DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT AND EMERGING REAR BATTLE DOCTRINE

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various field manuals, and included in this essay, clearly depicts the rear battle's state of ambiguity with respect to command and control and the O & O concept. The essay examines four major deficiencies with current and emerging rear battle doctrine and proposes alternatives to these deficiencies based upon the results of a study conducted by the VII US Corps in USAREUR commencing in January 1984. The major deficiencies examined include command and control, the role and responsibilities of the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), the base and base cluster defense concept, and the combat support and combat service support units' lack of providing sufficient firepower for self-defense. Soviet capabilities and intentions clearly indicate that the rear battle will be as dynamic and decisive as the deep and close-in battles. It is the intent of this essay to demonstrate that our current and emerging rear battle doctrine is both inadequate and in some cases contradictory. Furthermore, based upon the criticality of the threat, the rear battle doctrine deficiencies require immediate commitment by the Army for resolution, as the lack of concentration and resolve of these deficiencies could prove costly in any future conflict with the Soviet Union.
DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT & EMERGING REAR BATTLE DOCTRINE

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Airland Battle doctrine, as articulated in FM 100-5, Operations, fuses the deep, close-in and rear battles. While the deep and close-in battle doctrine has been well developed and exercised extensively, the rear battle doctrine development has been sporadic and in many instances neglected. The U.S. Army currently has a minimum of eight different field manuals that address the operational and organizational concepts for the conduct of the rear battle. A matrix of responsibilities associated with this battle, as outlined in the various field manuals, and included in this essay, clearly depicts the rear battle's state of ambiguity with respect to command and control and the O & O concept.

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The Airland Battle doctrine, as articulated in FM 100-5, Operations, fuses the deep, close-in and rear battles. While the deep and close-in battle doctrine has been well developed, refined, and exercised extensively, the rear battle doctrine development has been sporadic and exercises concentrating on the rear battle remain the exception, rather than the rule.

The United States Army currently has a minimum of eight different field manuals that address the operational concept of the conduct of the rear battle (See Appendix A). These manuals have been developed over a span of fifteen years and contain a mixture of contradictory concepts. The only manual to use the term rear battle is the "new" approved final draft of FM 90-14, Rear Battle. Even the Army's latest publication of FM 100-5 still refers to rear area protection (RAP) versus the rear battle. If you examine these eight manuals in some detail and review the scenarios of major Corps and Division command post and field exercises, it would appear that the rear battle is in a state of ambiguity with respect to operations, budget and the doctrinal resolution of C^2. The actual fusion of the three battles is questionable, and the lack of concentration on the rear battle could prove costly in any future conflict with the Soviet Union.

History is replete with situations where armies have successfully employed forces in the enemy's rear area to disrupt and destroy combat support and combat service support elements, thus forcing their enemy
to divert front line combat units to counter the rear threat.
Partisan Maccabees attacked targets of opportunity and supply camps in
the Roman Legion's rear area. Early in World War II in Burma,
Merrill's Marauders and three brigades of Chindits tied down elements
of Japanese divisions in rear area operations. Likewise, rear area
operations played an important part in Soviet strategy during World
War II when partisan activities interfered with German operations,
causing them to commit major forces in rear areas. And more recently,
during the Korean War and in the Yom Kipper War of 1973, forces using
Soviet doctrine were so successful in the conduct of rear area op-
erations that tactical units were required to suppress the threat.¹

It is not likely that the Soviets will forget their World War II
battle successes. "Soviet strategists, as well as tacticians, are
preparing for another 'front behind the front'..."² Using agents,
saboteurs, Spetznaz, airborne, airmobile, naval, marines and
Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs), the Soviet Union intends to wage
extensive rear area warfare. Attacks will target nuclear sites,
support bases, ammunition and POL storage facilities, lines of
communications, and essential command and control facilities. The
attacks will be an extension of and directly linked to the operations
in the main battle area. Ideally, the Soviets hope to reduce or
eliminate NATO's nuclear capability, diminish or disrupt C³,
especially at Corps and higher echelons, and equally important, to
disrupt combat service support to the forward forces. The synergistic affect of these operations would undoubtedly cause the diversion of NATO forward deployed combat forces to the rear battle.

A vignette from Patton's Principles, by Porter B. Williamson, amply illustrates the potential for mass confusion when a single soldier (friendly) unintentionally disrupts the normal logistical flow in the rear area. Consider the exponential effect on this disruption when approximately 20,000 active and "sleeper" Warsaw pact agents and Spetznaz teams are simultaneously assaulting NATO's vital arteries.

"In the Louisiana maneuvers last year, 1941, we had a Chinese national enlisted man in our American Army. He looked like any other American soldier in his uniform except he did not understand much English and spoke almost no English.

Well, this poor soldier got lost one day. Being unable to speak English, he could not ask where his outfit was located. I doubt he could pronounce the name of his outfit so any American could understand him.

Being in the uniform and walking along the highway, civilian drivers would give him a ride until the soldier would open the door, indicating he wanted out. He was at last stranded at a cross road where he attempted to hitchhike a ride with any Army vehicle of any unit.

The problem was he used his index finger to hitch instead of his thumb. He pointed forward with his finger instead of backward with his thumb. You can guess what happened. For one Army convoy, the Chinese soldier pointed his index finger down one road. Of course, no vehicle would stop since they knew he was directing traffic.
When the trucks failed to stop, he moved to another road and with the next convoy pointed down a new road. All of one entire afternoon, this soldier split our Army units by sending them down first one road and then another. Do all of you realize how easy it would be for one enemy soldier in an American uniform to destroy our firing capability?"³

The indications are clear that both Soviet intentions and capabilities pose a serious threat to the U.S. forces and while a war cannot be won in the rear area, it most assuredly can be lost, or better expressed by one of Stalin's Five Principles of Warfare; "a stable rear area has it's counter to the enemy area...an unstable rear area will turn any enemy, no matter how strong, into a chaotic disaster." Thus, failure to develop, resource and exercise realistic rear battle doctrine could alter the outcome of a future conflict with the Soviet Union.

Past rear area doctrine developed for the Pentomic and Combat Support Theater Army (COSTAR) Corps had a common criticism; confusing command and control. Current and emerging rear area doctrine retains this criticism and is even more complicated in other areas than its antecedents.

The objectives of the rear battle are defined and are consistent in the various manuals. They are to:
- Secure the rear area facilities
- Prevent or minimize enemy interference with C³
- Prevent or minimize disruption of combat and combat service support forward
- Find, fix and destroy enemy incursions in the rear area
- Provide area damage control (ADC) after an attack/incident

The basic concept for the conduct of the rear battle outlined in the eight manuals previously referenced, is also standardized for the most part. Minor incursions into the rear area, such as enemy controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, and terrorist activities are routinely expected to be countered by organic unit forces. The military police provide initial response forces to units and groupings of units. The military police are well trained in reconnaissance, have an excellent communications capability and, if concentrated possess the fire power to counter less than battalion size threats. In the Corps, their ability to counter the overall enemy threat in the rear area is dependent upon the arrival of the Time Phased Force Deployment Listed (TPFDL) MP Battalions and available combat multipliers. Since the MP Battalions currently lack the necessary crew-served anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, they require supporting forces from artillery, attack helicopters, close-air support and other available combat multipliers.
Should the rear area threat exceed the capabilities of the organic units, the military police and supporting forces, commitment of host nation or U.S. maneuver forces, either reserves or those least committed in the close-in battle, must be considered.

It should be noted here that the categorization of threat levels by type and intensity as outlined in the various field manuals is superfluous; either a unit or group of units can counter an enemy threat or it cannot, in which case response forces will be required regardless of the threat level designation (See Appendix B).

While the basic concept of operations of the rear battle is semi-standardized, the matrix at Appendix A exemplifies the myriad of differences in the designation of responsibilities to implement the operational concept. The major and initial issue that requires resolution is the answer to who's in charge. Until the C² issue is resolved the remaining doctrinal conflicts cannot be adequately addressed. In his Army War College text, Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces, LTG et) John H. Cushman states, "There is little uniformity in air/land field organizations, as they exist, at echelons above (or even below) corps." He further recognizes the absolute necessity for unity of command with respect to the rear battle when he comments that, "...the senior land or air/land commander needs to have a rear area command structure in place which is separate from the command structures responsible for other rear

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area activities such as logistics, air defense, and air base operations, but which takes into account and coordinates the defensive operations of these and other command structures."

In January 1984 the VII US Corps in US Army Europe (USAREUR) conducted an extensive study on the conduct of the rear battle. This study was initiated by direction of the CINCUSAREUR to provide a basis for shaping and influencing emerging doctrine pertaining to the rear battle. The study was underwritten by two major REFORGER exercises, seven corps level command post exercises, extensive doctrinal literature review and a three month long computer assisted map exercise designed specifically to address the rear battle requirements. Based upon the conclusions of this study, it was recommended that the myriad of operational concepts and field manuals (or parts thereof) addressing rear area security (RAS) and rear area protection (RAP) be rescinded. It was believed that rear battle discussions belong in the division, corps and echelons above corps manuals. There are no separate manuals for the deep and close-in battles, and if the Army truly desires to fuse the three battles, the integration of the manuals might provide the proper point of departure. Secondly, the study emphasized that the corps commander cannot delegate responsibility. He is responsible for the three battles and the connectivity between these really make it one battle in three locations all joined together with one objective. In this
regard it was recommended that the doctrine reflect the corps commanders as responsible for the corps rear battle, with authority for planning and execution delegated to the Deputy Corps Commander. In peacetime the Deputy Corps Commander is in the chain of command for the majority of the occupants of the corps rear area (CRA), thus it doesn't make sense to change that structure and shift the command and control responsibilities at the critical transition to war juncture. There is some reluctance on the part of doctrinaires to be specific in affixing this delegation to a designated individual for fear of usurping the corps commander's perrogative to organize for battle. This appears contrary to the Army's desire for standardization. Regardless, the new approved final draft of FM 90-14 delegates the rear battle responsibility to the "rear battle officer" and we are right back where we started with a lack of agreement/standardization of who's in charge.

While the command and control controversy is a key dilemma and is the driving force, there are several other major deficiencies with current and emerging doctrine that deserve attention. One such deficiency concerns the responsibility of the peacetime planning and training for the rear battle in the absence of the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). The RAOC is basically the G3 of the rear battle and thereby has the responsibility for the continuous planning and coordination, particularly with the host nation, in peace and war. While some progress has been made in forward deploying small
planning cells in Europe and moving the RAOC's up on the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), their task is far too immense to accomplish in absenitation. Real world reliance on the missions and responsibilities currently associated with the RAOCs argues for a major portion of the unit to be forward deployed or that the RAOCs be replaced by resourcing a third command post from active components.

The VII US Corps has conducted the airland battle using a three command post concept (TAC, MAIN and REAR) for four years. The Rear CP contains that part of the Corps staff concerned with the critical Manning, equipping and sustaining functions. The major staff elements present are the G1 and AG (in a combined Corps Personnel Operations Center [CPOC]), the G4 and G5 and special staff officers. As was stated previously, it is commanded by the Deputy Corps Commander and controlled through the Corps Rear Tactical Operations Center (CRTOC). The manning of the CRTOC has been evolutionary and "out of hide." It is currently manned on an ad hoc basis by members of the G3 and two forward deployed members of one of VII Corps' RAOCs. The operational cell is supplemented by a G2 element and liaison teams from the fire support element, aviation, engineers, ordnance and the air force. This ad hoc group performs the operations and intelligence functions of the rear CP until the arrival of the TPFDL RAOC. Neither the initial stages of battle nor subsequent ones should be the responsibility of an ad hoc group. While there is doctrinal consistency in outlining the critical functions and responsibilities
of the RAOC, the absence of a credible forward deployed RAOC planning cell invalidates this consistency. A RAOC arriving during the transition to war or after hostilities commence has little value to a forward deployed Corps faced with immediate rear battle requirements.

A third major deficiency in current and emerging rear battle doctrine is the reliance on the intricate base and base cluster concept of defense. This deficiency is exacerbated by an undefined terrain management responsibility in the absence of the RAOC. For all practical purposes, the base and base cluster concept is a "paper concept" that remains untested. In a base, which is a unit or multi-unit position that has a definite perimeter, it is feasible to expect a certain self-defense capability. Even the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) is plausible, as it would inevitably be the unit's normal operations center. However, base cluster defense and the Base Cluster Operation's Centers (BCOC) are non-starters. Realistically, units are not geographically grouped together to provide mutual defense support, they are located irrespective of other unit locations and where they can best accomplish their operational missions. In the conduct of the VII Corps map exercise portion of their study it was determined that numerous unit locations were in conflict with one another, units were located in non-trafficable terrain, and units knew little of other units in their area of operation. This is not an unusual phenomena as the rear area is in a constant state of flux and the management, C² and movement in this
area makes clustering practically impossible. Another problem with this concept is resources. The staffing and communications requirements outlined in the new FM 90-14 are non-existent. The combat service support units in the rear have the mission to support forward, thus it is unlikely that a major portion of the unit will be located in the clusters; they will be away performing their maintenance, transport, etc., missions. Secondly, a simple problem of CEOI's exasperates the communications problem, that is, if the CSS unit even has the requisite equipment. Finally, the responsibility for base clustering and training the base clusters for mutual defense, if it were viable, belongs to the RAOC which is not in theater. Thus, it would appear that there is insufficient thought and empirical doctrinal analysis to support the entire base cluster defense concept.

The final major deficiency in the rear battle doctrine concerns the available self-defense alternatives that could significantly improve a unit's ability to defend itself. Combat support and combat service support units are not adequately trained and equipped to defend themselves, nor are Military Police units optimally equipped to perform their response force mission. A portion of the VII US Corps rear battle analysis consisted of a computer assisted map exercise designed to define the rear area of a mature corps and assess its vulnerability and self-defense capability. The empirical data derived from the simulation demonstrated that many units in the CRA could defend themselves against attack by sizeable enemy forces (Soviet
airborne battalion) without a requirement to commit tactical units to the rear battle; however, this could only be accomplished with additional combat power. The study examined twelve self-defense alternatives in varying combinations and applied them to the threat using the McClintic Theater Model to determine which alternative or combination significantly improved the ability of the CS & CSS units to repel an attack of this size (Appendix C). The results of the study indicated that no single combat multiplier currently available, and considered, was effective in significantly improving a unit's ability to defend itself. However, the study did validate an optimal mix of self-defense alternatives that would significantly reduce the rear area vulnerability. The optimal mix was a combination of prepared defense, equipping CS & CSS units with an "upgunning" package, MP Platoon response force with an "upgunning" package and a battery of 155 Howitzers. The Bases of Issue Plan (BIOP) and feasibility of the "upgunning" of these units is currently under study by the Logistics Center. Weapons considered include the 25mm Bushmaster Chain gun, the Mark 19 40mm grenade machine gun, the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), the .50cal machine gun with ring mount, the 90mm recoiless rifle, the medium anti-tank weapon (MAW) and the light anti-tank weapon (LAW).

Soviet capabilities and intentions clearly indicate that the rear battle will be as dynamic and derisive as the deep and close-in battles. Our current and emerging doctrine is both inadequate and in
some cases contradictory. Based upon the criticality of the threat, the rear battle doctrine deficiencies require immediate commitment by the Army for resolution. The application of our age old principles of war such as unity of command, simplicity and economy of force might resolve the major obstacles plaguing rear battle doctrine from its inception.
APPENDIX B

LEVELS OF THREAT*

LEVEL I

- Enemy controlled agents activity
- Sabotage by enemy sympathizers
- Terrorism

LEVEL II

- Diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces
- Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units
- Special missions or unconventional warfare (UW) missions

LEVEL III

- Heliborne operations
- Airborne operations
- Amphibious operations
- Ground force deliberate operations
- Infiltration operations

APPENDIX C

COMBAT MULTIPLIERS CONSIDERED

1. Prepared Defense
2. Logistics Center "Up gunning" Package
3. MP Platoon
4. 155 Howitzers (one battery)
5. 105 Howitzers (one battery)
6. Attack Helicopter Platoon
7. 2 Sorties A-10's
8. AC 130 Gun Ship
9. Upgunn CS/CSS units with Mark 19 only
10. Upgunn CS/CSS units with .50cal machine gun only
11. Upgunn CS/CSS units with Squad automatic weapon only
12. Upgunn CS/CSS units with VIPER only
APPENDIX D
ENDNOTES


4. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, August 1984, pp. 2-3.

