UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

MAJOR ROBERT KILMER, JR. 85-1425

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TITLE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA:
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AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROBERT KILMER, JR., USA

FACULTY ADVISOR DR. LAWRENCE E. GRINTER

SPONSOR LT COL SAMUEL D. MC CORMICK, USCENTCOM, CCJ5-0

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AIR UNIVERSITY
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**Title:** United States and Soviet Military Security Assistance

**Abstract:** The United States and Soviet Union recognize the importance of the Horn of Africa. A key to peace and stability on the Horn is Somalia. The US and USSR have both aided Somalia in an attempt to influence events on the Horn and support their national interests. The US needs to pursue a positive policy towards Somalia. Somalia's border conflicts and internal tribal rivalries impact US interests. Somalia's neighbors respond negatively to military aid to Somalia. The US must find ways to achieve its goals placate Somalia's neighbors. Somalia's economy is weak and Somalia needs US help to get military aid. How the US approaches the delivery of military aid and the training of the Somali military will determine the impact and effectiveness of the aid. The study concludes that the US should provide limited military aid to Somalia; that an existing plan can be used; and that a review should be conducted to make sure that the Somalis can support any equipment that is provided.

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Preface

This paper will describe the impact and the effectiveness that the United States' and Soviet's military aid has had on Somalia in particular and the Horn of Africa in general. It will also make some recommendations based on the lessons learned by the U.S.S.R. and (so far) the U.S. This paper is intended to provide background information to those in the business of providing military aid and assistance to Somalia. This paper was produced using only unclassified sources. Military aid and assistance provided to Somalia by nations other than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has not been considered. Numerous interviews were conducted with Somali military personnel in the U.S. and Somalia. To maintain the anonymity of these personnel, all interviews are listed as a single bibliographic entry. The assistance of Maj. James N. Soligan, Maj. Robert L. Ostrander Jr., and Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter is gratefully acknowledged.
About the Author

The author's interest in Somalia developed as a result of his assignment to Somalia as part of the Tri-Service Training Assistance Team. The author spent five months in Somalia (June-November 1983) working with the Somali Ministry of Defense to upgrade the training in Somali military units and military schools. The author visited numerous combat units deployed on the Somali- Ethiopian frontier along with visiting reserve, garrison, and basic training units. All levels of military schools were inspected. Prior to his assignment in Somalia, the author spent six and a half years in mechanized infantry battalions in the United States and Europe, and three years as an infantry weapons instructor at the United States Army Infantry School. The author has had two articles published, both in Infantry magazine. The first was in the January-February 1982 issue and dealt with training infantry units on the use of small arms for air defense. The second was published in the July-August 1984 issue and dealt with the planning that needed to be done by members of a mobile training team.
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There are two threads that run through Somali history that have a major impact on Somalia today and on how the U.S. should interact with Somalia. Somalia's near constant warfare with its neighbors is the first of these threads. With the influx of modern weapons over the last score of years, the frequency and intensity of the conflicts have increased. The violence has put the superpowers at odds in the Horn of Africa. The slow expansion of the Somali tribes across the Horn has led to diversity and rivalry among the tribes. This rivalry is the second thread. The problems caused by this are clearly evident in the current operation of both the Somali government and military.

The only real hope for peace in the area is a negotiated settlement of the border disputes. U.S. dealings with Somalia must take this into account.
Militarily upsetting the status quo in the Horn is not in the best interest of the U.S. The U.S. must also weigh carefully how its actions will impact on long standing tribal rivalries and jealousies. What influence the U.S. has in the Horn of Africa could be lessened or even lost if these two long standing issues in Somali history are ignored.

Why would any country offer military aid to Somalia? The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. found many reasons with some of them being the same or at least similar. Both nations expected to get something in return for the aid that was provided. Often, what they received from the Somalis was reason enough to provide military aid. Sometimes wider interests, that did not concern the Somalis, were involved.

It is important to note that the reasons for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to provide aid to Somalia had little or nothing to do with Somalia achieving any of its own national interests. The aid was provided based primarily on what the superpowers thought they could get for it in achieving their national interests. When providing aid to Somalia, the U.S. must consider the risks involved and they must be weighed carefully against the potential gain for U.S. interests. The main risk is a negative impact on U.S. interests on the Horn caused by the adverse reaction of other nations to U.S. military aid to Somalia.

Historically, it has not mattered which country was supplying aid to Somalia, the reaction by Somalia's neighbors has been the same. The neighbors of Somalia have reacted unfavorably to military aid to Somalia. This unfavorable reaction stems directly from the fear that Somalia will use the military aid to advance its dream of a Greater Somalia. Considering the historical perspective, this is not an unreasonable fear. The two loudest protesters of military aid to Somalia have been Ethiopia and Kenya. With France as its protector, Djibouti has not protested as loudly as the others over the arming of Somalia.

There is no indication that the reactions to providing military aid to Somalia are going to change. There is no possibility that Somalia will give up its quest for a Greater Somalia. There is no chance that U.S. relations with Somalia's neighbors will improve greatly so long as the U.S. continues to provide military aid to Somalia. There is no indication that the form of Somali government is going to change. President Barre has continued to
consolidate his power. Much of this consolidation has occurred through tribal affiliations. The type and amount of military aid provided by the U.S. must take these circumstances into consideration. The U.S. must pursue its interests in Somalia with these thoughts in mind.

At current levels it will take about 50 years for the U.S. to equal the aid that the U.S.S.R. provided in about 15 years. The U.S. has put many conditions on the Somalis before military aid could be furnished. The Soviets did not put any conditions on the aid they provided. This lack of Soviet conditions is one reason that the Somalis originally accepted Soviet aid and not U.S. aid. The Somali economy was never strong enough to afford the $2 billion in military aid provided by the U.S.S.R. As a result, after a period of time, the Soviets just "wrote off" the debt, in effect, making the aid a grant. The U.S., on the other hand, insists that everything be paid for, even if payment is made by credit given to the Somalis by the U.S. Congress.

The U.S. must consider the amount of aid to be provided. The U.S. must provide enough aid to continue to keep access to Somali facilities but not so much aid that Somalia becomes a threat to its neighbors. The "strings" that are attached to the aid should be such that there is almost no chance that this aid could be used by Somalia or its rebel allies to upset U.S. interests on the Horn. Somalia's inability to pay for aid without U.S. credits will assist the U.S. in influencing events in the area. Somalia needs U.S. support and the U.S. can use this need to help achieve its national interests in the region. The U.S. must remember, however, the lack of influence the U.S.S.R. had on Somalia in trying to stop Somalia's Ogaden invasion.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have used decidedly different political techniques in providing military aid to Somalia. Predictably, the Somalis have responded in a manner that best suited their national interests. The U.S. routinely placed restrictions and conditions on the military aid provided to Somalia. The U.S.S.R. did not put any on its aid. The general Somali response has been to take the aid without strings, when a choice was available. The Somalis accept aid with strings when it is the only aid available. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have used similar general military training techniques but have differed in the details of their techniques. These differences are a direct result of the training philosophy used by each nation. These differences have had an impact on the short and long term effectiveness of the Somali military. It is
important to remember that the Soviet training philosophy and training
techniques learned by the Somali military have been modified by the Somalis
since the Soviet departure.

The political and training techniques used in handling military aid to
Somalia are important to the U.S. since both deal with the use of limited
resources. The political technique gets the resources there and the U.S. is
concerned that the aid works to further its national interests. The training
technique used by the U.S. is designed to give the Somalis the most efficient
and long term effective use of the resources provided.

The following recommendations are made.

* The U.S. should provide Somalia only enough military aid to
preserve Somalia's status as an independent nation within the borders
recognized by the OAU. This should provide the U.S. continued access to
Somali facilities that will support U.S. interests in the Horn, the Indian Ocean,
and the Persian Gulf. It should also keep Somalia from becoming a threat to
its neighbors, or aggravating long standing tribal rivalries, which would upset
the stability in the region that the U.S. needs to maintain influence on the
Horn and accomplish its goals.

* The Five Year Somali Military Training Enhancement Program,
developed by the Tri-Service Training Assistance Team (FMS case SO-B-OAI),
should be the document on which U.S. military aid and advisor training to the
Somali military is based. This plan provides for the upgrading and
modernization of all branches of the Somali military. The plan will do this at
the minimum cost to both the U.S. and Somalia.

* Groups such as the U.S. Air Force's Security Assistance
Committee should review all proposed U.S. military aid to Somalia to insure
that the aid meets the actual needs of Somalia and that Somalia has the
capability to operate, maintain, and support the equipment that is provided.
INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Soviet Union have recognized the importance of the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia). One key to peace and stability on the Horn is Somalia. The United States and the Soviet Union have both aided Somalia in an attempt to influence events on the Horn. The maintenance of influence with the nations on the Horn and the countering of Soviet influence are two reasons for the U.S. to pursue a positive policy towards Somalia. Somalia's long standing border conflicts and internal tribal rivalries and jealousies are problems that impact on U.S. policies and interests. Militarily upsetting the balance of power on the Horn is not in the best interest of the U.S. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have provided military aid to Somalia for reasons that have little or nothing to do with Somalia achieving any of its national interests. The aid was provided to support the superpowers' national interests. Somalia's neighbors have always responded negatively to military aid to Somalia. The U.S. must find ways to achieve its goals and to placate Somalia's neighbors at the same time. The Somali economy is unable to support the purchase of military aid. Therefore, other methods must be found. The limited financing that is available will necessarily limit the amount of military aid. Fortunately for U.S. interests, the Somalis need U.S. military aid. How the U.S. approaches the delivery of military aid and the training of the Somali military will determine the impact and effectiveness of the aid. In supporting Somalia and achieving U.S. national interests, the challenges before the U.S. military assistance community are many.
Chapter 1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There are two threads that run through Somali history that have a major impact on Somalia today and on how the U.S. should interact with Somalia. Somalia's near constant warfare with its neighbors is the first of these threads. With the influx of modern weapons over the last score of years, the frequency and intensity of the conflicts have increased. The violence has put the superpowers at odds in the Horn of Africa. The slow expansion of the Somali tribes across the Horn has led to diversity and rivalry among the tribes. This rivalry is the second thread. The problems caused by this are clearly evident in the current operation of both the Somali government and military.

The history of Somalia can be broken into four time periods. The first is the period prior to colonial partition. The second is the period of European colonization. The third covers from the formation of the Somali Republic to the revolution. The last phase begins with the establishment of the Somali Democratic Republic and runs to the present.

The first period of Somali history is the longest, everything prior to the 19th century. Unfortunately, it is also the least documented. This lack of documentation is based in part on the fact that the Somalis were, and principally are, a nomadic people with oral traditions. The first standardized Somali alphabet was not established until the 1970's.

The writings that are available from the first period (mostly Arab), indicate a strong Islamic influence on the Somalis by the 10th century. Trade was maintained in the area by a string of ports on the Somali coast including Berbera, Mogadishu, Merca, and Brava. This blending of Arab and native Somalis yielded the basic Somali nation of today. It also provides the background for some of Somalia's current problems with Ethiopia and internal tribal difficulties (9:16).
As a Muslim nation, a clash with Christian Ethiopia seemed inevitable. Recorded clashes go back as early as the 13th century and lasted into the 16th century. A decisive Ethiopian victory in 1542 quieted things down for a while and shifted the push of the Somalis more to the south than west, reaching what is now northeast Kenya. This spread of the Somali people over the Horn of Africa led to a greater divergence in the Somali tribes. The Somali nation divided itself into two major subgroups, Somaals and Saabs, consisting of four tribes of Somaals and two tribes of Saabs. Each tribe became further divided into smaller social groups. The Somaals predominately stayed with the nomadic traditions. The Saabs, however, were the tribes to push the farthest south and often became involved in agriculture and fishing. Both of these occupations were frowned on by the Somaals who, because of the harsher region in which they lived, were forced to remain nomadic. Although the current government has outlawed tribal discrimination, old traditions and allegiances die hard (39:894; 10:xvi).

The second period of Somali history lasted a little over a hundred years, from the early 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. This era in Somali history is dominated by four powers, England, France, Italy, and Ethiopia. The scramble for Africa saw each gain control of territory occupied by the Somalis. The process for the Europeans was to establish "protectorates" with local Somalis whereby the European power would "protect" the Somalis from other outside powers. As the 19th century closed, these agreements were made between "protecting" powers, with the Somalis left out of the process. The agreement that did the most to establish Somalia as it is today and perpetuate the Somali-Ethiopian problem occurred in 1897 when the British ceded the Ogaden to Menelik II of Ethiopia (17:26; 64:38-42).

This agreement had a great deal to do with the uprising led by Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. For about the first twenty years of the 20th century he fought the British and the Ethiopians. He is considered one of the first Somali nationalists (33:81).

There was little respite between these events and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The conquering of Ethiopia led to the Italians controlling most of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, Eritria, the Ogaden, and Italian Somaliland, creating their own empire. As World War II progressed, the British captured all of this territory. After the war, the British gave Eritria and the Ogaden to Ethiopia
and Italian Somaliland eventually became a United Nations' trusteeship administered by the Italians. By these actions the Somali nation was split into five states, the UN trusteeship, French Somaliland, the Ogaden controlled by Ethiopia, British Somaliland, and northeastern Kenya. This division of the Somali nation is symbolized by the five pointed white star on the current Somali national flag (47:22-24; 35:10).

The Somali Republic was born on 1 July 1960 when British Somaliland and the UN trusteeship were united and granted independence. The main foreign policy aim of the Somali government was, and is, the unifying of all Somalis into a single nation-state: Greater Somalia. This policy inflamed tensions in the area and in 1964 Somalia and Ethiopia fought major border clashes. There have also been numerous border clashes along the Somali-Kenyan border. Because of their Greater Somalia philosophy, the Somalis were on very bad terms with the British because of the Ogaden agreement of 1897, the British giving the Ogaden back to Ethiopia in 1954, and the British refusal to let the Somalis in Kenya unite with the Somali Republic. The Somalis were not on the best terms with the French because Djibouti was not permitted to join with the Somali Republic. The border with Djibouti has been relatively quiet because of a continued French military presence. Somalia's internal problems are both tribe versus tribe and north (former British Somaliland) versus south (former Italian Somaliland) (1:48; 37:48-50; 27:4-6).

On 15 October 1969 President Shermarke was assassinated and on 21 October 1969 the Somali military and police seized power. The Somali Democratic Republic was born and Major General Mohamed Siad Barre became the head of the government; thus beginning the fourth period of Somali history.

Barre instituted "scientific socialism" as a new governmental form but it did not change the Greater Somalia foreign policy. No Somali president could give up the idea and expect to remain in power. Tensions remained high and war broke out with Ethiopia in 1977. Until this time the Somalis had been supported militarily by the U.S.S.R. However, during the war the U.S.S.R. put its full support behind Ethiopia and Somalia expelled the Soviets. With Soviet and Cuban support, the Ethiopians drove the Somalis out of the Ogaden. Peace was never restored and border friction continued after the Somali defeat.
Major clashes have periodically erupted since then. After the 1977-78 war Somalia sought military aid from the west to rebuild its military forces (59:12).

Somalia's two major problems continue to be the border dispute with Ethiopia and its internal clan rivalries. The only real hope for peace in the area is a negotiated settlement of the border disputes. U.S. dealings with Somalia must take this into account. Militarily upsetting the status quo in the Horn is not in the best interest of the U.S. The U.S. must also weigh carefully how its actions will impact on long standing tribal rivalries and jealousies. What influence the U.S. has in the Horn of Africa could be lessened or even lost if these two long standing issues in Somali history are ignored.
REASONS FOR PROVIDING MILITARY AID

Why would any country offer military aid to Somalia? The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. found many reasons with some of them being the same or at least similar. Both nations expected to get something in return for the aid that was provided. Often, what they received from the Somalis was reason enough to provide military aid. Sometimes wider interests that did not concern the Somalis were involved.

Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. provided military aid to Somalia for the following reasons: because of Somalia's strategic location, the desire for bases and/or access to military facilities, to increase their influence in the area, and to reduce the influence of the other superpower and/or other powers in the area. Additionally, the U.S.S.R. provided aid to enhance its own image and to have access to, or deny access to, African strategic resources. The U.S. provided aid to support the interests of governments friendly to the U.S.

The strategic importance of Somalia is evident by noting its location. As the point of the Horn of Africa, Somalia provides access to many of the world's major shipping lanes. Almost all Suez Canal traffic passes Somalia. A great deal of the Persian Gulf trade also passes near Somalia. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have recognized that military forces operating from Somalia, or with access to Somali facilities, would have a great advantage in controlling these strategic waterways. In general, the U.S. is operating to keep the sea lines of communication (SLOC) open for itself and its allies and the Soviets want to restrict western access (8:10).

The bases and facilities that Somalia can provide are the key to its strategic location. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both exchanged military aid to Somalia for access to these facilities. The three main locations for the facilities...
are Berbera (on the Gulf of Aden) and Mogadishu and Kismayu (on the Indian Ocean). All three locations have air and naval facilities of varying quality but Berbera has the facilities that were desired most by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Berbera is the closest of the three to the Suez Canal, Persian Gulf and control of SLOC (45:31-32; 55:347).

Besides being aware of Somalia's strategic importance and the desire for the use of Somali facilities, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were looking to increase their influence in Africa and the Indian Ocean. The U.S.S.R. was trying to do such things as secure a foothold in Africa and form a coalition of Red Sea socialist states. The U.S. wanted to have a voice in the affairs of the Horn of Africa, specifically in a peaceful solution to the constant border clashes in the area (30:18-21; 56:5127; 58:9).

Additionally, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. wanted to limit the influence of the other superpower (and opposing lesser powers) particularly in Somalia and generally in the Horn of Africa. Initially the Soviet's support to Somalia was designed to counter U.S. influence in Ethiopia. The fact that it also caused trouble for Kenya and the French in Djibouti was not a major concern of the U.S.S.R. Later it also helped to counter U.S. gains in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After the Soviet ejection from Somalia, U.S. aid provided to Somalia was to counter the Soviet influence in Ethiopia (from which the U.S. had been ejected in the middle 70's) and other Soviet supported states in the Red Sea area. The U.S. wanted a balance of power in the region. They did not want the Somalis returning to the Soviet sphere because of a lack of Western military aid (4:138; 12:41; 11:3-4; 26:8).

In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the Soviets also provided aid to the Somalis to enhance the U.S.S.R.'s image as a world power. By simply operating in an ocean that is not contiguous to the U.S.S.R., having access to facilities and showing an ability to project power, the Soviets bolstered their image. The U.S.S.R. seemed to need this image boosting to support their move for influence in the area. The last reason for the U.S.S.R. to provide aid has to do with African resources. That is, to have access to the resources of Africa if they are needed by the U.S.S.R. or to deny access to these resources to states that are in opposition to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. provided aid to Somalia to support the interests of other friendly (pro-western) states or to increase its influence with non-aligned states (57:51; 21:1; 16:8).
It is important to note that the reasons for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to provide aid to Somalia had little or nothing to do with Somalia achieving any of its own national interests. The aid was provided primarily on what the superpowers thought they could get for it in achieving their national interests. When providing aid to Somalia, the U.S. must consider the risks involved. The risks must be weighed carefully against the potential gain for U.S. interests. The main risk is a negative impact on U.S. interests on the Horn caused by the adverse reaction of other nations to U.S. military aid to Somalia.
Chapter 3

REACTIONS TO MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA

Historically, it has not mattered which country was supplying aid to Somalia, the reaction by Somalia's neighbors has been the same. They have reacted unfavorably to the military aid. This unfavorable reaction stems directly from the fear that Somalia will use the military aid to advance its dream of a Greater Somalia. Considering the historical perspective, this is not an unreasonable fear. The two loudest protesters of military aid to Somalia have been Ethiopia and Kenya. With France as its protector, Djibouti has not protested as loudly as the others have over the arming of Somalia.

Ethiopia's reaction to military aid to Somalia has included both political and military actions over the years. Specifically, Ethiopia has let it be known, through the press and other media, that it is upset by military aid being provided to Somalia. Ethiopia has gone so far as to threaten to break off diplomatic relations with the nation that supplied military aid to Somalia. Militarily, Ethiopia has implemented two plans to counteract the military aid given to Somalia. The Ethiopians have continued to maintain strong military units along the Somali-Ethiopian border. The Ethiopians have also asked for increased military aid from their suppliers to counter the aid received by the Somalis. None of these actions have stemmed the flow of aid to Somalia. The reason that the aid was not stopped, or even slowed down, is because, except for the period 1974-77 when the U.S.S.R. was supplying both Somalia and Ethiopia, it was not in the interest of the opposing superpowers to do so (2:6; 22:7; 40:4701; 23:15).

Kenya's reaction to military aid supplied to Somalia has also followed both political and military responses. Kenya has been described as worried and outraged over military aid to Somalia. Kenya was opposed to Somalia being rearmed after the Somalis were driven from the Ogaden in the 1977-78
war and called for meetings with the United States in order to stress the point. Likewise, the Kenyans were not happy with the Soviets and Cubans for initially supplying the Somalis. Militarily the Kenyans approached the problem by accelerating their defense program and requesting greater military aid from the U.S. Since 1978, the Kenyan cry for limiting or stopping U.S. military aid to Somalia has not done much good. The U.S. has supplied both Kenya and Somalia with military aid to satisfy U.S. national interests and not the national interests of other nations (62:1&4 ; 31:78 ; 41:4742 ; 38:4653; 32:1&5).

Ethiopia and Kenya have also taken joint action to oppose the buildup of Somali military. Whether it is called a mutual defense pact or a treaty of friendship and cooperation does not matter. What does matter is that the existence of such documents indicates to Somalia, and those that supply arms to her, that Ethiopia and Kenya are concerned about Somalia's military strength and its willingness to use it. The adage that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" applies here. Kenya and Ethiopia are partners in their opposition to Somalia (13:8 ; 18:5117 ; 14:2 ; 53:271).

Other nations, as well as groups of private citizens, have also been opposed to military aid to Somalia. As could be guessed, the U.S.S.R. objected loudly to the idea of the U.S. providing military aid to Somalia. The providing of aid to Somalia, of course, opposes Soviet interests in the Horn of Africa. Private U.S. citizens have appeared before Congress to protest U.S. military aid to Somalia. It is felt by some Americans that military aid to Somalia will hinder U.S. relationships with other African countries. Somali expatriates have also protested U.S. military aid. They feel that providing military aid to a repressive government is not in the best interest of Somalia's future (24:5798; 25:6516 ; 52:202 ; 6:27).

The U.S. must pursue its interests in Somalia with these thoughts in mind. There is no indication that the reactions to providing military aid to Somalia are going to change. There is no possibility that Somalia will give up its quest for a Greater Somalia. There is no chance that U.S. relations with Somalia's neighbors will improve greatly so long as the U.S. continues to provide military aid to Somalia. There is no indication that the form of Somali government is going to change. President Barre has continued to consolidate his power. Much of this consolidation has occurred through tribal affiliations.
The type and amount of military aid provided by the U.S. must take these circumstances into consideration.
Chapter 4

THE MILITARY AID PROVIDED

The Somalis have always wanted a large military. Early on they found that the Soviets would give them what they wanted without any "strings" attached. The Soviets provided both hardware and training. Since the Soviet departure, the U.S. has been providing both, but far less than the Soviets had provided. Complicating matters, the U.S. puts conditions and restrictions on the aid and the Somalis can not afford to pay for the aid that they want. The Soviets solved the payment problem by "writing off" the debt. The U.S. solution is to let the Somalis purchase the aid with credits provided by the U.S. government.

There are three points concerning military aid to Somalia that are important to remember. The first is the disparity in the amount of aid provided by the U.S.S.R. compared to that provided by the U.S. At current levels it will take about 50 years for the U.S. to equal the aid that the U.S.S.R. provided in about 15 years. Secondly, the U.S. put many conditions on the Somalis before military aid could be furnished. The Soviets did not put any conditions on the aid they provided. This lack of conditions is one reason that the Somalis originally accepted Soviet aid and not U.S. aid. The last factor is repayment. The Somali economy was never strong enough to afford the $2 billion in military aid provided by the U.S.S.R. As a result, after a period of time, the Soviets just "wrote off" the debt, in effect, making the aid a grant. The U.S., on the other hand, insists that everything be paid for even if payment is made by credit given to the Somalis by the U.S. Congress.

Shortly after independence, Somalia went looking for military aid to build up its armed forces. In order to get western aid, Somalia had to promise not to accept military aid from any other source. The United States headed a group of western nations that offered arms for an army of 5,000-6,000 men.
Based on the Somali economy and the size of the population, it was felt that Somalia could not support a larger force. Somalia did not see it that way and wanted a larger force. The U.S.S.R. was prepared to give Somalia what it wanted, $30 million, for a 20,000 man army. The Soviets did not put any restrictive qualifications on the aid and the Somalis took the Soviet aid (20:9; 5:26).

From 1963 to 1977 the U.S.S.R. provided about $2 billion in military aid to Somalia. The military aid that was provided can be divided into two broad categories: hardware and training. The training can also be broken into two sub-categories. One category includes Somali officers sent to the U.S.S.R. for training. The other category includes Somalis trained in Somalia by Soviet advisors (61:32&36).

Initially, the hardware provided by the U.S.S.R. was World War II surplus and limited in quantity. Even in 1983 the Somalis were still using World War II vintage tanks for driver's training. Gradually, the equipment was updated. To the T-34 tanks were added T-54/55 series tanks. AK-47 automatic rifles were added to the bolt action SKS's. MIG-15's were the first fighters delivered and eventually MIG-21's arrived. The Soviets also provided bombers, transport aircraft, helicopters, and naval patrol boats and landing craft (46:78; 43:27; 44:2; 60:46; 19:8).

In order to properly use the equipment that was provided, the Soviets conducted training for the Somalis in the U.S.S.R. and in Somalia. Large numbers of Somali officers were sent to the U.S.S.R. for training. Almost every officer currently in the Somali military above the rank of captain received training in the U.S.S.R. Many company grade officers were also trained in the U.S.S.R. To conduct training in Somalia, the Soviets sent an estimated 6,000 Soviet advisors to Somalia. That meant about one Soviet advisor for every three Somalis in the military. At the height of the Soviet presence in Somalia, even the conservative estimates had between 2,500 and 3,000 Soviet advisors in Somalia. (28:--; 15:1&4; 3:11; 34:5).

In contrast to the vast amount of hardware provided by the U.S.S.R., the U.S. has provided only modest amounts of military aid and all of it is categorized as "defensive". The equipment has included such items as entrenching tools, jeeps, trucks and radars. The weapons that have been sent
include rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). The U.S. provided this aid based on certain conditions. The conditions were that the aid must not enable the Somalis to launch an offensive against their neighbors. Also, the Somalis were not permitted to allow the U.S. aid to fall into the hands of rebels opposing Somalia's neighbors. Additionally, the Somalis had to pull all of their forces out of the Ogaden and stop trying to change Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized borders by force (29:-- ; 36:7 ; 54:312).

The U.S. provides military training for Somali officers in the U.S. and sends trainers to Somalia to train all ranks in the Somali military. The U.S., however, is not training near the number of Somali officers that the Soviets trained, nor is the U.S. sending the number of trainers to Somalia that the Soviets did. The reason is the small amount of military aid provided by the U.S. as compared to the U.S.S.R. (48:40; 49:45; 50:45; 51:45).

The problem for Somalia in paying for military equipment is great and will probably become greater in the future. The Somali economy is simply not capable of supporting large arms expenditures. The Soviets probably understood this and therefore there was no realistic expectation of payment for the aid that was provided. The reasons for providing the aid gave adequate compensation to the Soviets. The U.S. also recognized the Somali's inability to pay for military equipment. Instead of "writing off" the aid the way the Soviets did, the U.S. Congress provides credits for the Somalis to pay for U.S. aid. The amount of credits limits the quantity of military aid purchased by the Somalis because there are no additional funds available to the Somalis for this purpose.

The U.S. must consider the amount of aid to be provided. The U.S. must provide enough aid to continue to keep access to Somali facilities but not so much aid that Somalia becomes a threat to its neighbors. The "strings" that are attached to the aid should be such that there is almost no chance that this aid could be used by Somalia or its rebel allies to upset U.S. interests on the Horn. Somalia's inability to pay for aid without U.S. credits will assist the U.S. in influencing events in the area. Somalia needs U.S. support and the U.S. can use this need to help achieve its national interests in the region. The U.S. must remember, however, the lack of influence the U.S.S.R. had on Somalia in trying to stop Somalia's Ogaden invasion.
Chapter 5

TECHNIQUES USED TO PROVIDE AND UTILIZE MILITARY AID

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have used decidedly different political techniques in providing military aid to Somalia. Predictably, the Somalis have responded in a manner that best suited their national interests. The U.S. routinely placed restrictions and conditions on the military aid provided to Somalia. The U.S.S.R. did not put any on its aid. The general Somali response has been to take the aid without strings, when a choice was available. The Somalis accept aid with strings when it is the only aid available. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have used similar general military training techniques but have differed in the details of their techniques. These differences are a direct result of the training philosophy used by each nation. These differences have had an impact on the short and long term effectiveness of the Somali military. It is important to remember that the Soviet training philosophy and training techniques learned by the Somali military have been modified by the Somalis since the Soviet departure.

The political technique used by the U.S. was to attach conditions to the military aid it offered Somalia. Aid was offered in the early 1960's provided the Somalis would not accept aid from non-western powers. At that time, Somalia was non-aligned and it had a choice of suppliers for military aid. Somalia, therefore, rejected the U.S. backed western aid and turned to the U.S.S.R. as its principal arms supplier (7:2).

The U.S.S.R. offered considerably more aid than the U.S. coalition and the aid was offered without conditions. The Somalis accepted the Soviet aid but they also wanted to show that they were still a non-aligned nation in the early 60's. While accepting Soviet aid for their military forces, the Somalis were accepting U.S. aid to build a national police force. This Somali balancing act
worked well until the revolution in October 1969. After the revolution, both military and police support were provided by the U.S.S.R. This ended Somalia's non-alignment (63:11).

After the Somalis expelled the Soviets in November 1977, they became non-aligned again. The Somalis had two problems. The U.S.S.R. would not give them aid any longer and the U.S. would not provide aid until certain conditions were met. It took about three years for the U.S. and Somalia to reach an aid agreement and about another two years for the aid to start to arrive in Somalia. During this five year period (1977-1982), the vast majority of Soviet supplied equipment, tanks, planes, ships, etc., became unserviceable or was lost in battle. The Somalis were in dire straits militarily and had almost no choice but to accept the conditions the U.S. placed on the aid it was going to provide.

Even after the U.S. started supplying military aid to Somalia, the Somalis were not happy. They were unhappy about the meager amount of U.S. aid being given to them compared to the vast quantities of aid the U.S.S.R. had been providing to Ethiopia since 1977. Having no alternative for modern equipment, the Somalis seem to have accepted the current level of U.S. aid (42:7).

This is only half the picture of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. provision of military aid to Somalia. The key to the entire operation is what happens to the aid once it has been made available to the Somalis. Here the differences are just as sharp but, more importantly, have greater far reaching impact on the abilities of the Somali military. Basically, the Soviet's trained the Somalis to be dependent on the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. has trained the Somalis to be dependent on themselves (28:--).

In the Soviet method of training in Somalia, the advisor seems to have been the most important key. These advisors seemed to be everywhere. They were in all of the units down to company/battery level and were there to do many things. They were to keep track of the Soviet equipment and make sure it did not fall into the wrong (anti-Barre) hands. They were also there to keep control of the Somalis by telling them what to do and how to do it. This near total Soviet domination of the Somali system helped to stifle all Somali initiative and insure Somali dependence on the U.S.S.R. (28:--).
Sometimes the Somalis were not even trained on the Soviet equipment that was provided. Soviet technicians were used to operate and maintain the equipment. How dependent the Somalis were on the U.S.S.R. became clear only after the Soviets were expelled. As an example, one tactical air field control tower was no longer fully mission capable because no Somalis had been trained on the use or maintenance of any of the meteorological or air traffic control equipment (28:--).

The Soviet advisor's short term effectiveness and importance was very high. The advisor kept the system running by continually training new personnel or performing the job himself. In the long term this limited training proved to be detrimental to the Somalis as they were never prepared to operate the Soviet training or maintenance systems without the Soviets.

In contrast, the approach of the U.S. advisors has been to "train the trainer" and the operator. Not only did the U.S. advisors train operators on how to use the equipment or tactical field techniques, but they also trained those Somalis that were to be responsible to continue the training after the U.S. advisors had departed. This approach was absolutely necessary because, unlike their Soviet counterparts that permeated the Somali system, the U.S. advisors were present for only the time required to complete the training and then returned to the U.S.

The short term impact of the U.S. advisor is not as important to the Somalis as the Soviet advisor's short term impact. Since a U.S. training system was not imposed on the Somalis, the U.S. advisor is not needed to keep it running. The U.S. advisor's main function is to conduct training within the Somali system. The long term impact of the U.S. advisor is very important. By using the Somali system and training trainers that can operate without U.S. help, and within the Somali system, the U.S. advisor can guarantee the Somalis an unending flow of trained personnel.

Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. trained all ranks in the Somali military. Both sent Somali officers to their respective countries for training. The difference is that a Somali officer could easily spend five or more years in the U.S.S.R. while it would be rare for a Somali officer to spend as much as 18 months in the U.S. The Soviets taught officers, NCOs, and soldiers separately and never trained
officers or NCOs how to train subordinates. The U.S. also trained all ranks but the training was integrated as much as possible so that cohesive units were built. The key to the U.S. technique was to make certain that the Somalis had the capacity to carry on the training after the departure of the U.S. advisors. This requirement habitually meant that U.S. techniques had to be modified to fit the Somali way of training.

In some cases, the U.S. has tried to impose its system on the Somalis but it has not worked. For example, a computerized logistic support system set up by the U.S. was simply not supportable by the Somalis. They did not have the infrastructure needed to support a computerized system. As a result, when the U.S. advisors departed, the system gradually fell into disuse and/or disrepair.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. advisors both used traditional training methods: lecture, demonstration, practical exercise (PE), etc. The importance of how the training differed can be seen by analyzing the PE method as an example. Using the Soviet taught PE method, a Somali might get less than one hour of training in a six hour training day. This occurred because only a fraction of the students were actually training at any one time. The rest would just sit around awaiting their turn. The U.S. system does not operate this way. Whether it is called "concurrent training", "opportunity training", or by some other name, training time is more fully utilized. This gets more students trained on more subjects in a shorter time.

The political and training techniques used in handling military aid to Somalia are important to the U.S. since both deal with the use of limited resources. The political technique gets the resources there and the U.S. is concerned that the aid works to further its national interests. The training technique used by the U.S. is designed to give the Somalis the most efficient and long term effective use of the resources provided.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions drawn from the data presented fall into two broad categories. First, conclusions will be based on the impact of the military aid that was provided by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The second set of conclusions will be based on the effectiveness of the aid that was provided by both.

The conclusions on the impact of the U.S.S.R.'s military aid to Somalia are:
* U.S.S.R. military aid provided the Somalis with one of the best equipped and largest standing armies in Africa.
* U.S.S.R. military aid provided the Somalis with the capacity to pursue its aim of achieving a Greater Somalia.
* U.S.S.R. military aid to Somalia reinforced the perception of Somalia's neighbors that Somalia was a threat to them.
* The U.S.S.R. was a destabilizing force in the Horn of Africa because it allowed Somalia to pursue a Greater Somalia policy.
* U.S.S.R. military aid did not give the U.S.S.R. enough influence to stop the Somalis from invading Ethiopia.
* The assumed common Marxist-Leninist philosophy shared between Somalia and the U.S.S.R. did not outweigh the national interests of the Somalis.
* U.S.S.R. military aid to Somalia allowed the U.S.S.R. to project political and military power into the Horn of Africa.
* Soviet provision of arms to both the Somalis and the Ethiopians proved detrimental to the Soviet position in Somalia.

The conclusions on the impact of the US's military aid to Somalia are:
* The limited quantity of U.S. aid does not permit Somalia to pursue its aim of a Greater Somalia.
U.S. aid has provided for some limited modernization of the
Somali military.
* The limited aid the U.S. has provided to Somalia has not made the
U.S. a destabilizing force in the Horn of Africa.
* The limited aid the U.S. has provided to Somalia has provided the
U.S. with additional access to Indian Ocean facilities.

The effectiveness of the military aid to Somalia is covered in two areas.
How effective was the aid in achieving the national interests of the nations
involved and how much did the aid improve the Somali military?

The conclusions on the effectiveness of the military aid to Somalia on the
nations involved are:
* Somalia was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving its major
foreign policy goal of a Greater Somalia only because the U.S.S.R. stopped
supplying military aid.
* The U.S.S.R. was successful in establishing a foothold in the Horn
of Africa from which it could extend its influence in the Horn of Africa and the
Indian Ocean.
* The U.S.S.R. has not been successful in eliminating U.S. influence
in the Horn of Africa or limiting U.S. influence in the Indian Ocean.
* The U.S. has been successful in reestablishing itself on the Horn of
Africa.
* The U.S. has been successful in obtaining access to facilities in
Somalia to support its interests in the Indian Ocean area.
* The U.S. has not been successful in eliminating U.S.S.R. influence in
the Horn of Africa or limiting U.S.S.R. presence in the Indian Ocean.

The conclusions on the effectiveness by which improvement was made in
the Somali military are:
* U.S.S.R. military aid was effective in building a relatively large
and modern military force.
* The saturation of the Somali military structure with Soviet
advisors was only effective for short term instruction in the Somali military.
* The imposition of the Soviet training system on the Somalis
worked only as long as the Soviet advisors were present to run it.
* The Soviet training system began to deteriorate as soon as the
Soviets were expelled from Somalia.
"The imposition of the U.S. training system on the Somalis only worked as long as the U.S. advisors were present to run it.
"The combining of U.S. and Somali training systems is the best long term method of getting the most effective use of U.S. military aid.
"The most efficient use of U.S. advisors is to train Somali leaders to be able to train other Somalis.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made.

"The U.S. should provide Somalia only enough military aid to preserve Somalia's status as an independent nation within the borders recognized by the OAU. This should provide the U.S. continued access to Somali facilities that will support U.S. interests in the Horn, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. It should also keep Somalia from becoming a threat to its neighbors, or aggravating long standing tribal rivalries, which would upset the stability in the region that the U.S. needs to maintain influence on the Horn and accomplish its goals.

"The Five Year Somali Military Training Enhancement Program, developed by the Tri-Service Training Assistance Team (FMS case SO-B-OAI), should be the document on which U.S. military aid and advisor training to the Somali military is based. This plan provides for the upgrading and modernization of all branches of the Somali military. The plan will do this at the minimum cost to both the U.S. and Somalia.

"Groups such as the U.S. Air Force's Security Assistance Committee should review all proposed U.S. military aid to Somalia to insure that the aid meets the actual needs of Somalia and that Somalia has the capability to operate, maintain, and support the equipment that is provided.
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