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JAPAN: IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED MILITARY ROLE(U)

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JAPAN: IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED MILITARY ROLE

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The Center for International Affairs
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Japan: Implications of an Expanded Military Role

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I. Purpose and Method of Study

In accordance with the questions posed in the Work Statement for this project, the present study examines opinions on the consequences of an expansion of Japan's military forces for the interests of the U.S. and states friendly to Japan, primarily through analysis of written sources. Opinion on the regional impact of present Japanese defense policy is discussed, as is the impact of hypothetical future Japanese defense policy. Attention is directed primarily to views held in the U.S., Japan, and other pro-Western Asian countries, and secondarily to opinions advanced in communist countries.

Due to the varying character and quantity of sources for each of the countries considered, differing treatments have been chosen for particular countries. For ASEAN, the ROC and the ROK, relatively fewer sources are available than for the U.S. and Japan, so available references are discussed and quoted from in the text of the study. It should be noted that it is uncertain, in the case of these countries, how comprehensively written sources convey the range of actual opinion, due to government restrictions on free expression.

Both Japanese and Americans have published more extensively on the topics of Japanese defense policy and the Asian geopolitical situation, so the sections on opinion in these countries take the form of interpretive essays which discuss the range of existing opinion with individual
reference to only a few representative works. Descriptive bibliographies of works by Japanese and Americans on security issues are appended to this study. These bibliographies give summaries of, and relevant quotations from, works examined in the course of research. These appendices may be examined by readers who desire more specific information than is contained in the text of the study.

Opinions expressed in communist countries are surveyed more briefly for two reasons. First, the focus of the study is on the effect of Japanese defense policy on the interests of the U.S. and countries friendly to it, so opinions expressed in these countries are most germane. Second, as the governments of these countries control written expression, a brief survey can be reasonably representative. Greater attention has been given to PRC views, due to the importance of the continuance of the current rapprochement to U.S. interests.
II. Summary

Most analyses of Japanese defense policy suggest that Japan will, in the near future, either continue its present policy, which calls for gradual increases in military procurement and improvements in readiness, or decide upon a somewhat larger and more rapid expansion of military forces. Analysts differ on the details of what Japanese defense policy is likely and preferable, but there are virtually no forecasts that Japan will dramatically change the overall outline of its postwar defense policy. This policy has called for Japan to undertake a gradually increasing role in territorial defense while remaining essentially dependent on and subordinate to the U.S. in both strategic defense and the making of defense policy. Military concerns have remained subordinated to economic and domestic policy concerns in postwar Japanese foreign policy. The opinion is virtually universal that, within this political context, expansion of Japanese military capabilities and roles is unlikely to prove destabilizing in the region or to have adverse consequences on the interests of friendly countries.

The Soviet military buildup in Asia and the Western Pacific has focused attention on Japanese defense policy and provided a justification for expansion of the Japanese military in the eyes of many observers. Many writers in fact focus on the gravity of the Soviet threat to Japan and the need for Japan to drastically improve its defenses. This view is most widely held in the U.S. and in Japan; views of
individual writers are discussed in the following sections on those countries. Such writers suggest implicitly or explicitly that the Soviet military buildup has preempted any potential criticism of an expansion of the Japanese military by justifying it, thus preventing any destabilization of relations among the pro-western countries of Asia. In this view, a Japanese military buildup is seen as a stabilizing force in Asia insofar as it reduces the risk of Soviet aggression.

Writings from other Asian countries suggest that this reasoning is widely accepted by elites and that a Japanese military buildup is acceptable so long as Japan remains subordinate to the U.S. in military policy. Opinions on this issue seem to vary roughly in line with degree of national concern with the threat posed by the region's communist countries. In Southeast Asia there is a definite body of opinion that China poses a greater threat to their interests than the Soviet Union, but Japan is not seen as a significant factor in affecting the military policy of China. Writings suggest that there is no affection felt for Japan in Asia and that memories of Japan's colonial and wartime brutality remain strong, but these emotions are viewed as dominating public opinion and thus limiting government action, rather than dominating elite opinion. There seems to be little feeling that Japan is likely to attempt in the near future to either greatly expand offensive weapons or attempt to use its military power to gain increased influence in the region.
The most sensitive area is the acquisition of military capability to project force beyond Japanese territory. This question is most strongly raised by the proposal that Japan defend its sealanes to an extent of 1000 miles. Comments from the Philippines and other ASEAN countries suggest that there will be no sustained objection to such an expansion of Japanese military roles, but that prior consultation with countries concerned and preservation of the appearance that the action is in response to U.S. desires is necessary. In this regard, comments noted in the South Korean section that greater, though still informal, military coordination with Japan would be acceptable to some in the government should be noted. It should be noted that opinions on Japanese military expansion held in other Asian countries cannot be judged as accurately as opinions in the U.S. and Japan since there are fewer sources available (and fewer independent of government thinking and control). Judgements of Asian reaction by U.S. and Japanese writers are generally brief and are often assertions rather than substantiated opinions. The two sources which most fully substantiate the contention that Japanese military expansion will not encounter major opposition in the region are Kondo Shigekatsu and Saito Seiichiro. (Their findings appear in sections V and VI and the appendix.)

Two lines of reasoning which foresee possible negative consequences from currently probable Japanese defense policy should be considered. One criticizes expansion of the
Japanese military as part of a larger criticism of U.S. military policy in Asia. Argued in most detail by Franklin Weinstein, whose writings are discussed in the U.S. section, this view holds that current U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in Asia is provocative and unsubtle and likely to increase tensions and accelerate the Soviet buildup rather than slow it. A policy of multiple-linkage is advocated. In this context, U.S. pressure on Japan to increase its military forces is seen as unrealistic in hopes for Japanese substitution for current U.S. efforts and in its estimate of the potential damage to bilateral relations.

The most significant criticism of current and probable Japanese military policy comes from within Japan. This argument holds that U.S. pressure for an expansion of the Japanese military could have the unintended consequences of contributing to a shift of political power toward insular nationalists less pliable to U.S. interests. It is argued that Japanese political and social characteristics—absence of a tradition of civilian control of the military, the primacy of bureaucrats over elected officials and courts, currently growing national pride seeking an outlet, the potential interest of Japanese corporations in arms production and export, the tendency of Japanese public opinion to shift suddenly to a new "consensus"—create the possibility that increased national attention to military policy might legitimize the Japanese right, encourage rapid accumulation of power by the military, and support a shift
toward a right-wing government. It should be emphasized that these opinions are expressed simply by the extreme left, but is rather put forward by Japanese moderates who are clearly internationalist and pro-western. It deserves consideration in view of the fact current U.S. policy to encourage greater Japanese "burden-sharing" seems part of a more general effort to encourage other countries ranging from NATO allies to the PRC to increase anti-Soviet efforts rather than a policy carefully coordinated with U.S. Japan policy.

Some analysts also consider the more remote possibility that Japan might abandon its current military policy of close cooperation with the U.S. in favor toward a more independent policy. Virtually all argue that such a development would be destabilizing in the region, with the exception of some Japanese conservatives. Essentially, any effort by Japan to become an independent regional military power, especially if it involved acquisition of nuclear weapons, would be viewed with alarm inside and outside Japan. Steps signaling such an effort by Japan would include termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and development of an independent nuclear capacity. Movement toward such a policy, it is felt, could result either from domestic political changes in Japan or external changes. Outside Japan, there seems to be little fear of a spontaneous revival of militarism and a general feeling that Japan is pacifist in general outlook and committed to promoting its commerce in foreign policy. However, Japanese concern on this issue, as discussed above,
should be noted.

A number of hypothetical, but quite possible, events are viewed as possible external stimuli for such a drastic change in Japanese military policy. These include: American termination of the Security Treaty or substantial withdrawal from Asia, acquisition of nuclear weapons by other Asian countries such as South Korea or Taiwan, a major change in Soviet-Chinese relations (war or rapprochement), outbreak of a major war, and collapse of Japanese economic relations. Due to the hypothetical nature of these developments, relatively little discussion is devoted to the precise changes they might cause in Japanese military and foreign policy. It should be noted that assertions that the development of an independent and militarily powerful Japan in the wake of such events would be destabilizing do not generally address the question of whether such a change in Japanese policy would be destabilizing in and of itself rather than as a part of a more general disintegration of the current regional balance of power.

To conclude, attention has been given to Japanese military policy primarily in the U.S. and Japan. Most discussion has been conducted by proponents of modestly expanded Japanese military capacity who focus on global and regional anti-Soviet strategy. Relatively little attention has been paid to potential adverse consequences of Japanese military expansion. Evaluation of adverse consequences is more often asserted than substantiated. Works on Japanese
military policy offer broad rather than specific guidance for American policy on this subject: the U.S. should maintain its security ties with Japan and preserve its ability to guide Japanese military policy and the appearance of same. Few analysts are willing to welcome the imponderable effects of a new and independent regional power.

Most specific policy recommendations in the literature relate to what steps Japan should take to strengthen its military and to integrate itself more fully into global anti-Soviet strategy. There is relatively little consideration of how to gauge or manage the regional or bilateral consequences of Japanese military expansion. In terms of the reaction of friendly countries in the region, the safest focus of Japanese military efforts would be on territorial defense. Any Japanese military efforts to develop the capacity to extend force beyond Japanese territory should be clearly designed to counter the Soviet Union in cooperation with the U.S. and should be discussed with other countries in the region. Since it is currently unlikely that Japan will acquire substantial offensive weapons systems, there has been little discussion of specific steps which might have adverse consequences within the region.
III. Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy

When Japan surrendered in 1945, it was the firm intention of the Allied powers led by the United States to destroy its war-making power for an indefinite period. A few months after the surrender, Japan had been fully disarmed and demilitarized.

The total disarmament of Japan remained Allied policy for nearly five years. It was fully supported by the Japanese government and people and was incorporated into national policy somewhat ambiguously by the constitution of 1946. With the onset of the Cold War, U.S. policy changed. During peace treaty negotiations in 1950-51, American Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles pressed Japanese representatives to agree to build a defense force, but Prime Minister Yoshida with the support of General MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander, successfully resisted.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 led to a significant modification of this policy. MacArthur ordered the prime minister to establish a “national police reserve” of 75,000 men and to strengthen the existing coast guard, the Maritime Safety Agency. Yoshida supported the establishment of these forces in the belief that they would operate essentially as an internal security force. The new force was organized along military lines and provided with military weapons by the United States. Japan’s non-communist neighbors voiced no significant opposition to the creation of
the police reserve.

The Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 made no reference to defense forces. The accompanying bilateral security treaty provided that the United States would use its forces, including those based in Japan, to "contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and contained an understanding that Japan "will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression..." At this time the United States concluded mutual defense treaties with the Philippines and with Australia and New Zealand, and in 1954 it made a similar agreement with the newly established Republic of Korea.

Japan has steadily but slowly increased the size and strength of its defense forces. The forces have never engaged in combat. The constitution has never been amended. The United States-Japan Security Treaty was amended in 1960 without imposing new defense obligations on Japan. Its Asian neighbors have had no occasion to criticize Japan's defense policy.

Japan's defense forces today number 270,000 persons, 90 percent of its authorized strength. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) consists of 13 army-type divisions, focussing on the defense of Hokkaido. The Maritime SDF possesses combat units including destroyers, submarines, and 220 combat aircraft. The ASELF has 430 combat aircraft including F4E and F15 fighters. The defense budget is $12.5 billion, just
under one percent of the gross national product. Japan produces 90 percent of the equipment for the SDF. It has voluntarily adopted many sweeping limitations on its defense activity pursuant to its interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution as permitting only defensive forces and weapons.
IV. Views in the United States

There have been two periods during the past fifteen years in which Americans have taken an interest in Japanese defense policy. One occurred in the early 1970s when American interest in Asia and in Asian geopolitical issues was high due to the Vietnam War. The first stirrings of political debate on military policy in postwar Japan, prompted by seeming American withdrawal from Asia and the emergence of a group of younger politicians and defense specialists, symbolized by Nakasone, drew some American interest. American attitudes toward this development were negative. Informed opinion found rapid rearmament to be unlikely, but nevertheless undesirable and potentially destabilizing in Asia (see Morley in Appendix); uninformed opinion found militarism resurgent and likely to displace U.S. interests in Asia, apparently on the basis of memories of the Second World War (see U.S. House, Special Study Committee); radical opinion found evidence of a rapidly developing fascist state (see Axelbank).

Nevertheless, interest in Japan and in Japanese defense policy remained limited in this period. Japan had only begun to appear as an economic power and threat on the U.S. horizon and geopolitical considerations of Asia focused on likely developments in the aftermath of the American defeat in Vietnam.
Recent Attitudes

After a hiatus in the middle 1970s, interest in Japanese defense policy reappeared in the late 1970s and has increased in the 1980s. American opinion on Japanese defense issues falls into two segments: works by a small group of specialists currently focusing on Japanese and Northeast Asian security issues, and sporadic and much more limited comments on Japanese defense, often in the context of other issues, in many sources. Japanese defense has, in general, attracted attention as a subsidiary issue raised by two larger concerns: appropriate U.S. military and diplomatic policy toward the Soviet Union and American economic and trade problems with Japan. It should be noted, in terms of the present study, that the effect of a major Japanese military buildup on pro-Western Asian states and thus on American regional interests (as opposed to global interests) has not been a primary focus of either group of works. Attention has not been focused on this question by either of the larger issues which have prompted renewed interest in Japanese defense policy.

Works by Specialists

Specialist works on Japanese defense policy have not generally given much emphasis to the effects of a major Japanese military buildup on pro-Western countries in the region or on American interests, outside the context of the current confrontation with the Soviet Union.
works in the field commonly focus on other issues: Japan's role in anti-Soviet strategy, the alignment of political forces within Japan on defense issues, strategic and tactical questions in Japanese military policy. Opinion seems to be divided within the group of specialists on the regional consequences of a Japanese military buildup, but few writers, whether positive or negative in their views on this issue, devote much attention to it. Typically, analysts will assert with little or nothing in the way of support that Japanese rearmament will be viewed with concern in ASEAN and prove destabilizing or that, within the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the global effort to increase Western defenses against Soviet expansionism, an increased Japanese military commitment will be welcomed in the region.

Though specialist's opinions are quite individual, for clarity it is possible to group their opinions on the consequences of a Japanese military buildup into three categories depending on their opinion of the desirability of such a buildup. The first group strongly favors a Japanese military buildup and generally foresees few negative consequences for the U.S. and pro-Western Asian countries. Views expressed by Donald Hellman in a 1981 article typify this approach:

To continue its highly successful alliance with Japan, the United States must clarify and link its own strategic and economic objectives toward northeast Asia. On the one hand, the Japanese must truly be treated as a partner in diplomatic actions regarding China, Korea, and other parts of northeast Asia. At the same time, it is neither reasonable nor domestically viable
for the United States virtually to underwrite Japan’s security while running a massive and seemingly chronic bilateral trade deficit...Without decisive leadership from the United States, Japanese security policy will emerge not from diplomatic calculation but from the crosscurrents of international events and the inherently nationalist pull of domestic politics in both countries.(1)

Donald Zagoria more directly expresses the view that expansion of Japan’s military forces will not damage the interests of other states:

In sum, the trend is neither toward mindless militarism nor toward an abnegation of Japanese responsibility...Fears about Japanese militarism are misplaced. But a somewhat more assertive Japan is likely to be an additional force for stability in Asia for a variety of reasons.

First, Japanese defense expenditures and security arrangements are oriented now and for the foreseeable future to the defense of the home islands...

Second, although Japan’s security will continue to be served by an alliance with the United States, its interests will not be served by gratuitously provoking the Soviet Union...

Finally, Japan’s interests as a great but vulnerable economic power (highly dependent on importing energy and raw materials) require it to wield its influence in strengthening the existing economic and political system in the region rather than undermining it.(2)

This group emphasizes the severity of the threat posed by the Soviet Union in Asia and the similarity of Japanese interests and those of other non-communist nations in the region, arguing on this basis that a Japanese military buildup will not be destabilizing. (Articles in the Appendix by Pike, Solomon and Stillwell also exemplify this view.)

The second group favors expansion of Japanese military forces but argues the need for careful diplomatic management of this transition in Japan’s role to prevent other states in
the region from feeling threatened. This group suggests that Japan will not desire to play a more destabilizing role in the region as it develops larger military forces, unless there is a major change in U.S.-Japan relations or the regional power balance, but that care must be taken in the process to assuage the fear and resentment felt toward Japan by weaker states in the region.

For example, William Tow argues in a 1978 article that incorporation of Japan into existing collective security arrangements would placate Asian fears of Japan:

...the central consideration with which Japanese policy must inevitably come to terms is how vast must Soviet and/or Chinese military capacity become before Japan's political climate reflects what would be an increasingly understandable concern for that nation's survival. [If] Japan were to seek a more active, collaborative defense relationship with the United States and with other non-Communist nations of the Asian/Pacific, it would need to designate to its own satisfaction a proper and effective "balance" so as to contribute effectively to regional security without raising the spectre of "resurgent Japanese militarism" in those nations with which Tokyo may presume to cooperate in security affairs. ...By entering into ANZUS with U.S. sanctioning, Japan could effectively demonstrate to such parties its true interest in becoming an Asian/Pacific defense partner rather than an expansionist "maverick power." (3)

It should be noted that he focuses almost entirely on the threat presented by the Soviet Union; Asian states' fear of Japan are simply asserted, rather than substantiated or analyzed.

Henry Rowen takes a more serious view of the possibility that a Japanese military buildup could have adverse consequences for other states, but considers this unlikely.
He considers two possible Japanese rearmament policies. The first, "strengthened self-defense", would require expansion of forces within current security arrangements:

What would be the likely effect on other nations? Which nations might feel threatened? It has been widely held in Japan and elsewhere that a rearmed Japan would be an alarming force in the world. This was understandable in the 1950s and 1960s, but would it be in the 1980s? After more than thirty years, it is difficult to see what the Japanese could do that they have not already done to make it clear that they do not have political and military designs against others. Those who express concern about Japanese militarism have memories, understandably bitter, about a now remote past, or they hold unpersuasive theories about innate characteristics of the Japanese people. Nonetheless, many Koreans might be alarmed and many Chinese as well...Such worries would be greatly eased if the U.S. commitment and a tangible U.S. military presence continued. This would also be true for more distant countries in Southeast Asia...(4)

The second possibility is a "heavily armed, neutral Japan". This course is seen as unlikely but possible if a new government comes to power or if faith is lost in the U.S. military guarantee:

...a more independent, armed Japan that has preserved its democratic institutions and has no ambitions to greatly extend its influence over the smaller states of Asia could contribute importantly to regional stability. Japan might, in effect, assume the role of protector of the small states...[and]...partially or even wholly replace the United States. But this course of action poses dangers...dangerous changes in Japanese domestic politics might occur...a more heavily armed Japan without ties to the United States would be viewed with alarm. Remote as this prospect seems, major and sometimes abrupt shifts in Japan's external relations have occurred before, and they cannot be excluded for the future.(5)

Thus Rowen essentially argues that a Japanese military buildup would have adverse consequences only if the current bilateral security relationship lapses and that, therefore,
careful management of alliance politics will be sufficient to prevent adverse consequences. (Articles by Curtis and Langer noted in the Appendix also illustrate this view.)

The third opinion holds that the current U.S. policy of building a military coalition against the Soviet Union in Asia, including pressing Japan to expand its military forces, is mistaken and destabilizing. Franklin Weinstein has most clearly advanced this view. He argues that the Soviet threat has been exaggerated and that the U.S. should adopt a multiple-linkage policy and seek a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

A Japanese rearmament plan, of the sort the U.S. is presently advocating, could in Weinstein's view provoke further expansion of Soviet Asian and Pacific forces but because of the type of weapons included in Japan's procurement plans, could not replace existing U.S. forces in the region. U.S. pressure might also provoke anti-Americanism in Japan. Weinstein argues that the U.S. should instead allow Japan to decide independently what defenses are appropriate for itself and encourage it to expand economic assistance under the comprehensive security doctrine.

Weinstein is criticizing U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union; he does not suggest that Japanese sentiment favors an activist military policy. He does note that other Asian nations would fear a more heavily armed Japan:

...the reactions of a number of Asian countries to a growing Japanese defense system will not be particularly enthusiastic...Although the concerns of
Koreans and Southeast Asians about a Japanese military buildup may be outweighed by other considerations, at least they need to be taken into account..."(6)

There are several apparent reasons for the limited attention given to the regional consequences of a Japanese military buildup. The growth of this field is clearly a result of increased interest in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Many writers clearly favor current administration policy toward the Soviet Union and are primarily concerned with considering how Japan can fit into global or regional arrays of military power to counter Soviet expansion or the likelihood that Japan will actually increase its military effort substantially. Given their emphasis on the central importance of policy toward the Soviet Union, these writers generally pay little attention to the regional implications of Japanese defense policy. Those who oppose current policy (see Franklin Weinstein) also generally argue from the vantage point of global strategy; the potentially destabilizing effect of a Japanese military buildup on Japan-ASEAN relations, for instance, becomes an assertion supporting a policy of multipolarity rather than total confrontation with the Soviet Union, rather than a subject for investigation.

The effect of a Japanese military buildup also receives little attention because it seems a contingency unlikely to arise in the view of most writers. Most analyses of the Japanese defense policy predict no destabilizing effects from Japan's current, gradual expansion of military forces.
particularly so long as this occurs within the context of a firm alliance to the U.S. and a military buildup by the Soviet Union in Asia and the Pacific. Further, most argue that there will be no major and rapid expansion of Japanese forces in the absence of major, and necessarily hypothetical, changes in the current geopolitical situation such as termination of the U.S.-Japan alliance, a major change in Sino-Soviet relations toward war or rapprochement, war in Korea or the Middle East, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea or Taiwan. Since most writers feel that a major Japanese military buildup is likely to occur only in the event of a hypothetical and probably disastrous development which would have far wide reaching effects, the negative effects of such a buildup on friendly states receive little attention.

A more mundane limit on discussion of this issue is the small scale and relative immaturity of the field. Relatively few scholars specialize in Japanese security matters so attention is naturally focused on the most currently pressing issues. Many works are rudimentary and repetitive; indicatively, many analysts apparently feel unable to assume any widespread familiarity with their topic and thus begin their discussion of Japanese defense issues with a review of postwar Japanese military policy, the development of the Soviet military posture in Asia or recent Western diplomacy with China. Basic work in the field is still being done, and attention has not yet extended to issues, such as the
potential repercussions in friendly states, which are tangential to the basic issues which have prompted current interest in Japanese defense policy.

Other Works

The focus of American interest in Japan is on economic issues; the focus of American interest in foreign policy is on policy toward the Soviet Union. Further, American interest in Japanese defense policy, as seen in general works on Japan and in the press, generally derives from one or both of these concerns. The "burden-sharing" issue relates to both in its view that Japan's failure to rearm is jeopardizing Western security and economic interests.

A large number of books on Japan directed to general audiences have appeared over the last decade and a half. Most have been addressed to Americans' chief interest in Japan--the reasons for its economic success--and have dealt with such topics as Japanese national economic policy and planning, Japanese institutions and methods of policy implementation, Japanese business management methods, and the cultural and historical bases of Japanese success. Japanese defense policy is a marginal concern in these works. Two broad lines of reasoning are apparent. First, a restrained defense policy is seen as a factor contributing to economic success in that such a policy has allowed concentration of national resources and will on economic policy and activity. This view is exemplified by the treatment of Japanese defense policy in Professor Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One*:
As the junior partner in a military alliance, the Japanese are appropriately deferential, but they are nevertheless convinced that Americans have assumed too forward a military posture and have spent too much on military hardware. For over two decades after World War II, Japan, pursuing economic growth with a passion that America reserved for fighting Communism, turned a higher proportion of its GNP and intellectual effort toward basic internal development than did the United States.

Second, continuation of the currently successful policy of emphasizing economic rather than military policy is considered sufficiently likely that Finlandization or neutralization of Japan is considered more likely than the revival of an active and militarist policy. This view is illustrated by a passage from Hofheinz and Calder’s The East Asia Edge:

Should the United States ever proceed with moves to withdraw from Korea and otherwise divorce itself from the security concerns of East Asia...such moves could also induce the “Finlandization,”...of a nation with a GNP...possibly the largest of any nation in the world by the year 2000--Japan.

The American press has devoted such sporadic but periodically intense attention to Japan that most conceivable views must find representation in it. However, to generalize, the press has over the last half decade generally advanced the "burden-sharing" criticism of Japanese policy. This view seems to be shared across the political spectrum of the mainstream American press and presumably reflects the rightward shift of American opinion as specifically reflected in a general sentiment that American allies worldwide should, in view of U.S. economic difficulties, contribute more to the collective defense against the Soviet Union. Similar
criticisms of Japanese defense policy may be found in both the conservative and liberal press. A U.S. News and World Report editorial of Nov. 21, 1983 states:

"...even in the face of Russia's growing...threat in the region, Japan is still unwilling to take on greater responsibility for even its own minimal defenses...The fact is, Japan has no intention of diverting additional billions from its industrial base so long as the U.S. provides it with a nuclear umbrella.

The New Republic, in a May 30, 1981 editorial entitled "Grow Up, Japan", says:

The United States, Japan's indulgent Daddy, has a right to feel used...[Japan] became rich and continues to prosper while spending less than one percent of its GNP on defense...

Only the committed left in the American press has argued the possibility of revived militarism in Japan. The Nation, for instance, has argued that the Japanese right and Japanese big business will support remilitarization and greatly expanded arms procurement and exports if it appears that domestic and foreign opinion will accept such actions.

In light of this, it criticizes U.S. pressure for expansion of the Japanese military in a 1982 editorial:

Weinberger is telling the Japanese to prepare for nuclear war or face a trade war. Unfortunately... protectionism and expansionist militarism have often come as parts of one terrible package." That package is labeled "Pandora" and they're tearing at its wrappings in Washington and Tokyo.(11)

As with American specialist works on Japanese defense policy, general works and the press have concentrated on the role that a moderately expanded Japanese military could play in U.S. global policy and have largely neglected the more
remote and hypothetical possibilities that a Japanese military buildup might eventually damage the interests of the United States.

A separate line of reasoning which holds that Japanese rearmament might damage American economic rather than geopolitical interests should be noted. Both specialists and the press have raised the possibility in recent years that a Japanese commitment to expand military power might lead to formation of a large, competitive and technically sophisticated arms industry which could seize a large portion of one of America's largest remaining markets for manufactured, as opposed to primary, products. The possibility is also raised that the rapidly increasing sophistication of the Japanese electronics industry may eventually produce American dependence on imported military technology. Business Week, for example, reports in a 1983 article that:

The growing discomfort with Washington's sponsorship of Japan's rearmament goes beyond remembrances of World War II, however. U.S. businessmen are wondering if Japan will repeat its successes in exporting autos, [etc. with]...military exports. Japan's electronics abilities could make it a strong exporter of electronic weapons.(12)

To summarize, American sources indicate widespread support for a Japanese military buildup of moderate, but larger than currently envisioned, scope and widespread belief that the political situation in Japan renders this relatively unlikely. Thus, there are few forecasts of damage to U.S. interests resulting from expansion of the Japanese military. Japanese failure to rearm is widely seen as more deleterious
to American interests. Perceptions of damage from Japanese rearmament either identify damaging economic consequences if Japanese industry repeats its success in other sectors in arms production or reflect general criticism of the present focus of U.S. policy on military competition with the Soviet Union.
V. Views in Japan

For a generation after the Second World War, legitimate opinion on defense issues in Japan fell into two main categories. Pacifists and leftists argued, for reasons of principle and ideology, that Japan should not possess military forces or that it should maintain only minimal ones. This group was and is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and has been the base of opposition to Japan's alliance with the United States.

The second category of opinion which developed centered on support for a policy line originally set forth in the Yoshida Doctrine. In this view, Japan should maintain relatively small military forces for territorial defense, rely primarily on the United States for defense, and defer to the U.S. in matters of defense and strategic policy. The main focus of Japanese external and internal policy was, in this view, properly on the goal of economic growth.

These two broad categories of opinion are still recognizably visible in Japan today. However, the range of "legitimate" opinion has expanded over the past decade or decade and a half to allow participation in public debate on military policy of hawkish conservatives who advocate that Japan create much stronger military forces than it presently possesses. Though a minority of Japanese have advocated such a policy throughout the postwar era, the new willingness of the Japanese elite and public to give such views a sincere
hearing rather than dismissing them as extremist represents a major change in attitudes. (1)

Several factors contributed to the newfound legitimacy of advocates of an expanded military. A series of external events are commonly argued to have increased the Japanese sense of vulnerability to external threats. The Guam Doctrine, America's defeat in Vietnam, and the proposed withdrawal of American troops from South Korea gave many Japanese the impression that the U.S. was reducing its military commitment to Asia and reduced general confidence in the dependability of the American guarantee of Japanese security. The collapse of detente, the expansion of Soviet military forces in Asia and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan increased fears of Soviet expansionism. Both developments lent legitimacy to proponents of an expanded Japanese military. American criticism of the scope of Japan's defense, especially as reflected in the "burden-sharing" controversy and in the efforts of the past two administrations to secure an expansion of Japanese military forces, have also tended to legitimize the right by raising the issue of military policy and providing those many Japanese who are convinced of the need to maintain good relations with the U.S. but not of the need for greater military power with a strong incentive to reconsider Japanese defense policy.

Internal developments also legitimized the right. Memories of the Second World War, the military governments,
and the association of military power with aggressive policies and brutality faded, while Japan's postwar economic success created increased national pride and a growing willingness to consider whether Japanese policy should have more than strictly commercial goals. The leftist political parties, which form the core of support for pacifist policy, have seen a gradual and cumulative erosion of their support over the postwar era. Further, Japan's rapprochement with the PRC and the PRC's subsequent and outspoken support for the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and a stronger Japanese military seriously compromised the anti-military stance of the Japanese left, which has traditionally looked primarily to China rather than the Soviet Union.

These developments have shifted Japanese opinion to the right. This is borne out by both public opinion polls which show increased support for Japan's military policy, long opposed by a pacifist majority, and by a number of political events, the most significant of which is perhaps the Socialist Party's reversal of its previous absolute opposition to the maintenance of military forces.

Thus, since roughly the mid 1970s, Japanese debate on military policy has seen competition between three broad lines of opinion. First, many in Japan remain dedicated pacifists; the shift to the right among leftists and pacifists has not been dramatic, but rather marked by a gradually increasing degree of acceptance of limited military forces dedicated to territorial defense.
Second, the policies advocated by the moderate mainstream still reflect the spirit of the Yoshida Doctrine. This group supports current policy, which calls for a gradual expansion of the Japanese military forces, largely to fulfill what are seen as Japanese responsibilities to the Western club of nations rather than to counter the Soviet Union, which is not seen as so significant a threat as it is in the United States, and a continued priority on political and economic rather than military policy in Japan's overall foreign policy. This group is the basis of support for the "comprehensive security" doctrine, which emphasizes the utility of economic and technical assistance in furthering Western interests in Asia, and for the Pacific Basin concept.

Third, the group here termed hawks comprises a wide range of opinion and is unified primarily in its members' support for expansion of the Japanese military. Positions range from support for simply a faster military buildup within Japan's present treaty arrangements, through support for participation in collective security arrangements, to support of a "gaullist" policy of independent defense.

Hawks represent a minority of opinion in Japan in terms of both the general public and those in positions of influence. However, in view of this study's concentration on written opinion on military issues, it should be observed that the views of this group are being published in Japan out of proportion to their share of public support. Japanese hawks have published prolifically in recent years and have
concentrated largely on defense policy. Writers representative of mainstream and left opinion have not concentrated so singlemindedly on defense topics and have, when discussing foreign policy, often focused on economic and political policies, such as those lumped under the term "comprehensive security", through which Japan can achieve its security goals, topics which fall outside our interests here.

The Japanese debate on military policy centers on such issues as the nature of the threat presented to Japan by the Soviet Union, the proper policy for Japan to adopt in response, and the effect on Japanese society of greater emphasis on military power. As in the U.S., the regional consequences of a military buildup have not been a primary focus. However, some works, which we will here examine first, have concentrated specifically on Asian reactions to the possibility of a Japanese military buildup. The opinions of writers representative of each of the three broad groups will then be considered. Though the consequences of a Japanese military buildup on the interests of other states are not their primary concern, their views on how a Japanese military buildup would affect Japanese foreign and domestic policy and U.S.-Japanese relations do bear on the focus of this study.

Two works by Japanese on the regional consequences of a Japanese military buildup are available. Though the writers hold different opinions on the desirability of a Japanese military buildup, they are in broad agreement on the fact
that other pro-Western Asian states are not significantly opposed to, and in large part support, a Japanese military buildup.

Professor Kondo Shigekatsu of Japan's National Institute for Defense (formerly the Nations' Defense College) has analyzed Asian opinion on the question of a Japanese military buildup through written sources. Kondo quotes and analyzes other states' responses to two possible Japanese defense policy lines: current policy, including sea lane defense; and a more active policy, entailing more rapid procurement of arms and the participation of the Japanese military in collective security activities abroad as, for instance, in playing a "supporting peacekeeping" role in the Korean peninsula. Professor Kondo's research is referred to in Section VI; here we will consider his conclusions. He finds that Japan's current policy is acceptable to other Asian nations, though varying degrees of support are evident and unfavorable attitudes toward Japan have prompted some emotional criticism, especially at the time of the textbook controversy. Kondo suggests that the hypothetical nature of the second policy line means that less evidence is available on Asian attitudes toward it, but he argues that fear of Japan has declined and that the pro-Western Asian countries might welcome, or at least not oppose, a larger Japanese regional military role if Japan remains allied to the United States. Military expansion combined with termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would be destabilizing.(2)

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A detailed article by Professor Saito Seiichiro analyzes the opinions of ASEAN leaders as revealed in extensive interviews. His particular findings are cited in Section VI. Saito's overall conclusion is that a Japanese military buildup has widespread support in ASEAN though individual leaders and individual countries have differing views and he argues further that ASEAN countries might even support a much larger Japanese regional military role than presently contemplated if Japan could be maneuvered into providing them military assistance and protection. In conclusion, he opposes a buildup because it would be counter to Japanese interests, creating onerous, dangerous and unprofitable regional commitments, rather than because it would damage the interests of other countries.

Japanese hawks minimize the changes in Japanese policy and society, and especially in U.S.-Japanese relations, which would result from a greater emphasis on military strength in Japanese policy. Most focus on the contribution greater military efforts would make to Japanese and Western security, and are similar to arguments advanced by American advocates of a strong military posture against the Soviet Union. The changes in present Japanese defense policy which such writers call for range from filling the perceived gap in Western defenses in Northeast Asia by undertaking more rapid military procurement, through participation in collective security arrangements and expansion of Japan's military relations with other countries, to development of nuclear weapons and
termination of the present defense treaty with the U.S.

The most moderate of these opinions, support for expansion of Japan’s forces without major enlargement of their duties, is represented by the views of Professor Nishihara Masashi of Japan’s National Defense Academy. In a 1983 article, he writes:

Maximum economic expansion with minimum political involvement, which was the essential guiding principle for Japanese foreign policy until recent years, was called the "Yoshida Doctrine"... The basic assumptions under which the defense policy operated and still operates have changed since then... The issue now is not whether or not Japan should have its own defense capability, but how strong it should be and how fast it should be achieved... Within the scope of the Security Treaty and the Japanese Constitution, Japan should make greater efforts to strengthen its air and naval power... (4)

Nishihara argues that a militarily stronger Japan will serve U.S. interests by allowing a diversion of forces elsewhere. He does not favor substantial participation by Japanese forces in regional collective security arrangements and criticizes constitutional revision, saying the "repercussions of revision upon neighboring Asian countries would be grave."

Professor Nakagawa Yatsuhiro advances the second view. He argues for an end to the constitutional ban on service by Japanese forces abroad and favors integration of Japan into collective security pacts:

...[given] expanded Soviet war-making potential and military adventurism... it is extremely dangerous for nations who love peace and freedom to hesitate to show their solidarity... the U.S. and Japan ought to move with confidence toward reorganization of the collective security apparatus in East Asia and the Pacific...
[including] the upgrading of the ASEAN security structure, the linkage of ANZUS and ASEAN, the integration of Japan with ANZUS, the establishment of an alliance between the U.S., Japan, and Korea, associate membership for Japan in NATO, and the establishment of a structure like WEPTO [West Pacific Treaty Organization]. (5)

Nakagawa sees no adverse consequences from such moves and argues the concern about Asian reaction to an expansion of the Japanese military is anachronistic. For example, he argues that "It is time for both Japan and South Korea to take a more serious look at their mutual security and to cease to be bound by events that transpired in an era that ended forty years ago." (6)

The opinions of Professor Kataoka Tetsuya represent Japanese "gaullist" views. In a 1980 work, he argues that Japan must terminate the bilateral security treaty, develop nuclear weapons and become a major regional power:

There is no more chance that Japan will return to the imperialist-colonialist past than that the United States or Great Britain will do so...[A gaullist] Japan would be an even stauncher friend of the United States, fully committed to mutual security and protection. A democracy...she would be sharing identical values with America. Economically, technologically, and culturally, she would be no less integrated with the United States than she is today. But she would possess a force de frappe to deter Soviet nuclear blackmail; thus, she would also replace the United States as the dominant power in the Western Pacific. (7)

In view of their support for a Japanese military buildup, the writers in this group do not generally emphasize the possible dangers to the interests of the U.S. or other Asian countries presented by such a policy. Even the "gaullists" suggest that an independent Japan would still cooperate with U.S. policy and simply be a more able and
committed ally. There is no agreement on the point at which a Japanese military buildup would become destabilizing in the region, but there does seem to be wide agreement among most analysts in most countries that Japanese possession of nuclear weapons would exceed this threshold. In this regard, it is notable that most Japanese hawks oppose development of nuclear weapons. Continued support of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty follows from this position as does the often cited need to consult with other Asian nations about the extent of a military buildup. (8)

The opinion of the left in Japan remains basically pacifist. Recent writings by Morishima Michio, [see bibliography] are an influential recent statement of the pacifist position—a military buildup would damage rather than increase Japanese security by threatening other countries without providing security from the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union and would also raise the danger of increasing domination of society by the military.

Morishima's argument has two main points. First, the difficulty of maintaining civilian control over the military means that a major expansion of Japan's armed forces would imperil Japanese democracy. Second, military power is not necessarily the best way of protecting Japanese autonomy and might instead jeopardize it.

Relating to the first point, Morishima writes:

Civilian control is difficult to maintain in Japan for the following reasons. First, since soldiers are specialists and citizens and politicians are laymen on
military matters, under civilian control, the laymen will force the specialists to submit. The concept of such civilian control is backed by the principle of the "primacy of laymen"(9) and, in fact, the Anglo-Saxon countries where civilian control has reached its ideal form are countries which have the principle of "primacy of laymen"...[In Japan] the party cabinet does not command the bureaucracy; in contrast, the bureaucracy has mastery over the parties. This attitude of accepting the superiority of specialists is a [longstanding] Japanese tradition..."

Morishima argues that this absence of civilian control is not restricted to the military, but that many groups in Japan including the courts, the legislature and university departments are largely free from external intervention in their affairs. Thus, it would be difficult to expect only the military to allow "laymen" i.e., outsiders, to control them. The lack of mutual trust between the Japanese military and public also is identified as a barrier to civilian control, as is Japanese public ignorance of military issues.

Morishima's argument that military expansion would not necessarily contribute to Japanese security and might imperil it is based on historical analogy and a theoretical consideration of international relations. His writings focus on the lessons to be drawn from the Second World War, which for him argue for a Japanese policy of neutrality and equidistance from the great powers. He contrasts the experience of imperial Japan, whose concentration on military power drew it into a destructive war, with that of Switzerland, whose utility as a financial center and go-between preserved it from Nazi invasion. More abstractly, he argues that present day Japan is threatened primarily by the
fact that its relationship with the U.S. involves it in superpower confrontation. A moderate military buildup would not improve Japan's security against the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union; Japan is dependent on U.S. power and on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. If Japan were to attempt to build a credible defense, it would have to arm heavily, and develop nuclear weapons, but this would still not guarantee its security. To preserve itself Japan should do two things. First, it should recognize the need to defend its position through non-military means: "...today, the country can be [best] defended not by 'hardware' like tanks and missiles, but by 'software' such as diplomacy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange." Second, if attacked, Japan should quickly negotiate a surrender which preserves its autonomy rather than attempting a doomed defense.(10)

In regard to possible negative consequences of a Japanese military buildup, attention should be paid to the criticisms and reservations expressed by moderates on the subject of an expansion of the Japanese military. Moderate mainstream opinion does generally support current Japanese military policy, which calls for a limited military buildup to enable Japan to assume a larger role in defense of its own territory and adjacent waters. This support is, however, often lukewarm and in large part represents a response to American desires for increased "burden-sharing." Many moderate thinkers consider other areas of policy more important to Japan's interests than military policy; others
express direct reservations about military expansion which are similar to those of the left.

It should be noted that, in a survey of written works on Japanese defense, moderate Japanese opinion risks being slighted or ignored because of its lack of attention to military issues. This relative silence should not necessarily be interpreted as full consent to the ideas widely expressed by proponents of an expanded Japanese military. Before considering direct criticism by moderates of military expansion, one should note that moderate thinking sees more pressing threats to Japanese security than the Soviet threat and views policies other than military expansion as most likely to further Japanese (and Western) interests. This policy focus can reasonably be considered an implicit criticism of substantial military expansion.

In the field of foreign policy, mainstream opinion has largely focused, in recent years, on such topics as energy security, trade relations, the Pacific Basin concept, and attempts to increase coordination of macroeconomic policies within the industrial world. Internally, policymakers are diverted from military expansion not only by popular pacifism, but also by their long-standing emphasis on economic management and industrial policy and their more recent concentration on "administrative reform" (a reform effort stressing reduction of government spending and deregulation of the economy). It is difficult to demonstrate a negative point, but observers of Japanese affairs would
confirm that such issues arouse more urgent concern and more
government action in Japan than military policy.

To take one major example of this tendency, the foreign
policy statements of recent Japanese prime ministers indicate
that mainstream Japanese see their nation's external
interests as served by diplomatic, economic and foreign
assistance strategies. The Fukuda and Ohira "doctrines"
emphasized the role of non-military policy in Japanese
foreign policy. (11) Continuing Japanese support for the
Pacific Basin concept—some form of increased cooperation or
coordination among the countries of the region—demonstrates
mainstream belief that economic diplomacy, foreign assistance
and cultivation of warm international relations can play a
major role in ensuring security. (12) Japanese diplomacy in
the Middle East, where Japan has worked to maintain economic
links with petroleum suppliers and to distance itself
somewhat from American policy, also illustrates this
tendency. Even Prime Minister Nakasone, who is far more pro-
defense than his predecessors, has devoted much of his
attention on foreign policy matters to diplomatic relations
with other Asian states, to "Pacific Basin cooperation" and
to supporting greater economic policy coordination and better
trade relations among Western states.

Aside from their preference for non-military elements of
foreign policy, moderates have expressed direct concern that
a larger buildup than now envisioned would be destabilizing.
One common argument advanced by the moderates is that greater
emphasis on military power would damage the Japanese economy and political structure. It is feared that substantial expansion of the military would lead to the creation of a military-industrial complex which would damage the economy in the same manner as in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Hasegawa Keitaro, a noted economic analyst, argues this view as follows:

As expansion of military spending continues, inflation becomes systemic. As military spending increases, progress in arms production has a temporary stimulating effect on development of technology, but this ends. As military expenditures increase to strengthen armaments, it has the ironic effect of actually reducing military power [through undermining economic strength].(13)

Professor Nagai Yonosuke, a moderate professor noted for his criticisms of Japanese proponents of military expansion, also notes the possibility that a defense buildup would encourage development of a military industrial complex. He further argues that major expansion of Japanese defense efforts, especially in response to American desires, risks bringing to power a more right-wing Japanese leadership less amenable to American interests. Nagai’s concerns are conveyed by the following excerpts from a recent article:

...in the current debate on the constitution and defense in Japan, the most significant development is the appearance of these military realists who would be willing to reconsider the Yoshida Doctrine, the prototype of Japan’s postwar defense orthodoxy which advocated a minimalist defense posture and a strong emphasis on economic development and trade. At first glance, such military realists may look pro-American because of their support of global American strategic aims, but, in fact, many of them seem more like the Gaullists of Europe who seek autonomy. Nakasone’s statement in Washington seems to imply a sort of “fortress Japan” which could conflict with the open-
market orientation vital for Japan's future... In the long run, the current American pressures on Japan may backfire on the U.S. and European defense industries. Once Japan makes an exception for the United States, this could be the first step towards a complete lifting of Japan's arms export embargo. Then, Japan would probably become a fierce competitor in arms sales.

Some Japanese businessmen are hoping for arms sales to combat recession. However... the mainstream business groups and the LDP... are worried about the boost investment [in arms development and production] may give to development of an uncontrollable Japanese military-industrial complex... Japan's rearmament would be welcome in Washington, while Japan's independence is not welcome. Both of these go hand in hand. I believe American pressure for Japan's rearmament and military technology cooperation may well be counterproductive and misleading... the most dangerous situation in U.S.-Japan relations would be an isolationist and protectionist United States, provoking both militarism and nationalism in Japan. Clearly, the U.S.-Japan relationship benefits from the absence of influential Gaullism and a heavy defense industry in Japan, in contrast to U.S.-European ties.(14)

Though his focus is on the domestic and bilateral consequences of military expansion, Nagai does briefly assert that the regional consequences of a Japanese military buildup would be negative:

... a substantial military build-up in Japan will be unwelcome in Southeast Asia, which still harbors strong fears of Japan as a potential regional menace. Although some observers had thought that this fear had disappeared with greater economic interdependence, the controversy over the textbook revisions in Japan in the summer of 1982 rudely reminded us of the enduring emotions on the part of Japan's neighbors... in fact, Japan's recent economic "advance" into Southeast Asia does show many parallels to its military "invasion" of that area during World War II. Thus the possible isolation of a re militarized Japan in Asia may indeed become the stimulus for a nationalistic stance—a sort of fortress Japan with nuclear weapons as the only course capable of providing it with greater autonomy at reduced cost.(15)

Nagai seems to be assuming that Japan's build up would be independent of any ties with the U.S. and not in response
to a clearly perceived threat to Japan's security. Under either of those conditions, the reaction in Southwest Asia would be less likely to be adverse.
VI. Views in Pro-Western Countries

1. ASLAN States

Japanese military expansion, as currently envisioned, has not met with serious objections from any ASEAN state and has been positively welcomed by some. The Philippines and Indonesia have taken the most cautious views, Indonesia in particular seeing the long term potential for adverse consequences in the trend of current policy, while Singapore and Malaysia have been the most positive. Thailand, faced with more immediate security concerns, has taken the least interest.

Written sources indicate that the planned expansion of Japanese military forces is not as important an issue for the ASEAN nations as it is for the U.S., the ROK, and to some extent, Taiwan. The possibility that an independent, militaristic, and aggressive Japan might emerge if current plans are extended and expanded can arouse strong emotional responses in the region, since memories of Japanese wartime occupation remain. However, a militaristic Japan is a far more remote and hypothetical threat than the many more immediate ones facing the region and is thus not a major concern. At present, Japan, as a major trading partner and aid donor to the region, is of much greater importance to ASEAN in economic than in geopolitical terms.

The region faces two major geopolitical threats:
expansion of the Indochinese conflict and great power rivalry. Japan enters into ASEAN thinking only in connection with the second problem and then only in a relatively minor way. Expansion of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region and the uncertain nature of future Chinese policy are key concerns. Japanese military expansion is a lesser concern and should remain so as long as Japan is clearly allied to the U.S. Attention is focused on how a Japanese military buildup will influence great power rivalry. Will it strengthen the American military presence in the Western Pacific, which several states desire, or will it encourage the U.S. to reduce its commitments to the region? Will a Japanese military buildup provoke increased Soviet military efforts or discourage them? Will Japanese assistance to the PRC strengthen the power of a state seen by many as the major threat to Southeast Asia?

Emotions created by past experience with Japanese militarism aside, ASEAN nations are in practice concerned with the effect of Japan’s defense policy on their efforts to prevent the local conflict in Indochina and the global conflict between the superpowers from adversely affecting them. While all ASEAN states have expressed willingness to accept the currently planned expansion of Japan’s military role, their enthusiasm has varied. Singapore has been most positive, while Indonesia has expressed the greatest reservations. Indonesian analysts, whose views are quoted below, see a potential for adverse consequences if Japanese
rearmament continues and is accompanied by a deterioration in U.S.-Japan relations. A more heavily armed Japan, if frustrated by a chronic inability to satisfy its interests through its relationship with the U.S., might adopt a more independent and aggressive foreign policy. These views seem based on general views on the behavior of states rather than on particularly Japanese characteristics. With this background, we may examine some representative ASEAN views on Japanese military policy.

**Singapore**

Among the countries of ASEAN, Singapore is the most concerned about Soviet expansion and least dominated by the Japanese economy. It has strongly favored a strong Japanese defense posture. Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yu has welcomed increased Japanese defense efforts as allowing a greater U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. In an interview in January, 1983, Lee stated:

> The question in the next crisis is not whether Japan is going to repeat this conquest for a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere. Rather, the question is whether the costs of securing the stability and security of the region can be carried solely by America.

The *Straits Times*, which is government controlled, has supported Japan's decision to rearm and play a bigger role in regional security. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Nathan has been quoted as saying:

> Japan is no longer a poor country; it is a prosperous industrial country. Therefore, it is natural that Japan expand its military strength in order to defend itself. So long as Japan does not contemplate possessing nuclear weapons, we will welcome expansion of
Japanese military strength.(4)

In a 1981 article, Chee-Neow Seah of the Political Science Department of the National University of Singapore has analyzed the Asian geopolitical situation as follows:

...the balance of power in the Western Pacific area [will continue to be] of a quadrilateral type even though the military capabilities of the four major powers, Soviet Union, U.S., Japan, and Communist China, would vary considerably so that whatever balance that is arrived at would have to be quite precarious... Pressure would be further exerted on the Japanese to spend more on defense presumably to assume part of the burden hitherto borne by the Americans... The quadrilateral balance in the Western Pacific is likely to persist for quite a period of time. There are likely to be some minor adjustments such as the increasing military expenditure by Japan, but generally ASEAN countries would not envisage drastic changes to this pattern. For example, many of the ASEAN states would welcome a militarily strong Japan but perhaps not as a substitute for the U.S. presence in the region. Japan's role should thus be subordinated to the U.S. and its presence should still be in the realm of economic assistance and technology transfer rather than in the field of a military watchdog.(5)

Japan's minor place in Singapore's concerns is demonstrated by Lau Teik Soon, head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. In an article on threats to Singapore's security, he dwells on internal challenges to the present government: communists, racial violence, and "anti-national elements" (the press and liberal-minded neo-Marxists among the intellectuals). Expansion of Soviet power is the key external threat. Japan is mentioned as follows:

Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew earlier suggested that the United States could work in concert with other like-minded states, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, to maintain a multinational naval task force to ensure a balance of power in Southeast Asia.(6)
Malaysia

Malaysia has also supported a Japanese military buildup. Major General Hashim has been quoted as saying:

*Japan must defend itself against the Soviet and Chinese threats by its own power. You don't know how long the Americans will remain...Japan should extend military cooperation to other states in the region...as a developing country, we would like Japan to cooperate in joint production of weapons...Japan is anti-communist. Thus, it is on our side. Therefore, even if Japan had nuclear weapons, it would not be a problem.* (7)

With more restraint, Prime Minister Mathir has said that Japanese defense policy is an internal matter for Japan and he would not be disturbed if Japan expanded its military power to assume protection over the surrounding area from the U.S., so long as it does not display a militarist stance. (8)

The *New Straits Times* of Kuala Lumpur has said that Malaysia welcomes Japan's intended military buildup, especially in view of the Soviet Union's increased presence in Asia and the Pacific region. (9)

A 1982 analysis of threats to Malaysian stability by a Malaysian academic associated with Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies identifies development problems, ethnic tensions, and Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism as the key problems facing Malaysia. Japan is not seen as a threat, but as still something of an unknown quantity:

*Japan...is very much in the forefront of Southeast Asian geopolitical and security thinking. Indeed, many consider it the real enigma of the region. For instance, where does the powerful Japanese economic dynamo fit into the regional security scheme of things, especially as, say in another ten to twenty years, it would appear that it may not be enough for Japan just to remain an economic force with close security links to*
America. In fact, it is no longer a question of whether Japan should rearm or not. It already has begun to rearm. The real question, then seems to be expansion of the armed forces, and when and how fast, in what form and to what extent. What the impact of these moves will be on the power structure in the region is somewhat uncertain. (10)

The Philippines

The Philippines has expressed reservations about expansion of the Japanese military and only cautious support. President Marcos has expressed open reservations about Japan's sea lane defense undertakings. During his visit to the U.S. in October, 1982, President Marcos was reported as having said that he was against the U.S. policy of strengthening Japan militarily. But after having met with the Japanese Prime Minister in May, 1983, he softened his tone, generally accepting the Japanese position. Thanking Japan for its pledge of aid, he observed that there were no fears of a resurgence of Japan as long as the U.S. maintained its presence in Asia and the Japanese role was limited to a defensive one. It seems that initially he had used his opposition to the U.S. policy only as a bargaining chip with the U.S. over the Subic Bay and the Clark Air Force bases. (11)

Written sources suggest lingering suspicion and dislike of Japan, but a willingness to accept a larger Japanese defense and even naval role in the region if there are prior consultations and a continuing link with the U.S.

Philippine Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrille has said:
I well understand Japan's need to expand its defenses... The Soviet Union has taken the Northern Territories and Soviet power is increasing in the vicinity of Japan... [but] before Japan expands its naval power, I would wish it to consult carefully with the nations concerned. If it doesn't our fears will grow. (12)

Carlos Rivera, editor of *ASIAPACIFIC Monthly*, expressed deeper reservations in a 1982 article:

In the Philippines, as in other ASEAN countries, the possibility of Japanese rearmament on a large scale, which becomes increasingly urgent because of U.S. prodding, cannot but give rise to grave concern. A militarized Japan, wedded to the Bushido, would be, to put it charitably, a potential threat to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Yet the fact must be faced that Japan cannot long remain a major economic power without also becoming a major military power. Moreover, the United States is right in demanding that Japan assume commensurate responsibility for the maintenance of the balance of power and the reinforcement of the lifelines of the Free World in the Asian-Pacific region... As long as the United States remains the dominant power in the Pacific, it can provide effective safeguards against a resurgence of aggressive Japanese militarism. (13)

Alejandro Nelchor of the Asian Development Bank argues that Japan can best support the security of Southeast Asian countries and its own interests by concentrating on strengthening the trading system. He argues that:

In order to reduce the vulnerability of its sea lanes of communication, Japan could make arrangements with neighboring coastal states in the region for the cooperative policing of the sea lanes so vital for international shipping. (14)

Jesus P. Estanislao of the Center for Research and Communication also argues that Japan can meet its strategic needs best by promoting increased trade with neighboring Asian countries and using the Pacific Basin Cooperation concept as means of increasing trade flows and promoting
economic growth and social stability in the region.

Estanislao also considers Japanese defense policy, tentatively suggesting that sea-lane defense is not viewed as threatening but emphasizing the need for continued American involvement:

A growing understanding has arisen for Japan's purely defensive needs, which require greater capability to defend its import and export shipping lanes. This means upgrading the Self-Defense Force's capacity for antisubmarine defense in order to protect shipping... Provided this is limited to modernizing the surveillance and denial capabilities in Japan's immediate environs, it cannot be perceived as threatening nor sensibly misunderstood as remilitarization.

But for Japan to limit itself significantly to improving its purely defensive capabilities, it is necessary that the United States continue to have a credible, clearly committed defense umbrella over the Pacific that can effectively counter any Soviet threat. The United States cannot continue to be perceived as an unreliable deterrent, whose interests really lie elsewhere.(15)

Indonesia

At the time of a state visit by Nakasone to Indonesia in 1963, President Suharto was quoted as having said that "if the military buildup is for defending the homeland it could not be criticized by any one and Indonesia has no objection."(16) This was the clearest and most positive comment ever expressed by the Indonesia government. Foreign Minister Mlochtar also expressed his support as follows:

Our concern has been duly taken note of and in fact some assurances have been given that in any relations with Japan or China, the interests of the Southeast Asian nations will be duly taken note of and certainly not jeopardized.(17)

Indonesian views are illustrated by excerpts from articles by Soedjatmoko, a former Indonesian diplomat and
policy-maker and now head of the UK University in Tokyo, and by Jusuf Wanandi and M. Hadisoesastro, members of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which is linked to the Suharto government. Soedjatmoko writes:

...once we reach the comforting conclusion that in the 1980s Japan will most likely remain under the protection of the defense treaty with the United States, we tend to minimize the potential for future problems. I believe we underestimate the longer-term impact of what, in my view, are the unreasonable pressures the U.S. government and the Congress have been putting on Japan with regard to its trade surplus with the United States. The continuing hectoring and monitoring of Japanese performance in reducing the trade surplus...must be deeply humiliating to the Japanese nation as a whole. This is bound to provide a psychological impetus to the growing Japanese desire to gradually assume a more independent stance in foreign policy.

However glacially slow, a shift in Japanese psychology and in Japan's perception of the world toward the development of the kind of international environment that will better suit its own resource requirements and trading needs is quite likely to manifest itself in the 1980s...

Given the growing Japanese perception that protectionist trends in the United States and Western Europe are closing it out of very important industrial markets...and given the additional insecurity of access to energy supplies, Japan may move much closer to China and to the Third World in the 1980's, and to the Soviet Union as well...A repositioning of Japan toward the communist powers would profoundly affect the distribution of economic and political power in the Asia-Pacific region. It would also raise questions about whether the revival of Japanese nationalism associated with such a shift would be accompanied by a new militarism as opposed to a continuing commitment to democracy. The course of these potential developments is certain to have a profound impact on the region as a whole in the coming decade.(18)

Wanandi and Hadisoesastro comment on Japan's security role in ASEAN as follows:

ASEAN would certainly support an increase in Japan's self-defense forces if it is intended for
defense of the Japanese archipelago and its surrounding seas, even of sea-lanes a thousand nautical miles southward and eastward. It is understandable that without an increase of burden sharing from U.S. allies, U.S. public opinion will be reluctant to support a great increase in its defense budget in the longer future. If the United States intends to give some kind of regional role to Japan in the Asian-Pacific area, including the protection of Japan’s vital sea-lanes through Southeast Asia, then a lot of discussion with ASEAN is needed to make it acceptable.

The main problems are: (1) the ASEAN countries aspire to be capable of defending their own seas, including the right of free passage through their territorial waters in the 1990s; (2) the role Japan will play in the region is still unclear to U.S. officials and defense experts. Besides, the consequences for the United States itself of giving Japan a regional role have not been thought out. Because of history and past experience, ASEAN members will not easily accept an expanded role without serious consultation on exactly what the role might include and how it could relate to ASEAN’s own plans for a regional order and regional defense.

The ASEAN countries also fear that U.S. credibility in the region will be again questioned if a regional role is given to Japan, and that the USSR might use this development to increase its own military presence.

There would clearly need to be some coordination between Japan and ASEAN regarding the future regional security of East Asia. In that context the problem of free passage through Southeast Asian waters should surely be included. For that purpose Japan should implement the kind of technology transfer that would increase each ASEAN member's ability to develop its own regional-security role. (19)

Indonesian analysts have expressed the most consistent concern about a Japanese military expansion on balance of power grounds. This line of reasoning is usefully summarized in an article by Juwono Sudarsono of the University of Indonesia. He argues that the "marginality and asymmetry of major power interest in the region makes attempts at regional or comprehensive solutions to the problem of a stable
regional balance of power] difficult at best”.

The U.S. and USSR take a sporadic and limited interest in the area, while neither Japan nor China, "the two other major powers" possesses the "political and economic preponderance over the entire region" which would allow it to oversee a "durable security framework." The internal weakness and lack of unity and common interests of the smaller states in the Southeast Asia region means that they are unable to take advantage of this relative freedom of action vis-a-vis larger powers and establish their own regional order.

"Chinese expansionism in the long term" is seen as the primary threat to the region. Sudarsono expresses concern about the long-term consequences of U.S.-PRC-Japanese cooperation. The position of this group on a settlement of Indochinese problems "smacks of a great power imposition of security arrangement that serves primarily the interests of the United States, China, and Japan." Japanese and U.S. "diplomatic and economic support" for a strengthening of Chinese military capability is also of concern. Thus, current Japanese policy is potentially damaging to Indonesian interests because it strengthens China and increases the influence of great powers in the region. By extension, a militarily stronger Japan tied to the U.S. and China might either take a more active role in the region or create greater freedom of action for China. (20)
Thailand

During Nakasone’s 1982 visit to Thailand, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanoud was quoted as having welcomed a Japanese military buildup within the context of the Japanese Constitution and as having maintained that it would contribute to peace and stability of the region and was, thus, an appropriate policy.\(^{(21)}\) In a 1981 interview Arun Panupon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, has said:

> Constitutional reform is a question which the Japanese people must decide for themselves and not one which foreigners should comment on. In terms of principle, Japan has the right to defend itself...I don’t think it appropriate for Japan to give military assistance to Asia...What Japan should do is not defend sea lanes, but contribute to the strength of the countries along its sea lanes.\(^{(22)}\)

Sarasin Varaphol, a Thai academic, identifies four major threats to Thai security: Vietnamese expansion, big power rivalry, internal insurgency, and economic problems.\(^{(23)}\) These preoccupations are reflected in Arun’s comments that:

> There is no need [for Japan to extend military assistance to Asian countries]. To best help strengthen Asian countries, Japan should extend economic and political cooperation.\(^{(24)}\)

In particular, he mentions that Japan should align its policy on Vietnam with ASEAN.
2. Republic of Korea

Attitudes regarding an expanded defense role by Japan vary widely in the Republic of Korea. "Subtle caution and reluctant acceptance" might appropriately characterize the attitude of the Korean government. Striking a balance between the long-standing resentment of Japan felt by the Korean people and the need to maintain a close relationship with Japan in the political, economic and defense fields presents difficult choices for the Korean government.

While fear of and opposition to any suggestion of a resurgence of Japanese militarism still exists, there are indications that Korean government officials have begun to take a pragmatic and realistic approach to Japanese defense policy. Official statements indicate government willingness to accept Japanese military expansion.

A comment by Minister of Defense Sung-Min Yun is illustrative:

> It is our judgement that the Japanese defense buildup will be carried out within a limited level in the course of security cooperation with the U.S. Therefore, I do not believe that the Japanese plan of strengthening military capability would necessarily bring about Japanese militarism. We believe that Japanese military buildup will contribute to maintenance of the regional military balance. However, we are concerned over the possibility that the U.S. Pacific forces may be shifted to the Middle East or other areas.(1)

These cautious but practical statements by responsible officials reflect the Korean government's belief that, in cultivating relations with Japan, they should not be bound by
emotions generated by the unhappy history of Korean-Japanese relations. Rather, they look positively toward the future, as was demonstrated by President Chun’s visit to Japan in September, 1984. Though the visit was regarded as largely symbolic, the leaders of the two countries expressed their agreement that “the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is †essential† to that of East Asia including Japan” and reaffirmed that their countries would †cooperate henceforth with each other with a view to promoting peace, stability and prosperity of this region.”(2)

Koreans desire assurances that Japan show its clear appreciation of the “essentialness” of the Korean peninsula to the security of Japan and agree to assume its fair share of the regional defense burden by increasing economic cooperation and assistance through removing obstacles to the outflow of capital and technology to other Asian countries.(3)

On the understanding that Korea-Japan relations remain satisfactory in others areas and that Japan not be the only Western power with a defense role in the region, Korean government officials think that a militarily strong Japan could contribute to regional peace and stability. It is also the understanding of the Korean government that the American government wants Japan to expand only its conventional capabilities while remaining under the American nuclear umbrella, thus excluding the possibility that Japan will become a nuclear power. Based on these assumptions,
Korean government officials would also regard the defense by Japan of the 1,000 mile sea lanes as of a localized, limited nature, inevitable to protect Japanese economic interests. The Korean position is easily understood in view of the militant attitude of North Korea.

Public opinion is divided on the subject of Japanese defense policy. While many average Koreans and a large number of intellectuals are still preoccupied with the traditional fear of Japanese militarism(4), a significant number of influential figures, including National Assemblymen and scholars, think that U.S. demands are reasonably justified in light of traditional balance of power concepts. This group also thinks that Japan, as a major economic power, should increase her defense capabilities to lighten the burden of the economically troubled bloc leader.(5) They contend that, in view of the multilateral interdependence characteristic of the present international economy, the possibility of Japan returning to pure militarism is quite remote. They argue that, under the present bilateral security pact with the U.S., Japan’s military role is considerably constrained and that, even if Japan assumes a bigger military role, it would be within this framework. Therefore, gradual military strengthening and revival of militarism are separate matters.(6) On this assumption, they predict that Japan will undertake a burden-sharing policy commensurate with its economic wealth and contribute to the strengthening of Northeast Asian security without posing any
threat to other Asian states.

Therefore, they suggest that the Korean government should actively encourage Japan to contribute to the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In this regard, they set out several conditions:

First, Japanese arms buildup programs should be carried out strictly within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Second, the U.S. government should maintain its military presence in the region at the current level even after Japan strengthens its military capabilities. Increasing the military role of Japan, if it is accompanied by diminishing American power, may result in greater assertiveness by Japan and thus increase tension among Japan, the U.S. and her allies.(7)

Third, the Korean government should be included in consultations on creating a stronger regional security posture in Northeast Asia.

Fourth, Japan should expand its economic cooperation with Asian countries as a means of strengthening regional security capabilities.(8)

In parallel with this delicate issue, the question of a triangular military alliance linking the U.S., Japan and Korea has surfaced. Government officials publicly reject the existence or possibility of such a system. However, on bilateral defense cooperation between Korea and Japan, the Korean government takes a pragmatic, yet cautious, attitude. The Minister of Defense has said:
Korea and Japan maintain defense cooperation on a limited basis, such as exchanging information and defense personnel. Though substantial defense cooperation is not expected in the near future for various reasons, I believe that defense cooperation between the two countries is desirable for the strategic purpose of blocking a Soviet naval advance to the Pacific Ocean and keeping track of North Korean naval activities. (9)

The division of views within the Korean government is illustrated by the Foreign Minister’s more cautious statement:

Considering the internal and external atmosphere which is based on past historical memories, Korean-Japanese defense collaboration is not probable in the near future. Thus, at this stage, within the existing Korean-American and Japanese-American defense structures, both countries should maintain close cooperation in order to sustain the peace and stability of this region. Korea and Japan should strengthen economic cooperation based on their existing friendly relations. (10)

Nevertheless, it seems to be clear that a gradual increase in military cooperation between the two countries will take place in the coming decade. Increasing contacts between officials, such as the visit to Japan of General Lee Ki-Baek, head of the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of President Chun’s official party and the participation of General Watanabe, head of Japan’s Joint Staff Council in the Korean Armed Forces Day ceremony on October 1, 1984, have undoubtedly had an important influence on defense cooperation.

Taking all these considerations into account, it may be concluded that the Korean government and people will support or accept a moderate Japanese defense buildup within the existing alliance structure intended to contribute to
the overall security capabilities of the U.S., Korea and Japan and also to counter Soviet military threats in the Asian and Pacific region. Therefore, as long as Japan does not attempt to become a strong, independent military power or a nationalist society, Koreans are prepared to accept the U.S. emphasis on a Japanese military buildup.
3. Taiwan

Taiwanese attitudes toward Japanese defense policy, as toward many issues, are much influenced by the overriding need to maintain the strongest ties possible with other nations in the face of a widespread movement toward rapprochement with the PRC. Japan switched its recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1972 and over the last decade has developed extensive and rapidly increasing economic ties with the PRC. Nevertheless, Japan has maintained strong, though ostensibly non-governmental, diplomatic ties to Taiwan and bilateral trade and investment are large and growing.

As in South Korea, suspicion and resentment of Japan, created by a history of colonization, remain strong. Public and editorial reaction to the textbook incident was strong. However, writings by Taiwanese academics and officials show a strong interest in emphasizing the importance of Taiwan to Japan, as well as other Pacific states, in the interest of avoiding isolation as ties to the PRC grow. This tendency may be seen in works on economic relations(1) and on strategic questions. Taiwanese writers emphasize the potential military importance of Taiwan in air and naval warfare in the Pacific and its strategic control of the Taiwan and Bashi Straits through which Japan's sea lanes pass. As a Taiwanese strategist writes:

Taiwan and its other islands under ROC's juridical control... are the focusing points of the sea lanes of communications linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans... Taiwan commands some of the strategic waterways. Taiwan was a major base for the Japanese invasion into
Philippines and into the Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War demonstrated the value of Taiwan for supporting US military operations in the Southeast Asia. With a good number of modern runways, harbors, military establishments, plus a strong standing combat ready forces and over 3 million reserve troops, Taiwan is an unsinkable super air craft carrier in the Western Pacific. There is no substitute for a good network of bases for the free democratic world. Fleet and bases are still the mutual supporting elements in the sea power equation. Taiwan is a key strategic point; the seizure or retention of which afford marked advantages to either opposing bloc of forces.(2)

Further, Taiwanese writings reflect support for a more active Japanese defense policy in the hope this will encourage a greater consciousness of the threat posed by the communist enemies of Taiwan in the region. Two editorials from the China Times illustrate such views:

If Japan improves its military potential, within the limits required for its self-defense needs, to strengthen its ability to resist the possible aggression of the communists, then Asian nations will support Japan. But if Japan forgets the bitter lesson of the second world war and tries to rearm itself to invade other nations, it will have no nation’s support.(3)

If it is for the purpose of defending against communist aggression, we do not object to Japan’s endeavor to enhance its military strength. But Japan must bear in mind the sentiments of other Asian nations.(4)

In particular, Taiwanese writers seem to favor and desire to encourage Japanese interest in sea lane defense, as illustrated by a passage from a report issued by the Chinese Strategic Association, which argues that the Taiwanese government should positively negotiate with Japan on the subject of sea lane defense. It stresses that Taiwan’s basic role should be to safeguard the security of the Bashi Channel and the Taiwan Strait.(5)
Growth of Japanese concern about the security of its sea lanes is seen as likely to contribute to a continuing Japanese interest in Taiwan. This is illustrated by an article by Vice Admiral Ko Tun-hwa, Strategy Adviser to the President of Taiwan, who emphasizes Taiwan's role in the defense of Japan as follows:

The Japanese have sought to develop a fruitful relationship on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. They are aware, however, that the location of Taiwan gives it great strategic importance to their own chain of islands. Any change in the status of Taiwan would be to Japan's disadvantage. In turn, Japan's security and development are essential to the peace of the Far East and the world. Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty authorizes the United States to use facilities in Japan to maintain the peace and security of the Far East, of which Taiwan is a part. (6)
VII. Views in Communist Countries

1. People's Republic of China

Since normalization of relations in 1972, and especially since the signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, Japan and the PRC have enjoyed increasingly close ties. Economic ties in particular have grown due to the present Chinese regime's emphasis on economic development.

Recent PRC sources indicate that the PRC has two major goals in its policy toward Japan: to secure increased Japanese assistance in modernization, and to encourage Japan to allow foreign and defense policies consistent with the PRC's policy toward the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Japanese government policy and Japanese opinion are viewed as favorable to achievement of these goals.

A 1983 paper by Pei Nonong, Deputy Director of the Chinese Institute of International Studies notes that one key aim of PRC policy is to "greatly strengthen Sino-Japanese relations of friendship and cooperation." He argues that bilateral relations will be stable and mutually beneficial due to the two countries' economic complementarity, cultural similarities, and common security interests.

Though ties in all fields are expected to expand, economic relations receive emphasis:

Economically, China and Japan share mutually complementary conditions by which they can clearly benefit each other. Japan needs China's energy and natural resources and markets. China needs cooperation...
with Japan in such areas as technology, capital investment and managerial methods.(1)

Concerning Japanese security policy, PRC writers argue that Japan can and should play a positive role in increasing regional stability and countering the Soviet Union through both military and foreign policy.

A 1982 analysis of Japanese security policy from the PRC's Journal of International Studies observes and approves Japan’s growing tendency to view the Soviet threat seriously and argues that Japan’s policy must be more forceful:

Japan must consider its security in the context of the entire international situation. Japan must adapt its valuable post-war conscience to the new situation. It must attempt to adopt complementary policies, utilize its strength and avoid its disadvantages in order to obtain a peaceful international environment and guarantee its security. Concretely, it is expected that Japan will cope with the Soviet Union by strengthening U.S.-Japan relations, coordinating its plans with Western Europe and cementing China-Japan friendship and cooperation.(2)

In formulating its military policy, Japan must take the Soviet threat seriously and strengthen its defenses, but be careful not to move from an inadequate defense posture to an excessive one which will destabilize the region:

A sovereign state needs to possess a solid, independent self-defense force... If Japan falls short of this score, the United States will not be able to take up the slack and the consequences will be dreadful. This does not mean that Japan should develop its military beyond its needs, thus heading towards militarism which is opposed by the Japanese and other Asian people. In regard to setting up and developing a “U.S.-Japan-Korea military system,” this runs counter to historical trends, and will certainly aggravate the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, endanger the region’s peace and stability, and be condemned by the people of this region...some [Japanese] maintain that militarily Japan is no match for the Soviet Union. In coping with the Soviet Union, Japan can only use...
economic and diplomatic means. These people hope to coax and mollify the Soviet Union through economic means. History has repeatedly proved that the development of economic relations does not change the nature of an aggressive country. If one is not sufficiently vigilant one can easily fall into one's opponent's trap. Appeasement brings disaster.(3)

A 1985 analysis of the strategic situation in Southeast Asia takes a favorable view of Japanese (and American) efforts to contribute to the security and stability of the region, though noting the possibilities for friction with ASEAN:

The principal security problems in Southeast Asia today are the aggressive policies of the Soviets and Vietnam...The buildup of Soviet military strength and strategic bases form the primary threat to the Asian-Pacific region. Checking this threat is the common desire of the United States, Japan and ASEAN. The United States and Japan have two plans to provide security against the Soviet and Vietnam threat. First, they want to build a tight economic network between the countries in the region...Second, both the United States and Japan have moved to expand their armaments and improve their alliance...The ASEAN countries are enhancing their defense systems and improving military cooperation between one another...They welcome an end to isolationism by the United States and they'd like to see U.S. military influence return to their region. They are somewhat concerned about Japan's growing military power, though they understand the need for it. Neither the United States nor the ASEAN countries want to see Japan a big military power...The strategic U.S.-Japanese-ASEAN three-way relationship will coexist with the military threat by the Soviets and Vietnam until international relations take a great change.(4)

Chinese analysts thus feel that a moderate expansion of Japan's military is a desirable development. PRC thinking on the issue of whether expansion of the Japanese military could have adverse consequences is best illustrated by articles published during and since the textbook incident, which provoked consideration of Japanese militarism. Sources
indicate that while Chinese still deeply resent Japan’s invasion and occupation of Chinese territory, there is little fear of revived militarism. Japanese advocates of an aggressive, independent military policy are viewed as a minority unlikely to determine policy.

A Renmin Ribao editorial at the time of the textbook incident stated:

"History is an objective reality which brooks no distortion. Japanese militarists can paint the hell on earth they created in China as a "paradise", describe their aggression against China and Southeast Asia as moves to establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and use their textbooks to describe Japanese aggression as an "advance". But they cannot dispel the painful memories of their aggression, killing, torture and plunder from the minds of the Chinese and Southeast Asian peoples, nor can they ease the strong hatred of the Japanese people who were forced to serve as cannon-fodder in the aggressive war...If both countries draw the proper lesson from this unfortunate period to prevent it from recurring, the Chinese and Japanese peoples can continue to be friends for many generations to come...The Japanese Education Ministry’s distortions are harmful to the consolidation and development of friendly Sino-Japanese relations and to Japan’s peaceful coexistence with other Asian countries. This is why the Japanese public has severely criticized the Education Ministry. We believe that joint efforts by the Chinese and Japanese people will foil the efforts of certain militarists in Japan."

A 1983 editorial from the same paper on the same subject also suggests that current trends do not indicate remilitarization:

"This evasive attitude of successive Japanese governments [on the issue of Japanese aggression in Asia] has made possible the continued activities of the remnant Japanese militarists and has given rise to international fears that Japan might again embark on the road of militarist aggression.

Prime Minister Nakasone’s admission of Japan’s past aggression against China is a positive step in continuing development of friendship and cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations. This, of course, is likely to
meet with opposition from some in Japan, but furthering Sino-Japanese friendship is the trend of history and expresses the desires of both peoples.(6)

A 1985 article on economic and social trends in Japan also suggests militarism will not revive in Japan:

Will the "big nation" or "first rate country" mentality revive in Japan and lead to chauvinistic adventures? Spirits from the past still live deep in the minds of some, and may re-emerge given the right circumstances. But the overwhelming majority of Japanese people dislike war and want the past 40 years of peace to continue.(7)

Finally, a commentary on General Secretary Hu Yaobang's November, 1983 trip to Japan indicates that PRC opinion approves current Japanese policy trends:

General Secretary Hu Yaobang more than achieved the objective of his visit to Japan November 23-30—to seek a long and steady growth of the Sino-Japanese relationship of good neighborliness and amity.

His visit led to a common pledge by both countries to work together for an enduring harmony which will last through the next century and beyond.

His appeals for closer ties of friendship, unity and economic cooperation through future generations drew enthusiastic response from the Japanese Government and public...

Hu reiterated China's independent foreign policy of safeguarding world peace and opposing hegemonism. Nakasone expressed his appreciation for China's position on international affairs and promised Japan's cooperation with China in working for Asian and global peace and security.(8)
2. North Korea

North Korea has consistently taken a very critical attitude to any political and military agreements, either bilateral or trilateral, among the U.S., Japan and South Korea. The recent visits to Korea by President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone were criticized in North Korea as sinister schemes "to strengthen military collusion with Japan behind the facade of security and hasten a formation of a tripartite military alliance among three countries."
President Chun's visit to Japan was also denounced as a "sell-out" trip.(1)

The Pyongyang regime has been particularly critical of Nakasone's "hawkish" defense policies. The Party's official paper, the Rodong Shinmun, criticized Japanese defense policy as follows:

The U.S. imperialists are trying to bring Japan into their aggressive policy with a view to form a tripartite military alliance, an Asian version of NATO. They also instigate Japan to infiltrate South Korea in political, economic and military fields.(2)

Kim Il Sung, arguing that Japanese policy reflects "samurai" values, criticized it as follows:

Under the protection of the U.S. imperialists, Japanese militarists are trying to become a leading power of Asia. Their slogan of "self-defense" is only an excuse for a criminal cover-up of their expansionist policy. The so-called 1,000 mile sea lane defense is exactly the same one they used at the time when they were frantically pursuing the idea of a "Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia."(3)

Following President Reagan's visit to Seoul in November, 1983, a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign
Ministry issued a statement criticizing U.S. Asian policy contending that:

Reagan's visit was to strengthen colonial military fascist rule in South Korea and to form a tripartite military alliance in their scheme to contain Socialist states...After rearming Japan, the U.S. will try to bring Japanese militarists to aid their aggression in Asia.(4)

North Korean tactics toward Japan and the U.S. are double-edged. While denouncing both countries, they have persistently attempted to have direct contacts with them. On September 18, 1984, in a meeting with Mr. Ishibashi Masashi, Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, Kim Il Sung asked Ishibashi to help North Korea "establish good neighborly relations with Japan" and said that he would not criticize the Nakasone cabinet "by name" and that he would regard Tokyo's present policy toward South Korea as "temporary".(5) Evidently, this was an intentional gesture toward the Nakasone government. The North Koreans need Japan for two reasons. First, they want economic cooperation with Japan, particularly transfer of technology from Japan. The other purpose is to destabilize the trilateral relationship among the U.S., Japan and South Korea.

The issue of the Japanese military buildup has naturally made North Korean leaders feel uneasy, and thus they have tried to secure certain assurances from their traditional allies, the Soviet Union and China. According to Mr. Hatuzok, a Soviet who defected to the West on November 23, 1984 through the Demilitarized Zone, Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kapitsa had agreed in Pyongyang to provide North Korea with some sophisticated weapons including MIG-23, T-72 tanks and helicopters. The unofficial visit of Kim Il Sung to China during November 26-29, 1984 might have been to discuss ways and means to counter the changing situations in the region.

In conclusion, the North Korean attitude on this question may be summed up as follows:

1) Whether Japan is militarized or not, Pyongyang's criticisms of both Japan and the U.S will continue as long as both countries maintain a close political, economic and military partnership, which contains the Soviet Union. Their chief aim is to weaken the cooperative relationship.

2) It is also clear that they will continue to propagate their willingness to have improved relations with both the U.S. and Japan in an effort to destabilize the situation in the region, including the Korean peninsula.
Published Soviet views on Japanese military policy show overall consistency and continuity. Soviet writings have long emphasized what is seen as a Japanese tendency toward militarism and reaction. The power and militaristic tendency of Japanese industry and the influence of right wing politicians have long been criticized as has the importance of Japan's role as a client state and major military base in U.S. global strategy. The tone and intensity of Soviet criticism of Japan has varied in response to internal ideological changes in the Soviet Union and in line with adjustments in Soviet-Japanese relations. Thus, criticism has been muted in periods of tentative rapprochement when political or economic agreements seemed possible, as the early 1970s when Japanese participation in Siberian development seemed likely, and more strident in periods of East-West tension, as at present. (1)

One scholar familiar with Soviet writings on Japan suggests that "essentially the USSR would like Japan not to be too strong, on the international plane at least; to prevent, hamper and denigrate any help by Japan to the arch-enemy China, to the United States of America and to the image of capitalism as a successful system. Tone and emphasis may change, but it would appear that any fundamental reversal of this posture is not foreseeable at present. Meanwhile the Soviet authorities continue to decry Japan as intrinsically a
reactionary country..."(2)

A useful survey of recent Soviet opinion on the Asian geopolitical situation notes that "the single most worrisome subjective trend in Asia today from a Soviet perspective is the network of new relationships attending diplomatic initiatives in Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo. Neither Sino-Japanese nor Sino-American normalization came as a surprise to Soviet analysts...[but what was unexpected was]...a simultaneous Sino-Japanese and Sino-American rapprochement without any corresponding attenuation of Japanese-American ties." One Soviet source decries the "emerging alliance of 'American imperialists, Japanese revanchists, and Chinese great-power chauvinists'."(3)

Recent Soviet views on Japanese military policy are typified by two recent articles by leading Soviet Asianists associated with the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. One article, a survey of U.S. and Soviet relations with Japan in the postwar period, notes the growth of Japanese militarism from the early 1970s onward and the increasingly anti-Soviet and pro-military policies of recent Japanese prime ministers. Japan is seen as being forced into militarism and increased integration in worldwide U.S. military expansion due to internal developments and its susceptibility, as a client state to U.S. pressure.(4)

The second article addresses more directly the topic of this study. Japan, it is suggested, has built a successful diplomacy which serves its economic interests on cynical use
of development aid and technological assistance and on its alliance with the U.S. However, Japanese submission to U.S. pressure to increase its military power would seriously damage its interests. Somewhat contrary to evidence presented elsewhere in this study, it is argued that "China, like the U.S., is apprehensive of the uncontrolled growth of the Japanese military potential. Are there any guarantees that its growth, which so far has been limited, would not become uncontrolled in the future? The answer is in the negative." Further, a militarily strong Japan will be a destabilizing factor for Western interests in Asia: "...the U.S. is making an obvious mistake in forcing Japan to depart from the principles it will have to impose on it later. It is an obvious blunder to believe that only the USSR would stand to lose if Japan is transformed into a powerful center of military force."(4)

Much of recent Soviet writings relating to Japanese military policy focus on American efforts to involve Japan more deeply in global and regional groupings directed against the Soviet Union. Articles focus on efforts to coordinate Japanese policy more fully with NATO and to encourage military cooperation among the U.S., South Korea, Japan and potentially China and on the strategic (as well as economic) goals of the Pacific Basin initiative. Soviet commentators, of course, criticize these developments as hostile to their own country. However, their argument that these policies have the potential to exacerbate bilateral tensions between
the U.S. and Japan and to damage relations with smaller Asian countries which do not wish to be dominated deserves some attention in the context of this study. Excerpts given below from recent articles illustrate Soviet views.

U.S. efforts to increase military coordination in Northeast Asia were criticized in a Pravda commentary at the time of President Reagan's 1983 visit to Korea and Japan:

President Reagan's trip to Japan and South Korea was an integral part of the present U.S. administration's policy of directly aggravating confrontation with the Soviet Union...their goal is to set up an Asian-Pacific variant of the North Atlantic bloc: a three-sided military alliance of the U.S., Japan and South Korea...The creation of this "Pacific triangle" is directed not only against socialist countries. This imperialistic design is contrary to the national interests of all Asiatic peoples and is a threat to the peace and security of the region.(6)

A November 1984 Pravda commentary critical of combined U.S.-Japan military maneuvers on hokkaido concludes:

Moreover, as U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz has admitted, the U.S. has no intention of abandoning its plan for setting up a Far Eastern "Pacific Community" modeled after NATO.

The escalation of Washington and Tokyo's dangerous preparations in Asia and the Pacific Ocean cannot help but evoke concern among all the states of that region. The strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, accompanied by the revival of revanchist and militaristic ambitions in Japan, can serve only to worsen the international situation. It is clear that the peoples' real interests have nothing in common with this policy.(7)

Japan's role in America's Asia strategy is criticized in a 1982 article on the "Remilitarization of Japan":

Big monopoly capital, the reactionary and nationalist forces, actively assisted by the U.S. imperialists, have been taking unstinting efforts for three decades now to make Japan gradually cast aside the provisions of the peaceful Constitution and strengthen its military potential and the aggressive military and
political alliance with Washington...

Japan's militarization is becoming even more dangerous in the light of the Pentagon-hatched plan to knit together some sort of a "strategic triangle" in the Far East comprising the USA, Japan and South Korea, with the possible admission of China later on. It is obvious that two sides of the triangle--Washington-Tokyo and Washington-Seoul--already exist. The present problem is to form the third side--Tokyo-Seoul. Neither does Washington desist in its efforts to raise Japan's role in modernizing the armed forces of China, which has already officially notified Tokyo of its desire "to buy Japanese artillery guns and even tanks."

The policy of remilitarization and Japan's readiness both to assist and take part in the implementation of hegemonistic plans of the American imperialists pose a direct threat to peace and security in the Far East.(8)

Finally, a 1983 article on "The Shady Aims of the "Pacific Community"" examines tensions in U.S. efforts to increase economic and military integration in Asia:

As seen by its architects, the community is supposed to bolster the positions of capitalism in the Asia-Pacific region, promote the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) and maintain the role of developing countries as suppliers of raw materials for the industrialized capitalist states.

There is, however, a difference of aims among the imperialist powers, the most vociferous champions of the proposed Pacific community...

Amidst the aggravated market problem of the world capitalist economy, Japanese monopolies want not only to establish but run an international Pacific grouping. They hope it will help win them more profits from the exploitation of the developing countries and also give them a lever to strengthen their position in trade and economic relations with Western Europe and North America...U.S. manufacturers are not as well positioned to take advantage of a formal cooperative framework...This is why the American concept of a Pacific community rests largely on the military and political considerations of the U.S. ruling circles who would like to use integration tendencies in the Pacific and regroup the imperialist force so as to fortify their own strategic positions in the first place.

The USA reckons it will be able to apply military and political levers in an international regional structure so as to retain its hegemony by employing and improving the existing mechanism of military ties, to keep Japan and other Pacific allies under control and draw them deeper into its militarist anti-Soviet course.
As the American TNCs are somewhat losing control over Japan's sources of raw materials, differences between Tokyo and Washington are intensifying. This tendency manifests itself not only in growing trade contradictions and an escalating technological warfare but also in a divergence between the two countries on some international issues, including the Pacific community problem.

Under these circumstances, the USA is promoting military ties, putting more pressure on Tokyo through the mechanism of joint military planning, manoeuvres and arms deliveries. By pushing Japan into what it believes is "controlled" militarization, Washington wants to place on its ally wider functions in ensuring its military and political interests in the Far East and bind that country to the planned Pacific community...

Washington's militarization plans are causing great anxiety in the ASEAN member states... They are apprehensive of the idea of a Pacific community regarding it, not without a reason, as a bid to impose American-Japanese military and economic diktat on them... this "biocomania" is counter to the genuine interests of the peoples, and its inevitable result will be greater confrontation.(9)
IV. Views in the United States


5. Ibid, p. 255.


7. Representative statements of such views can be found in Rowen, op. cit., and in Sheldon W. Simon, "Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment," Asian Survey 18 (7/78).


V. Views in Japan


6. Ibid., p. 833.


VI. Views in Pro-Western Countries

1. ASEAN States


7. Translated from Saito, op. cit., p. 171.


10. Kernial Sandu, "Stability and Security in the


12. Translated from Saito, op. cit., p. 165.


2. Republic of Korea


2. Joint Communique issued between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Prime Minister of Japan on September 11, 1984, para. 5.


8. Ibid., pp. 86-7.


10. Interview with the Foreign Minister Lee Won Kyung, op. cit., p. 58.

3. Republic of China

2. Tun-hwa Ko, "The Strategic Importance of Taiwan" in Ibid., p. 79.


VII. Views in Communist Countries

1. People's Republic of China


3. Ibid.


2. North Korea


4. Ibid., November 15, 1983.


3. USSR


2. Ibid., p. 149.


APPENDIX

1. Descriptive Bibliography of U.S. Sources


--An early 1970s left-wing analysis of what is viewed as the growth of militarism in Japan. A series of reactionary phenomena--links among the "zaibatsu", conservative politicians, right-wing extremists, and "yakusa"; accommodation by the non-communist left to the right; growth of military spending and support for revision of the Constitution--are discussed to support this view. Japan is forecast to remilitarize and confront the PRC while maintaining links with the U.S. and extending its economic domination over SE Asia and Australia. Argument is subjective and built on anecdotal evidence chosen to prove intended point. For example, in a chapter concerning Mishima Yukio's career and suicide, the author mentions with attribution contemporary comments that the suicide was "'sublime', "aesthetic", "beautiful", and "pure"", arguing that this shows a widespread Japanese attachment to the ideals of the pre-war state. This work was probably not typical of U.S. opinion even at the time, during the Vietnam War, when it was written. The author summarizes his views as follows:

1. There is a definite resurgence of military strength in Japan.
2. There are strong signs that the ruling elite feels military power is necessary to maintain economic power in the long run.
3. There is very clearly a Japanese military-industrial complex in the making.
4. China and the Soviet Union feel threatened by growing Japanese economic and military power which is viewed favorably, on balance, by Washington.
5. There is a powerful right wing in Japan that has strong appeal to traditional Japanese political and social values, and there is a "value alliance" between the right wing, the political and economic ruling elite, and the military.
6. The left is strong but is at odds with dominant trends in Japan and, curiously, with many Soviet and Chinese party objectives.
7. The balance of power in Asia is shifting and both the Japanese government and the United States see Japan as a bulwark against Communism.
8. The trend toward eventual acquisition of self-controlled nuclear weapons by Japan is gaining

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9. The movement toward changing the pacifist “Macarthur Constitution” is, therefore, making headway, and a revision may be inevitable.


---Analyzing the current state of the global balance of power, the author argues that the U.S. has preponderant interests in three regions (Europe, the Middle East and the Far East) which must be defended against a two-pronged Soviet movement to the South (against Afghanistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf and in Vietnam). Identifies three major political challenges to the U.S. position in Asia: 1) maintenance of advantageous relations with the PRC; 2) the internal instability of various Asian states; and 3) the Soviet Union’s military buildup in the Pacific and the threat that this will drive Asian states toward neutralism. Recognizes the domestic difficulties involved in a major Japanese military buildup but argues that such a buildup is just and necessary. No consideration of the effect on other states in the region.


---Reviews the development of current Japanese views on defense. Notes the difference in U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat. Argues concerning Japan’s development international role that “Firstly, it is realistic to anticipate the emergence of Japan as a more active regional power. Secondly, however, it would be unrealistic for the United States and other NATO states to assume that the major thrust of such activities would be in the defense policy area.” A short passage is devoted to probable reactions in the region to a Japanese military buildup. This reaction is seen, apparently with reference to the then recent textbook incident, as likely to be negative. To quote: “Although attention has been focused primarily on Chinese and Soviet anxieties over Japan’s possible military roles in the region, one suspects that the deepest concern and resistance would emanate from the ASEAN nations. These smaller nations have not totally adjusted to living under Japanese economic dominance and a powerful SDF would only add to the discomfort. Their uneasiness is obviously attributable to the Japanese wartime occupation of the region. It can also be related to uncertainty regarding legitimate Japanese strategic concerns”.

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The authors argue that the U.S. should be cautious in urging a heavy Japanese military buildup and that such a development could cause tension in U.S.-ASEAN relations and lead to a divergence of U.S. and Japanese interests.

-- Identifies two basic views as of 1980 on the future of Japanese defense policy -- 1) continuity and 2) development of a more independent and assertive policy -- and gives own view of probable developments. Notes Japan's tilt toward the PRC and the growth of increasingly anti-Soviet attitudes. Argues that Japan will not accede to U.S. pressure to participate in an informal triple alliance with the PRC against the Soviet Union or to undertake a heavy military buildup. Argues with supporting evidence that a heavy Japanese military buildup would disturb other Asian nations. The relevant passage reads: "...a major and rapid Japanese expansion of military capabilities and a broadened definition of the mission of the self-defense forces...[would] arouse fears among other Asian countries about Japanese intentions. Although the non-communist countries in the region are no longer as fearful as they once were of a Japanese military role per se, I believe they would view with intense apprehension any Japanese effort to play a regional role."

-- A book-length study of Japanese attitudes and domestic political alignment in the early 1970s on the question of an expansion of the military. Considers the views of only three countries (the PRC, USSR, and U.S.) on a Japanese military buildup at any length. The first two nations are seen as highly opposed, while U.S. views are described as inconsistent: the support for greater Japanese military effort implicit in the "free rider" criticism and in low-key Department of Defense pressure for increased Japanese military spending balanced by the opposition expressed by some Americans. (Two works also included in this bibliography are cited as examples of American opposition: Axelbank's Black Star Over Japan and a 1970 Special Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.)

--Extended discussion of U.S. military strategy in Northeast Asia. Argues that due to domestic political circumstances which limit military spending, the U.S. will have to depend on an alliance structure, rather than its own independent actions, to deter Soviet military activity in the region. This alliance must be with the "Iron Triangle" of states noted in the title: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In this regard, argues that the PRC is neither reliable nor militarily powerful enough to be an appropriate ally and that the U.S. must maintain and expand its military links with Taiwan.

Discusses Japanese military policy primarily in the contexts of anti-Soviet strategy and U.S.-Japan relations. Authors desire more rapid expansion of Japanese military capabilities and roles, and Japanese coordination of defense policy with Korea and Taiwan than they consider likely. Japanese military expansion is expected to be gradual. Concerning topic of study, asserts that a powerful Japan would be destabilizing, but considers possibility sufficiently remote as not to require discussion: "It is clear that Japan will not be a dominant military power in the region in the foreseeable future--nor would the nations of East Asia welcome such an eventuality." (p. 120) More specifically, supports greater Japan-South Korea military coordination and notes no barriers to such coordination. (p. 51) See especially Chapters 4 and 8.


--Argues that the U.S. must place greater importance on Asia in the future in order to deal with the growing Soviet threat and the greater prosperity and independence of nations in the region, especially Japan. Suggests an "Asia first, Japan first" focus for U.S. foreign policy. Emphasizes the need for U.S. leadership to secure increases in Japanese defense spending. Sees a Japanese military buildup as needed both to counter the Soviet Union and to preempt deterioration of the bilateral alliance due to trade problems. Notes Japan's tilt toward the PRC in recent years, but argues that Japan will resist pressure for closer U.S.-PRC-Japan military coordination. Does not consider effect of Japanese military buildup on rest of Asia.

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--Examines the character and development of Japan's military. Discusses the internal political debate over military expansion. Supports a Japanese military buildup but argues that it will be gradual and defensive in nature. Only PRC reactions considered at any length and these in context of tilt toward PRC shown in bilateral treaty of 1978 and the PRC's encouragement of a Japanese military buildup. Argues that close military cooperation between Japan and the PRC would be threatening insofar as it presents a dangerous challenge to the Soviet Union. South Korea mentioned briefly—an informal military accord with Japan is expected as Japan's military buildup expands its defense perimeter. Very briefly notes, without analysis, that Japan's emergence as a regional power would not be "welcomed by other nations, especially if this should occur at the expense of America's involvement and commitment", but argues that Japan will feel no desire for such a role unless the U.S. security guarantee breaks down.

--Discussion of potential Soviet military and political threat to Asia. Argues that the Soviet military buildup has produced loose trilateral cooperation among the PRC, Japan and the U.S. Takes a cautious view of this development and, in relation to Japan, briefly states "...the United States may be tempted to press Japan beyond what the Japanese political situation can tolerate to step up dramatically its military contributions. Such eagerness to push Japan into assuming a larger share of the common defense could in turn encourage the Japanese to review reluctantly their national security strategy. Interpreting U.S. policy as testifying to weakness of will or resources available for the guarantee of Japan's security, the Japanese may then decide to take the road to full-fledged rearmament. The international repercussions of such a move would be enormous."

--Discusses American bilateral relations with each
country during the 1970s and trilateral patterns of influence. Concerning Japanese defense policy, the focus is on the details of political developments during the decade rather than on the future. Brief references to some U.S. and SE Asian opposition to a rapid Japanese military buildup without elaboration.


--Discussion of current Japanese domestic debate on defense policy. Opens with discussion of postwar strategic policy under the Yoshida Doctrine. Argues that developments during the 1970s--Soviet expansion, perceptions of declining American power and commitment to Japan--gave a new sense of urgency to the defense policy debate and a new legitimacy to proponents of expanded defense. Identifies four groups in the current debate: "political realists" (the mainstream group which opposes "the development of an autonomous defense for reasons similar to Yoshida's: the economic costs involved and the provocative effects of major rearmament"), "unarmed neutralists", "Japanese Gaullists" and "military realists" (who support rearmament within the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty). Sees key debate as between the political and military realists. Absent major change, suggests that the current gradual military buildup will continue. Major changes in current policy will occur only given major external destabilizing event such as a major deterioration of the bilateral alliance; war in Korea, the Middle East or Europe; or acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea.


--An examination of the prospects for Japanese security policy in the 1970s. Argues that the LDP will attempt to maintain a status quo policy in defense as in other areas but, in view of the party's weakness in the early 1970s, suggests that Japan might move toward governments and public attitudes favoring either "welfarism" or "chauvinism". Argues that those Americans calling for greater "burden-sharing" fail to anticipate the destabilizing effect of a militarily stronger Japan. A stronger Japan would threaten SE Asia (brief reference is made to lingering memories of WWII as the reason) and would be less amenable to American control.
U.S. BIBLIOGRAPHY

---A detailed discussion of the alignment of political forces on the question of increased Japanese military spending in 1982, at which time Suzuki's commitment to the Reagan administration to expand Japan's military role was in conflict with political forces and public opinion committed to the status quo.

---Argues that U.S. Asian policy in the 1980s will be dominated by "a single over-arching principle: the desire to see established in Asia a condition of socio-political, economic, and military equilibrium within the framework...of some new type of international system...this U.S. policy can be referred to as 'Asian equilibrium through Asian regionalism'." Takes "engendered anarchy", as exemplified by Kampuchea and Iran, as biggest threat to U.S. power.

---Analysis of the situation in the mid-1970s. Sees three basic threats: war in Korea, a Sino-Soviet war or rapprochement, and a major change in the U.S.-Soviet military balance. Identifies three possible Japanese strategies in the decade ahead: continuation of present policy, "strengthened self-defense", and armed neutrality. Argues that the second policy, especially if it involves major naval expansion, would threaten other countries in the region unless a strong U.S. presence is maintained. The third policy might be chosen if the bilateral security relationship ends or a new government comes to power. Suggests that Japan would develop nuclear weapons only if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were lost or Taiwan or Korea developed them.

---Reports that Japan is unlikely to undertake any serious military buildup due to the domestic political situation.

Scalera, Garrett N. "The Economic Future of South Korea and
U.S. BIBLIOGRAPHY

--Argues for the continuation of strong U.S. support for South Korea on the grounds that the economic importance of the NE Asian economic unit (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan) makes the security of Taiwan and especially South Korea essential to Japan and the U.S. Further suggests that war on the Korean peninsula would be the most likely cause of Japanese remilitarization.

--Argues that Japan is searching for a new goal upon which to concentrate its efforts. Describes possible alternate roles for Japan: as a "Big Switzerland", as a "Superstate" which actively uses its economic and industrial power and as a "Superpower" which would also develop military and political power. Suggests that transition to the third alternative would be destabilizing especially if accompanied by a growth in nationalism. Argues "In the absence of other goals, the Japanese are very likely to turn to nationalism--or be forced into such a role...Our best guess is that, if the world rejects Japan, Japan will in turn reject the world by consciously setting out to prove that Japan is better and stronger than anyone else".

--Examines neonationalism in Japan with reference to writings by Japanese in 1979-80. Argues that the decline of U.S. military and economic power, Japan's increasing economic importance, and the development of neonationalism and support for rearmament in Japan indicate that the U.S. should rethink its relations with Japan and renegotiate the security treaty with a view toward withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan. Concludes with the argument that Japan will become an "independent Asian power" within a decade and that the U.S. must adjust its policy to prevent friction. No consideration of the effect of these changes on other countries.

--Examines the effect on Japanese security and diplomatic policy of Japan's increasing economic
ties abroad and its dependence on imports of raw materials. Argues that four developments might push Japan toward "rearmament, neutrality, and/or involvement in hostilities... 1) the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute; 2) hostility between North and South Korea; 3) the growth of Soviet, and ultimately, Chinese naval power in oceans through which Japanese commerce must pass; and 4) political cleavages and revolutionary change in countries which supply vital raw materials and natural resources to Japan." Discusses Japanese economic relations in the region and their impact on its security with particular focus on the possibility and importance of energy imports from the PRC and USSR. Concludes by arguing that Japan will undertake no major military buildup while its security relationship with the U.S. remains intact.


-- The writer, a Congressman and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs at the time of writing, discusses the "burden-sharing" problem and argues that a Japanese military buildup is needed to meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the stability and security of South Korea and the Persian Gulf. This middle of the road view calls for bilateral consultation and accommodation of military and trade issues. The author desires that Japan develop the capacity for defense of its territory and contiguous sea lanes, but that it not become a regional or nuclear power.


-- Overall analysis of U.S. policy choices in Asia in the 1980s. Argues that the U.S. must either enter into an "active "united front" with the PRC against the Soviet Union or combine an "active "forward" military presence in the region" with maintenance of existing security relationships. Suggests that global heightening of East-West tensions will push East Asia toward polarization into two camps. Short discussion of Japan's defense which forecasts growth in military spending in the 1980s and suggests that bilateral security talks will focus on coordinating forces for sea lane defense. Considers only PRC reactions to a Japanese military buildup, observing that Peiking is likely to continue its present support for a more active Japanese defense posture.
--Argues that major growth in the military capacity of NE Asian communist countries (the USSR, PRC and North Korea) during the 1980s will demand efforts to: reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula, reinforce U.S. "credibility" in the region, raise South Korean military strength, increase U.S.-Japan military collaboration, and manage U.S.-PRC relations so as to preserve Sino-Soviet tensions. In relation to Japan, argues that the 1980s will see a heavy Japanese military buildup. The U.S. and Japan "must get serious about the contingent defense of Japan from direct or indirect attack" by developing "combined command structures" for emergencies, "exploit[ing] the Japanese base on behalf of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan", and by undertaking official joint U.S.-ROK-Japan military planning. No discussion of the effect of a heavy Japanese military buildup on other nations in the region.

--To allay Asian nations' concern over the firmness of the U.S. security commitment to the region, the author proposes creating an anti-Soviet alliance around a revitalized ANZUS pact, which would also include Japan. Such an arrangement is seen as a response to the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific. Notes Japan's need, if it is to increase its military profile in the region to be able to "contribute effectively to regional security without raising the spectre of "resurgent Japanese militarism" and suggests that "by entering into ANZUS with U.S. sanctioning, Japan could effectively demonstrate... its true interest in becoming an Asian/Pacific defense partner rather than an expansionist "maverick power"." Briefly raises, without considering the effect in the region or the domestic political difficulty, the possibility that Japan might develop a submarine-borne nuclear capacity if the U.S. fails to provide a credible defense against Soviet or PRC military expansion.

--Detailed summary of defense-related technology issues
in bilateral relations in the early 1980s. Focuses on negotiations in three areas: transfers of Japanese technology with military applications to the U.S.; cooperation in joint development of military technology; and exports of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. Argues that careful management of this new and difficult area is necessary if the bilateral security relationship is to be preserved.


--Significantly characterizes Japan's defense strategy as one of "military restraint" rather than an effort to get a "free ride". Argues that "Japan's policy of relative military restraint clearly has been compatible with the protection of U.S. interests in the region. U.S. defense commitments to Japan and neighboring states...made possible Japanese military restraint...[and] also enhance China's sense of regional security, as China seems more comfortable with a strong U.S. presence and a modest Japanese defense posture than it would if the situation were reversed". Views domestic restraints on a major Japanese military buildup as decisive in the absence of major changes in the regional situation such as a rise in Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S. withdrawal from Asia, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by the ROK or ROC. Approves of current Japanese defense policy: "...currently planned JSDF force improvements...will improve Japan's capability to resist aggression or coercion and...greatly enhance Japan's security without adverse effect on its present relatively stable situation". Suggests major Japanese rearmament would destabilize the region.


--Four pages of report devoted to the participating Representatives impressions on the Japanese situation. They express "genuine concern about the new militarism we witnessed" and argue that "there is a strong effort underway by some groups in Japan toward rearmament and a seeming return to the old 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'". Anecdotal evidence.

Weinstein, Franklin B. "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations," in U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of...
--Argues that there is insufficient political support in Japan for any major increase in defense spending and that this situation will prevail so long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella obviates any real strategic need for such a buildup. Argues against U.S. pressure for greater burden-sharing—a minor Japanese military buildup would be largely a symbolic gesture which could not reduce American commitments in NE Asia but would nevertheless have significant costs including damage to Japan's relations with Asian states and damage to U.S.-Japan relations. Discusses in detail the effect of U.S. withdrawal from South Korea on regional security and emphasizes the need to encourage nuclear non-proliferation in the area. Notes that acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea is the most likely event which would spark a major Japanese military buildup.

--Useful and recent summary of author's opinions on Japan's military and economic policies and its relations with Southeast Asia. Summarizes his arguments in favor of multiple-linkage approach to Soviet Union, against expecting Japan to make a major contribution to reducing U.S. military commitments in the northern Pacific. Useful summary of ASEAN views on Japanese military expansion based on interviews and research: finds mixture of views ranging from approval to concern that the military expansion would reduce aid flows and heighten great power tensions in region. Notes an interesting paradox in Japanese diplomacy toward the region: "The Japanese have long been assailed as economic animals bent only on profit, but when they begin to talk of a political or military role, they give rise to suspicion that they are seeking to extend their domination beyond the economic sphere or are seeking to gain additional leverage to reinforce their economic influence. When the Japanese reiterate that they do not intend to develop the military power of which they are capable, they provoke suspicion and, in some cases, alarm; it may be that the more they speak of their determination to refrain from a major military role, the more they stimulate concern—perhaps a case of protesting too much."

Weinstein, Franklin B. "The U.S. Role in East and Southeast
U.S. BIBLIOGRAPHY

--Argues that the main security threat in Asia is not from the Soviet military buildup but from internal instability and the possibility of economic/energy resource competition within the Western-oriented group. Argues against pressure for a Japanese military buildup—a military buildup large enough and focused on acquisition of capabilities necessary to replace U.S. forces in the area would be destabilizing. Sees two policies as possible for the U.S. in the 1980s: a united front against the USSR and a "modus vivendi" with the USSR combined with establishment of a multiple linkage system. Advocates the second. Suggests that U.S. pressure for a Japanese military buildup would be counterproductive. Such a buildup could not relieve U.S. forces for service elsewhere, but would destabilize the region by provoking greater Soviet military expansion and raising fears in South Korea and ASEAN. The U.S. should instead urge Japan to focus on its non-military contribution to security: development aid to increase regional stability, alternate energy research to reduce dependence, cautious economic links with the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam to discourage them from destabilizing actions.

--Evaluates Japanese foreign and defense policy in postwar period through the 1970s. Views Japan as a "lightly armed trading state" with little political and no military influence throughout the period. Examines Japanese domestic attitudes toward defense and argues that large scale expansion of current defense efforts is unlikely. No discussion of other nations' reactions.

--Detailed analysis of negotiations on security issues prior to the Reagan-Suzuki summit and the controversy in Japan over language in the communique describing the bilateral security relationship as an "alliance". Argues that Japanese opinion, with the exception of that of a small number of defense specialists, politicians and bureaucrats who are more international in outlook, is profoundly isolationist. Suggests that
no short term change in this view, and hence in the level of defense, may be expected, but argues that over the longer term this isolationism may fade, especially as perception of a Soviet threat become more widespread. A major buildup of the Japanese military cannot be expected to happen automatically even then, however. U.S. officials must carefully cultivate Japanese leaders and public opinion if they desire Japan to undertake a larger military role.


-- Analysis of geopolitical situation in Asia and prospects for future. Sees Asia as a region of pro-Western stability despite Soviet adventurism. Detailed discussion of factors contributing to stability and factors which give the Soviet Union an opportunity to increase its influence. Argues U.S. policy must be to strengthen relations with Japan and ASEAN and to cautiously develop the relationship with the PRC. Identifies the "cautious reassertion of Japan" as a factor for stability in the region. Notes "...the trend is neither toward mindless militarism nor toward an abnegation of Japanese responsibility...Fears about Japanese militarism are misplaced."
2. Descriptive Bibliography of Japanese Sources


--Advocates a policy of Japanese "Gaullism" which would involve development of a strong, independent military and an independent nuclear force. Sees such a policy as necessary for both objective and subjective reasons, i.e. to counter the Soviet threat and to satisfy and revive national honor. However, sees little chance of acceptance for such a policy in the absence of some cataclysmic event (the "Pearl Harbor" of the title) capable of shocking the Japanese out of their current isolationism and self-satisfied pacifism. Little discussion of the regional consequences of such a policy; does advocate a military alliance with South Korea, implies support for a Japanese contribution to Taiwanese security. (See especially chapter four.)

--Analyzes the nature of the Soviet threat in the region and advocates a Japanese military buildup as part of larger efforts to contain it. Focuses on strategy and on Japanese domestic opinion on defense issues. Notes without discussion widespread Japanese concern about regional consequences of a military buildup: "Japan also has been extremely sensitive to the danger that the U.S. and Southeast Asian nations might regard any strengthening of Japan's defense forces as a return to "militarism." Many persons in Japan have been apprehensive that other Asian/Pacific nations would be resistant to the idea of a direct Japanese military role in cooperative regional security endeavors." However, implies that economic assistance to ASEAN as part of common effort against Soviet threat would resolve this problem.

JAPAN BIBLIOGRAPHY

---Study by professor from Japan’s National Defense College of Asian reactions to a Japanese military buildup. Analyzes reactions to two possible policies: present policy and a more active military posture, including participation by Japanese troops in collective security arrangements, peacekeeping missions abroad. Examines evidence available in written sources and from interviews. Concludes that present Japanese policy is encountering no serious opposition and is widely supported in Asia. Further concludes that even a more active policy would be accepted and even welcomed if within the existing U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

---Discusses geopolitical developments in Asia in 1960s-70s. Sees changes in both U.S. and PRC policies as a response to failure of more ambitious policies. Discusses development of Japanese opinion on defense policy and Japanese relations with South Korea and the PRC.

---Discusses Asian political and strategic situation. Supports 1976 military expansion plan as well as increased economic and technical assistance under the comprehensive security doctrine to build regional security. Little discussion of regional impact of Japanese military buildup but does note that the growing Sino-Japanese relationship may be destabilizing: "...the majority of Asian nations have given a positive evaluation of the Japan-China Treaty. But the reaction of the ROK has been somewhat negative, and there seems to be some anxiety in parts of Southeast Asian over future pressures being exerted by a cooperative Sino-Japanese relationship."

---Argues that access to the Pacific is a key Soviet strategic goal and that the current balance of power in Northeast Asia is fragile, especially because the West is depending too heavily on continuation of the PRC’s current policy. Analyzes the Soviet naval...
buildup. Sees little possibility of a rapid Japanese military buildup or a more active Japanese strategic stance: "Although the prospect of a friendlier, economically cooperative relationship with China is popular in Japan, the inclusion of China in the U.S.-Japanese military alliance is not at all attractive, especially if it means that Japan would be expected to make a military contribution beyond taking care of its own territorial defense. It will take years, perhaps even a couple of generations, before Japan will be ready to participate actively in a regional alliance."

--An important exposition of Japanese pacifist and neutralist thought by noted scholar. Title and author's viewpoint are explained by introductory passage: "In January 1941, [Admiral] Inoue wrote his "Argument for a New Armaments Plan". He forcefully argued that naval competition with the U.S. and the UK had not increased Japanese security. Today as well, what Japan can do is not face down the threat of war, but only evade it." Argues that possession of military forces presents a major danger to Japan because of the continuing potential for militarism and authoritarianism, and the difficulty of maintaining civilian control over the military under the Japanese system. Argues that, in view of the overwhelming power of the superpowers and Japan's inherent vulnerability, the possibility of military defense is illusory. Suggests that Japan can be best protected by a policy of unarmed neutralism, which would make it unthreatening to aggressors and more useful independent than occupied. If Japan is attacked it should surrender and negotiate favorable terms rather than futilely resist. Part of a published debate between Morishima and Seki Yoshihiko, an defense supporter.

--Continuation of debate between Morishima and Seki.

--Criticism of the defense policies of Nakasone and the "military realist" school; discussion of burden-sharing issue. Opposes heavy military buildup as likely to have deleterious effect on Japanese economy and bilateral relations: "...such military realists may look pro-American because of their support of
global American strategic aims, but, in fact, many of them seem more like the Gaullists of Europe who seek autonomy. Nakasone's...[policy statements]...seem to imply a sort of "fortress Japan" which could conflict with the open-market orientation vital for Japan's future."

--Advocates pro-Western collective security pact for Asia/Pacific region. Suggests gradual strengthening and extension of current bilateral and multilateral defense pacts could evolve into a Western Pacific Treaty Organization (WEPTO). Suggested policy is extremely activist in Japanese terms: advocates Japanese participation with Australia in peace-keeping force in Cambodia, formation of a U.S.-Japan-ROK military alliance, integration of Japan into NATO, and constitutional revision. Assumes such actions would be welcomed by pro-Western Asian countries; indicatively, argues that residual suspicion from colonial period only barrier to Japan-ROK military link.

--Clearly favors a military buildup. After briefly reviewing the changes in the geostrategic situation and climate of opinion which made discussion of a military buildup possible in Japan, gives a detailed discussion of needed procurement, recruitment and readiness measures. Strongly advocates increased coordination with U.S. forces. Little consideration of regional repercussions of a Japanese military buildup but suggests that other Asian nations (ROK, Australia, New Zealand, ASEAN) would welcome increased military coordination with Japan. Argues without substantiation that revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would damage relations with pro-Western Asian countries and the U.S.

--Advocates a Japanese military buildup in the context of the bilateral treaty with the U.S. Focuses on the threat posed to Japan by the Soviet Union. No consideration of regional impact of policy.

--Advocates increased military spending, improved
JAPAN BIBLIOGRAPHY

readiness, rationalization of strategy and procurement, and creations of reserves for Japanese military. Believes military mission should be territorial defense; opposes external role because of probable opposition from other Asian countries: "To provide effective insurance...[against Soviet attacks on Japanese shipping]...would necessitate setting up large naval complexes in Southeast Asia. The countries concerned would not relish a Japanese military presence in this area in the foreseeable future, since many of them are still wary of the spectre of Japanese militarism."

Saito, Seichiro. "Tonan Ajia wa Nihon no Kaiken Rongi o Do Mite iru ka?" [How Does Southeast Asia View Japan's Debate on Revision of the Constitution?] Shokun Dec. 81. -- Detailed report of interviews with senior government military and diplomatic officials in ASEAN countries. Extensive quotes of their views. Conclusion criticizes Japanese tendency to lump ASEAN countries together and fail to discern their differences. Notes the "fragility" of ASEAN countries due to internal instability. Argues that ASEAN is divided on nature of external threats, with the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore encouraging an increased U.S. presence to counter the Soviet Union, while Malaysia and Indonesia are more concerned about the PRC and the possibility that U.S. policy will strengthen it. Holds that ASEAN strongly supports a Japanese military buildup. ASEAN views on revision of the Japanese Constitution vary from conditional acceptance in the Philippines to positive approval in Singapore and Malaysia: "It would not be correct to say that the ASEAN countries feel absolutely no fear of Japanese militarization. However, the important point is that Japan's appeal is growing and is offsetting their fear of Japan." Approves of foreign aid-based diplomacy as both worthwhile and useful. Interestingly, argues against constitutional revision and a military buildup on the grounds that it would open Japan to manipulation by ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia: "What I wish to emphasize is that, if Japan were, in the context of East-West relations, to revise its constitution and greatly expand its military power, this military power might possibly have an appeal to ASEAN as a 'Japan card'. Using 'fear of Japan' as its weapon, it would aim at securing military assistance from Japan." Japan would thus be drawn into protecting other Asian countries from external threats while they concentrate on resolving internal problems.

--Extended argument for possession of armed forces to deter aggression built around criticism of the observations and historical examples Morishima advances to support his pacifist views. Important attack on pacifist position.

--Continuation of debate discussed above.

--Suggests that the postwar Japanese tendency to reject strategic thinking is ending due to changes in the external situation: relative decline of U.S. power, absolute increase in Soviet power. Advocates, without specifics, closer links to NATO for Japan in order to improve Western defenses. Argues that military expansion should be limited to what will not threaten the "countries of the Western alliance" to avoid undercutting efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Argues that the U.S. can no longer oppose the Soviet Union alone and that the situation requires combined efforts with Japan and NATO. No consideration of the regional impact of such a policy.

Sono, Akira and Kaihara, Osamu. "Kokkai no Boei Rongi wa Chugakusei no Toronkai" [The Defense Debate in the Diet is like a Junior High School Debate]. Shokun May 84.
--Wideranging discussion of global geopolitical situation by two supporters of expansion of Japan's military. Criticizes the unrealistic nature of most Japanese discussion of defense policy (hence the title). Expects status quo policy to continue.

--Calls for development of stronger regional anti-Soviet cooperation. Argues that a larger Japanese role in region is needed, especially in sealane defense, but feels it should be within the context of bilateral and multilateral arrangements to avoid destabilizing effects on the region. To quote: "To hasten the realization of appropriate new Japanese defense policies, one development of tremendous value would be the enunciation by the non-communist Asian nations and the United States of clear statements regarding the sorts of defense policies they would like Japan to adopt, including their views with respect to the kind of defense cooperation they
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desire with Japan in this region. Japan must ascertain, for example, whether the Asian/Pacific states, including the U.S., would find acceptable an eventual Japanese decision to increase the country’s naval strength. In view of the residual historical memories still latent in some parts of the region, Japan is certainly in no position to take a unilateral positive initiative with respect to such a project as constructing large ships similar to those of the U.S. fleet. Japan can proceed only to the extent that acceptance can be obtained from the other regional states, and then only under the condition that the future Japanese naval forces would be incorporated into an allied fleet, thereby precluding any possibility that Japan would utilize such forces unilaterally, except in the case of defending the Japanese homeland and the nearby sea lanes.

---Criticizes Japanese public opinion on defense issues as unrealistic, supports a more active military role for Japan within the U.S.-Japan alliance. By implication, sees no unfavorable consequences in the region. However, suggests Japanese political situation is volatile, hence dangerous: "...the sort of public crisis of confidence that might emerge in Japan could force the nation in one of two directions: rapid and massive rearmament, or Finlandization...if the government fails to exercise the political leadership necessary to influence public opinion on national security issues, the process of consensus formation will be shaped by events. The unfolding of a crisis may then enflame public passions and permit dangerous, extremist forces in society to influence the process of consensus formation.

In Japan, there seem to exist the conditions for a sudden, uncontrollable wave of public outcry and alarm about defense policy. In the context of Japanese politics, such an outburst could take either of two extreme forms. On the one hand, public opinion could coalesce in support of a very militaristic solution to Japan’s security problem. This could result from the fear that the United States might not come to the aid of Japan in case of an emergency...there is something worrisome about the fact that those advocating substantially increased Japanese military power are now speaking out more openly, more forcefully, and more persistently than ever before, and are paid increasingly serious attention. These developments could be simply a harbinger of a new self-image for Japan, one that is consistent with its
enhanced power, status, and international responsibilities. But they could also suggest an underlying volatility of Japanese opinion toward defense issues, a volatility that could propel Japan toward a remilitarization of its approach to international affairs.

On the other hand, however, a public uprising against Japan’s national security policy need not be limited to a militarist or rightist variety but has its counterpart at the opposite political extreme. A potent backlash could arise in Japan against what is seen as a “militaristic” trend in government and society, sharply polarizing the Japanese political debate.

Thus, the sort of public crisis of confidence that might emerge in Japan could force the nation in one of two directions: rapid and massive rearmament, or Finlandization.


--Summary of nature and development of Japanese-Soviet mutual images by a professor of Russian Studies at Sophia University. Concentrates on Japanese perceptions. Several developments—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet buildup in Asia and the Pacific, continued acrimony over fishing rights, and increased consciousness of the Northern Territories issue—have worsened Japanese opinion of the Soviet Union. Author concludes that mutual esteem is unlikely to increase soon.
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