CSI BATTLEBOOK

CSI BATTLEBOOK 1-A
REAR AREA OPERATIONS
REAR AREA SECURITY

Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Battle Analysis, Rear Area Operations, 1st Marine Division, October 1950, Kojo, Korea.

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A battlebook prepared by students of the US Army Command and General Staff College under the supervision of the Combat Studies Institute as part of the Battle Analysis program.

26 October 1950, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment took over security of a supply dump at Kojo, Korea. They were surprised by an attack from organized North Korean units. Two companies were cut off, finally managed to fight off the attack and regained contact with their battalion after losing 27 killed, 89 wounded and 3 missing.
TOPIC: AREA OPERATIONS

PURPOSE: AREA SECURITY

IN COMMAND: DIVISION

STAFF GROUP A. SECTION 1

Presented by: Chief of Operations

Mayor: Stephen E. D. Burnett

Mayor: Thomas A. D. Riordan

Mayor: John T. Sanders

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Major: Wesley F. Timmons

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United States Army Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in fulfillment of PhD program

Dr. Wladislaw

Dr. Wladislaw

Dr. Wladislaw
On 16 October 1950, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment took over security of a supply dump at KOFO, Korea. They were surprised by an attack from organized North Korean units. Two companies were cut off, but all managed to fight off the attack and return contact with their battalion after losing 23 killed, 47 wounded and 4 missing.

This is a good example of a combat unit detailed to a rear area security mission engaging an organized enemy force. Because the ROK 5th Division remained in the area, the analysis will go further than the ROK battle and investigate the difficulties encountered in securing the supply route during the first week in November 1950.

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\[ \text{References:} \\
\text{Appleton, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1961.} \\
\text{Blanchard, Carroll H. Korean War, \textit{Intelligence and Maps of Korea: Korean War.} 2nd ed. Courtesy of the Foundation, Albany, N.Y., 1956.} \\
\text{Wicker, A. W. \textit{War in Peacetime,} 2nd ed. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1963.} \]


FIGURES:
Figure 1 - Ford Area
Figure 2 - Marine Dispositions at Ford
Figure 3 - Majon-Ni Perimeter
Figure 4 - Majon-Ni and Road to Work
THE BATTLE OF KOJU

This is the story of the Battle of Koju with the 1st Marine Division. It is a historical view at what can be termed as a rear area protection mission which later became a part of our military tactical training. The analysis of the mission and the men is surrounded by a complete examination of the situation, the concept of the operation, the combat service support received by the Marines at Koju and the nearby area, as well as the command and signal that were available and used during the action from 21 October to 13 November 1950 in the country of Korea during what has been commonly termed the Korean War.

1. SITUATION.

a. General Overview:

(1) The near disastrous setbacks suffered by the US and South Korean forces during July and August 1950 were dramatically reversed the following month by a highly successful amphibious operation at Inchon by the US 7th Marine Corps. So successful was the operation that General MacArthur announced the liberation of Seoul on 25 September, less than a week after the landing. Having secured the North Korean capital
and communication lines, the operation resulted in the rapid collapse of the North Korean offensive. While a few enemy units were able to return integrity and threaten US forces, enemy activities were mainly limited to delay and withdrawal to the north.

MacArthur was quick to capitalize on his success by ordering a push north to cut off and destroy withdrawing North Korean forces. As part of this plan, the 1st Marine Division, which had taken part in the ROK landing, was to be transferred by sea to the northeast coast of Korea in support of the offensive to the north.

(2) The plan originally called for an assault landing in WONSAN since Republic of Korea (ROK) army elements, moving northward, were well south of the city and encountering scattered resistance from forces withdrawing north. Just as the initial planning had been completed, information was received by the 1st Marine Division that ROK army elements had rapidly advanced north and seized and passed through WONSAN area on or about 7 November to the north. As a consequence, the plan was changed from an assault to an administrative landing. While underway, the 1st Marine Division received additional changes to the mission, to include sending one battalion, immediately upon landing, to 108.5, 35 miles south of WONSAN.
b. Enemy Situation:

(1) The enemy order of battle during these operations ran the gamut from retreating North Korean rifle divisions, attempting to thread their way through the 1st Marine Division’s zone in order to rejoin the receding North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), to a Chinese army from which the remnants of an entire division–surrendered to US forces at HAGARU-RI. General well organized and skillfully led, though not infallible. NKPA units were encountered defending.

Such units were the 23d, 5th, and 15th NKPA battalions.
In the各国 operation as part of organized groups totaling as much as 15,000. An attempt was made to
integrate the number of stragglers and deserters and
covered in civilian clothing, and were usually
spread throughout the area as local citizens or
military personnel returning to their homes. In
many cases equipment of the organized units consisted
of both small and small crew-served weapons and
vastly amounts of ammunition that could be easily
carried. Rifles, machine guns and mortars were common.
The stragglers and deserters, dressed in civilian
clothing, carried no weapons.

(2) North Korean units specifically
identified were the 45th, the 48th, and the 50th
Elements of the 15th NKPA Rifle Division which had
successfully withdrawn to the north following the
United Nations (UN) offensive of 15 September 1950, and
were used in the MAJON-MI area where it was to remain
for the communists commenced their counteroffensive
on 29 October. Communist Forces (CCF) crossed the
Border. Other North Korean divisions identified
were also the 50th and 15th NKPA Divisions, elements of
which engaged attacks on the Marines in the WONSAN -
CHONGCHANGânsole Railway Route (MSR) area and against US
and Forces of WONSAN. These forces were
predominantly aggressive and effective in part due to
It was felt that the 2d and 5th NPEA Divisions were the 1st NPEA units to invade South Korea and were largely composed of troops who had previously served with the CCP in China.

(c) The Chinese Communist order of battle included units from the 3d and 4th CCF Field Armies, veterans of both the fighting against the Japanese in World War II and against the Chinese Nationalists following that war. The general plan for the employment of enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's zone was the assignment of one army, the 42d CCF Army of the 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army, to a delaying action south of the CHOSIN and FUSEK Reservoirs, while bringing up the larger and more effective forces of the 3d CCF Field Army to launch a counteroffensive. The 124th Division of the 42d Army had the specified mission of delaying the advance of the Marines along the HAMHUNG-HAGURU-RI axis.

c. Weather: With the summer over, temperatures would often reach into the high 40's, though it was not uncommon for temperatures to drop into the 20's and lower 30's at night. Towards the latter stages of this operation, it would drop close to zero degrees Fahrenheit at night. The day that the 1st Marine

...
d. Terrain:

(1) During the WONSAN phase of the 1st Marine Division’s operation, it was soon realized that the terrain forced North Korean forces, escaping to the north from the PUSAN Perimeter combat in the south, to focus on the most favorable route. This most favorable route of escape entered the 1st Marine Division’s zone in the vicinity of FION in the south, continued to the northwest through ANBYON, westward to MAJON-NI and eventually northward exiting the MAJON-NI valley via the primary north-south road. See Figures 3 & 4. From MAJON-NI to FION was 78 miles; WONSAN to MAJON-NI was 29
The 1st Marine Division zone was 700 miles north to south and 60 miles east to west. A summary of the terrain characteristics pertaining to the zone of the 1st Marines Regiment (Reinforced), or referred to throughout this report as Regimental Combat Team One (RCT-1), focuses on KOJO and MAJON-NI.

2. KOJO. To date, this was the most attractive area the Marines had seen in Korea: an almost undamaged small seaport flanked by white beaches and clear blue waters of the bay. Surrounding the city of KOJO was a flat coastal plain some four to five kilometers in diameter. See Figures 1 & 2. From the outskirts of the city to the rise of the hills which encircle the seaport was a solid field of rice paddies. Northwest of the city was a long ridge of high ground which became the 1st Battalion's Command Post (CP) location. This ridge ran in a southwesterly direction from the point where it rose from the beach. (It was later occupied by C Company, 1st Battalion and two Platoons of A Company because the positions offered by the terrain were separated by numerous ravines and secondary roads). To the south of the city, and east of the railroad track was Hill 109. It overlooked the ocean and two smaller villages (PANGDONG-NI and MAHKONGDONG-NI) located along the coast, as well as an extensive open area covered by rice paddies. These are good and hills, ranging from 150 to 200 feet in
The village, formed a semi-circle or natural perimeter
for KOJO. To the northeast of KOJO was a small
peninsula.

(2) The supply dump (the original "defend"
objective of 1st Battalion's mission) was located at
the railroad station in the flat ground to the south of
KOJO. This low point of the terrain could be easily
approached by the enemy from numerous directions. The
most likely avenues of approach were from the south
along the secondary coastal road and through the valley
leading towards KOJO from the southwest.

(4) MAJON-NI. Twenty-eight miles inland, to
the west, from WONSAN was MAJON-NI, located adjacent to
major road junctions for north-south and east-west
traffic. This was the main WONSAN, PYONGYANG, SEOUL
network. In certain locations, there were altitude
differences of over 3000 meters between WONSAN and
MAJON-NI. Both of the roads in question had been
literally carved out of the walls of barren mountains.
In some places, the road had awesome 1,000-foot
drop-offs. The roads were generally carved out of the
mountains and were made up of loose rocks and boulders.
Any travel b. road was slow and tedious. Each turn and
each boulder represented a potential ambush site.

(5) The village of MAJON-NI is in a "Y"
Chin Lai Valley (See Figure 3-3A. It is completely surrounded by rugged, impenetrable mountains that drop sharply into a valley. In the valley, outlined by two streams, is the village of MAJOW-MI, with a population of less than 400 people. The village was a small, partially self-sufficient community that, for the most part, had remained unchanged for hundreds of years due partly to its isolated location within the valley surrounded by huge mountains. Yet the "Y" shaped valley provided possible avenues of approach at each apex of the "Y". In addition, the surrounding mountains were covered with numerous natural drainage defiles that converged into the valley. Each drainage defile represented a potential avenue of approach for small guerrilla enemy forces operating on foot. The surrounding terrain was so imposing that the typical defensive perimeter consisting of a series of outposts would be ineffective. Any defense of this valley would require a coordination of reverse and forward slope positions. Supporting fire for such a defensive scheme would also be adversely affected by the terrain. The supporting artillery/mortar fires would have to be positioned to fire in any direction. With the high ground rising immediately in all directions around the valley, artillery would literally be "firing out of a barrel."
e. Friendly Situation:

(1) Strengths:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength with no equipment shortages because they had landed administratively at WONSAN several days prior and were unopposed during the road convoy to MAJON-NI.

(2) Morale was high as the end of the war appeared in sight with the collapse of the NKPA offensive and exploitation north by the allied forces.

(3) Availability and close coordination of fire support means was a significant factor in the defense of MAJON-NI.

(b) KOJO (1/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength and equipment authorization.

(2) High morale prevailed due to the anticipated end of the war.

(2) Weaknesses:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) Narrow defiles and enemy ambushes cut off ground resupply creating shortages of
(2) Early onset of winter towards the end of the operation found some elements without winter clothing.

(3) Location in hostile territory created security problems as the area had been under Russian influence since WWII.

(4) Large numbers of refugees and POW's strained the capabilities of the Civil Affairs section.

(5) The mountainous terrain prevented close support by artillery and employment of the attached tank company.

(b) KOJO (1/1st Marines):

(1) Location in hostile territory and large numbers of refugees created security problems.

(2) Company positions were not mutually supporting.

(3) No battalion indirect fire support was available until six hours after the initial attack began.
Dispositions:

(a) 3/1st Marines: A perimeter of 2,400 meters circumference around MAJON-N1 was formed by the three rifle companies, provisional Platoons of Headquarters and Service Companies, and artillery and engineer troops. The Battalion CP was located in the center of the perimeter with the artillery battery about 500 meters south of the CP. Since the commanding ground was too far from the village and too rugged for company outposts, daytime observation posts were established and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads was conducted.

(b) 1/1st Marines: Company B occupied outposts three kilometers south of KOJO to cover the southwestern approaches along the coastal road and the road which ran through the valley leading to KOJO. The northern sector immediately adjacent to the west and one kilometer northwest of KOJO was held by A Company; while to the southwest of A Company, C Company's defensive positions were oriented toward approaches from the northwest.
In September 1950, after successful routinig elements of the North Korean People's Army, pushing them northward and back across the 38th parallel from EOKW, there developed a pensive moment by the leaders on the ground of both the United Nations forces and the forces of the Korean Army (RKP). Both General MacArthur and Sympathetic Rhee believed that they could not, or would not, accept the status quo prior to the North Korean invasion in the previous June. (In retrospect, the controversy over MacArthur's interpretation of his mission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's authority to push north of the 38th parallel was the root of the problem.) General MacArthur's strategy was to attack across the 38th parallel with the Eighth (US) Army in the west. To do this, he retained X (US) Corps as a separate operational force under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. X Corps would conduct an amphibious landing at WONSAN on the eastern coast after the amphibious attack on the western side of the peninsula had been initiated. X Corps would then establish a beachhead, attack with assigned, attached, and organic elements to the west for about 125 miles. The intent was to line up with elements of Eighth Army in the north, on FOB RVN thus trapping the remnants of the North Korean Army which was retreating. Both the
In February and 1st Corps would proceed together, under a \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) central axis towards the Manchurian border.

2. The details of the concept of operation was discussed several times during the September-October 1950 time frame. Even with the numerous changes to the initial operations plans, the operation was to be handled by the US Marines under the command of the \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) 1st Corps Commander. On 24 October 1950, the Marine Commander, under the command of the \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) (US) Corps, was told that the \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) Corps had received a planning document indicating that the \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) Corps Commander would become the sole commander of the occupation forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel and east of the Tokopec Mountain range. These forces would consist of a single American Army Division — the 3d Infantry Division — and the First Marine Division. The rest of Eighth Army was to return to Japan. This peaceful attitude prevailed throughout the theater from the headquarters of MacArthur to the foxhole of the forces that were present in Korea. The attitude was of peace falling over the area, a chance to go home. The end of the conflict.

In the part of the wind-down north of the 38th parallel, the First Marine Division received the strategic mission from 1st Corps Operations Under \( \text{\textvisiblespace} \) 19 October 1950.
(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of CHONGJIN.

(2) To relieve all elements of 1st Corps in 1F32 and zone.

(3) To protect the WONSOON-CHONGJI-MAJIN-NO area, employing not less than one Regimental Combat Team (RCT), and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.

(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.

(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in the CHONGJIN area rapidly on order.

(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) in the repair of the YONGHUNG-HAMHUNG railroad, employing not less than one engineer company.

d. The 1st Marine Division further assigned these tasks to the following units in their Operations Order 17, dated at 0600 hours on 28 October 1950.

Although this was the formal order, most commanders knew the contents of what was coming in the previous midnight hours:

(1) FC1-1 to relieve elements of the 1 FOL in the WONSOON-CHONGJI-MAJIN-NO zone, establish necessary road
(2) RCT-1 to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, control enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at 1000 until further orders.

(3) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps along the HAMHUNG-CHOSIN Reservoir road, advance south to the northern tip of the reservoir and CHOSIN, prepared for further advance to the northern border of Korea and to destroy enemy in zone.

(4) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-1, relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps in the vicinity of FUSEN Reservoir, establish necessary roadblocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy.

(4) RCT 1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to the designated commander for operational control and landing in the vicinity of CHOSIN.

(5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less attachments, from an assembly area in the vicinity of CHOSIN, be prepared for operating in the zone of any RCT.

v. The mission analysis focuses on the US Marine Regimental Combat Team 1. See Team Organization on p. 10. The mission of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
A mission AT104 was to be extracted from the previous assigned missions. The battalion was currently at a
helipad near KONSAP airfield. The unit was bored.
The unit was at ease with the new mission. They were
to go to 1001 and accomplish the mission as it had been
stated. A closer look at the mission needs to be
occurred so that one can understand more clearly.
the intent of the orders from the 3 Corps and the First
Marine Division.

3. At 1001, where it backs into the sea, was a
depot. This depot was used by the ROK and the Marines
and was to be used by the armed forces that were to
come later in the area. The First Marine Division gave
the mission to the First Battalion to protect that
depot. The intent of the mission as provided by the
Division and the Corps was clear. The battalion was to
protect the depot and to protect the roads in and out
of the area, which included the railroad that led into
the depot. As indicated by troops available and the
force analysis, there was an insufficient amount of
forces and an irregular land formation for those troops
to protect. The latter problem was compounded by enemy
drug operations in the area. It was a case of
substitution of enemy forces that were present on
the terrain on which the Marines were supposed to be
deployed. The following is the final step of the
sequence of the mission as it was extracted from the
The First Battalion received the mission to
provide support to 1000 and relieve the 1 ROK forces.
It was once thought the area as it was interpreted and
mapped by the G-2, was a terrain suitable for tank
maneuver. The tanks had been supposed to service elsewhere in theater and as
the terrain did not lend itself to tank maneuver, it
was determined that the tanks were not needed in 1000.
As it turned out, this was a good decision and had no
effect on the situation in the area at all. The enemy
in the area did not have tanks and the terrain
restrictions would have prevented their use.

The task was to relieve the 1 ROK units and
secure an area consisting of a coastal plain about
four miles in diameter which stretched from the bay to
a contoured area of hills ranging from 150 to 600 feet in
altitude. At the basin was the depot. The mission to
secure the basin had not changed. The intent was the
same as in order to secure this depot, but the contents of the
deposits had changed, with departing ROK forces. Now
the type of the order had to have changed. With
replacement of the depot, just what was the First battalion
expected? The roads were empty and the roads seemed
somewhat depressed. The 1 ROK and the "team"
remained the same. The mission had to determine
that the mission was. There is no indication that the
commander of the battalion asked for clarification of
his orders or that he interpreted them any differently
than he had when he received them aboard the USS Mount
McKinley the day earlier. The intent remained the
same - protect the depot.

1. The area that was drawn on the map for the
battalion was clear to the commanders of the Marine
companies on the ground. (See Figures 1 & 2). They
had to spread their companies outside the safety of the
mutual support of the adjoining forces. There was no
document of the time in the hands of the Marines that
indicated there was such a mission as rear area
protection, nor was there any statement in the mission
or task that would indicate that the units were to
conduct a rear area protection mission. Indeed, after
having had to lend over the beaches and to establish a
defense along the railroad and the port cities, it is
clear to the person reading the mission that there was
no rear area problem of which one could possibly be
aware. The situation was not that accurate.

1. But there was an enemy threat to the rear of
the battalion. The only way which it could be handled
could be to have the friendly forces reorganize on the
terrain and to better define the threat that existed.
Since there appears to be no doctrine at the particular
In the current situation and there appears to be no change of mission for the First Battalion, it can only be stated that the battalion had to stick to its original course of action and to protect the empty depot against the threats of what then was considered to be an organized enemy and not the enemy that they faced.

2. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins provides a clear interpretation of the mission in which the First Battalion was involved. It is recounted from his documentation of the area and the mission. It was done prior to the knowledge that the depot had been emptied by the departing ROK forces.

"Mindful of my mission - to protect the supply dump until removed - I had disposed the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this end. The supply dump was located at the railroad station in the flat ground south of K030 - a point difficult to defend, since it was on the low ground and could be approached by the enemy from any direction." (1)

NOTE: LTC D. M. Schmuck assumed command of the 1/1 (on LTC Hawkins on 16 Nov 50.)

The word of the commander who issued the order was well understood and was not questioned. LTC Hawkins did not see a better way to accomplish the mission.

The 3d Battalion, First Marine Division,
record and initially left aboard the ships. The enemy situation did not indicate that the masses would be needed as soon after the first wave of PCT-1 landed at KOKO—particularly since the 1st Battalion landed without incident. However, in retrospect, this reserve would be used. As the 1st Battalion developed the situation on the shore, the Regimental Commander made the important decision to commit the 2d Battalion to KOKO to reinforce the 1st Battalion's initial positions. In order to accomplish this task, the battalion was ordered to land over the beaches at PONSON and to use the train to move to KOKO. This was done on 28 October 1950. After arriving in the late afternoon, the battalion bearded the gondola cars of the available Korean train and arrived in KOKO at about 2230 hours. This occurred without significant incident. The battalion commander of the reinforcing battalion understood his mission, was prepared to accomplish it, and did it without misunderstanding. The 2d Battalion tied in with the 1st Battalion thus complementing the efforts of the Regimental Combat Team.

The 2d Marine Battalion was ordered to depart KOKO on 26 October. Its mission was to relieve the 3d ROK Regiment at KOKO. The battalion was given the mission of establishing defensive positions at KOKO. Scouting and then enemy forces that very night.
be left behind and to deny the enemy the use of the roads in the area - specifically the complete road network in the area. The mission statement to the battalion also specified the patrolling of roads to the north, south, and east of MAJON-NI and to keep the road open between MAJON-NI and WONSAN. The overriding significance of the area was characterized by the junction of the roads leading east to WONSAN, south to SEOUL, and north to PYONGYANG. These roads would obviously be used by retreating, or more appropriately, escaping forces of the North Korean Army as they moved back to the north.

n. After a reconnaissance of the area, LTC Thomas L. Ridge, Commander of the 3d Battalion, concluded that the difficult terrain (a 28 mile, steep, twisting road through deep gorges and passes that invited ambushes and landslides which would block the roads) could not be kept open 100 percent of the time, as required in order to accomplish the mission. LTC Ridge received oral orders from the Commander, RCT-1, which actually relieved the battalion from the mission of keeping the WONSAN to MAJON-NI road open. With this modification to the mission, the 3d Battalion understood the mission to be one that consisted of being a force for blocking and screening. Because of the size of the area, the battalion perimeter was
established using company observation points. The large spaces between the observation posts were covered by patrols. The primary road network was patrolled, but this was mainly during daylight hours. In retrospect—and with a larger force—it may have been wise to have patrolled at night. Patrolling at night may have been necessary as it may have resulted in a greater degree of success.

a. The attachments that would occur after 28 October should be briefly mentioned so that their mission is understood as their involvement is explained later in the analysis. The commitment of the regimental reserve on 28 October to reinforce the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the departure of the 3d Battalion to maintain the road network in the MAJON-NI area, resulted in WONSAN, the original landing position and the area that should have remained secure, being left with no security force.

b. Commander, 1st Marine Division, attached the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, as well as elements of the 5th Korean Marine Corps (KMC), to the Regimental Combat Team 1. Their mission was to patrol the roads into the WONSAN area. Additionally, the battalion, as attached, was to maintain blocking positions at ANBYON and to secure the airfield and the harbor at WONSAN. This latter task should require further study to determine
The effectiveness of these attachments, but will not be
included in its entirety here.
(1) General. KOJO, MAJON-NI and other actions dedicated to the protection of MSR's were one part of the Corps' campaign in northeast Korea. Each movement affected subsequent battles. For the purpose of this study we will address the general events prior to the 1st Marine Division's administrative landing at WONSAN, the landing itself, and combat actions at KOJO and MAJON-NI. This spans a time frame of 21 October 1950 to 13 November 1950.

(2) Rear Area Security. WONSAN itself was basically within enemy territory. Although the 3d ROK Division advanced far north of WONSAN itself, it trailed long risky Lines of Communication (LOC's). This vulnerability required the 1st Marine Division to move from SEOUL to WONSAN and create a viable supply depot at sea and relieve ROK units. In some ways, the subsequent actions in the KOJO-MAJON-NI-WONSAN area were rear area protection missions in a tactical and strategic and deep battle from the operational perspective. Furthermore, the threat itself was "hidden" Marine commanders were often unable to maneuver over the various regular ROK units. squadrons, and other and other and other and other and other
I. Preliminary Events, and the Outcome for Both UN and NKPA.

3. 1950.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Major opposing forces consisted of the depleted 5th, 7th, and 10th NKPA divisions, retreating north from their battle positions around the Pusan perimeter. The retreat was organized, and included harassing actions to disrupt US supply routes. The goal of the retreating North Koreans was to link up with the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) that had already crossed the Yalu River. On 13 October 1950, the first CCF elements of the 4th Field Army came south. By 15 October 1950, 120,000 Chinese veterans were inside North Korea, and by 25 October, one entire CCF Field Army was in the X Corps zone. In general, the NKPA forces were well clothed and equipped; in armament, they relied on automatic weapons and grenades with little heavy combat support. The 5th NKPA division moved north from the Pusan perimeter to HAPCHON, northeast to IWOJ and then west. Its strength at strength was 7,000 men and its mission was to secure US Marine and eventually join with CCF troops. The division was formed with combat veterans and had previously served with the CCF in China.
On October 14, the 1st Marine Division departed INCHON after being relieved by 8th Army units around SEOUL. Its replacement was WONSAN. The Navy began minesweeping the harbor on 19 October, but the harbor was not completely clear on the Division's arrival in WONSAN harbor on 20 October. The 1st Marine Regiment (1/1), one of three infantry regiments in the 1st Marine Division, was ordered "to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in WONSAN-KOJO-HAON-N1 zone, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at KOJO until further orders." The short warning time precluded detailed essential unit planning. After a successful amphibious landing on 26 October, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assembled at WONSAN airfield for further movement to KOJO. At 1330 hours, the first wave of the 1st Battalion departed WONSAN for KOJO with the last troops departing at approximately 1900.
On 27 October, all supplies and equipment which could not be moved by rail were loaded on a truck for the front. The immediate task for 1 lst to relieve POC and protect an area consisting of a coastal plain 50 meters in diameter and a semicircle of hills, 1500 feet in height. With the arrival of the 11th, the 5th regiment departed on orders for Korea in the afternoon of 27 October. Ironically, the supplies that 11 lst was supposed to guard were removed by the departing Koreans. This fact made the 1st division's mission somewhat nonsensical, but apparently only the South Koreans knew the dump was empty. In terms of enemy activity, "they [ROK] admitted that small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had sometimes raided the villages for rice, but added that ROK patrols had secured the hills without meeting any organized resistance." (4)

(b) Opening Moves.

(1) Although there was no hint of an enemy advance or any, the Marines were cautious in their advance. The main dump was at the railroad station in the old American town of 4900. It was "important to destroy since it lay on the ground that would have to hold the enemy advance.

(2) (The 1st Marine Division) was supposed to be in place and ready by that date.
LtCol Hawkins did not expect an immediate attack by large enemy forces. In such an
unfavorable position, Hawkins' behavior in protecting
the depot deserves explanation. He
engaged the enemy before learning that the ROIs had
taken the contents of the supply dump with them. For
added firepower, the battalion reinforced B Company
with light machine guns, 3.2" rocket launchers, heavy
machine guns, 75mm recoiless rifles, flame throwers,
and 81mm mortars. On the afternoon of 27 October,
Hawkins faced an additional burden. Appearing in the
corridor southwest of KOKO, 2000-3000 refugees streamed
toward the seaport. Hawkins did not have time to
screen all the refugees before nightfall, so he
organized them into the peninsula northeast of KOKO.

In the afternoon, 1/1 received probing fire from
several directions. At 1600 hours, a patrol fired
returning fire from Hill 165 (Figure 10).
A. Shortly after the 2nd and 3rd Platoon of B Company had been pushed from their positions, the N. Korean attack launched within grenade distance. But confused the Americans by shouting, “Come this way! Don’t shoot! We’re friends!” when challenged.

Logically surprised, the 1st Platoon of B Company was caught by two platoons of North Koreans. Seven Marines died before they got out of their sleeping bags. The MPA attacked 3rd Platoon and the B Company of the three points to the south and southeast. Three platoons of communists retreated after barrages of 60mm mortars. These mortar fires were concentrated directly on Marine positions. At C Company, North Korea mounted within 10 feet of the Marines before daylight. This was the fiercest attack, but C Company, which was around that night, in the south, B Company, and the rest of the 1st Platoon suffered a barrage of 60 people and the 1st Platoon at 11:10 and the 1st Platoon at 11:20. At 11:30, the troops were surrounded, and the 1st Platoon was surrounded.
During the battle, the unit was surrounded and under attack on all sides. Company E, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, was engaged in a fierce battle for control of an area near the village of CHONCHOW-RI. The enemy forces that attacked the 1st Battalion were estimated to be between 2,000-3,000 men. The 10th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 5th Marines, along with approximately 160 North Korean soldiers and 200 Chinese, counterattacked and drove the enemy from their positions.

Initially, the North Koreans employed little defensive fire and relied on surprise. Whistles and horns were used to coordinate their efforts, and the Marines initially believed the attack as being integrated and skilled. The North Korean tactics were similar to those seen in previous periods of the war. For the Marines, the surprise was a success. After the initial surprise, the Marines quickly coordinated their efforts and attempted to suppress the enemy. Company E, 7th Marines, was charged with the task of halting the enemy advance. The 8th Marines, supported by the 5th Marines, provided fire support.

During the course of the battle, the Marines were able to push the North Koreans back to the original perimeter. The 7th Marines, supported by the 5th Marines, were able to contain the enemy and prevent further advancement. The 8th Marines were able to hold their position and prevent the enemy from breaching the perimeter. The 5th Marines provided cover and support for the 7th Marines.

In conclusion, the battle was a major victory for the Marines and marked a turning point in the war. The Marines were able to repel the enemy and maintain control of the area. The battle demonstrated the Marines' ability to adapt and overcome challenges in a variety of situations.
Company B withdrew, and Company F replaced them on the right. The Marines arrived at 1900 and planted their paratroopers on the beach northeast of town. Still under attack, B Company remained radio contact with the 4.2-inch mortars after repairing some damaged antennas. At 0300 hours, the mortars relocated and broke up the ongoing NFPA attack. By 0700 hours, the artillery was operational, but the mortar threat had passed. If the artillery had reached the front right-tilt on 29 October, B Company's 3.RK would have been stronger. At 0330 hours, the NFPA engaged and moved east of the rail yards track, then north towards FOO. B Company resumed withdrawal along the track north of CHONGCHON-N1, assisted by A Company. This evacuation was nearly complete when 200 enemy troops moved west out of FOO into an open field of fire. A and B Company, supported by F Battery, fired on wounded 75 enemy. The engagement finally ended when Marine Corps artillery completed some uncontrolled direct fire support missions that forced the NFPA to withdraw.

Reinforcement. At 0412 hours on 15 October, the 1st Battalion transmitted a message to the 5th Division. 'Rushed up by the 5th Marines, it
is prepared to support Marines tonight.' The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines had been under attack.
around 1600 hours on the 27th by 1000 NKPA. It
requested helicopters for evacuation of the wounded.
and landing Ship Transport-Hospital (LSTHs) for less
critically injured soldiers. Another message left KOJO
at 1000. Basically, it asked "shall we hold here, or
withdraw north," requested regimental reinforcement,
and finally mentioned that the ROK supply dump was
open. Corps and Division agreed that KOJO should be
held, since a large scale NKPA attack seemed likely.
Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply
dump. Nonetheless it at the Division CP seemed to know as yet
that it had been removed." (7) but General Smith, 1st
Marine Division Commander, ordered the 1st Marines to
send a battalion of reinforcements anyway. Slated for
the task was COL Fuller's regimental headquarters and
the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Using the railroad from
WONSAN, the first trains left for KOJO at 1630 hours
and arrived at 2230 hours on 26 October. In terms of
additional combat support, 1/1 recommended a second
destroyer for gunfire support. Since the roads and
bridges out of WONSAN were not sturdy enough to hold
trains, 1st Marines also sent an LST loaded with troops.
Finally, the 2/11 Marine Artillery (-) plus the motor
transport of 2/1 was ordered to move to KOJO on the
morning of 28 October. "Marine up a train and loading
it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies in
three and one half hours had been something of a

The North Koreans are setting their command and control and rocket support to sustain the operation. The artillery batteries missed the main night attack, and the rocket attack was delayed before the NPF moved west of KOJO. There was a lot of wasted motion. The first request for additional artillery was cancelled after further inspection revealed little room for the extra assets. The enemy was elusive; he struck, moved on, and harassed Marine security forces. At KOJO, there was inadequate intelligence to support the commander. This fact gave the North Koreans the decisive edge.

The 1st Battalion's reserves were all in WONSAN and the convoys and water transport were too slow to assure rapid reinforcement. For all practical purposes, the reinforcement effort was lost energy.

(1) Consolidation. COL Puller's reinforcement of KOJO left his zone relatively unchanged. The 1st Marines major mission wascestor to the WONSAN beachhead. With the 2d Battalion supporting the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the 1st Battalion relieving the POK's at MAJON-NI, there were restricted few troops available to patrol the NPF and perform blocking positions at KOJO. In addition, POK's further inland - 91229-
As an example, the ten tankers and one heavy transport ran aground at WONSAN on the morning of 22 October. In a repeat performance, they ran aground again on 29 October on arrival at JOKO. At the time a Navy tubboat came to the LST's aid, the tanks were surrendered to KOJO. With the enemy disappeared into the eastern foothills, the 1st Marines under the 3rd Tanks returned to WONSAN -- without ever being unloaded. Patrols in KOJO itself and west of the coastal plain were fruitless. The enemy was gone.

Even so, in the two days of action, Marine air strikes and Navy destroyers leveled 60% of KOJO. On 30 October, a 1st Battalion patrol moving south from KOJO along the railroad track found the bodies of 12 Marines near Hill 109. As they approached the outskirts of TANGCHON, the patrol received sniper fire. Wasting no time, Corsairs were called again, resulting in the death of 16 more North Koreans. The patrol estimated 50% of TANGCHON was destroyed. This was the last major action in the KOJO operation. Marines casualties were 16 KIA, 37 WIA, and 4 MIA. The Marines estimated enemy losses at 250 KIA from an actual body count of 165. Section 11111111 there were 37 POWs. In this phase of the operation, the 3rd Tankers were slow again. Patrols again searched south for T40 divisions that had somehow bypassed the town and moved northwest. Indeed, the 3rd Tankers made no further contact with WONSAN.
(4) Relief. It was now clear to the 1st Marines that KOJO was no longer a hot spot in their zone of operations. With the security of WONSAN in mind, the 1st Marine Division sent the 5th KMC Battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion in KOJO. 1/1 departed KOJO at 0700 hours on 2 November by LST. Arriving at WONSAN at approximately 1230 hours, they took up defensive positions around the city. The 2d Battalion left KOJO by rail and motor convoy on 3 November. After some minor guerrilla contact on the route north, they arrived at WONSAN at 1200 hours on 4 November.

(d) Key Events. The KOJO operation had several key events. The first was the decision to send the 1st Battalion south. With the long LOC's (59 miles from the logistic beach head), relative isolation, and poor command and control, KOJO was a questionable objective to defend. The 1st Battalion Commander contributed to this decision. By placing his companies to defend a reverse front that did not exist, he directed several operations of 3 and 6 Companies, resulting in the capture of 1,400 prisoners and 23 dead. The final decision to relieve 1/1 was made.

...
reinforcement. It was too late with too much of the
modern equipment. The excessive artillery and beachad
armor characterized the ineffective reinforcement
effort. All of these events played into the hands of
the NKPA. Although estimated enemy losses were high,
they successfully disrupted the southern flank of the
Munsan logistics cantonment, diverted resources to a
non-critical area, and endangered the MSR's.

(c) Outcome. KOU was a qualified
success for the NKPA. Apparently armed with more
accurate intelligence than was available to the
Marines, they used violent, night tactics to shatter
isolated 1st Battalion positions. They quickly broke
off the battle when faced with superior firepower.
Having already fought up and down the length of the
Korean peninsula, the North Koreans used their vast
eperience to concentrate forces to achieve local
superiority and overwhelm the defenses. The Marines
were a much heavier force than the NKPA; therefore,
reinforcement was slower and less flexible. On the
other hand, the North Koreans relied on light doctrine
and tactics; consequently, they did not need to
shoulder an unreasonable logistics burden. In defense of
the 3rd Marines, there was insufficient time for them
to read, prepare, and issue orders. This spread
confusion at the command level. It was clear that
There was little understanding of the Division Commander's concept for KOJO. The final result was that the communists harassed the Marine forces, interdicted their support LOC's, and blended into the hills in preparation for their lineup with the CCF.

4) MAJON-NI.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Threat units at MAJON-NI were similar in origin to the NKPA forces that fought the 1st Battalion at KOJO. The major opposing force was the 15th NKPA Division. Although they were also retreating north from the PUSAN perimeter, the unit was a veteran force with CCF experience prior to the Korean conflict. The 15th NKPA Division, under Maj Gen Pak Chun Sol, consisted of three regiments (45th, 48th, and 50th) of uncertain strength. Their mission was occupation and control of the upper Imjin River Valley for unconventional operations. MAJON-NI was one of their main objectives.

(2) Friendly Forces. MAJON-NI was a critical North Korean village for several reasons. In terms of LOC's, it was a major junction in the roads to P'yongyang, SEOUL and PUSAN (fig 5). Politically, MAJON-NI was "a pocket of forced culture in the district of the puppet state set up..."
be a center for World War II." In the meantime, it
was necessary for the 1st Marine Division to move
to locate the area late in the afternoon of 18
November, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved the
11th ROK Regiment. The Marines arrived via truck
convoy from WONSAN, and the ROK is returned in the same
manner. The 1st Marines did provide some combat
support to the 3d Battalion. They attached D Battery,
3d Battalion, 11th Marines for artillery support; the
1st platoon of the 4.2" Mortar Company for light
indirect fires; and finally, C Company (-) of the 1st
Tank Battalion. 1st Marines issued two missions to the
3d Battalion: 1) "Form a defensive position at
MAJON-NI, destroy enemy forces, and deny them the use
of this central road net" (10) and 2) "patrol roads to
north, south, and west and keep the road open between
MAJON-NI and WONSAN." (11) After publication of the
orders, an oral amendment eliminated the second
requirement. The road between WONSAN and MAJON-NI
traveled through a 3000 foot pass -- excellent terrain
for ambushes. On arrival at MAJON-NI, the 3d Battalion
formed a perimeter approximately 3400 meters in
circumference. The 3d Battalion commander placed the
air D Battery, position to properly cover any avenue of
approach. In the realm of reduced control, MAJON-NI
was a sort of haven for Korean transients. The
D Battery was a vital unit processed those refugees in
...to include the latest reports. The IC was close to death of the war, or D-12. To understand the magnitude of the
civil affairs problem, an average death rate of 30 POWs
was lost in 17 days of operation in the Majon-Hni area.

(c) Opening Moves. The next two weeks
in combat at Majon-Hni revealed that supply of the
operation would be the central theme. As an immediate
step, 3D Battalion established patrol sectors by
company: C Company on the mom road, H Company on
the Khoi Road, and 1 Company on the primary
road south to Pongang. First combat occurred on
the morning of 2 November. At 0900 hours, an
undetermined size NIPA force ambushed a resupply convoy
bound for Majon-Hni. See Figure 4. An "00 flying cover
for convoy tried to signal he had spotted road block
and for convoy to turn around, but his signal was
unobserved or not understood."(12) The Koreans
assaulted the center surface of the narrow road, and
attacked with devastating small arms, machine gun, and
rocket fire. There was no reserve but return to
IPD NIPA. The latter included more five trucks and
received no reserve. The 1st Marines responded by
concentrating all their tank tanks to the
moment. The moment, frustrated dispersed the enemy
for a period in withdrawal, but friendly losses were
4 Marines, 3 WIA, and 2 damaged trucks.
Although the attack on the H Company truck platoon was in vain, the action continued. While this action was under way, NKPA elements ambushed a motorized patrol from H Company near YOKAE-RI at approximately 0130 hours. As the attack continued, the platoon sent a report back to MAJUN-RI. Radio problems delayed external reinforcement, so the 3d Battalion dispatched the remainder of H Company. Artillery fire assisted in this second Marine withdrawal of the day. Losses included 5 KIA and 16 WIA. In both of the ambushes, enemy losses were undetermined, but light. In a more successful vein, supporting fire was quite effective. Marine Corsairs dispersed the enemy attacking the convoy, and D Battery saved the enfiladed H Company platoon. Unfortunately, both actions show a general Marine disregard for security. A platoon convoy escort was obviously insufficient to react to an ambush. Intelligence apparently ignored enemy presence or did not have the true picture. In sum, the first day's engagement was an NKPA victory and repeated the narrow trend of reacting to disaster, as opposed to properly organizing forces to meet the threat.

The original attack included 5d Battalion Combat Team, but it was decided to hold all the troops of this battalion for use in the MacDonnelly area. Anticipating that this could not be done, the 1st Air Delivery Platoon was ordered to drop 152 parachutes behind the Munsan perimeter. Although this drop alleviated the situation, the 1st Air Delivery Platoon was ordered to drop another convoy to MAJON-III at 0500 hours on 2 November. As the convoy departed Munsan, there were significant communications problems between MAJON-III and Wonsan. Due to the mountainous terrain, radio communications were unreliable. Messages delivered by helicopter and OY became the primary means of communications. Despite these difficulties, the convoy included heavier combat support assets than assigned on the previous day. In the place of an infantry platoon, an entire rifle company (C Company, 1st Battalion) under CPT Robert Barrow was added to the supply train. Additionally, 1st Marines Special Operations teams, a section of 81mm mortars, and a tankless rifle section. OY aircraft insured the accurate delivery of these assets. In a tactical innovation, CPT Barrow placed the engineers and a few of their vehicles in the rear of the convoy. This allowed the engineers to repair any undetected craters on their way.
The fire had ended an hour before, the NIFM struck again.

By Friday, July 30th, the OY spotting the enemy on the open field, one platoon of infantry left their trucks and engaged the enemy. The fire fight gradually progressed from the lead elements down the left flank of the entire convoy. The OY called for airstrikes, and the NIFM section marked enemy positions with white phosphorous. Since this action occurred at 1700 hours, it was dusk and the close air support was only effective in suppressing enemy fire, as opposed to destroying enemy forces and positions. The enemy attack intensified as night dominated the battlefield.

In a seemingly impulsive decision, CPT Barrow ordered lights out and the trucks turned around while the infantry units continued covering. While this may have been the only realistic choice, the results were disastrous. One truck went over a cliff with 30 troops aboard; by miracle, no one died as a result of the accident and only 16 were injured. On the other hand, as the Marines escaped the ambush and counted their losses, the head count was discouraging. The mission complete, the Marines reported 2 KIA. Furthermore, five vehicles were lost, including a jeep, personal weapons, two trucks, and two 2.5 ton trucks. The morale of the enemy was once again, unchallenged, and virtually intact. As CPT Barrow returned to the conditions around him, at 2600 hours, he felt...
The significant question is why CDR Fuller
agreed to force another convoy through the NLR
without clearing the area with a reconnaissance in
force. With the morning's successful airlift, the 3d
Battalion did have a viable, albeit tenuous, supply
line. In hindsight, the losses on 1 November were a
modest price. Learning from his mistake, CPT Barrow
modified his tactics for the next convoy. Departing
MONSAF on 4 November at 0630 hours, he adopted more
rigorous security measures and regained the tactical
initiative. Deploying his infantry platoons on foot,
1000 yards in advance of the lead vehicles, the Marines
surprised approximately 70 guerrillas who were
leisurely enjoying a late morning breakfast. Turning
the tables, the Marines killed 51 NKPA, took 3 POW's,
and counted no friendly casualties. The chain of
events regarding the resupply operations from 2 to 4
November was typical for the 1st Marines throughout the
MONSAF-MEDEF-MEDF-NF operation. Although they
were not able to achieve their objectives or
convert known tactics into a tangible threat,
they continually adjusted their techniques to
meet the enemy's, usually, the cost of the
Marines in terms of casualties.

- 3rd Marine Division, Phil
I. Situation Reports

II. Action

At 0000 hours on March 23, 1951, Company C and Company L, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, were firing on the enemy forces located in the vicinity of the Gun MET Tai Drainage area. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, had already been engaged in the battle for the Gun MET Tai area for several days. At 0745 hours, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, moved into the Gun MET Tai area to reinforce the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was tasked with blocking enemy movement and screening friendly troops.

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, encountered heavy enemy resistance and engaged in a fierce firefight. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was able to drive the enemy from the area and establish a foothold.

At 1100 hours, Company C, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was ordered to return to Wonsan. The remaining companies of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, were ordered to proceed to Munchon-ri, an intermediate village near the top of the highest pass on the Togwun-Munchon-N1 road. The 2d Battalion's mission was to block enemy movement north and screen civilians.

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The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, encountered heavy enemy resistance and engaged in a fierce firefight. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was able to drive the enemy from the area and establish a foothold.
the 1st Marines sent F Company to reinforce the beleaguered E Company. They arrived at 1015, about the time that F Company's convoy came from the west. By then, the battle was over. Requesting emergency helicopter evacuation, the Marines listed 8 KIA and 27 WIA. Enemy losses were in excess of 40. While absorbing these substantial losses, the Marines did destroy 50 cases of 120mm ammunition and 300 cases of small arms ordnance that the North Koreans left in their hasty retreat. With the action complete, 2d Battalion continued to MUNCHON-NI. In analyzing both the perimeter defense and the E Company convoy, surprise and security were the pivotal principles of war. The forewarned Marines in MAJON-NI successfully beat off the 45th NKPA attack; but the North Koreans badly bloodied the tactically blind and understrength E Company convoy. Reminiscent of KOJO and other convoy operations, the 1st Marines did not adequately protect its forces and waited for disaster before dispatching the required troops. As usual, the reinforcements arrived to find the enemy melting into the hills. Whereas the 1st Marines used their combat experience for the MAJON-NI perimeter defense and the 4 November convoy, they rapsed back into old ways for the E Company debacle.

(2) Relief at MAJON-NI. The increased combat activity at MAJON-NI concerned the 1st
On 10 November, 311 Field Artillery
the 5th ROK Battalion to O-1, awaiting with a
company, they assumed the perimeter sector erected by a
Company of the 1st Battalion. That same day, an 81-
spotted 200 North Koreans four miles west of MAJON-HI.
In a good display of responsive indirect fire, 3
Battery-mortars dispersed the enemy concentration.
Anticipating further NVA offensives, the CIC warned of
another attack on the MAJON-HI perimeter on the night
of 11-12 November. This was a correct prediction as
the 45th NVA regiment began their typical probes
around 0100 hours on 12 November. The main attack
focused on the 3d KMC front, but never developed
momentum. The North Koreans wandered into a "Bouncing
Betty" minefield that achieved a debilitating affect on
the enemy. With the attack ending again at daybreak,
Marine losses were two killed and six wounded. At 1030
hours the following morning, the 1st Battalion, 15th
Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (US) departed WONSAN to
relieve the Marines at MAJON-HI. The soldiers,
replacing their Marine counterparts, bogged down at
each North Korean roadblock and spent the night in a
defensive perimeter astride the TOGMAN road. They
were relieved at MAJON-HI at 1530 hours. The 3d
Battalion departed for WONSAN at 1615 hours on 14
November. The next day, the 3d Battalion, 15th
Infantry relieved 21 at MAJON-HI. In effect, the
Major operation was over for the 1st Marines. The final losses for the 3d Battalion were 16 KIA, 4 MIA, and 15 MIA against an estimated 550 NPA dead and unknown number of wounded. This enemy MIA figure is probably grossly inflated due to their lack of reliable dead counts. The various supply convoys registered more casualties: 2 killed and 31 wounded. With the relief of its major maneuver battalions, RCT-1 displaced north to CHIBYONG. They were no longer responsible for the WONSAN-MAJON-NI-KOJO area.

(d) Key Events. There were two critical events in the MAJON-NI operations for the 1st Marines: the initial perimeter defense of MAJON-NI on 7 November, and A Company’s convoy success on 4 November. The successful perimeter defense demonstrated to the NPA that the Marine forces in the town itself were well organized and entrenched. The 3d Battalion took advantage of their combat support assets: the D Battery howitzers covered all axes of attack, air strikes interdicted enemy movement during the day, and careful civilian and POW interrogation warned the defenders of significant attack. The overwhelming influence of these combat multipliers neutralized the rather negative effects of poor planning and task organization that occasionally ruined supply operations. The only good convoy attempt was the 4
Marine operation under CPT Robert Burrow. Adopting his tactics to suit the enemy threat, he routed the
|jackets from the NKPA, killed more than 144 North
|Koreans, and pushed the convoy to its destination
|safely. After this success, why did the Marines resume
|their past habit of undermanned, defensive convoys?
|Eight more Marines died at the horseshoe east of
|MUNSONN-NI because of a failure to exploit proven
|tactics. The entire 1st Marine tactical plan was
|inconsistent. Generally, the key events favored the
|Marines; but they failed to exploit their tactical
|advantages in MSR control.

(e) Outcome. There was no clear
tactical victory for either force. Both sides
accomplished their missions: the Marines kept the MSRs
open and massed enormous numbers of POWs. On the other
hand, the 15th NKPA Division successfully disrupted
Marine supply operations and destroyed a valuable
portion of Marine supplies and personnel. Accordingly,
both adversaries revealed specific strengths. The
North Koreans used the principles of concentration and
mobility to maintain tactical advantage over the
Marines. They would only fight when they possessed
clear numerical superiority; as Marine reinforcements
arrived, they terminated the engagement. Although the
NKPA on was not at full strength, it clearly
outmaneuvered the 15th force in the MUNSONN-NKPA-NI
like similar to their sister units who fought at
Pusan, the 15th MPA Division had substantial battle
experience. They were veterans of the Korean War and
CEP operations prior to 1950. They used the terrain to
maintain an offensive posture throughout the entire
battle. Marine operations displayed the traditional
American strengths. The quality and quantity of
ammunition vastly outclassed the NKPA. Especially in
terms of combat support, arrival of US close air
support and artillery usually terminated the Korean
attacks. Marine morale was noteworthy. Continuously
under pressure, they doggedly pursued their objectives.
Indeed, perseverance characterized these operations
much more than informed analysis of their situation, or
innovative response. The Marines survived due to the
massive available logistical support. When one
logistical convoy failed, the Marines dispatched
another one. If the MSR's were temporarily closed, then
a massive airdrop similar to the 3 November MAJON-NI
resupply was sufficient. The Marines were seldom short
of fighting equipment or material. Casualties were
immediately moved by both armies. The NKPA typically
removed their wounded and dead from the battlefield.
This habit deprived Marine intelligence of reliable
and strength estimates. For emergency cases, the
Marines often relied on evacuation helicopters. In
fact, the final outcome was a draw. This battle was
just a minor prelude to future operations in the north. The NKPA trudged north to join Chinese units preparing to attack in force; and the Marines were only displaced to CHINGHAE for yet another mission, another battle, in the same war.

Analysis,

(1) The administrative landings of the 1st Marine Division at WONSAN in October and the actions of the following weeks should have resulted in the largest defeat of NKPA soldiers of the war. However, the successes of prior weeks had bred overconfidence, and the 25th (US) Corps was oriented to the north for continued success. This opened the left flank and rear of the 1st Marine Division to large numbers of infiltrating NKPA. The realization of this threat to the division rear area resulted in the entire 1st Marine Regiment being dedicated to securing base areas and main supply routes against organized guerrillas and elements of the 5th Division NKPA from 24 October through 17 November. The reactive posture that the 1st Marine Regiment was forced into detracted from the primary mission of the division. Additionally, had the Division been more attuned to threat capabilities and directed greater attention to the withdrawing enemy force, the flank and rear would not have been exposed. Furthermore, the failure to close the door on the
(1) The enemy field a disciplined force to fight the operations conducted by the 1st Marine Regiment were indecisive to the overall conduct of the war. Although the entire regiment was directed to the mission of securing base areas and main supply routes, this did not significantly detract from the tactical mission of the 1st Marine Division’s accomplishment of its tactical mission. Consequently, little or no tactical advantage was gained by the NKPA.

(2) The enemy achieved surprise initially at K030. This is primarily attributed to military intelligence not properly developing the situation. There was insufficient planning time afforded to the regiment or the battalion. This recognition of deficiencies does not detract from the question of whether or not there was an urgency for the battalion to deploy to K030 at that time. It only identifies and reinforces the importance of rapid and correct intelligence as well as the need for sufficient time for a unit to tactically employ forces against the initial enemy threat.
The tactical operations were at small scale. The enemy attempted and achieved surprise, confusion, and destruction. Although this is not unlike the previous tactics employed, the successes gained were not without significant enemy losses. The most successful reaction to NKPA tactics was the use of air cover to alert convoys to enemy roadblocks on the KAO-KW MSR. The aerial observer would identify the roadblock and alert the ground commander who would dismount and deploy forces. The air cover would then provide close air support. Initially, there were some coordination problems with this concept. However, with continued use, it was successful in countering subsequent enemy attempts to block the MSR.

5. The harshest immediate realization for the 1st Marine Division forces was that the NKPA was not defeated. The enemy's ability to strike and inflict significant damage while in full retreat was quickly realized. The threat to the 1st Marine Division rear area was from a very disciplined force conducting an organized withdrawal. It required the attention of the entire 1st Marine Regiment.

Tactically, the actions reinforced the importance of integration of fires and mutually supporting positions. The failure to have artillery or mortars available to control the 7500 destructed
even for defense. Moreover, the defensive positions were not mutually supporting and afforded little benefit in the overall tactical defense plan. This was probably a result of a lack of intelligence of the enemy; however, it clearly demonstrated the importance for integration of fires and air cover to a mutually supported defense plan.

(7) Significant long term benefits are not obvious. The tactics employed by the enemy were the same in withdrawal as demonstrated during the offensive. It did reinforce the discipline and professionalism of the enemy. Even while in retreat and suffering heavy losses, the NKPA was capable of mounting serious threats to the I st Marine Division rear areas.

(8) It is no sweeping revelation that surprise can counterbalance superior forces. Inadequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield had permitted the enemy to achieve surprise at KOJO. The need to provide sufficient intelligence and planning time for a force to successfully accomplish a mission is reiterated.

(9) Little missions should be identified to support the tactical and operational plan. The actions of 1507 were in defense of a supply depot that had already been enveloped. The employment of a force
The essential information is not clear. It seems to be discussing supporting forces and a measure to ensure a supply, but the actual text consists only of a few oil drums, waste of resources.
Introduction: This report discusses the administrative operations which supported the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in their operations in the vicinity of Inchon, Korea, during the period 26 October through 13 November 1950. Some background information will be given on the support plans leading up to these operations, and a brief mention will be made of the problems faced by the opposing force.

2. Background:

(a) Logistics posed a problem for the 1st Marine Division from the very start of its operations in Northeastern Korea. The original D-Day for the Inchon landing was set for 15 October 1950. Due to a number of factors, most of which had to do with an underestimation of the difficulty of getting the required 10 day levels of Classes of supply and fuel prior to the Division's arrival at Inchon, D-Day was eventually slipped to 20 October 1950. The naval base at Inchon could only handle one 50,000-ton ship and then only at high tide. As a result, there were serious problems which made necessary the location of several additional ports on and off the
The distance involved added to the logistic problems. These were as follows:

- Hanchon to KIO 79 miles
- Hanchon to MAGRON II 26 miles
- Hanchon to Hwangdong 78 miles

The mission assigned to RCT-7 was to commit an area such that it was necessary to devote about the entire 1st Motor Transport Battalion (less Auto Maintenance and Supply Companies) to support that RCT. This action, while essential, left the division short of motor transport assets in an area where almost all traffic was limited to existing road and rail lines. In fact, so vital were the roads to the overall operations in the Chosin Reservoir area that RCT-1's mission was to secure them as NSRs behind the area of operations of RCT-5 and RCT-7. This mission was soon extended to include the responsibility for security of the Hanchon supply dump at KIO. The 1/1 was dispatched on a return trip, immediately upon arrival at KIO.

RCT-10 was assigned to carry out that task.

The transportation available to move the transport assets of the 1/1 was reduced considerably.
I. After the surprise attack of the enemy on 25 October at I.O.O.D. it was necessary to reinforce with 21st Marines by rail from WONSAM. A Corps, at WONSAM, was requested to assemble a train, at 1400 hours, 25 October. Arrangements were made to use an LST to move 10 tanks by sea because the roads and bridges were too light to support their weight. In response to a request for helicopters to evacuate casualties, a second LSTH was sent to KDJO.

2/1 went directly from their landing craft, at WONSAM, onto a train on the rail siding, and 3 and 1/2 hours later, with the Regimental Command Group, arrived at KDJO. They were followed by a second train of two hours. Both arrived safely in KDJO before the seven hours to complete. Five helicopters were used to evacuate the wounded of 2/1 by 1000 on 26 October, when the first showers of the campaign were falling. All reinforcements were in place by 1100 on 27 October.
Upon their relief at KOJO on 30 October and 1 November, I/1 was removed by LST to WONSAK, arriving there at 1200 hours on 2 November. I/1 moved to WONSAK the next day by road, with most of the soldiers marching and a limited number of trucks being used to move equipment. A railroad train was also used. The decision to march the troops was made for two reasons: a lack of transportation and to keep them moving to prevent frostbite. They completed the 35 mile route in two days, having to halt twice to provide perimeter security for crews repairing the rail line following guerrilla attacks on it.

(h) At this point, responsibility for the rear area security in the area of operations (AO) was passed to the Third Battalion, operating out of MAJON-NI, where they arrived by road transport to relieve the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 hours, 28 October. The MAJON-NI deployment offered a challenge to logistics planners, since there were no rail connections as there had been at KOJO, and the MSR was a narrow, winding route that rose through a steep pass (3000 ft) early in its 28 mile run. So vulnerable was this road to attack that the mission of 3/1 was quickly amended to exclude the responsibility for keeping it open. To have done so would have over-taxed the entire movement of the unit, threatening their supply.
(5) As a result of this decision, it became necessary to rely on helicopters for transportation between MAJON-NI and WONSAN, and to resupply by fighting convoys through enemy ambushes on the road. One such convoy was forced back close to WONSAN itself, on 2 November. This led to the first of a total of 377 tons of supplies being dropped by air, using Air Force C-47 aircraft, during the month of November.

(6) The combination of bad roads and enemy action made road resupply of the garrison at MAJON-NI very difficult. It became necessary to provide each convoy with engineers to dismantle roadblocks and infantry to fight off ambushes. Eventually, this procedure seems to have become an accepted method of getting the enemy out into the open, where a counter-ambush could be employed to fix and

The Marines were relieved at

prior to the 1st Battalion, 15th

Mechanized Infantry (M16), which required two

in the enemy-controlled road
I - ANALYSIS:

1. Transportation and movement were clearly the major logistical problems encountered by the 1st, 12, and 3d Marine battalions in their AC during this period. The Marines displayed great flexibility in their moves from sea to rail and road; and the dispatch of reinforcements from WONSAN to KOJO by rail on 28 October in the space of a few hours indicates that the Corps staff had a good grip on the situation. It would appear the Korean and Chinese forces had little access to either motor transport or rail assets; this no doubt had an adverse effect on their ability to concentrate fighting forces, but enabled them to use ambush and infiltration techniques to good effect. The difficulties in passing supplies to fighting troops is remarked on by several commentators, but at no time was this acknowledged to be a serious threat to the success of the mission. The use of airdrops of supplies into MÂJUM-III was quite successful in making sure that the minimum amount of supplies needed got through despite the blocked roads; this success may have been due in part to a rehearsal carried out before the drops were actually needed.

2. An evaluation of wounded troops was used extensively, even though plans were obviously in existence to have wounded from 1000 to LST. This
a feature felt were enhanced morale. Several comments are made in the official special action reports regarding the harmful effect a lack of medical treatment had on the enemy's forces.

(3) A minor difficulty was encountered with water sources at Kojod. There was no problem in this regard at MAJON-NI, where clean water was abundant and a water point soon established.

(4) The cold weather had an adverse effect on personnel, in that several cases of frostbite were reported. Lubrication of weapons was also affected. The grease and oil issued to clean and service personal arms were reported to be not suited for the Korean winter climate.

(5) Analysis of the operations at Kojod and MAJON-NI offers little insight into personnel issues. Enemy forces were in retreat, and their efforts were aimed at regrouping as many of their forces as possible. The limited Marine losses did not cause any significant personnel shortages. After action reports concluded that the Marine Corps Personnel System was sound and well adapted to combat conditions. Based on the gradual increase in administrative and personnel management capability of officers as they gained experience in combat, it was recommended that more
adequate training in these areas be given to certain Marine civilians prior to participation in combat.

(3) The actions around FOCO demonstrated the potential importance of civil affairs (CA) in rear area operations. Both refugees and retreating enemy soldiers in civilian clothes were encountered by Marine units in Korea. In addition to the normal requirements for humane treatment of displaced persons demanded by international law and the need to ensure that refugees did not interfere with military operations, the Marines needed to quickly segregate retreating enemy soldiers from the other Korean transients in order to prevent the former from returning to their units in the countryside. To accomplish this task quickly, all transients were "processed" by a Civil Affairs officer. POWs were kept in limited facilities, and since these were strained by the need to err on the safe side when making determinations as to exactly who should be detained, the need for trained and knowledgeable CA personnel was noted.

- Strict troop discipline and cooperation with local civilian leaders in the MAJOM-MI area produced favorable results for the Marines. Villagers in MAJOM-MI were allowed to continue to have their own laws and customs and to follow all customs and laws that did not directly conflict with the Marine mission.
In addition to creating favorable world and local
effects, each joint treatment of civilians was highly
beneficial to local civilians, and warned the Marines of
future IEDN attacks on several occasions.

For in conclusion, the logistical and
administrative procedures carried out by the Marines at
BEC and PHON-N1 were both effective and economical.
While these cannot be said to have played a decisive
part in the success of the mission, it is clear that
without such actions, particularly in the areas of
treatment utilization and civil affairs, the mission
would not have been done as well.
(a) The 1st Marine Division was under the operational control of X (US) Corps during this period of operations. The X (US) Corps Commander, General Almond, had his command post in WONSAN from 24 October until 2 November, when he moved it to HAM-HUNG. The 1st Marine Division Commander was Major General Smith. From the USS Mount McKinley, his division command post moved to a location a mile north of WONSAN on 27 October, and then to HUNGAN on 4 November. The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.

(b) The formation of self-sustaining Regimental Combat Team (RCT) task organizations was the normal rule rather than the exception at this time. The term "detachment" was used with these task organizations in order to allow flexibility to the RCT in choice of size and composition of the various detachments as required by the situation and available transportation.

(RCT-1 was commanded by Colonel Fuller. He had three battalions under him: 1st
1st Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Haines; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter; and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Baker. Upon landing at WONSAN, the 1st Battalion initially moved to KOJO, the 2d Battalion remained at WONSAN, and the 3d Battalion moved to MAJON-NI.

(2) Locations:

(a) 1st Battalion was in the vicinity of KOJO at 1700 hours on 27 October. The command post was located on the slopes north of two platoons from A Company (Figure 1). B Company was in an outpost position two miles south and southwest of KOJO. 1st Platoon of B Company was located on the east slope of Hill 105. 2d Platoon was on Hill 185, and 3d Platoon and Company Headquarters were on the high ground west and south of 1st Platoon. C Company was in position a mile and a half north of B Company in a line of foxholes in the hills with the platoons arranged with 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and 3d Platoon respectively from west to east. A Company had its 2d and 3d Platoons located 225 meters east of C Company and 1st Platoon located at Hill 117. F Battery, 11th Marines, the artillery support, was located on the beach northeast of KOJO. When B Company was attacked during the night of 27 October, it withdrew from its outpost
positions and organized a 360-degree defense on both sides of the railway track just south of CHONGCHON-MI.

(b) On 28 October, due to the attack of the previous night, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was sent to KOJO from WONSAN. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 5th MARC Battalion were then attached to the 1st Marine Division to patrol the roads in the WONSAN area and maintain blocking positions at AMBYON. They remained attached until 2 November when they detached to comply with new orders.

(c) From 28 to 31 October, 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines occupied positions in a semicircle around Hill 117 at KOJO. Each rifle company set up outposts in front of its zone. At 0700 hours on 1 November, 1st Battalion left KOJO from WONSAN by LST. On 2 November they took up positions at the road block near HATSUMA, four miles southeast of WONSAN. 2d Battalion and the artillery battery stayed in KOJO until 3 November when they returned to WONSAN.

(d) Third Battalion, 1st Marines plus its attached elements were located in MAJON-MI on 28 October. The battalion command post was located in the choulhouse (Figure 5). A battalion perimeter was established with daytime company observation posts and the patrolling of the three main roads which intersected in the town. 6 Company was responsible for
The road to WONSAN, A Company the road to SEOUL, and 1 Company the road to PYONGYANG.

(e) On 5 November, A Company, 1st Battalion was assigned as the guard to a truck convoy bringing supplies from WONSAN to the 3d Battalion at MAJON-NI. After its arrival, Colonel Puller placed it under the operational control of the 3d Battalion for defense because an attack was expected that night. The three rifle Platoons and their reinforcing elements were assigned a sector between G and H Companies on the perimeter. The next day, 6 November, A Company returned to WONSAN and 1st Battalion control.

(f) On 6 November, 2d Battalion (-) was ordered by Colonel Puller to go to MUNCHON-NI via the MA 20-NI road. The mission was to block enemy movement along the trails leading north and to screen civilians. The 2d BM Battalion arrived at MAJON-NI on 10 November as reinforcements. It was assigned to the sector in the perimeter where A Company, 1st Battalion had been on 6 November.

(g) On 13 November elements of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U.S. 3d Infantry Division arrived at MAJON-NI to take over the perimeter defense. At 0115 on 14 November, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines left MAJON-NI for WONSAN.
On 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, relieved the CHIC-ECH, eight miles southeast of PHU-HUE. The 2d Battalion arrived at CHIC-ECH on 15 November, and the 3d Battalion on 17 November. With these movements, the 1st Marine Division gained a relative degree of concentration until the inter-echelon distance between elements being less than 60 miles.

C2 Analysis: There were no command relationship problems associated with this operation. The PCT task organization provided a flexible organization for combat. Units could be attached and detached without problem. The manner in which this was done met the changing circumstances of the operation. Span of control of the number of subordinate units was well within the parameters for effective management. The physical span of control caused significant problems for the commanders involved because of the abnormal distances between units. The operation orders and plans that placed these units in such a widespread configuration were executed rather quickly based on the rapidly changing situation in Hanoi. If more time for planning and coordination had been available, PCT-1 may not have been given the mission to protect an empty airstrip.
Task Organization:

Prior to landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division
1st Sig Bn, less detachments
Carrier Plt, FMFPac
Det, 4th Sig Bn
2d Sig Rep Unit
Det, 205 Sig Rep Co
RTO, RIT Team

RCT-1
Det, 1st Sig Bn
Sig Co (G-5)
AMSLCO

After the landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division
1st Sig Bn, less detachments
Carrier Plt, FMFPac

RCT-1
Det, 1st Sig Bn

Planning and Operations: The 1st Marine Division was assigned a zone of action 300 miles north-south by 60 miles east-west. RCT-1 was assigned responsibility for the KOJO-WONSAN-MAJDON-NI area. These certainly represented abnormal distances for communications. Some distances to keep in mind are:

- WONSAN to KOJO: 39 miles
- WONSAN to MAJDON-NI: 28 miles
- WONSAN to KAHNUNG: 78 miles

In addition to the distances involved, the terrain was extremely mountainous. In order to communicate, RCTs were supplemented with high power signal company and signal battalion radios. The amplitude modulated (AM) continuous wave (CW) radio had lowered antenna cut
In the frequencies on which they were to operate. The
1st Marine Division operated two to three division
command nets, usually directly to RCTs or battalions.
Additionally, the 1st Marine Division operated an
administrative net to the naval shore station to handle
marine out-of-theater message traffic. This was
inadequate because of the delays trying to get
administrative messages through the X Corps nets. Wire
was not a practical solution to communications
requirements except for intra-CP communications.
Extreme importance was placed on radio relay and
helicopter air messenger service. Because the 1st
Marine Division was working with the army, X Corps
assigned blocks of frequencies and call signs. At SHJO,
RCT-1 was assigned a detachment of ANGLICO to control
and coordinate naval gun fire.

(3) Analysis:

(a) RCT-1's Special Action Report
indicates that the regimental communications were
generally adequate, but that communication to division
was only possible through the attached signal element 1
March.

(b) Equipment: Many of the battalions
operated organizational radio only worked if the
temperatures were above freezing. High and were 0&deg;
(c) Effectiveness: There were numerous instances cited of poor air-to-ground communications and misunderstandings of signals between ground personnel and FAC’s. Delays in messages were extremely common. The message of the fight at Koto had to be relayed to the 1st Marine Division by the 7th Marines. The 7th Marines requested that instructions be forwarded by both radio and air messenger. Messages concerning air and air support from an attack unit on the front line were delayed. Even the radio communications between MAJON-N1 and WOHSEM were minimal only for a few hours at night because of the intense civilian masses surrounding 3rd Marines.

SOURCE: General Liaison Communications
While the division and the regiments were
inoffensive, this led to difficulties in the higher
headquarters determining what actions were occurring at
the regimental levels. This also caused delays in
responding to situations as they developed at the
remote ambush sites. In many areas, the communications
problems experienced in Korea in 1950 will still exist
in rear area operations today. Long distances,
reliance on radio, inability to use wire,
susceptibility of radio to jamming, and guerrilla
interdiction will cause significant problems for the
units conducting rear area operations.