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THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS IN THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDA (POM) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

BY

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28 MAY 1985

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
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Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency is discussed. An analysis of the input by CINCs regarding suggested changes to the current POM process is also accomplished. A brief summary of the most recent changes and initiatives by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to more enhance the CINCs' involvement in the POM process, is also provided. Additionally, some suggestions for further consideration are also mentioned.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ROLE OF CONTAINERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS IN THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDA (POM) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

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This essay explores the role of the Commanders in Chief (CINC's) of the Unified and Specified Commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the POM development process of the military departments. This paper defines the organizational basis for the Unified and Specified Commands. A discussion is provided of the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS), and the various steps in the Department of Defense (DOD) resource allocation and management process. A brief overview of the key PPBS documents is provided. The role of the JCS in the PPBS process and the organization of the JCS Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency is discussed. An analysis of the input by CINCs regarding suggested changes to the current POM process is also accomplished. A brief summary of the most recent changes and initiatives by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to more enhance the CINCs involvement in the POM process, is also provided. Additionally, some suggestions for further consideration are also mentioned.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS IN THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDA (POM) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Our unified or joint system of command, in keeping with our strategy and our global perspective is unique. Unified command calls for a single operational commander responsible to the National Command Authorities and exercising command over all the units of his assigned forces, regardless of Service. This system of command has worked well since President Eisenhower on April 3, 1958, set out the guidelines for a system of operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our objectives. Further, his concept was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve "as staff in assisting the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of direction over the Unified Commands".

The United States military is a system of Unified and Specified Commands as envisioned by President Eisenhower. The present system of Unified Commands organized on a geographical/political basis is supplemented by three Specified Commands organized on a functional basis.

UNIFIED COMMANDS

A Unified Command is composed of US combat forces from two or more Services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is normally organized on a geographical/political basis.

They are:

1. US Pacific Command
2. US European Command
3. US Southern Command
4. US Atlantic Command
5. US Central Command
6. US Readiness Command

SPECIFIED COMMANDS

A Specified Command is composed of US combat forces—normally from a single Service—organized on a functional basis, and has a broad and continuing mission.

They are:

1. Strategic Air Command (USAF)
2. Military Airlift Command (USAF)
3. Aerospace Defense Command (USAF)
General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in an article for Defense magazine referred to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands as "on the front line of deterrence." He reiterated the need for our CINCs to have a time proven combination of authority, necessary information and resources. That the CINCs and their commands exist to be ready to fight our wars, and hopefully to fight them successfully. That the CINCs would fight the war under preapproved plans which would have a unique mission, slice of geography and allies. Accordingly, the views of the commanders must be fully considered as we build and maintain our forces in peacetime.2

General Vessey, in his aforementioned article referenced the necessity for the interoperability of our forces tested by joint exercises and documented in joint doctrine. He ended with a caution that the effectiveness of our CINCs is the basis of our deterrence strategy—through which peace and liberty is maintained.

The purpose of my paper is to further develop on the comments of General Vessey. I intend to narrowly focus my effort on the resource allocation process within the Department of Defense and the involvement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CINCs' role in the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS).

The discussion of the roles of the JCS and CINCs in the PPBS cycle must touch on some of the documents of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) which was developed in 1952. It is through various planning documents of JSPS, that an interface with the PPBS is established to provide for the manning, equipping, and training of US military forces.

The resource flow of the Department of Defense is different from the operational command of the US Forces. "The operational command of the US
Forces flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands.

In contrast to the chain of command of operational command, resources flow from the Congress, which appropriates the money, authorizes the equipment and manpower levels; to the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and finally to the Military Departments. The budget requests are submitted in reverse order.

The significant point is the absence of the JCS and Unified and Specified Commands in the resource allocation process.
The process of resource allocation and management in the Department of Defense (DOD) is a seven (7) stage process/cycle. The first five stages are the traditionally recognized steps, the last two are more recently evolved and recognized:

**STEPS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT**

1. The Planning Phase
2. The Programing Phase
3. The Budget Phase
4. The Executive Budget Phase
5. The Congressional Review, Authorization and Appropriation Phase
6. The Execution Phase
7. The Audit Follow-up Phase

The Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System of DOD deals principally with the first three phases.

The planning phase attempts to set military and civilian goals and objectives, and outlines the forces and resources needed to achieve these objectives. The programming phase develops and approves programs for reaching those objectives. In the budgeting phase, inputs required for those programs are budgeted and priced as precisely as possible for the immediate budget year, then folded into the President's overall federal budget for submission to Congress. The planning and programing phases cover a five year period, the Five Year Defense Program or FYDP. The budgeting phase concentrates in depth on the first year of the five year period, since that is the period to be decided on by the Congress.4

**THE PLANNING PHASE**

The product of this phase is the Defense Guidance (DG) a document prepared annually to cover a five year period. The DG defines the threat against which the DOD programs are measured. It "states the national defense policy,
objectives, strategy, provides resources and forces guidance to achieve those objectives; and establishes the fiscal guidelines for the upcoming programming phase."

This phase begins more than two years before the first fiscal year in which funds would be obligated. It begins with a review of the previous year's guidance and is attended by representatives of OSD, JCS and the CINCs. The involvement of the CINCs in the review and revision process has only been undertaken in the last two years.5

THE PROGRAMMING PHASE

In this phase the Defense Agencies and the Military Departments submit their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary of Defense for review. The Military Departments include in their submissions those POM items identified by the Unified and Specified Commands that their Military Department is administrative agency. The Department of the Air Force would include the POM items related to the operation of the Headquarters of the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the three Specified Commands and those items identified by the Air Force component of the other Unified Commands. The Department of the Army would include the Headquarters POM items for United States European Command (USEUCOM) and the United States Southern Command (USOUTHCOM). Other POM items submitted by the Army component of the other Unified Commands would also be included. The Department of the Navy would include the Headquarters POM submission for United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and those items identified by the naval components of the other Unified Commands. The program review is directed to eliminate duplications, overlaps and to identify possible efficiencies. The Defense Resource Board (DRB), chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, OSD Comptroller acts as Executive Secretary, select teams to consolidate the issues identified into eight books by subject:

1. The Policy and Risk Assessment Book
2. The Nuclear Force Book
3. The Conventional Forces Book
4. The Modernization and Investment Book
5. The Readiness and Logistics Book
6. The Manpower Book
7. The Intelligence Book
8. The Management Initiatives Book

The DRB Program review is conducted in July and completed by August. The agreed decisions are published as the Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs).

THE BUDGETING PHASE

The Military Services and Defense Agencies now change their POM submissions to reflect the agreed upon PDMs. The revised POMs form the basis for the September budget estimate submission to DOD. The budget estimates (BE) are folded into the DOD budget and a comprehensive review is conducted during the September-November time frame. This review is a detailed indepth review of the Service and Defense Agencies' budgets, and concentrates on the budget which will be the basis of the DOD budget submission to Congress.

THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET PHASE

During this phase, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pulls together the submissions of all the Executive Departments to represent the submission of the President's Budget to Congress in January. During this phase, adjustments to budget estimates are made based upon late decisions on
government-wide economic assumptions and changed guidance by the President to his departmental heads.

THE CONGRESSIONAL PHASE

This phase is best characterized by appearances before various committees and subcommittees by Department of Defense representatives. This includes appearances before the Budget Committees which set an overall ceiling for the defense budget; the Armed Services Committees which will develop the Defense Authorization Act; and finally the Appropriations Committees which will develop the Defense Appropriations Act which will appropriate the funds for the programs authorized. As an example of this envolved Congressional process—

in 1983, 1,306 DOD witnesses provided 2106 hours of testimony in hundreds of appearances before a total of 96 different committees and subcommittees. In addition, there were approximately 85,000 written inquiries and nearly 600,000 telephone calls during the year from Congress. In 1983, DOD provided Congress with 21,753 pages of justification documents in support of the FY 1984 budget request, a threefold increase over 1970.6

THE EXECUTION PHASE

This phase is conducted during the current fiscal year or years in the case of multi-year appropriations. During this phase, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies allocate the approved budget appropriations to the subordinate organizations within their department or agency. This is commonly referred to as either the budget execution year (incorrectly) or current year (correctly). It is during this phase that the commands within the Military Departments obligate the funds allocated to them for supplies, services, or procurement contracts. It is this phase that most military personnel are familiar with because it involves the actual outlay of funds, the procurement
of the supplies, and for short lead-time items, the delivery of procured equipment.

THE AUDIT FOLLOW-UP PHASE

This is the phase least understood outside of the resource management community. It involves document/contract review/audit of the executed programs. This can occur during or after the fiscal year(s) of the appropriation. It is during this review/audit phase that the fraud, waste, or abuse of the execution phase is determined. The scope of the audit follow-up phase goes beyond this paper.

KEY PPBS DOCUMENTS

It may serve the reader well for me to provide a more complete list of the key documents in the DOD Planning, Programing and Budget System (PPBS):

- Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA). Submitted by JCS to provide transition from long-range to mid-range strategic planning.

- Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). Submitted by JCS to provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. It includes a concise military appraisal of the threat; recommended military strategy; planning for the levels required; and an appraisal of the capabilities and risks associated with the programed force levels.

- Defense Guidance (DG). An authoritative statement directing defense policy, strategy, force, and resource planning, and fiscal guidance for development of the FOMs. The Draft DG is circulated to all DOD components including the CINCs for comment on the major issues, problems and resource constraints.
- Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). Each Military Department and Defense Agency must submit to OSD annually POMs consistent with strategy and guidance, both programmatic and fiscal, as developed by the DG.

- Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). JCS submits the JPAM. It provides a risk assessment of the POM force recommendations and capabilities to execute the national strategy.

- Issue Books (IBs). A compilation of the issues identified by the OSD staff, DOD components and OMB after review of the POMs. The issues are sorted into the eight books previously mentioned.

- Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). The formal decisions on the submitted POMs and subsequent issues identified in the IBs and resolved by the Defense Resources Board (DRB).

- Budget Estimates (BE). Submitted by the Defense Agencies and Military Departments based on the program approved by the PDMs and on economic assumptions on pay, pricing, and inflation. The budget estimates include the prior, current, and budget fiscal years.

- Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). DOD and OMB jointly review the budget estimates. The budget decisions are formal decisions on the composition of the DOD budget by program element for the current year, budget year, authorization year and an estimate of the three succeeding years. Approved PBDs will change the DOD Budget submission.
The JCS are involved in PPBS at many different levels. In the planning phase they develop the intelligence for the short and mid-range and publish the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) which provides the intelligence estimates and guidance needed for planning. The Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) provides the military intelligence priorities. The priorities are the basis for resource requirements for intelligence activities. After analyzing the current and future threat to include the long-range threat postulated by the Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA), the CINCs develop their force requirements to meet the threat.

After the Military Departments submit their POMS, JCS publishes the JPAM to provide their view of the adequacy of the POM force. During the Budgeting Phase, JCS develops the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) which provides the allocation of forces to the CINCs.

The Chairman of JCS (CJCS) is a member of both the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Defense System Acquisition Review Committee (DSARC). The DRB is the DOD level board which reviews the proposed planning guidance and manages the program and budget review process. The Chairman of JCS is the only military member of the DRB.

The past year saw a new JCS organization appear which provides the structured agency within OJCS to become more involved, or to support the CJCS involvement in the PPBS cycle. This organization within OJCS is called the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA). SPRAA is chartered to:

- provide analysis and recommendations concerning the impact of the DOD program and budget proposals upon the warfighting capabilities of the armed forces. SPRAA is the OJCS focal point for resource implications in joint planning issues considered by the JCS.
SPRAA is organized to have the ability to provide analysis on weapons and support systems, manpower, program, and budget.

Specifically, SPRAA has a multitude of functions under its charter. They include but are not limited to:

- Review force guidance, plans, concepts, joint doctrine, strategy and resources to determine to what extent warfighting capabilities are met.
o Review the CINC's warfighting requirement and capabilities, assess differences, and develop recommendations.

o Review OSD, Military Service, CINC, Defense Agency, and QJCS inputs to the PPBS, and prepare assessments.

o Assess research and development, and system acquisition.

o Support analytically the JCS for Congressional and Presidential interaction.

o Support analytically the CJCS's role as DRB and DSARC member.

o Develop policies and procedures for PPBS actions by QJCS and the CINCs.

o Liaison with OSD, Military Services, CINCs, QJCS, Defense Agencies on resource allocation matters.

o Develop and maintain a program and budget data base to support assessments.

The role that SPRAA is to play in the JCS and CINCs' involvement with the PPBS process is still evolutionary. It's final form and contribution is still to be measured. Its impact may not be any too soon.9

Recently, there has been much written about "reform of JCS". Much of what has been written has been dealing with the structure of the organization; the command lines associated with JCS and the CINCs; the role of the QJCS staff; but, some has dealt with the role of JCS in the resource allocation process. One such proposed "reform" called for:

revised policy, planning and programing system which must be directed toward giving the major commands the forces they need to meet potential threats. No reform can survive or meet the nation's needs, which continues to plan and program around Service-oriented 'slices' of general purpose forces; which prevents joint planning and programing of the nation's strategic forces across Service lines; and which segregates the nation's research, development, and acquisition effort from an explicit link to the force that will be built in each mission area. The nation must refocus its defense planning and budgetary activities away from a
Service-oriented structure. Defense must submit plans and
budgets to the Congress with a five-year time horizon,
which are structured by mission area, rather than by Ser-
vice, which involves assessments of US capabilities, that
of our allies and those of the threat. 10

INVolVEMENT OF THE CINCs IN THE PPBS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

During the past two years, there has been a plethora of changes to
increase the involvement of the CINCs in the PPBS cycle. The regulatory basis
for the involvement of the CINC is DODI 7045.7, Subject: Implementation of the
Planning, Programing and Budgeting System and was published on 23 May 1984. It
formalized many of the initiatives of the Secretary of Defense since 1981 to
increase the involvement of the CINC in PPBS (INCL 1). During 1984, the
changes to involve the CINCs more have been significant.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, (DEPSECDEF), the Honorable William H.
Taft IV, has been instrumental in increasing the CINC's contribution to the
PPBS process within DOD. He has actively solicited the input of the CINC
responsible to fight our wars. Much of the recommendations made by the CINC
has been acted upon, some is still under consideration and some was not
considered appropriate for change. During the rest of the paper, I will only
deal with the suggestions and recommendations of the Unified Command Comman-
ders. The three Specified Commands are all United States Air Force organiza-
tions; treated by HQ, USAF as a major command (MAJCOM) for programing and
budgeting purposes. The Specified Command CINC responded they felt they are
well served in the program/budget process within the Air Force Board process.

The DEPSECDEF solicited from the CINC on 8 August 1984 their recom-
mendations on the role of the CINC in PPBS. The most significant recommenda-
tions by the CINC were:

o Change to the PPBS process should be gradual and evolutionary.
Turbulence caused by change should be minimized.
The need for the codification of the changes made during the last 3-4 years. Many of which were made by strength of personality of the players.

The need for more effective and timely communications by the CINCs with their components and supporting Service headquarters.

The CINCs submission to the Service POMs must include their war-fighting needs.

The necessity for early involvement in the POM process—before Service guidance is published.

The desire for direct input to the Services—not through major commands or subordinate commands.

CICS should serve as the CINCs negotiator/advocate for theater problems that cross Services.

There should be some annual submission by the CINCs to SECDEF, and JCS prioritizing their requirements.

On 26 September 1984, JCS-SPRAA solicited from the CINCs, in a separate and distinct action from the DEPSECDEF, input on enhancing the CINCs participation in the POM development process. SPRAA provided a series of hierarchical procedures requiring actions by CINCs, components, Services, JCS and OJCS and proposed a scenario of command relationships which basically overcame earlier objection by CINCCENT and moved the input level for USCENTCOM requirements to Major Command level i.e., FORSCOM and TAC. The comments provided by the CINCs is summarized as follows:

- The entire system of PPBS must be kept in context, it starts with the ability to influence the Defense Guidance.
o JCS involvement. Consideration should be given to early submission of priority lists to JCS who would provide them to the Military Departments and include JCS POM development guidance.

o JCS track and resolve cross Service issues. They must be the CINCs advocates.

o CINCs components don't participate in the POM machination; aren't represented at Service level; and don't provide the best level to integrate the CINCs warfighting needs. Service Major Command priorities could be different than CINCs component requirements.

o Problem with US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) prioritizing inputs from USREDCOM, USLANTCOM, USCENTCOM, and USOUTHCOM.

o How best to integrate Unified Command SAC and MAC needs through their TAC components.

On 5 October 1984, JCS pursued the earlier SPRAA efforts by providing additional guidance on command relationships and procedures for POM input. This procedure involved the CINCs items being flagged to Services by component commands and therefore have visibility through the POM process. JCS reinforced the principle that the component commanders are the key in the process.

The DEPSECDEF on 1 October 1984 invited the members of the D&E to provide input on enhancements to the CINCs' involvement in the POM process.

CJCS responded:

- Component commanders, the key link, and CINCs must strengthen the link by dialogue.
- Provide warfighting needs to components for integration into the POM submission process.
- CINCs submit in November to JCS a list of warfighting needs. JCS will provide lists to Services.
CINC will be invited to provide unresolved concerns to JCS prior to POM lockup.\(^\text{11}\)

Secretary of the Army Marsh responded:

- CINC provide requirements early in program development, a prioritized list of their requirement to the SECOEF, CINC, and the Services. This would allow the Services the ability to build the CINC requirements in the beginning of the cycle.\(^\text{12}\)

All of the aforementioned correspondence and dialogue led to the release by the DEPSECDEF of DRB 84-50 dated 14 November 1984. He summarized that the input from the DRB members and CINC addresses four major areas of concern: the CINC's submission of prioritized requirements; the relationship between the CINC and the Military Departments during POM development; the visibility of resources in the POMs to CINC requirements; and the participation of the CINC in the DRB Program Review process.\(^\text{13}\)

The DEPSECDEF took the following actions in conjunction with development of the FY 1987 POMs and in preparation for the program review.

**CINC's Submission of Prioritized Requirements**

The CINC will, as previously, submit clearly identified requirements to the Military Departments through their component commanders. In addition, each CINC shall prepare a separate list of their higher priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints. Copies of that list should be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, to the DEPSECDEF, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December of each year.\(^\text{14}\)

**Tracking CINC Concerns During POM Development**

The POM development process remains the responsibility of the Military Departments. The primary interaction between the CINC and the Military Departments shall continue to be through the component commanders. All three Military Departments have taken steps to strengthen the links between the CINC and their component commanders. He endorsed such steps and encouraged any additional actions needed along these lines.

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In addition, the CINCs should have an opportunity for direct interface with the Military Departments on issues of concern to them. Direct communications between the CINCs and the Military Departments should be used to resolve CINCs problems and concerns during POM development.

**Visibility of CINC Requirements in the POMs**

In order to assess the degree of responsiveness to CINC requirements in the POMs, there must be sufficient visibility of the manner in which those requirements were addressed. In the past, when confronted with DRB issues of unfunded CINC priorities, it has been difficult to measure that shortfall against other priorities which were accommodated in the POMs.

In the future, there should be a separate annex for each POM which clearly identifies the CINCs' requirements as submitted through their component commands; whether they were met in the POM, with supporting rationale where such needs were not met. The POM Preparation Instructions shall be adjusted accordingly.

**Participation of the CINCs in the DRB Program Review Process**

Several suggestions were made to increase the CINCs' role in the Program Review process. At present, the CINCs must raise Program Review issues through a DRB member as issue sponsor. CINCs attend only the special DRB meetings set aside to hear their views on the POMs and the DRB meeting on Issue Book One, Policy and Risk Assessment.

The CINCs will in the future be permitted to raise Program Review issues independently. Issue outlines submitted by the CINCs will be subject to the same procedure currently used for selecting and assigning issues for consideration by the DRB. The DEPSECDEF will invite relevant CINCs to attend the DRB Program Review meetings when the issues they have raised will be considered.

**Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

In connection with the consideration of these issues, the Chairman of the JCS has proposed several changes in the role played by the JCS in the development of the POMs. Specifically, he has proposed that the JCS should review and coordinate the concerns of the CINCs and provide them to the Military Departments, and that the CINCs should present their unresolved concerns with the POMs to the JCS before the POMs are completed. These changes, along with any others relating to the participation of the JCS in the PRBS process, will be reviewed by the DRB on the recommendation of the Chairman of the JCS. Until they have been reviewed and approved, their implementation is deferred.
One could think that the DEPSECDEF memorandum would slow down this evolutionary process. Quite to the contrary. As recently as 10 December 1984, additional guidance was being provided regarding the priority lists required for submission. He clarified that the list being provided to SECDEF, DEPSECDEF and CJCS of higher priority problem areas did not replace the requirement for submission of prioritized program needs to component commanders. Additionally, guidance was provided that the "subject list should provide in priority order each CINCs most important problem area." Each area identified should have a proposed solution within reasonable and realistic fiscal constraints.

One could reasonably conclude that the enhanced role of the CINCs in the POM process is in fact evolutionary. It is not yet complete and I expect that future fiscal years will see additional refinements in the process. Some areas for consideration that may have not been resolved to date include the following:

- The continuing submission of POM items through Service major commands and the problem of prioritization. The Army seems to have finessed the problem by having FORSCOM provide the CINCs input to HQDA who will:
  - be responsible to prioritize and merge the CINCs' requirement,
  - special displays will be included in FORSCOM's input to HQDA to identify the CINCs warfighting needs,
  - HQDA will be responsible for development of new program development increment packages PDIP for CINCs' needs.

- The absence of a naval component for USREDCOM has not been addressed, and the submission of USREDCOM naval POM issues,
particularly those required by the Joint Deployment Agency has not been resolved.

- The issue of full ARB membership for the CINCs has still been avoided.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid, p. 3.


5. Ibid., p. 5.

6. Ibid., p. 9.


9. Ibid., p. 3-5.


15. Ibid., p. 1.

16. Ibid., p. 2.

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid., p. 2.

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