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COMBAT ROLE FOR THE USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS(U) ARMY
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Item 20 - continued.

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Prior to their conversion to training divisions, these units were all combat infantry divisions and thus retain some remnants of this past organization. So the present structure continues to provide a firm organization for command and control of maneuver units.

The expense and turmoil created by this additional mission would be minimal, since the combat division would not be assembled until after mobilization and all parts of the combat division would come from the various training centers, branch schools and installation support units, both active and reserve. All that is lacking for the formation of 12 additional combat divisions is an implementation plan.

Finally, by adopting this concept, the army would gain the additional flexibility of being able to tailor the mission of the training divisions to the immediate needs of the army, giving it the following potential:

(1) Within a period of weeks, increasing the combat force by 12 additional Light Infantry Divisions.

(2) Allowing all twelve training divisions to continue in their role as training divisions producing individual replacements.

(3) Allowing part of the divisions to continue their training mission and converting the remainder to combat divisions.
A COMBAT ROLE FOR THE USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of warfare envisioned for Europe and Southwest Asia in the 1980's has been described by our senior leadership as being characterized by quick and decisive combat, so those units actually on the ground at the site of the action would most likely decide the outcome of the conflict. They do not anticipate a long buildup prior to hostilities, which would allow for the training and preparation of forces for war. This concept reduces the probability of a long war or a war of attrition--the type for which the United States has mobilized so well in the past. The Soviets fully realize our vast potential to convert over time our national resources to a major war fighting effort. Because of this, they will most likely force a short war upon us to deny this advantage. Therefore, the majority of our forces are training in preparation for quick and decisive warfare, rather than for a war of attrition.

Most elements of the army have adjusted themselves to this new concept of "come-as-you-are-war". But the 12 training divisions of the army's reserve forces are an exception. The current mission for these units was developed following the Korean War. Because of the great time lag in expanding the training base and confusion and over-staffing of training centers, the army sought a more efficient way to mobilize. So the army reserve's 12 Combat Infantry Divisions were converted to training divisions and given the mobilization mission of
establishing training centers, or augmenting the existing training base.

But this current mission is based upon the needs of the army of the 1950's, when ample time was available to train new troops and to deploy units.

It is fair to say that this system would have been effective enough then and even during the Vietnam War and possibly in some very special cases today. However, at the present time, with no military draft and a forecast of immediate need for forces at the outset of hostilities, it appears that the current mission for the training divisions is out-dated and unrealistic.

This study will set forth and analyze a more appropriate mission for the training divisions to insure that they will be able to contribute to the nation's war effort in any future military conflict.
Based upon our successful experience in previous wars, when the United States had ample time to put the draft into place and to begin gearing up for mobilization, the current plans are based generally along these same traditional lines. Even so, some USAR and Nation Guard units will deploy upon short notice as roundout units. But the 12 USAR training divisions are still assigned the mobilization mission of deploying to training centers across the country. Upon arrival at these centers, the divisions will augment or take over the training responsibility within a few days of mobilization.

This scenario does not specify when trainees will begin arriving at the training centers. With our present system of draft registration, it is estimated that once authorization is granted by Congress to initiate the draft (which hopefully will be done simultaneously with mobilization), it may take six months for the first draftees to arrive at the training centers. Under current plans, this may mean that the training divisions will mobilize, report to their training centers and then not be fully utilized for a period of six months while they are waiting for the selective service to begin to function.

So the trainee may not enter the system for six months, then take an additional 12 to 14 weeks to complete his basic training, then require leave and shipment time. This means that a period of almost one year may be required to acquire, train and deploy the first combat replacements. If the next war really is a rapid, come-as-you-are affair, this period of time is totally unacceptable.
Because mobilization will be a lengthy and wasteful process and because unprecedented force modernization has been so costly, we now rely greatly upon reserve component capabilities to mobilize and deploy quickly.

So the 12 USAR training divisions are currently assigned an outmoded mission that in all likelihood will not contribute to a 1980's war. It seems appropriate then to assign them missions which will enable them to contribute more to a decisive war of rapid deployment. In order for these divisions to be utilized to their fullest potential and, at the same time, to provide some flexibility in the type of missions that they are capable of performing, I propose that the training divisions be given two missions which, through their unique organization, they are quite capable of performing.

**FIRST MISSION:** Upon mobilization, each of the 12 training divisions would move to its designated training center. Using the current Light Infantry Division table of organization, they would fill up the various unit positions, building upon their organic base of approximately 4500 personnel. They would then receive combat support and combat service support elements from those reserve units being mobilized at that particular mobilization site, normally designated as base support units. Also, they should receive personnel from the various branch schools. The Individual Ready Reserve would be mobilized and scheduled to arrive at the training centers shortly after the training divisions. Next they would be received, classified, tested and in some cases retrained. Then they would be assigned to unfilled positions within the divisions. Finally, to complete the
fill-up of personnel, those trainees already in the training cycle would be assigned to the division upon completion of their basic training. After a brief period of unit training, the new Light Infantry Division would begin its deployment to the theatre of operations.

SECOND MISSION: Upon mobilization, each of the 12 training divisions would move to its designated training center and either take over or augment the training base and conduct basic and related training to prepare troops for overseas replacement.

The missions described above give the decision-makers flexibility and allow both for the traditional buildup of forces over a protracted period of time and for the rapid deployment of 12 fully trained and equipped Light Infantry Divisions to meet the threat. Each of these missions can be executed upon short notice and without the purchase of additional new equipment or facilities.

The American ranger units are usually regarded as the ideal for the Light Infantry fighting force. They are highly motivated, extremely well led and operate with a very limited amount of combat and logistical support. These units are normally moved quickly and they operate in built up, mountinous and forested areas, over what would be considered unsuitable terrain for regular heavy forces. Likewise, the USAR Light Infantry Division will require a light organization with very little organic transportation or fire support, but will provide for an ample supply of combat infantrymen.
In the effort to create a role for such new divisions, Major General John W. Foss has asserted that, "The whole argument for light infantry has been that it can outperform heavier forces in close and difficult terrain, the type of terrain which exists in many areas of West Germany. The Defense Science Board Study of Urban Warfare this year, (1984) reaffirmed the extensive urbanization of Western Europe, the utility of using the small villages to reinforce the defense, and the great value of infantry for that role. Light infantry can release the heavier, more powerful forces from having to cover and defend rough, urban and wooded areas and allow them to move to the more open and favorable terrain." 1

Besides defending built-up areas and areas labeled as unsuitable for heavy forces, light divisions would also provide airfield security, protect lines of communication and generally provide for corps rear-area security. It could perform these missions in addition to providing a mobile force that could be quickly and easily lifted around the battlefield as the situation dictated.
How feasible would it be to convert the organization of the Training Divisions to that of Light Infantry Divisions?

In the current organization of the Training Division, one unit, the Maneuver Training Command, provides the key to the overall conversion process. This unit consists of approximately 400 personnel, mostly officers. All branches serve in the MTC, which is organized into various evaluation teams, each headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. During mobilization, the Maneuver Training Command headquarters becomes the Division Service Command (DISCOM), and designated teams then provide cadre or staffs for the combat and combat service support units.

Consider, for example, conversion of the Engineer Battalion: Initially, the Engineer Team of the MTC converts to the Engineer Battalion staff, with the team chief becoming the battalion commander and the assistant team chief the Executive Officer. Other key positions, such as company commander, first sergeants and platoon sergeants, would be filled from within the Training Division structure. With this skeletal staff, the cadre would move immediately to the Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where necessary specialized personnel both from the school itself and from the enlisted students would be assigned to fill out the organization structure. Company grade officers attending the basic course and advanced course at Fort Belvoir would be brought in to fill out the remaining officer positions. Within a period of four weeks, all individual training would be completed. Finally, in coordination with the rear detachment, under direction of the Battalion Executive Officer, located at the mobilization site, all available engineer equipment would be requisitioned and moved to Fort Leonard Wood.
FOOTNOTES

1. Foss, John W. Major General, "Light Infantry Has a Definite Place on The Battlefield." Army Times, (29 October 1984)

(2) The unit members know and trust their leaders.

(3) The individual soldiers are fighting for each other, rather than for lofty ideals. Most established reserve units fit this description very well, particularly those from small towns or cities. Since this combination of characteristics is conducive to success on the battlefield, placing the divisions anywhere else would appear to be a misapplication of a very important asset.

In conclusion, the time and effort devoted to gearing up the training base for mobilization may produce too little, too late to influence the outcome of the next war. By providing flexibility in types of missions for the Training Divisions, additional war fighting resources can be quickly mobilized to meet the emergency, whether the situation calls for traditional mobilization or an immediate and rapid deployment to the theatre of conflict.

Finally, no serious proposal is complete without a quotation from Clausewitz to firmly establish the validity of one's argument. The following is from his views on the strategic reserve: "The point at which the concept of a strategic reserve begins to be self-contradictory is not difficult to determine: it comes when the decisive stage of the battle has been reached. All forces must be used to achieve it, and any idea of reserves, of available combat units that are not meant to be used until after this decision, is an absurdity."²
this message would be perceived as less provocative than adding 12 combat divisions to the active force.

As a reserve officer with 14 years of service in most units of the 100th Training Division, my professional opinion is that the division units can adequately train for and perform more than one mission at a time. It has been mentioned previously, but is of such importance that I will state it again, reservists remain in their units and individual jobs for several years, normally moving only to be promoted. There are very few transfers between units, so these reservists have ample time to focus on and to learn their particular jobs. Further, because they do not have reassignments, there is a tendency for some to become stale in their work. In fact, most would welcome an opportunity or challenge to move into a new area of responsibility. I firmly believe that reservists could manage two individual unit assignments and concentrate on these in alternating years.

In view of the great concern for defense costs, providing for 12 new combat divisions at no additional expense should be politically attractive. The two-mission concept does not call for additional full-time manning personnel or additional man-day spaces. Instead, it uses the current division budget and training schedule to develope the reserve Light Infantry Division.

Much has been written about why units fight well in combat. When these reasons are examined closely, they generally come down to unit cohesion:

(1) The members know each other, have trained together nd have been together as a unit for a long time.
The concept of flexibility in the mobilization of reserve components (two missions) will strengthen our ability to respond to a short war and still allow, if necessary, the option of gearing up for a more protracted war that would require an expansion of the training base. This flexibility would contribute to the nation's deterrence capabilities in that an aggressor could see us preparing to add 12 additional combat divisions to the short war scenario, as well as maintaining the capability to augment the training centers for the long war. Further, because of the army's expanding areas of global responsibility and its limited force structure, the addition of 12 combat divisions will permit better coverage of these critical areas.

During the past several years, we have become very concerned with the amount of dollars spent on defense. We have started asking such questions as "How much is enough?" and "What exactly are the defense dollars being spent on?" and "Are we getting our money's worth?". In view of this concern for the expanding defense budget and our demand for efficient defense spending, the prospect of acquiring 12 additional combat divisions while not losing the capacity to augment the training centers provides an economical way of building up our national defense at little or no additional cost and could be described as "bargain defense."

The national will of the United States is constantly being evaluated to determine its credibility, to determine if we have the courage and ability to do what we say we are going to do. Adding the 12 combat divisions to our force list will provide further evidence to the world that we are developing the forces to back up our national objectives. Further, since these units would be reserve components,
Conversion of Training Divisions will undoubtedly create an organizational void: If the original purpose of the Training Division is to teach initial entry training, and if the 12 divisions are converted to Light Infantry Divisions, then who is going to conduct the initial entry training for the large buildup which will occur at mobilization.

Part of the answer is that our current doctrine forecasts future war as quick and decisive, probably not lasting long enough for the large additional forces to be called up, trained and deployed as organized units. The next war will most likely be fought and decided by those forces in existence at the opening of hostilities. If the 12 training divisions were mobilized and deployed to the theatre of operations as combat divisions, the training base that was in existence at the time of mobilization would continue to function. To increase this training base as the draft began to work, retirees, late arriving members of the IRR, wounded personnel returned to duty and excess cadre personnel from the reorganization of the training divisions would be used. These sources of personnel would enable the training base to expand and if further expansion was necessary, the ARCOM and other headquarters staffs could be used for this purpose. Thus, with careful planning, an organizational "back up" could be structured to fill the void left by the conversion of Training Divisions.

In the meantime, the Army would be better prepared for a short, decisive armed conflict--12 Light Infantry Divisions better prepared, to be exact.
What about the equipment necessary for conversion? First, keep in mind the fact that the Light Division's distinctive characteristic is its requirement for only limited logistical support. Consider the minimum amounts of equipment needed for combat:

Under the Training Division's current organization, each individual is equipped with an M-16 rifle, protective mask, helmet and carrying harness which includes a canteen, with a division total of approximately 4500 of each item. Within the support battalion are a number of trucks, trailers and jeeps of varying sizes. This basic equipment would be transferred in the conversion mission to the Light Infantry Division. To supply the TO&E items necessary to bring the units up to their wartime requirements, three options exist:

(1) The 12 divisions can be supplied from war reserve and depot stocks.

(2) The divisions could take equipment left behind by units deploying on POMCUS stocks.

(3) The 12 divisions could take equipment that was in maintenance and that being procured.

Based on the three options listed above, the divisions might draw upon a combination of these sources. Finally, they could move to the theater of operations and rely on the corps support (corps plug) assets to cover the shortages.
The Maneuver Training Command could easily coordinate the reorganization of division units and develop and designate the various missions that would be required for both types of units. Likewise, it could conduct annual tests and training exercises for these units. The MTC's core of special staffs for the combat and combat service support units would provide the basic vehicle for conversion. After the 12 divisions had been able to train and perform through at least two mission changes, consideration could be given to testing the feasibility of deploying the Light Division. This deployment test could be conducted at a post or installation within the United States and could involve only cadre or cadre and filler company grade officers, some of whom would come directly from the branch schools for the exercise. A more ambitious test would be for a selected division to be deployed on a reforger exercise, again without the lower ranking enlisted personnel. The rationale for not taking a full-up unit would be the expense and the fact that training is "perishable", so most lessons learned would not be significant, and in all likelihood the trainee would be reassigned prior to actual conversion. Thus, by focusing on squad leader and above, most conversion problems would be encountered and most important and permanent roles would be tested in the exercises. Bringing the cadre of the division together and allowing them to function as a field maneuver unit would provide much valuable experience at all levels of command. To insure that experience with troops was not lost or overlooked, platoon sergeants and squad leaders could train with TO&E infantry units during alternate annual training periods. The same procedure could apply to other types of combat and combat service support personnel.
To better explain this concept of two missions, consider how a battalion commander and his staff would function over a two year period. During the year dedicated to training as a part of the Training Division, the battalion would prepare its mission-essential task list and train accordingly. At annual training, they would then function as a training battalion and train basic trainees. During the next year, the battalion commander and his staff would assume the role of a Light Infantry Battalion, develop their mission-essential task list and train accordingly. At annual training, they would conduct command post exercises or simulation exercises to test their preparation. Along with alternating the missions annually, each member of the staff would continue to be responsible for his own military education.

The two-mission assignment is well suited to USAR capabilities. Consider that reservists remain in their positions and units much longer and experience fewer geographical moves than do regular army personnel. The key to making the program work is to train a strong and knowledgable cadre around which the units can be built and to establish unit cohesion which enables the staffs and commanders to function well under either configuration.
How well or poorly are current personnel and training activities of the Training Divisions suited for this new and complex mission of conversion to a Light Infantry Division? The Training Divisions are presently organized as cadre units, consisting primarily of headquarters, staffs commanders down to company level, with most key NCO's in the chain of command. These individuals come to their units with basic general skills and continue to maintain and improve them through the SQT and NCOES programs. Personnel are trained to carry out unit missions at the monthly drills and during the annual training period. The same arrangement could provide for retaining and developing skills needed in the new Light Division. Under this two-mission proposal, a unit would alternate mission training periods every year: For example, in 1986, the division would train for its Training Division role; then in 1987, the division would train for and use annual training to carry out missions of a Light Infantry Division.

This may appear complicated, but in reality it is not. Consider that very few of the branches or MOS's would have to be changed and that individuals would be working in the same skills, only in a different organizational structure. Further, Training Division personnel are for the most part either officers or senior noncommissioned officers with current or recent assignments as drill sergeants. These highly trained individuals would participate in annual command post exercises and field training exercises for both missions, alternating from year to year. Besides their specialized unit training, they would continue to keep themselves individually trained.
Consider next, the formation of the Artillery Brigade. The headquarters cadre for this unit will come from the Training Command. The base for each of the three battalions will come from the three battalions remaining after reorganization of the infantry brigades. After a short organizational period, the skeletal artillery brigade will move to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and begin its fill-up with enlisted personnel and company grade officers. The unit would finalize individual training within four weeks and then spend approximately two weeks on unit training prior to movement to the port of embarkation.

Finally, consider formation of the DISCOM. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company from the Maneuver Training Command would assume these duties, with the MTC commander becoming the DISCOM commander. The various teams from the MTC would be used to provide the cadre staff for the Maintenance Battalion and Supply and Service Battalion. The current Supply and Service Battalion of the Training Division would be split, with Wheel and Maintenance assets going to the Maintenance Battalion and Supply and Service assets going to the new Supply and Service Battalion. The support base at the training center would be used to fill out these units with supplies, equipment and personnel. Finally, the Medical Battalion would be organized around the Medical Team from the Maneuver Training Command and the First Aid Section from the Training Command. The balance of personnel and equipment for this battalion would come from base support assets and from other non-deploying reserve units.
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
and Headquarters Company staff of the Light Infantry Division. (see Inclosure #2).

The remainder of the Reception Station personnel and equipment will be absorbed by other units. The Military Police, Signal, Air Defense and Engineer units of the LID will be formed by taking the respective planning teams from the Maneuver Training Command, thereby providing a cadre for these support units. The balance of personnel would come from those students at the various branch schools who were being trained at the time of mobilization and from basic trainees at the training centers and arriving members of the IRR. Since each of the training brigades currently has four battalions and the Light Infantry organization requires only three, the three extra training battalions would be used as a base for the artillery battalions being formed under the Headquarters of the Training Command which would eventually serve as the Artillery Brigade Headquarters. Cadre for the three infantry brigades should come from the existing training organization. Then these brigades, while relying heavily upon the 430 former Drill Sergeants for small unit leadership at the squad and platoon level, should be filled up with basic trainees from the local training center and for special skills, from members of the IRR. Additional combat support, such as TOW, DRAGON, Mortar and Stinger crews, would be filled by levies from the Infantry School, which would provide either students or instructional personnel. These special crews would complete their individual training at the Infantry School and then move to join their assigned brigade headquarters for a minimum of two weeks of unit training prior to deployment.
After the executive officer had arrived with his filler personnel and equipment, the battalion would spend approximately two additional weeks to organize and train the unit for the types of missions it would be expected to perform for the Light Division. At the completion of this training, it would prepare for shipment to the theatre of operations, where it would link up with its parent unit. Other division support units would be similarly mobilized however, the three infantry brigades and DISCOM would remain at the original mobilization site for their training and final preparation.

Training personnel in preparation for this conversion should be on-going and integral to the Training Divisions' mission. Key officers and NCO's should participate in numerous command post and simulation exercises for familiarization with the types of missions they would be expected to perform and to ascertain the minimum types and amounts of supplies and equipment that would be necessary to accomplish conversion to a Light Infantry Division. In short, conversion planning and training would be high priority and on-going activities for all Training Divisions.

Current organization of the USAR Training Divisions, depicted in inclosure #1, provides Command and Control Headquarters for five brigade size units. These headquarters should provide the nucleus for the new Light Division. Now consider how Training Division personnel will be integrated into the structure. All personnel in the Training Division Headquarters, including personnel and administrative staff of the Reception Station, should be reorganized as Headquarters