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PROCEEDINGS

THIRD USERS' WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

COHESION

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**PROCEEDINGS THIRD USERS' WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS
COHESION**

**Health Care Studies and Clinical Investigation Activities, Health Services
Command
Fort Sam Houston, TX**

Oct 83

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Proceedings document the workshop presentations and group reports. Combat stress casualties were analyzed for their historical significance. The role of cohesion in the prevention of combat stress reactions was examined. The elements of cohesion were identified. Discussion of how to develop cohesion are summarized.		

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Proceedings: Third Users' Workshop on Combat Stress
Health Care Studies and Clinical Investigation Activity
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
21 - 23 September 1983

PREFACE

The purpose of the Third Users' Workshop on Combat Stress was to focus on cohesion. The workshop offered the opportunity for participants to learn the current trends concerning the development of unit cohesion, the assessment of unit cohesion, and the implications of unit cohesion. This proceedings documents the efforts of the participants. It is hoped that this workshop will allow for increased awareness of the importance of cohesion.

A. David Mangelsdorff, Ph.D., M.P.H.
James M. King, Ph.D.
Donald E. O'Brien, Ph.D.

Editors

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
PREFACE.....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS.....	iv
PRELIMINARY AGENDA.....	viii
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.....	ix
GOALS TASKED TO PARTICIPANTS.....	xii
TASK GROUP REPORTS:	
Subgroup I.....	1
Subgroup II.....	9
Subgroup III.....	12
PRESENTATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS:	
Reuven Gal -	
Unit Morale: Some Observations on its Israeli Version.....	17
The Unit Questionnaire for Soldiers and Junior Leaders.....	36
Military Profession: Between Commitment and Obedience.....	43
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research -	
Army Satisfaction Inventory (ASI).....	55
Command Climate Survey.....	60
Company Perceptions Questionnaire.....	63
Frederick J. Manning and Larry H. Ingraham -	
An Investigation Into the Value of Unit Cohesion in Peacetime.....	68

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

	<u>Page</u>
United States Army Reserach Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences -	
First DCSPER IPR on the New Manning System (NMS) Field Evaluation.....	101
ARI Reserach in the NMS Evaluation.....	123
Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana -	
Plan of Action: Cohesion Technology for Cohort Units.....	143
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) -	
Unit Readiness Questionnaire.....	147
4th Infantry Division -	
The Combat Stress Survey.....	150
Unit Status Questionnaire.....	166
United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School -	
Human Dimension - Draft Field Manual.....	169
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Sam Houston, TX, Behavioral Sciences Division -	
Standardization Agreement on Combat Stress Terminology.....	214



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY HEALTH CARE STUDIES AND CLINICAL INVESTIGATION ACTIVITY
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS 78234

HSNH-Z

SUBJECT: Third Users' Workshop on Combat Stress

1. The Third Users' Workshop on Combat Stress is scheduled for 21-23 September 1983, sponsored by the Health Care Studies and Clinical Investigation Activity (HCSCIA), Health Services Command, Building 2268, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This Workshop will focus on the development of a survey to assess unit cohesion. The Workshop will offer the opportunity to learn current trends concerning the development of unit cohesion, the assessment of organizational factors, and the research efforts on unit cohesion. Participants will have the opportunity to exchange ideas about needs and programs.
2. A critical element in this Workshop is the active participation of the mental health professionals with the organizational effectiveness (OE) consultants from units which will be among the earliest to mobilize. This combination is intended to provide a credible evaluation of proposed materials.
3. Since spaces are limited, selection for attendance will be based upon the following priorities:
 - a. Unit is willing to have both mental health and OE consultants attend.
 - b. Unit is willing to locally fund one or more attendees.
 - c. Unit is likely to be mobilized early in any future large scale conflict.
 - d. Participants are willing to exchange their training materials, research, reports, or unit cohesion surveys, if applicable.
4. Participants are encouraged to secure military space available flights into San Antonio to one of the local Air Force bases. This will allow the coordinators to invite (and pay for) more individuals to the Workshop.

HSNN-Z

SUBJECT: Third Users' Workshop on Combat Stress

5. Participants are requested to send materials relevant to unit cohesion as soon as possible to the Workshop Points of Contact who are: Dr. A. David Mangelsdorff, Major Don E. O'Brien, and Captain James M. King of HCSCIA, AUTOVON 471-4541/2411/6028.

WALTER A. BRUSCH
Colonel, Dental Corps
Commanding



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY HEALTH CARE STUDIES AND CLINICAL INVESTIGATION ACTIVITY
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS 78234

HSNH-D

8 September 1983

SUBJECT: Third Users Workshop on Combat Stress

1. Welcome to the "Third Users Workshop on Combat Stress". The goals of this Workshop are as follows:

- a. To determine what commanders need to know about the cohesiveness of their units.
- b. To identify indicators and/or crucial aspects of unit cohesion.
- c. To determine how best to provide feedback to commanders about the cohesiveness of their units.
- d. To develop suggestions that will assist in the development of unit cohesion.

Remember that this is not a psychometric exercise. We intend to define the elements of cohesion, and to explore the processes through which cohesion is developed. The following information is provided to assist you in settling in during your stay.

2. Plan to arrive in San Antonio on the afternoon of Wednesday, 21 September 1983. Commercial taxi fare from the San Antonio International Airport to Fort Sam Houston is roughly \$15.00. Proceed to Bldg 367 (see map, Incl 1) and secure your room. Have the taxi wait during this process. You will be staying either in Bldg 592, 1384, or 107. HCSCIA is located in Bldg 2268. The opening remarks will be in the main auditorium on the second floor of the Health Services Command Headquarters building, Bldg 2792. Workshop sessions will be held in Willis Hall, Bldg 2841, Academy of Health Sciences. You will be advised of the specific room assignments during the opening remarks.

3. Transportation to the Workshop site from the BOQ's and the DVOQ will be provided starting at 0730 on Thursday, 22 September 1983 and Friday, 23 September 1983. Please be ready when the bus arrives. Workshop participants will be returned to their quarters on Thursday afternoon after the sessions have concluded. Please note that the Workshop sessions will continue through mid-afternoon on Friday. Plan to remain through the end of the meetings. You will be expected to leave for the San Antonio International Airport from the Workshop site on Friday, so you may wish to bring your luggage with you on Friday morning.

HSN-D

8 September 1983

SUBJECT: Third Users Workshop on Combat Stress

4. Arrangements have been made for a group noon meal on Thursday. A group activity will be organized on Thursday evening if there is sufficient interest. Information concerning statements of nonavailability is attached at Incl 2.
5. The Workshop uniform will be either the battle dress uniform or the fatigue uniform. Casual attire be appropriate for civilian attendees.
6. Telephone messages may be left at AV 471-6028/7027/4541/3331 (commercial 512-221-xxxx). Please have callers indicate the degree of urgency associated with each message. POC's and their quarters numbers are: Dr. A.D. Mangelsdorff (512-344-0942), MAJ Donald O'Brien (512-654-0937), and CPT James King (512-655-1865).
7. We plan to publish the proceedings of this Workshop within one month of its conclusion. If you wish to have any of your material included in this volume, bring it with you to the Workshop, where it will be collected by one of the POC's. We strongly encourage each of our attendees to submit a paper for publication in the proceedings.
8. Please accept my best wishes for a productive and enjoyable Workshop experience.



WALTER A. BRUSCH
COL, DC
Commanding

THIRD USERS' WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

HEALTH CARE STUDIES
and
CLINICAL INVESTIGATION ACTIVITY

Ft Sam Houston, Texas

PRELIMINARY AGENDA

Wednesday 21 September 1983

Travel day

Participants notify POCs of arrival in San Antonio. There may be a get-together depending upon arrival times.

Thursday 22 September 1983

- 0745 Assemble at HQ, Health Services Command, Rm 221 (Auditorium)
- 0800 Welcome
- 0815 Introduction and purpose
- 0830 Presentations
- 0945 BREAK
- 1000 Presentations
- 1200 LUNCH
- 1300 Tasking of participants; breakdown into small work groups to develop lists of features relevant to assessing unit cohesion
- 1800 EVENING ACTIVITY

Friday 23 September 1983

- 0745 Reassembling of small work groups for consolidation final lists
- 0845 BREAK
- 0900 Presentation by work groups of final lists developed
Processing of information gathered and experience

PARTICIPANTS IN THIRD USERS' WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

Dr. Reuven Gal
Department of Military Psychiatry
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
Washington, DC 20307
AV 291 5210/5261

MAJ(P) Frederick J. Manning
Division of Neuropsychiatry
WRAIR
Washington, DC 20307
AV 291 3042/3006

Dr. David Marlowe
Department of Military Psychiatry
WRAIR
Washington, DC 20307
AV 291 5360/5210

COL Jesse J. Harris
WRAIR Field Station, P. O. Box 338
Womack Community Hospital
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
AV 236 9432/7990

CPT Alfred J. Johnson
THRU: Cdr, 82nd Airborne
TO: Cdr, 307 Med Bn
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
AV 236 8605

CPT Frank Helmick
THRU: Cdr, 82nd Airborne
TO: AFVC-GF-OE
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
AV 236 0751

Dr. Adie McRae
Soldier Support Center
ATZI-NCR-SD
Fort Ben Harrison, Indiana 46216
AV 699 3880

CPT Tony Mangiardi
Soldier Support Center
ATZI-NCR-SD
Fort Ben Harrison, Indiana 46216
AV 699 3863

PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED

LTC Linton Holsenbeck
4th Med BN
Fort Carson, CO 80913
AV 691 4812/5322

CPT Ed Turner
AFZC-HR-OE
4th Infantry Division
Fort Carson, CO 80913

LTC Richard Ruhmann
HQ, 18th Airborne Corps
ATTN: AFZA-DCS-OE
AV 236 7200/0982

MAJ C. T. Bennet
US Army CDEC
ATC-EX-HF
Fort Ord, CA 93906

CPT Dwayne Marrott
CMHA
9th Infantry Division
TMC1, Bldg 4290, RM 264
Fort Lewis, WA 98433
AV 357 7201

MAJ Robert J. Schneider
USAMRU-E
HQ 7th MEDCOM
APO New York 09102
AV 2122-626/740 (Heidelberg)

Dr. Trueman Tremble
PERI-RL
Army Reserach Institute
5001 Eisenhower Ave
Alexandria, VA 22333
AV 284 8294

COL James W. Stokes
Chief, Psychiatry and Neurology Branch
Behavioral Sciences Division
ATTN: HSHA-IBS
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

LTC Brian Chermol
Behavioral Sciences Division
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED

CPT(P) Robert P. O'Brien
Behavioral Science Division
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

MAJ Tim Sheehan
Behavioral Science Division
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

MAJ Phyllis McDonald
P. O. Box 353
WACH
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
AV 236-1813

LTC Paul D. Ellsworth
Chief, Occupational Therapy Section
BAMC
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
AV 471-5885

MAJ Lewis Kurke
Psychiatry and Neurology Service
5th General Hospital
Bad Cannstatt
APO New York 01954

Dr. Gary Howard Feuerberg
US Army, CDEC
Scientific Support Laboratory
Fort Ord, CA 93906

MAJ Denise Rotert
Occupational Therapy Section
Academy of Health Sciences, US Army
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

GOALS TASKED TO PARTICIPANTS

1. To define the elements of cohesion.
2. To determine what commanders need to know about the cohesiveness of their units.
3. To identify indicators and/or crucial aspects of unit cohesion.
4. To determine how best to provide feedback to commanders about the cohesiveness of their units.
5. To develop suggestions that will assist in the development of unit cohesion.

3rd USERS WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

SUBGROUP I REPORT

1. Members of Subgroup I:

CPT Alfred Johnson (spokesman)

LTC Richard Ruhman

Dr. Adie McRae

Dr. David Marlowe

CPT James King

MAJ Tim Sheehan

LTC Paul Ellsworth

COL Jim Stokes (recorder)

2. Main themes in group's discussion on first day:

Our Army's problem may be less one of promoting cohesion than of discontinuing policies which actively retard or destroy it. Military unit cohesion is the natural product of a series of life experiences which: 1) require mutual reliance/interdependence, 2) generate trust and confidence, and 3) are structured to reinforce suitable norms of soldierly behavior and hierarchical relationships. Current policies which obstruct this include: Army training programs which focus on individual performance and assessment; leadership attitudes which suppress inter-personal caring in favor of cold-blooded "bottom-line" analysis for personal advancement; and the resulting pressure to micromanage which stunts any sense of personal identity as a competent, trusted soldier or junior leader. The consequent failure to develop military unit cohesion could mean failure in combat even in present day scenarios, and may have even more severe consequences in the highly dispersed, lethal context of Airland Battle 2000.

3. Responses to Question 1: (Define the important elements of Military Unit Cohesion).

A. Unit cohesion is made up of several interrelated but independently varying elements. These include:

1. Horizontal bonding (among peers) and loyalty.
2. Vertical bonding (between leaders and led) and loyalty.
3. Confidence (optimism, will):
 - a. in self.
 - b. in peers.
 - c. in weapons and equipment.
 - d. in leaders (their competence, caring, etc.).
 - e. in supporting units, nation, etc.
4. Commitment to goals (as articulated by leaders):
 - a. of unit.
 - b. of Army and Nation.
 - c. implies goals are accepted as "legitimate".
5. Soldierly identity (norms):
 - a. as shaped by rules, tradition and/or indoctrination.
 - b. as embodied in unit identity.
 - c. which are presumably shared by the peers and leaders.
6. "Morale" (a fluctuating mood or affect state):
 - a. influenced by physiological status (sleep loss, metabolic factors, CNS arousal and neurochemistry).
 - b. also influenced by satisfaction of physiologic & psychologic needs.

B. Comments:

1. Unit cohesion is an "alloy" whose properties are more than simply the sum of its elements. Therefore, it cannot be adequately assayed by a single number summation (or even a weighted average) of the individual elements.

2. The mix of elements which works best in garrison may differ from that which works best in combat.

3. The optimal mix may differ in combat, combat support, and CSS units with different types of skills, tasks, and missions.

4. The specific content of an element may be more important than its intensity. For example:

a. Commitment may be intense, but to the wrong goals, or to only some of the goals while others are adamantly rejected.

b. The ideal Soldierly Identity (shared "norms") is different for different units, and may even have to be remolded by applying different emphases in the same unit under different circumstances (e.g. the "hard-fighting, hard drinking" 1st Cavalry Division who are being exhorted to forego all alcohol and keep their cool in the face of provocative demonstrators during this year's REFORGER exercise).

c. Confidence must be primarily in the soldierly competence and caring of peers and leaders, rather than in less relevant areas.

5. The assessment of Unit Cohesion requires measurement of the absolute "strengths" of the elements, judgement as to the appropriateness of their content, and some interpretation of the interaction between elements.

4. Responses to Question 2: (What does a commander need to know about unit cohesion?)

A. In brief, commanders need to know what it is, why it pays off, how to get it (or how not to wreck it), and what are its potential pitfalls.

B. The commander needs a general conceptual education on unit cohesion to be able to participate in the consultation model. He/she needs to know that unit cohesion is multi-factorial, and how the factors may interact to strengthen or weaken the product.

C. The subject must be pitched at different levels for different populations, and be expressed in suitable vocabularies for the different users. The general education package should include suitable concrete examples. It could, perhaps, be used as a self-assessment tool with immediate practical applications. It should, however, provide a system perspective and not simply be a "cookbook."

D. The commander needs to know the "bottom line" - how unit cohesion will pay off in terms of his/her/the units mission and objectives. This, too must be expressed in military rather than sociologic terms and vocabulary, which will vary from very concrete to very abstract (jargonistic?) depending on the echelon involved. The fact that our group focused on this need to state the "bottom line" to the commander first can be taken as an indicator of how far we still have to go to guide the current Army leader from a purely managerial frame of reference into a leadership framework in which "caring for the troops" has merit in its own right and not simply for its "bottom line" pay-off to the organization.

E. Commanders also need to know that measures to promote unit cohesion can

also backfire, or produce forms of unit cohesion, due to improper mixes of the elements, which have undesirable properties and consequences.

Examples:

1. Too much horizontal bonding, not enough vertical bonding makes for an unresponsive, adversarial situation.

2. Too much horizontal and vertical bonding without the right soldierly identity and confidence makes a friendly unit that can't fight.

5. Response to Question 3: (What are useful indicators of unit cohesion?)

A. Definition: An "Indicator" is something which is readily seen or collected, and does not require sophisticated measurement or survey techniques.

B. Traditional "objective" indicators include number of AWOLs, sick call cases, and desertions. More intuitive or subjective indicators include: reports, inspections, ARTEP success and other performance measures.

C. The risk of indicators is that their high face validity may be misleading;

1. There may be other accidental reasons for changes in an indicator.

For example, an infectious disease epidemic can cause an increased sick call rate.

2. indicators which usually work in garrison, such as soldierly appearance, snappy salutes, tend to become goals in themselves and are carried to extremes. However, these indicators can't be taken into combat. Examples: starched fatigues, "sized" BDUs.

3. Even in garrison, some units, especially combat tested ones, adopt a casual "field soldier" ideal and resist what they regard as "mickey-mouse" regulations and standards.

D. Some indicators that often do work:

1. Day to day commitment is tested by unpleasant or painful but "voluntary" group activities such as early morning P.T. unit runs which are made matters of unit pride and inter-unit competition.
2. The effectiveness of intra-group normative process often shows in personal appearance and behavior: Very deviant appearances stand out and may signal either individuals or cliques who are holding some identity ahead of the soldierly one. Use of this indicator is complicated by the U.S. Army's promotion of individuality and/or ethnic identity as a legitimate social and Army goal. It may be necessary to look deeper at the group/deviant interactions to establish that it involves true deviance and not cohesion-promoting "role playing."
3. Potentially useful measures, not "indicators", include sociometric analyses which are impractical on a large scale, and simple questionnaires. When possible, these questionnaires should be administered as a part of other activities such as routine vaccination/shot-record updating programs, rather than as a special tasks. Questions like "Is there something you want to talk with your leader about but haven't been able to?" may identify those who need help.
4. While indicators must be used with caution, we do well to tie our measures to those indicators with high face validity, those that commanders have been trained to use. We should also educate commanders to use the indicators more selectively.

6. Response to Question 4: (How should feedback be given to the commander?)

A. Many of the responses to Questions 2 and 3 apply to the case of giving specific feedback to a specific commander as well as to the general users of this information, i.e. use vocabulary and "bottom-line" statements tailored to the recipient's level, plus suitable cautions against over - or mis-interpretation. Feedback should be appropriate to the organizational level.

B. To avoid misunderstandings and bad feelings, feedback should always be face-to-face and one-on-one, not a letter or computer-generated printout. In principle, superiors should not be given results before subordinates have been briefed about the findings and given a chance to discuss them.

C. The leader should receive feedback on the extent to which their own leadership style is functional or dysfunctional. If the leader's actions were found to be a cause of problems, the surveyor needs to help the leader confront this, but must do so in a tactful way suited to the individual situation.

D. The issue of ethical handling of potentially sensitive material was discussed. Any doubt about who is the "client", i.e. the tasker or requester of the survey who is entitled to all of the results, should have been made clear to all participants before conducting the survey. So, a survey conducted for a battalion commander which uncovered problems in one of the companies would be fully reported to the battalion commander after discussion with the company commander involved, but would not normally be provided to the brigade or division commander without the battalion commander's consent. An exception might arise if the survey found evidence of serious criminal activity or of gross negligence that impaired safety or effectiveness in either a garrison or field setting which could not be corrected on the spot

by the commander involved. Some judgement would be required in those rare cases when the responsible commander did not choose to report such a problem to higher authority him/herself.

7. Response to Question 5: (What techniques can be employed to develop cohesion in a unit?)

A. Meaningful, hard training, conducted by the leaders themselves.

B. Decentralization to give junior leaders and subordinates a sense of competence.

C. Increase team training and decrease purely individual training: Example: although firing The Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) is an individual task, doctrine for its use requires a group to engage a target. The courage to fire the weapon almost always is developed in the group context. Therefore, it should be learned in the group context.

3rd USERS WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

SUBGROUP II REPORT

1. Members of Subgroup II:

CPT Ed Turner

LTC Linton Holsenbeck

MAJ Richard Manning

Dr. Truman Trimble

MAJ Phyllis McDonald

MAJ Donald E. O'Brien

MAJ Denise Rotert

CPT Frank Helmick

MAJ Robert Schneider (spokesman)

2. Identify crucial indicators of cohesion:

1. Do the individual's value systems (expressed as behavior) overlap with the Army's value system? This would be observed primarily at company level.

2. Are Commanders committed to the concept of cohesion?

3. Is the Commander aware of the views and beliefs of his men?

4. Does the Commander have a source of family views? Does he use and support family support systems? Does he know how important they are to cohesion?

5. Do leaders know their men (literally)?

6. Do the men respect each other? Do they rate others' competence highly? Do they like each other? Do they value the other men?

7. Are unit markers allowed to set one unit off from other units? They may be verbal, insignia, etc. They must be voluntary.

8. Do men "hang together" and participate together in unit parties, activities, etc., after duty hours?

9. Is military courtesy used within the unit?

10. Do support people know the men in unit and vice versa?

11. Do men defend the unit against outsiders?

12. Do subgroup identities override unit and other soldier identities?

13. Does the administrative structure reinforce cohesion (i.e., do support troops do things with deployment force - do they do PT with deployment force or their "own" unit). For example, do medics participate with deployment force or do they train on their own?

14. Do people want to stay in the unit or get out? You would examine rates of reenlistments, extensions, etc.

3. How should we provide feedback?

1. To help the Commander fix the bad things in his unit while reinforce the good things in the unit.

2. Feedback is to help the Commander - it must be constructive, and not just criticism.

3. Prepare the Commander first - he must know that some results might not be favorable.

4. Suggestions on how to develop cohesion.

1. Use a values based performance management system. Define the crucial values honesty, readiness, etc. This leads to setting norms, standards, which must be communicated to all, norms define the mission. The mission leads to organizational objectives on more specific statements of the mission. These objectives help define individual objectives and behaviors, which, in turn, lead to performance standards for the individual.

2. Look at each policy and verify it's importance on cohesion is positive.

3. Make cohesion a goal. Work details, PT, etc. must be considered in this process.

4. Promote vertical communication through education for officers and NCO's in techniques of effective communication. Provide positive incentives to encourage this process.

5. Use pre-formed units, such as whole squads, sections, etc., for work details, even if the entire unit is not required.

6. The Army's reward system should reinforce the unit, not the individual (i.e., a squad of the month).

5. Elements of Military Cohesion:

1. Horizontal (peer) bonding, which includes confidence in the ability of the group to do the job and evaluation of one's peers.

2. Vertical bonding, which includes confidence in one's leaders, and trust and confidence in the men on the part of leaders.

3. Personal integration, which includes acceptance of military goals, belief that one's work is meaningful and trust that the individual is important.

4. Confidence in self.

3rd USERS WORKSHOP ON COMBAT STRESS

SUBGROUP III REPORT

1. Members of Subgroup III:

Dr. Reuven Gal

COL Jesse J. Harris

LTC Brian Chermol

Dr. David Mangelsdorff

MAJ C. T. Bennett

MAJ Lewis Kurke

CPT Dwayne Merrott

CPT Tony Mangiardi (spokesman)

2. Determine what commanders need to know about the cohesiveness of their units.

1. From the perspective of leadership, commanders need to know, first and foremost, whether or not cohesion exists in their unit, i.e., the state of cohesion. The reasons for this are self explanatory and impact on unit performance and effectiveness. The assumption is that cohesion is important to mission accomplishment. One way of viewing cohesion in this context is whether or not there is a perception of a group mission among unit members. In order to make this determination the leader needs to know the elements of cohesion. Although there are certain general characteristics relating to group performance, motivation and commitment, there are also mission specific considerations. For example, a high state of individual skill proficiency and the ability to operate on one's own is required for snipers and certain kinds of demolition or reconnaissance missions. Likewise, a

great deal of interdependence among unit members is required for crew served weapons patrols and other types of operations.

2. In general the commander might want to know the state of commitment of the unit members, the state of morale, and the degree to which unit members share values. The commander would also want to know how obtaining the information could be operationalized. Two ways to do this would be through observation, and/or through the use of formalized survey techniques.

3. Identify indicators and/or crucial aspects of unit cohesion.

1. Indicators of unit cohesion can be determined through two basic means: observations and surveys. Observations were viewed as indirect measures, while surveys were viewed as direct measures. Observations were divided into hard data and unobtrusive observations. Hard data includes such factors as UCMJ rates, AWOLs, sick call rates, etc. It was pointed out that these data are related and situation dependent in their analysis. Therefore, they are not hard and fast criteria. Unobtrusive observations are those made to determine how unit members interact and behave in their everyday activities. These include observing group activities, how friendships are formed, how and with whom soldiers spend their time after duty, how much involvement exists among unit members, what sorts of metaphors and themes of communication exists in casual conversations, etc.

2. The survey/assessment instrument was viewed as a statistical method from which the state of unit cohesion might be quantified. Crucial aspects which might be included in surveys include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the degree of follower confidence in supervisors and leaders; (2) the degree of confidence in weapons; (3) the degree of confidence in fellow soldiers; (4) the degree of confidence in one's own proficiency based

on training. Issues that should be addressed in the formulation of surveys included: (1) how to choose the best survey, i.e., what should the items address; (2) under what kind of conditions will the unit be expected to function; (3) how should the items be phrased so as to have the correct meaning to the soldier. In general, it was agreed that a survey should consist of certain core items which have some validity and reliability, and that supplements directed to particular issues might be developed.

4. How best to provide feedback to commanders about the cohesiveness of their units.

1. In discussing this issue, Group III addressed alternatives and procedural issues relating to the conduct of surveys. It was emphasized that surveys should be conducted by special personnel from outside the unit. In the IDF a special corps of psychologists conducted the surveys. Their effectiveness depended upon previous combat experience, and their ability to establish rapport with commanders. The IDF model was viewed as being "super" and obviously meeting the needs of Israeli forces within their cultural boundaries. The typical Israeli company commander welcomed the assessment and feedback, since engagement with hostile forces is an imminent every day reality. Further, relief from command based on the results of the survey seldom, if ever, occurred. It was pointed out that this might not be the case in the US Army.

2. A four step alternative to the IDF model for battalion level surveys was suggested: (1) survey each company; (2) brief each company commander and 1SGT on results; (3) brief the battalion commander on the whole battalion; (4) battalion commander would get information on each company by asking individual company commanders.

3. Another important issue discussed was the need to establish guidelines and to determine who would have the authority/responsibility for administration, duplication, utilization and interpretation of surveys.

5. Develop suggestions that will assist in the development of unit cohesion.


NOTE: Group Three did not address this issue directly.

6. Conceptualization of the Cohesion Process.

1. As an aid in understanding the dynamic relationship among the various elements involved in the cohesion process a pictorial metaphor was developed (see attached diagram). This metaphor likened the process to two gears, one larger and one smaller. The smaller was viewed as driving the larger, i.e., the source of power which permitted the dynamic interaction of the many basic elements. This dynamic force was viewed as consisting of time/experience/training, and it was recognized that these factors could have a positive as well as negative influence on the process of cohesion. Negative influences were viewed as being basically learning experiences, while positive influences were successes in leadership/followership and other crucial aspects of cohesion building.

The larger wheel driven by the smaller gear, contains the individual and group elements of cohesion which are manifested in mission accomplishment. At the core of this larger wheel is command climate, which includes leadership and technical and tactical competence. Around the edges of the larger wheel are individual elements (shared values, common goals, commitment, competence, motivation, etc.) and group elements (both vertical and horizontal bonding, unit identification and pride, unit confidence, morale and caring, trust and mutual support). It is understood that this model could be improved upon, and elements added or subtracted depending upon empirical findings.

COHESION PROCESS



COL (Res'.) Reuven Gal, Ph.D.
Israeli Defense Forces
August 1983

UNIT MORALE: SOME OBSERVATIONS
ON ITS ISRAELI VERSION*

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Introduction

Morale is a popular concept. Within a military context, morale is recognized intuitively as a very important factor, something that is frequently talked about. Yet the term morale is quite vague. For some it is the state of mind of the individual - his dedication, eagerness and willingness to sacrifice. For others it is a social phenomenon - collective enthusiasm, sometimes called "esprit de corps", or the persistence of a group in pursuing their goals under adverse conditions.

Sometimes the discussion of the morale concept would contain implicit value judgments. Some would even say ideological judgments. These peculiar aspects of the morale concept will be discussed later in this paper. Morale is also frequently assumed to vary along a unidimensional scale - from high to low. But even a casual observation suggests that we are dealing with a complex phenomenon, one that is neither easily identified nor well understood; one, in sum, that should be studied in a rigorous professional way.

Definitions.

Within the military context, there are many who would consider "morale" and "motivation" synonymous terms. They are frequently used interchangeably in order to refer to the soldier's readiness to fight and to sacrifice for (the sake of) his assigned missions. Although the morale concept delineates more the group (or unit) frame of reference, and motivation is regarded primarily as an individual's attribute, within the military context of fighting units these two concepts often come close enough together to be regarded as synonyms.

Indeed, several authors did define morale and motivation inter-dependently: Crinker & Spiegel¹ describing airforce pilots of the US during World War II, defined morale as "the collective state of motivation for combat throughout the group." Namely, the level of morale in a unit is almost a simple summation of the "states of motivation" of the unit's members.

Another example of calculation, yet, is found in the definition of combat motivation, even in the individual level: Anthony Kellett, for example, (who recently completed a very extensive review on Combat Motivation²) has defined combat motivation as "the conscious or unconscious calculation by the combat soldier of the material and spiritual benefits and cost likely to be attached to various courses of action arising from his assigned combat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the influences that bear on soldier's choice of, degree of commitment to, and persistence in effecting, a certain course of action"

"The calculation of..." Well, while we do not really expect soldiers to keep working on their pocket calculators while they are in their trenches, Kellett's definition nevertheless points to the various possible courses of action that may result from the soldiers' levels of motivation and morale, and to the important factors of choice, commitment and persistence underlying those two terms.

Another arithmetic-like definition of morale - a definition that has become well famous among military writers - was made by the French Napoleon. "In war," he said, "the morale is to the physical as three to one."

Other definitions of morale are concerned mainly with its relationship to performance. Thus, for instance, Shibutani³ defines morale as "the degree of effectiveness with which the recognized goals

of joint enterprise are pursued." Others see in morale the "persistence in carrying out collective goals" (IBID. p3). So, "effectiveness in pursuing the goals...", "persistence in carrying out missions..." - indeed, some of my close friends in the Israeli Forces, well-experienced field commanders though they are, would even say that they "don't give a damn" for their troops' morale - as long as the effectiveness and persistence of their combat performance remains high! Thus, the relationships between morale and motivations, on the one hand, and morale and performance on the other hand, are still to be explored and carefully defined.

An interesting approach to the interface between morale and cohesion has been recently adopted by Ingraham and Manning ⁴. These authors refer to "morale" as a term used for individual level of analysis, while "cohesion" is used for the group level of analysis. Their definition of "individual morale" is as follows: "A psychological state of mind, characterized by a sense of well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups (IBID.6). Thus, according to Ingraham and Manning, the two main components of a soldier's morale are his confidence in himself (presumably as a professional soldier) and his confidence in his small unit (i.e. team, section or platoon).

History.

Turning to its historical perspective, it is interesting to note that the earliest known ⁱnquiry into the issue of military morale was made by the Greek military leader and ^{iv}Writer Xenophon (434-355 BC). After leading his troops through a seven-month-long escape journey, fighting desperately for their survival, Xenophon wrote ⁵: "You know,

I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them". Military superiority, then, depends on "who is stronger in soul." And even though Xenophon was leading a mercenary army, whose soldiers were paid for their military performance, it is clear that he referred to the morale and motivation factor as the key to withstand an enemy. Yet it is a correct observation that since the French Revolution most of the military organizations became less comprised of mercenaries and professional soldiers (motivated mainly by means of high pay rolls and severe discipline) and more dominated by ideological and patriotic factors. The issue of morale and troops' motivation became significantly more crucial, especially in military organizations based on conscription.

Furthermore, in recent years researchers have sometimes referred to morale not even at the unit level but at the national level. One such example is Martin Van Creveld's excellent study on the German Army ("Wehrmacht") during the two World Wars. According to Van Creveld⁶ "an army's worth as a military instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by...(the national) Fighting Power". The latter is defined by Van Creveld as the "sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight". "Its manifestations are discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness to die" (Van Creveld, ^{TBID:} 1980, p1).

Another example in this regard stems from the work done ^{by} COL Trevor N. Dupuy⁷ of the US Army. Dupuy developed a method for the evaluation of the National Combat Effectiveness. According to his analyses the advantage of the Germans (in terms of NCE) in World War

II varied from 20-30 per cent superiority over the Western Allies, to 150 per cent superiority over the Russians. For the Six-Day War, Dupuy's analysis revealed a superiority, on the part of the Israelis, of 54 per cent over the Jordanians, of 75 per cent over the Egyptians, of 163 per cent over the Syrians and of 250 per cent over the Palestinians! (Dupuy, 1977).

Between the two World Wars the formal attitude towards military morale has changed significantly. Before and during World War I army generals were concerned only with keeping their fighting troops highly vigilant and aggressive, whereas the second World War, with its increasing citizen armies, required more attention to be paid to the soldier's "souls". Perhaps the fact that successful commanders like Montgomery, Slim and Wavell have gained considerable military achievements by stressing behavioral and motivational factors, provided legitimacy for these factors at the high-level military authorities as well. Indicative of that trend was the establishment, during the second World War, of the Morale Branch in the US Army and the Morale Committee in Britain.

Morale Surveys in the Israel Armed Forces.

Israeli examples regarding army morale surveys can be found as early as the birth of the Israel Defence forces (IDF) in 1948. The very first morale survey conducted in the newly-born Israeli Army was administered in 1949, by Lewis Guttman, who was then a young captain in the small psychological unit that had already been established in the IDF. Guttman's survey assess the soldiers' satisfaction with the "arrangements" in their bases and their "mood". The term "mood" was apparently Guttman's substitute for "morale"...

The results obtained on that early survey, showed a distribution of 70 and 30 per cent of soldiers who reported to be in a "good mood" or a "bad mood", respectively. While Guttman preferred to present his findings in a rather pessimistic way ((Figure 1 was copied directly from the original report), it seems, nevertheless, that the 1949 Israeli combatants kept quite a high morale - considering the circumstances under which they had to operate. Interestingly enough, the distribution of (roughly) 30% to 70% between those who feel low morale and those expressing high morale, is almost a tradition in the IDF, and perhaps it reflects certain universal attributes of attitude distributions.

Morale surveys are presently conducted on a regular base in the IDF, whether periodically or at previously-determined points along the training course. In some cases they are conducted in response to certain events, presumably affecting the unit's morale. The surveys are ^{administered} ~~conducted~~ by trained field-psychologists, who are normally graduate industrial or organizational psychologists, all officers in uniform, stationed in the combat units, at the Brigades' and Divisions' levels.

There are very strict rules and guidelines regarding the administrations of the morale surveys. The military psychologists are carefully trained to observe these rules and guidelines and are notoriously alert to stick to them as they conduct their surveys in their units. These guidelines can be summarized in the following list:

1. Surveys are always administered with the agreement and coordination of the C.O.
2. Results are never presented to H.Q. before presentation and discussion with the C.O.

3. Results are never presented to a higher level C.O. before previously presented and discussed with subordinate C.O.
4. Results are always presented in a comparative and relative manner.
5. Presentation of survey results are always followed by a discussion (C.O. with the psychologist) concerning the significance, ramifications and possible actions to be taken based upon the survey.

As one can see, there is much emphasis put on the commanding officer of the unit. He is the one who practically invites the survey, he is the first to be reported to about its results, and he is also responsible for carrying out the conclusions and actions to be taken, derived from the findings obtained by the survey.

In all Israel's recent wars, most notably in the Yom Kippur War and the recent War in Lebanon, these morale surveys provided a first-class source of information for both CO's and Headquarters. It is hard to estimate how many and what type of decisions have been made as a result of these surveys, but it is unquestionable that field commanders in the IDF are highly concerned with the changes in their units' levels of morale, and hence are very vigilant to the latest figures in their units' morale surveys.

The Research

The morale surveys may also provide the military student with the excellent opportunity to explore the nature of the "morale" concept, its inner structure and components. While different morale surveys at different times and among different units reveal different levels of morale, the inter-relationship structure between the various variables

remain, however, relatively stable across many surveys. The findings presented and discussed in the following paragraphs are based on one of these surveys, which has been analyzed by a senior researcher from the Department of Behavioral Sciences in the IDF. The researcher, Ya'akov Ezrahi ⁸ used the data obtained from standard morale questionnaires which had been administered to more than 1200 soldiers stationed in the Golan Heights, all serving in active combat units, during the middle days of May, 1981, when all the IDF forces in the Golan Heights were on the alert, preparing for a contingent operation against the PLO's continuous terrorist actions launched from Lebanon. The analysis of the findings of that large-scale survey yielded a correlation matrix which delineates the inter-relationships between various morale-related variables (*FIGURE 2*).

Personal morale (as assessed by individuals responses to the item: "How is your morale level today?" - on a 5-point scale) correlated positively ($r=.55$) with perceived company morale ("What is the morale level in your Company?"). Figure 2 includes the main variables which correlated significantly with these two items.

The results of this study are in accordance with previous similar studies done on Israeli units. In all those studies the same main factors emerged as comprising the soldier's level of morale:

1. unit cohesiveness,
2. confidence in commanders,
3. confidence in weapons and in oneself as a soldier, and
4. perceived legitimacy of war (or military operation).

UNIT COHESIVENESS

The strength of unit cohesiveness has been shown, time and again, as being a key factor in soldiers' level of morale and combat efficiency (e.g. 4,¹² 8, 9, 10, 11). Furthermore, it has been shown to play an unequivocal role in the onset and extend of psychiatric reactions during combat (see ^{Engelham, Manning¹³} ~~WPA~~ for a recent review). One anecdotal observation during the Yom Kippur (1973) War demonstrates this point dramatically. Since the 1973 war caught the Israelis by surprise, some of the IDF reserve armore units were sent expeditiously to the front lines before even forming their normal combat teams. Hence, many tank crews found themselves fighting the battle without even knowing each other's names....When psychiatric casualties figures were subsequently compared, they were profoundly higher among such crews than among "organic" crews, fighting under identical circumstances.

At the other end of the combat theatre, the phenomenon of combat heroism and its relationship to unit cohesiveness had been demonstrated ¹⁴. It has been shown that more acts of heroism had been committed among cohesive and "intimate" units than among units with a lower level of cohesiveness. ^{Thus, even though} ~~in~~ in terms of multiple correlation the unit cohesiveness contributes about 17% of the variance in the perceived morale level of that unit, it is my personal belief that in practice the sense of group-cohesiveness in time of war, is a primary and powerful source of personal and group morale, a source that its impact cannot be statistically measured.

CONFIDENCE IN COMMANDERS

The unique impact of this variable on the Israeli soldiers' combat readiness and their unit morale has been demonstrated in Ezrahi's data as well as in another recent Israeli report ¹⁵. As shown above (see Fig 2), both individual level of morale and the perceived unit's morale are significantly correlated with the degree of confidence in the unit's C.O. ($r=.24$ and $.27$, respectively). However, even an higher correlation is found between self and unit's levels of morale and the perceived relationships with the commander ($r=.32$ and $.47$, respectively). Furthermore, it has been shown ⁽¹⁵⁾ that the level of confidence in C.O. reaches even higher levels following active fighting periods. Finally, Kalay has convincingly demonstrated that ^{the} soldiers' trust in ^{their} commanders is dependened on the commander's professional capability, on his credibility as a source of information and on the amount of care and attention that he pays to his men. While all these findings apply to various levels of unit commanders, they seem to refer primarily to the Company's C.O. level.

In the IDF, then, - perhaps more apparently so than in other armies - commanders have special weight in comprising their soldier's morale. It may be the unique characteristics of the Israeli army officers - all coming from the ranks rather than being graduates of military colleges, being selected on previous demonstration of excellent leadership, and most important of all, basing their leadership primarily on personal example and leading from the front (the famous Israeli "Follow me" diction) - which make trust and confidence in the Israeli C.O. so crucial for its troops.

While some reports on American officers (e.g. 16) show amazing facts about fragging and disobedience on the battlefield, the Israeli case reveals, for example, that in the Yom Kippur War and again in the recent Lebanon War, the number of officers killed in action, while leading their men, was three times as high as their numbers among the troops. Similar figures were found regarding acts of heroism, among officers, in battle 14.

CONFIDENCE IN WEAPONS AND IN ONESELF AS A SOLDIER

Our data, accumulated over a period of about 30 years, with four or five wars in between, reveals a gradually increasing effect, over the years, of the soldier's degree of confidence in the weapon he uses - whether it be his personal weapon (i.e. rifle, machine gun) or his crew's (tank, artillery gun etc.) on his self confidence and, subsequently, on his morale level and sense of well-being as a combatant. Apparently, the augmentation of this factor is influenced by the increasing sophistication of the weapons system and other related modern auxiliaries of the war machine. It is, in any case, a significant component in troops' morale, as we have shown.

It is interesting to note (see Fig 2) that confidence in one's self and the unit's cohesiveness reveal the two highest correlations with the individual's level of morale. This finding is in a complete accordance with Ingraham & Manning's (1964) definition of "individual morale", and thus provides empirical support to the view that individual morale is characterized by "a sense of well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups" (4,p.6).

PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF WAR

It is a general rule, known in social psychology, that the perceived legitimacy of goals affects the group's efforts to achieve them. As long as the unit's goals are accepted as legitimate, the hardships and cost are minimized, the necessity is of prime importance and the readiness for sacrifice is unlimited. Yet, the legitimacy of any war is not always apparent and, furthermore, it is not always free of value judgments and moral considerations.

The Israeli soldiers who were abruptly mobilized and thrown into dreadful battles in the middle of Yom Kippur Day in 1973 had no doubts about the legitimacy of the war for which they were called up. Many of those soldiers who were fighting in the Golan Heights against the flood of Syrian tanks, needed only to look behind their shoulders in order to see their homes and remind themselves that they were fighting for their very survival. But what happens when circumstances are different, when the cause of war is not a sudden attack and the course of war carries you far away from your country's borders, as in the case of the war in Lebanon? What happens when "home" is not behind your shoulders and you apparently not defending it nor your family? The positive correlation (.28) between the individual's morale level and his perception regarding the legitimacy of the war suggest, indeed, that under such circumstances morale level is at stake.

THE RIDDLE

Yet, how can one explain the continuous high level of morale exhibited by the Israeli combat units in Lebanon in what developed into the longest war Israel has sustained since her War of

Independence? Recalling that the legitimacy of war is one of the bricks building the soldier's morale, how can one account for the fact that when that legitimacy became debatable and lacked national consensus - still the young soldiers in those combat units stationed in Lebanon showed a stable, fairly high levels of morale, as reflected in the IDF morale surveys conducted several months after the war had started?

The answer lies, again, in the better understanding of the components of the 'morale' concept. The legitimacy of war is, indeed, one of those components - yet it is not the only one and does not stand by itself. Unit cohesiveness, the leadership of the C.O. and confidence in one's arms and self - still provide enough guarantee for maintaining reasonable morale levels. But the interesting point here is that even the fourth component - perceived legitimacy of war - might still exist among troops, albeit debates in the "outer world". Rank soldiers do not occupy themselves constantly with the question of the "right and wrong" of their activities. They replace their own mechanism of examining the legitimacy and rightness of their goals with something (or someone) that represents those goals for them - the commander. The more they trust their commanders, the more this trust will include the goals set by the commanders. Hence, when the order comes from the commander to move, say, north, the soldiers will accept this order as a legitimate one only because they have full confidence in that commander.

One should not confuse this complete trust in commanders with total obedience. The issue here is not that of blind obedience (e.g. 17) for in a case where a commander does not have the full trust and confidence of his soldiers, they will, indeed, start to question his orders. In the case of blind obedience, the orders could come from someone very remote and abstract and still be followed

unquestioningly. In our case the doubts exist and the ambivalence and conflict are there, too. But as long as the direct commander is trusted, the doubts and conflicts are solvable.

The boundaries of military obedience (as opposed to the concept of commitment) has been discussed elsewhere. ⁽¹⁸⁾ To our present purpose here, suffice it to say that the soldier's performance is a net result of a combination of some inner factors: a sense of cohesion and belongingness, a level of trust in his peers, his leaders and himself. Out of that - not of some outer command - merges his readiness to fight, even to sacrifice his life.


In summary, the soldier's morale, as comprised by its components, is that secrete weapon by which even intolerable commands - morally debatable or physically hazardous - will be ultimately carried out to its incredible summits.

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
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**"30% OF THE SOLDIERS ARE
IN A BAD MOOD"**



CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MORALE AND OTHER VARIABLES
 MORAL SURVEY IN ARMY COMBAT UNITS, MAY 81 (Y. EZRAHI)



COL (Res'.) Reuven Gal, Ph.D.
Israeli Defense Forces

THE UNIT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SOLDIERS
AND JUNIOR LEADERS

THE UNIT QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR SOLDIERS AND JUNIOR LEADERS

The U.S. Army wants to know what soldiers think and how they feel about various subjects related to their service.

Please read each of the following questions and circle the number of the answer which best describes your thoughts and feelings.

This questionnaire is meant to be anonymous, so please do not include your name.

Thank you for your cooperation!

1. What is the level of morale in your company?

1. very high
2. high
3. moderate
4. a little low
5. low

2. How would you describe your company's readiness for combat?

1. very high
2. high
3. moderate
4. a little low
5. unprepared/not ready at all

3. How would you describe the condition of your unit's major weapon systems (Tanks, APC's etc)? What kind of shape are they in?

1. very good
2. good
3. not so good
4. poor/unworkable

4. How would you describe your friends' readiness to fight, if and when it is necessary?

1. very high
2. high
3. moderate
4. a little low
5. very low/not ready at all

5. In the event of combat - how would you describe your confidence in:

	very high	high	moderate	a little low	very low
a. your platoon leader	1	2	3	4	5
b. your Troop Commander	1	2	3	4	5
c. your crew/squad members	1	2	3	4	5
d. yourself	1	2	3	4	5

11. How would you rate your own skills and abilities as a soldier (using your weapons, operating and maintaining your equipment, etc.)?
1. very high
 2. high
 3. moderate
 4. a little low
 5. very low
12. In general, how would you rate yourself as a soldier?
1. excellent
 2. above average
 3. average
 4. below average
 5. poor
13. In general, how would you rate the Warsaw-Pact soldiers?
1. excellent
 2. above average
 3. average
 4. below average
 5. poor
14. How would you describe your unit togetherness in terms of the relationships among its members?
1. very high
 2. high
 3. moderate
 4. a little low
 5. very low
15. The relationships between the officers and the men in your unit are:
1. very good
 2. good
 3. not so good
 4. poor
16. To what extent do you worry about what might happen to you personally, if and when your unit goes into combat?
1. very often
 2. often
 3. occasionally
 4. hardly ever
 5. never

17. How often do the soldiers talk to each other about these worries?

1. very often
2. often
3. occasionally
4. hardly ever
5. never

18. How often do your leaders talk to their troops about possible war-time issues?

1. very often
2. often
3. occasionally
4. hardly ever
5. never

19. How much stress do you typically undergo because of separation from family/wife/girlfriend due to field training?

1. None
2. Minimal
3. Average
4. Moderate
5. Extreme

20. How much of a contribution do you feel you are making to the security of the United States by serving in the Army?

1. very great contribution
2. great contribution
3. some contribution
4. little contribution
5. very little contribution

21. What is the level of your personal morale?

1. very high
2. high
3. moderate
4. a little low
5. low

Background Information

Squadron _____

Troop _____

Platoon _____

MOS _____

Rank _____

Year in Service _____

Previous experience in combat yes no

How many months have you been in your present troop?

Education

8 yrs _____

9-11 _____

12 (High School Diploma) _____

GED _____

12-15 _____

College Degree _____

Marital Status

Single _____

Married _____

Divorced/Separated _____

Other (please specify) _____

If you are currently married, is this your first marriage?
yes _____ no _____

Number of children (if applicable) _____

Age _____ (age at last birthday)

COL (Res'.) Reuven Gal, Ph.D.
Israeli Defense Forces

MILITARY PROFESSION: BETWEEN COMMITMENT AND OBEDIENCE *

* Paper presented at the Symposium "Commitment in the Military Profession,"
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MILITARY PROFESSION: BETWEEN COMMITMENT AND OBEDIENCE

BY REUVEN GAL

The military profession is founded on the principle of commitment. In most cases belonging to the military is not merely a question of a place of work, a 'job', or an occupation. It is a way of life and, frequently, a lifetime commitment. By virtue of this commitment military professionals may conquer great heights, risk their men's lives and even sacrifice their own. The motivating power of this commitment can be immense.

However, the case I would like to present here is one in which commitment to the military profession is in conflict with another powerful force. I refer to the conflict between one's military obligation and one's commitment to his own conscience, that is, to the conflict between obedience and commitment.

The dictionary defines obedience as "the act or practice of dutiful or submissive compliance". On the other hand, commitment is defined as "the act of pledging oneself to a position on an issue or a question."

The differences between these two concepts are real. They stem from the fact that the two pertain to two different arenas. While obedience is the main pillar on which the whole superstructure of discipline rests, commitment is a cornerstone in the wall of moral behavior and conscience.

It is obviously unnecessary to explain and justify the need for discipline within the military organization. 'Discipline beyond all' is a basic rule in every army. But let us examine the nature of military discipline: it is based on fear and punishment; it is enhanced by threat and sanctions; and it is instilled through endless drills and orders. Robert Burton, in his famous "Anatomy of Melancholy", wrote: "The fear of some divine and supreme powers keeps men in obedience". While it is much more earthly powers that keep men-in-uniform in daily obedience, it is, nevertheless, fear and external power that generate military discipline and its obedient behavior.

True, this description should not be taken as an absolutely negative characterization of discipline and obedience in army life. "Wouldst thou approve thy constancy, approve first thy obedience" (John Milton, Paradise Lost). Obedience is a pre-condition not only for constancy and integrity, but for good performance, efficiency and mission completion as well. Without obedience, the whole military structure would collapse.

However, obedience is a double-edged sword, especially when it becomes blind. Milgram's experiments (1965 a, b) on blind obedience have clearly demonstrated that it can be so powerful as to block and prevent all signs of doubt or hesitancy. Indeed, acting in obedience to a perceived legitimized authority, people can lose all sense of responsibility for their most destructive acts, conceiving of themselves as the instrument of this authority rather than as independent agents.

Thus, in the name of obedience, some of the most inhuman acts have been carried out, far beyond the bounds of one's own conscience; sometimes, beyond and far from one's own commitment.

Let us now examine the nature of commitment. Within the military context, the commitment of a soldier and an officer is comprised of personal belief, self-conviction and decisiveness. With regard to officers and commanders in particular, commitment also includes a sense of responsibility - to one's men, one's unit, one's task. However, these are all internal sources, normally based on one's own conscience and values. And this is where both the strength and the weakness of commitment lie: unlike the case of obedience, where orders come from one single source, it is the intricate interplay of morals, values and conscience that makes commitment so powerful, yet so fragile and painstaking to maintain.

"Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all", says Hamlet in the famous play by Shakespeare, referring to this scrupulous attribute of conscience. Evidently, commitment does not make cowards of us all, but it certainly leaves an open door for doubts and hesitations.

Let me try to draw a comparison between obedience and commitment. While I am referring to both here in their military context, their attributes are applicable to other areas of life as well.

Obedience

Commitment

A sense of duty that originates from outside.

A sense of duty that originates from within.

Based on a single-source order, given by an indisputable authority.

Based on a compounded network of personal beliefs, self-convictions and inner decisions.

Generated by sanctions and punishments, and further motivated by the fear of the possible consequences of disobedience.

Generated by recognition of a need and by the power of related values and norms; further motivated by the sense of justified goals.

Blocks or minimizes any doubts and questions.

Allows for doubts and facilitates re-examination.

In a word, it is quite apparent that obedience and commitment are certainly not synonyms, however, they do represent the two primary bases of the military profession.

Let me now present a case which well serves to exemplify our subject. It is that of Colonel Eli Geva, an armoured-brigade commander in the Israeli Army, who was released from service in

the middle of the recent war in Lebanon after objecting to leading his men into Beirut, in the vanguard of the force that was given the task in contingency plans of taking the city.

In a subsequent newspaper interview, COL Geva explained his act as follows: "I asked to be relieved of my position as a brigade commander at a specific point which was related to a specific mission...I did not resign...Nobody gave me any order to stay or to resign.... Had I received an order to continue my command I would have obeyed it...as long as it did not demand of me to kill or harm innocent women and children...but I don't believe anybody would have ordered me to do such a thing...that is, I would have carried out any order, including attacking the city of Beirut - and then I would have asked to resign from the Army." Regarding his motives, COL Geva said, "I thought that my responsibility to my men made my primary duty doing anything I could in order to try and prevent the decision to enter Beirut. My second reason was that moving into Beirut would have forced us to use massive firepower in order to secure our men's lives. Doing so would have caused vast destruction and loss of life. In my opinion this was morally unjustified." (Ma'ariv, 26 Sep 82, interview with Y. Erez.).

Though COL Geva offered to stay in his unit and participate in the continuing battles as an ordinary tank-driver, his request was denied and he was ultimately released from the IDF, thus bearing the cost of his decision by bringing to an end a very promising military career.

As could be expected, Geva's behavior led to a wide range of reactions. The rarity of similar cases in the history of the Israeli Army* made Geva's demonstrative action both controversial and unique. Among critics of his decision, there were some who blamed him for shirking his obligations as an officer and as a commander to his men. Others considered his act as clear insubordination and regarded his denial of any intent to disobey order as untenable, since a request "to be relieved of command" at such a high rank is equivalent to a soldier's refusing to fight.

But is it not also part of an officer's obligation to protest a decision which he is convinced is immoral and opposed to all his values and beliefs? Is it not his duty to his men to do all he can to safeguard their lives? Is it appropriate to talk about obedience - or disobedience in this case - when it comes to the act of leading one's men into combat?

COL Geva's case is a tragic example of a clash between the multiple sources of one's commitment: A conflict between the commitment to one's superiors and the commitment to one's subordinates, between the commitment to the military and the government in whose name it acts and the commitment to one's own conscience.

*There have been only two other known cases, both occurring during Israel's War of Independence (1948), in which commanders refused to order their troops to carry out what they considered to be poorly-planned and hazardous operations.

But there is yet another aspect of Eli Geva's action: One of the motives for his demonstrative act was the need to protest against plans and decisions made by the General Staff concerning a possible entry into Beirut, that were in his opinion unjustified and immoral.

COL Geva is not the first to uphold an officer's right to protest. Richard Gabriel (1982) and his colleague (Gabriel & Savage, 1978) have, among many other authors, stated clearly the need for channels of protest within the military that will accord with both democratic principles and the nature of army life. These channels may include resignation, a request to be relieved of one's position, an appeal to a superior commander, and refusal to obey an order. While resignation is an extreme act of protest that should be resorted to only in extreme cases, it is a legitimate option of an officer or a soldier serving in a democratic military system. In "Crisis in Command", Gabriel and Savage stress even further that "resignation can be accompanied by a public declaration of the reasons, thus exposing the policy in question to public scrutiny and debate. Such a course of action is perfectly consistent with democratic values and in no way challenges civilian control of the military" (p. 108).

Regarding the special case of high-rank officers in the army, Gabriel and Savage point that "resignation is almost always a powerful tool when used by a general officer. Indeed, it is the most effective means of protest that a general officer can employ. Since he is likely to be closer to the policy-making level than his subordinates, his resignation can be expected to

have the greater impact on policy. At the same time, he is identified in the public mind as a powerful figure whose resignation would have a great impact" (p. 108).

Thus, a resignation from the military, or a request to be relieved of a command position, can be consistent with the officer's code of ethics, moral judgement and values; it can be an integral consequence of his commitment to his profession.


In other words, if discipline and obedience are one side of the military coin, demonstrative protest may be the other. Military discipline is based on trust and on the soldier's confidence that the decisions made by his superiors (and which he is obliged to carry out) serve proper goals, are reached via appropriate processes that stem from a legitimate authority, and are in accordance with a common value-system that the soldier identifies with. As long as these criteria exist, discipline and obedience are unquestionable; every soldier and officer is bound to obey orders that derive from such well-rooted sources. However, as soon as one of the above criteria becomes dubious, confidence fails and questions arise: Is this a legitimate order? Does it serve a proper goal? Has it been given by a legitimate authority, and has it been reached through a legitimate decision-making process? Is it consistent with my own values and moral code?

In such situations, if the individual's behavior is guided by obedience, he will, as shown by Stanley Milgram's experiment, carry out the order given to him in spite of his doubts. Obedience, as was noted earlier, blocks or minimizes doubts and

questions. But if the soldier's reactions are motivated by a commitment to the service that is based on personal conviction and moral judgement, doubts may develop to the point of protest against an order, or reluctance to carry it out. Such was the background of COL Geva's decision.

Let me conclude with two final remarks. First, I would like to suggest several postulates concerning the inter-relationship of obedience and commitment as the two bases of military professionalism:

- a. The higher the officer is in rank, the more he should be expected to be motivated by commitment rather than by obedience.
- b. The more a military system is ideologically oriented (as opposed to occupational and bureaucratically), the more likely it is that commitment will predominate.
- c. The stronger the consensus regarding the goals of a military organization, the stronger will be the commitment of its members. As consensus declines, so will the level of commitment, and obedience will play a larger role.
- d. As members of a military organization become less committed to its goals, discipline and obedience become more necessary, and they may become substitutes for commitment, to the point where the requirements of discipline will contravene those of conscience.



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1. Gabriel, R.A. To See
Westport, CT, 1982.
2. Gabriel, R.A. and Savage
Wang, New York, 1978
3. Milgram, S. Some conditi
authority. Human Re
4. Milgram, S. Liberating
Personality and Soci

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ARMY SATISFACTION INVENTORY (ASI)

Card
 Column
 (1-4) Booklet #
 (5) 2

ARMY SATISFACTION INVENTORY (ASI)

Below is a list of incomplete statements organized under topical headings. Complete each statement by selecting one and only one Dissatisfaction/Satisfaction rating for each statement.

A rating of "1" indicates you are completely dissatisfied with. A rating of "5" indicates you are completely satisfied with. A rating of "2", "3", or "4" falls between these two extremes.

The numerical ratings you assign are interpreted as representing the direction and strength of your feelings.

Please circle your responses.

	Completely DISSATISFIED with	Mostly DISSATISFIED with	About NEUTRAL/UNDECIDED	Mostly SATISFIED with	Completely SATISFIED with	
	1	2	3	4	5	
<u>GENERAL</u>						
1. An						
6	1	2	3	4	5	the idea of having an all-volunteer Army.
7	1	2	3	4	5	this Post's progress in improving leadership, training, professionalism.
8	1	2	3	4	5	this Post's progress in improving living conditions for its members.
9	1	2	3	4	5	the public image of the Army.
10	1	2	3	4	5	Army recruiter practices and information.
<u>MY PRESENT JOB</u>						
11	1	2	3	4	5	the interestingness of my present job.
12	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of respect paid my work.
13	1	2	3	4	5	how much I am relied upon by others.
14	1	2	3	4	5	the extent to which what I do actually counts.

	Completely DISSATISFIED with	Mostly DISSATISFIED with	About NEUTRAL/UNDECIDED	Mostly SATISFIED with	Completely SATISFIED with	
15	1	2	3	4	5	the frequency with which I do work I am trained for.
16	1	2	3	4	5	the quality of training/supervision I receive
17	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of "make work" assignments I am given.
18	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of time I spend on extra details.
19	1	2	3	4	5	my duty hours.
20	1	2	3	4	5	my tour of duty so far here.
<u>LEADERSHIP CONDITIONS</u>						
I am						
21	1	2	3	4	5	the leadership and efficiency in my present unit.
22	1	2	3	4	5	the state of discipline in my present unit.
23	1	2	3	4	5	the management and efficiency in my present duty section.
24	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of concern shown by my leader for my personal welfare.
25	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of mutual trust and respect in my duty situation.
26	1	2	3	4	5	the extent to which I am kept informed.
27	1	2	3	4	5	the extent to which I am required to "hurry up and wait."
<u>MY PRESENT LIVING QUARTERS</u>						
I am						
28	1	2	3	4	5	the overall pleasantness and comfort of.
29	1	2	3	4	5	the maintenance and state of repair of.
30	1	2	3	4	5	the amount of space I have in.
31	1	2	3	4	5	the degree of privacy I have in.

Card
Column

	Completely DISSATISFIED with	Mostly DISSATISFIED with	About NEUTRAL/UNDECIDED	Mostly SATISFIED with	Completely SATISFIED with	
32.	1	2	3	4	5	the furniture and furnishings in.
33.	1	2	3	4	5	the freedom I have to decorate.
34.	1	2	3	4	5	the freedom I have to entertain guests in.
35.	1	2	3	4	5	the Army chow I am served.
<u>POST ENVIRONMENT</u>						
I am						
36.	1	2	3	4	5	the social and recreational opportunities on this Post.
37.	1	2	3	4	5	the club I belong to (Officers, NCO, Soldiers').
38.	1	2	3	4	5	the Post commissary.
39.	1	2	3	4	5	the Post Exchange (PX).
40.	1	2	3	4	5	on-Post transportation resources.
41.	1	2	3	4	5	transportation resources to and from Post.
42.	1	2	3	4	5	the security precautions on Post.
43.	1	2	3	4	5	the military discipline on this Post.
44.	1	2	3	4	5	race relationships on this Post.
45.	1	2	3	4	5	the local schools for children.
<u>MEDICAL CARE ON THIS POST</u>						
I am						
46.	1	2	3	4	5	the overall quality of Post medical care.
47.	1	2	3	4	5	the length of waiting periods to receive care.
48.	1	2	3	4	5	the responsiveness of the medical personnel.
49.	1	2	3	4	5	the continuity of the care given.
50.	1	2	3	4	5	the physical facilities.
51.	1	2	3	4	5	the CHAMPUS program.

	Completely DISSATISFIED with	Mostly DISSATISFIED with	About NEUTRAL/UNDECIDED	Mostly SATISFIED with	Completely SATISFIED with	
<u>DENTAL CARE ON THIS POST</u>						
I am						
52	1	2	3	4	5	the overall quality of Post dental care (for myself).
53	1	2	3	4	5	the extent of dental services available to dependents.
54	1	2	3	4	5	the length of waiting periods to receive dental care.
<u>CAREER ASPECTS</u>						
I am						
55	1	2	3	4	5	the fairness of Army pay.
56	1	2	3	4	5	the opportunities for advancement/promotion.
57	1	2	3	4	5	tour stabilization opportunities.
58	1	2	3	4	5	the job security one has in the Army.
59	1	2	3	4	5	the opportunities for professional achievement and fulfillment.
60	1	2	3	4	5	the standard-of-living one has in the Army.
61	1	2	3	4	5	leave/sine-off policies.
62	1	2	3	4	5	the Army's retirement benefits.
63	1	2	3	4	5	family life in the Army.
64	1	2	3	4	5	the opportunity one has to acquire civilian-related skills in the Army.
65	1	2	3	4	5	the Army as a career for me.

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COMMAND CLIMATE SURVEY

Card Column
(1-4) Booklet #
(5) C

COMMAND CLIMATE SURVEY

Please indicate your answer to the following questions about your unit (Company or equivalent) by putting an X in the appropriate column (yes or No). Check Yes if you think the real answer should be "Mostly."

	(1) <u>YES</u>	(2) <u>NO</u>
6. Are the policies in your unit fair?	—	—
7. Does your boss tell you when you've done a good job?	—	—
8. Does your boss listen to your explanation when some thing goes wrong?	—	—
9. Do you have confidence in your leaders?	—	—
10. Do you have confidence in your equipment?	—	—
11. Are you satisfied with teamwork in your team or section?	—	—
12. Would you prefer to deploy to war with this unit (instead of some other one)?	—	—
13. Is the information you get through channels timely, accurate, and complete?	—	—
14. Does the information you get, or decisions you receive, include the purpose, the reason, the "why" of the decision?	—	—
15. Do you think you are getting enough realistic training?	—	—
16. Can you tell your boss, "Hey, that's dumb so let's don't do it?"	—	—
17. Do you get to influence the training schedule?	—	—

18. Are you allowed to do your job the way you think it should be done? _____

19-33 What's the best thing you like about your unit?

ANSWER HERE:

34-48 What do you dislike most about your unit?

ANSWER HERE:

49-63 What should the chain of command start doing that it is not doing now?

64-78 What should the chain of command stop doing that it is doing now?

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING ONLY IF YOU ARE MARRIED:

(1) (2)
YES NO

79. Do you often feel torn between job and family? _____

80. Do you and your spouse ever get into arguments over the Army, or your present job? _____

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COMPANY PERCEPTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE



FREDERICK J. MANNING

and

LARRY H. INGRAHAM

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE VALUE OF UNIT COHESION IN PEACETIME

recognized the overwhelming importance of interpersonal relationships in sustaining soldiers in battle. Historian S.L.A. Marshall (1966) said it best however, in writing of his observations in World War II:

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade.

Later on, he answers his own question of what induces a man to face death bravely:

...largely the same things which induce him to face life bravely---friendship, loyalty to responsibility, and the knowledge that he is a repository of the faith, and confidence of others.

The importance of unit cohesion in time of peace, it seems to us, is much less well accepted. Indeed, one could argue, with Marshall, that:

It is from the acquiring of the habit of working with the group and of feeling responsible to the group that his (the soldier's) thoughts are apt to turn ultimately to the welfare of the group when tactical disintegration occurs in battle.

One could argue with DuPicq, that while esprit-de-corps may improve with experience in war, wars are becoming shorter and shorter, demanding therefore that we create esprit in advance. However, it has been our experience that these arguments are often ineffective with commanders. Their posture may be summarized by the answer we received on one occasion: "The enemy will take care of our cohesion building. Right now, my job is training, not making the troops feel good." The project we will describe below was our attempt to find an answer to the basic question implicit in that response: How does the presence or

absence of unit cohesion affect the peacetime performance of basic individual and unit skills?

Our investigation is of course not the first in this area. There exists an extensive literature devoted to the relationship between interpersonal attraction and productivity. Results, however, in studies of the peacetime military, athletic teams, and industries have all proved equivocal. Goodacre (1951) found a high positive correlation between sociometric measures of cohesiveness and the problem-solving scores of combat units engaged in field exercises. Hemphill and Sechrest (1952) studied bomber crews in combat over Korea. Sociometric scores of crew cohesiveness were positively correlated with bombing accuracy scores. French (1951) on the other hand, was unable to show a significant relationship between his sociometric index of cohesiveness within military recruit companies and a variety of measures of performance, and Palmer and Myers (1968), observing radar crews of forty anti-aircraft batteries for a period of three months, found sociometric measures of group cohesiveness negatively related to productivity.

Results are no less diverse in the area of team athletic competition. Klein and Christiansen (1969), VanderVelden (1971), and Wydmeyer and Martens (1978), for example, all found highly cohesive basketball teams were more successful than less cohesive teams. Fiedler (1954) and Grace (1954), however, found a negative relationship between cohesion and performance, and Melnick and Chemers (1974) found that cohesiveness had neither a positive nor negative relationship to team success in basketball.

Stogdill's (1972) review of the experimental and civilian work force literature produced the same diversity of results: twelve studies showed a positive relationship between productivity and cohesiveness, eleven showed a negative relationship, and eleven showed no relationship whatever. In the analysis of these results, Stogdill (1972), points out that cohesiveness and productivity tend to be positively related under conditions of high group motivation and negatively related under conditions of low motivation. An even more elementary explanation, however, is the wide variation in the measurement, indeed even the definition, of cohesiveness. Cartwright (1968) has pointed out three rather different uses of the term: (a) attraction to the group, including resistance to leaving it; (b) the motivation of members to participate in group activities; and (c) coordination of the efforts of members. Although he felt that sociologists and social psychologists had more or less come to a de facto agreement limiting their use to the first of these three (cf. Lott and Lott, 1965), Zander's (1979) view was that "...in the absence of a reliable method for measuring cohesiveness in a natural setting, or a reliable procedure for creating it in the laboratory, one cannot be sure to what phenomena investigators are attending when they examine its origins or effects." Military writers, at any rate, tend to use a working definition which includes group motivation or direction as well as group attractiveness. The Chief-of-Staff of the US Army thus defines unit cohesion as follows: the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and

commitment to each other, the unit and mission accomplishment despite combat or mission stress (ARCOST Action Team, 1980; see also Hauser, 1979). This definition, which incorporates the added concept of group drive, implies that the group member's identification with leaders of his unit and his group often results in commitment to the norms of the formal organization which these leaders represent. It also emphasizes the critical role of the small unit leader, who is in fact a member of at least two groups simultaneously. The "link-pin" concept of Likert (1961) is helpful in this regard. For Likert leaders occupy positions in a hierarchy between levels; they are simultaneously members of their small face-to-face work groups and members of the next higher managerial echelon. It is thus possible for cohesion to be transmitted and distributed throughout a sizeable collection of groups that are not coextensive in their memberships but are linked to one another by members who occupy positions in more than one group. We generally speak of this larger collective as having esprit-de-corps or esprit when this process is successful. In any case, we began our inquiry into the value of cohesion in peace time with a clear realization that it would need a measure of cohesion that included not only attraction to peers, but also identification with leaders and/or organizational goals. Our survey of the literature, and that of Stogdill (1972), made us confident that if we could devise such a measure the importance of unit cohesion to peacetime military performance would become apparent to commanders.

MEASUREMENT OF COHESION

Conversations, interviews, and test runs with soldiers and experienced leaders, as well as close inspection of the literature cited above led to a battery of questions which were put to a sample of each of the 20 battalions visited by the 7th U.S. Corps Inspector General (IG) in the course of a 9 month period in late 1979 to early 1980. A total of 37 people in each battalion were questioned by IG team members: the battalion personnel officer, the Company Commander of HDQTRS and Alpha Companies; the First Sergeants of Charlie and Service Companies; platoon leaders from 1st platoon Bravo Company, 2nd platoon Charlie Company, and a scout platoon from Service Company; Platoon sergeants were quizzed from the communications platoon of HDQTRS Company, 3rd platoon Alpha Company, and 4th platoon Bravo Company; Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Companies each contributed two squad leaders, and HDQTR and Service Companies one each. Fifteen junior enlisted soldiers were selected at random from the unit manning roster, as well as 3 soldiers below the rank of E-4 who had arrived only within the prior month. The sets of questions were of course tailored to fit the position of the person within the unit, and tapped both subjective feeling ("how do you like being in this unit?") and objective information ("who do you spend time with after duty hours?"). The junior enlisted men were questioned about their squad, squad leaders about their squads and their platoons. The platoon Sergeant is questioned about his platoon and the company, and so on up the line so that although we ultimately derive a battalion score, this is merely a

compilation of the attachment the surveyed members feel to their immediate group (including the leaders). The left most column of Table 1A is a list of the questions asked the junior enlisted soldiers. The central three columns (headed by plus, 0, and minus) are sample high-cohesion, low-cohesion, and zero-cohesion answers. The inspection team member asking the questions compared the answers received to the samples and simply circled the sample answer most similar to that given by the subject. We then awarded one point for each plus answer and subtracted a point for each minus answer. The individual's score was then simply the algebraic sum, and the battalion score the sum total accumulated across all ranks, positions, and questions. The three columns on the far right of Table 1A are in fact the percentage of subjects giving high, low and zero cohesion answers to these questions. These data are based on the answers of 300 junior enlisted soldiers in 20 battalions. Table 1B is a similar display of the questions put to company commanders.

A question that arises immediately in the development of any new measuring instrument, of course, is that of reliability. In the present case, a skeptic might ask if we were actually learning something about the battalions involved or about the IG team members asking the questions. In fact, that doubt has been almost entirely resolved by the 35 interviews that were scored independently and simultaneously by two team members. The correlation between the two sets of scores so derived is .98, so whatever the questions may be measuring, they almost certainly involve differences among battalions rather than differences among our questioners.

The question of validity, however, is somewhat more difficult to answer. In the words of more than a few of the battalion commanders whose units scored on the low side, "Are we really measuring unit cohesion?" The question itself, of course, assumes that there is some standard out there against which we can hold our new measuring instrument to assess its adequacy, much like the standard yard, foot and inch measures at the Greenwich Observatory. In fact, if such a standard exists at all, it is in the minds of people like the crusty old Infantry colonel who was the Inspector General for the Corps. Our only goal was to make a handy instrument so one doesn't need 30 years' experience to tell whether a unit has a reasonable level of cohesion. Viewed in this way, the measurement appears to have a fairly high degree of validity. There were only two instances out of 20 battalions where the Inspector General saw unit cohesion as markedly different than our scores indicated. In one case, he felt they were too high, and in another case he felt they were too low. Further evidence for "face" validity came from the scores of the two armored cavalry squadrons we assessed. These two units, the closest we have to elite troops in US Army, Europe, gathered 82 and 79 percent of all possible points on our cohesion measure. The rest of the units tested scored between 65 and 74 percent.

Another approach to the topic of validity forsakes the search for an outside standard altogether, and simply asks whether the measure helps organize our experience at all. Does it show any orderly relationships to other available data? If

so, are they the relationships one would expect if the measure really measured cohesion? The data in Tables Two through Six provide an affirmative answer to both of these questions.

A varimax factor analysis conducted on the average scores of the 8 subgroups (personnel officer, C.O., First Sergeant, etc.) of each battalion, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, yielded a primary factor most strongly represented by the scores of junior enlisted soldiers, followed closely by those of the commanding officer and first sergeant. Two further factors, strongly dominated by the scores of the personnel officers (S-1) and "newbies" respectively, accounted for the remainder of the variance. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, the data in Tables 2 through 6 are limited to the scores of the junior enlisted. Each of these tables involves dividing the total enlisted sample into sub-samples based on type of battalion, type of job, months on the job, rank, or race, and then noting what percentage of the scores in each of these subgroups fell into the low third, the middle third and the high third of all junior enlisted scores. Simply put, the important number in each of these tables is 33: if there are no differences among the sub-samples, then all of the entries in the table should read 33. In Table 2, however, we see that only 23% of junior enlisted soldiers in the armor battalions we investigated had scores which placed them among the low one-third of all junior enlisted. Thirty-two percent scored in the middle third, and 45% scored in the high one-third. Further inspection of the column labelled "HIGH THIRD" reveals that Armor and

Cavalry, both units organized around small groups of soldiers in a fighting vehicle, show disproportionately high cohesion scores. If we look at Table 3, which shows as its sub-sample career management fields (type of job), we see that 46% of Armor crewmen score among the high one-third of enlisted soldiers. Tables 4 through 6 also show reasonable results for a purported measure of cohesion. Scores increase with rank, and with time on the job, and, as we might expect, minorities tend to identify less with their battalion than Caucasians. We could perhaps continue this analysis somewhat further, but it is clear that the findings are at least consistent with the hypothesis that we're measuring "the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other and the unit". We will now turn to the subject of whether our measures have anything to do with mission accomplishment.


RELATIONS BETWEEN SURVEY SCORES AND TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF
BATTALION PERFORMANCE.

Table 7 shows the intercorrelations among nine measures of battalion performance. A glossary of acronyms is included at the rear of the paper, so we will not go into great detail at the moment on this table. We started out with a much larger list --- 23, in fact --- which constituted just about all the quantifiable information we could obtain on the units. Many of them, however, were closely related to one of these nine or, in a couple of instances, showed the same score for nearly all battalions. These nine are not very closely related, and our combat arms

brethren assure us that taken as a set, they provide a pretty fair picture of battalion functioning. Figure 1 contrasts the performance of the 5 battalions with the highest cohesion scores with the 5 lowest scoring, and Table 8 shows the correlation of cohesion scores with the various measures of performance across all 20 battalions. The bottom line of the table shows the rank-order correlations between the battalion cohesion scores (i.e., summing over all 37 interviews in each of the 20 battalions) and each of the nine performance measures. The lines above this one show the statistically significant correlations between these measures and various subsamples of the battalion. Ignoring the far right hand column for the moment, the table shows very strong relations between cohesion scores and the results of the annual general inspection (AGI), with physical fitness testing (PT), operational readiness testing (ORT), and with the number of battalion members arrested in the previous 12 months (CRIME). Considerably less impressive relations existed between unit cohesion scores and the percentage of battalion members passing the IG-administered skill qualification tests (SQT), the battalion's reenlistment (REUP6), disciplinary (UCMJ6), and administrative discharge (AD6) rates. No relationship whatever was seen in the case of yearly battalion level tactical testing (ARTEP). We were initially quite disappointed that all our cohesion measures did not correlate strongly with all our performance measures, and spent considerable time and effort evaluating hypotheses explaining this particular spectrum of findings. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and section or

squad leaders show very low correlations with battalion performance. Why this should be so is not clear. The simplest explanation is that the questions asked of these groups were simply not good ways of measuring the extent to which these men felt themselves a part of a cohesive unit. It is of course possible that the questions are fine measures, but that some unique characteristics of these groups or their positions (e.g., first level supervisors, former junior enlisted, etc) make their cohesion scores unrelated to unit performance. We cannot presently determine which of these alternatives is correct, and would thus opt for the simpler.

On the performance side, we finally recalled conversation with commanders in which they talked about juggling priorities, even selective disobedience, in the face of too little time for too many tasks. Indeed, if everyone picked his priorities slightly differently, we would be doomed to exactly the kind of results we see in the table. Under these circumstances perhaps the most useful description of our results would be that performance is a function of both knowledge (itself a function of such things as training time, instructor ability and diligence and training aids as well as native ability) and motivation (a very direct function of unit cohesion and esprit as well as traditional creature comforts): $\text{Performance} = f(\text{knowledge} \times \text{motivation})$. Factors like the battalion's priorities, the level of technical skill required for a given task, and available resources will determine which specific aspects of a given battalion's performance are affected most strongly by level of unit cohesion.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

The right hand column of Table 8 might be seen as a test of this notion of cohesion as a non-specific "multiplier". It shows the correlation of cohesion scores and the average ranking of the battalion on the nine performance measures in the table. As expected, the correlation of battalion cohesion with this measure of overall performance is quite high (.81). Scores of the junior enlisted soldiers (.72) and the company commanders (.68) also showed exceptionally high correlations. It seems likely then that unit cohesion, "bonding together of unit members... to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment," is indeed not only a "force multiplier" in combat, but a powerful "training multiplier" in time of peace.

Some might argue (and have) that this discovery by no means implies that esprit or cohesion causes high performance, but that in fact it is more likely to be other way around --- that high performance produces high esprit. There is certainly nothing in our data that would allow us to choose between these two positions (if indeed we must choose rather than accept the seemingly obvious middle ground of a reciprocal interaction). Our Army is just initiating a substantial number of changes aimed at drastically increasing unit cohesion, including introduction of a regimental system of some sort and unit rotations to overseas assignments. Perhaps we will soon know the answer to the question of primacy (since no one appears likely to argue that recruits are arriving with more skills and abilities these days). In the meantime, however, we can ask where the high scoring units in the present study step away from the pack. Even

more precisely, which questions on our survey differentiated the five most cohesive units from the five least cohesive units? Nine of the junior enlisted questions so qualified, but the best of these were:

- (1) How often, aside from meetings, does the CO talk with you personally?
- (2) Is your squad (section) leader ever included in after-duty activities?
- (3) If we went to war tomorrow, would you feel confident going with this unit, or would you rather go with another?
- (4) How often, aside from meetings, does your platoon leader talk with you personally?
- (5) Who would you go to first if you had a personal problem, like being in debt?

Question number three, on confidence in going to war, was intended as a broad sort of summary question, and it does not provide much help in creating cohesion, however well it may measure it. The other four questions, however, seem to us to have profound implications for leadership.

"Solidarity and confidence cannot be improvised. They are born only of mutual acquaintanceship ... pride exists only among people who know each other well". This advice of DuPicq (1946) is apparently nowhere more applicable than in the relations of leader to led. Not only does the group member's commitment to the norms of the formal organization depend upon identification with the leaders, in the "link-pin" fashion described above (George, 1971), but persons who are made to feel like valued members of a group will feel far more attraction to the group than those who do not have much social worth. We would argue

from this that building cohesion requires interaction beyond the work setting, where rank and duties so clearly delimit "worth." Unit athletic teams provide excellent examples of settings where a private might out perform superiors, might even teach them a thing or two, and in the process, come to be known by them as other than first rank, fourth file in the heavy weapons platoon.

Which activities are not so important as who participates in how many different settings. Company leaders usually acknowledge the necessity of "command presence" in the barracks after duty hours, but all too often find they have nothing to say once they get there. They find their only shared experiences are the formal interactions of the workday. Hence, their presence after work is often resented. The more people, the more varied the settings, and the more time the group maintains stable membership, the more the members have in common and the higher the resultant cohesion. S.L.A. Marshall (1966) provides a succinct and appropriate closing which is consistent with this view:

The good company has no place for an officer who would rather be right than be loved, for the time will quickly come when he walks alone, and in battle no man may succeed in solitude.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AD6	Number of "Administrative Discharges" (i.e., not medical or punitive, but prior to scheduled termination of the term of enlistment) in the previous six months.
AGI	Annual General Inspection. The week-long check of unit administration and maintenance performed by the inspector general and his team. The actual scores used were the percentages of sub-areas passed, weighted by the team by importance of sub-areas.
ARTEP	Army Testing and Evaluation Program, a standardized, unit level, graded field exercise testing the unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. Scores are % of missions passed.
CO	Commanding Officer.
CRIME	The number of apprehensions, by local military police, of battalion members, for all crimes, during the previous 12 months.
EM	Enlisted Member. Soldiers in the lowest four pay grades.
1SG/FSG	First Sergeant, the highest ranking non-commissioned officer in the company.
ORT	Operational Readiness Test, a full scale "alert", in which the battalion is required to deploy to its wartime position with all equipment. A standard NATO rating system provides the scores (4 = best, 16 is worst).
PFC	Private First Class.
PLD	Platoon Leader, generally a second lieutenant.
PSG	Platoon Sergeant, generally a Sergeant First Class (E-7).
PT	Physical Training. Scores used is % of unit members passing the standard physical fitness test administered during the week-long AGI.
PVT	Private. Either of the two lowest pay grades.

PEUP6 Reenlistments by battalion members in the previous six months, as a % of the battalion's assigned quota.

SLD Squad or Section Leader, generally a Sergeant (E-5) or Staff Sergeant (E-6), in charge of 5 to 15 men, depending on the type of unit.

SP4 Specialist Fourth Class, a soldier in pay grade E-4, in a position demanding technical but not supervisory skills.

SGT Skill Qualification Test, a standardized test of individual job skills. All members of one company were tested during the AGI, on map reading, disassembling and reassembling the M-16 rifle, first aid for leg wound, and use of the protective mask. The battalion's score was the % passing.

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice. The law governing military members. Score for battalion was number of non-judicial and court-imposed punishments in the previous six months.

TABLE 1A: QUESTIONS ASKED OF 15 RANDOMLY SELECTED JUNIOR ENLISTED SOLDIERS IN EACH OF 20 BATTALIONS; "MODEL" HIGH-COHESION (+) NEUTRAL (0), AND LOW-COHESION (-) ANSWERS WHICH SERVED AS STANDARDS FOR THE SCORERS; AND THE PERCENTAGE OF ACTUAL ANSWERS FALLING IN EACH OF THESE THREE CATEGORIES.

	MODEL ANSWERS		PERCENT	
	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)
1. How do you like being in this unit.	Like it	Hate it	26	61
2. How do you like the guys in your squad?	Tight	Hate them	31	67
3. Who do you spend time with after duty hours, besides wife or girlfriend?	Same squad	Other	32	39
4. Is there much mixing of races after duty, or do the blacks tend to hang with blacks, whites with whites, and so on?	Mixing	Blacks with blacks, etc.	41	19
5. Is your squad leader ever included in after duty activities?	Yes	No	29	20
6. Do you like the work you're doing?	Yes, it's what I came in for	No, but or Yes, but	69	21
7. Who would you go to first if you had a personal problem, like being in debt?	Someone in the same Plt	Other	74	14
8. Is there anyone in your squad you might lend money in an emergency?	Yes	No	91	3
9. Do the officers in the Co seem to know their stuff?	Yes	No	63	30
10. How often, aside from meetings, does your Plt Sgt talk with you personally?	Often (weekly)	Never or hardly ever	62	16
11. How often, aside from meetings, does your Plt leader talk with you personally?	Often (weekly)	Never or hardly ever	43	22
12. How often, aside from meetings, does the CO talk with you personally?	Twice a month or more	Never or hardly ever	39	13
13. Do the NCOs in the Co seem to know their stuff?	Yes	No	53	42
14. If we went to war tomorrow, would you feel confident going with this unit or would you rather go with another?	Wouldn't change	Other unit	69	9

TABLE 18: QUESTIONS ASKED OF 2 COMPANY COMMANDERS IN EACH OF 20 BATTALIONS; "MODEL" HIGH COHESION (+), NEUTRAL (0), AND LOW-COHESION ANSWERS WHICH SERVED AS STANDARDS FOR THE SCORERS; AND THE PERCENTAGE OF ACTUAL ANSWERS FALLING IN EACH OF THESE THREE CATEGORIES.

QUESTIONS	MODEL ANSWERS			PERCENT
	(+)	(0)	(-)	
1. How do you like being in this unit?	Like it	It's alright	Hate it	71 26 2
2. How do you like the soldiers in your Company?	They're tops	They're okay	They're not much	86 14 0
3. How do you like the NCOs in your Company?	They're tops	They're okay	They're not much	55 38 7
4. How often do you see people from the Company after duty hours; for anything, business or pleasure?	At least weekly	At least monthly	Less than monthly	100 0 0
5. Who do you spend time with after duty hours, besides your family?	People from own Co or Bn		Other	79 0 21
6. What do you do to reward outstanding performance by your Co?	Time off, or other reward	Praise alone	Not applicable or not possible	98 2 0
7. Is there anyone in the company you might lend money in an emergency?	Yes	It all depends, or it's against Regs	No way!	67 17 17
8. Are there any "duds" in the Co?	No	Yes, but....	Yes	10 19 71
9. Do the officers in this Bn seem to know their stuff?	Yes	Yes, but or No, but....	No	76 19 5
10. How often do you talk with the Bn Cdr outside of taking care of business?	Often (weekly)	Once in a while (twice a month or so)	Hardly ever	79 14 7
11. Do the NCOs in this company seem to know their stuff?	Yes	Yes, but or No, but....	No	64 29 7
12. Who would you go to first if you had a personal problem, like being in debt?	Someone in my same Bn		Other	71 0 29
13. What is the Company's peacetime mission?	Reasonable approximation	Fakes it	Doesn't know or joke answer	93 7 0
14. What actions have you taken to produce or maintain Company unity and team feelings?	Anything promoting group activity on or off duty	Nothing except having sections or squads room together	Nothing (no matter what the reason)	93 7 0
15. If we went to war tomorrow, would you feel confident going with this unit, or would you rather go with another?	Wouldn't change	Don't know	Other unit	95 0 5
16. Can you name all you squad leaders from memory?	Omits no one	Omits one	Omits more than one	76 14 10
17. How many Co parties or social events have taken place in the last three months?	Three or more	two	One or less	21 29 50
18. Do you have teams in community sports leagues?	Yes, all or most	Some	Only a couple, or I don't know	91 7 2
19. Has any part of the Co been involved in any community projects in the last 3 months (e.g., a test, BVA, on or off duty)?	Yes	No	He'll no, or unfortunately yes	86 34 0

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIOR ENLISTED SOLDIERS' COHESION SCORES BY TYPE OF UNIT

PERCENT SCORING AMONG

TYPE BN	PERCENT SCORING AMONG			N
	LOW THIRD	MIDDLE THIRD	HIGH THIRD	
ARMOR	23	32	45	44
ARTILLERY	34	36	30	114
ARMORED CAV	18	32	50	44
ENGINEER	42	33	25	57
INFANTRY	40	33	27	<u>15</u>
				275

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIOR ENLISTED SOLDIERS' COHESION SCORES BY TYPE OF JOB

PERCENT SCORING AMONG

CAREER MGT FIELD	LOW THIRD	MIDDLE THIRD	HIGH THIRD	N
COMMUNICATION	48	33	19	21
INFANTRYMEN	45	46	9	11
COMBAT ENGINEERING	43	35	22	40
FA (CANNON)	26	36	39	70
ARMOR	23	31	46	44
MECHANICAL MAINT	33	27	40	33
ADMINISTRATION	20	50	30	10
SUPPLY & SERVICE	30	30	40	17
				296

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIOR ENLISTED SOLDIERS' COHESION SCORES BY RANK (PAY GRADE)

RANK	PERCENT SCORING AMONG			N
	LOW THIRD	MIDDLE THIRD	HIGH THIRD	
PVT (E-1)	32	45	23	22
PVT (E-2)	43	35	22	46
PFC (E-3)	35	35	30	72
SP4 (E-4)	29	32	39	132
				<u>272</u>

TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIOR ENLISTED COHESION SCORES BY TIME ON PRESENT JOB

PERCENT SCORING AMONG

MONTHS IN PRESENT JOB	PERCENT SCORING AMONG			N
	LOW THIRD	MIDDLE THIRD OF ALL JR ENLISTED MEN	HIGH THIRD	
1-6	41	24	31	75
7-12	30	40	30	80
13-24	26	32	42	62
25 +	30	30	40	<u>30</u> 247

TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIOR ENLISTED SOLDIERS' COHESION SCORES BY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP

PERCENT SCORING AMONG

RACE/ ETHNIC GROUP	LOW THIRD	MIDDLE THIRD	HIGH THIRD	N
CAUCASIAN	28	32	40	151
BLACK	35	36	29	102
HISPANIC	46	36	18	<u>22</u>
				275

TABLE 7: INTERCORRELATIONS OF NINE TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF BATTALION EFFECTIVENESS*

SPEARMAN R

	AGI	SQT	PT	ORT	AD	UCMJ	REUP	CRIME
ARTEP	-.11	-.23	.09	-.14	.06	-.14	.32	-.15
AGI		.17	.39	-.76	.10	.08	.07	.44
SQT			.32	-.20	.00	.26	-.05	.08
PT				-.48	.12	-.30	.35	-.43
ORT					-.26	.20	.00	.59
AD						.19	.24	.01
UCMJ							.28	.38
REUP								-.10

* SEE GLOSSARY FOR ABBREVIATIONS

TABLE 8: SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COHESION AND MEASURES OF BATTALION PERFORMANCE (N=20 BATTALIONS)*

COHESION SCORES	ARTEP	AGI	SQT	PT	ORT	UCMJ6	AD6	RBUP6	CRIME	AVE RANK
Co Commander	-	.47	-	.64	.42	-	-	-	-.47	.68
1st Sergeant	-	.39	-	.48	.50	-.50	-	-	-.68	.49
Platoon Ldrs.	-	-	-	.52	-	-	-	-	-	.34
Platoon Sgts.	-	.57	-	-	-	-	.57	-	-	.11
Squad Ldrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.08
Junior Enlisted	--	.38	-	.64	-	-	-	.38	-.47	.72
ALL	.10	.58	.30	.75	.52	-.29	.22	.32	-.69	.81









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r .01 = .52



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
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







5 HIGHEST COHESION BNS
vs 5 LOWEST



 5 HIGHEST COHESION BNS
 vs 5 LOWEST



5 HIGHEST COHESION BNS
 vs 5 LOWEST



 5 HIGHEST COHESION BNS
 vs 5 LOWEST

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

FIRST DCSPER IPR ON THE NEW MANNING
SYSTEM (NMS) FIELD EVALUATION



NEW MANNING SYSTEM

FIRST DCSPER IPR ON THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM (NMS) FIELD EVALUATION

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

14 MARCH 1983


BRIEFING FOR LTG THURMAN

NEW MANNING SYSTEM


TOPICS TO BE COVERED

- IMPORTANCE OF COHESION/COMMITMENT TO BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS
- SNAPSHOT OF NMS UNITS TODAY
- ARI ACTIONS - PAST/FUTURE

NEW MANNING SYSTEM



NEW MANNING SYSTEM




BATTLEFIELD
EFFECTIVENESS

COHESION

SOURCE:

- FM 100 - 5
- SHILS/JANOWITZ
- MARLOWE
- LITTLE
- HOIBERG
- WESBROOK


NEW MANNING SYSTEM



COHESION

COMMITMENT TO: PEERS
LEADERS
MISSION

NEW MANNING SYSTEM



COMPONENTS OF MILITARY UNIT COHESION

SOURCE:

SHILS & JANOVITZ

ETZIONI

HOLMES

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

THEORETICAL BASIS FOR EVALUATION

COHESION AND COMMITMENT -- DEVELOPMENT

BY THREE STEPS, THROUGH LEADERSHIP

- BONDING SOLDIERS TOGETHER
- BONDING SOLDIERS AND THEIR LEADERS TOGETHER
- DEVELOPING CONSENSUS ON VALUES AND OBJECTIVES (E.G., MISSION)

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

DATA COLLECTION POINTS

PROJECT COHORT	NMS EVAL	APPROX. MONTH	UNL EVENT
	X	0	RECEPTION STATION
X	X	2	MID-OSUT (END BT)
X	X	4	END-OSUT/ARRIVAL AT FORSCOM
X	X	8	END COLLECTIVE TRAINING
	X	12	MID-SUSTAINMENT
	X	17	END SUSTAINMENT/PRE-DEPLOYMENT
	X	19	POST-DEPLOYMENT
	X	25	MID-OCONUS TOUR
	X	35	END OF CYCLE

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

METHODOLOGY

- ATTITUDINAL QUESTIONNAIRES (END OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING)
- CONTRAST UNITS: 18 COHORT VS 18 "SIMILAR" BASELINE (N=1282) (N=877)
- COHORT AND BASELINE UNITS COMPARED VIA "T-TESTS"

- SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES

PROBABILITIES:

*=.05

**=.01

***=.001

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

UNIT PERFORMANCE

	<u>COHORT</u>	<u>BASELINE</u>
INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE		
● I'M WELL TRAINED FOR MY MOS/DUTY POSITION	3.85 ***	3.66
GROUP PERFORMANCE		
● THIS UNIT WOULD DO WELL IN COMBAT	3.35 ***	3.13
● SMS ARE MOTIVATED/WORK AS A TEAM	3.37 *	3.29
● SMS TRY HARD TO DO A GOOD JOB/ BE GOOD SOLDIERS	3.55 *	3.49

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

COMMITMENT TO PEERS

	COHORT	BASELINE
• TEAM, SQUAD, PLATOON	3.55	3.50
• TEAM MEMBERS, SQUAD MEMBERS	3.44	3.39

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

COMMITMENT TO LEADERS

TEAM, SQUAD, PLATOON LEVEL

	<u>COHORT</u>	<u>BASELINE</u>
● CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADER		
●● SUPERVISOR WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN/HELP	3.45	3.40
●● TEAM/SQUAD LEADER STANDARDS/CONCERN FOR SMS	3.36	3.28
●● QUALITY OF NCOs	3.36***	3.17
● TROOP COMMITMENT TO LEADER		
●● SQUAD/TEAM LEADER	3.28	3.30
●● PLATOON LEADER/PLATOON SERGEANT	3.43***	3.29

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

COMMITMENT TO LEADERS

COMPANY, BATTALION LEVEL

	<u>COHORT</u>	<u>BASELINE</u>
● CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADER		
●● SETS HIGH PERFORMANCE STANDARDS	3.82	3.75
●● EXHIBITS CONCERN FOR SMS	3.20	3.26
● TROOP COMMITMENT TO LEADER		
●● COMPANY, BATTALION LEADERS	3.21	3.28
● TROOP COMMITMENT TO GROUP		
●● COMPANY, BATTALION	3.06	3.11

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

SOLDIER MORALE/SATISFACTION

	<u>COHORT</u>	<u>BASELINE</u>
● MORALE		
●● SOLDIER MORALE/ADJUSTMENT	3.01 ***	3.21
●● SATISFACTION WITH ARMY/JOB	2.88 ***	3.08
● SATISFACTION WITH UNIT		
●● SATISFACTION WITH/LOYALTY TO UNIT	2.42 ***	2.56
●● OPINION ABOUT THE "COHORT" CONCEPT	2.38 ***	3.21

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

ARI ACTIONS

PAST

- IDENTIFIED COHESION TECHNOLOGIES
- TRACKED COHORT UNITS
- PARTICIPATED IN FIELD EVALUATION
- DEVELOPED COHESION QUESTIONNAIRE

FUTURE

- BUILD AND TEST NEW COHESION TECHNOLOGIES
- CONTINUE TO TRACK COHORT COMPANIES
- CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
- ISOLATE LESSONS LEARNED BY CONTRASTING
III AND LO PERFORMING UNITS

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

- SPECIAL LEADER TRAINING PACKAGES
- "CHALLENGES" TRAINING (I.E., OUTWARD BOUND)
- USE OF CEREMONIES, SONGS, SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION, TRADITIONS
- ESTABLISHING AND REINFORCING EXCELLENCE OF UNIT PERFORMANCE (PROLIFERATION OF THE 82ND FEELING)

EXAMPLES OF EXISTING ARMY COHESION TECHNOLOGIES

- HIGH PERFORMANCE ONE
- COMMANDERS WORKBOOK ON COHESION TECH
- FT. ORD WORKSHOP FOR NMS UNITS
- COHESION PROGRAM OF CO. B, 6/32 AR, FT. CARSON

COHESION TECHNOLOGIES

HIGH PERFORMANCE ONE: A LEADERSHIP WORKSHOP FOR COMBAT LEADERS

- "A COOPERATIVE DESIGN OF OEC&S AND HTTB"
- THREE DAY WORKSHOP FOR BN LEADERS (01-05) RUN BY OESOs
- CONTENT:
 - PERSONAL POWER (E.G., SELF RELIANCE, LEADERSHIP, TIME MANAGEMENT)
 - INFLUENCE SKILLS (E.G., COMMUNICATIONS, MOTIVATION, PERFORMANCE COUNSELING)
 - TEAMWORK (BUILDING COHESION)
 - ORGANIZATIONS AS SYSTEMS (E.G., SYSTEMS THEORY, MODELS, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE)
 - ACTION PLANNING (E.G., MANAGERIAL STRATEGY, PLANNING)
- STATUS:
 - TRIED IN TWO BNs AT HTTB WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS
 - REVISED VERSION BEING TESTED NOW
 - CAPABLE OF MODIFICATION FOR COMPANIES WITH LESS SKILLED FACILITATORS
- POC:
 - CAC: LTC BRYANT, AV 552-2127
 - OEC&S: LTC BERG, AV 929-7108

COHESION TECHNOLOGIES
COMMANDERS WORKBOOK ON COHESION TECH (DRAFT)

- A GUIDE BOOK TO ASSIST COMMANDERS IN ACHIEVING UNIT COHESION BY:
 - ORGANIZING THEIR OWN RESOURCES (UNIT COHESION TEAM)
 - SELECTING THE COMMITMENT BEHAVIOR THEY WISH TO REINFORCE
 - DELIVERING THE MESSAGE IN WHAT THE UNIT ALREADY DOES (E.G., JODY CADENCE, UNIT GREETING, SPIRIT SHOUTS, UNIT HISTORY)
 - MAKE CONSCIOUS USE OF COHESION BUILDING EXERCISES (E.G., BONDING CYCLE, "THE TEN-FOOT TALL EXPERIENCE," RITES OF PASSAGE)

- STATUS:
 - USED AT FT. LEWIS AS PART OF THE HTTP
 - RESULTS/EVALUATION, UNKNOWN

- POC:
 - CAC: LTC BRYANT, AV 552-2127
 - OEC&S: LTC BERG, AV 929-7108

COHESION TECHNOLOGIES
ET. ORD OF WORKSHOP FOR NMS UNITS

- TWO DAY WORKSHOP FOR COMPANY LEADERS (E5-03) LED BY OESOs
- CONTENT:
 - TIME MANAGEMENT/PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 - ROLE CLARIFICATION
 - SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP
 - CONFLICT RESOLUTION
 - SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT (STAGES/ CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNIT)
 - COHESION-BUILDING USING SHARED VALUES
 - IDENTIFICATION AND ELIMINATION OF BARRIERS TO COHESION (VIOLATION OF EXPECTATIONS/LACK OF ROLE CLARITY)
- GIVEN PRIOR TO RECEIVING COHORT PACKET, NO PLANNED FOLLOW-UP IS CONDUCTED
- STATUS:
 - CONDUCTED IN EACH OF THE 10 NMS UNITS AT ORD
 - DRAWN FROM EXISTING MATERIALS/MODIFIED FOR EACH UNIT
- POC: CPT CLARK, AV 929-6906

COHESION TECHNOLOGIES
COHESION PROGRAM OF CO. B, 6/32 AR, FT CARSON

● FEATURES

- CADRE TEAM BUILDING TRAINING BY OESOs PRIOR TO UNIT FILL
- AIT IN THE FORSCOM UNIT
- COLLECTIVE TRAINING LEADING TO PASSING COMPANY ARTEP
- INVOLVEMENT OF ALL BN MEMBERS IN STARTING/DEVELOPING Co. B (E.G. NCOs FROM SISTER COS. TAUGHT, BUT B Co. NCOs REINFORCED)
- CONSCIOUS USE OF "RITES OF PASSAGE" (E.G. BATTALION CEREMONY ISSUING TANKS ONLY WHEN THE UNIT SHOWED THEY COULD DRIVE AND MAINTAIN THEM, WHITE VS. OD T-SHIRTS)
- MORE RELIANCE ON NCO CORPS FOR LEADERSHIP
- EMPHASIS ON CREW, SECTION, AND SQUAD RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL AWARDS
- BN LEVEL WELCOME PROGRAM FOR NEW ARRIVALS
- HIGH LEADER ACCESSIBILITY TO SMS
- WELL DEFINED SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS
- SOLDIERS INITIATE DISCIPLINE--PEER PRESSURE TO WEAR UNIFORMS/KEEP HAIR CUT
- "CAN-DO" ATTITUDE AMONG SMS

● STATUS

- REPORTED IN ARMY (5/82), PP. 54-60
- MANY OF ITS FEATURES ARE STILL USED BY NMS UNITS AT FT. CARSON
- THE COMPANY HAS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

POC: MSG KING, AV 691-2026

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ARI RESEARCH IN THE NMS EVALUATION




NEW MANNING SYSTEM

ARI RESEARCH IN THE NMS EVALUATION

BRIEFING FOR:

MG FRENCH
COMMANDER, SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER

18 AUGUST 1983



NEW MANNING SYSTEM

TOPICS TO BE COVERED

- 0 NATURE/IMPORTANCE OF COHESION IN THE MILITARY
- 0 FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST-ARI SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NMS
- 0 STATUS OF PLANS FOR DEVELOPING:
 - COHESION TECHNOLOGY FOR NMS UNITS
 - ADDITIONAL REPORTS OUT OF THE NMS FIELD EVALUATION DATA BASE

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHLY COHESIVE GROUPS

HIGHLY COHESIVE GROUPS:

- EXERT GREATER INFLUENCE OVER THEIR MEMBERS
- ARE MORE EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING GOALS THEY SET FOR THEMSELVES
- HAVE HIGHER MEMBER SATISFACTION
- ENGAGE IN MORE SOCIAL INTERACTION
- ENGAGE IN MORE POSITIVE INTERACTIONS

THAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE LOWER LEVELS OF COHESION

SOURCE: SHAW (1971)



NEW MANNING SYSTEM

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH UNIT COHESION/EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBAT

BELIEF IN:

- ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY
- MILITARY POWER OF THE UNIT
- TECHNICAL ABILITIES OF THE UNIT
- ONE'S OWN COMBAT ABILITY/SKILL

SUPPORT (CARING) OF:

- FELLOW SOLDIERS
- OFFICERS
- NCOs

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN:

- FELLOW SOLDIERS
- OFFICER COMPETENCE/FAIRNESS
- NCO COMPETENCE/FAIRNESS

SOURCE: STOFFER, ET AL., 1949; MARLOW, 1979;
AND SARKESIAN, 1980

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CONSEQUENCES OF GROUP COHESION

COHESION CAN ENHANCE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS BY:


- ENABLING UNITS TO RESIST DISINTEGRATION
- REDUCING FREQUENCY OF BOTH PSYCHIATRIC AND "NON-COMBAT" CASUALTIES
- ACTING AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

ALTERNATIVELY, COHESION CAN DETRACT FROM COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS BY:

- PROVIDING SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR
 - "COMBAT REFUSALS"
 - ACTS OF DESERTION OR SURRENDER
 - "FRAGGING" OF LEADERS
 - DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

SOURCES: SHILS AND JANOWITZ, 1948; STOUFFER ET AL., 1949; LITTLE, 1969;
SAVAGE AND GABRIEL, 1976; FARIS, 1977; MARLOWE, 1979.

NEW MANNING SYSTEM



SOURCE:
SHILS & JANOWITZ
ETZIONI
HOLMES

COMPONENTS OF MILITARY UNIT COHESION

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

ELEMENTS/CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIT COHESIVENESS

HORIZONTAL BONDING

- DEMONSTRATED SUPPORT (CONCERN) AMONG FELLOW SOLDIERS
- TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN FELLOW SOLDIERS
- FEELINGS OF LOYALTY/COMMITMENT TO FELLOW SOLDIERS
- COMPETENCY OF FELLOW SOLDIERS

VERTICAL BONDING

- DEMONSTRATED SUPPORT (CONCERN) FROM NCOs AND OFFICERS
- TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN NCOs AND OFFICERS
- FEELINGS OF LOYALTY/COMMITMENT TO LEADERS

PERSONAL INTEGRATION

- BELIEF IN ARMY VALUES
- FEELINGS OF LOYALTY/COMMITMENT TO THE MISSION
- SOLDIER PRIDE
- ACCEPTANCE OF ARMY LIFE

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FIRST ARI SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

OBJECTIVES

- DESCRIBE HOW THE NMS IS WORKING
- IDENTIFY ACTIONS TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NMS

FOCUS IS UPON LEADERS AS A MEANS OF:

- SUBSTANTIATING FIRST TERM PERCEPTIONS (REPORTED IN EARLIER ARI BRIEFINGS)
- TRACING OUT LEADER ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS/SOLDIER SATISFACTION
- UNDERSTANDING HOW COHESION IS DEVELOPING AMONG LEADERS

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

FIRST ARI SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

TOPICS TO BE COVERED:

- PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERS AND FIRST TOUR SOLDIERS AT THE END OF CT
- CHANGES IN LEADER PERCEPTIONS FROM: END AIT TO THE END OF CT
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF COHESION AMONG COHORT LEADERS

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
METHODOLOGY:

- ATTITUDINAL QUESTIONNAIRES:
 - SEPARATE FOR LEADERS AND FIRST TERMERS
 - ADMINISTERED AT SEVEN POINTS IN TIME
 - ANALYZED AT END AIT AND END COLLECTIVE TRAINING
 - ANALYZED AS SINGLE ITEMS AND ITEM CLUSTERS
 - DISPLAYED AS AVERAGES RANGING FROM "1" (LOW) TO "5" (HIGH)
- SAMPLE DRAWN FROM FIRST 20 COHORT UNITS AND 20 BASELINE UNITS (SAME TYPE AND POST):
 - LEADERS:
 - TWO PERIODS: END AIT AND END COLLECTIVE TRAINING
 - NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS RANGE FROM 247 TO 429
 - FIRST TERMERS:
 - ONE PERIOD: END COLLECTIVE TRAINING
 - NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS RANGE FROM 877 TO 1287
- ANALYSIS:
 - COHORT AND BASELINE LEADERS COMPARED VIA ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
 - COHORT AND BASELINE FIRST TERMERS COMPARED VIA T-TESTS

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COMPARISON OF LEADERS AND FIRST TERMERS AT THE END OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING

RATINGS OF:	RESULTS	
	LEADERS	FIRST-TERMERS
• RATINGS OF:		
-- TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS	YES	YES
-- UNIT EFFECTIVENESS/COMBAT READINESS	YES	YES
• STATUS OF ENLISTED PEER BONDING	YES	YES
• SOLDIER SATISFACTION:		
-- LIKING FOR COHORT CONCEPT	NO	NO
-- DESIRE TO STAY IN CURRENT UNIT	NO	NO
-- RATING OF SOLDIER/UNIT MORALE	EVEN	NO



NEW MANNING SYSTEM

CHANGES IN LEADER PERCEPTIONS FROM END AIT TO END COLLECTIVE TRAINING

0 AT END AIT, COHORT LEADER RATINGS WERE HIGHER THAN BASELINE ON:

- EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
- HORIZONTAL BONDING AMONG ENLISTED PEERS
- UNIT MORALE

0 THESE THREE MEASURES ALL FELL BY END OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING:

- TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS AND ENLISTED BONDING WERE STILL HIGHER THAN BASELINE

- UNIT MORALE WAS NOW EVEN WITH BASELINE

0 LEADER DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CURRENT UNIT ALSO CHANGED:

- EVEN WITH BASELINE AT END AIT
- BELOW BASELINE AT END COLLECTIVE


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DEVELOPMENT OF LEADER COHESION FROM
END AIT TO END COLLECTIVE TRAINING:
COMPONENTS OF COHESION

- PERSONAL INTEGRATION
- VERTICAL BONDING
 - SENIOR¹ TO JUNIOR²
 - JUNIOR TO SENIOR
 - ALL TO UNIT
- HORIZONTAL
 - AMONG SENIOR
 - AMONG JUNIOR

¹ SENIOR LEADERS ARE PLT SGTs, PLT LDRs, 1st SGTs, AND CO CDRs.

² JUNIOR LEADERS ARE TM AND SQD LDRs.



NEW MANNING SYSTEM


DEVELOPMENT OF LEADER COHESION FROM END AIT TO END COLLECTIVE TRAINING

PERSONAL INTEGRATION

- DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COHORT AND BASELINE LEADERS WERE MINIMAL
- (BOTH COHORT AND BASELINE LEADER MORALE REMAINED HIGH)

VERTICAL BONDING

- SR LEADER JR LEADERS
SR COHORT LEADERS SEE THEIR JR LEADERS AS SHOWING MORE CONCERN/STRUCTURE THAN BASELINE
NO DIFFERENCE IN SR LEADERS LOYALTY AND COMMITMENT TO JR LEADERS
- JR LEADERS TO SR LEADERS
COHORT JR LEADERS SEE SR LEADERS AS SHOWING MORE STRUCTURE AT BOTH END AIT AND END COLLECTIVE TRAINING
COHORT JR LEADERS SEE SR LEADER CONCERN AS DROPPING END AIT/END COLLECTIVE BY END COLLECTIVE TRAINING, JR LEADER LOYALTY AND COMMITMENT TO SR LEADERS IN COHORT UNITS HAS DROPPED TO BASELINE
- ALL LEADERS: LOYALTY/COMMITMENT TO UNIT HIGHER FOR COHORT LEADERS



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HORIZONTAL BONDING

0 AMONG SENIOR LEADERS:

- NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COHORT AND BASELINE SR LDKS ON:
- PERCEIVED AMOUNT OF STRUCTURE PROVIDED
- CONCERN SHOWN TO SOLDIERS
- LOYALTY AND COMMITMENT TO THEIR PEERS


0 AMONG JUNIOR LEADERS:

- JR COHORT LEADERS RATE THEMSELVES HIGHER IN SHOWING CONCERN AND STRUCTURE
- COHESION AMONG JR LEADERS - HIGHER AT END AIT, NO DIFFERENCE AT END COLLECTIVE

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS


- COHORT UNITS ARE PERCEIVED AS MORE EFFECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING AND COMBAT READINESS.
- HORIZONTAL BONDING AMONG ENLISTED PEERS IS STRONGER IN COHORT UNITS THROUGH END COLLECTIVE TRAINING.
- OTHER COMPONENTS OF COHESION ARE NOT RELIABLY HIGHER FOR COHORT FIRST TERMERS.
- LEADERS' COHESIVENESS, DESIRE TO REMAIN IN UNIT, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD COHORT SUGGEST A FIX IS NEEDED.



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STATUS OF "COHESION TECHNOLOGY" FOR NMS UNITS

TASK	AGENCY	STATUS
1. LITERATURE REVIEW	ARI	COMPLETED
2. CONCEPT PAPERS	ARI	IN PROGRESS (DUE 9/83)
3. FIELD WORK	ARI/SSC	BEING PLANNED
4. REPORTS OF FIELD FINDINGS	ARI	BEING PLANNED
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS	ARI/SSC	EXISTING PROGRAMS
6. SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS	SSC	PARTIALLY ASSEMBLED
7. EVALUATION OF SOLUTIONS	SSC/ARI	
8. LONG TERM SOLUTIONS	SSC	



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STATUS OF ARI PORTION OF FIELD EVALUATION

TASKS	STATUS
0 DEVELOP QUESTIONNAIRES	COHORT QS IN PLACE "CORE" NMS QS IN PLACE REMAINING "NODES" BEING DEVELOPED
0 ASSEMBLE/MANAGE DATA BASE	
-- COHORT UNITS (#1-20) -- NMS UNITS (#21-44)	IN PLACE THRU CI, 7 BEYOND CI 18 IN OSUT, NONE BEYOND OSUT
0 INCREASE QUALITY CONTROL	UNDER NEGOTIATION
0 LINK ARI-TCATA DATA BASE	DESIRED, NOT ACCOMPLISHED
0 FIELD WORK TO IMPROVE QS	DESIRED, NOT ACCOMPLISHED

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

ASSESSMENT/DIAGNOSTIC PHASE

OBJECTIVES FOR DATA COLLECTION

- DIAGNOSE STATUS-QUO OF NMS UNITS
 - CAPABILITIES
 - PROBLEMS
- DETERMINE LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES/MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES/POLICIES WHICH FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY COHESIVENESS
- MEASURING UNIT COHESIVENESS

SOURCES

- COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
SEPTEMBER 27, 28
- FIELD WORK IN NMS UNITS
(LEADERS, FIRST TERMERS)
- NMS EVALUATION
- LITERATURE REVIEW
- COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
- STRUCTURED INTERVIEW/LESSONS
LEARNED
 - ADV. COURSE STUDENTS
 - NMS LEADERS, FIRST TERMERS
- LITERATURE REVIEW
- WORKSHOP ON COMBAT COHESION/STRESS
- CPT MURPHY, USMA
- NMS EVALUATION
- FIELD WORK IN NMS UNITS

Soldier Support Center
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

PLAN OF ACTION:
COHESION TECHNOLOGY FOR COHORT UNITS

Plan of Action: Cohesion Technology for Cohort Units.

1. Background and Purpose. While DCSPER of the Army, General Thurman made the observation that even though there has been a reduction of turbulence in Cohort units there has not been a concomitant increase in unit cohesiveness. He then tasked SSC and ARI to produce - or package - suitable "cohesion technologies" for application within Cohort units, with particular reference to "early on" training. The goal of these actions is to improve cohesion within these new Cohort units, and to provide their commanders with some means for sustaining it during the remainder of the cycle. The plan of action that follows describes the joint efforts of SSC-NCR and ARI to accomplish this tasking.

2. Objectives and Products. There will be two basic cohesion technologies, or products produced by this effort, and several possible by-products.

a. At the completion of the OSUT training cycle a "hand off" is made to the selected FORSCOM Cohort cadre. It is critical that the cadre selected be made aware of the cohesion objectives of the Cohort program and equipped with the skill and knowledge to enhance and maintain a high level of cohesion therein. DA Pam 350-2, Training, Developing, and Maintaining Unit Cohesion, will be the starting point for developing training modules for presentation to cadre during the "hand off" period at the OSUT installation. This material from the Pam will be augmented by lessons learned from a brief literature review, interviews with selected company leaders, and commanders associated with Cohort units.

b. To maintain and sustain the higher level of cohesion produced in the Cohort units, a COHORT Leaders Guide to Unit Cohesion will be produced. This guide also will start with the DA Pam, and will be extended with the addition of lessons learned and validated practices from field commanders.

c. In addition to the two main products there should be generated sufficient content and material to incorporate into programs of instruction for the service schools. Also a further product will be an evaluation of the Sportsmind cohesion technology at Ft Lewis in coordination with the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA). A further by-product will be an Army-wide coordinated definition of "cohesion," to be inserted into AR 310-25, The Army Dictionary.

3. Actions and time needed to produce products:

<u>Action Needed</u>	<u>Who</u>	<u>When</u>
a. A literature review of military cohesion to include: (1) cohesion in combat, (2) cohesion definition,	ARI	Sept 83

- (3) cohesion building technologies. The material and content to be used in developing the training module, The Leaders Guide, and the definition.
- | | | |
|---|-------------------|--------|
| b. Submit definition to the Personnel Management School for Army-wide staffing and eventual inclusion in Army Dictionary. | SSC | Oct 83 |
| c. Develop structured interview and obtain techniques and lessons learned from Adv. Course students (Ft Benning, Ft Sill, Ft Knox) C&GS, and SGM Academy. | ARI/SSC | Oct 83 |
| d. By using a structured Interview Form, collect data from Cohort commanders. (Green Tabbers conference) | SSC/ARI | Oct 83 |
| e. From Lit. review, and other sources, determine what can be incorporated into Leaders Guide. | SSC | Nov 83 |
| f. In process review. | SSC/ARI | Jan 84 |
| g. Develop Leaders Guide for implementation by NMSTF. | SSC/NMSTF | Jan 84 |
| h. Develop Training Module for Hand Off Training of Cohort cadres. | SSC/OEC&S & NMSTF | Apr 84 |
| i. Submit input to DTD for inclusion in Training Module for Service Schools. | SSC/ARI | May 84 |

J. Complete After Action Report and evaluation on Sportsmind application at Ft Hood and Ft Lewis. Results, if positive, to be included in revised Leaders Guide and Training Module.

SSC/ARI/ADEA

Jun 84

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

UNIT READINESS QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIT READINESS QUESTIONNAIRE
101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

To improve unit combat effectiveness, Division Mental Health requests your cooperation in answering the following questions. The questions relate to readiness and unit morale. It is very important that you answer these questions honestly as they apply to you. Confidentiality is assured. The data will be used only on a unit basis and will not reflect individual responses. PLEASE CIRCLE THE RESPONSE TO EACH QUESTION WHICH IS CLOSEST TO YOUR PRESENT FEELINGS ABOUT YOUR UNIT.

Please check your rank: E1 - E3 E4 - E5 E6 - up

1. How are your relations with other members of your unit?
 VERY GOOD GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
2. How are your relations with your chain of command?
 VERY GOOD GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
3. How are your relations with your commander?
 VERY GOOD GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
4. The methods of discipline used in my unit are:
 VERY FAIR FAIR O.K. NOT FAIR VERY POOR
5. How much does your commander set an example of leadership for you to follow?
 VERY GREAT GREAT O.K. LITTLE NOT AT ALL
6. Rate the ability of your NCO's to command.
 EXCELLENT VERY GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
7. Rate the ability of your officers to command.
 EXCELLENT VERY GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
8. How do you rate your equipment?
 EXCELLENT VERY GOOD O.K. BAD VERY BAD
9. How is the morale in your unit? (Do your friends feel good about the unit?)
 VERY HIGH HIGH O.K. LOW VERY LOW
10. How much pride do you have in yourself as a soldier?
 VERY MUCH MUCH O.K. LITTLE VERY LITTLE
11. How proud are you to be a member of your unit?
 VERY MUCH MUCH O.K. LITTLE VERY LITTLE

12. How willing is your chain of command to help with your personal problems?
 VERY MOSTLY SORT OF LITTLE NOT AT ALL
13. Do unit NCO's talk with troops about the soldier's feelings and ideas?
 REGULARLY MANY TIMES SOMETIMES FEW TIMES NOT AT ALL
14. Do unit officers talk with troops about the soldier's feelings and ideas?
 REGULARLY MANY TIMES SOMETIMES FEW TIMES NOT AT ALL
15. How ready is your unit to go to combat?
 VERY HIGH HIGH O.K. LOW VERY LOW
16. How capable are your officers to lead the unit in combat?
 VERY HIGH HIGH O.K. LOW VERY LOW
17. How secure do you feel going into combat with your NCO's?
 VERY MUCH MUCH SORT OF LITTLE VERY LITTLE
18. How secure do you feel going into combat with your officers?
 VERY MUCH MUCH SORT OF LITTLE VERY LITTLE
19. How secure do you feel going into combat with your squad?
 VERY MUCH MUCH SORT OF LITTLE VERY LITTLE
20. How willing are you to fight if the need exists?
 VERY MUCH MUCH SORT OF LITTLE VERY LITTLE
21. How willing to fight are your friends in the unit, if the need exists?
 VERY MUCH MUCH SORT OF LITTLE VERY LITTLE
22. In a combat situation, how many people in your unit would be more trouble than they are worth?
 NONE VERY FEW HALF MANY MOST
23. Overall, how do you think your unit would perform in a combat situation?
 EXCELLENT VERY GOOD O.K. NOT GOOD VERY POOR
24. What is the major problem in your unit?
25. What is the second major problem in the unit?
26. What is your most important personal problem?
27. What is your second major personal problem?
28. Write any comments about your unit you wish to make! You may use the rest of the page or additional paper to make any comments you wish, about anything.

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)


COMBAT STRESS SURVEY

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)

COMBAT PSYCHIATRY PROGRAM

The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Mental Health Section recognizes the following mission. First, to be ready for imminent combat, battle stress casualty management and prevention plans in place, highly practiced, and well known to the division. Second, to be ourselves prepared to mobilize. This requires an attitude of readiness, firm identification with our medical battalion and our division, a full-range of personal field survival skills, and families who can maintain stability in our absence. Third, to provide quality garrison mental health care with an emphasis on easy accessibility and high interaction with the command. Fourth, to develop ourselves and our subordinates through clinical supervision, in-service training, and personal effort. Fifth, to enjoy and take pride in our work.

Apparent in this mission statement is its radical departure from the "sitting in the clinic waiting on the patients" style of division mental health most widely practiced throughout our Army. Since the clinical setting is so familiar already, our iteration will not be discussed here. The topic of this communication is our work in the area of battle stress casualty prevention, the most critical and potentially beneficial plank in our platform. We call this our Combat Psychiatry Program.



BATTLE STRESS TRAINING: It is essential that combat leaders understand the nature and sources of battle stress and learn techniques of maintenance and management of their human resources in combat, that they recognize the normal battle reaction and distinguish it from battle stress casualty status, that they understand the principles of medical management of battle stress casualties and expect their early return to duty. We have developed a two-hour Battle Stress Training Module aimed at Officer Professionalism and NCO Professionalism Development Seminars. The same module, with minor modifications is used to train Chaplains, medical platoons, and medical clearing company personnel. This training has been provided to approximately 500 officers, 300 NCOs and 200 EM in the last twelve months. An outline of this module is at Inclosure 1.

COMBAT STRESS SURVEY: A quick and reliable method of measuring unit psychological readiness for combat would be an invaluable aid to the line commander. Much work along this line has been done by the Psychology Service of the Israeli Defense Force. A similar survey technique has been under development here over the past ten months. A preliminary version of such an instrument has been used in 15 company size units. Eight of these units are a part of an ongoing study of a Brigade Task Force which recently trained at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. This study is being conducted with assistance from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Combat Psychiatry Division. Continued development is planned. A copy of the current version of this survey instrument is at Inclosure 2.

THE COMBAT STRESS SURVEY

THE COMBAT STRESS SURVEY (CSS) IS A MEASURE OF UNIT PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS FOR COMBAT. THE SURVEY WAS DEVELOPED BY CPT (DR.) JOHN POWELL, FORMER PSYCHOLOGIST OF THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) MENTAL HEALTH TEAM, AND WAS LATER REFINED BY CPT LIZZIE DONALD, THE CURRENT 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION PSYCHOLOGIST. CPT POWELL MODELLED AFTER THE ISRAELIS IN HIS CONCEPTION OF THE CSS, AND COLLABORATED CLOSELY WITH THE OFFICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (OE) IN ITS CONSTRUCTION.

THAT A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN OE AND DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH (DMH) IS ESSENTIAL. DMH HAS DESIGNED A QUESTIONNAIRE WHICH SPECIFICALLY RELATES TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL READINESS OF A UNIT AT A DESIGNATED POINT IN TIME -- A READINESS WHICH MAY BE DIFFERENT WHEN ASSESSED AT A LATER TIME. WHEREAS DMH FOCUSES ON PROVIDING A HERE-AND-NOW OR "SNAPSHOT" ASSESSMENT OF UNITS' PREPAREDNESS FOR COMBAT, OE IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPRAISAL OF UNIT FUNCTIONING IN BOTH GARRISON AND COMBAT ENVIRONMENTS. OE ALSO OFFERS SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BATTALION COMMANDER ON WAYS TO IMPROVE OR POSSIBLY REMEDY IDENTIFIED PROBLEM AREAS. THUS, OE CAN SERVE AS AN EXCELLENT REFERRAL SOURCE FOR THOSE UNITS WHICH REQUIRE EVALUATION BEYOND THAT WHICH IS PROVIDED BY DMH.

THE CSS IS A 20-ITEM LIKERT-TYPE QUESTIONNAIRE IN WHICH THE SOLDIER RATES HIS UNIT ON A RESPONSE SCALE FROM 1 TO 5. A "1" RESPONSE INDICATES THAT THE SOLDIER STRONGLY DISAGREES WITH THE STATEMENT AND A "5" RESPONSE INDICATES STRONG AGREEMENT.

THE CSS IS DESIGNED TO TAP THREE ASPECTS OF UNIT COMBAT PREPAREDNESS: TRAINING, LEADERSHIP AND MORALE. THE TRAINING ITEMS RELATE TO INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER AND UNIT TRAINING, ABILITY TO USE

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS EFFECTIVELY, AND CARING FOR AND EVACUATING THE WOUNDED IN COMBAT. ON THE LEADERSHIP ITEMS THE SOLDIER RATES THE PERCEIVED ABILITIES OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS, COMPANY GRADE, AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS TO LEAD HIM IN A COMBAT SITUATION, AS WELL AS TO KEEP HIM INFORMED OF WHAT TO EXPECT WHILE IN THE FIELD.

THE MORALE ITEMS ASSESS THE PERCEIVED DEPENDABILITY AND COMPETENCE OF FELLOW SOLDIERS IN A COMBAT SITUATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE SOLDIERS' PERCEPTION OF CONCERN FROM LEADERS DEMONSTRATED BOTH IN GARRISON AND COMBAT ENVIRONMENTS IS MEASURED. THESE ITEMS ALSO MEASURE UNIT COHESIVENESS IN TERMS OF THE SOLDIER'S PRIDE IN HIS UNIT, WHETHER HIS UNIT VALUES HIS WORK, AND THE AMOUNT OF FREE TIME THAT IS SPENT WITH UNIT MEMBERS.

RESULTS OF THE COMBAT STRESS SURVEY

THE COMBAT STRESS SURVEY DATA ARE MACHINE SCORED AND COMPUTER ANALYZED. THE COMPUTER IS EQUIPPED TO REPORT UP TO TEN SETS OR GROUPS OF DATA PER RUN. THESE RESULTS ARE USUALLY GROUPED ACCORDING TO RANK, ETHNIC GROUP, AND SEX. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL ITEM. THE COMPUTER IS ALSO CAPABLE OF REPORTING COMBINED GROUP RESPONSES SUCH AS RACE X RANK, AS LONG AS THE COMPUTER LIMIT OF TEN GROUPS OF DATA PER RUN IS NOT EXCEEDED. SEVERAL RUNS PER SET OF UNIT DATA MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY DATA ANALYSES IF MORE THAN TEN GROUPS ARE NEEDED.

SPECIFIC GROUP DATA ARE THEN CONTRASTED AND COMPARED WITH ALL UNIT DATA FOR A SPECIFIC QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM. THOSE GROUPS WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED OR FALL BENEATH THE OVERALL UNIT MEAN FOR A PARTICULAR ITEM WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLORATION DURING THE COMMAND INTERVIEWS. THE COMPUTER RANK ORDERS EACH ITEM, THEREBY FACILITATING

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE TOP AND BOTTOM TEN ITEMS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION.

COMMAND INTERVIEWS

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND INTERVIEWS IS TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK TO UNIT COMMANDERS AND FIRST SERGEANTS REGARDING THEIR TROOPS' PERCEPTION OF UNIT TRAINING, MORALE AND LEADERSHIP. COMMAND IS ALSO OFFERED A COMPARISON OF THEIR UNIT'S PERFORMANCE WITH THAT OF THE ENTIRE BATTALION IN THE ABOVE THREE AREAS. SHOULD COMMAND INQUIRE ABOUT POSSIBLE WAYS TO IMPROVE ON PROBLEMICAL AREAS, THEY ARE REFERRED TO OE OR THE DIVISION MHT FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT, TRAINING OR CONSULTATION. THE UNIT COMMANDER/FIRST SERGEANT INTERVIEW GENERALLY LASTS ABOUT ONE HOUR. THIS DECISION RESTS SOLELY WITH THE BATTALION COMMANDER.

BATTALION COMMANDER'S BRIEFING

IN ADMINISTERING THE COMBAT STRESS SURVEY TO ENTIRE BATTALIONS AND CONDUCTING COMMAND INTERVIEWS, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE GATHERING OF ALL DATA CULMINATES IN THE BRIEFING OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER. HE IS THE CLIENT -- NOT THE UNIT COMMANDER OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.

THE BATTALION COMMANDER IS BRIEFED ACCORDING TO THE LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, AND MORALE PERCEIVED WITHIN HIS BATTALION OVERALL. HE IS NOT GIVEN A COMPANY-BY-COMPANY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS. THE REASON THAT THE BATTALION COMMANDER IS BRIEFED IS THAT HE ALONE POSSESSES CONTROL OF INITIATION OF ANY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OR POLICIES. ALTHOUGH THE TEAM ASSESSES THE BATTALION'S PREPAREDNESS FOR COMBAT STRESS, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT CHANGES WILL ENSUE.

CURRENT STATUS OF 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH TEAM COMBAT STRESS RESEARCH

COMBAT STRESS RESEARCH IS IN ITS BEGINNING STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AT 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH. CPTs POWELL AND DONALD HAVE ASSESSED A 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION MEDICAL BATTALION (APPROXIMATELY 200 TROOPS) AND AN ARMOR BATTALION (APPROXIMATELY 300 TROOPS), RESPECTIVELY. THE CSS HAD NOT BEEN COMPUTERIZED AT THAT TIME. RESPONSES WERE HAND-SCORED AND REPORTED IN TERMS OF AVERAGES, OR MEAN SCORES. THOUGH THIS WAS A RATHER CRUDE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE, THE CSS NEVERTHELESS WAS FOUND TO ADEQUATELY DISCRIMINATE UNITS AND TO IDENTIFY OBSTACLES WHICH INTERFERED WITH UNITS' READINESS TO COPE WITH THE STRESSES OF COMBAT. VARIABILITY ACROSS UNITS ADDS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE CSS. FURTHER EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENT.

A CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECT

IN OCTOBER THE TEN SUPPORT BATTALIONS THAT ARE ASSIGNED TO 1ST BRIGADE WILL PARTICIPATE IN A MASSIVE COMBAT-LIKE TRAINING EXERCISE TO BE HELD AT FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA. THE DIVISION TEAM, SPREAD-HEADED BY LTC LINTON HOLSENBECK, MC, AND CPT LIZZIE DONALD, MSC, WILL ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF A MAJOR COMBAT TRAINING EXERCISE ON UNITS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO COPE WITH COMBAT STRESS. MORE THAN 600 TROOPS IN ALL RANKS AND DIFFERENT BRANCHES WILL BE ASSESSED. THE COMPANIES SAMPLED INCLUDE: ARMOR, INFANTRY, CHEMICAL, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL AND HEADQUARTERS.

THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY IS A PRE- AND POST-TEST DESIGN. UNITS ARE ASSESSED WITHIN ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE TRAINING EXERCISE AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE EXERCISE. THE DIVISION TEAM WILL LOOK FOR DIFFERENCES ACROSS BRANCHES AND WILL COMPARE THE RESULTS OF INTACT

VS COMPOSITE COMPANIES. THIS RESEARCH PROJECT WILL BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE A SIMILAR ASSESSMENT OF 2D AND 3D BRIGADES WHEN THEY DEPLOY TO FORT IRWIN DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1984.

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DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH

COMBAT STRESS SURVEY
(CSS)

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE MEMBERS OF YOUR ORGANIZATION WORK TOGETHER. THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE WILL BE USED TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNIT/ORGANIZATION.

IF THE RESULTS ARE TO BE HELPFUL, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWER EACH QUESTION AS THOROUGHLY AND FRANKLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS NOT A TEST, THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS.

THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES WILL BE PROCESSED BY AUTOMATED EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL SUMMARIZE THE ANSWERS IN STATISTICAL FORM SO THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED. PLEASE DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE OR ANSWER SHEET.

COMBAT STRESS SURVEY

Section A

1. This background information is necessary to get a complete picture of your unit and may be used to sort responses into selected subgroups.
 2. Please answer all the questions unless you have extreme reluctance to answer a particular statement.
 3. Begin your responses with statement number 116 on your answer sheet.
(On side two - Green Side)
-

116. Have you taken this survey before in this unit?

1. No.
2. Yes.

117. Sex.

1. Male.
2. Female.

118. Education.

1. No High School Diploma.
2. High School Diploma or G.E.D.
3. College Work, less than a 4-year degree.
4. College Work, 4-year degree.
5. Graduate Degree.

119. How long have you been in the Army?

1. 6 months or less.
2. 7 to 18 months.
3. 19 months to 4 years.
4. 5 to 10 years.
5. Over 10 years.

120. How long have you been at this installation?

1. 6 months or less.
2. 7 to 12 months.
3. 13 to 18 months.
4. 19 months to 2 years.
5. More than 2 years.

121. How long have you been in this unit?

1. 6 months or less.
2. 7 to 12 months.
3. 13 to 18 months.
4. 19 months to 2 years.
5. More than 2 years.

US Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School

HUMAN DIMENSION
(Draft Field Manual)


RESPONSE SCALE

- (1) Strongly Disagree.
- (2) Somewhat Disagree.
- (3) Undecided.
- (4) Somewhat Agree.
- (5) Strongly Agree.

- 85. My individual training has been good in preparing me for combat.
- 86. My unit training has been good in preparing my unit to work together in combat.
- 87. I am confident in the abilities of the enlisted people (E-1 to E-4) in my unit to perform their duties in a combat situation.
- 88. I am confident in the abilities of the NCO's (E-5 and above) in my unit to effectively manage the people under them in a combat situation.
- 89. I am confident in the ability of the company grade officers (LT and CPT) in my unit to lead me in a combat situation.
- 90. I am confident in the ability of the field grade officers (MAJ and above) over me to lead me in a combat situation.
- 91. In a combat situation, I would feel I could completely trust and depend upon the people I work with.
- 92. In a combat situation, most people in my unit would be more trouble than they are worth.
- 93. In a combat situation, my equipment would function well.
- 94. I can use my weapons effectively in a combat situation.
- 95. When I am in the field my unit tells me what is going on and what to expect.
- 96. When I am in the field, my leaders insure that I am properly fed, warm, and rested whenever possible.
- 97. The NCO's over me have much concern for my well-being.
- 98. The officers over me have much concern for my well-being.
- 99. My unit has good training on caring for and evacuating our own wounded in combat.
- 100. I am proud of my unit.
- 101. My unit values what I do.
- 102. I choose to spend my free time with the people in my unit.
- 103. My family members are well prepared to take care of themselves if my unit should suddenly have to go into combat.
- 104. My chances are very good of staying alive if my unit went into combat against the Russians in Europe.

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BATTLEFIELD INTERVIEW

The purpose of this interview is to help us measure certain aspects of your unit's readiness for combat. We are interested in how this exercise is affecting your readiness. You will not be personally identified in any way. Your responses to the interview will not be reported individually to anyone. We are only interested in the overall collective opinions of your unit. If you have strong reservations about answering any particular question please say so. Obviously, your honest opinion is what we need and our work will be useless without it.

1. Since this exercise began, has your confidence in yourself as a soldier:
Increased? _____ Decreased? _____ Stayed the same? _____
2. How would you rate your own fighting ability?
3. Since this exercise began, has your confidence in your unit's fighting ability:
Increased? _____ Decreased? _____ Stayed the same? _____
4. How would you rate your unit's fighting ability now?
5. Since this exercise began, has your opinion of your company grade officers:
Increased? _____ Decreased? _____ Stayed the same? _____
6. How would you rate your company grade officers overall now?
7. Since this exercise began, has your opinion of your NCO's (E-5 and above):
Improved? _____ Gotten worse? _____ Stayed the same? _____
8. How would you rate your NCO's overall now?
9. Since this exercise began, how your opinion of the enlisted people (E-1 - E-4) in your unit:
Improved? _____ Gotten worse? _____ Stayed the same? _____
10. How would you rate the enlisted people overall now?
11. Since this exercise began, has your confidence in your weapons:
Increased? _____ Decreased? _____ Stayed the same? _____

16-5 Blank

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

UNIT STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE

11. Does your unit tell you what is going on and what to expect when you are in the field?

NEVER _____ ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. When you are in the field, do your leaders insure you are properly fed, warm and rested whenever possible?

NEVER _____ ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. How much concern do the NCOs over you have for your well-being?

VERY _____ VERY
LITTLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCH

14. How much concern do the officers over you have for your well-being?

VERY _____ VERY
LITTLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCH

15. How good is the training in your unit on caring for and evacuating your own wounded in combat?

VERY _____ VERY
POOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GOOD

16. Are you proud of your unit?

VERY _____ VERY
LITTLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCH

17. Does your unit value what you do?

VERY _____ VERY
LITTLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCH

18. In your free time do you choose to spend time with the people in your unit?

NEVER _____ ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19. How well prepared are your dependents to take care of themselves if your unit should suddenly have to go into combat?

VERY _____ VERY
POORLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 WELL

20. What would be your chance of staying alive if your unit went into combat against Russians in Europe?

VERY _____ VERY
POOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GOOD

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UNIT STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE

CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOUR HONEST OPINION.

1. How good has your individual training been in preparing you for combat?

VERY OK VERY
POOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GOOD

2. How good has your unit training been in preparing your unit to work together in combat?

VERY OK VERY
POOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GOOD

3. How confident are you in the abilities of the enlisted people (E-1=E-4s) in your unit to perform their duties in a combat situation?

NOT VERY
CONFIDENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CONFIDENT

4. How confident are you in the abilities of the NCOs (E-5 and above) in your unit to effectively manage the people under them in a combat situation?

NOT VERY
CONFIDENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CONFIDENT

5. How confident are you in the ability of the company grade officers (LT & CPT) in your unit to lead you in a combat situation?

NOT VERY
CONFIDENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CONFIDENT

6. How confident are you in the ability of the field grade officers (MAJ and above) over you to lead you in a combat situation?

NOT VERY
CONFIDENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CONFIDENT

7. In a combat situation, would you feel you could completely trust and depend upon the people you work with?

VERY VERY
LITTLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCH

8. In a combat situation how many people in your unit would be more trouble than they are worth?

VERY MOST
FEW 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. In a combat situation, how well would your equipment function?

VERY VERY
POORLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 WELL

10. Can you use your weapons effectively in a combat situation?

VERY VERY
POORLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 WELL

HUMAN DIMENSION

- Section 1.0 GENERAL
1.1 ... Belief Systems
1.2 ... Vision
- 2.0 THE THREE DAYS OF WAR
2.1 ... Day Prior to War
2.2 ... Day of War
2.3 ... Day After
2.4 ... Definition
- 3.0 THEORIES OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
3.1 ... Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs
3.1a Physical Needs
3.1b Safety Needs
3.1c Belonging Needs
3.1d Esteem Needs
3.1e Self-Actualization Needs
3.1f Command Action
3.2 ... Vroom's Expectancy Theory
3.2a Outcome
3.2b Value
3.2c Effort
3.2d Command Action
- 4.0 INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
4.1 ... Definition
4.2 ... Role
4.3 ... Status
4.4 ... Norms
- 5.0 COHESION
5.1 ... Factors Affecting Cohesion
5.2 ... Horizontal Integration
5.3 ... Vertical Integration
5.4 ... Personal Integration
5.5 ... Benefits of Cohesion
5.6 ... Command Action
5.7 ... Individual Characteristics
- 6.0 VALUES
6.1 ... Command Action
- 7.0 COMMUNICATION
7.1 ... Command Action

Section 8.0 DECISION MAKING
8.1 ... Group Decisions
8.2 ... Multiple-stage Problems
8.3 ... Heterogeneous Groups
8.4 ... Size of Group
8.5 ... Participate
8.6 ... Command Decisions

9.0 STRESS
9.1 ... Definition
9.2 ... Stressors
9.3 ... Command Action
9.4 ... Combat
9.5 ... Resources
9.6 ... Planning for Stress

10.0 SUMMARY

HUMAN DIMENSION

GENERAL

Section
1.0

The average person utilizes approximately 10-20 percent of his/her potential. This means that each individual has vast resources which are untapped. In the military, particularly the Army, emphasis is being placed on developing the force so that "more is done with less." This involves a greater utilization of what is presently available. What better place to start than with the most valuable resource in the Army - the soldier.

The question now being asked is, "If we have these untapped resources, what is preventing us from utilizing them?" More and more researchers are beginning to believe the primary obstacle is the individual's belief system. The individual gathers data through the five senses and stores it. We call this data experience. The sum total of experiences-shapes how the world is viewed. It is this personal view of the world that causes such statements as, "I can't do _____," or "Higher headquarters will never be able to accomplish _____." Many beliefs are formed from limited or even no real data. Very often, behavior is based on unwarranted assumptions. So how can the individual avoid limiting his potential? The answer may be to change the belief system. Actions take place in accordance with the belief held. If the soldier believes that he can perform a task, his/her chance of success is greater than if he/she does not have this belief. However, commanders should be aware that a belief may sometimes not promote unit performance.

Influencing
Belief Systems

Belief being a disadvantage

A belief system proved to be a disadvantage to Merrill's Marauders in Burma. They believed that higher headquarters did not care about them. "Coupled with the physical deterioration of the unit, this apparent breach of faith resulted in an almost complete breakdown of morale in the major portion of the unit." (Kellett 1982). Conversely, the outstanding performance of the Seventh Armored Brigade during the 1973 Israeli war was attributed to the belief they were all that stood between the Syrians and Upper Galilee. It was this belief which gave the officers and men the courage to fight for four days and three nights against continually renewed and fresh Syrian forces (Kellett, 1982).

1.2 Potential of the Individual

The second way to unleash potential is to create the vision of what one wants to achieve. Extensive research has determined that high performing individuals consistently have one trait in common -- they form clear mental pictures of that which they wish to accomplish (Garfield, 1982). They then mentally rehearse their performance over and over until they believe they can accomplish the task and then they act accordingly. Prior to 1954, no one believed it possible to run the mile in less than four minutes. No one, that is, except Roger Bannister. Not only did he believe that it could be done, but he had a vision of himself accomplishing the feat. He continually told himself that it could be done and he would do it. He committed himself and this commitment culminated in his running the first sub-four-minute mile. The interesting part is that once Bannister had done it, the belief system

of others was changed, and within two years, a number of other runners had broken the four-minute mile.

2.0

THE THREE DAYS OF WAR --
CONTEXT FOR HUMAN DIMENSION ON THE BATTLEFIELD

The human dimension can be addressed from the single perspective of the battlefield (Figure 1). It is critical that commanders consider the human dimension within the framework of the three days of war (the day prior, the day of and the day after). The commander must ensure that during the day prior to combat the soldiers in his command have been exposed to an environment in which the soldier can develop maximally both as an individual and as a soldier.

2.1

It is during this integration period - the day prior to combat - that soldiers become closer and the bonding which is essential to cohesion begins to develop. This bonding is critical and without it unit performance will be severely degraded. For example, during World War II it was found that those German soldiers who deserted tended to be men who had difficulty being assimilated into groups. (Shils and Janowitz, 1948).

2.2

The day of war the commander strives to accomplish his mission and care for his men at the same time.

2.3

The day after war the commander's primary responsibility is to maintain the combat readiness of his unit. During reconstitution the unit

THE THREE DAYS OF WAR

CONTEXT FOR HUMAN DIMENSION ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Day Prior	Day Of	Day After
<p>Socialization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">o Recruitmento IET <p>Reinforcement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">o Unit cohesion developedo Integration of unit values up to division level	<p>Maintenance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">o Welfare of soldierso Integration of new replacements	<p>Reconstitution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">o Integration of new soldiers and equipment

Figure 1.

is brought up to strength by the infusion of new unit members and re-supplied. The emphasis is on quick integration of personnel so as to increase cohesion and combat readiness. In this chapter we will be focusing on the individual and his interaction with his unit. Additionally, we will focus on ways the commander can influence the human dimension during the three days of war.

2.4 Definition

The human dimension is the physiological and psychological capability of soldiers and units to do their duty during the three days of war.

THEORIES OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

In order for the commander to have a framework to conceptualize the individual in the human dimension scenario, two theories of human motivation will be presented. These are Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory of motivation.

3.1 MASLOW'S HIERARCHY

Maslow maintains that individuals are motivated to fulfill certain needs and they are as follows:

- o Self-actualization
- o Esteem
- o Belonging
- o Safety
- o Physiological

3.1a

Food and shelter

Physiological Needs

He maintains that needs develop from lower to higher and the lower needs have to be satisfied before development of the next higher need takes place. For example, a soldier who has not had food in two weeks may be almost totally occupied with satisfying that need. Further, individuals may expose themselves to extreme danger to satisfy this need.

3.1b

Soldiers need to feel safe

Safety Needs

If the physical needs are satisfied, then the soldier will work to develop the next need. If he is concerned with his safety, he will not be attentive to duties. If, for example, he does not feel the leader has prepared the night defensive position adequately, that will be his primary concern. Shils and Janowitz (1948) concluded that the factors weakening group solidarity of the Wehrmacht in 1945 were isolation, family ties and the requirements of physical survival.

3.1c

Belonging and acceptance

Social Need

The need for belonging and for social acceptance will center around the individual's desire to be an accepted member of the unit and have satisfying interpersonal relationships with other unit members. As new soldiers are assigned to the unit, commanders can assist in their integration. It is often difficult for new unit members to become integrated -- they feel they are outsiders and old members are reluctant to show acceptance of the new unit members. This reluctance to

accept new unit members breeds feelings of isolation which can seriously affect a soldier's combat performance. As Marshall (1947) states in Men Against Fire, "Men working in groups or in teams do not have the same tendency to default of fire as do single riflemen." The longer the acceptance process takes, the longer it will take for the unit to become cohesive. Commanders and staffs can decrease this time by ensuring the following actions take place..

3.1d

Self-respect and
esteem of others

Esteem Needs

According to Maslow, everyone has a need or desire for self-respect and the esteem of others. Satisfaction of the self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth and adequacy and being useful. As we shall see later in this chapter, allowing soldiers to participate in activities which will lead to successes will increase the self-esteem of the soldier. Maslow also believes that it is important for the individual to feel important and needed.

3.1e

Be all you can be

Self-
Actualization

Self-actualization refers to the individual doing what he/she is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a soldier must soldier. It refers to the individual moving towards his/her potential. Self-actualization is the soldier "being all he can be".

COMMAND ACTION

Unit History

At one time it was standard for a new unit member to be thoroughly oriented to the unit history -- the battles fought, the glory achieved. A soldier could feel a closeness and sense of pride in the unit. Commanders may want to return to this tradition where the unit members, from the first day, know and take pride in unit history. One way to accomplish this is through a unit motto. For example, "Gary Owen" of the Seventh Cavalry or "Airborne" of the 82d Airborne Division serve this function.

Rites

Along with unit history, rites of passage should be established indicating an acceptance of a unit member. This gives unit members a feeling of being special in the unit. The benefits of rites of passage can be seen throughout history. For example, the army of Genghis Khan had an elite force called the Mangoday. According to legend, their performance in combat has not be equaled to this day. However, to become a member of the Mangoday was not easy. Volunteers were taken on a forced march of six days. During the march all food was withheld. Rest was cut down from six hours on the first day to five hours on the second day, and progressively down to one hour on the sixth day. On the seventh day an exercise was held consisting of attacks and flanking action. Anyone able to withstand this and still wishing to serve in the Mangoday was sworn in and accepted into one of the battalions (Harlew, 1969).

Identifying with the unit

Assigning each individual a sponsor of comparable rank, interest and background to be responsible for the new member's integration will assist the integration effort. The sponsor should be made to realize that it is his/her job to get the new member involved as soon as possible. Formally welcoming new unit members at the highest possible level of command assists the new soldier in identifying with the unit and shows him/her that superiors care.

Self-esteem

Commanders can influence the way in which soldiers see themselves. By the commander's action the individual may have a positive or negative view. It is to the advantage of the commander to foster a positive self-concept in the soldier since it has been found that the higher the self-concept, the higher the level of performance. The commander can influence self-concept in a positive manner by the following:


Positive
Self-concept

- o Provide successful experiences through realistic training
- o Giving feedback for a job "well done"
- o Delegating responsibility to the lowest level.

3.2

EXPECTANCY THEORY

Maslow believed that the individual is motivated to fulfill certain needs (Vroom's, 1964). Expectation theory looks at motivation in:



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

slightly different angle.

Expectancy theory focuses on the variables that, from the person's point of view, affect the decision to do or not do something. It states that people are continually choosing between alternative courses of action, and that their motivation is the result of individual courses of action, and the result of individual beliefs about three factors:

- o Outcome
- o Value
- o Effort

3.2a

Rewards and punishment

Outcome

Every behavior has associated with it, in an individual's mind, certain outcomes (rewards or punishments). An individual believes or expects that if he/she behaves in a certain way, he/she will get certain things. (Example: pull SDO or SDNCO and get the next day off -- go AWOL and get busted.)

3.2b

Individuals differ in what is important

Value

Value in this theory means worth or attractiveness. Outcomes have different worth for every individual. One soldier may value promotion because of power/achievement needs, while another may not want to be promoted and have to leave the organization because of high attachment to unit members.

3.2c

The soldier must believe
he can perform the task

Effort

Each behavior also has associated with it a certain expectancy or probability of success, i.e., how hard it will be to achieve such behavior and the probability of success. The soldier has a strong expectancy that, by putting forth effort, he can score 250 on the PT test, but has only a 50-50 chance of "maxing" it. So, according to this theory, motivation to do something is greatest where the individual believes that:

- o The behavior will lead to expected outcomes
- o These outcomes have positive value for the individual
- o The individual is able to perform at the desired level.

3.2d

COMMAND ACTION

This theory provides a framework for understanding how the "can" and "want to" factors are related. The more clearly a soldier understands what behaviors are necessary for successful performance, the less effort it takes for high performance and the more motivated he or she is likely to be. Commanders can set the stage for motivation to develop in his/her soldiers by assigning tasks which are neither ridiculously easy nor extremely hard, but which give the soldier a fair chance of success, thereby fostering a sense of accomplishment.

Both Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Vroom's expectancy theory provide a conceptual framework that the commander may use to encourage

squad or even division staff. A leader must be aware of the dynamics which occur when group or unit functions to accomplish a task. As the unit gains experience in working together, certain characteristics emerge. These characteristics are:

- o Roles
- o Status
- o Norms

4.2

Roles

Each individual in a unit has a role to perform. Some of the roles are obvious such as the S1, or S3 or the unit commander. However, some roles may not be quite as obvious. The unit commander may also have the role of counselor or the XO may have the role of intermediary between the S1, S2, S3 and S4 shops. A system of roles accepted and understood by unit members can assist performance. However, conflict may result if perceived roles are not agreed upon. For example, the S3 may not see the XO's role as being intermediary and may resent his interference. The soldier's role in the unit can take on different dimensions such as the following:

- o Acquiescence - every unit has those who always do what they are told.
- o Informal leader - the individual that peers look up to, and who seems to be respected by all.
- o Devil's advocate - barracks lawyer who questions everything.

individual motivation. Now, let us look at the relationship between the individual and the group.

4.0

INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP

To maximize the soldier as a resource, commanders and staff may need to look at the human dimension issue, not only from the individual behavior standpoint, but more importantly, how individuals interact as a group. This is important because it is as a group that soldiers function to accomplish the mission. This group interaction is what must be fostered in order to achieve mission accomplishment. One way to think of a military unit is as a series of groups functioning together for a single purpose. For example, a battalion is composed of companies which, in turn, have platoons and squads. Both the companies and platoons are also considered to be groups. However, it is believed that the squad is the most influential group with which the soldier interacts. Likewise, the unit staff is considered to be a group. It is important to keep in mind how the individual interacts with the group as a whole.

4.1

Definition

A group is two or more people who interact because of mutual interests. Soldiers are constantly being asked to function in one type of group or another. It may be as a member of a crew-served weapon, or infantry

- o Expert - usually in a specific area such as maintenance or weapons.
- o Mediator - helps his peers get along together.

4.3

Status

Status is the esteem given to the soldier in the unit. It is not an absolute measure but a relative one. In most units some soldiers will be accorded higher status than others. There are different types of status:

- o Occupational.
- o Rank - note that a high-ranking lower such as a first sergeant can often have more influence than a low-ranking higher such as a second lieutenant.
- o Personal investment - amount of involvement increases esteem.
- o Expert - status accorded the combat veteran by the rookie replacement.

4.4

Norms

Norms are standards for behavior. Norms determine whether a behavior is appropriate or inappropriate. Group norms can be directed toward the advantage of the unit or serve as a hindrance to a unit functioning at a high state of performance. For example, it may be a unit


norm that members spit shine their boots. Violation of this norm will result in group pressure brought to bear on the individual to conform. However, a group norm may be to do only what is required and never volunteer. This type of norm does not assist unit effectiveness.

Soldier-Unit Interaction

A model to assist commanders in conceptualizing the interaction between the soldier and the unit can be seen in Figure 2. Individual characteristics such as intelligence, skills, values and beliefs combine with group characteristics such as cohesiveness, maturity, norms and roles to form unit processes. However, these unit processes are also influenced by both the physical environment (resources, nature of task) and social environment (goals, rewards). These affect the processes such as communication, decision making and cooperation and impact on the unit outcome.

Maslow's hierarchy and Vroom's expectancy theories allow the commander to maintain a systems view of his organization. It is important to realize that effecting a change in one component of this model will impact on all other parts. For example, changing the physical environment (such as deploying the unit to the battle area) will have consequences for all the other parts of the system. It may be that individuals will have to adjust to a different climate; perhaps the terrain will be different and more strenuous; individuals may have to use sleeping bags and sleep in tents. All of this will, in turn, affect

Figure 2



individual and group performance

5.0

COHESION

Definition

Cohesion is the extent to which members are attracted to the group and each other. Soldiers who identify with their unit, especially at the squad and platoon level, will fight longer and harder and endure more hardships than other soldiers. A highly cohesive small force has the potential for destroying a large fighting force with lower cohesion -- cohesion acts as a force multiplier. "Whichever Army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them." (Xenophon). A cohesive unit is one in which individual members feel a part of the team and direct their efforts toward team accomplishment. The two major components of cohesion are belonging and commitment. These components work together for cohesion. Once individuals feel they belong, a commitment to the unit will develop.

Belonging
and
Commitment

5.1

Developing unit cohesion requires the achievement of three factors:

- o Horizontal integration.
- o Vertical integration.
- o Personal integration.

5.2

Horizontal
Integration

Closeness between individuals is a necessary part of developing cohesion in a unit. It is through this closeness that interdependency occurs where there is a blending of interests, aims and objectives among unit members. It is because of this bonding that unit members

are willing to look after each other. Commanders can influence this by emphasizing personnel stabilization.

5.3 Bonding also needs to occur between soldiers and leaders and leaders and commanders. This results in a blending of unit interests, aims and objectives. Bonding will occur if leaders do the following:

- o Care about the soldier.
- o Practice fairness in rewards and discipline.
- o Serve as a role model for soldiers.

5.4 Personal Integration
A blending of personal and unit goals occurs where the individual has a belief in the correctness of the unit goals/mission and is willing to support these goals/mission. The Gloucestershire Regiment in Korea is a classic example of devotion to unit goals. It is believed that their motivation to live up to the regimental tradition was one of the most important reasons they were able to perform as they did. Although outnumbered and short of supplies, they repeatedly withstood Chinese attacks. Surrounded and running out of ammunition, they continued to fight. Only 80 members of the regiment avoided being killed or captured. The Gloucestershires were credited with playing a major part in blunting the Chinese offensive and received an American presidential citation.

5.5 Cohesive units endure longer

Benefits Units that are cohesive should be able to endure the shock of combat

and maintain effectiveness over a longer period of time than less cohesive units. Soldiers who identify with a unit and have a commitment to its members will fight harder and endure hardships over a longer period of time than other soldiers. Members of cohesive units will sublimate their personal welfare to that of their buddies and unit. The 442d Regimental Combat Team of WWII is an example of a highly cohesive unit. This Nisei unit with the nickname of "Go For Broke" was the highest decorated American unit in World War II. Additionally, they had no desertions during their combat service and no combat stress casualties. They had a point of honor to prove. This established the bond which contributed to their outstanding success as a fighting force. As long as the individual soldier feels his needs are being met by his group membership and that he is continuing to contribute to the group effort, he will continue to fight. An important aspect of combat performance is the social support the individual provides others. Feelings of being needed play an important part in the individual's willingness to fight. This social support need is fostered and strengthened by cohesion.

5.6

COMMAND ACTIONS

Commanders are in a position to critically influence cohesion instilled in soldiers; however, cohesion cannot be willed into existence. The following are specific actions, policies and conditions which must be emphasized for unit cohesion to develop.

- o Have clear understanding of unit missions/goals.
- o Model behavior consistent with unit values.
- o Establish small unit training (squad level).

- o Satisfy members' basic need (e.g., clothing, shelter, food).
- o Show that leaders care.
- o Provide a yardstick so the individual can measure his performance.
- o Increase unit member confidence.
- o Have necessary resources for mission accomplishment.
- o Have clear lines of communication.
- o Have unit member assignment stability.
- o Rewards.
- o Environmental threat.

The following are ways the commander and staff can successfully institute the above actions.

5.6a

Clear understanding of
unit missions/goals

When soldiers are aware of the unit's mission and goals, they have a common target to direct their efforts. Each soldier should be able to state the unit mission. Mission/goals cards are one method to do this.

5.6b

Model behavior consistent
with unit values

It is extremely important that commanders model the behavior consistent

with the values they wish adopted by their soldiers. In other words, commanders need to "walk their talk". Soldiers look to their commanders to set the example but they are not easily fooled when actions do not match words.

5.6c

**Small unit training
(squad level)**

Small unit training is an effective method to increase cohesion. Unit members learn to depend on each other and this mutual dependence affects cohesion. Although training at the platoon and company level is important, there is also much to be gained by emphasizing training at squad or perhaps even fire-team level.

5.6d

Satisfy member needs

Each individual has basic needs which must be fulfilled. However, these needs may differ among individuals. In combat commanders should be encouraged to monitor how well basic needs such as food, shelter, rest, and even safety are being satisfied. A psychological component seen in combat is the need of the individual to have comradeship, loyalty, trust, esteem, and the feeling that what one does is significant. Again, stability of personnel establishes a setting for this to happen.

5.6e

Know who cares

Soldiers want to know that supervisors are interested in their welfare. Supervisors need to assure the unit members that they are aware of what the soldier has done and how the mission has been accomplished. Since soldiers fight mainly for themselves, their buddies and their unit, showing the individual there is concern for all three at higher command levels will help to foster and maintain cohesion in lower units.

5.6f

Yardsticks to measure performance

If soldiers are to improve their performance, they need to know how well they have performed (both individually and as a unit). Establishing a regular system to assess performance and provide feedback to subordinate units and their members in a non-punitive manner enables them to learn from past performance and feel a sense of accomplishment for a job well done. Very often a pat on the back, if done immediately, can be just as important as an award. Too often, positive outcomes are ignored in units whereas poor performance is given attention by negative actions. While attention to substandard performance is necessary, soldiers should also receive attention for what they do well or to standards

5.6g

Unit member confidence

A sense of accomplishment, whether in training or in combat, helps foster confidence. Having confidence in oneself, one's buddies, equipment and unit gives the soldier a tremendous advantage. Ensuring that the unit has adequate equipment, the best training and the best

leadership possible will help to instill the confidence needed and encourage unit cohesion. Training which allows soldiers to experience successes can help build confidence.

5.6h

Resources for mission accomplishment

Commanders and staffs can assist subordinate leaders and staff develop and maintain small unit cohesion by ensuring that lower units have to the maximum extent possible, the resources necessary to accomplish their mission. Unit members who are committed to their unit wish to see their unit perform well. However, much of their commitment and cohesion can be lost if there is insufficient personnel and equipment for mission accomplishment.

5.6i

Communications

One of the key components of mission accomplishment is coordination, and for a tactical mission to be well coordinate, good communications are required at all levels of command. Open lines of communication, both horizontally and vertically, enhance mission accomplishment. Commanders should periodically test the lines of communication to identify blockages and institute corrective actions.

5.6j

Stabilization of unit members

Unit cohesion develops through a process of personal interaction and takes time. Because of this, personnel turbulence can have devastating effects on cohesion. A command policy which emphasizes and is directed

towards personnel stabilization and quick integration of new personnel can minimize these disruptions (see section on integration of new personnel).

5.6k

Rewards

Formal recognition of unit performance is one way cohesion can be developed. The following are ideas for unit recognition.

- o Establish small unit achievement badges, e.g., tank gunnery badge, squad tactical badges.
- o Administer small unit letters of achievement.
- o Institute squad of the month award.

5.6l

Environmental threat

Environmental threat is the most powerful mechanism for fostering cohesion in a unit. Units that must react to outside threat have been found to draw together, form a common bond and develop a resolve to meet the threat. Again, the 442d Regimental Combat Team is a good example of this. Their closeness was due not only to external threat of combat, but more importantly, was a reaction to prove themselves to the American people.

However, if the external threat becomes too great, cohesion may be affected. The individual may be concerned strictly with the element

of survival. Commanders should remain aware of these possibilities because at these crucial times the leadership of the unit could be the difference of the unit continuing to fight or to fall apart.

5.7

Effects of cohesion

Units that are cohesive will communicate more within the unit. They share information that is relevant to the group on both a formal and informal basis. Because members of the cohesive unit share a common ideology regarding norms, they spend more time discussing these norms than less cohesive units. Rewarding openness and honesty will increase the level of communications.

Influence

A cohesive unit has more influence over its members than other units. Individual unit members conduct themselves in such a manner so as not to evoke the censure of the unit. Soldiers have reported that their outstanding performance in combat was a result of "not wanting to let their buddies down." Again, encouraging small unit training will increase this by developing interdependence.

Perception of Group Members

Unit cohesiveness and increased communication affect the perceptions of unit members. The unit will tend to become defensive in its evaluation by others and be very favorable in its evaluation of its members, its importance, and its performance. The danger is that a unit will tend to over-evaluate their capabilities. Cohesive units often

Defensiveness

turn their defensiveness towards outsiders which can have serious implications for new members in general and new leaders in particular.

Continually emphasizing realistic evaluations by units will assist commanders in minimizing this.

5.8

Individual characteristics of cohesion

The major individual characteristics which facilitate cohesiveness are similarity of members and the opportunity to interact. Individuals who share similar backgrounds and attitudes are more likely to become cohesive than heterogeneous groups. However, heterogeneous groups will also become cohesive in certain situations; for instance, the closeness that developed between individuals from different backgrounds and ethnic groups fighting in Vietnam. Remember, danger from without can promote unit cohesiveness if the other factors discussed are in balance.

6.0

VALUES.

Values are identified by the things that are most important to the individual. They are closely held standards that influence the individual's behavior.

Values are difficult
to change

The commander should be aware that each individual in his unit will maintain values which are inherent in that individual. These values have developed through the socialization process of parents and peers and are deeply engrained in the individual. Because of this, it is

Values Are
Engrained

unlikely that changes will occur in a soldier's value system. Commanders who are aware of this will not attempt to change individual values, but to instill additional values compatible with those of the organization.

6.1

COMMAND ACTIONS

Commanders may be able to instill additional values by the following:

- o Clearly articulating the unit values.
- o Modeling behavior consistent with unit values.
- o Developing clear statements of unit purpose/mission/goals.
- o Rewarding behavior of soldiers consistent with unit values.
- o Promoting loyalty by meeting soldier needs.

7.0

COMMUNICATION

Good communication has been found to promote organizational performance, morale, teamwork and unity. The purpose of communication is as follows:

- o Provide information.
- o Command and instruct.
- o Influence and persuade.
- o Integrative function.

As Marshall (1953) states in the River and the Gauntlet: "...the lesson shines forth clear that when battle troops lack effective communications, and when they do not understand down to the last man that fullness of information is the mainspring of operations, the fight is

already half lost." The lack of communication can have devastating effects on combat operations. Marshall (1947), investigating seven instances of panic, concluded that each panic was precipitated by a minor event such as one or two men running to the rear (perhaps for a good reason). He believes others followed, generating the panic, because they did not understand the reason for the panic. Marshall indicates "It was the lack of information rather than the sight of running men which was the crux of the danger." The objectives the commander selects, the tactics he applies, and the effectiveness with which subordinates execute his plans and decisions -- all of these hinge upon the quality of communication in the organization.

7.1

COMMAND ACTIONS

The most important determinant of who communicates with whom in an organization is the opportunity to interact. (Jewell and Reitz, 1981). The commander who distances himself from the lower level troops will very often miss out on vital information and subordinates will be deprived of valuable information. Field Marshal Sir William Slim, as commander of the Fourteenth Army in World War II, understood this. He created two nerve centers. In addition to his war room, he established an information room. This information room was accessible to even the lowest ranks and provided information about Corps operations and the war in general (Slim, 1956). Thus, every soldier in his command had the opportunity to keep abreast of war-time events on a large scale and to share that information with other soldiers.

An important point for the commander to keep in mind is that people are more inclined to communicate with individuals on the same or

higher level than with those whose status is lower than their own. Therefore, the commander needs to continually remain aware of the amount and effectiveness of communication in his unit. Most commanders are aware of instances in which a communication blockage occurred at the mid-level of the organization preventing those at the lowest echelon from "getting the word". Emphasis should continually be placed on ensuring a downward flow of communications.

**Cohesive groups
communicate more**

The higher the level of group cohesiveness, the more individuals in the group communicate with each other. Not only do they communicate more, but the accuracy of the information is greater, primarily because they take the time for effective communication. Because of this, commanders can exercise an influence on the communication process by taking the steps to increase cohesion mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter.

Feedback

Commanders should be aware that the single most powerful means for improving communication effectively is through feedback. Check out:

- o That the intended receiver received the message.
- o How the message was interpreted.

The most effective means of acquiring feedback is to simply ask for it. For example, a commander who has put out "the word" to the troops

should take the time to ask soldiers if they received the message. If he finds they have not, then he can take steps to identify the blockage and remove it.

**Reinforce soldiers
for feedback**

**Receptive
To Feedback**

Feedback will improve if leaders foster an atmosphere in which individuals feel free to give accurate feedback without fear of retribution. Soldiers should be encouraged and reinforced for seeking clarification of any message about which they feel uncertain.

**Honesty
"Tell it like it is"**

**Model
Behavior**

Part of this atmosphere of feedback should be an open and honest exchange of information. When subordinates know that commanders want to be told "like it is", they will be more than willing to communicate in an open and honest fashion. Commanders may ask themselves the question: "Do I ask for accurate reports or reports that make the unit look good?" "If the answer is the former, do I reward this honesty and offer assistance or take actions to rectify the situation, perhaps at the expense of the individual making the report?"

8.0

DECISION MAKING

Research has shown that the decisions made by groups are different from those made by individuals (Jewell and Reitz, 1981). Additionally, some problems are better approached from a group perspective

while others are better resolved by individual effort. It is to the commander's advantage to be aware of which types of decision making are more appropriate to a given situation.

8.1

Groups are better at certain decisions

It has been found that problems on which groups make better decisions have two characteristics:

- o They have multiple parts.
- o The parts of the problem are susceptible to division of labor.

For example, planning the assault on an objective may require knowledge of the route to the objective, knowledge of the objective itself and information about the enemy. Transportation will have to be coordinated as well as artillery fire and logistical support. On this type of problem many decisions will be made and the interaction of many people will take place.

8.2

Multiple-stage problems

On some types of problems it has been found that group decisions are not as good as an individual solution. These are multiple-stage problems. These types of problems require thinking through a series of interrelated steps or stages, analyzing a number of rules at each point and always keeping in mind past conclusions related to the problem. Multiple-stage problems are not amenable to a division of

labor and the large number of possible lines of reasoning make it difficult to demonstrate the correctness of any given solution. Long-range planning for a division or corps would be an example of multiple-stage problems. Be aware, however, that even though these types of problems do not lend themselves to group decision making, their complexity requires the input from many sources. The group provides suggestions, alternatives and perhaps even tentative solutions, but the decision is made by a single individual. A division or corps staff experiences this quite often with the staff providing input to the commander so he can make an informed decision.

8.3

**Heterogeneous groups
make better decisions**

**Composition
Of The Group**

Research has shown that heterogeneous groups (different traits) make better decisions and outperform homogeneous groups (similar traits) regardless of the task (Jewell and Reitz, 1981). Keeping this in mind, commanders may wish to have on their staff individuals with a range of experiences, backgrounds, perspectives and temperaments.

8.4

**Size of decision making
groups affects decision**

As the size of decision making groups increases, communication becomes more difficult and the opportunity for each member to participate decreases. Additionally, the chance that discussion will be dominated by a few increases, especially if one group member is of higher rank than the rest of the group. The commander, when forming

decision making groups, should be aware that the group leader (whether it is formal leadership - rank - or informal leadership) will have significant impact on group processes. It is important that the commander ensures the group leader will work towards the good of the organization.

8.5

Participate in the solution

In the military, many problems require solutions that depend upon the support of subordinates to be effective. A solution to a problem is useless unless those implementing it are supportive of the solution. When a group participates in a problem solution, those individuals have a vested interest in seeing that solution implemented. It follows then that more individuals will accept a solution to a problem when a group develops a solution than when an individual provides the solution. Furthermore, those who participate in the decision making process are more satisfied with the decision than when the decision is handed down by an individual.

8.6

COMMAND ACTIONS

Commanders may find the following helpful:

- o Spread decision making around by giving broad missions. Give soldiers the chance and they will figure out ways to do things better.
- o Establish policy to force decision making down the chain as far as possible.

- o Encourage initiative. If you dictate to soldiers, they will lose initiative and become accustomed to waiting around to be told what to do.
- o Allow subordinates a chance to participate.
- o Establish overall goals but give people the chance to make mistakes and learn.

If the problem to be solved is conducive to group work, then it is to the commander's advantage to have the group solve the problem. The solution will be better, the group will have ownership in the decision and they will tend to be satisfied with the decision made.

9.0

STRESS

A common problem faced by Army leaders at all levels is dysfunctional stress. Stressors that are not adequately coped with can seriously affect discipline, cohesion and combat readiness of an organization. It is therefore critical for leaders to be familiar with environmental stressors and their potential effects on soldiers. In addition, the commander should be aware of resources available to him and his subordinates to better cope with stressors. While coping with dysfunctional stress is important, commanders should be aware that all stress is not bad. A certain amount of stress is necessary for everyday functioning. It is when the soldier is unable to cope with stress that dysfunctional behavior occurs.

Stress
Training

It is the responsibility of the commander to prepare his soldiers to deal with the stress generated by combat. The commander should ensure that soldiers are trained to identify environmental stressors, recognize stress reactions in themselves and others and have the coping mechanisms necessary to functionally adapt to stressors. Commanders should be aware of the effects of stressors on soldiers in subordinate units and have a stress management plan available to properly treat combat stress casualties.

9.1

Definition

Stress, as defined by Dr. Hans Selye (1974), is "the body's non-specific response to any demand placed on it, whether that demand is pleasant or not." Put another way, it is the physical and psychological reaction to what is happening in the soldier's world, according to his perception.

9.2

Stressors

Influence
Number Of
Stressors

Commanders have the ability to drastically influence the number of stressors soldiers are exposed to and also, the intensity of the stressors. The following are stressors which commanders can influence:

- o Quantitative overload - having too much to do.
- o Qualitative overload - task is too difficult.
- o Underutilization - not enough to do.
- o Poor communication - subordinates are not kept informed.
- o Rapid change - crisis management.

- o Insufficient rest.
- o Insufficient food.

However, there are some stressors which cannot be modified and over which the commander has little or no control. Here are a few examples of such stressors:

- o Ambiguity of combat situation.
- o Isolation.
- o Enemy artillery fire.
- o Slow up-hill fight against strong opposition.
- o First experience under fire.
- o Halt of an advance, or withdrawal.

9.3

COMMAND ACTION

Since the commander has little influence on these types of stressors, he needs to ensure that his soldiers have the necessary stress training which will enable them to appropriately adjust to the situation. Training which instills confidence is one mechanism to assist the individual cope with stress. The soldier gains confidence by having been exposed to training which approximates the combat situation as closely as possible. The following are examples of pre-combat training designed to increase soldier confidence and help him cope with stressors.

- o Frequent live fire exercises that stress volume, accuracy and control of fire.
- o Simulations of realistic artillery and air support.

- o Hands-on training with enemy weapons.
- o Frequent weapon proficiency and maintenance checks.

Fear of the unknown is a major factor for a soldier entering combat for the first time. Training that has approximated combat will do much to lessen the trauma of that first combat experience. Further, prior training in the management of stress will help reduce the number of stress casualties as a result of combat. A platoon leader of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, writing of the first day of the invasion of Sicily said: "There was a feeling of illusion about it, almost as if it had been only another in the great and bloodless schemes that had filled so many weeks in England. It left the men with an oddly discontented feeling, incongruously mixed with a superb self-confidence." (Mowat, 1955).

Combat

When soldiers are exposed to combat, stress casualties will result. Commanders must remain aware of the stress casualty rate as well as other factors in order to make a realistic assessment of unit effectiveness. There are valuable resources available to the commander to keep him aware of stress levels in his subordinate units. A team composed of the division psychologist, division psychiatrist, social workers and the organizational effectiveness consultant can be formed to provide this information to the commander. This team would be able to keep a finger on the unit pulse and thereby be able to make recommendations to the commander for stress intervention. The team would

Resources
Available
To Commander

do this by remaining in constant touch with units in combat and with the soldiers in those units. They would talk to soldiers and hear their concerns and frustrations. The team would have available questionnaires and surveys designed to measure stress levels and the effectiveness of the individuals in dealing with stress prior to combat. This information would be passed on to the commander. This action would provide a means to dissipate the build-up of stress and anxiety.

9.5

Resources

The division psychiatrist and the division psychologist are the primary resources available to the commander to deal with combat stress casualties.

9.6

Planning for stress

A comprehensive plan to manage combat stress is essential. It should include pre-combat training and educating the soldiers on the causes of stress and how to cope with it. When troops are in combat, it is necessary to be able to assess the unit level of stress so the commander can make informed decisions. Finally, a treatment plan is needed so that soldiers can return to their units as soon as possible with no long-term psychological effects.

This chapter has addressed the issue of the human dimension in the soldier. Included for discussion were such critical areas as motivation, cohesion, communications, values, decision making and stress. These areas were addressed from the standpoint of importance to mission accomplishment and additionally, what actions, methods and processes are available to the commander to foster these areas which are critical to success on the battlefield.

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HUMAN DIMENSION QUESTIONS

COHESION:

- p. 19 1. What should the Commander do to develop a cohesive staff that positively influences small unit cohesion and will to fight?
- p. 20 2. What should the Commander and his staff do to insure that subordinate commanders and staff have a positive influence on cohesion?
- p. 6,17 3. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to ensure that replacements are properly integrated into cohesion?
- p. 19 4. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to assist subordinate leaders develop and maintain cohesive small units?

VALUES:

- p. 26 5. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to make the organization's mission seem important to each member?
- p. 27 6. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to ensure that organizational values are internalized by all members of subordinate units so that there is a consistency in unit operations?
- p. 27 7. If, because of value differences, the Corps or Division Commander cannot identify with subordinates' values, what should he do? What methods, actions or processes should be used to diagnose the problem and solve it?

INTERPERSONAL:

- p. 11,21,22 8. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to create a climate under which subordinates develop competence, trustworthiness, confidence and honesty?
- p. 28 9. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to reduce the barriers to effective communication?
- p. 34 10. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to stay aware of the stress level and the effects of stress on soldiers in subordinate units?
- p. 9 11. What should the Corps or Division Commander and his staff do to create an atmosphere that contributes to each individual feeling supported and important?

OTHER:

- Throughout 12. What should the Corps or Division Commander do to ensure that he interacts with his staff and major subordinate commanders in ways that foster effective problem-solving, decision-making, planning, communications, evaluating, and an overall climate that fosters cohesion, discipline, morale, and will to fight?
- Not addressed 13. What type of methods or subsystems should be developed by the Corps or Division Commander and his staff to handle contingency planning? .

US Army Academy of Health Sciences
Behavioral Sciences Division
COL James W. Stokes, MD

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT ON COMBAT STRESS TERMINOLOGY

US ARMY ACADEMY OF HEALTH SCIENCES
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES DIVISION

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT ON COMBAT STRESS TERMINOLOGY

by

COL James W. Stokes, MD

1. "Combat Stress" includes all the physiological and emotional stresses encountered in the combat situation. It is inherently complex and changing.

a. It almost inevitably generates internal conflicts among motives such as personal comfort and/or survival vs devotion to duty vs loyalty to comrades vs moral precepts.

b. It is likely to stimulate intense and perhaps conflicting emotions: anxiety, terror, love, hate, grief, rage, guilt, pride, or disgust.

c. Physical fatigue, sleep loss, climate, noise and vibration, hunger, and minor diseases, in addition to being sources of discomfort and even of fear themselves, are also likely to lower the individual's confidence and ability to cope successfully on a moment-to-moment basis with internal conflict and intense emotion.

d. Combat stress is not limited to those moments when one is under fire. Even combat service support troops who are never themselves actually fired upon may be subjected to combat stress.

2. "Combat Stress Reactions (CSR)" is a generic term which covers all reactions in the combat setting, ranging from heroism and exceptional feats of strength and endurance, through the normal psychophysiological reactions to abnormal stress, to complete functional collapse.

3. "Battle Fatigue" - ("Combat Fatigue") is the preferred term for all uncomfortable or performance degrading CSR when seen at troop level and for at least the first week of treatment.

a. Battle Fatigue (BF) ranges from:

(1) Mild: 0-100% performance degrading, and can be managed and rested up in soldier's own unit or its closest logistical support elements.

(2) Moderate: 80-100% performance degrading, and symptoms are such that the soldier: 1) is too much burden for his/her own unit and its closest support; 2) is best treated by AMEDD mental health specialists, but; 3) could be rested and transported in the rear logistical support units if the AMEDD is overloaded.

(3) Severe: 80-100% disabled, and symptoms are so disruptive as to require AMEDD management/treatment.

b. Note: prognosis may not be worse for severe than for moderate or mild BF, although reacceptance by the old unit may be an unrealistic goal for those whose symptoms were highly disruptive or dangerous.

c. Mental health personnel may, as each case evolves, discriminate between:

(1) Battle Fatigue - Acute, due to an intense traumatic experience. Statistically this has an intermediate prognosis for full return to actual combat.

(2) Battle Fatigue - Semi-Acute, with severe physiologic fatigue and sleep debt. This has the best statistical prognosis for full return to combat.

(3) Battle Fatigue - Chronic, "Old Timers" or "Short Timers" type. These often do poorly if returned to actual combat but do well at responsible administrative duties.

(4) Mixed types of the above.

d. However, these subtypes should not become labels to the soldiers themselves or take on a self-fulfilling prophetic function. The only sure way to know whether an individual will respond to treatment and positive expectation is to try positively.

4. The old term "Combat Exhaustion" is acceptable but not preferred. It applies logically only to those who are 100% ineffective (whether "mild," "moderate," or "severe"), and has more implications of finality or irreversibility than does "fatigue." Its use should therefore be discouraged to avoid confusion.

5. The term "Transient Battle Reaction" was proposed in AR 40-66, December 1980, to label those cases who had little history of physical stress and sleep deprivation as different from "Battle Fatigue" cases who were suffering from such factors. The Academy rejects this distinction (in favor of the Battle Fatigue modifiers "acute" and "semi-acute," as stated in paragraph 3.c. above), for the following reasons:

a. It is impractical to quantify sleep loss and physical fatigue under operational conditions. The stressors usually begin long before the shooting starts and may impact differently on different individuals.

b. We have no way of standardizing how labellers use such an undefinable distinction. The labellers will range from junior medics (91Bs) through field-experienced physician assistants to physicians fresh out of hospital settings and mental health personnel of differing disciplines and backgrounds.

c. Trying to mass indoctrinate such diverse students to use a second term for an ill-defined subset of Battle Fatigue cases is most likely just to confuse them. "Transient" to some people is a synonym for "bum."

d. The use of the label, therefore, will be overly determined by the subjective judgements of the labeller. It is likely to take on moralizing connotations such as "Transient Battle Reaction proves weakness, while battle fatigue happens to good soldiers who just get too tired."

e. Uncontrolled mythology is likely to develop among the troops themselves about the two very different terms; this could influence response to treatment and reacceptability into the unit in ways we won't even be aware of.

f. So the Academy position is, "Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS) and let one label, 'Battle Fatigue,' fit all cases who are having adverse stress responses in combat."

6. The "Fatigue" in "Battle Fatigue" is an analogy of emotional fatigue to physical fatigue, not a reference to physical fatigue. It is a good analogy:

a. Runners can be temporarily "exhausted" pushing too hard in a 100-yard dash or in a 27-mile marathon. Both cases look alike, lying on the ground gasping for breath. In most cases, the treatment is the same: get them up, walking around; cool off; and replenish fluids. Only in a few cases is intensive medical treatment required which recognizes the subtle biochemical differences between the two types.

b. Soldiers can be temporarily emotionally overloaded in a few seconds of horrifying combat or in days or weeks of less intensive experience. Both types show a variety of symptoms with more overlap than differentiation. In most cases the treatment is the same: sleep, replenishment, hygiene, structured military activities, supportive psychotherapy or counseling and positive suggestion. Only if this fails are other, more specific measures indicated.

c. In both the physical and emotional sides of the analogy, "fatigue" is a function of intensity and duration. In both, a critical factor is how well the individual was prepared for the specific type of event he/she was entered in.

7. The Fact Sheet which follows summarizes what the Academy is promulgating as doctrine for the management of battle fatigue.

Incl

JAMES W. STOKES
COL, MC
C, P/N Br, BSD, AHS

FACT SHEET

HSMA-IBS
21 Nov 83

SUBJECT: Management of Combat Stress and Battle Fatigue

ISSUE. Information

FACTS.

1. Combat Stress: Combinations of physical and mental stress in the combat zone can produce symptoms in any soldier which temporarily interfere with military performance. Management of stress is a command responsibility. Most such soldiers can be treated symptomatically, reassured, and restored to effectiveness by leaders and medical personnel within the unit. Such non-disabling stress reactions are referred to as "mild battle fatigue".

2. Moderate/Severe Battle Fatigue: Only those soldiers with stress reactions whose symptoms make them an unacceptable burden on the unit should be held for treatment as "casualties" and, if necessary, be evacuated by medical support units. Diagnostic labels should not be used. Instead, all stress casualties should be carded as "battle fatigue", moderate or severe, with brief, factual notes describing symptom presentation and any known precipitating factors. "Moderate" is used for cases who are best treated by AMEDD personnel but who could be managed and transported by non-medical support units if necessary. "Severe" cases are those whose symptoms are so disruptive that they need urgent medical management. "Severe" does not indicate a poorer chance for full recovery.

3. Epidemiology: Many factors influence the occurrence of battle fatigue, for example: intensity, duration and nature of combat, level of training, leadership, home front concerns, and physical stress and fatigue. An average casualty rate for heavy conventional combat is one battle fatigued soldier for every three wounded in action (WW II data). On contaminated chemical battlefields, stress casualties among inexperienced troops may temporarily exceed chemical casualties two to one (WW II data).

4. Management Principles: PROXIMITY - treat as close to the unit as the situation permits; IMMEDIACY - treat quickly and briefly; EXPECTANCY - express positive expectation for recovery and rapid return to duty.

SUBJECT: Management of Combat Stress and Battle Fatigue

5. Treatment Methods: Brief medical/neuropsychiatric examination to rule out serious physical/mental illness or injury; reassurance; relative relief from danger; sleep; nutrition; rehydration; attention to hygiene; restoration of confidence by group sharing of experiences and feelings; supportive counselling; structured military activities; sedative or tranquilizing medication only in low doses when essential for rest or agitated behavior.

6. Treatment Results: Seventy to eighty percent of moderate/severe battle fatigue cases return to duty within 1-3 days if kept within the division. When returned to their original units and welcomed there, recovered cases have no increased risk of relapse. Most cases who do not recover fully within 72 hours can be restored to some duty provided they continue in structured, equally positive treatment within the combat zone. Premature evacuation of battle fatigued soldiers out of the combat zone must be prevented as it often results in permanent psychiatric disability.

7. Treatment Resources: Within a division's Medical Battalion, specialized management is provided by the Division Mental Health Section (Division Psychiatrist, Social Worker and Clinical Psychologist, plus up to eight enlisted Behavioral Science Specialists (MOS 91G)). One or two of the 91G's are assigned to each medical clearing company in support of a brigade, while the rest of the team is usually concentrated at the medical support company in the division rear.

8. Differential Diagnosis: Casualties with organic mental conditions, including drug intoxication, withdrawal or other toxic brain disorders, must be treated at the appropriate medical echelon. Malingerers must be discharged back to duty or for administrative action. Patients with serious psychotic disorders are evacuated via the Evacuation Hospital in the corps area.

9. Preventive Measures: During respites from combat, as in peacetime, the Divisional Mental Health Section has primary preventive functions of staff and command consultation, assessing units' psychological readiness for combat, educating leaders and medical personnel on combat stress management and battle fatigue, supervising battalions' preventive psychiatry plans and providing psychiatric support to soldiers with problems unrelated to the combat situation. Effective preventive programs can reduce the incidence of battle fatigue casualties to less than one-tenth of the wounded in action.

COL Stokes/471-3803

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