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
MILITARY MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE (AVF)
IN THE 1980s/1990s

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM W. HUNTER, JR., INF

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

MILITARY MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE (AVF)
IN THE 1980s/1990s

by

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ABSTRACT

Author: William W. Hunter, Jr., COL, INF

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The purpose of this individual study project was to analyze our capability to maintain the AVF in the 1980s/1990s and use this as a basis to address possible military manpower alternatives to the AVF. The author concludes that the AVF could not have been maintained in the past without a significant increase in the number of women being recruited and without the recruitment of Black Americans in disproportion to their population in this country. In addition, a recent DoD Manpower report estimated that a manpower pool shortage of approximately 150,000 personnel would exist in case of a war in Europe. This problem exists despite the significant personnel increases in the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard in recent years. These problems will be exacerbated in the 1980s/1990s as the male youth population declines. The author analyzes possible military manpower alternatives to the AVF, and recommends the reinstatement of the Draft as the best solution to the current/future problems of the AVF.

(All Volunteer Force)

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"It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even his personal services to the defense of it."¹

George Washington 1783

Chapter 1

THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research paper is to determine if the All Volunteer Force can be maintained in the late 1980's and early 1990's. This will be accomplished by analyzing the current status of the AVF, and the capability of this nation to maintain the force as the male youth population declines. Finally this paper will address possible military manpower alternatives to the All Volunteer Force.

GENERAL

The United States has maintained the AVF since 1 July 1973. Our capability to continue to maintain this force in the late 1980's and early 1990's in the face of a declining male youth population is vital to our national interest. Failure to maintain the force will impact on our capability to meet international commitments, and therefore on our status as a superpower.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AVF

The decision to move toward an AVF was political in nature. In October 1968, then presidential candidate Richard Nixon made a campaign promise to move toward an AVF upon conclusion of the Vietnam War.² This was obviously a politically popular decision which responded to inequities in the draft system, "draft dodging" and demonstrations against the Vietnam War. On 27 March 1969, President Nixon appointed an advisory commission on the AVF under the chairmanship of Thomas S. Gates, former Secretary of Defense. In April 1969, the Defense Department appointed a Project Volunteer Committee to develop a program to move toward an AVF. On 20 February 1970, the report of the President's Advisory Commission on the AVF was submitted to the President. The report recommended an AVF, and the end of the draft by 30 June 1971. In August 1970, the Defense Department Project Volunteer Committee recommended a program to attain an AVF. In January 1971, President Nixon sent Congress legislation that increased military pay and ended the draft on 1 July 1973.

ACTIVE FORCES CURRENT STATUS: QUANTITY

Quantity is the most often used criteria for determining the success of the AVF. As can be seen in Table 1, the Active Forces have been generally successful in meeting Fiscal Year end strengths since the inception of the AVF.

Table 1

TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY END
STRENGTH TRENDS
(Thousands)


	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Congressional Authorization	2,553	2,329	2,190	2,149	2,091	2,093	2,085	2,056	2,052	2,080	2,108	2,130	2,136
Actual	2,512	2,252	2,161	2,127	2,081	2,074	2,061	2,024	2,050	2,082	2,109	2,123	2,138
Percentage	98	97	99	99	99+	99	99	98	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Briefing on Fiscal Year 1984 Recruiting, Retention, and Strength Results. (Slide 3)

This fact can be misleading however. The first question that must be asked is, "do the end strengths reflect our international military commitments or are they driven by our capability to recruit the force, particularly in the U.S. Army?" Table 2 reflects active duty military personnel strength levels from 1949-84. As can be seen the strengths of the Active Forces have remained relatively constant since the end of the Draft in 1973. The end strengths for the period 1973-1984 are significantly less than the end strengths for the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Have our international military commitments decreased since this period? The author does not believe they have. "The 'correct' size of the armed forces is, of course, endlessly disputable; but importantly, the winnowing of strength in the seventies happened incrementally and without reference to any understandable change in strategic circumstance or vision."³

Table 2

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH LEVELS



Source: Ibid., (Slide 3B)

Another question that must be asked is, "Could the Active forces have met Fiscal Year end strengths during the period 1973-1984 without significantly increasing the number of women being recruited and the recruitment of Black Americans in disproportion to their population in this country?" Table 3 indicates that the total active duty female strength in the active forces has increased by approximately 150,000 between 30 June 1972 and 30 September 1983. Approximately 60,000 of this increase was in the U.S. Army (See Appendix A). The increase in active duty female strength has continued in FY 1981 through Fiscal Year 1984 (See Appendix B).

Table 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEMALE MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY, OFFICERS, AND ENLISTED (P25.61)

TOTAL MILITARY SERVICES

MAY 31, 1945 TO DATE


DATE	TOTAL	OFFICERS	ENLISTED AND OFFICER CANDIDATES
30 JUN 1967	35,173	12,619	22,554
30 JUN 1968	38,397	13,344	25,053
30 JUN 1969	39,506	13,183	26,323
30 JUN 1970	41,479	13,102	28,377
30 JUN 1971	42,775	12,907	29,868
30 JUN 1972	45,033	12,636	32,397
30 JUN 1973	55,402	12,775	42,627
30 JUN 1974	74,715	13,140	61,575
30 JUN 1975	96,868	13,596	83,272
30 JUN 1976	109,133	13,741	95,392
30 SEP 1976	111,753	14,169	97,584
30 SEP 1977	118,966	15,292	103,674
30 SEP 1978	134,312	16,715	117,597
30 SEP 1979	151,082	18,959	132,123
30 SEP 1980	171,418	21,466	149,952
30 SEP 1981	184,651	23,326	161,325
30 SEP 1982	189,048	25,275	163,773
30 SEP 1983	197,878	26,973	170,905

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1983, p. 97.

Table 4 reflects the distribution of DoD total active duty enlisted end strengths by racial groups for the period 1964-1984. The table reflects a significant increase in the number of Black Americans in the Active Force since the end of the draft. Blacks currently constitute 12% of the population in this country; The Active Force is 21% Black. All the Services are disproportionate and the Army's enlisted strength is 31% Black (See Appendix C).

Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF DOD TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED END STRENGTHS BY RACIAL GROUPS



833 11

Source: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Briefing on Fiscal Year 1984 Recruiting, Retention, and Strength Results. (Slide 35B)

The author believes that the AVF could not have been maintained in the past without a significant increase in the number of women being recruited and without the recruitment of black Americans in disproportion to their population in this

country. The increase in the number of women recruited during this period is a controversial issue for which there is no consensus in or out of the Army. The debate on this issue is endless and resolution will probably not occur until the next war, when under current policy, women soldiers will be killed in significant numbers. The author believes this will be unacceptable to the American people. The recruitment of Black Americans in disproportion to their population is also a controversial issue. The author believes that the Armed Services should be generally representative of this country as a whole. "A Democratic society does not want the military to be a 'school of the nation' or to over recruit from the lowest social and deprived minority groups."⁴ To summarize, "There can be no question, despite official reports to the contrary, that the AVF is much less representative of America's male youth than was the military of the draft era."⁵

ACTIVE FORCES CURRENT STATUS: QUALITY

The Active Forces have made great progress in terms of the quality of accessions in recent years. Quality is measured by the number of nonprior service (NPS) enlisted accessions with high school diplomas and by mental category (See Appendix D). Table 5 indicates that 93% of the non-prior service enlisted accessions in Fiscal Year 84 had high school diplomas, and were in Mental Categories I-III. The Army has made the greatest improvement in both categories; High School Diploma Graduate accessions have risen from 54% in Fiscal Year 1980 to 91% in Fiscal Year 1984 and Mental Category I-III accessions have risen from 50% in Fiscal Year 1980 to 90% in Fiscal Year 1984.

Table 5

QUALITY INDICATORS OF ACTIVE DUTY
ENLISTED NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS

SERVICE	High School Diploma Graduates as a Percentage of Total NPS				AFQT Categories I thru III as a Percentage of Total NPS					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984
Army	54	80	86	88	91	50	69	81	88	90
Navy	75	76	79	91	93	82	88	89	92	92
Marine Corps	78	80	85	92	95	73	87	91	94	96
Air Force	83	88	94	98	99	91	93	94	98	99
TOTAL DoD	68	81	86	91	93	69	82	87	92	93

Source: Ibid., (Slide 8)

High School Diploma Graduates accessions in Fiscal Year 1984 compare favorably to Pre-AVF years although there has been a significant decrease in the number Non-Prior Service accessions with some college and college graduates since the end of the Draft (See Appendix E). Mental Category I-III Non-Prior Service accessions in Fiscal Year 1984 also compare favorably with the Pre-AVF years as reflected in Appendix F.

ACTIVE FORCES CURRENT STATUS: REPRESENTATION

Two measures will be utilized to determine whether the AVF is representative of the U.S. population as a whole; region and race. Sex will not be utilized as a measure of representation because the number of women in the force under current

policy cannot approximate the national distribution. As previously discussed, however, it is important to understand that the active duty female strength has increased by 150,000 since 30 June 1972, the year before the inception of the AVF.

The AVF is generally representative of the regional youth population in the U.S. This is based on a comparison of regional distribution of Fiscal Year 1984 Non-Prior Service Accessions in DoD and the 17-21 year old youth population as reflected in Table 6. A state by state comparison of this data contained in Appendix G confirms that the AVF is generally representative of the regional youth population in the U.S. As previously discussed, the AVF is not racially representative of this country as a whole.

Table 6

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FY 1984
NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
TOTAL DoD
(Percentage of Total)

<u>CENSUS REGION</u>	<u>FY 1984 NPS ACCESSIONS</u>	<u>17-21 YEAR OLD YOUTH POPULATION</u>
New England	5	5
Middle Atlantic	15	15
East North Central	23	20
West North Central	7	7
South Atlantic	18	16
East South Central	7	6
West South Central	9	11
Mountain	5	5
Pacific	12	14

Source. Ibid., (Slide 36B)

RESERVE COMPONENTS CURRENT STATUS: QUANTITY

The United States Total Force policy places increased reliance on Reserve Components to augment Active Forces in times of national emergency. The Selected Reserve will provide units and individuals to augment Active Forces. The Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard (IRR/ING) is the major source of individuals who have been trained for replacement or augmentation of Active or Reserve units. The Reserve Components have made significant progress in manning the Selected Reserve and the IRR/ING in recent years. Table 7 reflects the growth of the Selected Reserve since FY1980; the table indicates an increase in end strength of 195,000 personnel since FY1980, and the total strength of the Selected Reserve is at the highest level ever attained. The Selected Reserve is also projected to increase in Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986 (See Appendix H).

Table 7

SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS
FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE

COMPONENT	END STRENGTH (THOUSANDS)					PERCENT CHANGE FY 1980--FY 1984
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	
ARNG	367	389	408	417	434	+18%
USAR	207	225	257	266	275	+33%
USNR	87	88	94	109	121	+39%
USMCR	35	37	41	43	41	+15%
ANG	96	98	101	102	105	+ 9%
USAFR	<u>59</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>70</u>	+19%
TOTAL DoD	851	899	964	1005	1046	+23%

Numbers may not add due to rounding
Source Ibid., (Slide 26B)

Table 8 reflects the growth of the IRR/ING since Fiscal Year 1980 and the projected increases for Fiscal Years 1985/1986.

Table 8

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE AND INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Actual		Programmed	
	FY 1980	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986
Army National Guard (ING)	7	9	10	11
Army Reserve	205	277	271	273
Naval Reserve	97	69	88	99
Marine Corps Reserve	57	48	48	48
Air National Guard (ING) ^a	---	---	---	---
Air Force Reserve	<u>47</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>41</u>
DoD TOTAL ^b	413	445	454	467

^a Fewer than 5000.

^b Numbers may not add to total due to rounding.

Source: Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year 1986 p. 120.

Like the Active Components, the Reserve Forces have significantly increased the recruitment of women and minorities to attain these end strengths. "The number of women grew from 68,000 in FY1980 (9.3 percent) to 102,000 in FY1984 (9.8 percent) Similarly, Minority Personnel increased from 170,000 in FY1980 (20 percent) to 226,000 in FY1984 (21.6 percent)".⁶ It is also significant that the services have stated that "additional increases are expected in both categories (women and minorities) in future years."⁷

The Reserve Components are evidently undermanned despite the recent increases in personnel. There are indications that a serious shortage of manpower would exist in the case of a war in Europe. GEN Bernard Rogers the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe in testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on 1 Mar 85 stated that the United States needs to reinstitute the draft. General Rogers is concerned that "the United States won't be able to mobilize fast enough in event of war to provide the 150,000 combat replacements he would need within 90 days."⁸ General Roger's testimony is similar to information contained in the FY86 DoD Manpower Requirements Report which predicted "that in wartime the armed forces' shortage of trained enlisted personnel would peak at 151,000."⁹ The report further states that "The Army would find itself 117,000 people short of requirements, including 97,000 people short in combat skills, 90 days after mobilization."¹⁰ The problem is the time required to gear-up the training base to provide trained manpower. The report estimates that it would be "120 days after mobilization before significant numbers of new troops join the fighting."¹¹

There are also indications that the Active Forces are shifting too much responsibility to the Reserve Components. "Since 1980, membership in the Selected Reserve and Guard Units has increased 21 percent, while active duty strength has grown by only five percent. By the end of the decade, Guard and Reserve strength will increase another 20 percent under current projections, to more than 1.2 million people, while active strength will grow by 10 percent to more than 2.2 million."¹² Appendix I reflects a comparison of DoD Active and Selected Reserve End Strengths between Fiscal 1980 and Fiscal Year 1984. The Selected Reserve has grown by 4% with a corresponding 4% decrease in the Active Force. Appendix J reflects a comparison of Army Active and Selected Reserve End Strengths. During

the past 4 years the Active Force has retained about the same end strength, while the Selected Reserve has increased by 23 percent or 136,000 personnel. This increase in personnel end strength has been accompanied by an increase in missions and there are indications that a saturation point has been reached. In recent testimony to a Senate Panel Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs James Webb stated "that the Services would 'Run into problems' if more responsibilities are shifted from the Active Forces"¹³. Webb further stated that he was "concerned about the small size of the Active Force and suggested that the military's ability to meet its worldwide commitments should be weighed before the services become even more dependent on inactive forces"¹⁴ Lawrence Korb, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Installations and Logistics stated before the same panel that "The Navy tried to reduce the number of operational fleet deployments but could not because of "national needs." Increasing the number of people in the Naval Reserve will not help meet these commitments. Deployments cannot be done by Reservists. The Navy could reach the point where ships deploy without enough sailors or where shore units are left undermanned."¹⁵

The Congress is reluctant to expand the Active Force because of the cost. It is much cheaper to shift responsibilities and missions to the Reserve Components. There is another factor, however, that must be considered and that is our capability to recruit an expanded Active Force. As previously discussed, the Active Force could not have been maintained since the inception of the AVF without a significant increase in the number of women being recruited and without the recruitment of Black Americans in disproportion to their population in this country. To expand the Active force will exacerbate these problems and even then we may not be successful in the face of the declining male youth population.

RESERVE COMPONENTS ARMAMENT STATUS: QUALITY

The quality of Reserve Component enlisted accessions has improved significantly since Fiscal Year 1980 as indicated in Table 9; in Fiscal Year 1984, 84.7 percent of enlistees were high school graduates.

Table 9

RESERVE ENLISTMENTS OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
Total Enlistments	222,100	218,400
High School Graduates ^a	168,400	185,000
Percent	75.8	84.7

^a Includes equivalency certificate and diploma graduates and students currently in high school who are expected to graduate.

SOURCE: Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year 1986 p. 118.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT STATUS AVF (ACTIVE FORCES/RESERVE COMPONENTS)

The Active Forces have been generally successful in meeting Fiscal Year end strengths since the inception of the AVF. This would not have been possible without a significant increase in the recruitment of women and black Americans. The Active Forces have made great progress in terms of the quality of accessions in recent years. The Active Forces are generally representative of the regional youth population in this country. The Active Forces are not racially representative of


the U.S. population as a whole, especially in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The Services have made great progress in manning the Selected Reserve and the IRR/ING in recent years, and the quality of enlistments has improved significantly since FY1980. The Reserve Components are evidently undermanned despite this recent progress. There are indications that a serious shortage of manpower would exist in a crisis that would require mobilization because of the time required to gear up the training base to provide new trained recruits. A recent DoD manpower report estimated this shortage at approximately 150,000 personnel, and General Bernard Rogers has called for a reinstatement of the Draft to eliminate this shortage. There are also indications that the Active Forces have shifted too much responsibility to the Reserve Components, and this may be a reflection of our capability to recruit the Active Force.

PROBLEMS FACING THE AVF IN THE FUTURE

The current problems facing the AVF will be exacerbated in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the declining male youth population in this country. (See Table 10). This table indicates that the total 17-21 year old male youth population will decline by 17 percent between 1978 and 1990 from 10.8 million to 9.0 million. During the period the white 17-21 year old population will decrease by 20% from 9.2 to 7.4 million; the black 17-21 year old population remains constant at 1.6 million from 1985-1990. This can only mean that the recruitment of black Americans will increase during the late 1980's and early 1990's, which will exacerbate the racial representation problem in the Armed Forces. The problem of a declining male youth population will be compounded if there is a concurrent improvement in the economy.

"Econometric studies linking military recruitment and unemployment rates suggest a 15 percent reduction in youth unemployment produces between a 3 percent and a 7.5 percent decline in military recruiting."¹⁶ In summary, the AVF faces serious problems in the future in recruiting the force.

Table 10



POPULATION OF 17-21 YEAR OLD MALES
 US CENSUS SERIES II
 (in millions)

Source: Sustaining Volunteer Enlistments in Decade Ahead: The Effect of Declining Population and Unemployment: A report prepared by General Research Corporation for the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pp. 2-5.

"The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too Late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends."¹

--General Douglas MacArthur

CHAPTER 2

THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE: POSSIBLE MILITARY MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The All Volunteer Force has been the subject of debate since its inception. There has been, and is, no consensus on the AVF or on the possible military manpower alternatives to the AVF. In the past few months the Secretary of Defense has argued for the retention of the AVF, GEN Bernard Rogers has recommended a return to a peacetime draft, and Senator Gary Hart has proposed legislation for some form of National Service. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of possible military manpower alternatives to the AVF.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING (UMT)

In its 1982 report to the President on the status and prospects of the AVF, the Military Manpower Task Force chaired by the Secretary of Defense, stated that "under a system of Universal Military Training, all young males--and perhaps females as well--would receive military training of three to four months. They would then graduate to a manpower pool and be eligible for military service in time of national emergency."² These personnel could also be assigned to the Active

Force as an option. The concept of Universal Military Training is not new; this concept was proposed to the U.S. Congress by the Truman Administration after World War II. Among its advocates was then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that "Our adoption of Universal Military Training would be a reassurance to the peace-loving nations of the world. I have been a strong advocate of universal military training in the past and made it the principal subject of my final report as Chief of Staff in September of 1945."³ Universal Military Training was unacceptable to the Congress during the Truman Administration. The advantages of Universal Military Training are numerous; it is equitable in that all male and possibly female personnel would receive training and it insures the manning of the Total Force. UMT also would "instill in the youth of the nation a sense of patriotism, discipline and responsibility."⁴ UMT however is too costly. "The estimated potential input to UMT in FY 1983 would include 1.25 million males and about 1.5 million females if women were included in the draft. The induction and training costs for males alone would be about \$11 billion per year; they would be about \$23 billion for males and females combined."⁵ In addition it is estimated that UMT "would eventually result in an IRR pool of about 5 million people"⁶ which far exceeds the current manpower requirement. UMT is therefore not considered to be a viable alternative to the AVF.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE (UMS)

The concept of Universal Military Service differs from UMT in that all young males and possibly females would be required to serve in the Active Forces for a specified period of time to be followed by service in the Reserve Components for a period of time. Universal Military Service has the same advantages as UMT. It is

equitable, patriotic, and insures manning of the Total Force. UMS, however, has serious disadvantages. Assuming a two year service obligation for males only, "UMS would lead to an armed force of some 3.5 to 6 million members."⁷ There is no requirement for a force this large. In addition, it is too costly; it is estimated that such a force would cost "another \$10 billion to \$20 billion per year for manpower alone."⁸ UMS is therefore not a viable alternative to the AVF.

UNIVERSAL NATIONAL SERVICE (UNS)

The Universal National Service concept would require all males and females to perform either military or civilian service. This concept is similar to UMT and UMS except that it provides the option of civilian service. Universal National Service would be equitable in that all youth would serve in some capacity. UNS would also fulfill the patriotic objective. It would require a Standby Draft provision to eliminate military manpower shortfalls caused by too few personnel taking the military service option. UNS is not a viable option to the AVF because it is too costly. It is estimated that "there would be about 5.5 million participants in non-military service each year if the term of service was two years,"⁹ and "the cost would be about \$40 billion a year."¹⁰ There are other forms of national service that deserve serious consideration to determine their feasibility. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado has introduced legislation that would set up a Select Commission on National Service Opportunities. "The commission would consider whether the service should be voluntary or mandatory, what compensation would be paid, at what age a person would enter the service, and what effect the program would have on the armed forces."¹¹ These are the sort of questions that must be answered in order to determine if some form of National Service is feasible and viable as an alternative to the AVF.

RESERVE DRAFT ONLY

The Reserve Draft Only is not an alternative to the AVF but a concept to meet strength shortfalls in the IRR/ING or Selected Reserve or both. This alternative would insure that the Reserve Components are manned at authorized strength levels. As previously discussed, the Reserve Components have made great progress in improving the strength status of the Selected Reserve and the IRR/ING in recent years. Despite this progress there are indications that a serious manpower shortage exists to meet the replacement requirement in Europe should war break out. This shortage motivated GEN Bernard Rogers to call for reinstatement of the draft; in effect GEN Rogers is calling for an IRR draft. The Reserve Components are taking action to further improve the strength status in the Selected Reserve and the IRR. Whether these increased end strengths can be met is not clear. The institution of a Reserve Draft Only would eliminate the manpower shortage in the IRR/ING immediately, and insure that Selected Reserve end strengths in future years are met. The Reserve Draft Only is a viable option to solving the current strength shortfall in the IRR/ING, and possible future strength problem in the Selected Reserve. This option, however, does not address the current and future problems in the Active Forces, and should be implemented only if a viable alternative to the AVF is not found.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE DRAFT

The Selective Service Draft appears to be the only viable alternative to the AVF pending further study of National Service options. Critics will question the political feasibility of this alternative, however, when faced with the other

alternatives previously discussed, it becomes the obvious choice; it is in fact the only alternative that is politically feasible because the other alternatives are far too costly.

A Selective Service Draft would eliminate any strength problems in the Active Force, and provide the capability to increase the Active Force if this is necessary. The Draft would also eliminate strength problems in the Selected Reserve and the IRR. The Draft could be administered in such a way as to insure that the Total Force is representative of the population in this country. In addition, the Draft could be administered to insure the quality of the total force in terms of High School Graduates and Mental Category. Reinstitution of the Draft would also provide the capability to immediately expand the force in times of crisis without gearing up the training base which is required at the present time. Finally, the Selective Service Draft would enhance our conventional deterrent, and signal the world the resolve of the U.S. to meet its international commitments. It should be pointed out that the Selective Service Draft has its disadvantages. These include, a higher rate of turnover and a less experienced force because draftees would, in all probability, have a two year obligation as they have in the past. There would also be a requirement to expand the training base to train the increased number of accessions. The Selective Service Draft System would be similar to that utilized when the Draft ended. At that time the system had "eliminated the major inequities and irritants that surrounded draft operations during the Vietnam War."¹² The system incorporated a lottery and "occupational, agricultural, student, and paternity deferrments had been phased out."¹³ "With the exception of registrants deferred for extreme hardship to dependents, certain medical speciality students, ministerial students and some elected public officials, all other registrants, or in excess of 95% of any age group, were exposed to the possibilities of processing for induction."¹⁴

CONCLUSIONS

1. That the Active Forces have been generally successful in meeting Fiscal Year End Strengths since the inception of the AVF.
2. That the Active Forces could not have met these end strengths without a significant increase in the number of women being recruited and without the recruitment of Black Americans in disproportion to their population in this country.
3. That the Active Forces have made great progress in raising the quality of enlisted accessions in recent years.
4. That the Active Forces are general representative of the regional youth population in this country.
5. That the Active Forces are not racially representative of the U.S. population as a whole, especially in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.
6. That the Reserve Components that made great progress in manning the Selected Reserve and the IRR/ING in recent years.
7. That the quality of enlistments in the Reserve Components has increased in recent years.
8. That despite the recent progress in manning of the Selected Reserve and the IRR/ING, the Reserve Components are currently undermanned.
9. That we are near a saturation point in the shifting of responsibility and missions from the Active Force to the Reserve Components and that any additional shifting of responsibilities must be closely analyzed.

10. That the current problems of the AVF will be exacerbated in the late 1980's and early 1990's by the declining male youth population.

11. That Universal Military Training, Universal Military Service, and Universal National Service are not viable alternatives to the AVF because they are far too costly.

12. That the Reserve Draft Only is a viable option to eliminate current strength shortfalls in the IRR/ING and any future strength shortfalls in the Selected Reserve should they occur.

13. That the Selective Service Draft appears to be the only viable alternative to the AVF pending further study of National Service options.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Selected Service Draft be reinstated in the United States immediately.

2. That the Selective Service Draft System in effect when the Draft ended be analyzed to insure that all possible inequities have been eliminated.

"The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States..."¹⁵

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8

CHAPTER I
FOOTNOTES

1. "How Should the U.S. Meet Its Military Manpower Needs?" American Enterprise Institute Forums moderated by John Charles Daly, 6 March 1970, p. 1.
 2. U.S. Department of Defense, Ending the Draft, the Story of the All Volunteer Force, by Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, Final Report, Human Resources Research Organization, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 29-30.
 3. General Brent Scowcroft, Editor, Military Service in the United States, 1982, p. 203.
- Mr. Lacy further stated: "Active force manpower authorizations--already lowered at the AVF's inception to a point smaller than at any time since mid-1950--dropped in the aggregate by 236,000 between 1973 and 1980. The prescribed strength of the drilling reserves (the "Selected Reserve") dropped by 93,000 in the same period. Detente with the Soviet Union and lessened tensions in Asia may have explained the baptismal downturn in force size at the AVF's inception, but they were unconvincing in terms of the subsequent, steady annual decline. And, while lessening manpower requirements would abet the AVF's performance for a while, it was improbable that the decline could go on indefinitely. Still, to arrest it, let alone reverse it, would place the AVF in a new circumstance of military manpower demand at precisely the time when manpower supply would be less favorable."
4. Morris Janowitz, The US Forces and the Zero Draft, 1973, p. 24.
 5. Michael W. Sherraden and Donald J. Eberly, Editors, National Service: Social, Economic and Military Impacts, 1982, p. 152.
 6. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1986, p. 118-119.
 7. Ibid., p. 119.
 8. Army Times, 18 March 1985, p. 21.
 9. Ibid., p. 13.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Ibid.
 12. Army Times, 1 April 1985, p. 20.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid.
 15. Ibid.
 16. General Brent Scowcroft, Editor, Military Service in the United States, 1982, p. 92.

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5. Ibid., pp. A-15 - A-16.
6. Ibid., p. A-14.
7. General Brent Scowcroft, Editor, Military Service in the United States, 1982, p. 173.
8. Ibid.
9. Military Manpower Task Force, A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All Volunteer Force, October 1982, p. A-18.
10. Ibid.
11. Army Times, 11 March 1985, p. 6.
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13. Ibid., p. 21.
14. Ibid.
15. Gerald Leinwand, The American Constitution, 1964, p. 347.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 FEMALE MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY, OFFICERS, AND ENLISTED (P25.61)

TOTAL MILITARY SERVICES

MAY 31, 1945 TO DATE

DATE	TOTAL	OFFICERS	ENLISTED AND OFFICER CANDIDATES
30 JUN 1967	14,483	4,742	9,741
30 JUN 1968	15,807	5,096	10,711
30 JUN 1969	15,878	5,157	10,721
30 JUN 1970	16,724	5,248	11,476
30 JUN 1971	18,865	5,040	11,825
30 JUN 1972	16,771	4,422	12,349
30 JUN 1973	20,736	4,279	16,457
30 JUN 1974	30,715	4,388	26,327
30 JUN 1975	42,295	4,594	37,701
30 JUN 1976	48,650	4,844	43,806
30 SEP 1976	49,611	5,150	44,461
30 SEP 1977	51,790	5,696	46,094
30 SEP 1978	56,841	6,292	50,549
30 SEP 1979	62,017	6,866	55,151
30 SEP 1980	69,338	7,609	61,729
30 SEP 1981	73,653	8,349	65,304
30 SEP 1982	73,104	9,033	64,071
30 SEP 1983	76,025	9,490	66,535

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1983, p. 99.

APPENDIX B

TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY FEMALE STRENGTH TRENDS
 FY 1981 THROUGH FY 1984
 (Numbers in Thousands)

FISCAL YEAR	BEGIN STRENGTH	END STRENGTH	CUMULATIVE NET CHANGE
1981	171.5	184.8	+13.3
1982	184.8	189.8	+ 5.0
1983	189.8	198.1	+ 8.3
1984	198.1	203.3	<u>+ 5.2</u>
		TOTAL NET CHANGE	+31.8

SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Briefing on Fiscal Year 1984 Recruiting, Retention, and Strength Results. (Slide 29)

APPENDIX C

ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED END STRENGTHS

	FY1984		FY1983	
	<u>NUMBER (THOUSANDS)</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL (THOUSANDS)</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL</u>
ARMY	204	31	211	32
NAVY	66	13	63	13
MARINE CORPS	36	20	36	20
AIR FORCE	<u>83</u>	17	<u>83</u>	17
TOTAL DOD	389	21	393	22

*BLACK RACE, †INCLUDES BLACK HISPANICS

SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 35)

APPENDIX D

ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST
(AFQT) CATEGORIES


<u>AFQT CATEGORY</u>	<u>AFQT PERCENTILE SCORE</u>	<u>LEVEL OF TRAINABILITY</u>
I	93-99	Well Above Average
II	65-92	Above Average
IIIA	50-65	Average
IIIB	31-49	Average
IV	10-30	Below Average
V	1-9	Well Below Average

Category IV non-high school graduates and all category vs by law are not eligible for enlistment.

SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 12)

APPENDIX E

**DISTRIBUTION OF DOD NPS ACCESSIONS*
BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
FY 1964 THRU 1984**




*INCLUDES NPS MALES AND FEMALES (INDUCTEES, REGULARS, AND RESERVES WITH 2 OR MORE YEARS ACTIVE COMMITMENT)

7164

SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 10)

APPENDIX F
**DISTRIBUTION OF DoD NPS ACCESSIONS*
 BY AFQT CATEGORY
 FY 1964 THRU 1984**




*INCLUDES NPS MALES AND FEMALES (INDUCTEES REGULARS AND RESERVES WITH 2 OR MORE YEARS ACTIVE COMMITMENT)

SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 16)

APPENDIX G

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS BY STATES

% OF FY 1984 NPS ACCESSIONS
% OF 17-21 YEAR OLD YOUTH



SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 36C)

APPENDIX H

SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER^a
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL		PROGRAMMED	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Army National Guard	367	434	438	450
Army Reserve	207	275	286	301
Naval Reserve	97	121	129	142
Marine Corps Reserve	35	41	42	43
Air National Guard	96	105	108	111
Air Force Reserve	<u>59</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>77</u>
Total ^b	861	1,046	1,077	1,124


^a Numbers include Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR).

^b Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.


SOURCE: Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year 1986, p. 117.

APPENDIX I

COMPARISON OF DOD ACTIVE AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS




ACTIVE	2,082,000
SEL RESERVE	<u>851,000</u>
	2,933,000



ACTIVE	2,138,000
SEL RESERVE	<u>1,046,000</u>
	3,184,000

SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Briefing on Fiscal Year 1984 Recruiting, Retention, and Strength Results. (Slide 27B).

COMPARISON OF ARMY ACTIVE AND SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS



SOURCE: Ibid., (Slide 27)