PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT—THE KEY FOR MAKING FORCE MODERNIZATION PAYOFF

BY

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The basic argument is to prove that the personnel management of the manpower resource area is the most vital and important element necessary to ensure success in the dramatic change the US Army is experiencing. The vehicle used is a discussion of the force modernization program with particular emphasis on presenting for commanders and personnel managers recent examples of success and failure, as well as a discussion of pitfalls in the management of soldiers. The paper is primarily focused for, and intended to be useful to, the Active
Component. Data was collected through an unclassified literature search, personal interviews with recent and serving commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and military personnel management officials from division/installation level through, and including, the Department of the Army level. The author relied heavily upon personal knowledge gained in the management of enlisted soldiers during the "bow wave" period of the current force modernization effort. Four major themes are examined to report on personnel management developments which affect the supportability and direction to new equipment training in units; manning restructured organizations; implement and execute training programs for individuals to man new organizations; and the "new manning system." The essay concludes that because the Army cannot control the threat; advances in technology; national demographics or politics, the Army itself must make further changes to attain the optimum personnel management system for the future. Such changes must include recognition and adherence to the manpower "facts of life" by leaders and managers at all levels and a better appreciation by each service member of why the changes are required.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT -- THE KEY FOR MAKING

FORCE MODERNIZATION PAYOFF

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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US Army War College
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The basic argument is to prove that the personnel management function of the manpower resource area is the most vital and important element necessary to ensure success in the dramatic change the US Army is experiencing. The vehicle used is a discussion of the force modernization program with particular emphasis on presenting for commanders and personnel managers recent examples of success and failure, as well as a discussion of pitfalls in the management of soldiers. The paper is primarily focused for, and intended to be useful to the Active Component. Data was collected through an unclassified literature search, personal interviews with recent and serving commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and military personnel management officials from division/installation level through, and including, the Department of the Army level. The author relied heavily upon personal knowledge gained in the management of enlisted soldiers during the "bow wave" period of the current force modernization effort. Four major themes are examined to report on personnel management developments which affect the supportability and direction to: new equipment training in units; manning restructured organizations; implement and execute training programs for individuals to man new weaponry and organizations; and the "new manning system". The essay concludes that because the Army cannot control the threat; advances in technology; national demographics or politics, the Army itself must make further changes to attain the optimum personnel management system for the future. Such changes must include recognition and adherence to the manpower "facts of life" by leaders and managers at all levels and a better appreciation by each servicemember of why the changes are required.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT -- The Key for Making Force Modernization Payoff.

To appreciate the personnel management implications of force modernization, one must have a background in the manpower function of the Army. The following brief discussion of manpower, and its component parts is necessary to understand how and why "people are the Army".

The manpower management function of the Army must be considered to be a major resource area. Perhaps it is the most critical from an overall aspect and as such, the umbrella term "manpower" is most easily understood by describing its component operations. These are the operations encompassed by the planning; programming and budgeting for personnel; manpower authorizations management; and personnel management.

Manpower planning is the process through which the aggregated requirement for manpower necessary to meet the operational needs of the Nation under mobilization, or at least to meet the requirement for the defense establishment's described "Objective Force" during wartime is described. To quantify the total demand, forces are structured using the Joint Strategic Planning
Document Analysis II into units, and the supporting structures necessary to man, equip and train the Army for wartime. Using the planning force, manpower programming establishes the criteria for the accession of soldiers and their training.

Manpower programming usually results in a smaller force, which is structured by the service, to describe the amount of manpower resources to attain and sustain the activities (either fully or on a limited basis) for the forces described in the Five Year Defense Program. This sized force is also assumed to be operational at a level of "less than wartime" for a significant portion of the total force. During the process of manpower programming, some units or capabilities may be "zeroed out"; changed from Active to Reserve components; or structured for manning at a less than "full" level of authorization for specific organizations. Most commonly, some combination of all three measures is adopted to arrive at a level which is supportable from both a budgetary and personnel availability view. The result of this process is the "Program Force", which is termed the program strength. The other resources needed to support this force are also determined through this process in
other functional areas. When the program has been approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Program Decision Memorandum is prepared and, if necessary, the Five Year Defense Program is updated.

Having arrived at a quantified, structured total manpower statement of need, the Army prepares, justifies, and executes its budget for personnel in the program force.

Manpower authorizations management is another of the major manpower management functions. This process allocates approved (programed and budgeted) authorizations, or spaces, to the subordinate elements of the Army. It also includes the procedures for documenting and auditing all authorized positions. Some of the commonly used terms associated in this major area may be familiar to soldiers in units. They include Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE); Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE); The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS); and the Personnel Structure and Accounting System (PERSACS).

The recognition, through the authorization of spaces, represents validated needs for soldiers of specific grades and skills at the unit level and is
performed in this operational area of the manpower function.

Once the needs of the Army and its subordinate elements have been stated, Personnel Management begins to operate. It has often been said that manpower needs are "spaces" and the personnel resources are "faces". 1

Personnel management is the major function which deals with satisfying needs for trained soldiers in a timely manner. The many sub-functions of personnel management include inventory development; support; distribution and assignment; utilization; administration; and reporting.

For my purposes, inventory development is the function wherein current or future authorizations are compared to on-hand and projected inventories and any shortage or surplus is appropriately treated. The inventory is scrutinized by several categories of detail: skill (MOS/ASI/SQI); pay grade; duty status; assignment; and enlistment expiration date, to name some.

Personnel support is that portion of management which deals with the accession; training; promotion; retention; and pay of soldiers.
Distribution operations include the specification of desired levels of fill, expressed over time, and in a priority by specialty and grade for the subordinate elements of the Army. In the case of enlisted soldiers, MILPERCEN receives the stated needs from requisitioning activities, validates and prioritizes these to become requirements, and passes them to the appropriate accession or career management division for assignment action. Assignment is the process through which a qualified individual is selected and allocated to fill a validated requirement, and instructions to complete the process are issued to field activities.

The utilization of soldiers is principally a local command responsibility with maximum emphasis placed at the lowest level of command, usually at the organizational echelon. Proper utilization dictates that an individual's skill, expertise and special qualifications are properly used to satisfy authorizations in units or activities.

Personnel administration is that portion of management which attends to the official and personal needs of soldiers in units. It includes the maintenance
of records and completion of administrative actions, such as promotion, which affect individuals.

Throughout personnel management, status reporting or accounting is used to monitor programs, assist in decision making, and collect current information from which projections can be made. The principal data file used to support soldiers is the Enlisted Master File (EMF). To be maintained in an accurate condition, this data base must be updated through the Standard Installation Data Personnel System (SIDPERS) entries made from a soldier's unit of assignment or local Military Personnel Office (MILPO).

In the preceding section I have described in broad and general terms the functional area of manpower management. Particular emphasis has been devoted to a discussion of the enlisted personnel operations as a necessary element to support my title statement.

Force modernization has been discussed by many authors and speakers. All too often, some overlook what are in many ways the most significant elements of the process. I include the following components under the term "force modernization": equipment modernization;
unit reorganization; doctrinal evolution and innovation; advanced training concepts; and unit manning concepts.

Throughout the Army's history new weapons have been fielded and improved organizations have been introduced. At this time, well into the "Age of Technology" no comprehensive history of Force Modernization, not to mention the personnel aspects of the process, has been compiled and published. 3

In the following portion of this paper, I offer a discussion of recent events in the process of force modernization and their impact on personnel management.

Armies have always sought greater volumes of more lethal, accurate and capable weapons. Often new equipment forced the development of more modern tactics, doctrine and strategy. Today, each element and function of the Army is continuously under review through the Mission Area Analysis process. As a result of a change in weaponry or in the employment of equipment, an analysis of the functional areas must be conducted to determine if further modifications are necessary. As changes are approved, they are generally referred to as force modernization. The two major areas of force
remains that with a limited and finite supply of manpower (dictated by Congressional and budgetary levels) and competing priorities for the distribution of trained soldiers, some units may not have the number of soldiers by grade and MOS to achieve their desired level of readiness. This fact, to me, is inescapable. Through this discussion, perhaps others will accept this fact, and then appreciate the magnitude of changes and challenges in the support of new equipment fieldings. Personnel managers should listen closely as commanders explain their situations and be prepared to modify plans and programs to lessen the impact throughout the Army.

As technology advances and weapons systems become more lethal, new structures and organizations are developed. Their purposes are to take advantage of: evolution in weaponry; history; and doctrinal or strategic concept changes to meet the Nation’s purposes. In our Army, we have chosen to pursue a relatively stable total strength for the Active Component, and yet make significant changes in the composition of that element of the Total Force. These structural changes are sometimes dictated by new equipment, but perhaps the most significant changes are driven by grand strategy. The
reassigned personnel who do not have the required retainability; retained "overhead" personnel slotted against modernizing unit spaces; and malutilized or declared unfit for retraining, without completing required administrative sanctions or action.

For new units being activated at a training installation and scheduled for later deployment, some potential personnel management challenges can develop. These might include early, or late, arrival of personnel identified by MILPERCEN; changed schedules for training; reduced capability to provide support (housing); incomplete reviews of individual personnel records to determine eligibility for training and eventual deployment; among others. Any soldier not eligible for the assignment should immediately be replaced. Procedures have been employed to assign qualified replacements from installation resources which will be replaced during the next available distribution/assignment cycle. The personnel shortage, in this example, is not in the modernizing unit, but rather is in another activity or unit on the host station.

As the foregoing points out, in the fielding of new equipment there are "billpayers". The simple fact
quickly, thereby developing the cadre to man key positions in later modernizing units. This phenomenon will continue until the entire active structure is "modernized". The leadership at the top of the Army is aware of this situation; however, I believe more leaders at battalion, and lower levels, should become more involved with the entire fielding process from the personnel perspective.

For leaders at that level to become more aware, carefully organized instructions are issued to units scheduled for NET. Commanders should follow the instructions and develop their own execution guidance so that the transition will be as smooth as possible, not only for their unit, but for the remainder of the "consumers" of soldiers who hold the transitioning MOS. Any soldier either not eligible or available for training must be identified, and where possible, reassigned within the command or installation. This is necessary to ensure spaces which require fill are visible at each level of command.

In practice, some units have violated personnel management instructions and have trained soldiers already on orders to depart the command in their current MOS; not
not involved in, or stabilized by NET rules), throughout the Army to achieve the highest personnel readiness condition in accordance with current priorities and policies. All of these factors are considered within the Military Personnel Center and decisions are made and actions executed usually six months before the first unit begins NET.

To achieve the desired output from NET, some MOS, particularly skill level one and two, are oversubscribed when possible to account for forecasted, historically based attrition factors. The cumulative effect for the remainder of the Army has been termed a "force modernization bubble". Within a relatively fixed number of units who have high densities of soldiers of a particular MOS, a few units will often have "more than their share" when one considers a worldwide percentage of fill. However, until all units have the new equipment, it is important to train and assign soldiers to the units which do have the more modern weapons, as they are likely to be among the first committed to war. Further, by training soldiers wherever and whenever an opportunity exists, we are able to broaden the skill base of the entire force and can detect future junior leaders more
The figure portrays the events and approximate duration of training to be completed by units who have achieved the mandated strength and skill levels for the "feeder" MOS and ASI. Frequently, after the NET is completed, a soldier's specialty must be changed to reflect the training he has received.

Soldiers with appropriate MOS must often be inserted (cross leveled) to the unit, usually through the major command or installation distribution process. This is required so the unit will be properly manned for stability and larger unit training after the NET. For the lowest grade enlisted soldiers, this usually involves early identification of "spaces and faces" and coordination throughout each level of the personnel management system to ensure soldiers will be recruited, trained at the entry level, and assigned in a timely manner to permit integration and bonding within the unit. Further, since some low density initial MOS courses are offered infrequently and in some cases are of such duration, this accession process must begin as early as a year before the scheduled NET. Another management challenge at all levels is to spread, through distribution, the population of available soldiers (those
New Equipment Training

This figure represents a schematic of New Equipment Training (NET) sequences and events for a fielding of the M-1 Abrams tank in a typical Armor battalion stationed in Europe. Times, shown in days, are approximate.

LEGEND:

- training
- evaluation/test

Output MOS:
19K-M-1 Abrams Armor Crewman
41C-Fire Control Instrument Repair Specialist
45E-M-1 Abrams Tank Turret Mechanic
45G-Fire Control Systems Repairer
45K-Tank Turret Repairer
63E-M-1 Abrams Tank System Mechanic
63G-Fuel and Electrical System Repairer
63H-Track Vehicle Repairer

Figure 1.
--Units thus modernized (through NET) will be maintained at the level corresponding to that assigned for the particular major command (MACOM) or installation.

--In the case of units activated at the "schoolhouse" and receiving new equipment, the guidance requires a level of personnel fill to ensure sufficient soldiers are trained through NET, so the unit deploys and will arrive at the next assigned station with 100 percent of all MOS/ASI skills in the gaining command's ALO. These units are to be maintained at that level for 120 days after arrival at the new station as well.

--The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools; and Army Material Command (AMC), and United States Army Europe (USAREUR) new equipment training teams (NETT) will also be manned at 100 percent of instructors authorized in the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for those skills attendant to fielding new equipment.

The personnel management aspects of NET are complex. For example, the fielding plan for the M-1 tank in a European based organization is outlined in the following figure. (figure 1.)
Regardless of the strategy, either in the field or at the "schoolhouse", they are called "new equipment training" fieldings. The Army has a significant investment in the hardware and technology now being assigned to units. To help ensure the maximum return on this investment, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has announced policy guidance for the distribution and assignment of soldiers to modernizing units. This is announced as the Active Component Enlisted Distribution Policy and is confirmed in the Force Modernization Master Plan, and provides instructions for the levels of fill for soldiers to achieve:

--90 percent of the authorized level of organization (ALO) strength in new system related Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) for both the operators and the maintainers for a period beginning sixty days prior to the beginning of new equipment training (NET) and through sixty days after completion of NET. This guidance represents a decrease in level and duration of formerly announced and mandated strength levels and is a result of personnel management actions and force structure changes.
proficiency by crew and commanders if we are to capitalize on their capabilities." 6

The new equipment ranges from such major weapon systems as the Abrams (M-1) tank, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and the Apache (AH-64) attack helicopter, to new items of individual equipment and weaponry such as the 9mm pistol and lightweight battle dress uniforms (BDU).

Often, major systems (nearly fifty of the over 400 are considered major) are assigned in units or organizations already in the field. This process may be called a conversion, a transition from the old to the new. Older items are often referred to as displaced systems; their fate may include transfer or sale to a foreign service or for reissue, possibly after modification, to another unit, often in the reserves.

Another strategy requires the formation of entirely new organizations, usually as a result of significant weapon system capability changes or because of training complexities. Examples of this technique include original unit formations for the MLRS units and Patriot air defense artillery battalions.
forecast the future and to report accurately on the current status of the Army.

Clearly, soldiers are the most vital resources for each of the two components of force modernization. From any point of view, be it humanistic, fiscal, programatic, or from any other focus, people are the key. In the following sections, I will address some of the personnel management aspects for the elements of force modernization. Each will be discussed except those of doctrinal innovations and evolutions. This component will not be covered because revised doctrine is normally a product of a few individuals who are senior professional military experts, rather than the Army at large.

The introduction of new equipment into the Army has, and will continue to pose significant personnel management challenges. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated: "Over four hundred new warfighting systems are being developed and fielded within the Army. Many exhibit unrivaled mobility and lethality. They are also sophisticated, requiring a high level of knowledge and
Obviously we have not reduced our missions; if anything they have been increased; we have adopted a force development strategy to create lighter infantry divisions. Further, we have increased the standards for entrance and retention for the entire force over the past three years, and the supply of potential soldiers has not been increased by any external actions such as adoption of a draft. We have made a significant change to increase the recruitment of females in the past six years; however, female soldiers cannot meet the total demand for a modernized combat force.

What we have done is to improve the personnel management of and within the Army. Personnel operators today are more involved than ever in each facet of overall planning and current operations. No longer can a force planner, or an equipment developer, or a logistian, or any other specialist, fail to be cognizant of personnel matters and concerns. Commanders, as well as individual soldiers, are more knowledgeable of personnel topics. The entire personnel system itself has become more modern and as a result, more complex. Still personnel management operations are better because of increased visibility, awareness, and capability to
requires operators and maintainers in sufficient numbers with adequate skills to make the new, and even older, weapons payoff. Better hardware alone is not enough; people must be present in the proper quantity, having sufficient intellectual and physical qualities and in a timely sequence to make the investment in hardware worthwhile.

It is obvious that the Nation's demand for military manpower was a function of the force structure (size and equipment) which had been determined after careful analysis of assigned and derived missions and by the policies which governed our personnel structure. To meet the challenges of the future (since we cannot command or legislate an increase in births to support an Army) the implementation of some or all of the following measures was necessary. One must either make changes to the strategy or missions; reduce entrance requirements for soldiers; or increase the personnel supply (by changing factors which limit the population eligible for service); increase the efficiency and effectiveness of personnel operations; or by some combination of these, to meet the manpower requirement and lessen reliance on personnel management. 5
error. With a national population whose density of potential soldiers is growing smaller, less able and skillful in the use of technology, the Army was forced to make changes in the manner we prepare for the future.

On the equipment side of force modernization, over time, new and more capable weapons designed to take advantage of improved technology to meet changed threats, have been integrated into the Army. Until the recent past, these systems have not posed significant challenges to the personnel community, or to the nation for that matter. Now, with the significant financial investment being made to meet both readiness and sustainment objectives, even a casual review shows that significantly more than half of every dollar of defense spending involves a personnel cost. One cannot stop at fiscal costs, he must examine the human manpower costs which cover the full spectrum of operations and maintenance as well.

The need for improved weapons has not been understated; but have we shortchanged the personnel side of the equation? Since the early 1970s, the Army has been rebuilding and responding to increased threats in an ever more dangerous world. The advanced technology
modernization then are: organizational changes and the
fielding of new equipment.

Organizations have been changed over time to be
better able to execute missions; meet new threats; to
respond to changes in policy; or to face other realities.
Beginning in 1982, five central thrusts could be
identified in the force modernization program undertaken
by the U. S. Army. These were, and are, improvements in
and adoption of technology for: distributed command,
control, communications and intelligence; self-contained
munitions; biotechnology; very intelligent surveillance
and target acquisition equipment; and finally, the
realities of the "soldier-machine interface". 4

In recognition of the future reduced manpower
resources, and with favorable budgetary support, combined
with strong and capable leadership, "force modernization"
has become a central theme visible to nearly everyone in
the Army.

From the personnel management perspective, in my
opinion, the most significant of these thrusts is the
soldier-machine interface. The General Accounting
Office, in a 1981 report to Congress, attributed at least
half of the failures in systems or weapons to human
point I am making is in regard to actions underway to develop a lighter, highly mobile and capable infantry division. The two major personnel management concerns to be addressed are: "quality of life" and making the shifts in the training base to meet newly determined strength levels and mixes.

With respect to quality of life, the Army's personnel managers and commanders at all levels must be sensitive to the needs of individuals as they relate to services, housing, and turbulence in general. In this situation there are many examples; I shall outline two cases.

In the case where an existing infantry division is restructured to meet the Light Infantry Model, most units experience a decrease in overall strength levels. Commanders must be especially sensitive to the individual circumstances which surround each member of the unit. It seems to me, that each leader must be knowledgeable and aware of his soldier's situation, concerns, and needs. If my experience in attempting to assist in the reorganization to a light division is representative, the efforts of all personnel managers, at all levels, can be described as a man trying to paint a moving train with a
brush. The engine is moving in one direction, but the number, type, and arrival time of the cars change at almost each curve on the route. Therefore, not all the cars will be painted uniformly, or with the same quality of finish. Additionally, if the final composition of the train at its destination isn’t known, people board and detrain according to the last announced schedule throughout the journey. The painful part for both individuals and personnel managers is when decisions are made which affect the destination (time and composition) the Army cannot always validate already “collected tickets” for the trip, and replacements or extensions must be generated, often causing some turbulence to another railroad’s operations.

This simplistic analogy is not an apology; it is offered as a recognized fact of life. Top Army leaders are not unaware of these situations, hence the formation of battalion sized packaged units thus creating “reserved seat holders” for the entire journey. This simple, but painful, decision to form the new type division with this innovative personnel strategy will be tested in the future.
Another case is the formation of a unit from the "ground up". The most recent example is the 10th Infantry Division being formed at Forts Benning and Drum.

In this case, since few soldiers were stationed at the division's headquarters installation, a smaller number have been concerned with moving away. The trauma of a Permanent Change of Station move for families and soldiers ordered to join the division has been delayed in some cases because of a lack of facilities. The other uncertainties about the eventual composition; location; size; and timing of activations remains however.

The primary objective is to have the right soldier arrive on time at the right place. When the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army make decisions and issue orders, the results improve dramatically. I am referring to the situation in which these leaders affirmed a decision not to fill the division at Fort Drum beyond the station's capacity for troop and family housing. This development, quoted in the "Army Times" shows that our leaders have a full and comprehensive feeling for the needs of our soldiers and their families.

As the approved composition of each of the light divisions is being resolved, again Secretary Marsh
provided timely guidance to the Army staff by limiting the total number of soldiers to be allocated to its eventual structure. As reported, a memorandum from the Secretary to the Light Division Steering Committee, contained instructions to limit the new formations to 10,700 soldiers. This action may assist in resolving some of the changes proposed by functional area proponents and others interested in "optimizing" the light division.

Once a structure is decided upon, plans to dedicate resources to the force can be confirmed. In the case of the light infantry divisions, the training base must be resourced with people, the recruiting force must be advised of which accessions to seek, and personnel managers at all levels can more accurately forecast who the billpayers will be, and what strength levels can be projected around the world.

All of these processes are ongoing simultaneously; the only fixed "personnel" parameters are on the manpower side of the equation. Through legislative and policy changes the managers of the Army make adjustments to meet Army objectives and goals. As previously noted, these changes may include promotion acceleration (or slowdown);
incentive payment adjustments; training duration changes; and other techniques to man the force.

Other evolutionary changes in structures occur periodically as a result of planned for and relatively minor (as opposed to major divisional formation) changes. The recently experienced, and almost universal conversion from the "H" to "J" series TOE and implementing MTOE is an example.

As these changes have been planned for some time, we should expect few personnel management challenges in the conversion. New soldiers should have been recruited, trained and assigned to man changed structures and new equipment; however, in a large bureaucracy some actions are not properly coordinated, timed, or documented and problems may develop.

The conversion of one formation or organization invariably results in a requirement to make modifications elsewhere. In 1982, the DCSPER of the Army began a systematic and continuing review to analyze and report to the Army on personnel matters which pertained to force modernization. These areas, originally fifteen in number, encompassed the traditional "branches". A thorough and vigorous examination of all aspects
associated with each area was undertaken by personnel managers and commanders at Department of the Army, Major Command, and Proponent levels.

The results of these "Personnel Reviews" were initially announced by messages; since September of 1983, they have been communicated in letter format.

During the Communications-Electronics Personnel Review, it became apparent that because over 300 new C-E systems were to be introduced during the next five years, a potential need for as many as 17,000 additional Signal soldiers, officers, and warrant officers was seen. Similar situations, albeit not of this magnitude, were discovered during most of the Personnel Reviews held to date. Solutions must be found by structure and equipment developers, and procurement officials, in conjunction with commanders and personnel managers. This predicted personnel nightmare was partially a result of TOE changes and the introduction of new equipment. 11

In some cases a less than complete set of high-technology communications switching equipment was being procured due to competing budgetary requirements. This combined with lengthy and changing procurement strategies, further compounded by extended fielding
schedules, had resulted in a series of mixed generation communications gear and units, which must as always, be manned by soldiers. These highly specialized soldiers hold many different MOS and are frequently in schools to qualify them to operate and maintain the new systems. The combination of resourcing the training base, diversity of skills required (MOS and ASI) in low densities, and a vital need to design incentives for retention, provided personnel managers with multiple opportunities to excell.

The preceding discussion focused on personnel managers' difficulties in meeting one challenge of the future; the development of an inventory of trained soldiers to use and repair new equipment. The Army has not always realized that "technology is a double edged sword" and that with increases in system capability there may be a significant personnel (manpower) cost for both quantity and quality. In recognition of this fact, MANPRINT (Manpower and Personnel Integration) was developed and is being used by Project Managers, scientists, and personnel specialists. The expected result of this effort, with the new tools, is an improved soldier-machine interface (SMI). The process used is a
melding of previously developed tools which assess the total personnel demands for a system (HARDMAN or hardware versus manpower), with the expected qualitative skills of soldiers who use and repair the equipment (Early Comparability Analysis or ECA), and the study of ergonomics, which adjusts tasks or conditions to suit the workers. The successful integration of numbers and types of soldiers through this process is both mutually interdependent and a repetitive process which will help produce the blueprint for manning current and future equipment. 12

The many tasks and functions to be performed by soldiers must be discretely identified so that the correct inventory may be developed and assigned to elements of the Army. The system used to identify the variety of jobs for enlisted soldiers involves Military Occupational Specialties (MOS); Additional Occupational Specialties (ASI); and Special Qualification Identifiers (SOI). The latter are used primarily to identify soldiers and positions in specialized units, such as parachutists and rangers. The MOS and ASI structure was developed to identify soldiers who have been trained to operate particular equipment or to perform highly
specialized tasks. The normal procedures employed to award these identifiers includes attendance at a formal (training base, unit, or contractor) school, and new equipment training. Of particular concern to leaders and personnel managers is the timely award and posting of automated management systems to reflect changed MOS and or ASI. The Army’s DCSPER has highlighted this need to field and training commanders through the personnel review feedback system on at least eleven separate occasions over the past two years. This emphasis has paid off; more qualified soldiers have been identified; more reporting system problems have been solved; and more visibility to the challenges of managing the inventory has been achieved. Commanders and leaders at unit level must continue to work for their soldiers, with personnel managers, to ensure an individual’s accomplishments and qualifications are accurately reported so that proper assignments can be made. Force structure analysis and extensive proponent involvement is required to prescribe the inventory levels and optimum composition of each MOS/ASI to ensure promotion growth and professional development within each Career Management Field (CMF).
The final aspect of personnel management influenced by force modernization I will address is the New Manning System (NMS). In the 1984 "Army" Green Book, General Elton provides an excellent description of the system which was designed in 1981. There are two elements of the NMS. First there is the Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) unit movement system, and second, the U.S. Army Regimental System. 13

In the COHORT process units, and eventually battalions, are formed, trained, and deployed then maintained for a fixed term "life cycle". From a personnel management aspect, this appears to be almost a "fill and forget" operation for the normal three year cycle. The challenges to managers arise in identifying the number of qualified cadre soldiers who are available for assignment to these units. Initial entry, first term soldiers are usually used to fill the primary career management field MOS in skill level one for the COHORT unit. The distribution policy requires a fill level of 100 percent for authorized spaces to achieve an aggregate minimum deployment strength of 95 percent. Skill level one for example, is overfilled, and skill level two is deliberately underfilled to provide immediate promotion.
opportunities within the unit. The cadre, to include unit officers, and other key unit personnel (supply and communications specialists for example) are selected so as to arrive at least sixty days before the unit is to be formed. To achieve this "on station time" managers at the installation, in the major command (Forces Command), and in MILPERCENT must act on requirements validated nine months prior to the unit's formation. All personnel distribution and assignment actions which pertain to COHORTs are managed "off-line". Once formed, these units are stabilized in accordance with DA PAM 600-82-series procedures. 14

The combat arms soldiers in skill level three and four (pay grade E-6 and E-7) are always in great demand for assignment to many high priority positions which include Drill Sergeant and recruiters. Many of these priority programs have "quality" indicators described in guidance and policies which are not, unfortunately, applicable to the normal selection of NMS cadre members. Commanders and managers of these COHORT units should "profile" the cadre to determine if a representative sample of the Army has been allocated. Similarly, proponents of all special career or assignment programs
should review requirements and inventories to be careful not to "price themselves out of the market" of soldiers.

Under the American Regimental System, a commitment is made to soldiers who become "regimentally affiliated". The commitment involves an assignment to a unit of his regiment whenever he is assigned at battalion level. These battalions are carefully grouped into a "community of battalions" structured to afford a homebase in one of the United States (Hawaii is the homebase for the 8th Field Artillery Regiment) and in a limited number of overseas locations. By deliberately limiting the multitude of Army postings available to soldiers to just a very few, an individual and his family will almost certainly know a comrade when they first join a new unit of his regiment. The close and continuous identification of individuals with units is designed to create a sense of belonging and identity for the members of the selected regiments. At this time some of the designated combat arms regiments of infantry, armor, and cannon field artillery have been formed; others are scheduled to be activated; perhaps later other type units will be designated into regiments.
For personnel managers, again the situation for distribution and assignment is carefully limited by policy. Managers must be aware of current and projected strengths of regiments in their representative locations to meet prescribed manning objectives from an available inventory of affiliated soldiers. Some flexibility to meet these levels is provided by the distribution guidance which allows both voluntary and involuntary leveling to meet stated requirements. 15

Personnel officials must monitor ongoing force modernization actions as units of regiments receive new equipment or become organized under revised structures which authorize changed quantities or skills of soldiers. Commanders should protect the intended advantages of the regimental system and be aware of modifications as more experience is gained in its implementation.

Throughout the formation of units under the New Manning System, especially COHORT units which are slated to deploy, there are direct personnel costs. The short term billpayer in this case is FORSCOM, and in turn, the installations from which they deploy. When units band together to form elements of a regiment, more eligible soldiers become affiliated. Often forward deployed
elements of the Army are manned at a higher percentage of fill than units in the sustaining base. This fact alone will guarantee a more accelerated demand for affiliated replacements than the previously exclusively employed individual replacement system which drew from a pool of eligible soldiers of the grade and skill required, not just from a collection within a regiment.
It has often been said "where you stand depends upon where you sit." In an effort to assess the degree of difficulty for personnel managers and commanders, by echelon, to implement the force modernization aspects of Personnel Management, the Personnel Plans Branch of MILPERCEN collected the following information. It portrays in a figure, the perceived degree of difficulty associated with selected force modernization aspects of personnel management, reported by echelon. (figure 2.)

From this figure one may conclude:

The perception of difficulty varies as a function of time, echelon and the type of modernization action undertaken.

Different units/installations/theaters within an echelon may have different perceptions of similar actions. Generally, overseas long tour areas report greater difficulty, perhaps as a function of increased training costs.

Commanders and personnel managers alike must be able to respond whenever an echelon reports excessive difficulty in accomplishing some type or aspect of any
"Perceived Degree of Difficulty"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE MODERNIZATION TASK</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DIVISION/INSTALLATION</th>
<th>MAJOR COMMAND</th>
<th>ARMY (MILPERCEN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Equipment Training</td>
<td>S-M</td>
<td>M-G</td>
<td>S-M</td>
<td>N-S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition &quot;H&quot; to &quot;J&quot; Series TOE/MTOE</td>
<td>S-M</td>
<td>S-M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New MOS Training</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI Training (TDY)</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>M-G</td>
<td>(FORSOM)-N</td>
<td>S-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(USAREUR)-M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COHORT (NMS)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S-G</td>
<td>S-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Regimental System (NMS)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M-G</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND:
"Degree of Difficulty"
N--Negligible
S--Slight
M--Moderate
G--Great

Adapted from Briefing Chart: source USA MILPERCEN DAPC-PLO

Figure 2.
force modernization action. Some appropriate responses could include the following:

--Modify the personnel management plan by:
- changing times
- changing levels of personnel fill
- changing guidance or instructions
- increasing use of "off line" methods
- changing responsibilities
- changing levels of involvement

or by,

--Modifying personnel policies to impact on:
- accessions
- retention
- incentives
- promotions

The list above is not all inclusive, and certainly it does not cover all the intricacies of force modernization, but it does point out some of the "ways to skin the cat".

The message is clear. Since personnel management is a responsibility shared by soldiers, commanders and
personnel managers at each level, careful analysis and focused actions are necessary to bring to a successful conclusion any type of force modernization effort. Within a fixed manpower level, there will always be billpayers; obviously the solution to a particular problem will not please everyone involved in the most extensive and dramatic series of changes the Army has experienced.

I believe no one in the Army plans for failure; close and continuous stewardship of the personnel aspects of force modernization are required. At every level each and every member must display flexibility, innovation, commitment, and dedication to meet the current and yet unidentified challenges. These are the keys for personnel management to create and sustain an Army of Excellence capable of meeting any challenges our Nation’s leaders place before us.
ENDNOTES


15. Ibid.
