened security concerns within the ASEAN countries. Finally, big power rivalry in the Pacific region has once again drawn Southeast Asia into the international power equation.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to determine whether ASEAN has the potential to become a viable defense alliance. Alliances succeed only when individual nations share common interests supported by a common willingness to defend those interests. In practical terms, a viable defense alliance must not only identify common threats, but also possess the capability and will to project a credible deterrence. The prospects for a successful alliance are enhanced if the member nations share complementary political and economic systems. Potential sources of discord must be minimized and sacrifices must inevitably be made by individual nations in support of more important common objectives.

This study will analyze the potential ASEAN holds for assuming a security dimension. It will include historic considerations as well as current factors in an effort to predict the future of ASEAN. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the evidence presented and the author will recommend actions which should be taken to enhance ASEAN's security posture.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The study begins with a brief historical survey of regionalism as a concept for cooperation and development in Southeast Asia. It then proceeds to examine opportunities and challenges for ASEAN, including the security
concerns and capabilities of both the ASEAN states and external powers. The study concludes with an analysis of prospects for an ASEAN alliance and recommendations to enhance the security of ASEAN.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

The study was dependent upon a wide variety of historical texts, public documents, periodicals and newspaper articles, as well as published and unpublished papers for the information necessary to address a broad and complex subject. The author believes that an understanding of the historical development of ASEAN provides important clues which are essential to forecasting future trends within ASEAN and the southeast Asian region. The impact of external factors is also weighed because Southeast Asia has frequently been subject to outside forces which the nations of the region have been unable to control. Before arriving at his conclusion, the author believed it was necessary to examine how each of the ASEAN nations perceives its own self interests and security needs to determine if collective security is a viable alternative to existing defense arrangements. While many of the conclusions derived from this analysis are drawn from the thoughts of prominent regional specialists, in the final analysis the author was dependent on his subjective evaluation of the evidence and his personal experience in Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In order to analyze ASEAN's potential for becoming a viable defense alliance, it is important to have an appreciation for the historical development of the concept of "regionalism" in Southeast Asia. Many of the early regional organizations established in Southeast Asia have not survived the test of time; while others have survived, albeit in modified form. In either case it is important to review the history of these organizations because modern trends in Southeast Asian regionalism are the product of experience gained through involvement in earlier attempts to promote regional cooperation. By the same token, a brief examination of the history of Southeast Asian regional organizations provides a background for predicting the prospects for the future of ASEAN and the role it may play in supporting regional security in Southeast Asia.

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

ASEAN, as the culmination of regionalism in Southeast Asia, is the product of past efforts by individual nations to achieve greater benefits through close cooperation in various fields. In Asia, the concept materialized in 1947 with the formation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). For 27 years, this organization played a significant role in the development of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia because it produced substantial achievements, thereby justifying the worthiness of the concept for the current generation of Southeast Asia's leaders.
In retrospect, ECAFE became subject to the bureaucratic proliferation which characterize many United Nation's organizations. Despite the fact that many non-Asian countries controlled the direction of the organization's projects, many Asian nations profited from ECAFE sponsored projects. ECAFE's development programs focused on flood control, electric power, transportation, agriculture and small industrial projects. Its most impressive accomplishment was the completion of the Asian Highway Project which coordinated national highway plans, covering nearly 37,000 miles, connecting the commercial centers of twelve countries from the Turkish border to Singapore. Its other major undertaking, the Mekong River Project, was impeded by the war in Indochina and remains to be completed; however, the potential for irrigation, navigation, and hydroelectric power offered by the Mekong River which flows for 2,600 miles through Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, could serve to foster future cooperation among modern day adversaries.

THE COLombo PLAN

While ECAFE served as a "regional United Nation" in Asia, a new organization, the Colombo Plan emerged in 1950 to attack the broad technical development problems which existed in Southeast Asia. The Colombo Plan was established at the British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting held in Colombo in January 1950. Its goal is to provide technical experts, equipment and facilities from outside the region to assist in the development of the economics of countries in South and Southeast Asia. Although the original membership of the organization consisted of seven members of the British Commonwealth, it has expanded to include 26 member countries, including all of the Southeast Asian nations, as well as Japan and the United States.

During the 34 years of its existence, the Colombo Plan has recorded a record of impressive achievements. Since its inception until 1980, $61.3
billion in capital and technical assistance has been dispersed to the member countries. Its investment in human resource development has exceeded $4 billion and benefited more than 153,000 students and trainees. Today, the Colombo Plan continues to support economic and social development throughout Asia and the Pacific with priority given to training and scholarships. The infrastructure of the economies of modern Southeast Asia are indebted, in no small measure, to assistance provided under the auspices of the Colombo Plan.

ECAFE and the Colombo Plan have been significant not only to the economic development of Southeast Asia, but also to the attraction Southeast Asia's leaders hold for collective approaches to regional problems. These two organizations provided a foundation upon which Southeast Asian countries were later to develop their own regional organizations. In effect, a psychology of mutual cooperation was developed to address common problems which contribute to instability in Southeast Asia. The security aspect of instability in Southeast Asia was also addressed by mutual means and, like ECAFE and the Colombo Plan, it was originally the product of Western initiative.

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

The success associated with Southeast Asian participation in regional economic development organizations contributed to a receptive response by two Southeast Asian nations to US overtures for a regional defense organization. The partition of Vietnam into communist and noncommunist states as a result of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, served as the catalyst for the formation of the SEATO alliance. Thailand and the Philippines, fearing the spread of Asian Communism, joined six other nations as signatories to the Manila Pact in September 1954. During its lifetime, it can be argued that SEATO prevented any instance of outright aggression against its members; however, it can be
countered that the existence of SEATO contributed to the involvement of the US, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines and Korea in a civil war in Vietnam which proved to be the wrong place to draw the line against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.

In the final analysis, the effectiveness of SEATO as a defense alliance to protect Southeast Asia from communist aggression was a failure. As a product of US initiative, it was dependent on US resolve and resources. Its domination by a Western power was also resented by other Southeast Asian nations who were motivated primarily by strong nationalistic sentiments. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned by the SEATO members, both Western and Southeast Asian, is that outside powers are limited in their ability to exercise their power in support of unpopular governments against indigenous insurgency movements, especially in the absence of wholehearted political support at home.

THE FIVE POWER DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT

SEATO was not the only international organization inspired by Western nations to address the security problems of Southeast Asia. The security of two Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia and Singapore, are affected by the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) which also includes Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This arrangement, signed in November 1971, commits its members only to consult together in the event of a threat or attack against Malaysia or Singapore and to determine what measures should be taken, either separately or jointly.

A strong argument can be made that the FPDA lacks credibility in the post-Vietnam era. Britain withdrew its forces from Singapore in March 1976. While Australia retains small army and air force units in Singapore and Malaysia, New Zealand's commitment is limited to a small contingent in Singapore. The
national will both countries could generate to commit forces to the defense of either Singapore or Malaysia remains suspect, at best, in the absence of a major international conflict in the region. Fundamentally, the FPDA remains a product of Western initiative which appears to lack either the convincing muscle or will to make a significant contribution to Southeast Asia's security.

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asian participation in ECAFE, The Colombo Plan and SEATO was responsible for the interest displayed by the governments of the region for the development of a regional organization which was truly "Asian." In January 1959, Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku Abolul Rohman visited the Philippines to discuss with Philippines President Garcia his proposal for a "Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty." Both leaders agreed for the need to establish a regional organization which would serve to inhibit communist encroachment in rural areas by attacking the roots of poverty. President Garcia's public statements emphasizing the anti-communist aspects of the proposed organization injected a decidedly political time to the proposal, thereby alienating neutral or non-aligned Southeast Asian nations.5

Thailand, on the other hand, was receptive to joining an indigenous regional organization, especially one which sought to combat communist subversion by dealing with the problem of rural poverty. Although Thailand was willing to include neutral nations in the proposed organization, the Thai government believed it would be naive to separate economics from politics. Because of the political question, only Malaya, which originally sponsored the proposal and was combating its own insurgency, choose to join Thailand and the Philippines is establishing Southeast Asia's first indigenous regional organization. On 31 July 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) came into
being with the avowed purpose of promoting economic, social and cultural cooperation.

The history of ASA is important because it serves as an example of a promising regional organization that can fail to achieve its stated objectives. On the surface, it appeared that ASA contained ingredients which pointed toward a viable future. By 1960 the three member nations had shown the highest rates of economic growth in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, ASA's internal economic performance did not live up to its expectations. In retrospect, this should have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the trading patterns of the three countries involved. A study conducted in 1962 revealed that intraregional trade among the ASA countries comprised no more than 8% of each country's total trade.6

The ASA experience also portrays the misgivings aligned and non-aligned nations harbor when they attempt to promote a broad concept of regionalism. The SEATO affiliation of two of the founding members undoubtedly was instrumental in dampening the enthusiasm for ASA in the eyes of neutral countries. Conversely, Thailand always viewed ASA in political terms with an eye on its security interests. The former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman underscored this point when he stated:

The relevance of ASA to the Vietnam conflict is that its members should look to (ASA) as a significant attempt to strengthen ourselves internally while the Vietnam situation awaits political solution... It is difficult to divorce economics from politics.7

Indeed, by 1963 regional political events led to a complete suspension of productive activity within ASA. Southeast Asia's first indigenous effort to establish a cooperative regional organization, devoid of outside influence, was unable to withstand the strains put upon it by the sources of tension and conflict which underlie the Southeast Asian scene.
Intra-regional political disputes have historically served as both a unifying and decisive factor in Southeast Asia. The suspension of cooperation within ASA came to a head in June 1962, when the Philippines renewed its century old claim to Sabah. Shortly thereafter, in September 1963, Indonesia entered the fray by resuming its "confrontation" campaign against Malaysia. A by-product of the conflicts between Malaysia and its adversaries, Indonesia and the Philippines, was the emergence of a new regional organization referred to as MAPHILINDO (Malaya + Philippines + Indonesia).

MAPHILINDO was organized in August 1963 for purposes which were hardly constructive. The organization was conceived by the Philippines in an effort to form an alliance with Indonesia as a means toward furthering its claim to Sabah. Indonesia believed that by accepting the Philippines proposal to join MAPHILINDO, it could enlist the support of the Philippines government in its effort to absorb the proposed nation of Malaysia. Apparently, Malaya joined MAPHILINDO in an effort to mollify the expansionist designs of its adversaries as it sought to guarantee its independence.  

With international support, Malaysia succeeded in proclaiming its independence on 16 September 1963. MAPHILINDO, however, was doomed to failure because Indonesia and the Philippines continued to oppose the establishment of Malaysia. The only notable accomplishment associated with MAPHILINDO was Indonesia's willingness, despite it ulterior motives, to accept the concept of regionalism as a subject for future consideration.
CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

1. The term "regionalism" is defined in this study as "the organization of a group of independent states organized for the purpose of safeguarding their common interests in order to obtain greater benefits through close cooperation in various fields." William Yen Chuko, "Concepts of Regionalism in Southeast Asia," Dissertation Abstracts, 1966, p. 6828.

2. D. T. Lakdawala, "Trends in Regional Cooperation in Asia," South Asia Pacific Crisis, ed. by Margaret Grant, p. 85.


6. Ibid., p. 175.


CHAPTER III

ASEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged from the framework of the dormant Association of Southeast Asia. It was established with the signing of the Bangkok declaration on 8 August 1967 by five of the six current members: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. Brunei, the most recent member, joined ASEAN on 7 January 1984, one week after its independence had been achieved. The Bangkok declaration pledged the member states "to promote regional peace and stability through observing respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region." The emphasis on the pledge to "promote peace and stability" was designed to focus attention on the need to resolve interregional crises such as the Indonesian-Malaysian "Confrontation" and the Philippine-Malaysian claim to Sabah.

Despite the Bangkok declaration's recognition of the need for regional "peace and stability," the primary focus of ASEAN's charter was to provide "active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields." ASEAN has since made significant economic progress which could justify the argument that the member states have much worth defending.

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

In the 18 years of its existence, ASEAN's progress in the economic arena has been mixed. In one sense, the ASEAN region has been rediscovered by the free world's economic powers. This rediscovery can be attributed to the fact
that the average annual GNP growth rate for ASEAN states has been in excess of 7% since 1971. Three of the ASEAN countries, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, are in the world's top dozen net exporters of agricultural produce. A recent economic survey also listed five ASEAN countries in the world's top 20 economic performers. In extra-regional terms, ASEAN has developed strong economic links as a marketplace and source of raw materials for Japan, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States.

Internal economic cooperation within ASEAN, however, has fallen far short of its original expectations. Despite ASEAN sponsorship of industrial and trade projects, only modest success has been achieved in interregional economic cooperation. The past colonial legacy of competing economies has created a situation in which trade among the member countries still amounts to only about 15% of the region's total trade, despite ASEAN sponsorship of preferential trading arrangements. An ASEAN industrial project supported by Japan's offer to provide $1 billion in assistance remains dormant because Singapore, ASEAN's most advanced industrial partner, has elected not to participate in the project. Thus, in the economic arena, the national interests of the individual member states has impeded close cooperation, just as it did in earlier attempts to promote Southeast Asian regionalism. There still is no clear sign that the ASEAN countries will be willing to subjugate their national economic interests to a supra-national organization.

**POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION**

The one area in which ASEAN has been most successful is in the political and diplomatic arena. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been concerned with overcoming regional crises such as the "Confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia and the competing Philippine-Malaysian claims to Sabah. The
successful subjugation of those conflicts in the interests of regional political solidarity has demonstrated ASEAN's ability to achieve political accommodation to promote the common welfare of its members.

Political cohesion within ASEAN is largely a product of the legacy of communist subversion which has confronted each of the original five member states. The history of cooperation in Southeast Asia has been characterized by unity only when joint countermeasures were perceived as being necessary to meet a common threat. The withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1973 was viewed with alarm by the ASEAN states which interpreted the event as a US abandonment of the region in the face of an emerging communist victory. The focus of that fear came clearly into view with the April 1975 communist victory in Vietnam, followed in rapid succession by communist victories in Laos and Kampuchea.

In the aftermath of the communist victories in Indochina, the leaders of ASEAN governments met urgently on 23-24 February 1976 in Denpasar, Bali for ASEAN's first summit meeting. The meeting sought to address the impact of the fall of Vietnam on the noncommunist countries of ASEAN and to seek measures which would avoid the fulfillment of the domino theory.

ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY

The theme of ASEAN neutrality had surfaced periodically prior to the Bali summit meeting. As early as 1971, the five ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur had called for a neutral Southeast Asia, "free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers."9 The concept was resurrected in Bali in February 1976 with the initiative coming primarily from Malaysia. A Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed by the ASEAN heads of state which expressed hopes for the "early establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)" in Southeast Asia.10 The concord also
emphasized "the pursuit of political stability" as "an essential contribution to international peace and security" and it expressed the hope that cooperation would "eliminate threats posed by subversion."11

The peaceful nonaligned themes of the Bali summit meeting were also conveyed in the form of a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia which was adopted by the ASEAN foreign ministers. The treaty offered the olive branch to Vietnam by committing ASEAN not to threaten the "political and economic stability, sovereignty of territorial integrity of another" while leaving the treaty "open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia."12

In an effort to reassure Vietnam that ASEAN's peaceful overtures were sincere and to make it clear that ASEAN's response to Vietnam's victory was not to transform ASEAN's political consensus into a defense alliance, the ASEAN concord expressed a desire for "continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests."13 Thus, the ASEAN states explicitly denied accusations from Vietnam and the Soviet Union that ASEAN was primarily a military alliance supported by the United States. While ASEAN feared Vietnam's intentions, the door was left open for peaceful political cooperation in post war Southeast Asia.

In retrospect, a positive response by Vietnam to ASEAN's ZOPFAN proposal calling for accommodation between the capitalist and socialist systems may have contributed to a more stable Southeast Asia by curtailing the influence of outside powers. Vietnam's support of the ZOPFAN concept may also have contributed to dissension within ASEAN because not all of the ASEAN's states shared Malaysia's enthusiasm for a reapproachment with communist Vietnam. As Vietnam became more closely aligned with the Soviet Union and the socialist states denounced ASEAN for becoming a military alliance supported by the
United States, the effect was twofold: to unify ASEAN in the face on a common threat; and to incur support from China which viewed with concern the emerging partnership between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

**THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMON THREAT**

Vietnam's hostility toward ASEAN continued until June 1978 when the ASEAN foreign ministers were gathering in Thailand for their annual meeting. Vietnam suddenly adopted a conciliatory attitude toward ASEAN, thereby raising hopes for peaceful cooperation in the region. It now appears that Vietnam's peaceful overtures may have been designed to mask its real intentions or to inject an element of confusion into ASEAN's united political front.

ASEAN's worse fears were realized on 25 December 1978, when Vietnamese forces invaded Kampuchea. The installation of a Vietnam supported regime, supported by the presence of 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers confirmed to ASEAN's leaders the hostile intentions of a Soviet sponsored Vietnam. This event, more than any of the other ominous developments in Southeast Asia, galvanized ASEAN's political will to resist Soviet sponsored aggression by Vietnam.

A united ASEAN has since been the international leader in focusing world public opinion against Soviet-sponsored aggression by Vietnam. For four successive years, ASEAN sponsored motions have denied United Nation's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. The ASEAN states have also reached an accord to create and support a coalition of Cambodian resistance forces. Although ASEAN has stopped short of becoming a defense alliance, the 3 November 1978 Treaty of Peace and Cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union has been cited as a provocation which may force a reluctant ASEAN into a military pact.
THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FORCES

In the past, the ASEAN community has expressed its desire for the region to become a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Under present circumstances, that goal may be extremely difficult to fulfill. It has been demonstrated that ASEAN has been most successful in reducing internal tensions and in serving as a vehicle for political consultation; however, in the post-Vietnam era local conflict and the heightening presence of external forces have recently shifted the focus of ASEAN's interests. Thus, ASEAN's future will be shaped, in part, by its response to the challenges posed by the major external powers in the region.

The United States

In the immediate aftermath of the war in Vietnam the United States viewed Southeast Asia with a sense of frustration, bordering on irrationality. The US withdrew from the Southeast Asian mainland, determined to disassociate itself from the memories of Vietnam. Only in recent years has the US begun to acknowledge that it retains strategic, political, economic and ideological interests in both Southeast Asia as a region and in ASEAN as an institution.

The United States has reaffirmed its intention to remain a Pacific power and it recognizes that it has vital security and economic interests in the Pacific region. US security interests in Southeast Asia are reflected by the fact that two of its eight mutual security treaties link the US with Southeast Asian countries. The security of its two treaty partners, the Philippines and Thailand, are central to US defense interests in ASEAN.

The foundations of the US security relationship with the Philippines rest upon the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the Military Base Agreement of 1947. US bases in the Philippines, at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay, have
become increasingly important as the US, supported by ASEAN, seeks to counter the new challenge posed by the expansion of Soviet naval and air facilities in Vietnam. From its Philippine bases, the US maintains a continuous air and naval presence in the Pacific region capable of supporting US forces which might be projected into the region. In the words of the US Secretary of Defense: "The proximity of these facilities (Clark and Subic) to the international sealanes connecting the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia makes them vital to the security of the region."14

In return for US access to bases in the Philippines, the US has supported the Philippines' capability to combat a resurgent communist insurgency, thereby providing the unstable Marcos government the ability to buy time to put its own political and economic house in order. US security support for the Philippines is substantial, with $50 million in MAP grants and an additional $50 million in FMS credits funded for FY 1986.15 Unfortunately, while US military assistance will aid in combating the security-related aspects of the insurgency, by associating itself closely with the Marcos government, the US may become the focus of popular discontent in the post-Marcos era.

The US has provided visible support to its other treaty partner in ASEAN, Thailand, by expediting shipments of arms to strengthen its capability to defend itself against the Vietnamese threat. The US security relationship with Thailand stems from the 1954 Manila Pact and the now defunct SEATO treaty. Since Thailand has become a front line state, with its borders routinely violated by Vietnamese armed forces, US support for Thailand has increased. The most dramatic sign of US willingness to assist Thailand is represented by the US decision in March 1985 to sell Thailand 12 sophisticated F-16 fighters.16 The US has also funded $97.5 million in FMS credits and $5 million in MAP aid to Thailand for FY 1986.17 US defense interests in Thailand may also be motivated by fears that the US may lose access to its strategic bases in the
Philippines. Although it may be politically difficult for the US to return forces to mainland Southeast Asia, in the military sense, the best alternative to air and naval bases in the Philippines would be access to one or more of its five former air bases in Thailand as well as the naval facility at Sattahip.

In political and ideological terms, the United States has begun to reassert its interest in promoting and defending democratic institutions in Southeast Asia by seeking closer cooperation with ASEAN. It has become routine for the US Secretary of State to address meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers. The US apparently recognizes that ASEAN represents the best hope for democracy, in its regional forms, to survive as an alternative to the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia. The existence of communist dominated insurgencies in five of the six ASEAN countries poses a direct challenge to the continued development of democratic institutions in the region. US political interest in Southeast Asia is also becoming increasingly affected by the growing influence exercised within the US political system by Asian immigrants and international business lobbies.

Economically, ASEAN as a group has become the United States fifth largest trading partner and its economies are among the fastest growing countries in the world. For example, during the period 1965 to 1980, the average economic growth rates of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have been as high as those of the OPEC countries and higher than that of Japan. Moreover, the combined population of ASEAN countries exceed that of the United States, offering the potential for even greater economic markets.

The standard enunciation of current US policy objectives toward Southeast Asia includes: contributing to regional stability, fostering economic growth and supporting regional cooperation. If any dominant institution in Southeast Asia reflects similar objectives, ASEAN fits the description. US Secretary of
State, George Schultz recently described US interest in ASEAN as being "of the greatest importance to our overall Pacific Policy." Clearly, the US interest in supporting ASEAN is a key faction in US foreign policy in the Pacific.

The Soviet Union

Although the Soviet Union's political and economic interests in Southeast Asia have been relatively insignificant, except for a brief period of influence with Sukarno of Indonesia, Soviet interest in the region has increased in response to its deepening conflict with China and the expansion of superpower rivalry in the late 1960s. The emerging Soviet interest can be explained in terms of its global strategy directed against the United States and the People's Republic of China. First, the Soviets seek to counter the US alliance system in Asia. Second, the USSR seeks to encircle and isolate China to contain its influence. Third, the Soviets have come to rely on their southern SLOCs to support their forces in the Soviet Far East because its northern SLOCs are closed for six months of the year. Finally, the Soviets are intent upon projecting their naval and maritime power to threaten the vital sealanes and straits adjacent to the Asian landmass.

In order to accomplish its objectives, the ASEAN countries have become critically important to Soviet strategy and foreign policy. A key aspect of Soviet interest in ASEAN is derived from a combination of events which contributed to the vulnerability of Southeast Asia. Foremost among these were the Soviets perception of a US disengagement from the region, ASEAN's proclamation of a goal of eventual neutrality and a long standing Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia.

The idea of a collective Asian security system was originally surfaced by the Soviet Union in the 1930s, prior to the outbreak of World War II. It remained dormant until 1971, when Moscow recognized the opportunity to eventually fill a vacuum which might emerge in the wake of a US withdrawal from
Southeast Asia in accordance with the Guam Doctrine which advocated regional self sufficiency. Soviet Premiere Brezhnev outlined his proposal for an Asian collective security system at the Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions in 1972:

> It is becoming clear that the real road to security in Asia is not the road of military blocs... but the road of good-neighborly cooperation by all interested states. Collective security in Asia... should be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations among states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, noninterference in internal affairs, extensive development of economic cooperation and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.  \(^{22}\)

It is interesting to note that the Soviet proposal was declared almost in coincidence with the Guam declaration. The countries of Southeast Asia generally recognized that the Soviet collective security plan for Asia was a specific response to a new opportunity for super power involvement in the region. In that sense, the security proposal was directed against the influence of both the US and China. The Soviet proposal may also have contributed to ASEAN interest in ZOPFAN which was warmly welcomed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet's perception of their proposal for peace and security in Asia and its connection to the ASEAN neutralization plan was expressed in an Izvestia article in January 1985 which argued that "the submission and discussion of the neutralization proposal indicates that ASEAN countries are leading the search for ways to develop cooperation and strengthen security in the region."  \(^{23}\)

The appearance of growing Soviet influence on ASEAN vanished on 3 November 1978 when it signed a 25 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam. Article 6 of the treaty pledged both sides to come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack, thereby making the treaty a de facto security alliance.  \(^{24}\) Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it was generally believed that Vietnam's interest in the treaty was motivated by its precarious economic position. In retrospect, however, it is now clear that the Vietnamese
were eager to obtain necessary support from the Soviet Union to conduct their planned invasion of Kampuchea. Less than two months after the promulgation of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship and Cooperative Treaty, the Vietnamese launched their invasion into Kampuchea, secure in their belief that the alliance with the Soviets would offset their vulnerable northern border which was exposed to China.

In return for its support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, the Soviet Union obtained some leverage over Vietnam including access to important air and naval facilities. Furthermore, by 1978, the Soviets secured Vietnam's membership in COMECON, making it the first Asian member, excepting the Mongolian People's Republic. In effect, the Soviet Union was challenging not only the US defense network in Asia, but also the free enterprise economic systems of Southeast Asia by offering massive economic support to prospective members of COMECON.

The Soviet Union's support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the more recent Vietnamese dry season offenses into Thai territory have incurred the wrath of ASEAN. ASEAN's closer ties to the US and its Pacific partners is now seen by Moscow as an attempt to persuade ASEAN members to turn their organization into a military alliance as a successor to SEATO. Recently, Soviet writers have expressed alarm at the prospects of a de facto ASEAN military pact which they claim the US has supplied with $3 billion worth of equipment in the past six years, thereby making ASEAN "capable of maintaining an Army of 770,000 men." It therefore appears certain that the Soviet Union will continue to challenge perceived threats to its interests which will in turn generate counter policies by the US, China and ASEAN.
The People's Republic of China

Chinese policy toward the nations of Southeast Asia in general, and ASEAN in particular, has undergone considerable revision in recent years. The history of Chinese policy towards individual Southeast Asian nations has contributed to a legacy of caution and suspicion. For a generation Chinese policy in Southeast Asia has been to promote dissension in order to preserve its influence in the region. China's active support in the past for insurgency movements in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines has not been forgotten by Southeast Asia's leaders. In Indonesia, suspicions still linger that China was behind the violent, abortive coup attempt in 1965. China's credibility is further weakened by the Chinese Communist Party's continued relations with illegal communist parties in ASEAN countries, its offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea and its interest in the large and influential overseas Chinese communities in each of the ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, these problems not withstanding, in recent years, there has been a dramatic improvement in China's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors.

China's primary security interests in Southeast Asia are no longer concerned with promoting the emergence of subservient, communist dominated governments. Rather, the twin catalysts of an aggressive, hostile Vietnam and the emergence of a sizable Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia have focused Chinese concerns on preventing encirclement by the Soviet Union. In order to meet the growing Soviet challenge, China has adopted a policy of tacit alignment with the US and the ASEAN states as the only viable counterweight to the growth of the Soviet influence. Manifestations of China's change in policy include support for Cambodian resistance forces, military attacks along Vietnam's northern frontier, significant lessening of military support for insurgency movements within the ASEAN states and recognition of ASEAN as a positive emerging force in regional and international affairs.
Any significant improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union would have a profound impact on the ASEAN countries and the free world's global strategy. As recently as December 1984, there were unsettling indications that China may be adopting a softer position regarding China's stand against Soviet involvement in Vietnam and Afghanistan. In December 1984, a First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union visited China and signed technical and economic agreements. During his visit to Peking, the fifth anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan passed on 26 December without any comment from the Chinese government. At almost the same time, Vietnam began its annual dry seasons offensive in Kampuchea. Significantly, despite the most successful Vietnamese offensive ever conducted against the Cambodian insurgents, which resulted in the virtual destruction of the insurgents base areas and strong Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, China failed to take any military action against Vietnam.

A Chinese reapproachment with the Soviet Union, which would probably be motivated by a Chinese desire to obtain economic and technical aid, could shatter ASEAN's diplomatic unity. If Thailand, in particular, did not have a Chinese counterweight to Vietnam, the Thais might find it prudent to acknowledge Vietnam's control of Kampuchea and seek accommodation with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Depending on one's perspective, Vietnam has been both an aggressor and a victim in the history of Southeast Asia. Vietnam's relationship with its northern neighbor, China, has been marked by 1,000 years of Chinese occupation before it became independent in the tenth century. China's influence on Vietnam's development contributed to a cultural collision between Vietnam and the neighboring states of Kampuchea, Thailand and Laos. Since the eleventh
century, the cultures of India and China have clashed in a series of wars between kingdoms representing the Thai, Khmer and Vietnamese people. Regrettably, the animosities and suspicions linger and contribute to the instability which characterizes the modern relationship between countries in mainland Southeast Asia.

Vietnam's historical concern for potential aggression from China, Kampuchea and Thailand has been compounded by superpower rivalry and the affects of its war to achieve national unity. Vietnam's fear of aggression from China has recently opened the door to Soviet influence, thereby insuring a state of mutual hostility with China and other Southeast Asian nations which fear both Vietnamese hegemony and the expansion of Soviet power in the region. In effect, Vietnamese attitudes have contributed to a self fulfilling prophecy in its relationships with its neighbors.

While Soviet interests in obtaining leverage in Vietnam are motivated by desires to contain China's influence and counter US power in the region, Vietnam's willingness to accommodate Soviet desires are open to speculation. Clearly, Vietnam feared China's intentions, the resurgence of US influence in ASEAN and the improvement in relations between the US and China. In the absence of economic and military assistance from the United States, it is understandable that Vietnam would turn to the Soviet Union to support its war torn society and to defend itself from China. If Vietnam's leaders had turned their intentions inward, even with Soviet assistance and a limited Soviet military presence, a semblance of stability might have returned to Southeast Asia.

Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was a cataclysmic event which had far-reaching implications. One logical explanation for Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea lies in the "domestic imperative" theory. This theory
holds that Vietnam, beset by serious post-war economic and social problems, was compelled to send its large, "unemployed" army to engage a weak and unpopular foreign enemy. In so doing, Vietnam's revolutionary leaders were also able to justify the continued militarization of Vietnamese society.\(^\text{30}\)

Whatever its intentions may have been, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea elicited wide ranging consequences: it confirmed China's suspicions of Vietnam's quest for hegemony in mainland Southeast Asia and united Thailand and its ASEAN partners against Soviet supported Vietnamese aggression. Soviet influence and military support for the Vietnamese army of occupation became a long term necessity. To counter Soviet influence, a formerly discredited United States was encouraged to reassert itself in Asia and a united ASEAN rallied worldwide support against Vietnam and a puppet government in Phnom Penh.

Japan

While the world's major powers have "rediscovered" their interests in Southeast Asia, for Japan no rediscovery has been necessary. Japan has long recognized Southeast Asia's strategic location between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well its importance as a crucial region for raw materials and markets. Although Japan's political and diplomatic relations with the ASEAN states have been encumbered by memories of World War II, Japan's economic influence in the region is unsurpassed. Japan is now ASEAN's principal economic partner and her diplomatic influence is assuming even higher visibility. Concurrently, Southeast Asia is Japan's largest recipient of overseas aid.\(^\text{31}\)

Japan's security needs are closely allied to US policy in Asia. Prime Minister Nakasone has been quoted as saying that he hoped to make Japan into "a big aircraft carrier" to counter growing Soviet power in the region.\(^\text{32}\)

While Southeast Asia's leaders remain uneasy about US support for Japan's
increasing defense capabilities, Japan's dependence upon its sealane lifelines virtually necessitate a Japanese defense interest in maintaining secure SLOCs. Negotiations are now in progress for Japan to assume a greater share of the US defense burden in Asia by defending sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles from the main island of Honshu. Future Japanese defense plans will inevitably be tied to its defense relationship with the US; however, it is conceivable that with Japan's vital economic interests in Southeast Asia, a congruence of common defense concerns may eventually develop between Japan and the ASEAN states.
CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 4.

3. Ibid., p. 1.


6. Ibid., p. 86.


12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Michael Weisskopf, "US Will Sell F-16 Warplanes to Thailand," Washington Post, 13 March 1985, p. A19. The decision to sell F-16 fighters to the Thai may have far reaching ramifications because the US will find it difficult to withhold F-16 sales to other ASEAN countries which have also expressed their desire to purchase F-16s.
17. Weinberger, p. 239.
22. Ibid., p. 84.
23. Ibid.
25. Moon, p. 106.
27. Southeast Asia's overseas Chinese population was recently estimated to be approximately 18 million. R. Toba, "ASEAN Development Strategy and Japanese Cooperation," *Asia Pacific Community*, p. 81.
32. "Japan," *Asia 1984 Yearbook*, p. 188.
CHAPTER IV

SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ASEAN STATES

As early as February 1968, members of the Philippine government were suggesting that defense should be a major subject of concern at ASEAN meetings. The subject was raised at the time because of the proposed British withdrawal from Singapore.\(^1\) Thailand also harbored visions of an ASEAN security dimensions and its ex-foreign minister Thanat Khoman once suggested that ASEAN would provide the member nations "with something they want to join together to defend."\(^2\) The ASEAN charter contains an important clause which states that "the members are determined to insure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities."\(^3\)

While Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and the growth of Soviet influence in the region have been the catalysts for the formation of a united ASEAN diplomatic front, in the security area the posture may be more apparent than real. Furthermore, the development of a viable ASEAN military force may be more wishful in concept than practical in execution. ASEAN's potential to assume a security dimensions will be largely dependent on each nation's perception of its own security interests.

THAILAND

Thailand's current security interests are driven by the presence of hostile Vietnamese forces along its border with Kampuchea. The Soviet Union's support for the Vietnamese in Kampuchea and the presence of Soviet forces in
Vietnam adds a global dimension to Thailand's status as a frontline state. The ongoing conflict in Kampuchea, which shows no signs of abating, also makes Vietnam increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, thus cementing an alliance which Thailand feels incapable of containing on its own.

Thailand's eagerness to mobilize support from friendly Southeast Asian nations in order to meet a common threat is not without resent historical precedence. Since the late 1960s, Thailand has cooperated with Malaysia to combat the Chinese Terrorist Organization (CTO), the armed remnants of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Bilateral cooperation, institutionalized through a combined regional military border control committee, consists of shared intelligence information, combined training programs and combined operations directed against the CTO which has established secure bases in the mountainous Thai-Malaysian border area. In return for Thai support against Malaysian insurgents, the Malaysian government has generally refrained from overtly supporting a Thai based, Muslim separatist movement which is active in the four southernmost Thai provinces.

The level of cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia against insurgents in South Thailand has varied with the political climate. Neither party has been willing to commit sufficient resources to eliminate insurgents who directed their activities against the other's government. Thailand in particular has been more concerned with containing the insurgents from the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) who operated in other areas of the Southern Thai Penninsula. In essence, limited counterinsurgency cooperation is achieved only when such action poses a direct internal threat and satisfies the self interests of each government concerned.

Thailand's armed forces have been equipped primarily through US military assistance. Between 1950 and 1978 Thailand received approximately $1 billion in military assistance from the US. This assistance provided Thailand with an
adequate capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations; however, the 140,000 man Thai Army is generally conceded to be ill prepared to defend against a Vietnamese army of equal size poised along the Kampuchean frontier.

In response to the Vietnamese threat, Thailand has taken steps to increase the defense capabilities of its armed forces. The Thai defense budget has grown from 2.77% of Gross Domestic Product in 1975 to 4.08% in 1983. Its increasing defense expenditures, assisted in large part by US foreign military sales (FMS) credits, have been directed toward improving its armor, anti-tank and air power to meet the Vietnamese threat. Thailand has also taken steps to improve its defense self-sufficiency by operating a US funded vehicle rebuild facility, a battery plant and an ammunition facility. Despite these small scale improvements, in the absence of substantial external support, Thailand's unsophisticated logistics system would not be adequate to support extended conventional operations against Vietnamese armed forces.

The United States and China remain central to Thailand's security interests. Thai leaders attach great importance to the US security commitment, reemphasizing the importance of the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat security agreement, the need for increasingly sophisticated foreign military sales purchases, the continuation of annual combined Thai-US exercises and visits by ships from the US Seventh Fleet. China's willingness to punish Vietnam for its incursions into Thailand and its continued support for Cambodian insurgents are essential to offset Vietnam's potential for aggression in Thailand. Perhaps China's greatest contribution to Thailand's security has been its withholding of support to the CPT, thereby allowing Thai defense efforts to be directed against the Vietnamese threat.

While Thailand continues to successfully maintain internal security and deter Vietnam by its association with both China and the US, the long term
prognosis for the success of its current policy is uncertain. Thai leaders are understandably most interested in soliciting additional security commitments from other ASEAN states. Heretofore, Thailand has succeeded in using the ASEAN connection to focus condemnation on Vietnam and to impose its own immediate security priorities on its ASEAN partners. It has also succeeded in fostering the seeds of ASEAN defense cooperation, as evidenced by its agreement with Singapore to produce seven types of arms and ammunition common to both nations.\(^5\)

Whether or not Thailand will be able to continue to defend itself against a threatening Vietnam in the short term or Sino-Soviet ambitions in the future remains to be seen. For the time being, Thailand, with the moral support of its ASEAN partners, is engaged in a delicate balancing act between the powers in the region. Historically, the Thais have been unusually successful in accommodating their interest to the realities of the times. In the future, Thailand's security may be dependent upon events over which it exercises little control.

**SINGAPORE**

Singapore, a small city state composed overwhelmingly of overseas Chinese immigrants, has traditionally been one of the most anti-communist nations in Southeast Asia. Until recently, Singapore's security interests were concerned with the potential vulnerability of its Chinese population to long term subversion by China. In recent years, however, Singapore has rationally distinguished the difference between the long term potential threat from China and the clear and present danger posed by the Soviet Union. Singapore was a strong supporter of US efforts in Vietnam and it viewed with alarm the post-Vietnam US disengagement from mainland Southeast Asia. As a signator of the
Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), Singapore is largely dependent on Britain, Australia and New Zealand for its external defense needs.

Within ASEAN, and in a variety of international forums, Singapore has been a strong supporter of Thailand's firm stand against the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Singapore's support for the resistance coalition of Cambodian insurgents has been unswerving, despite the opposition of Australia and New Zealand to the major role played by the Pol Pot, Khmer Rouge faction. In addition to its diplomatic support for the Cambodian insurgents, Singapore has provided them with weapons and other military equipment. Singapore can be expected to continue to exert its influence within ASEAN to ensure that political solidarity against Vietnam continues.

In order to support its perceived security needs, Singapore has developed small, but highly professional armed forces. Consisting of approximately 55,000 personnel, Singapore's armed forces represent the largest per capita investment in personnel of any ASEAN country and its per capita defense expenditures are the highest in Southeast Asia. This relatively high investment in defense may increase in view of cracks which are beginning to surface within the FPDA.

Australia's commitment to Singapore's defense is being questioned in the light of its plans to remove a Mirage squadron from Butterworth, Malaysia. New Zealand's reliability as a partner within the FPDA is also suspect in view of the ruling Labor Party's call for the withdrawal of an infantry battalion stationed in Singapore and the proposed closing of its defense attache offices in ASEAN capitals. The current New Zealand government's policy of barring naval ships which are either nuclear powered or carrying nuclear weapons further discredits its reliability as an ally.

Perhaps in anticipation of developments which would require greater self sufficiency in defense matters, Singapore has developed a relatively large
defense industry: Singapore is one of ten governments licensed by the US government to co-produce M-16 rifles. Its capability to manufacture high technology items allows Singapore to produce sophisticated communication-electronics equipment and her capability to produce and maintain small surface ships has allowed Singapore to export small attack vessels. Singapore is also coproducing small arms with at least one member of ASEAN (Thailand).

In the future, dependent on the evolution of the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership, Singapore may quietly attempt to persuade its ASEAN partners to reexamine the region's defense requirements. In the meantime, Singapore will continue to urge the United States to play a more prominent role in the defense of the island nation. Should the US eventually lose access to its base facilities in the Philippines, Singapore might be willing to permit the US Navy and Air Force to expand its access to Singapore's naval and air facilities.

**THE PHILIPPINES**

The external interests of the Philippines are closely tied to its historic relationship with the United States. The United States is committed to the defense of the Philippines through both a bilateral defense treaty dating from 1951 and the 1954 Manile Pact. In view of the importance the United States attaches to the naval facilities at Subic Bay and the airbase at Clark, the Philippine government believes that the United States would honor its security commitments if the country was threatened by external aggression. On the other hand, the United States should feel far less secure in its long term ability to retain access to these strategically important facilities. Loss of access to US facilities in the Philippines would seriously degrade the US forward defense posture in the Pacific and in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union, would threaten free world access to the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
Political instability in the Philippines is a legitimate source of concern to the US and ASEAN. Since the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983, popular dissatisfaction with the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos has risen rapidly to the surface. As a result, domestic political and economic issues have been of overwhelming immediate concern to the Philippine government.

Secure in the belief that the United States has much to defend in the Philippines, the Philippine government has concentrated its defense efforts on countering the internal threat. Currently, the armed threat is posed by two independent groups: the Maoist New People's Army, concentrated primarily in the north, and an externally supported Muslim separatist movement in the south. While the latter threat has been the target of most counterinsurgency operations, resulting in excess of 60,000 casualties in the past decade, the communist insurgency is widely believed to represent the greater political threat in the long term. With no viable democratic alternative, many dissatisfied Filipinos are beginning to view the Maoists as the only power group which can effectively challenge the Marcos regime.

Until recently, the Philippine military establishment had been closely identified with the human rights abuses associated with the Marcos government. During the period of martial law (1972-1981), a system of personal alliances and internal corruption afflicted the military and police forces. The temporary removal of Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Fabian Ver provides the opportunity for a reform movement within the armed forces. The internal security situation in the Philippines and the survival of its remaining democratic institutions may be dependent upon the success of much needed reforms within the military and constabulary police forces.
The United States has been the principle arms supplier to the Philippines ever since the establishment of the Republic in 1946. During the period 1946-1974, the US provided the Philippines with over $1,416 million in military assistance. In recent years, major purchases of counterinsurgency equipment from the United States have included helicopters, armored personnel carriers, patrol boats and small arms. Of greater potential interest to the Philippines' ASEAN partners has been the procurement of US fighter and transport aircraft, minesweepers, frigates and air-to-air-missiles.

While the Philippines has been a faithful supporter of ASEAN's condemnation of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, its domestic problems have regulated its regional role to secondary interests. Southeast Asia's leaders, aware of the delicate position of the Marcos government, recognize that the Philippines' contributions to ASEAN will remain limited unless a post-Marcos government succeeds in restoring domestic political and economic stability to the country. The future of the US military bases in the Philippines and the stability of the ASEAN region itself may well depend on the type of government which succeeds Marcos.

MALAYSIA

The Federation of Malaysia achieved its independence from Britain in September 1963 following a long counterinsurgency effort against the insurgent forces of the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM). The Malayan Emergency, as it is commonly called, was waged by British led forces from 1948 to 1960. The CPM, a Maoist movement composed almost exclusively of ethnic overseas Chinese, still retains elements of its forces in enclaves along the Thai-Malaysian border. Although the CPM no longer poses a serious challenge to the Malaysian government, its potential appeal to the ethnic Chinese, who comprise approximately 50% of Malaysia's population, underscores the long standing fears.
Malaysians have held for the possibility of racial discord within their society. Periodically, these tensions have risen to the surface in the form of violent and destabilizing racial riots between Malay and Chinese citizens.

To this day, Malaysian's security interest are primarily internal in nature. Operations by government security forces against the remnants of the CPM, with limited cooperation from Thailand, continue alone the Thai-Malaysian border; however, Thai concerns about Malaysia's sympathy for the Muslim separatist movement in Southern Thailand remains a potential source of friction between the two countries. China's support for the CPM has waned in recent years, motivated by China's overriding concern for the intrusion of Soviet influence in Indochina; nevertheless, Malaysia views China as posing the most serious long term threat to its security interests. There are no "overseas Soviets" in Malaysia to render party-to-party support for a dormant, Maoist communist party.

Malaysia has been the sponsor and strongest advocate for regional neutrality within ASEAN. Although Malaysia recognizes that the prospects for securing Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality are remote as long as warfare continues in Kampuchea, the ZOPFAN concept remains the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy. In deference to Thailand's vulnerable position as a front line state against Vietnam, Malaysia has supported ASEAN's strong position against Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Unlike Thailand and Singapore, however, there is no evidence that Malaysia has been providing material support to the Cambodian insurgents despite unconfirmed reports that Malaysia is secretly training Cambodian insurgents in Malaysian military camps.8

In accordance with its neutral leanings and fear of long term Chinese intentions, Malaysia is concerned with the evolution of an anti-Soviet consensus between China, the US and some of its ASEAN partners. Its fear of
US, Soviet and Chinese rivalry and involvement in Southeast Asian affairs has also contributed to Malaysia's "Look East Policy" which advocated emulating Japan and the Republic of Korea as examples for Malaysia's economic development. In many respects, Malaysia's view of developments in the ASEAN region are different from those of Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.

In the security arena, there is evidence which appears to support the view that Malaysia will resist alignment with free world interests in the region while other developments point to a recognition of an emerging external threat. Malaysia, which is a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement, has recently broken its traditional policy of relying solely on the US and other Western nations for military equipment by expressing an interest in purchasing new helicopters from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Malaysia has announced that it intends to build a new $645 million Air Force base on the east coast of the peninsula and to purchase 80 US A4 Skyhawk aircraft. Significantly, perhaps, Malaysia has found it necessary to deny Soviet allegations that the proposed 3,000 acre air force base is designed to support US contingency plans in the region. It is more likely that plans to develop the capability of the Royal Malaysian Air Force are motivated in part by prospects that Australia will soon withdrew its squadron of Mirage aircraft from the base at Butterworth.

There are other apparent contradictions in Malaysia's espoused public positions on foreign policy objectives and actual developments in its security posture. While Malaysia's current inventory of armaments are primarily designed to maintain internal security, there are indications that Malaysia is increasing its external defense capability. Recent Malaysian defense investments do not appear to support its stated "neutralist" objectives. On the contrary, Malaysia's recent defense initiatives may reflect a new realization that the prospects for securing ZOPFAN may not be possible in the foreseeable future.
Indonesia's strategic importance and its potential to become a regional power cannot be overemphasized. With a population in excess of 158 million, Indonesia ranks as one of the most highly populated nations on earth. Comprised of 13,000 islands, Indonesia sits astride the major sealanes linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as the trade routes from Australia to the nations of the Pacific rim. Its oil reserves would be vital to the economies of East Asia should there be an interruption of the oil flow from the Persian Gulf.

Since Indonesia obtained its independence from the Dutch in 1950, Indonesia's foreign and defense policies have frequently centered on territorial disputes with its neighbors. President Sukarno's "confrontation" policy with Malaysia in the early 1960s, Indonesia's recent strain with Australia concerning self-determination for the island of East Timor and tension along Indonesia's borders with Papua New Guinea are examples of the instability associated with Indonesia's relations with its neighbors. Indonesia's role in the development of Southeast Asian regionalism has frequently been disruptive and, to the dismay of its ASEAN partners, the trend has continued.

It has been demonstrated that ASEAN's greatest success to date has been in the evolution of a regional political consensus, especially in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. That perception was shattered in February 1984 when the Commander of Indonesia's armed forces, General L. B. Murdani, visited Vietnam where he was quoted as saying that Indonesia did not consider Vietnam to be a threat to Southeast Asia. He further stated his belief that Vietnam and Indonesia would never go to war with each other. Despite efforts to ameliorate the damage to ASEAN solidarity caused by General Murdani's remarks, the public display of unity for the ASEAN positions on
Kampuchea in particular, and the Soviet-Vietnamese threat to regional security in general, has been severely compromised.

Indonesia, like Malaysia, does not share the perception held by other ASEAN states that Vietnam and the Soviet Union represent the greatest threats to regional security. The strongly anti-Communist views held by Indonesia's leaders stem from the abortive communist coup in 1965 against the government of President Sukarno. Evidence implicating China's involvement with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) led to the purging of the armed forces and the slaughter of an estimated 100,000 PKI members and sympathizers. The reaction against the PKI became an anti-communist crusade which also ended the Soviet Union's role as the chief supplier to Indonesia's armed forces. Of necessity, in the aftermath of the abortive coup attempt, Indonesia turned to the United States for military support to rebuild a defense establishment designed to maintain internal security.

From 1965 to 1977, the US provided $141.4 million to Indonesia through the military assistance program. Since that time, the US has continued to support Indonesia defense needs through foreign military sales credits, with $34.7 million allocated for FY1986. In terms of defense related industrial self-sufficiency, Indonesia is the only ASEAN nation which has a basic aircraft industry. Its air force includes 15 US F-5 aircraft which have been modified to increase their range and capabilities. Modernization of the army and navy will provide Indonesia with a military capability beyond that required for internal defense.

Indonesia's future role within ASEAN remains uncertain. Its security perspectives as an island nation differ markedly from those of the mainland Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia's deep suspicions of China's long term intentions will probably inhibit close cooperation with China to offset the growth of Soviet influence in the region. In effect, ASEAN political solidarity
is threatened by Indonesia's fear of China's growing influence which could force Vietnam to rely ever increasingly on Soviet support. Conversely, if Indonesia senses the emergence of a strong partnership between Thailand and China, it could reconsider its willingness to support closer regional defense ties.

BRUNEI

Within a week after achieving independence from Britain on 1 January 1984, Brunei became a member of ASEAN. Why a small, former British protectorate, composed of 200,000 people, with a prosperous oil based economy would choose to join ASEAN is open to question. The primary answers given include the quest for security and the desire to enhance its ability to achieve foreign policy objectives. The latter answer is understandable since, with ASEAN support, Brunei has improved its access to international forums frequented by ASEAN members.

Brunei's concern for security, like Malaysia's, stems in part from an indigenous Malay society cohabitating with an ethnic Chinese minority which compromises 25% of the population and dominates the private sector of the economy. While the potential for internal racial discord is present, Brunei's oil revenues provide the general populace with a relatively high standard of living. Internal security concerns also stem from an abortive coup in 1962 which was led by the Brunei People's Party and required suppression by British Army Gurkhas.

There is also an external factor to Brunei's security interests which has the potential to become a divisive element within ASEAN. Originally, the British envisioned a democratic Brunei which would join the new nation of Malaysia in 1963; however, in 1962 voters rejected the concept fearing that
the Malaysian federal government would have taken most of Brunei's oil revenues for the national treasury. Given its vulnerability, Brunei's leaders feared that Malaysia or Indonesia might one day attempt to assimilate Brunei and its oil resources. By joining ASEAN, Brunei has assumed potential protectors from the other ASEAN states and improved its prospects for survival, as long as the ASEAN members abide by the principles of the ASEAN charter.

Brunei currently spends an inordinate percentage of its budget on defense. In 1983 Brunei allocated $162.8 million for defense spending. Its armed forces, consisting of 3,200 men, trained and commanded by British officers, is well equipped with small quantities of modern tanks, artillery, helicopters, aircraft and patrol boats. In return for British access to a jungle training facility, Brunei has retained the presence of a 900 man Gurkha Reserve Unit which is financed by Brunei's defense funds. In order to further increase its security, in the absence of formal security ties to an outside power, there is speculation that Brunei may seek to eventually join the Five Power Defense Arrangement.
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Armed Forces (thousands)</th>
<th>Paramilitary Forces (in thousands)</th>
<th>Estimated GDP (Billions)</th>
<th>Estimated Defense Expenditures (Billions)</th>
<th>Reserves (thousands)</th>
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<td>58.8</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>3,060</td>
<td>6 to 16 est.</td>
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<td>.4</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>unk</td>
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<td>3,060</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>40.37</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>366.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
<td>15.13</td>
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<td>196.1</td>
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**SOURCE:** The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984-1985* (London 1984) and the *Asia 1985 Yearbook* (Hong Kong 1985)

**NOTE:** All monetary values are given in US $ equivalents.

* Excludes internal security
** Includes internal security
TABLE 2

ASEAN AND INDOCHINA: KEY ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TANKS</th>
<th>ARMORED VEHICLES</th>
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<th>HELICOPTERS</th>
<th>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NAVAL PATROL CRAFT</th>
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<td>200+</td>
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<td>LAOS</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>unk</td>
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<td>2,748</td>
<td>870+</td>
<td>212+</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>480</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
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<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>SINGAPORE</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>82</td>
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<td>BRUNEI</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,684</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>153</td>
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CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES


10. Stubblefield, p. 33.


14. Weinberger, p. 239.


CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

ASEAN is a partnership conceived from the experience gained by Southeast Asian countries from participation in earlier regional organizations. The organization embodies the traits of diversity which characterize the cultures and social systems of its members. The concept of Southeast Asian regionalism, culminating with the formation of ASEAN, has emerged from a series of unsuccessful and frequently ill-conceived organizations which have not passed the test of time. Cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia has been fragile, even in modern times, and continues to be subject to the interests of individual states which comprise the ASEAN partnership.

The ASEAN states have collectively defined their vision of Southeast Asia's future in hopeful, if not utopian terms. The organization's cooperative economic achievements have been modest, while overall economic progress in the region has been substantial. The vision of a region of peace and neutrality remains unfulfilled. On the contrary, confrontation, fear and conflict have reemerged within the Southeast Asian region. While ASEAN has always espoused the need for a peaceful and cooperative regional environment, that goal remains unfulfilled.

PROSPECTS FOR AN ASEAN SECURITY DIMENSION

An analysis of the evidence recorded in this study does not support the idea that ASEAN will become a formal security alliance in the near future. The factors which support this conclusion are many:
First, the history of Southeast Asian regionalism is replete with examples which underscore the internal diversity and dissension which have characterized earlier Southeast Asian regional organizations. Unresolved sources of potential conflict among ASEAN states in the form of historical suspicions, border conflicts, competing economies and racial tensions retain their potential for regional disharmony. For the time being, more immediate problems have restrained these potential sources of tensions in favor of a veneer of exterior unity; however, regional incidents, economic crises or changes in governments could easily reopen old wounds and shatter what may, in the long term, prove to be the illusion of ASEAN unity.

Second, very real differences exist among the ASEAN states in their perception of the long term threat to each nation's security. Thailand, as a front line state, supported politically by Singapore and an unpopular government in the Philippines, views Vietnam and the Soviet Union as posing the most immediate threats to its security. On the other hand, Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Brunei, fear the growing influence of China in the region. In varying degrees, neutralist, non-aligned sentiments, fueled primarily by Malaysia, remain below the political surface of those ASEAN states not immediately threatened by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. While the Vietnamese-Soviet threat is sufficient to promote diplomatic condemnation, it is insufficient to support an alliance which would promote Chinese foreign policy objectives.

Third, the situation in Indochina requires a political solution palatable to both Thailand and Vietnam. Thailand with support from China, can be expected to remain intractable on the issue of Vietnamese hegemony in Kampuchea. It is inconceivable that Thailand will ever accept Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, its traditional buffer state against Vietnam, or for that matter, a Kampuchean government which is dominated by Vietnamese influence. The Kampuchean problem
is further complicated by Vietnam's dependence on continuing Soviet military support, thereby ensuring China's continuing support for Thailand. Eventually, China's involvement in the regional power struggle may increase dissen-
sion within ASEAN which fears China's influence on illegal communist parties and overseas Chinese immigrants.

Fourth, the competition between the United States, China and the Soviet Union will contribute to discord within ASEAN. These is a familiar Southeast Asian saying which notes that "when the elephants fight, the grass is trampled." Big power rivalry is inevitably accompanied by destabilizing actions which transpire in the course of events, as each power seeks to achieve leverage and influence over the other. Thailand in particular has become a focal point for rivalry among the major regional powers. The Philippines, with its important US bases, is also ripe for manipulation by the major powers, especially during the period of instability which will inevitably accompany the passage of the Marcos government. And while China remains preoccupied with Vietnam and the Soviet Union, it retains close party ties with illegal communist parties in five of the ASEAN countries, thereby retaining leverage which can be exercised at will.

Fifth, the military forces of the ASEAN states are ill equipped and unprepared to serve as a viable deterrent to external aggression. Their combined military strength is inferior to that of Vietnam, not to mention China or the Soviet Union. Even under the best of circumstances and the strongest unity of will, ASEAN countries lack the lift capacity to rapidly mobilize and move combined armies to meet an external attack against an ASEAN country. Without exception, the armed forces of the ASEAN countries are equipped and trained to deal with internal security problems and not with conventional aggression. Combined training of ASEAN-wide forces is nonexistent
and bilateral cooperation is minimal. Sustainability against any conceivable external threat is also beyond their combined capabilities. Even with a concerted regional effort, the ASEAN economies could not support defense expenditures of the magnitude required without seriously disrupting their societies and inviting the internal discord which would inevitably follow.

Despite the pessimistic appraisal provided here for the short term future of an ASEAN military alliance, it should not be concluded that ASEAN should ignore security considerations. On the contrary, defense cooperation continues to be discussed within the ASEAN framework and bilateral defense cooperation is a reality among some ASEAN states. ASEAN cannot ignore the Soviet supported invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam. To do so would disrupt even the illusion of ASEAN unity and could force Thailand to reevaluate the importance of its membership in ASEAN.

Solidarity remains essential to a viable ASEAN partnership. While an ASEAN alliance may be unachievable at this time, concerted efforts should continue to be made within ASEAN to minimize the forces which divide the organization. The problems associated with historical suspicions are being addressed through existing cultural and social interchange programs, however, progress will inevitably be slow in this area. The China problem can only be addressed through improved communications and understanding with China through ASEAN sponsored forums. Long term improvements in ASEAN's relationship with China will depend on China's position regarding its relationship with the Soviet Union and its support for Chinese dominated communist parties in the ASEAN countries. Finally, ASEAN should coordinate closely in developing security forces which promote interoperability and concern for external defense needs. Closer cooperation in all aspects of defense, including the expansion of combined training exercise, will improve the deterrence capabilities of ASEAN even outside the framework of a formal alliance structure.
For the time being, ASEAN's vision of a "Zone of Peace and Neutrality" appears to be an unrealistic expression of wishful thinking. The ASEAN states remain vulnerable to external threats and international events which are beyond their ability to control, although in solidarity, the ASEAN states can exercise limited influence on worldwide public opinion. ASEAN will remain vulnerable to a number of international developments and possibilities:

First, continued Sino-Soviet rivalry will influence future security events throughout ASEAN. As long as China and the Soviet Union remain at odds on fundamental vital issues which divide the two Communist powers, destabilizing competition between the two countries will continue. Under existing circumstances, the Soviet Union can be expected to continue its support for Vietnam, in return for access to strategic bases, while it also strives to sow dissension within ASEAN. China, in turn, will counter Vietnamese-Soviet efforts at every opportunity, seeking closer ties with ASEAN countries by withholding all out support for communist insurgent organizations in the region. ASEAN, caught between the communist antagonists, must rely on the United States for diplomatic and security support, although the confidence level of US intervention in the event of a crisis remains low.

Second, a reapproachment between the Soviet Union and China would have profound repercussions throughout ASEAN. In the absence of a firm US response, in the form of security guarantees reinforced by a visible and credible presence, many Southeast Asian nations would find it difficult to retain close ties with the United States. Support for indigenous communist insurgencies, or even outright surrogate aggression, would threaten the very existence of free enterprise systems and democratic institutions in Southeast Asia. Thailand, in particular, which has historically accommodated itself to the realities of regional power politics, would find it extremely difficult to resist...
Sino-Soviet power in the region. ASEAN, lacking a credible defense, would be unable to defend itself. At best, non-aligned, neutralism would be the only alternative for the mainland Southeast Asian nations. Conceivably, a close relationship could develop between the communist powers and several of the ASEAN countries.

Third, the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines, or a conscious US decision to abandon its interests in Southeast Asia, would radically change the balance of power in the region. No other free world nation is capable of providing security assistance or guarantees to the countries comprising ASEAN. Although Japan considers ASEAN to be vital to its interests, it remains dependent on the US for its own security. Similarly, the FPDA is incapable of replacing US power in the region. China and the Soviet Union, either in concert or in competition, might find a defenseless and vulnerable Southeast Asia too valuable a potential prize to ignore.

**PROPOSAL FOR CLOSER ASEAN—US DEFENSE COOPERATION**

ASEAN's future is best served by continuing to ally its economic interests with the free world and its external security interests with the United States. The United States is the only nation capable of providing an effective deterrence against outside aggression directed toward the ASEAN countries. Although the United States has visibly renewed its commitment to remain a Pacific power, the ASEAN countries must recognize that the US will remain reluctant to become involved in another conflict on the Southeast Asian mainland. Direct US involvement in counterinsurgency operations within ASEAN is clearly out of the picture; therefore, it is imperative that the individual ASEAN nations put their own houses in order if they expect the US to provide high levels of security assistance in the future.
Although ASEAN lacks the potential to become a viable alliance against external aggression, it does possess significant internal defense forces. The US should encourage and assist ASEAN in standardizing its military equipment and increasing multi-lateral training among its armed forces. In the event of internal emergencies sponsored by external powers, the ASEAN states, supported by US transport and air power, are capable of providing each other with a credible level of mutual assistance. Even though the unified ASEAN political position may always be difficult to achieve in defense matters, even bilateral support for an ASEAN country under conditions of internal siege could mean the difference between success or failure. Closer defense cooperation among the ASEAN countries, supported by US military assistance, offers the best prospects for the internal security of ASEAN.

In the long term, the illusion of ASEAN solidarity and strength may become a reality. In order to achieve that reality, time is needed for the ASEAN states to bury their many differences, strengthen their relatively new democratic institutions, achieve economic prosperity and satisfy the aspirations of their people. Only the United States and Japan, as the free worlds preeminent military and economic powers in the Pacific, can provide the support necessary for ASEAN to achieve a secure and prosperous future.

The United States must recognize its interests in Southeast Asia and continue to support its alliance partners in the region. US security assistance to ASEAN countries must continue in direct relationship to US interests and in response to the nature of the threat. The US, in concert with Japan and the FPDA countries, should provide ASEAN countries with security assistance levels which will allow them to assume greater responsibility for protecting regional sealanes of communication and improve early warning detection systems. Interoperability and closer coordination of defense systems...
within ASEAN, linked with US defense systems in the Pacific, is a goal which should be vigorously pursued.

In return for substantial US security assistance to individual ASEAN countries, the ASEAN states should support the US policy of maintaining forward deployed forces in the Pacific. In concert, the ASEAN governments are capable of bringing substantial pressure to bear on any future government in the Philippines to support defense forces which are stationed there to deter or defeat overt aggression in the region. If nationalist sentiments in the Philippines become directed against the US presence in that country, such opposition might be deflected by the "internationalization" of US bases by stationing limited ASEAN forces on such facilities. In the event that a continued US military presence in the Philippines becomes impossible, one or more ASEAN countries should provide suitable facilities in return for continuing US protection.

The evidence presented here favors a continuing close relationship between ASEAN and the United States. ASEAN's ability to ensure its security from external aggression, combat internal insurgencies and continue balanced economic development in the face of growing Soviet power in the region are dependent upon continued US military support and higher levels of Japanese economic assistance. It is unrealistic to suppose that comparable outside assistance could be obtained from other sources. In lieu of continued US military support, ASEAN would be forced to seek comparable assistance from another world power. The PRC not only lacks the economic ability and defense capabilities to replace the US, but it also remains the source of deep suspicion among most ASEAN countries. The Soviet Union is the only other power that is both capable and willing to provide comparable assistance to ASEAN. ASEAN, for a variety of reasons, is undoubtedly reluctant to undertake a foreign policy shift of this magnitude since ASEAN would be turning to a
nation for which it holds no ideological affinity, while incurring the hostility of the PRC.

Since ASEAN is unable to defend itself from external aggression and because the ASEAN states share an overlapping of security interests with the US, a closer partnership between ASEAN and the US serves the best interests of both parties. The US should convincingly reaffirm its existing treaty commitments to its ASEAN allies while urging the ASEAN countries to seek more stable relations with the PRC. In the future, many ASEAN countries may bury their suspicions of China, thereby offsetting the potential for Soviet sponsored aggression in the region. Eventually, if ASEAN's economic growth continues at current levels and its members succeed in burying the mutual suspicions of the past, ASEAN may one day develop the capability to defend its own collective security interests.
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