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STUDENT ESSAY

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FALKLANDS' WAR:
STRATEGIC, INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC FAILURES

BY

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MAY 1985

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



AD-A157 369

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A157 369	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) "Falklands' War: Strategic, Intelligence, and Diplomatic Failures"		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED STUDENT ESSAY	
7. AUTHOR(s) Lieutenant Colonel Luis Andarcia		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
12. REPORT DATE May 1985		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED	
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, an archipelago located about 400 miles off the Argentine coast. The surprise attack brought to a climax 140 years of controversy between Argentina and Great Britain over the sovereignty of the islands. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded quickly to the Argentine show of force, and British units recaptured the islands within a month of their arrival. The Falklands War was short-lived, but significant. The outbreak of hostilities was the result of miscalculations (See continuation).			

20. ABSTRACT--Continuation.

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May 1985

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Luis Andarcia, LTC, AR
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TITLE: Falklands' War: Strategic, Intelligence, and
Diplomatic Failures

FORMAT: Individual Essay

DATE: 12 May 1985 **PAGES:** 29

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, an archipelago located about 400 miles off the Argentine coast. The surprise attack brought to a climax 140 years of controversy between Argentina and Great Britain over the sovereignty of the islands. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded quickly to the Argentine show of force, and British units recaptured the islands within a month of their arrival. The Falklands War was short-lived, but significant. The outbreak of hostilities was the result of miscalculations on the part of the Argentine military junta, which risked its political future and the economic stability of the country on a show of military force against a major world power. Unfortunately, Argentine strategy failed to anticipate the strong British popular reaction and the willingness of the prime minister to use the crisis to strengthen the position of her Conservative government at home. Britain was vulnerable to surprise attack essentially because her intelligence professionals overlooked signs of political unrest and certain military intelligence communications from Argentina. Also contributing to escalation of the conflict were the aborted U.S. diplomatic effort and the junta's misdirected confidence in a positive Soviet reaction. The outcome of the Falklands War and the U.S. support of Britain reaffirmed the strength of the NATO alliance, but also had a negative impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S. has lost its grip on the politics of Latin America, and even its diplomatic role as negotiator was questioned within the region.

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FALKLANDS' WAR:

Strategic, Intelligence and Diplomatic Failures

Introduction

The objective of this essay is to analyze the fundamental aspects of the war between Britain and Argentina, focusing on intelligence, political and strategic decision-making, and diplomacy.

Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands on the 2nd of April 1982 took the British government and its people by surprise; nevertheless on April 3rd, one day after this act of aggression, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the Royal Fleet deployed to the South Atlantic, and thirty days later the islands were recaptured. The series of misperceptions and miscalculations, on both sides, which led to this debacle were deeply rooted in nationalistic pride and ethnocentrism. Internal political problems manifested themselves in war fever, which could not be controlled by the international legal system nor by frenetic attempts at shuttle diplomacy. A study of this short-lived, intense

conflict can teach us much about current strategic realities.

Political History of the Islands

According to legend, the Falkland Islands were first discovered in 1501 by Amerigo Vespucci, an Italian explorer representing the Spanish Crown. However, the earliest documentation of a European claim is a sketch of the island chain by a cartographer of King Carlos I of Spain, bearing the name San Anton Islands and dated 1526. Sixty-five years later, the British navigator John Davis sighted the islands, and eight years after that the Dutch captain Sebald de Viert landed there, inspiring the name "Sebaldinas". A century later another British sailor John Strong called the archipelago "Falklands" in honor of the British noble who had financed his travels.

France was the first European power to occupy the territory, having arrived on the "strange rocky islets" in 1754. Thereafter, the islands were called "Malouinas," pronounced "Malvinas" by the Spaniards. In 1762 the British expelled the French, remaining there until 1774, but recognizing the Spanish possession of the islands.

Argentina's Independence Day in 1810 marked the beginning of a 170-year territorial dispute between

Argentina and Great Britain. The infant South American republic considered herself the legitimate heir to Spanish interests in the islands, which are located about 400 miles off the Argentine coast. In 1820 Argentina took control of the region, only to be humiliated thirteen years later when the British corvette Clio arrived at the archipelago and the British flag was raised over the islands once again.

Never accepting British occupation, the Argentinians continue to call the islands by the Spanish name "Malvinas." Wounded national pride has kept the issue alive among the Argentine people, and periodically, especially during times of political and economic instability, the situation has festered into open resentment and hostilities. In 1964 the United Nations convened a session to address the sovereignty of the territory. Ironically, just as the U.N. General Assembly was exhorting Great Britain and Argentina to look for a peaceful solution, Argentine nationalists took matters into their own hands. An Argentinian airline flight was diverted from its national route, landed at Port Stanley, and the Argentine flag was raised over the islands. Four days later, nationalists attacked the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Tensions continued to erupt. In 1972 Argentina's national newspaper called for volunteers to form an occupation force, and in 1976 an Argentine destroyer in the

Falklands area attacked a British research vessel, which was unarmed except for explosives intended for geoseismic studies. Responding to the official British protest, the Buenos Aires government claimed that the incident occurred inside Argentina's "territorial waters."

Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement were too slow and frustrating for the Argentinians. In February 1982, after five years of negotiations, Argentina complained that she was losing her patience because of the lack of progress. As of February 26th, both parties had only agreed to form a negotiating commission that would meet on a regular basis. London announced its decision to table the sovereignty issue for twenty-five years, in hopes that the British inhabitants of the islands would overcome their reluctance to become Argentine citizens.

Having reached an impasse in negotiations, the President of Argentina, General Leopoldo Galtieri seized upon a minor diplomatic dispute as a pretext for a show of military force. In 1979 an Argentine businessman, Sergio Davidoff, had acquired three whaling stations in the South Georgia Islands, also British possessions. Each time Davidoff visited his property, he was required to obtain special permission from the British authorities in the Falklands. The strained relationship between Buenos Aires

and London erupted into confrontation on 18 March 1982, when nineteen of Davidoff's workers, transported by an Argentine naval vessel, landed at San Pedro Island, South Georgia, and raised the Argentine flag. The British warned the Argentinians to leave the island, and General Galtieri dispatched additional naval forces to South Georgia, warning the British ambassador in Buenos Aires that Argentina was prepared to protect its citizens from being expelled by the British garrison on the islands.

The Strategy of Invasion

Argentina's invasion of the Falklands was a successful military operation capitalizing on the element of surprise. The operation employed both secrecy and rapidity, the two elements Clausewitz considered essential for a successful surprise attack.¹ The Argentinians were able to deceive British intelligence in the area by using computer-coded transmissions. Argentine naval forces arrived at the islands on April 2, barely two weeks after the confrontation in South Georgia. Having captured both the British garrison and the British governor in a single day, the Argentine forces then issued an ultimatum, and the attack was concluded with very few casualties, on the Argentine side.

History, however, has shown that a successful surprise attack does not always result in final victory. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States rebuilt its naval forces and mobilized its national will to defeat the aggressor, after a prolonged conflict. In the Falklands War, the British retaliated as quickly as possible, employing superior naval, aviation, and ground-based forces. Within thirty days of the arrival of the British task force, the islands were again securely in the hands of the British.

Why did Argentina's strategy fail? The military operation was apparently designed to end British domination of the Falkland Islands--a political objective in the international arena. But the military junta of Argentina had as its primary goal the strengthening of its power within the country--an internal political objective. General Galtieri's government was in a difficult position at home, having failed to avert a serious economic crisis and threatened by the rise of opposition parties and workers' unions, which had been prohibited since the coup d'etat in 1976. Reclaiming the "Malvinas" would serve as a means to divert public attention from the burdensome economic problems and revitalize the national spirit through a successful show of military force against a major world power. War fever in Buenos Aires was intensifying daily, fed by national press reports and public demonstrations. The junta

gambled that a show of national unity before a common foe would restore the country's internal cohesion. In short, the junta's strategic objectives were based on political hopes and not on the realities of international conflict.

Argentina's pursuit of total victory was based on several miscalculations. First, the political leaders underestimated the strength of the British commitment in the area. They believed that the British would lack the will to retake the islands by military force. To the Argentinians, the lack of progress at the negotiation table was a signal that the British were not willing to resolve the issue through diplomacy. The withdrawal of the British patrol ship Endurance from the area was viewed as indicating a lack of a long-term military commitment in the South Atlantic. Argentina believed that London had always considered sovereignty of the Falklands an insignificant matter, since the British had felt no urgency to decide the issue for more than 140 years. The junta rationalized that the British would be able to save face by using the 150th anniversary of the British seizure of the Falkland Islands, set for January 1983, as a fitting occasion for relinquishing its colonial claims to the archipelago.

Unfortunately, Galtieri's assessment failed to take into account the probability that the Thatcher government

and the British press would view the crisis as a test of national will and military strength. On April 1, the British had demonstrated their willingness to take military action in a crisis with Argentina. In response to the incidents in the South Georgias, the Thatcher government had reacted immediately, alerting a naval force of three destroyers and a frigate to deploy from Gibraltar to the Falklands. However, the junta still went through with its plans to invade the Falklands the next day, and on the 3rd of April, Argentine forces captured South Georgia. Like the junta, the Thatcher government was suffering from economic adversities and political instability, and at this critical point, the British were not willing to show weakness at home or abroad.

Argentina's even-handed foreign policy over the preceding few years doubtless contributed to General Galtieri's false confidence in taking an aggressive action to occupy the islands. The South American nation had maintained friendly relations with both the United States and the U.S.S.R. and Galtieri reasoned that, at the very least, neither superpower would adamantly oppose the Argentine invasion and, at best, they might help temper Britain's reaction to the occupation. When the U.S. imposed a grain embargo upon the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan, Argentina filled the gap by selling grain to the Soviet

Union. So Galtieri was disappointed to see the Soviets abstain from vetoing the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Argentine invasion. He did not realize that the Soviet Union would not stand alone in the community of nations in supporting international aggression. The junta had failed to assure a positive reaction on the part of the Soviets by advising them in advance of its intention to invade.

In planning a surprise attack, the moral considerations retain a great importance. A country which launches a surprise operation most likely will be denounced as the aggressor by the community of nations. If the military action is not wholly successful, severe reprisals will be taken against the country guilty of the breach of peace. If the aggressor is defeated, it may be held fully responsible and accountable for its actions. In the case of the Falklands crisis, the British government called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on April 1, asking for sanctions against Argentina. The resolution, quickly passed by the council, demanded that Argentina withdraw its troops from the islands immediately. In Brussels, ten nations of the European Common Market agreed to suspend their imports from Argentina, an action which cut the country's exports by 20 percent.

In addition to miscalculating the direction of world opinion, the Argentine junta failed to predict the U.S.'s willingness to support the British. The military and political leadership of Argentina believed that the U.S. would either act to prevent any retaliatory action by the British or at least remain neutral in the conflict. In the Central American crisis, Argentina had been involved in training military forces and supplying military advisors, intelligence information, food, and other materiel to El Salvador and other countries. The junta was doing more than any other Latin American country to support U.S. objectives in Central America. Nevertheless, a broader view of U.S. international interests would reveal the basis of American support of the British cause, if negotiations failed. Following the defense of North America, Europe ranks second in strategic importance for the U.S., because of the Communist threat in the area and also because of the long-standing economic, political, and social ties the U.S. has with its "mother continent." South America is in fifth position, following the Pacific (third) and the Middle East (fourth). Furthermore, the U.S. and Great Britain are strong partners in NATO, the first line of defense in Europe from aggression by countries of the Warsaw Pact. If forced to choose sides in the Falklands conflict, the U.S. would be obligated to aid Great Britain and not allow the defeat or humiliation of its NATO ally.

Had Argentine intelligence made a more accurate strategic analysis, the country might have placed diplomatic efforts to negotiate the issue above the self-interests of the junta.

Failure of British Intelligence

Whatever the reasons underlying the invasion of the Falklands, the military action did succeed in surprising the British, whose government, reacting with strength and decisiveness, soon managed to turn an unfavorable situation into an indisputable victory. In discussing the British failure to anticipate the invasion, it is important to analyze the role of ethnocentrism, which frequently creates dangerous misperceptions. First World versus Third World ethnocentrism is a particularly virulent form of this common problem.

In the case of the Falklands, ethnocentricity can account for the marked inability of British officials to interpret and anticipate the intentions and capabilities of the Argentine junta. Great Britain made little attempt to understand the nationalistic fervor of the Argentine people, the instability their economy, or the radically different circumstances in a less developed country. Traditionally, Great Britain has tended to ignore the Latin American

perspective and to underestimate the importance of South America and the determination of its people.²

At least one British official, Sir James Cable, ambassador to another European country, did not consider the Falklands invasion worthy of being termed a surprise attack (nor the Argentinians worthy opponents of the British). In a foreign policy address after the war, Cable said:

Strategic surprise is the fate of the enemy who is not awaiting any attack at all. Perhaps he does not even know he is an enemy, or else he thinks that his own strength or his alliances or distances or national obstacles have given him immunity. He may believe in the sovereign virtues of a non-aggression pact, of neutrality, of international law. He may rely on the protection of the United Nations. He may even have concluded that there was no point in attempting a defence which could only be futile. The last kind of enemy, however, is a sitting bird and attacking him should not be dignified as strategic surprise.

The problem of strategic surprise is very complex because it involves human psychology and other subjective factors. Efforts to hedge against surprise are constrained by a murky combination of controversial political and diplomatic issues. It has been suggested that the principal cause of surprise is not the failure of intelligence, but the unwillingness of political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch. Politicians' reluctance to authorize military response to an

early warning is rarely due to stupidity or negligence. Rather it is due to concern (sometimes justifiable, as in the case of the Falklands) for the possible effects on the economy, internal politics, or diplomatic ties with other nations.

The failure of the British government to send a deterrent force at the time of the Georgia incident can be attributed largely to economic problems, especially the exorbitant cost of sending a naval task force to a British outpost 8,000 miles away. Also contributing to the British inertia were several other factors: the relatively short crisis period (easily seen as another flareup of a centuries-long dispute); the temporary absence of the British Foreign Secretary (in Israel when the invasion took place); the Foreign Office's preoccupation with the upcoming budget meeting of the European Community; and continued British underestimation of the strength of Argentinian nationalism.

Having examined the political climate that shaped Mrs. Thatcher's response, we must address the question of the accuracy of British intelligence sources. The Economist, in its 10 April 1982, edition sharply criticized the intelligence failure:




British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher



Alexander Haig
U.S. Secretary of State



General Leopoldo Galtieri, President of Argentina



Did the British government know of Argentina's intention to invade in advance? If so, why did it not act sooner?" The operational plans of the Argentine Navy, indicating the probability, though not the certainty, of the invasion, are said to have been in Whitehall on or around March 26th, seven days before the assault.

British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington had admitted knowing that a naval exercise was taking the Argentine fleet towards the Falklands, but claimed that not until March 29th did the junta itself take the final decision to invade. This is quite possible, considering that the Galtieri regime was also involved in quelling anti-government civil disturbances during this period.

The responsibility of supplying Mrs. Thatcher's overseas and defense cabinet committee with intelligence summaries falls to the cabinet office's Joint Intelligence Committee and its supporting joint intelligence organization. This committee is under Foreign Office chairmanship and has a wealth of resources on which to draw. These include:

*Signals intelligence. This is usually the most reliable and valuable raw material. The signals stations on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic are well placed to listen to Argentinian transmissions. The results are pooled

between the British government's communications headquarters (an arm of the Foreign Office) and the National Security Agency in Washington. There were, no doubt, Argentine computer-based codes that could not be cracked.³

*Photographs. The build-up of the Argentine forces was observed from American satellites, and this intelligence was passed on to Britain as a regular gift from Washington's national reconnaissance office.⁴

*Routine political reporting. The British embassy in Buenos Aires, with contributions from its military and naval attaches, reports regularly to the Foreign Office, and presumably has its own secret intelligence sources within Argentina.⁵

The cabinet's Joint Intelligence Committee consists of civil servants and intelligence officers, not ministers. Its membership includes people from the whole range of secret agencies (the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service, GCHQ, the various branches of defense intelligence) plus officials from the Foreign, Home, and Cabinet Offices and the Defense Ministry. It is this committee which produces the intelligence briefs for the handful of ministers who are deemed to have the "need to know."

What were these professionals saying about the Falklands six to eight weeks before the invasion, when there was still time to dispatch the Royal Navy to the South Atlantic? Officials from the Buenos Aires Embassy now claim that it had been vigorously warning London all along. The misperception of the country's national will, based on British intelligence analysis, resulted in the resignation of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who took with him the two senior ministers most closely involved, Mr. Humphry Athus and Mr. Richard Luce. Mrs. Thatcher tried to persuade Lord Carrington not to resign, but he felt the credibility of his department was undermined by the charge of giving the cabinet false assessments of intelligence from Argentina.

Having succumbed to a surprise attack, the government of Britain reacted very quickly and was able to put out to sea a considerable task force, projecting sea power over a distance of 8,000 miles to the Falkland Islands. Within thirty days, the archipelago was recaptured.

Breakdown of U.S. Diplomacy

For the United States, the Falklands conflict was a secondary rather than a primary crisis. However, there is no doubt that the war put the U.S. in an awkward position since it has ties of friendship and alliances with both of the combatants. Among the White House staff, there was

little sense of urgency. The Falklands crisis, however, was not an isolated problem; it threatened the credibility of the Western Alliance (NATO); the survival of a British government, friend of the U.S.; the future of American policy and relations in the Western Hemisphere as well as in Europe; and the possibility of another dangerous strategic incursion by the Soviet Union into South America.⁶ President Reagan naturally declared himself a friend to both parties and sent Secretary of State Alexander Haig on a diplomatic shuttle mission. The President made a personal telephone call to General Galtieri, but this diplomatic effort failed. Mr. Caspar Weinberger's spokesman at the Defense Department announced on Tuesday that the United States would give no help to either side in a British-Argentine conflict.

The United States could not afford a British-Argentine war, regardless of which nation won or lost. The Reagan administration wanted a negotiated settlement, but on April 15th, on the occasion of Mr. Alexander Haig's second visit to Buenos Aires, it became clear that the United States was moving from its role as mediator in the Falklands dispute towards becoming a supporter of Britain. General Galtieri refused to withdraw Argentina's troops from the islands without any but the barest of preconditions, so the United States announced its willingness to support the British

cause and impose penalties, including trade sanctions, against Argentina. (At this point, the military junta should have negotiated a diplomatic solution, because the strategic premises for the invasion, lack of British military response and American neutrality, had proved to be false. Argentina was not prepared for a war against a member of one of the most powerful military alliances in the world.)

Early in the crisis, Mrs. Thatcher had imposed three preconditions for stopping British military action, none of which gave any credence to Argentina's claims to the islands:⁷

1. The Argentinean troops must withdraw from the islands before talks could begin.
2. The sovereignty of the islands has not been affected by the act of invasion.
3. The wishes of the Falkland islanders will be "paramount" in future negotiations.

Mr. Haig's shuttle diplomacy was frenetic. He arrived in London on the afternoon of Thursday, April 8th, with a delegation of seven senior American government officials, among them General Vernon Walters, a good Spanish speaker. After talking with the Chief of the Defense Staff (Admiral

of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin), Sir Anthony Acland from the Foreign Office, Mrs. Thatcher, and Mr. Pym, Mr. Haig returned the next morning to Buenos Aires. He spent four hours on Saturday afternoon with Mr. Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister and five hours with President Galtieri. Mr. Haig's main task was to persuade the Argentinians that the British were not bluffing over the use of force.

On April 30th, the Americans disclosed a plan offering a negotiated settlement before the real fighting began. The plan called for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of British and Argentine forces from the South Atlantic; an end to European Economic Community sanctions against Argentina; the setting up of an interim American-British-Argentine authority on the island, which would work with the Falklanders; and a "framework" for negotiations on a final settlement.

Negotiations broke down on May 1st, when Secretary of State Haig became exasperated at the conflicts within the Argentine military junta and clearly took the side of the British. Mr. Haig branded Argentina an aggressor and announced a series of measures the U.S. would take against the country, including a ban on military sales and a freeze on credits. Most important, the U.S. stated that it would

offer "to respond positively to requests for material support from the British forces." This decision aroused anti-American feelings in Argentina and throughout Latin America, and from that point on, the United States was no longer acceptable as a sole mediator in the crisis. Concurrently with the U.S. efforts, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and Peru individually tried to stop the war between Britain and Argentina through diplomatic negotiations. However, these efforts were unsuccessful because the combatants were not willing to give up their national interests.

The Soviet Opinion

Mr. Alexander Haig's assessment that the Soviets would try to take advantage of crisis to further its strategic incursion into Latin America proved not too far from reality. Widening the schism between the U.S. and its Latin neighbors would further Soviet political interests in the region, particularly by discouraging Latin American support of U.S. objectives in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In early May, the Soviet Union declared itself in favor of Argentina and began a "war of words" against the NATO allies.

The Kremlin termed the British determination to recapture the islands "inadvisable" and denounced the sending of

the British fleet as an act of "piracy." In his shuttle diplomacy, Alexander Haig was serving as a "messenger of the British neo-colonialism." According to Soviet reasoning, Great Britain had "provoked an escalation of the crisis" for two reasons:

First, Britain, eager to continue its traditional economic exploitation, was looking for the oil and gas reserves around the Falklands.

Second, the crisis in itself was useful in hiding the failure of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government.

The USSR also stated that the economic sanctions imposed on Argentina by the European Common Market were "another manifestation of the well-known imperialistic tactics of economic domination." The Soviet message was clear: Latin American nations, suffering grave economic problems at home and in the international marketplace, were still subject to the economic and military domination of the U.S. and Western Europe.

Unfortunately for the Argentinians, the Soviet Union offered only empty words. The junta in Buenos Aires believed that the Soviets would come to the aid of its South American trading partner and veto U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 502 on the Falklands invasion. Though the

Kremlin offered General Galtieri some intelligence assistance, this never materialized to the same extent as the U.S. logistical and intelligence aid to the British. Argentina and other Latin American nations learned not to be over-dependent upon either of the superpowers in solving their political problems.

Conclusion: The Lessons Learned

One may draw many lessons from this unique short war:

*From the strategic viewpoint, the Argentinians introduced the element of surprise, but failed to follow through. Once the decision has been taken to wage war, the attacker has to make extensive use of his air forces. Argentina placed them on the mainland, 400 miles away from the Falklands, losing the opportunity to gain air superiority and present a major obstacle to the British fleet.

*The outcome of the war, and not the outcome of the campaigns, determines how well the strategy serves the nation's interests.

*Final outcomes of war depend on a wider range of factors that are beyond the contest of military power. In the case of the Falklands War, the outcome was determined by many complex factors, including the internal political cli-

mate of both combatants and the global interests of the superpowers.

*In deciding whether or not to initiate hostilities, statesmen should attempt to weigh the risks and costs of avoiding war, on the one hand, against the dangers and possible gains of war, on the other. The Argentine junta failed to make a realistic assessment of the military and political risks inherent in provoking a confrontation with a major world power.

*In fighting a war, a nation has to suit the means to the ends. Argentina gambled that Britain would not retaliate with military force, and so did not mobilize sufficient resources to wage a conventional war.

*Bueno de Mezquita assumed that foreign policy decisions are made by individual political leaders, whose self-interest will be affected by the outcome of the war.⁸ The Argentine junta evidently intended to use the war as a means to restore national unity and preserve its own power. The defeat in the Falklands meant the demise of the Argentine military. On the other hand, the junta's spectacular retreat from the political scene and the nation's return to democracy, with a new government elected by a clear majority, are no doubt positive outcomes for the country and

a source of hope for the eventual settlement of the Falklands question.

*The mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts within the interamerican system did not function appropriately in order to avoid war in the South Atlantic. The OAS and other alliances have been discredited and paralyzed as a result of this failure.

*Washington must realize that it no longer dominates the politics of Latin American nations. The governments of these countries, whether they are democratic or totalitarian, are acting with greater autonomy and defining their own interests, both nationally and regionally. Cooperation between the United States and Latin America will continue only if the U.S. recognizes that political and economic relations must be consistent with the needs and interests of the individual countries and the region. The Monroe Doctrine and Pan Americanism have lost their credibility.

In seeking a resolution of the Falklands conflict, the world community faces a considerable diplomatic challenge. No legal solution can be successful unless it is supported by a joint Anglo-Argentine determination to resolve the issue. Despite the aggression on the part of Argentina, the Organization of American States and other non-aligned countries have given their support to the Argentine claims.

At its last summit meeting, the OAS reaffirmed its position that the "Malvinas," South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands are an integral part of the Latin American region.

There are three possible ways to solve the problem:

*Transfer of sovereignty and administration to
Argentina

*The sharing of control through an Anglo-Argentine
commission

*A lease-back alternative, allowing eventual Argentine
sovereignty.

Finding a permanent solution to the Falklands question will require some serious negotiations among the principal parties, Argentina, Great Britain, and possibly the United States. And it will require a recognition, among all interested nations, of the new political realities in the region.

NOTES

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2. Peter Calvert, "The Falkland Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs," The Times (London), June 4, 1982, p 160.
3. Editorial, "Falkland Islands: Will Two Weeks of Steaming Let Off the Pressure?" The Economist, Apr 10, 1982, p 225.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Alexander Haig, "The Falklands: My Waterloo," Time, Apr 9, 1984, p 39.
7. El Diario de Caracas, Apr 22, 1982, p 39.
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