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THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM--IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGN

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD D. TERRELL, AR

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013
**THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM -- IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGN**

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**ABSTRACT**

The basic question is whether or not the implications of design of the Army War College curriculum are fully contained to afford the educational vehicle to produce fully-developed professionals for the US Army. Data were gathered using literature research techniques from source documents found in both the Army War College Library and the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Included in the documents are: chronicles of the AWC, curricula outlines, historical writings of both English and American writers, and staff...
after-action reports of both instructors and students. Visits to the Civil War battlefields of Gettysburg, Antietam and the Wilderness were also conducted.

A statistical section is provided, drawing a comparison between two periods (inception to 1940 and 1950 to present).

After thorough research it is concluded that one outstanding and significant item missing from the Army War College curriculum since 1950 is in the United States, Korea or Europe, would provide unlimited potential for enhancing the military knowledge of the American soldier and would further contribute to the national security of this nation.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM — IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGN

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The basic question is whether or not the implications of design of the Army War College curriculum are fully contained to afford the educational vehicle to produce fully-developed professionals for the US Army. Data were gathered using literature research techniques from source documents found in both the Army War College library and the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Included in the documents are: chronicles of the AWC, curricula outlines, historical writings of both English and American writers, and staff after-action reports of both instructors and students. Visits to the Civil War battlefields of Gettysburg, Antietam and the Wilderness were also conducted.

A statistical section is provided, drawing a comparison between two periods (inception to 1940 and 1950 to present).

After thorough research it is concluded that one outstanding and significant item missing from the Army War College curriculum since 1950 is the historical/staff ride. These rides to old battlefields, whether conducted in the United States, Korea or Europe, would provide unlimited potential for enhancing the military knowledge of the American soldier and would further contribute to the national security of this nation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details of Offensive Operations Must Be Practiced</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swift's Applicatory System of Instruction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Staff/Historical Rides</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRST PERIOD 1901-1916</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early History as General Staff Adjunct</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC Early Mission</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECOND PERIOD WW I-1928</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Education System Established</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Structure</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gettysburg Battlefield</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIRD PERIOD 1928-1940</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Updated</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives and Format of Rides Conducted</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing Experiences Related by Other Officers</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOURTH PERIOD 1950-PRESENT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-Trained Soldier and Theoretical Instruction</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions Updated</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can We Get There From Here?</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATISTICS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Graduate Statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1940</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 to Present</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons of the Battlefield</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson's Essential Elements for War Preparation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of Conclusions</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"Study attentively," said Napoleon, "the campaigns of the great masters."

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM — IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

The United States Army War College curricula before 1940 were oriented toward producing fully-trained, professional leaders for the US Army. World War II saw these leaders rise to successful commands of divisions, corps and armies without having had battalion or brigade commands. Technology and inventions have come a long way since the days of the great generals of WW II and Korea — men like Marshall, Eisenhower, Nimitz, Bradley, Patton, Eichelberger, Ridgeway, and Wheeler. And today, while it is recognized that there must be continued emphasis on pushing technological frontiers, one must remember that technological superiority alone has very rarely been decisive. The knowledge and application of the science of war applied to blending combat-effective forces and superiority in the practice of the art of war is really what has most often been decisive. Thus, commanders must be men of great determination and likewise be highly trained in the art and science of war.

The science of war consists of theories and their relationships, including their development, examination and dissemination of methods and
capabilities (method and means) assisting in the successful conduct of war. The commander's tactical, operational and strategic skills are a matter of judgment and the application of the science of war requires this judgment be used in weighing the intangibles to the conditions at hand.

There appear to be three separate levels of instruction in the art of war. The basic level includes the principles of strategy, tactics, and administration which can be learned from books or can be taught. The second level requires that the principles learned from the basic level be applied to identified situations, on a map for strategy, on the ground for tactics, and by solving problems in administration. More belief is placed in the teacher who has had actual combat experience since, with the appropriate opportunity and terrain, he may deal with problems more objectively. The third instructional level is a natural occurrence of the second whereby one must believe in the truth of what he has been taught. Wars throughout the ages have taught that, though officers can learn the principles of war from books, they are not always able to apply these principles when they face the enemy. The teaching of books is often overlooked, and the officer or soldier usually remembers only what he has learned and constantly practiced on the ground during training and field maneuvers. (In most cases, the real key to survival.)

War requires not only education, but also great determination of character. In small wars no great education is required to enable officers to do their duty, but in larger campaigns education is almost as necessary as determination of character. However, it should also be remembered that the
experience of one individual, even in war, is very limited and if one hopes to
master his profession and become an able commander of a large unit, he must
have recourse to books. Believing in the truth and efficacy of what is
learned from books is essential. To gain this belief the lessons must be
practiced in peace time so the soldier can find out for himself that what is
taught will be really useful in war. And of course the way to do this is by
applying the lessons to definite situations in peace exercises on the
ground.[1]

To form the "military eye", to develop a proper habit of thoughts and
actions and to render decisions quickly and accurately, one must rely on
practice and intelligence before the highest result will be reached. Most men
have a certain amount of tactical or even strategical instinct, but this
instinct needs to be developed to the utmost, and that can only be done with
constant practice. In the heat of combat a commander’s own decisions, orders
from his superiors, the ground and the condition of his troops are crowded
upon him at once with what seem to be a hundred variations. Every situation
which will arise in war cannot be practiced beforehand because potential
situations are so numerous and change so rapidly. Those which most commonly
arise can be practiced, however, and the soldier generally comes to realize
that situations do not vary as much as the ground.[2]

DISCUSSION

In war soldiers must learn to attack across open fields, move through
thick woods or country enclosed with fences, cross difficult obstacles such as swampy streams or rivers, or take hills. Many other conditions of the terrain present themselves, and each must be treated differently; i.e., batteries, companies, squadrons, battalions and brigades have to move and fight in different ways in order to gain the highest advantage from each type of terrain. Therefore, the officers commanding these units must study and analyze the terrain before moving the men. In peace exercises a definite situation can be assumed and the terrain studied for a particular objective, perhaps in isolation but still leading to a culminating point and the ultimate reward of surviving in combat.

The details of offensive operations (destroying enemy forces, securing key terrain, depriving the enemy of resources, demoralizing him and destroying his will to continue the battle, deceiving and diverting the enemy and developing intelligence); of defensive operations (causing an enemy attack to fail, preserving forces, facilities, installations, and activities, retaining tactical, strategic or political objectives, gaining time, concentrating forces elsewhere, wearing down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations, controlling essential terrain, and forcing the enemy to mass so that he is more vulnerable to our firepower); and of retrograde operations (trading space for time -- DELAY, maintaining contact with the enemy to avoid being outmaneuvered and to preserve the force -- WITHDRAWAL, moving away from an area with or without enemy pressure -- RETIREMENT, a rearward movement by a force not in contact with the enemy).[3] Learning how all these operations can be carried out under varying conditions of terrain cannot be obtained from books; one must go to the field to practice.
One of the key influences before 1950 rested in Major Eben Swift (later MG Swift) who, as an instructor at both Leavenworth and the AWC, put forth his "applicatory system of instruction" which assumes that principles are best learned by their application rather than by the abstract study of the principles themselves. Full success is dependent upon the number of examples considered and the variety and manner in which the principles are applied. This of course requires more time, but results are more lasting.[4]

A staff ride may be described as a method of allowing staff officers to work together in carrying out the various duties they would be required to perform during a campaign (employment of tactics, strategy and logistics). It differs from a war game (KRIEGSPIEL) in that it is carried out on actual ground instead of on a map; it differs from maneuvers in that no troops are employed; and it differs from a historical ride in that this form of exercise is linked with a historical incident, battle or campaign and is studied on the ground on which the battle or campaign took place. It is, therefore, more practical than a war game and, being less expensive, can be conducted more frequently than maneuvers.[5] The ground selected for staff rides (unlike the historical rides which must be conducted on historical ground) should possess key terrain, routes affording cover and concealment, observation advantages and avenues of approach to the objective. Features of tactical importance should include woods, hills, streams, etc. During the ride the troops are imaginary and the officers work out their problems in the open.

The most important aspect of a ride is that it allows the study of actual terrain (one of the most valuable elements in military training for
professional development), affording insights of the limitations in the picture of the land and thereby allowing further insights to map imperfections. This forces one to cultivate a perception not only for capabilities but also to grasp the military features of a landscape. Additionally, it provides training in the decision-making process, leaving no doubts as to the magnitude of these decisions or that the resultant responsibility for them must be left to the commander on the ground. Combining the elements of the different operations and presenting on the ground gives one the best possible solution for a system of learning that is applicatory.

Today most officers would probably agree that they learn more easily and remember longer by means of tactical exercises on the ground (such as historical/staff rides) than by any other form of instruction. Indeed, most are inclined to regard everything they read or learn from books as theory, and everything they do with the troops either in peace or war as practice. Exercises without troops (TEWTs) were first used by the British Army as a means for instructing officers at their Staff College in the correct way of applying the principles of strategy and tactics to a definite situation presented by a scheme, and also for teaching them the proper method of reconnoitering ground for strategical, tactical, and administrative purposes.

Colonel Haking in 1908 indicated that "there are four methods of imparting military instruction to officers and their value may be indicated in the following order:

1. practical experience in front of the enemy in war,
Although every one of these is essential for the creation of efficient commanders and staff officers in war, the greatest value of the fourth can be obtained from the third. This is the cornerstone that more fully educates our future military leaders.

FIRST PERIOD 1901-1916

During the years between the founding of the Army War College in 1901 and World War I there was little thought of a specific war or even the probability of war, yet our government was wise enough to prepare our armed forces to meet any military demand from whatever direction it might come.

In 1908 Secretary of War Elihu Root warned: "Be careful not to let your attention be focused too strongly on the administration of the army. The General Staff was created with the primary object of studying military science. You are brought together to do the thinking for the Army, not the administration . . . . [The] highest duty of a soldier is self-abnegation. Keep dissension and jealousy out of the Army. Do not cease to be citizens."[7]

Established by War Department General Order 155, dated November 27, 1901, the Army War College performed the functions of a general staff and was under the supervision of a board of nine officers, known as the War College Board. In August 1903 the War Department abolished that board and placed the
College under the authority of the Chief of Staff. With this initial impetus the War College germinated, grew and resided in Washington, D.C., until the eve of World War II (June 1940). The first appropriation for the War College, in fiscal year 1901, was the amount of $20,000, and the College's duties were:

"a. Study [of] military science and practice and inventions
b. Supervision of the several service schools
c. War College course -- advanced instruction
d. Planning of field maneuvers and problems, simulating conditions of actual warfare (as nearly as possible)
e. Preparation of comprehensive plans for the national defense."

The object of the Army War College during the early years was not to impart academic instruction but make practical application of military knowledge already acquired. This included giving officers training in higher command and in duties of the general staff with troops in campaign. These were designed to mold a reasonable and consistent habit of considering military questions and to develop self-reliance. Thus, since the real reason for having an Army is to prepare for war, the War College was to become nothing more than an organ of the General Staff. Until 1928 the course of study to support the College's mission included "exercises in issuing verbal orders, tactical instruction on broad lines by conferences, tactical rides, strategical and tactical exercises and studies with map, strategical exercises and studies with map, special studies (military importance), lectures, campaign studies and staff rides, war studies, and a month of tactical and staff rides." [emphasis supplied]

In Bliss' memo on the operations of the Army War College he relates that
the War College should not involve a repetition of what has been given at the other service schools. According to Bliss, one should have learned all that he needs to know of the theory of the art of war before coming to the War College, and one should learn by doing rather than receiving academic instruction at the College.[12] "Under this conception the Army War College began its career primarily as a working adjunct of the General Staff rather than as an institution of learning with a permanent staff of professors, giving academic instruction."[13]

SECOND PERIOD WW I-1928

The period 1899-1919 witnessed a substantial advance in the content and scope of military instruction in the U.S. Army. World War I furnished a testing ground where every phase of the art and science of war tried our military leaders and awarded them a creditable share of the victory. No little share in the results achieved is due the system of higher military instruction -- a system that left much to be desired, but nevertheless, contributed in large measure to America's success in the test of a great war.

After World War I an entirely new educational system of the Army was established. It embodied the best methods of the past, modified by the carefully-analyzed experiences of the war. The War College's mission became: "to train officers for high command and staff; in tactics, strategics and logistics of all units larger than an Army corps; in the duties of the War Department General Staff; in the duties of Corps area commanders and staffs;
and for duty in the offices of the assistant Secretary of War."[14] The College became an institution of learning and changed its purpose from that of doing things to learning how best to do them. Using the applicatory system, it included in its subjects strategy, logistics and tactics.[15]

The curriculum structure and course of study at the War College until 1928 can be summarized by the following representative description of "The Course." "The work as planned and executed included lectures, conferences, demonstrations, problems, historical rides and War Games. . . . Intelligence: 8 Lectures, 33 Conferences; War Plans: 2 Lectures, 7 Problems, 3 Orientation Conferences; Operations: 3 Lectures, 10 Conferences, 3 Problems; Supply: 9 Lectures, 1 Problem; Training: 9 Lectures, 4 Problems, 4 Demonstrations, 11 Conferences; Command: 2 Lectures, 4 Historical Rides, 3 Problems, 4 War Games. In addition to the above, fifty-one (51) lectures on varied subjects of interest and application to the course were delivered by selected specialists during the year."[16] Thus, the study of campaigns and leadership in military history formed an important part of the senior officers' professional training experience during this period.

Based on the amount of time spent, the Gettysburg campaign of the Civil War appears to be the foremost instructional vehicle for Army War College staff/historical rides conducted prior to 1940. Commandant McAndrew, who studied that historical campaign during his school year prior to World War I, included the following in his outline of the War College course: "1) cover by study and research the solution of the defense of the country in time of war; 2) bearing always in mind the purpose of the College to train selected
officers for duty on the General Staff of the War Department and for high command; 3) course to be oriented and supplemented by lectures and conferences; 4) war games and terrain exercises to be utilized as accessories to develop and test the ability of students in command and General Staff functions. . . . It is [further] desired that the students become accustomed to dealing with the administrative, technical and supply services in seeking advice, information and data as the policy of the War Department and the intent of the law contemplates."[17]

Many of the AWC students who investigated and examined the Gettysburg battlefield later numbered among American military leaders who led us through World War II and Korea. As students of the past, they profited from the reexamination of this particular event. The tour ride was the capstone of the course and normally was conducted the last month of the school year after the students had had lectures on military history and historical methodology. Rather than simply recounting events, the students analyzed the events, the leadership, the psychology of men in combat and the economic, political, military and logistical aspects. Only so much of detailed battlefield tactics was presented as was deemed necessary to properly complete the larger picture and sustain the interest of the listeners. Stress was placed primarily on those elements that were still important to battle. Of particular value was the bringing out of the influence of time, space and the ground (itself) in military operations, which tended to develop the students' imagination, initiative, resourcefulness, quick decision-making, teamplay and leadership. The tour rides normally included the Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, battlefield site and were generally conducted continuously day and night for a week.
Suppositions as to what the Army War College students actually knew of the Gettysburg operation and what they might have acquired from its study probably include the following:

- strategic ramifications of the campaign
- Lee's move north after the Chancellorsville victory
- Hooker's dilatory movement covering the northeast
- absence of Stuart's needed reconnaissance
- violation by Lee of the Principles of War
- impact of logistics upon strategy
- lines of communication
- failure of the Confederate leadership (lack of coordination, reliance upon inferior subordinates, Lee's proclivity for discretionary orders)
- lack of aggressive counterattacks on both sides
- the positions of commanders in battle
- point of view of morale and personal leadership factors: command functions in WWI parallel those of Pickett's division with few differences except size of unit and rank of commanders
- bravery, inspiring confidence under fire
- responsibility for execution of orders and exercising direct and personal influence
- objectives of the campaign in furtherance of national aims
- special features of the system of command
- comparison of Union and Confederate strategies
- political and economic pressures.

The AWC Commandant enunciated the following in his speech to the 1924 class. "We have not sufficient troops to carry on large maneuvers in the Army of the United States, but the most efficient field exercises for high command and General Staff officers can be carried on at very small expense in a somewhat similar manner as we carried them on this year south of Gettysburg. The exercises, in my opinion, were worth many times the cost and even with our limited appropriations, it is hoped they can be extended and carried on at different centers as they are as near the practical putting into operation of the principles and doctrines of warfare as can be obtained in time of
peace."[18] Therefore, the Army War College must endeavor "to study and come to conclusions on the matters of principles and doctrines, keeping in mind facile so that it may apply such principles and doctrines to new and strange cases, efficiently and unhesitatingly."[19]

THIRD PERIOD 1928-1940

In comparing AWC curricula, one must consider the missions assigned to the school which appear to be driven by the events of the day. Before 1950 a dramatic and specific War College mission change is found only once -- in 1928 -- changing the duties of the college enunciated in 1901 (as related earlier) to those of training officers in the conduct of field operations of the Army and higher echelons, instructing officers in War Department General Staff duties and those of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, training officers for joint operations of the Army and Navy, and instructing officers in the strategy, tactics and logistics of large operations in past wars.[20]

For the first time the mission of the college came closer to what Secretary Root wanted, that being (1) fitting selected officers for usefulness on the general staff of the War Department and higher echelons of the field forces (as far as natural abilities and qualities would permit), (2) fitting for command of large units, and (3) ensuring that selected officers secured a thorough understanding of the organization, powers and limitations of the sister services.[21]

In 1928 the assistant commandant, Colonel DeWitt, provided guidance to
the 1929 class which may be considered as representative of the orientation lectures during the years through 1940. He points out: "We must all make ourselves familiar with this mission and keep it in mind throughout the course in order that we may not wander away from the main issue, due to absorption of interest in the work that may be immediately at hand."[22] He noted further that War College students are selected for their proven efficiency (record selection) to assist in broadening their knowledge of the art of war and to comply with the law in adding to the list of officers qualified for duty with the War Department General Staff.[23]

From 1928 until the school's closing in June 1940 the course of study was generally as follows:

Preparation for War Part I, Mid-September
G-3 Sub Course, September 28 - October 24
G-1 Sub Course, October 26 - November 18
Mobilization Course [only in academic years 1938-39, 1939-40]
G-4 Sub Course November 19 - December 22
G-2 Sub Course January 4 to January 27
Conduct of War Period Part I, including Analytic Studies
Sub Course January 28 - February 24
Preparation for War Period Part II, including War Plans
Course February 25 - May 12
Conduct of War Period Part II, May 13
Preparation of Command Post Exercise
Historical or Staff Ride, June 10 - 19
Graduation - Late June[24]

While an FTX may have had for its objective the study of the strategy and tactics of Civil War leaders in 1863-1865, it also served to give each student an opportunity to evaluate the decisions made and dispositions taken in view of the terrain and conditions involved. The objectives of the historical or staff ride were to analyze:
operations to determine factors contributing to success or failure
command/staff features involved
-Commanders' estimates
-each General Staff operating function
-correct staff procedures
-logistic features of the operations
-strategic ramifications.

"In terms of the development of the Army War College course, the historical ride, of from 400-500 miles, provided a capstone of the work of the college in the development of training in tactical-strategic military problems expected to be faced by future commanders and staff officers."[25] No definite organization was required for the staff/historical ride, but the variety and manner in which the principles were applied to the military lesson chosen had to be carefully considered to ensure a successful ride. A sample AWC format (LOI) for the conduct of a historical ride follows:

1. Purpose of the exercise
2. Organization
   Development and conduct
   Faculty advisers and student lecturers
   Assignment of personnel to busses
   Responsibilities
   Faculty advisers -- preparatory measures and
during the exercise
   Student lecturers
   Individual preparation by students
3. Conduct of the exercise
4. Bus route
5. Time and events schedule
6. Miscellaneous
   Transportation and mileage
   Uniform
   Baggage
   Accomodations
   Rooms
   Food
   Settlement of accounts
   Books and maps
7. Scenarios
Many generals of World War II and Korean fame once plotted their maneuvers on the Gettysburg map and could probably ridgeline the key terrain from memory. If England’s battles were won on the playing fields of Eton, then one can certainly contend that United States victories in World War II were first played on the 1:25,000 map sheets of Gettysburg. Generals who participated in historical rides to Gettysburg include: Connor (Commandant of AWC; Superintendent at West Point), McAndrew (Commandant of AWC), O’Ryan (MG NYARNG), Gruenther (Supreme Commander Allied Forces, Europe 1950’s), Shedd (commanded Panama Canal 1940-44), Grant III (Civil Defense effort, WW II), Harmon (Commanded an Armored Division and Corp in North Africa and Europe), Swing (commanded 11th Airborne Division and I Corps), Ryder (commanded an Infantry Division and Corp in Europe), Wheeler (commanded in India and Burma in 1945), Ridgeway (commanded in Europe and Korea), and Patton (commanded an Armored Division and Army in Europe), to mention only a few. One can only speculate on the value of historical rides for the leadership, command, and operational development of these gentlemen -- on the ground one tends to remember better.

Another kind of experience certainly of value to each individual is sharing the experiences of others. The discussions and group participation during the Gettysburg exercises, as well as other staff/historical rides must have generated memories these officers were able to recall later. If an officer has learned the art and the science of war with reference to the ground, then more than likely he will remember it in battle. "The historical
aspects of the campaigns and battles ... described are distinctly secondary to the primary purpose of military education for the future. The visits to the battlefield, the narratives of the events of those days, and the descriptions of the leaders, the troops, the arms and equipment are all intended as vehicles to illustrate and emphasize those principles of strategy, tactics, logistics, morale, and leadership which will ever constitute invaluable guides in future battles."[27]

Conducting its last staff/historical ride in the spring of 1939, the Army War College then closed its doors and suspended formal instruction with the graduating class of 1940.

FOURTH PERIOD 1950–PRESENT

Since its beginnings, the Army War College has suspended operations for the periods 1918 through 1919 (World War I) and 1941 through 1950 (World War II). The two breaks afforded the soldier the opportunity to practice his profession for real -- unlike most professionals, he ordinarily has no opportunity to do so. Today familiarity with one's work is gained by experience and theoretical instruction. Modern armies are composed of the peace-trained soldier, and rightly so, since there will be very little time after the outbreak of hostilities for him to learn what is expected of him in his combat role.

In 1950 the Army War College was established for the third time. The new curriculum did not contain historical/staff or terrain rides, probably due
to the fact that the leaders of the day were thinking only of the present—almost all of the American military had served in combat and the Army was probably filled with people who had had their fill of tactical exercises for real. "The curriculum has changed greatly through the years and anything resembling historical analysis among the offerings today remains somewhat coincidental."[28]

Beginning in 1950 the curriculum supported the mission of preparing officers "for duty as commanders and as general staff officers within the headquarters of the Army group and corresponding communications zone activities, the theater Army, the theater, the zone of interior Army, and the Department of the Army, with emphasis on the Headquarters, Department of the Army."[29] In 1953–54 the words "prepare selected Army officers" instead of just to prepare officers were added.[30] In 1957–58 the AWC mission became:

"a. to prepare selected Army officers for the highest command and general staff positions in the Army, and for such high level positions within the Department of Defense or other governmental agencies as the Army might be called upon to fill,

b. to develop tactical and logistical doctrine relating to the employment and operations of Theater Army and Army Group to include joint aspects thereof,

c. to develop studies relating to the optimum strategy, doctrine, organization, and equipment for current and future Army forces, and

d. to further inter-service and inter-departmental understanding, with emphasis on Army doctrine and operations."[31]

In 1960–61, Army Regulation 350–104 established basic guidance on the
preparation and implementation of the curriculum, and stated that the mission of the US Army War College was to:

"a. prepare selected Army officers for the highest command and general staff positions in the Army, in joint, allied and combined commands, and for such high level positions within the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies at the national level as the Army may be called upon to fill,

b. develop the tactical and logistical doctrine relating to the organization, employment and operations of Army group and theater Army to include joint aspects thereof, and to provide curriculum coverage at these levels,

c. develop studies relating to optimum strategies, doctrine, organization and equipment for current and future Army forces,

d. develop interservice and interdepartmental understanding with emphasis on Army doctrine and operations and to support academic exchange where feasible and desirable with selected civilian institutions . . ."[32]

In 1963-64, AR 350-5 purported a new mission for the college:

"The mission of the United States Army War College is to prepare selected senior officers for command and high level staff duties, with emphasis on Army doctrine and operations, and to advance interdepartmental and interservice understanding."[33]

The 1969 AWC mission in AR 350-5 was as follows: "to provide resident and nonresident instruction for senior officers of the Army and other services in the exercise of command and in the execution of key staff responsibilities at major military and departmental headquarters and to advance the art and science of land warfare in the joint and combined environment."[34]

It was not until 1978 that the USAWC mission took on two important
aspects in addition to its 1969-77 mission: "to conduct strategic studies on the nature and use of the US Army during peace and war and formulate strategic concepts in order to assist in achieving US national objectives, . . . [and to conduct] resident and corresponding study courses for selected active duty, reserve and national guard officers."[35]

The 1982 mission included:

"to provide a course of study which will prepare graduates for senior leadership positions in the Army, Defense, and related Departments and agencies by professional military education in national security affairs with emphasis on the development and employment of military forces in land warfare; conduct strategic studies on the nature and use of the US Army during peace and war; support Army participation in joint arenas with respect to broad issues of national security; address major concerns for which an independent internal study capability is needed; and contribute independent studies and analyses on issues of current and future import to the Army; in accomplishing this mission the US Army War College conducts resident and corresponding study courses for selected officers of the Active and Reserve Components and federal civilian employees."[36]

According to the 1985 curriculum pamphlet, the purpose of the US Army War College is to qualify students to contribute with distinction to the preparation for and potential conduct of war in support of national policy.

The range of professional development thus implied does not focus particularly on one's next job but on those that follow, because each graduating student will join the ranks of those officers from which the very highest leadership of the Army will be selected for the remainder of this decade and the next. Fundamental to this purpose is an education which will assist each individual in growing and becoming a fully-developed professional who is skilled in the art and science of land warfare, holds strong personal and professional values, is sensitive to the political, economic and societal factors which
influence our nation's security and well being. [37]

The College provides the learning environment and educational opportunities to cultivate both personal and professional growth and to promote continuing habits of objective analysis, self-assessment, and independent judgment. Specifically, the educational objectives focus on preparing the student to:

"1. Command, lead, manage, and staff Army and other defense organization at Colonel level and higher.
2. Exemplify, articulate, and develop in others professional military values.
3. Recognize, analyze, and articulate the impact of US policy decisions on national security.
4. Recognize, analyze, and articulate the impact of the actions and policies of allies, neutrals, and adversaries on US national security.
5. Translate national security policy into military objectives and supporting military concepts.
6. Conceptionalize strategies, operational concepts, and plans to carry out national security policies and military objectives in worldwide contingencies.
7. Assess and allocate forces required to execute a national military strategy and its contingency plans.
8. Mobilize, deploy, and employ forces in support of strategic plans.
9. Perform at a higher level in [his] specialty." [38]

Out of the purpose and objectives of the 1985 curriculum, one must ask: Can we get there from here? There appears to be a missing link in developing fully-developed professionals skilled in the art and science of land warfare -- staff/historical rides similar to those conducted prior to World War II.

STATISTICS

- 21 -
From 1905 to June 1940 there were 2,047 total graduates of the Army War College. Of these, 995 have become Army Generals, with 197 graduates from sister services. From 1951 to June 1984 there were 7,047 total graduates. Of these, 1,008 have become Army Generals, with 1,080 graduates from sister services. Interestingly enough, there were 53.8 per cent of total Army graduates from 1905-1940 who attained the rank of general officer, while only 16.9 per cent of total Army graduates from 1950-1984 have attained that rank. And, even during the buildup of Vietnam and throughout that conflict, the percentage never exceeded 20 per cent.

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*Years at least one historical/staff ride was conducted.*  
**Historical/staff rides not conducted due to lack of funds.*
CONCLUSION

There are important things learned on a battlefield and in command and staff positions in actual warfare, and there too are things learned in life as we live it which never find their way into books. These are handed down by personal contact. The spirit of the AWC is one of cooperation between faculty and students, independent of rank and position, aimed at achieving practical results through free and full discussion. There is no academic competition nor the need for blind acceptance of school solutions. It is in the assembling of the various War College classes where the communication with one another, the contact, the preservation of tradition, the gathering together to perpetuate these lessons is important, but most important of all is the eventual dissemination of these lessons throughout the total Army.

The operational art and science of war appear to have made a full swing back to the years before 1940. Perhaps it is time to again seek the missing link to the Army War College curriculum and allow the pinnacle of the Army educational system to include the development of a fully balanced mentality that deals with theories as they are concerned with facts. The flexibility of the mind and the elasticity of judgment are of the greatest importance. The complexity of the conduct of war when the entire nation is involved, the necessity of developing all resources in money, men, materiel and supplies by a military agency requires that that agency be composed of men not only thoroughly familiar with military affairs but also in touch with world affairs.

Regardless of location or war, there are still lessons to be derived
from the battlefield. Subjects of these lessons include discipline, morale, faith and relationships under the stress of combat; consideration of leadership; man's proclivity for conflict; and the civilian-military interaction during conflict. Understandably one cannot be interested in drill, ceremony and discipline alone and still be fully professional. He must endeavor to professionally qualify himself in order to "... employ the armed forces of the nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force" (strategy).[39]

In an article written for the 1984–85 Army Green Book, General William R. Richardson indicates that there are "three elements essential to preparation [for war]: (1) understanding the art and science of war, (2) knowing how to fight, (3) training as we intend to fight. Understanding is best gained through the study of war and appreciation for the dynamics of battle and the interaction of factors that decide the outcome. [Further,] to understand war is to understand combat power -- the continuation of maneuver, firepower and protection. Leaders must be taught how to apply tactical principles to the infinite variations in terrain, to read the ground and know its impact on weapons and equipment."[40]

Studies at the Army War College since 1950 have moved beyond consideration of campaigns and battles. Computers, systems analysis and operations research tied to the Army General Staff and how to "fight" with Congress and agencies for resources are in vogue today. It remains to be seen whether or not the current generation of military leaders will be prepared to cope with the needs of the Nation. The mission of the Army War College should
remain the development of selected officers for the higher duties of command in war and for the duties of the General Staff in the higher grades and should not be merely the rounding out of all officers' educations.

At the current attrition rate of VietNam veterans, the 1990s will find the total Army sorely short of leaders with actual combat experience, not unlike the Russian army before the invasion of Afghanistan. It is up to the Army service schools (especially the senior service college) to take this into consideration and do something about it by fulfilling Secretary Root's 1903 comment: "[n]ot to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression. . ."[41]

1. COL R. C. B. Haking, Staff Rides and Regimental Tours, p.8.
2. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p.5.
10. Ibid., p.30.
11. Ibid., p.107.
12. Ibid., p.18.
15. Ibid., p.40.
16. COL Alexander M. Miller, Chronicles of the Army War College, p.9.
17. Erickson, p.12.
18. Ibid., p.69 -- Commandant’s closing remarks, June 28, 1924.
19. Ibid., p.68.
21. Ibid., p.3.
23. Ibid.
24. Stansfield, p.16.
25. Ibid., p.36.
27. Memorandum from Group B, Historical Ride, 1939-40, p.5.
33. Curriculum, 1963-64.

38. Ibid.


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