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
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STUDENT REPORT
GREAT WARRIORS: HANNIBAL BARCA AND
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS
MAJOR ANNE T. PECK 84-1990
"insights into tomorrow"

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TITLE GREAT WARRIORS: HANNIBAL BARCA AND PUBLIUS CORNELIUS
SCIPIO AFRICANUS

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As George Santayana aptly pointed out, "Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it." The best leaders, military and civilian, study past successes and failures to learn not only what happened but why it happened. Thus it is useful for military officers to not only study brilliant military leaders of the past, but also to view the context in which they operated. The ACSC Strategy Process Model is an excellent framework within which to view the accomplishments--and failures--of historic military figures. This paper will provide the reader with an analysis of Hannibal Barca and Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War (219 - 201 B.C.) in the context of the ACSC Strategy Process Model, which should assist the reader in determining the causes and factors involved in their success.

Before studying them individually, it is necessary to set the stage for the Second Punic War by analyzing the environment: Rome, Carthage, and the results of the First Punic War. Rome and Carthage (located in North Africa near modern Tunis) were allied as early as 508 B.C. when Carthage was the more powerful. In that year the two cities signed a treaty in which Carthage recognized Rome's right to exist but imposed severe limitations on Rome's

future trade (1:43). By the middle of the third century B.C., Rome was still an inferior power.

Founded around 813 B.C., Carthage was the richest of Mediterranean cities in the third century, taking in millions of dollars a year (1:40). Its armies and navies had turned it from a trading post into an empire. Her navy was powerful, allowing Carthaginian merchants to roam without challenge throughout Asia, Europe and North Africa. Her army was largely comprised of mercenaries, frequently Libyan. Her military leaders, however, were nominated by the Senate and approved by the Assembly. The generals served as long as the Senate desired and were chosen for their military skills (1:43).

In contrast, Rome was an agrarian society contained within the central region of Italy. Until the First Punic War began in 264, it had no navy and minimal trade, partly because of the treaty with Carthage. Rome felt that military service was part of citizenship; thus all male citizens served in the armies (1:25). Military leadership, on the other hand, was vested in the two elected Roman consuls, or heads of state (much as our President is the military Commander in Chief). This caused problems, not only because the consuls' "generalship" was extremely limited, but also because new consuls were elected annually, eliminating any continuity in military leadership. Their forces, however, were patriotic citizens with a vested interest in the outcome (1:43).

At the beginning of the First Punic War (264 B.C.), the Romans had just unified the peninsula through alliances of the city-states. The fact that Rome preferred to ally itself to Italian tribes rather than subjugate them (9:10) played a large part in the outcome of the Second Punic War. The initial incident that began the first war was the seizure of Messana in Sicily by the Mamertines. Hiero, King of Syracuse, besieged the city but was driven off by Carthaginians, who occupied the city. The Mamertines then appealed to Rome to expel their Carthaginian "saviors" (1:43-44). Rome had been concerned that Sicily, a mile from the Italian coast, was held by hostile powers (Greece and Carthage) and also reasoned that the next step in its own expansion was to acquire Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. The Romans definitely did not want Carthage to have an operating base that close to Italian shores (1:43). Although the Mamertines then changed their minds about being rescued, Rome responded and the war began.

Several aspects of the First Punic War are noteworthy. The Roman Senate made a strong ally of King Hiero (1:44), resulting in his help during the second war. The first war was an overall mix of success and blunder on both sides (9:11). For each side, however, one hero emerged. For Rome it was the consul Regulus; for Carthage, it was Hamilcar Barca, whose three sons would play the most prominent roles in the war to follow (1:44). Rome built its first navy, 330 vessels (1:44), and won the decisive battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 B.C., ending the war (9:11). Carthage was forced to surrender, to remove all restrictions on

Roman trade, and to pay Rome 440 talents a year for ten years (1:45). Following the peace settlement, another conflict arose in Sardinia. When Rome declared war again, Carthage bought peace with 1200 additional talents and the surrender of Sardinia and Corsica (1:46).

Hamilcar Barca was enraged at the humiliation heaped upon Carthage by Rome, and he appealed to the Carthaginian Senate to let him continue the fight. The merchants, fearing a more powerful Rome's effect on their vast incomes, financed Hamilcar's trip to Spain to establish an operating base from which to attack the Romans (1:46). While Rome was occupied battling the Gauls (225 - 222 B.C.), Hamilcar entrenched himself in Spain in New Carthage (modern Cartagena) with his three sons: Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago. After Hamilcar's death, his son-in-law, also named Hasdrubal, signed a treaty with Rome to remain south of the Ebro (Iberian) River (1:46-47). Hannibal's father had had him swear an oath on an altar at the age of nine that he would avenge Carthage (9:11). The stage was set for the Second Punic War.

For this analysis, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the ACSC Strategy Process Model. Chapters Two and Three will deal with Hannibal and Scipio separately, with Chapter Four providing a comparison of the two. A discussion of sources can be found in the appendix. Results of this analysis should further the reader's knowledge of both military history and the strategy process.

Chapter Two

HANNIBAL BARCA

BACKGROUND

Hannibal was the son of Hamilcar Barca, the Carthaginian hero of the First Punic War (264 - 241 B.C.), in which Carthage was defeated. Located near modern Tunis in northern Africa, Carthage was the richest city in the Mediterranean, controlling a vast trading empire that included Europe and Africa (1:43). Rome's victory and emergence as a naval power threatened Carthage's lucrative trade. Hamilcar felt Carthage had been humiliated in the surrender of Sardinia and Corsica. He asked the Senate for permission to reestablish Carthaginian power in Spain as a stepping-stone for an attack on Rome. The landed aristocracy opposed the idea, fearing another war; however, the mercantile middle class, who felt the loss of the ports and markets, favored it. As a compromise, Hamilcar was allowed to go to Spain with a "modest contingent" (1:46-47) in 238 B.C. With him went his three sons--Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago--each of whom would command in the next war.

An excellent description of Hannibal as a young man comes from Livy via noted historian Will Durant:

In addition to a Carthaginian gentleman's schooling in the languages, literatures, and history of Phoenicia and Greece, he had received a soldier's training through nineteen years in camp. He had

disciplined his body to hardship, his appetite to moderation, his tongue to silence, his thought to objectivity. He could run or ride with the swiftest, hunt or fight with the bravest; he was "the first to enter the battle," says the hostile Livy, "and the last to abandon the field." The veterans loved him because in his commanding presence and piercing eyes they saw their old leader returned to them in fresh youth; the recruits liked him because he wore no distinctive dress, never rested till he had provided for his army's needs, and shared with them all sufferings and gains. (1:48)

After Hamilcar's death in 229, his son-in-law Hasdrubal became the commander for eight years (1:47). During this time Rome was concerned about Carthaginian activity in Spain but was having problems with the Gauls, whom they had to defeat militarily. Unable to challenge them directly, the Romans signed an agreement with Hasdrubal that the Carthaginians would remain south of the Ebro (Iberian) River. Hasdrubal governed wisely, consolidating Spanish cooperation, until he was assassinated in 221 (1:47) by a Celtic slave (3:489). While Hasdrubal had been commander, he and Hannibal had visited Carthage. Since he was the soldiers' choice as Hasdrubal's successor, Hannibal was nominated by the Senate and confirmed by the Assembly to become the commander in Spain (2:7-8). Upon the death of Hasdrubal, the troops formally elected the 28-year-old Hannibal their commander, and the action began.

EVENTS

Initially Hannibal set about capturing everything south of the Ebro, with Saguntum last (2:13-15). The Saguntines were

allied with Rome, and as they saw war was imminent, they appealed to Rome for help (2:17). Even as they heard Saguntum was besieged, the Romans chose to send envoys to Spain and to Carthage to avert war (2:19). The envoys failed, Saguntum was eventually taken, and since Hannibal was expected to cross the Ebro, the Roman Senate declared war in 219 (2:45). After wintering in New Carthage, Hannibal called his Spanish troops together and told them of his intent to cross the Alps into Italy (2:59). Leaving a contingent of troops under the command of his brother Hasdrubal to control Spain (2:63), Hannibal crossed the Alps late in 218 (possibly October) with African and Spanish troops, his famous elephants, and Numidian cavalry. (Numidia was a region of North Africa lying southwest of Carthage and populated by nomadic tribes.) After an arduous trek, facing hostile Gallic tribes and equally hostile weather, Hannibal arrived in Italy with about 20,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 horse (2:110-111). He then set about winning over or conquering the nearest Italian tribes, most of whom were Gauls.

The Romans had raised armies totaling 300,000 foot, 14,000 horse, and 456,000 reserves (1:49). They dispatched one of their consuls, Publius Cornelius Scipio, with an army to Spain to stop Hannibal. Hearing that Hannibal had crossed the Alps, Cornelius diverted to northern Italy (the Po River region) to head him off (2:113). The first battle between Hannibal and a Roman consul took place near the Ticinus River, and Hannibal's superior cavalry routed the Romans (2:137). Cornelius was wounded, and

according to the preferred story, his life was saved by his son, also named Publius Cornelius Scipio, who would challenge Hannibal sixteen years later on the plains of northern Africa (2:137).

Carthage had historically relied on mercenaries to augment their cadre of fighters, and Hannibal was no exception. He planned to recruit forces from various Italian tribes who he assumed would be delighted to rid themselves of the Roman yoke. The Gauls whom he encountered in northern Italy appeared to fit that category. While Hamilcar had been operating in Spain, the Romans had been subduing the Gallic tribes of northern Italy, thus incurring their resentment. Where possible, Hannibal treated kindly those tribes that might ally with him immediately or eventually. On the other hand, Hannibal had to provide his own logistical support from surrounding territory, by force if necessary. The Gauls originally maintained neutrality, intending to side with the apparent victor (2:153). Hannibal, needing both supplies and rewards for his mercenaries, had 2,000 foot and 1,000 cavalry lay waste to the countryside up to the Po (2:153). The Gauls sent envoys requesting help to Rome. The Roman Senate was extremely suspicious of Gallic sincerity and loyalty; as a result, only one of the two consuls, Sempronius, was dispatched with a force to the area near the Trebia River.

An initial skirmish between the Roman cavalry and a smattering of the Carthaginian force convinced Sempronius that he was victorious and delay would be counterproductive. He was also aware that consular elections would be held shortly, and he might

be replaced before he garnered his just glory (2:155:157). Since his fellow consul was ill and unable to argue, Sempronius prepared for battle. Hannibal's usual, sound intelligence sources (often Gauls, since they were numerous in both camps) told him of the headstrong, impatient commander and of an imminent encounter. Greatly outnumbered by a Roman force of 18,000 Romans and 20,000 allies--but only 4,000 horse--(2:163), Hannibal chose with great care the appropriate site for an ambush. The Trebia River, a tributary of the Po, ran between the two camps. On his own side of the river, Hannibal found an area overgrown with marsh grass and other foliage that would conceal even cavalry (2:159). Hannibal summoned his brother Mago and told him to pick 100 infantry and 100 horse to hold that location (2:159). Hannibal's forces rose early, breakfasted, oiled their bodies against the cold, and were ready when the signal came (2:161-163). After Mago and his handpicked force were hidden, Hannibal sent some of his Numidian cavalry across the river "riding up to the enemy's gates and discharging missiles against his outposts, to lure him into battle." (2:161)




Figure II-1. The Battle of Trebia River. (9:Atch)

With the flurry caused by the Numidians, Sempronius sent out his cavalry first, then 6,000 infantry, and finally the remainder of his force: he was eager for battle (2:161). It was December and snowing in the region between the Alps and the Apennines; the proximity of the rivers and marshes intensified the cold (2:161). Since the Roman force had been hastily sent forth, neither man nor horse had eaten, nor had any provision been made against the cold. Chasing the Numidians across the river in water chest-high, the Romans suffered from benumbed bodies and, later on, hunger (2:161-163). By the time the Roman force had crossed the river, the well-prepared Carthaginian force was ready to meet them. Hannibal arrayed about 8,000 light-armed troops (Baliares) in front,

with his heavy infantry--"the strength and the flower of his army"--behind (2;163). He formed wings on either side of 10,000 horse, with the elephants stationed outside those (2:163). The Roman troops were scattered in pursuit when the Numidian cavalry turned and made a stand. Sempronius then recalled his advance troops and posted them on the flanks of his infantry (2:163).

Hannibal's light-armed troops began the battle but found the Roman legions too powerful; Hannibal then repositioned them on the wings. The Roman cavalry, already outnumbered by the Numidian cavalry and already wearied, were then faced with a barrage of missiles from the Baliaries (2:163-165). To add to their dismay, the scent and proximity of the elephants panicked their horses. Thus they were routed (2:165).

But the Baliaries, having put the cavalry to flight, were raining missiles on their flanks; the elephants had now charged the centre of the line; and Mago and his Numidians, as soon as the Roman army had passed their ambushade without observing it, started up in their rear, and caused the wildest panic and confusion. (2:165)

Just as the Roman skirmishers, tasked with harrassing the elephants, were about to stampede them back toward Hannibal's forces, Hannibal ordered that they be driven from the center to the extreme left Roman wing, manned by Gallic auxiliaries (2:165). They promptly caused a human stampede, routing the Gauls. As the Romans found themselves beset on all sides, about 10,000 men forced a way out of the trap by slaughtering their way through Hannibal's Gallic mercenaries in the center of the battle (2:167). Thereafter, assorted groups broke out at whatever points they could and fled across the countryside (2:167).

The cold rain and snow cost both sides: the Romans lost the battle, and Hannibal lost most of his elephants. [According to Polybius, only one survived; Livy's version indicates that at least seven survived, only to die in a later battle. (2:167)] That night the remainder of the Romans, under the leadership of the consul Cornelius (recovering from his wounds nearby), made their way to the town of Placentia, where they could winter (2:167-169). As the year 218 drew to a close, both Roman consuls and their armies had been defeated by Hannibal.

For the year 217, the Romans elected as their consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius. Even in winter quarters the Roman armies were given no peace, mainly because of the Numidian cavalry's ranging throughout the area (2:169). Flaminius drew by lot the command wintering in Placentia and advised them to be ready for battle by mid-March of 217 (2:187). Not popular with the Senate (he was a plebeian), Flaminius was determined to begin his consulship in his province (2:187-189). Hearing that Flaminius had arrived while the other consul was still in Rome, Hannibal made his way to the area through a difficult, marshy shortcut (2:205). While making his way through the rugged terrain and unable to apply medical remedies, he lost the sight in one eye (2:207).

Hannibal pitched his camp on the first dry ground available nearby and learned from his advance scouts that the Roman army "lay around the walls of Arretium." (2:209)

He then went to work with all possible diligence to learn the plans and the temper of the consul, the lie of the land and the roads, his resources for provisioning the army--everything, in short, which it was important to find out.

. . . . The consul had been proud and headstrong since his former consulship, and lacked all proper reverence, not only for the laws and for the senate's majesty, but even for the gods. This native rashness had been nourished by the success which Fortune had bestowed on him in political and military enterprises. It was therefore sufficiently apparent that, seeking no counsel, either divine or human, he would manage everything with recklessness and headlong haste; but to make him incline the more toward his characteristic faults, the Phoenician planned to provoke and exasperate him. (2:209)

Having learned what he needed to know, Hannibal proceeded to have his forces "waste the heart of Ecruria" (2:209) and let Flaminius view from afar the havoc he could wreak. Flaminius was unlikely to sit still under any circumstances, but seeing Hannibal laying waste to the fields of his allies, he felt it was a personal disgrace (2:211). Although his war council advised that he wait for Servilius and additional forces before any major undertakings, Flaminius stormed out of the council and vowed to defeat Hannibal before he did any further damage (2:211). Having wasted most of the land between Lake Trasimenus and the town of Cortona, Hannibal had reached a spot "designed by nature for an ambushade," where Trasimenus was closest to the mountains of Cortona (2:213). Between the lake and the mountains was a very narrow track; the ground then widened into a little plain, and beyond that were steep hills (2:213). At that point Hannibal laid out a camp for his African and Spanish troops. The Baliares and the rest of his light-armed forces he placed behind the mountains. He stationed his cavalry near the entrance to the track; hidden behind hillocks, they could wait until the Roman army passed them

and close the pass, trapping the Romans between the lake and the mountains (2:213).




Figure II-2. The Battle of Lake Trasimenus. (9:Atch)

Flaminius had reached the lake around sunset; he chose to attack at first light while there was still mist rising from the lake (2:213-215). Entering the pass, they saw only the enemy in front--and did not see the cavalry behind them nor the Baliares hidden on the mountainsides (2:215). When Hannibal saw that the Romans were enclosed by his forces front and rear and trapped between the lake and the mountains, he gave the signal for all his forces to attack at once.

As they charged down, each at the nearest point, their onset was all the more sudden and unforeseen inasmuch as the mist from the lake lay less thickly on the heights than on the plain, and the attacking columns had been clearly visible to one another from the various hills and had therefore delivered their charge at more nearly the same instant. From the shouting that arose on every side the Romans learned, before they could clearly see, that they were surrounded; and they were already engaged on their front and flank before they could properly form up or get out their arms and draw their swords. (2:215)

Despite valiant fighting on the part of the Romans and Flaminius, the Roman force was either slaughtered or driven into the lake, where a number of them drowned. Flaminius himself fell in the battle (2:219). Less than 10,000 of the original 30,000 men (9:13) managed to escape or survive (2:221).

The Romans were most dismayed when the results of Lake Trasimenus were relayed to the city. On top of that calamity, the Romans received word that 4,000 horse under Centenius had been sent to join Servilius and that the entire force had "fallen into the hands of Hannibal." (2:227) The Romans decided to fall back on "a remedy that had now for a long time neither been employed nor needed--the creation of a dictator." (2:227) Although the consul was supposed to do the nominating, the Romans felt that trying to get a message through the lines to Servilius would be difficult, so they for the first time created a dictator by popular election (2:227). They chose Quintus Fabius Maximus, who assumed absolute command. When Servilius managed to return to Rome, Fabius took command of Servilius' surviving force and augmented it. Since word had been received that Phoenician ships were intercepting supply ships for the Roman army in Spain, Ser-

vilius was dispatched to Ostia to take up the maritime battle (2:239). Although Fabius took his army to the vicinity of Hannibal's force, he refused to meet them in battle (2:239). Concerned about the prudence of the latest Roman general, Hannibal did what he could to provoke him, but to no avail (2:241). Fabius preferred to use his forces periodically for small skirmishes--from a safe position and with refuge nearby--to build up their courage and feeling of success (2:241). Marcus Minucius Rufus, the Master of the Horse under Fabius, however, was impatient and "was only withheld from plunging the nation into ruin by his subordinate authority." (2:241)

Violent and hasty in his opinions and of unbridled tongue, he spoke of Fabius--at first in the hearing of a few, but after a time quite openly to everybody --not as deliberate but as slothful, not as cautious but as timid, inventing faults that neighbored on his virtues; and exalted himself by disparaging his superior--an infamous practice, which has grown in favour from the all too great prosperity of many who have followed it. (2:241-243)

Trying to goad Fabius into action, Hannibal moved toward Casinum, spreading terror and destruction en route (2:245). It became more and more difficult for the Roman forces to stand by and watch as Hannibal destroyed lands under their very noses. As they saw the fields of Campania in flames, Minucius spoke loudly against Fabius, railing against his inaction that was preserving Italy for the Phoenicians (2:249). Fabius was aware of activity bordering on insurrection but held doggedly to his policy of waiting throughout the summer of 217 (2:251). Knowing that Hannibal would soon be leaving the Falernian district in search of a

place to winter and moving through the same passes by which he had entered, Fabius posted two good-sized garrisons in Casilinum and on Mount Callicula. The main army he led back by the same ridges (2:251) and sent 400 cavalry under Mancinus to reconnoiter. Mancinus was one of the young officers who had listened to Minucius, and when he spotted Numidians roaming about the villages, "his heart was suddenly filled with the lust of combat, and he forgot the instructions of the dictator, who had bade him . . . retire before the enemy should see him." (2:253) The Numidians, alternately charging and retreating, drew him toward the camp at the same time they wore down his force. After an initial retreat, the Romans turned, fought, and were decimated (2:253). Mancinus fell in the battle as well.

Fabius meanwhile had established his camp on a hill, overlooking the pass Hannibal had planned to use (2:254). Hannibal again tried to draw his forces into battle by provoking their lines, but the Roman army formation remained firm (2:255). Deciding to try the pass across the ridge of Mt. Callicula, Hannibal feared an ambush. After collecting pine-knots and twigs, his troops tied bundles of them to the horns of about 2,000 head of cattle. Approaching the pass at night, when they reached the foothills and the narrow roads, Hannibal had the horns set afire and the cattle driven before them. The cattle panicked and ran in all directions, causing the Roman scouts guarding the pass to think they were surrounded (2:257). Deserting their posts and failing to return even when they realized the

ruse, the Romans allowed Hannibal's entire army to cross Mount Callicula in the confusion (2:259). Shortly afterward, Fabius was recalled to Rome to oversee necessary religious rites.

While Fabius was in Rome, there were more complaints from the populace at large on his delaying strategy (known since that time as Fabian tactics). Where Fabius preferred to wait and let disease, attrition, desertion and discouragement take their toll on the Carthaginian, the majority was in favor of direct action. This was heightened by the fact that Minucius, the Master of the Horse whom he had left in command, had been involved in a battle "which may be truthfully characterized as having ended with more rejoicing than success." (2:279) Further tarnishing Fabius' image was a clever stratagem of Hannibal's: having located the dictator's farm, Hannibal had all the surrounding lands razed but left his untouched, leaving the impression Fabius was being rewarded for some secret agreement (2:279).

When the news of Minucius' alleged victory was announced in Rome, there was an outcry against Fabius--that he not only was unwilling to fight the enemy but also that he would not accept the victory of another (2:285). Despite Fabius' pointing out that rash challenging of Hannibal had led to the disasters of the past two years, his logic was ignored (2:289).

Fabius returned to his army, where Minucius made himself even more insufferable, demanding joint command with Fabius, i.e., commanding the army on alternate days. Fabius of course refused and split the forces in half, including the cavalry, to

provide an army apiece (2:293). Hannibal was delighted to hear his spies' reports of the rift and immediately set out to ambush Minucius and his force. The battle was easy to provoke and as usual, was based on part of Hannibal's force lying in ambush. As the Carthaginian's forces were massacring Minucius' troops, Fabius, having heard the sounds of battle, came to the rescue. Upon seeing the fresh army appear, Hannibal withdrew (2:299). Having learned his lesson, Minucius that evening told his troops that they ought to rejoin and serve under Fabius, from whom they could obviously learn (2:301).

The Classic Battle: Cannae

Since 217 was drawing to a close, it was again time to elect consuls. The two elected were Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro, whose "antecedents were not merely base but even sordid" (2:289) and who had used the plebeian animosity toward Fabius (2:291) to get himself elected. Varro, who was of the lower class, mightily resented the nobles of the Senate and wished to make a name for himself against Hannibal--which he would indeed accomplish. During the winter months the Roman army was expanded and enlarged, both in infantry and cavalry. Prior to the spring departure of the consuls and the army, envoys arrived from Syracuse's King Hiero, of whom the Romans had made a strong ally during the First Punic War. The envoys brought not only gold but also a thousand "archers and slingers, a force well adapted to cope with Moors and Baliares and other tribes that

fought with missiles." (2:323) Thus augmented, the consuls prepared to renew the war against Hannibal in the summer of 216.

Before leaving the city, Varro made impassioned speeches to the effect that nobles had brought war into Italy and "would not cease to prey upon the nation's vitals, if they had many generals like Fabius." (2:327) Varro promised that he would put an end to the war on the day he sighted the enemy. Paulus, the other consul and a noble, spoke only once the day before their departure and pointed out

. . . that he marvelled--and indeed how should he not?--that a general, who before he knew either his own or the enemy's army or the lie of the land or the character of the country, was already certain, ere he had yet laid aside the dress of a civilian, what measures he must adopt in the field--he marvelled that such a general should even be able to predict to the very day on which he would be giving battle to the enemy! (2:327)

Fabius spoke to Paulus before their departure, reminding him of the fate of Flaminius and warning him that he would have more problems with Varro than with Hannibal (2:329). He cautioned Paulus to choose restraint and prudence, even though this would be unpopular with his troops and with his fellow consul (2:333).

When the consuls and their forces reached the camp, the old and new forces were united and the camps divided. The newer and smaller camp was placed closer to Hannibal's, while the greater part of the army and the "choicest troops" were in the old one (2:335). The Romans had 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, while Hannibal's force was comprised of 19,000 veterans, 16,000 unreliable Gauls and 10,000 horse (1:50). Hannibal was delighted to see

the Romans arrive, since the spoils and supplies available to him had been exhausted, leaving the Spanish troops ready to desert had another two weeks passed (2:337).

Because of their many differences, the two consuls commanded the army on alternate days, a compromise that was to cause their destruction. On a day when Paulus was commander, some Roman troops on their own slew a foraging party with minimal losses of their men. Fearing an ambush, Paulus forbade pursuit; Varro, however, felt that the enemy had slipped through their hands when they might have won the war had they continued (2:337).

Hannibal was not greatly disconcerted by this reverse; indeed he rejoiced that the hook should have been baited, as it were, for the rashness of the more impetuous consul, and especially for that of the new soldiers. All the circumstances of his enemies were as familiar to him as his own: that their generals were unlike each other and were at loggerheads, and that nearly two-thirds of their army consisted of recruits. (2:337)

Believing that the time and place were right for one of his ruses, Hannibal marched his troops out of camp carrying nothing but their weapons and arranged an ambush for the Romans, whom he expected to loot his camp (2:337-339). When the Romans realized that the camp was deserted and when scouts reported all kinds of booty, including silver, had been left behind, the troops clamored for the orders to take the camp, which Varro promptly gave. Paulus reported to Varro as he prepared to ride out that the omens were unfavorable; remembering Flaminius and another general who had been defeated on days of bad omens, Varro reluctantly returned to camp. "On that day, it might almost be said, the very

gods put off, but did not prevent, the calamity that impended over the Romans" (2:341) Although Hannibal returned to his camp that night, he decided to move, according to Livy because of food shortages and pending desertion by the Spaniards, and moved his force near the mountain of Cannae.

[NOTE: The account of Polybius differs in that Servilius, the previous consul, was still in command of the force when Hannibal took the citadel, which the Romans had been using for a granary. When Servilius asked Rome for instructions the Senate decided to give battle and the consuls set forth to take command. The engagement at Cannae was fought seven days after the Romans had set out to follow Hannibal. --2:342-343]

Hannibal pitched his camp "with his back to the Volturnus, a wind that brings clouds of dust over the drought-parched plains." (2:345) [That wind is now called Scirocco.] Such a location would result in his troops' having the wind at their backs and the enemy's facing into the wind and dust. Upon the arrival of the consuls and their army in the area, Hannibal devised his ultimate ambush, which he would accomplish on an open plain. On a day when Paulus was the commander, Hannibal ordered his troops to harrass the Romans all the way up to the gates of their camp (2:349), inciting both the troops and Varro to new heights of impatience for battle. The trap was baited.

When he was in command the following morning [probably 2 August of 216--9:Atch), Varro had all his troops fall in for battle (2:349). Paulus joined them, hoping to dissuade Varro but determined to help if he could. Once the forces were united from their

separate camps, Varro set up his battle-line:

. . . on the right wing--the one nearer the river-- they placed the Roman cavalry, and next to them the Roman foot; the left wing had on the outside the cavalry of the allies; and nearer the centre, in contact with the Roman legions, the infantry of the allies. The slingers and other light-armed auxiliaries were formed up in front. (2:351)

Hannibal crossed to the same side of the river at daybreak, sending in the forefront the Baliaries and other light-armed men and posted each corps in the order in which he brought it over (2:351).

The Gallic and Spanish horse were next to the river, on the left wing, facing the Roman cavalry; the right wing was assigned to the Numidian horse; the centre was composed of infantry, so arranged as to have the Africans at both ends, and between them Gauls and Spaniards. The Africans might have passed for an array of Romans, equipped as they were with arms captured partly at the Trebia but mostly at Lake Trasimennus [Trasimenus]. (3:351)

The battle was about to begin.




Figure 11-3. Battle Array at Cannae. (2:Map 7)

The sun was on the flanks of both armies: the Romans faced south and the Carthaginian force faced north. As planned, the wind, "Volturnus" [or Scirocco], was "beginning to blow against the Romans" and "carried dust right into their faces and prevented them from seeing anything." (2:353)

The battle began between the light-armed troops; then the Gallic and Spanish horse [left wing] under the command of Hasdrubal engaged the Roman right wing in combat very unlike the usual cavalry action. Both cavalries had to attack front to front since they were hemmed in by the river on one side and the infantry on the other (2:353). When the horses met, they came to a standstill, and the riders grappled with one another, dragging combatants from the saddle. For the most part they fought on foot, and Hannibal's cavalry routed the Roman horsemen (2:353).

On the other wing, the Numidian cavalry commanded by Maharbal faced the Roman allied cavalry and began with a ruse. About 500 Numidians, wearing concealed swords under their garments in addition to their customary arms and missiles, pretended to desert to the Romans, were presumably disarmed [except for the hidden swords], and were escorted to the rear of the allied cavalry. When the allied cavalry's attention was concentrated on the Numidian force in front of it, the pseudo-deserters attacked them from the rear, causing terror and confusion. The allied cavalry fled or dispersed, and the Gallic-Spanish horse, who had turned the Roman flank and crossed the rear, rode up to assist in finishing off the left wing (2:357-359). These actions left both wings of Hannibal's cavalry behind the Romans.

The main battle began between the light-armed opposing forces. After a time, the Gauls and Spaniards on Hannibal's front line fell back under the onslaught. The Roman forces crowded from the wings toward the center where the fighting was going on (2:354-355) and where it appeared they were winning. As the line continued to fall back and the Romans followed, the crack African troops and skirmishers were able to flank the Romans on either side. The cavalry approaching from the rear completed the double envelopment [or "closed the box"], leaving the Romans surrounded. The weary Romans were no match for the fresh, experienced African veterans, and they were massacred, including Paulus.




Figure II-4. The "Ambush" at Cannae. (2;Map 7)

Polybius reports that 70,000 were slain, while Livy gives a more conservative estimate of 45,500 foot and 2700 horse (2:363).

Hannibal lost 5700, of whom 4000 were Gauls (9:11). Varro fled, accompanied by "a scant fifty men" (2:365), in addition to approximately 17,000 who escaped to the two Roman camps (2:361). The destruction of the Roman army was complete, and cavalry had established its place in warfare. "It ended the days of Roman reliance upon infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for two thousand years." (1:51)

As the Roman survivors fought their way to freedom that night through Numidians hurling missiles (2:367), Hannibal was congratulated by his subordinates, who told him he'd soon be in Rome. When Hannibal proved cautious about taking Rome, his cavalry officer Maharbal said, "In very truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal: you know not how to use one." (2:369) Whatever the reason, perhaps because he was not particularly adept at sieges, Hannibal did not follow up on his greatest victory and take Rome while it was prostrate with terror and confusion. His failure to act cost him the war.

The Romans had finally learned their lesson: for the next 14 years they observed Fabian tactics with Hannibal around Capua and central Italy. Hannibal never again had the decisive military edge, and the Romans prevented his ever being augmented from Spain. Likewise they prevented his resupply by Carthage. They vested command in Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Scipio who had fallen in Spain; he recognized that the way to defeat Hannibal was to take the war to Africa. Despite lackluster support from the Roman Senate, Scipio trained carefully his raw recruits before

sailing to Africa. After he captured or threatened several cities and towns around Carthage, the Carthaginians summoned Hannibal home to meet the threat.

After 16 years in Italy without a major defeat at the hands of the Romans, Hannibal returned to Africa to meet Scipio on the battlefield. Scipio had studied Hannibal and applied the Carthaginian's methods: analyzing the enemy, choosing a battle site favorable to his own forces, and planning defenses against Hannibal's tactics. He was aided in this by a Numidian, Masinissa, whose nephew's life he had saved, and who brought to Scipio a Numidian cavalry of his own. As a result, Hannibal's army was defeated at Zama, and Hannibal recommended to Carthage that it sue for peace. Thus the Second Punic War finally concluded in 201 B.C.

Hannibal remained in Carthage to help heal the wounds of defeat; he served in public office in 196 and managed Carthage's finances so well that the enormous indemnity was paid to the Romans in full by 188 (1:54). To get rid of him, the Carthaginian oligarchy told Rome that Hannibal was plotting to start a new war. Although Scipio tried to spare his rival, the Senate of Rome demanded his surrender. Hannibal fled to the court of Antiochus III, who was considering war with the Romans, and became his war minister. When Antiochus was defeated in 189, the Romans made a condition that Hannibal be handed over (1:55). He escaped first to Crete, then to Bithynia. The Romans pursued him, finally surrounding his hiding place in 184. Rather than be taken, Hannibal said, "Let us relieve the Romans from the anxiety they have so long experienced, since they think it tries their

patience too much to wait for an old man's death." (1:55) He drank the poison he carried with him and died at the age of 67.

ANALYSIS

The national objective of Carthage was straightforward: to defeat Rome and restore Carthaginian naval and trade supremacy throughout the Mediterranean region. This national objective, however, was not fully supported by all the ruling Carthaginians. The landed aristocracy was against further war with Rome, having suffered from the results of the First Punic War. The mercantile middle class, on the other hand, had lost ports and markets as a result of Rome's victory and strongly wished to recover lost trade. The Barca family, active in the Senate, also favored a return engagement with the upstart Rome; as a result, the "war party" of the Senate was known as the Barcine party. The rhetoric of those favoring war prevailed in the Senate; war was declared, with the merchants financing Hamilcar and later Hannibal in their ventures to Spain and Italy. This division in support for the national objective was in sharp contrast to the Romans, who were united and dedicated to their national interest, survival.

Probably because of the First Punic War, the grand strategy was limited to military warfare rather than economic and political means. In ancient times nation-cities relied more on force than on subtleties of trade and politics, the latter usually being less effective. Although envoys were dispatched at intervals between Rome and Carthage, neither side expected them to find political solutions to problems, other than in negotiating peace terms. Although Hannibal was not a direct player in the

original decision, his father was, and he had been brought up to see the military viewpoint and the use of the military to achieve national goals.

Hannibal's military strategy began with development of his forces. As had other Carthaginians before him, he relied on augmenting his cadre of Numidian and African veterans with allies won over from the regions in which he operated. His long-range aim was to win over so many Italian tribes that there would be a large enough force to defeat Rome completely and break up the alliance of city-states throughout the peninsula. Thus Hannibal recruited a number of Spaniards during his Spanish campaigns who fought ferociously but for spoils--mercenaries who were loyal to their rewards, and in this case, to Hannibal himself for the most part. With his success in Spain and knowing that Rome had crushed the Gallic tribes in northern Italy, Hannibal expected large numbers to support his side and help defeat Rome. This never came to pass: although some Gallic tribes allied with him, others didn't, and the majority of Roman allies he met in Italy remained loyal, despite all his efforts to persuade them to desert. Except with the recalcitrant Gauls, Rome had preferred to forge military-political alliances rather than conduct overt warfare. This progressive view toward diplomacy prevented Hannibal's plan for Rome's destruction from successful execution.

In deploying his forces, Hannibal was forced initially to divide them. While he took one part on the offensive in Italy, the remainder, under command of his brother Hasdrubal, was left in Spain to secure the Carthaginian stronghold. Spain initially

was the only resupply link with Carthage and had to be protected. The Romans, especially the Scipios (father and son), recognized that Spain was Hannibal's lifeline and worked at defeating him there. They kept Hasdrubal from augmenting Hannibal in Italy when it would have been militarily effective, and they cut off the supply lines from Carthage, forcing Carthaginian ships to attempt landing along the Italian coast where they were more vulnerable to Roman attack. Hannibal, unfortunately, had to divide his forces at the outset; later, when he wished to reunite them, geography, distance, and the Romans prevented it.

Hannibal's skills became evident in his employment of the forces available. Always numerically inferior to the enemy-- usually by vast numbers--he compensated for that through total planning and analysis of each situation. His comprehensive intelligence-gathering system enabled him to gauge the environment [even using weather to his advantage on occasion], and to evaluate his opponent's personality and generalship. He chose when and where the battle would take place and arranged to take full advantage of his superior cavalry. He also made the most of Roman reliance on established battle lines for their legions.

Hannibal's military brilliance came to the fore in his battlefield strategy or tactics. In the absence of military doctrine, he created his own, and from these principles, e.g., the value of ambush, he determined different tactics for different circumstances. He designed his lines and formations based on the varying abilities of his forces; at Cannae he expected the Gauls and Spaniards to give way and spring his trap. He was

the master of the ambush, always in complete control of the battlefield environment, and his knowledge of the opposition's leadership and fighting style enabled him to design detailed battle plans. Cannae, his quintessential ambush, set an example that other generals would emulate in succeeding years: during World War II the German general Rommel defeated Allied armor at Tobruk with the same tactics [ironically, in northern Africa] (9:13).

The major influence on Hannibal's operations was the external restraint of economics. He was forced to provide the pay for his forces, both the veteran cadre and his assorted mercenaries. Getting relatively little logistical support from Carthage, he had to resupply himself and provide booty for his troops from the surrounding countryside. In some cases, shortages determined his area of operations and military targets.

Concerning linkage, Hannibal's objective was clearly defined: destroy Rome to restore Carthaginian power. He worked toward that end consistently, believing that sufficient victories would win him the allies who could help him achieve his purpose. It is argued that he could have taken Rome after Cannae, but he was ever aware of his capabilities and limitations. He still had a force that was small in number, leading him to consider that the probable siege required would be lengthy, with time on Rome's side. Had he marched on Rome the day following Cannae, his objective was probably achievable; since the Romans were terrified and confused, they might not have resisted. [On the other hand, their total and unified dedication to the survival of Rome might have resulted in a desperate stand that prevailed.]

The principle of future requires that a leader deal with the unknown effectively by maintaining as many options as possible. Tactically, Hannibal reduced the unknowns by assessing a variety of options and choosing the one best suited for time, place and his opponent. Because Hannibal dealt with reality, he could create an illusion for his enemies that would lead them into whatever trap he set. In each of his major battles, he was in control from the earliest moment the enemy approached.

In conclusion, Hannibal's ultimate failure to achieve his objective was probably strategic rather than tactical. He was unable to develop his forces as he planned, and his employment decisions were tactical rather than strategic. Although capable of analyzing every aspect of a single battle, he appears to have been unable to similarly analyze the results of those victories and to capitalize on them through enlightened deployment. As Maharbal put it, ". . . you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal: you know not how to use one." (2:369)

TABLE OF KEY EVENTS
(All dates are B. C.)

247	Hannibal born	[* date approximate]
221	Hannibal assumed command in Spain	
219	Siege of Saguntum (Spain)	
218	Hannibal crossed the Alps	
	Battle of the Ticenus River	
	Battle of Trebia River	
217	Battle of Lake Trasimenus	
216**	Battle of Cannae	[**probably 2 August]
202	Hannibal returned to Carthage	
	Hannibal defeated at Zama by Scipio (later "Africanus")	
201	End of Second Punic War	
195	Hannibal fled to Antioch's court	
184	Hannibal's suicide	

NO PRINT

Chapter Three

SCIPIO AFRICANUS

BACKGROUND

(NOTE: Since both Scipio Africanus and his father were named Publius Cornelius Scipio, and since the title "Africanus" was awarded following these events, our warrior will be referred to throughout as Scipio. His father, also a key player in the Second Punic War, will be referred to as Cornelius. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, Cornelius' brother and Scipio's uncle, will be referred to as Gnaeus.)

Very little is known about Scipio's life before his emergence as a military leader during the Second Punic War (219 - 201 B.C.). Born around 236/235 B.C., Scipio belonged to one of Rome's leading patrician families. Scipio's first historical appearance was in the year 217, when he served with his father during the initial years of the war.

Hannibal Barca, a Carthaginian from northern Africa (Carthage was located near modern Tunis), had been dedicated since childhood to avenging Carthage's defeat by Rome during the First Punic War. His father, Hamilcar Barca, had been the only military hero to emerge in that first war for Carthage. The initial war had resulted from Rome's expansion throughout the Italian peninsula, which it had united through a series of city-state alliances.

Born of a Carthaginian noble family, Hannibal, like his father before him, was financed by the mercantile middle class. The merchants had lost both money and markets as a result of the first war and wished to defeat Rome and regain Carthage's supremacy in the Mediterranean. Hannibal planned to establish a supply and recruitment base in Spain, then invade Italy. His strategy was to win over enough of the allied city-states to help him destroy Rome. After several battles in Spain in 218, Hannibal crossed the Alps and invaded northern Italy, populated by Gauls. The Gauls had been subdued forcibly by Rome, and they resented it--making them prime candidates for changing their allegiance to Hannibal.

In 219, while still in Spain, Hannibal had besieged the city of Saguntum. The Saguntines were allied with Rome and sent for help from the Romans. The Roman Senate debated the situation and concluded that Hannibal intended to cross the Ebro River, breaking a long-standing agreement between Rome and Carthage. Thus the Romans declared war on Carthage and dispatched Cornelius Scipio, Scipio's father and one of the two consuls (heads of state) that year, with an army to head Hannibal off and rescue Saguntum. In 218 Cornelius sailed for Spain but arrived too late to save Saguntum. He then tried to stop Hannibal at the Rhone River. Hannibal, who did not wish to fight the Romans until he was in Italy, evaded Cornelius and crossed the Alps in late 218. Realizing Hannibal was moving toward Italy, Cornelius left his brother Gnaeus with most of his army in Spain to battle Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother.

Cornelius then sailed "with scanty forces" (2:93) for northern Italy to intercept Hannibal there.

Cornelius met Hannibal's forces at the Ticenus River, in the Po River region; Hannibal's superior cavalry routed the Romans and Cornelius himself was wounded (2:137). According to the preferred story, his life was saved by his son Scipio (2:137), who was serving under his command. (The variation is that Cornelius was saved by a slave who had probably been dispatched by Scipio, who had been observing the battle.) Scipio was not to see Hannibal for another 16 years, when he would meet him in northern Africa to decide the war.

The second reference to Scipio details the events following Hannibal's massacre of the Romans at Cannae in 216. The scanty survivors, having fled to the nearby town of Canusium, made young (19) Scipio one of the two supreme commanders, despite four tribunes who outranked him (2:373). Most of the young nobles felt that the Roman cause was lost and debating whether to flee, wanted to hold a council to talk the matter over (2:375). Scipio, a natural leader at his youthful age, took a few followers to the place the young men were meeting.

Raising his sword over their heads, as they sat in consultation, "I solemnly swear," he said, "that even as I myself shall not desert the republic of the Roman people, so likewise shall I suffer no other Roman citizen to do so; if I wittingly speak false, may Jupiter Optimus Maximus utterly destroy me, my house, my family, and my estate. Marcus Caecilius, I call on you and the others who are present to swear after these terms, and if any refuse to swear, let him know that against him this sword is drawn." Quaking as though they beheld

the victorious Hannibal, all took the oath, and delivered themselves into the custody of Scipio. (2:375)

As a result of Scipio's rallying the young leaders after Cannae, Rome still had a cadre of officers and leaders trying to win.

The third noteworthy event came in 213 with the annual election of officials for Rome. After the two consuls (who served as heads of state) and other officials had been chosen, the two curile aediles (city administrators) were to be elected. When Scipio presented himself, one of the plebeian tribunes pointed out that Scipio should not be selected since he was below the legal age for eligibility. Scipio replied, "If all the citizens want to make me aedile I have years enough." (5:347) He was enthusiastically elected.

In the year 211 both Scipio's father and uncle, Cornelius and Gnaeus Scipio, fell in battle in Spain. The three Carthaginian generals then operating in Spain had divided their forces, and so the two Scipios divided their army to meet them in battle. Gnaeus with one-third of the army met the superior forces of Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal's brother, in battle. Cornelius, with two-thirds of the original army, fought against the other two commanders, Mago and Hasdrubal (son of Gisco). Both Scipios were killed in battle, and Rome was much shaken with the news, assuming that the superior hold on Spain that the Scipios had accomplished was now lost (8:49-50). Nevertheless, the Scipios' actions were critical in the outcome of the war. The three generals, because of political bickering among them, did not follow up on the Roman defeat

and press their advantage to retake Spain. They did not send reinforcements to Hannibal, either, which left him to battle against Rome alone. At no other time would reinforcing Hannibal have been more effective, but in their fight for personal glory at home, the three generals lost the advantage.

In 211, again under unusual circumstances, Scipio was given his first real military command. (He was chosen commander after Cannae but had no forces to be commanded.) It was election time in Rome again; the post this time was proconsul, or the military commander in a province, for Spain. The Senate and citizenry were equally concerned with Spain now since Hannibal was inflicting less damage on Italy. They agreed that since two commanders had fallen there within the past thirty days, a successor must be chosen with great care (6:69). No one was willing to stand for the office until Scipio, aged 24, came forward and announced he was ready to stand. Although normally candidates had to have served in all previous offices (including the consulship), Scipio was unanimously elected. After his election, some had misgivings about his age and about the difficulty of his campaigning where his father and uncle had fallen so recently (6:71). Sensing the discomfort, Scipio called an assembly and "discoursed with such elevation of spirit on his age and the command to be entrusted to him and the war to be waged," (6:73) that the people regained their enthusiasm for their choice.

For Scipio was remarkable not only for his real abilities, but thanks to a certain skill also had from his youth adapted himself to their display, doing most of his actions before the public either

as if they were prompted by visions in the night or inspired by the gods, whether because he also was possessed by a certain superstition, or in order that men might carry out without hesitation his commands and advice, as though emanating from an oracular source. More than that, preparing men's minds from the very beginning, from the time when he put on the manly gown (toga), there was not a day on which he did any business public or private without going first to the Capitol, and after he had entered the temple, sitting down and usually passing the time there alone in seclusion. This custom, which he maintained throughout his lifetime, confirmed in some men the belief . . . that he was a man of divine race. (6:73)

As a result of his charisma and presence, Scipio consistently had made the most of opportunities presented to him in his youth. Now, in pitting himself against the Carthaginians, he would need all his talents to succeed.

EVENTS

In 210 B.C. Scipio, with a fleet of 30 ships (quinqueremes), sailed for Spain (6:75). He took with him 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to reinforce the Roman armies already in Spain (8:56). Headquartered at the town of Tarraco, he met with a number of the Spanish tribes, "doubtless winning their support as much by his ready sympathy as by his confidence, for he had come to Spain to conquer the Carthaginian, not the Spaniard." (8:56) He also visited the army's winter quarters and

warmly praised the soldiers because, after suffering two such disasters in succession, they had held the province, and not allowing the enemy to feel any benefit from their successes, had kept them out of the whole region this side of the Ebro, and had loyally protected the allies. (6:77)

Having encouraged both his own forces and the Spaniards, Scipio retired to winter quarters in Tarraco to meld his disparate forces into a unified, cooperative army and plan his spring campaign (6:77).

His acute strategical insight, in a day when strategy, as distinct from battle tactics, had hardly been born, made him realise that Spain was the real key to the struggle. Spain was Hannibal's real base of operations; there he had trained his armies, and thence he looked for his reinforcements. (4:27)

Scipio followed the approach of his father and uncle before him, which was to take the offensive rather than merely a defensive stance. To retake Spain and defeat the Carthaginians, he had to have a central base of operations which would allow for resupply and incursions into various areas of Spain. In a brilliant stroke of daring, he decided to take the Carthaginian base of operations, New Carthage (modern Cartagena). New Carthage was the only Spanish town with a harbor adequate for a fleet, and its location made it convenient for Carthaginian ships crossing from Africa. It was the location not only of Carthaginian money and war materiel, but also where hostages taken from all over Spain were kept to ensure good faith from the Spaniards. Such an attempt would be possible since the three Carthaginian commanders, on the defensive in different areas, were at least ten days' march away when spring came. The only one Scipio told of his plans was Gaius Laelius, commander of the fleet, since Laelius would have to meet him there with the forces under his command.

The account shows that he was master of two more attributes of generalship--the power to keep his

intentions secret until their disclosure was necessary for the execution of the plan, and the wisdom to realise that military success depends largely on the thoroughness of the previous preparation. (4:29)

Early in the spring of 209, Scipio consolidated his forces at Tarraco and gave them an inspiring speech (according to Livy) on the hopeful Roman position in the war (8:66). Leaving Silanus with 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to guard his rear and his communications, Scipio crossed the Ebro with 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry (8:66).




Figure III-1. Spain. (4:84)

Laelius had been ordered by Scipio to sail the fleet along the coast and time his arrival with that of the land army. "The cooperation of the navy with the army proved excellent The land army also, after a rapid march, reached New Carthage, before

the enemy could move." (8:67) His army was not told of its destination until shortly before its arrival.

On arriving at New Carthage, Scipio encamped on the isthmus in the east, his lines stretching from the sea on the south . . . thus effectively blocking the connection of New Carthage with the mainland. He protected the outer side, i.e. the east, with a palisade and double trench, reaching right across the neck of land, in view of the possibility of the arrival of one of the three Carthaginian armies. The side facing the town was left unprotected, because the position on the hill was quite strong enough in itself and it would leave greater tactical freedom. The fleet under Laelius arrived at the right time, and after drawing it up as if to blockade the town by sea, and reviewing it, Scipio addressed his troops, inspiring his men with the self-confidence and courage which he so obviously felt. (8:88)

The following morning his fleet surrounded the city from the sea with ships armed with various types of missiles; Scipio drew up his men outside the camp and tried to provoke the Carthaginians into a sortie, which meant the Carthaginians would meet him on favorable ground for the Romans and might reduce the numbers of an already outnumbered garrison holding the city (8:88). Mago, who commanded the garrison, took the bait and sent out 2,000 armed citizens and 1,000 of his regular troops (8:89). The latter had been posted on two hills which protected the lagoon and overlooked the sea, and Scipio had hoped to draw them away from those posts (8:89). After heavy fighting and casualties, the Carthaginians fell back into the city, and, having weakened the enemy's strength and morale in the preliminary fight, Scipio turned to an all-out assault on the city walls on as many sides as possible (8:89-90). The fleet beleaguered the city from the south, and detachments of

the army threw themselves in waves against the walls. This initial assault was unsuccessful and Scipio withdrew his wearied troops "as the hour was advanced." (8:90)

After allowing his men to rest for a while, he distributed still more ladders, and recommenced the assault with such energy that "the whole extent of the wall was covered with escaladers." The defenders, who had hoped the danger was averted for the time and were short of ammunition, were thrown into confusion. At the same time the wading detachment prepared to start through the shallow lagoon on a desperate adventure, to try to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Suddenly as the sun began to decline, a squall from the north sprang up which forced the water from the lagoon into the sea. Scipio, who had learnt in Tarraco of the possibility of such a wind, was less surprised than the men who were about to start through the lagoon; in his extraordinary confidence and exultation of spirit, he may even have anticipated some such external help, like the prophets of old Astonished and inspired, the 500 men raced with their ladders through the sinking waters of the lagoon. At the same time Scipio urged the frontal attack more strongly, to divert the enemy's attention away from the lagoon to the gate, where the Romans redoubled their efforts. The wading party soon reached the wall through the now shallow water, and ascended the deserted battlements The Roman escalading party swept along the north wall and, reaching the gate, attacked the enemy from the rear, and thus were able to cut through the bolts, so that those outside could force their way in. (8:90-91).

After that, it did not take long to capture the city. With the surrender of Mago, "the massacre stopped and the pillaging began." (8:92) Scipio spent the night in New Carthage and the next day divided the spoils among the troops. The captured citizens with wives and children he freed outright. Most of the prisoners were made Roman slaves; however, Scipio promised them their freedom when Carthage was defeated if they would fight for Rome. The Spanish hostages were also treated courteously. Scipio assured them of "their safety and their restoration" (8:92) if they would

ally themselves with Rome. Mago and the key Carthaginians Scipio entrusted to Laelius to take to Rome, along with news of the victory (8:92-93). Scipio also acquired the Carthaginian public funds, over 600 talents, and an immense quantity of war munitions (8:93). He had won his operational base, and the Carthaginians had lost theirs in a single battle.

Scipio remained in New Carthage, training and reorganizing his forces to meet the three Carthaginian generals still operating in Spain.

. . . probably Scipio was engaged not merely in keeping his men at concert pitch, but in training them in his new methods. For he had realised the essential weak points of the Roman army of his day, and had planned how best they might be remedied . . . But it was doubtless now and throughout the coming winter that Scipio found time to train and discipline his army to that revolution in tactical method which was to win the Punic War and place him among the world's greatest generals. (8:94)

While Scipio put his army and his fleet through their paces, he also established local weapons manufacture to arm them. It is likely he introduced the use of the Spanish sword, "which led the Romans to the mastery of the civilised world." (8:94-95) He also fortified the city and actively worked the silver mines he had captured as well. The three Carthaginian generals, for whatever reasons, could not or would not try to recapture New Carthage after its fall to the Romans (8:97-98). When all the work necessary had been accomplished, Scipio "garrisoned the now strengthened town, and left with his army, navy, and hostages for Tarraco

where he intended to spend the winter." (8:97) So the year 209 drew to a close.

Scipio's victory probably had more far-reaching effects than solely in Spanish operations. Hannibal had lost his chief recruiting ground, his resupply route, and his primary source of revenue to pay his mercenaries (8:98). It was indeed a turning point in the war.

Scipio had not immediately followed up on his victory at New Carthage; it was advantageous to allow time "for the victory to work its effect on the minds and sympathies of the Spaniards." (8:100) The winter was again spent in preparing his next campaign.

After the capture of New Carthage he held the coast and the sea, so that his fleet was only necessary to maintain his naval supremacy. This was important enough, but it did not need so large a fleet as he now had So, beaching his ships at Tarraco, he broke up his navy and distributed the pick of the crews among his land forces, which were thus increased possibly by some 3000 to 4000 legionaries With this increased force and with New Carthage as a base, Scipio could now think of a more serious offensive than that of his predecessors, and he planned to strike farther south at one of the Carthaginian armies. So in the spring of 208, after Laelius [the fleet commander] had returned from Rome, he withdrew from winter quarters and advanced south. (8:102)

Hasdrubal Barca, meanwhile, had also been making decisions. With the loss of his operating base and with the increasing defections of his Spanish allies, he could not afford to wait indefinitely. He decided to fight: if he won, he could perhaps regain his lost ground, and if he lost, he could make his way to Italy and reinforce Hannibal. (8:103-104) "He would strike the Romans as severe a blow as possible, and then leave Scipio to the care of

Mago and the other Hasdrubal." (8:104) To position himself in a part of Spain still siding with Carthage, he left central Spain and headed south near the town of Baecula (8:104). When he heard of Scipio's pending arrival, he tried to position his forces to best advantage against a numerically superior enemy (8:104-105). He camped on high ground with a river to his rear and to his front level ground, defended by a ridge, wide enough to deploy his troops and deep enough for safety (8:106). It was a strategic location, and although Scipio also camped on high ground, his position provided an inadequate water supply. "Scipio thus was forced to fight on Hasdrubal's ground." (8:106)

The two armies eyed each other for two days. On the third day, despite Hasdrubal's strong position, Scipio decided to make his move, motivated in part by his concern over the possible augmentation of Hasdrubal's forces by one of the other Carthaginian generals. He initially sent forth light-armed troops to reach the level ground where Hasdrubal's covering force of Numidian cavalry and light-armed infantry was positioned (8:107). Despite opposition, the Roman forces achieved their objective. Hasdrubal, who had withheld his main force because he thought a serious attack was unlikely, decided that he could prevail if he held his high ground but that he would have to use his main force to do it. He began to lead his forces out of camp toward the ridge. Scipio sent the rest of his light-armed troops to support the first attack and keep the enemy's attention. Then he divided the main army between himself and Laelius. He took his half up an arroyo on the enemy's

left, and Laelius performed a similar maneuver on the enemy's right (8:107).

Hasdrubal was still busy deploying his troops and had not yet occupied the ground on his wings, when the two Roman divisions swept up on to the terrace on both wings, and fell on the flank of the Carthaginians, while they were still trying to form up. Broken on the wings and fearing to be surrounded, the Carthaginians fell back, and the Roman centre gained the plateau on the top. Hasdrubal saw that the day was lost, and decided not to fight to the death, but in accordance with his original plan hastily collected as many troops and elephants, and as much of his money as he could, and fled to the north. (8:107-108)

Scipio captured the enemy's camp and took 10,000 foot and 2,000 cavalry prisoner (8:108). He also decided not to chase Hasdrubal, but sent a small contingent to a pass through the Pyrenees to keep an eye on his departure (8:112).




Figure III-2. The Battle of Baecula. (4:46)

The tactics employed by Scipio at Baecula were a complete break with the traditional movements of a Roman army, and mark a real turning-point in military development. The Roman army, which was traditionally drawn up in three lines, suffered from two chief weaknesses. It relied mainly on its weight, and while able to advance with devastating force, or to retire, it could not wheel easily and so could be outflanked and surrounded by a more mobile enemy, as had happened at Cannae. Secondly inadequate training of the individual precluded separate action by any of its component parts; it must act as a whole. These weaknesses Scipio tried to remedy by training his troops to new methods. At Baecula he abandoned the traditional tactics of the old three lines--namely, that each line should reinforce the one in front of it by filling up gaps caused by casualties The weak point of Scipio's move was that his light troops were not holding the enemy's main body. He had not yet learnt completely the lesson of Cannae, where the Romans were so held on their whole line that they could not face or withdraw from the Carthaginian flank attack. (8:108-111)

There was one other important aspect of the battle at Baecula, one which would help Scipio win in Africa. Among the prisoners taken after the battle, there was a young man of royal blood who was brought before Scipio. Through questioning Scipio learned that the young man had been raised in a royal Numidian household and that he was the nephew of the Numidian cavalry commander Masinissa, who was fighting for the Carthaginians. The boy, named Massiva, had been told by his uncle that he was too young to fight; he had, however, taken up arms and participated, with the result that he was taken prisoner. Scipio asked Massiva if he wished to return to his uncle, and with the boy's assent, he released him, clad him well, and provided a cavalry escort for his return. This act of kindness was to return to Scipio many times over when he engaged the Carthaginians in Africa. (4:51)

With the departure of Hasdrubal Barca, there remained the two other Carthaginian generals, Mago and Hasdrubal (son of Gisco). Hasdrubal retired to the coast near Gades, leaving Scipio in control of the Mediterranean coast and almost all of eastern Spain (8:120). In 207 Carthage sent replacements for Hasdrubal Barca's decimated or departed force; Hanno and his supplementary force probably raised the Carthaginian strength in Spain to around 40,000 (8:120). Hanno was dispatched with part of the army to recruit from the "more barbarian and neutral tribes of the interior," where he raised some 9,000 men (8:120). To counter Hanno, Scipio sent Silanus, whose force decimated the group of new recruits as well as the army regulars. This left Scipio's advance to the south open and safe. (8:122) Lucius Scipio, Scipio's brother, led the one other incursion and took the city of Orongis, a rich city in the district where Hasdrubal (Gisco) was operating. Both sides retired to winter quarters, with Scipio returning once more to Tarraco (8:123).

By the beginning of 206 B.C., Hasdrubal (Gisco) had probably learned that Hasdrubal Barca had been slain in battle and that Hannibal was isolated in the south of Italy (8:124-125). The original strategy of holding onto Spain until the war was won in Italy was no longer valid, since the likelihood of Hannibal's success had been much diminished.

For Hasdrubal to act on the defensive any longer merely meant delaying matters without helping Hannibal, except in the negative way of holding Scipio in Spain. Hannibal needed help urgently, and it was for Hasdrubal to try to force the issue and stake

it all on one last throw; for if he won, the long-looked-for help could be sent to Italy, while, if he failed, the Carthaginian hold on Spain was for ever lost For even now Scipio was looking across the waters to Africa for the ground of the final duel, and was impatient to force Hannibal's hand. Hasdrubal was ready to risk all to avoid seeing his power slip from him little by little, as one town after another was won over by the enemy. In this decision he was supported by Mago. Early in the year he left Gades with all his forces and crossed Further Spain, recruiting as he went, till he reached Ilipa, when he encamped with a total force of 50,000 infantry and 4,000-5,000 cavalry. (8:125)

Scipio also amassed his forces and combining near Baecula, his army numbered 45,000 infantry and 3,000 horse (8:126). The two armies met in the valley of the Baetis to battle for the final supremacy of Spain, most probably near the town of Ilipa (8:126-127). Scipio had learned from the fate of his father that the Spanish allies could not be wholeheartedly relied on. Since his Roman force was numerically inferior to the enemy, "he devised a plan of using his allies to impress the enemy and of leaving the fighting to his own legions." (8:128)

While Scipio was pitching his camp, Mago and Masinissa, the two African cavalry commanders, launched a surprise attack against him. Having foreseen this possibility, Scipio had stationed his own cavalry in a position to counter such an attack, and the Carthaginians were forced to retire (8:129). For several days there were only minor skirmishes while Scipio let Hasdrubal become familiar with the Roman order for formation. Hasdrubal had always employed his African troops in the center, with the allies on each wing, with the elephants in front of them. Scipio had customarily

also put his veterans in the middle with the allies on the wings, a formation that corresponded to the enemy's (8:129). On the actual day of battle, however, he reversed this order.

The night before the battle, Scipio had ordered his men to breakfast early, arm themselves, and march out of camp as soon as it was light. They did, and Scipio launched an attack against the enemy's camp, using cavalry and light-armed troops (8:130). The Carthaginians barely had time to arm themselves and had no opportunity to eat, which would tell later in the day. (The tactic is reminiscent of Hannibal's defeat of the Romans at Lake Trasimenus.) As the sun rose, Scipio advanced his main troops to the middle of the plain, employing them in the new battle order. With the Spaniards in the middle and Romans on the wings, Scipio's formation reduced the usefulness of his enemy's veterans, who were now facing the Spaniards (8:130). Likewise, the Spaniards would not be involved in the critical battle areas and were less likely to desert, since they no longer faced their countrymen (8:130).

Hasdrubal, meanwhile, had responded to the initial attack on the camp by dispatching his cavalry and light-armed troops to respond and by drawing up his heavy infantry on the plain near the foot of the hill. By the time he realized Scipio had altered his formation, it was too late to alter his own lines correspondingly (8:130-131).

The Romans waited until near the heat of the day to make their move, allowing the Carthaginian forces to feel the effect of hunger and the ensuing weakness (8:131). About noon Scipio made

his move: recalling his skirmishers, he placed them on the wings behind his infantry and in front of his cavalry.




Figure III-3. The Battle of Ilipa. (4:60)

Instructing his Spanish forces in the center to advance very slowly, Scipio led out the forces on the right wing, while Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius led the left wing in similar maneuvers (8:132). After a short advance forward, the right wing turned to the right; the rear ranks (skirmishers and cavalry) did the same. When they began to advance, the head of their column was slightly ahead of the front rank's, to preclude confusion in wheeling. The wing then marched to the right in column parallel to the Carthaginian line, until it had passed the longer enemy front line (8:132-133). The wing then wheeled sharply to the left and marched toward the enemy in column; that completed, it once more formed a

line with the infantry carrying out a left form, the cavalry a right one (8:133). It is most probable that the last movement was carried out after they had formed in sections, rather than trying it as a whole (8:133). At the same time the left wing had performed like movements on the other flank.

The Carthaginian elephants were stampeded and inflicted much damage on the Carthaginian infantry and cavalry (8:133-134). The Roman forces were pitted against hungry and exhausted Spaniards, who were no match for them. The crack African veterans were still in the center, not able to draw the Roman center line (Spanish allies) into battle nor come to the aid of the wings (8:133-134). The Carthaginian wings retreated and finally fled. Before the Romans could press their advantage home, a sudden cloudburst put an end to the fighting, but the battle had been won. Since all their Spanish allies deserted, Hasdrubal and Mago fled with the remainder of their forces, only to be overtaken by Scipio's cavalry and forced to make a stand when the infantry caught up with them. Hasdrubal and Mago made their way to Gades and took a ship for Carthage, leaving the rest of the army to its fate. Roman victory was complete.

The tactics were only a further development of those employed at Baecula. The army once again operated in three separate divisions--the centre and the two wings; while Scipio temporarily abandoned the control of the whole, and led in person one of the wings. It was on the wings that the battle was won, and by the self-reliance and unity of smaller bodies of men. The manoeuvre needed training and discipline, especially the fourth move, the forming line from column, which probably was carried out by sections. By this time Scipio had got an army not only devoted to

their general but one which had imbibed and practised his lesson, and had outgrown the old deficiency in mobility and in individual action. The lesson of Cannae had been taken to heart by Scipio, and was now applied with great brilliance against the enemy. Not only had he remedied the defects of his own army, but by a stroke of genius had been able to compensate for his inferior numbers by a measure which also prevented any disorder among the less trustworthy of his troops. (8:137-138)

Military history contains no more classic example of generalship than this battle of Ilipa. Rarely has so complete a victory been gained by a weaker over a stronger force, and this result was due to a perfect application of the principles of surprise and concentration, that is in essence an example for all time. (4:62)

Scipio now controlled Spain and was able to seriously consider his master plan, taking the war to Africa. He had seen that Spain was the key in the early part of the war; he had also seen that the only way to get Hannibal out of Italy was to carry the war to his homeland, Africa. To convince his rather conservative Roman government that this was the appropriate plan, he began building strong relationships with African princes. The two most important were Syphax and Masinissa. (8:140)

Syphax had ousted Masinissa and, as a result, ruled the area of Numidia. Allied nominally with Carthage, Syphax was Scipio's main target, and sensing the alliance was subject to Syphax's self-interest, Scipio sent Laelius to Africa to meet with him (8:140). Masinissa, who had been commanding cavalry for the Carthaginians, had been secretly won over by Silanus and had returned to Africa to recruit support for Scipio (8:140). It's likely that

part of Masinissa's decision was based on Scipio's return of his nephew Massiva unharmed after the battle of Baecula.

Syphax was most cordial to Laelius, but at most promised Scipio safe passage if he wished to discuss it in person (8:140). After Laelius' return, Scipio turned over command of Spain to Lucius Marcius and Silanus and daringly set sail for Africa, taking only two quinqueremes. As he neared the harbor, he spied the seven quinqueremes commanded by Hasdrubal (Gisgo) and barely evaded them to arrive in port. Hasdrubal also was seeking aid from Syphax, and the two opponents at Ilipa dined together with Syphax shortly thereafter (8:141).

Not only was Syphax won over, but even Hasdrubal was amazed at Scipio's personality, which impressed him more in private life than it had after his military successes. He saw with alarm what an impression Scipio's adroitness and charm in conversation might make on Syphax. No definite results were reached by the meeting--indeed none could have been, for Scipio did not come as an ambassador of Rome with full powers, but in a private capacity What Scipio gained was a great moral advantage. He impressed Syphax with the might and grandeur of Rome, and struck a severe blow at Carthage, who feared nothing more than the consolidation of the tribes in the west, with Syphax at their head and a pro-Roman policy. After a stormy voyage of four days, Scipio reached New Carthage, confident that he had done all that was possible to win a foothold in Africa. He could not foresee that the charms of Hasdrubal's daughter would counteract the impression he had made (8:142)

After conquering several recalcitrant Spanish cities (including Gades) and quelling a mutiny within his own ranks, Scipio returned triumphantly to Rome to sell his plan to the Senate (8:160). Although he received no formal recognition of his conquest of Spain, he was handily elected consul in 206 to serve for

the year 205 (8:160). Although very popular with the Roman people, Scipio faced a serious battle with the conservative, patrician Senate. The argument was whether Africa would be named a province and given to Scipio. Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had given his name to the Fabian tactics used against Hannibal for the past ten years, was Scipio's primary opponent. Scipio had said that if the Senate wouldn't give him Africa, he would take it to the people. Fabius strongly opposed such an action and asked Scipio if he would abide by the Senate's decision. Scipio responded that he would act in the best interests of the state, whereupon Fabius asked the tribunes to intervene (8:161). Having asked for a day's grace, Scipio submitted the matter for Senate decision. The Senate determined that one consul should take Sicily and sail to Africa only if the interests of the state demanded it; the other consul would march against Hannibal in Bruttium. Since Scipio's fellow consul (Licinius Crassus) also served as the Pontifex Maximus, or head priest for the state, he had to remain in Italy. Scipio and his African project had prevailed. (8:161)

Having won his Sicilian command, Scipio prepared for his expedition to Africa as well. Since the Senate had not empowered him to draft troops, he recruited 7,000 volunteers and had 30 ships built. He then sailed in 205 for Sicily, where he began to drill his new army (8:165). His main weakness, typical of a Roman army, was the lack of cavalry. Scipio chose 300 of his best men and reserved them from assignments to various ranks and centuries (7:207).

Then he chose out of the number of the younger men of all Sicily three hundred horsemen, men of high rank and wealth, to cross over with him into Africa. He appointed a day also on which they were to present themselves equipped and furnished with horses and arms. Such service far from home seemed to them formidable and likely to bring many hardships and great dangers on land and sea. And concern on this account troubled not merely the men themselves but also their parents and relations. (7:207)

On the appointed day Scipio elicited from the 300 men what was troubling them and offered to provide a substitute to serve in the place of each man who did not wish to go. The only stipulation was that the men must turn over their horses and arms and train their replacements. Gradually all 300 took advantage of Scipio's offer, and he had a cavalry. (7:209)

Scipio spent the winter of 205 - 204 training his troops, refitting his ships, and winning over the Greeks who predominated in the country, since he needed Sicily as his base of operations for an assault on Africa (8:167). He sent Laelius, his trusted lieutenant, on a raid into northern Africa, which panicked the Carthaginians. Even when they discovered it was Laelius rather than Scipio himself, the Carthaginians were dismayed at the foray and the plundering. Masinissa, who had been in Africa recruiting allies for Scipio, supposedly met Laelius and warned him about Syphax's doubtful allegiance. After Laelius' return, Scipio became involved in saving the town of Locri from Hannibal. After securing it, Scipio left in charge Pleminius, who turned out to be a total despot. The Locrians complained to Rome, and the Senate sent an investigating committee to see if Scipio was responsible, either in person or had knowingly selected such an evil commander. Had he

been found guilty, Scipio would have lost his command; the Locrians wisely did not attribute their misfortunes to Scipio, and he was exonerated. (8:172-173)

Then the Board turned to investigate Scipio's doubtful Greek morals. Scipio skilfully turned the tables by impressing it with his own military preparations. Its members were conducted round the arsenals and magazines, and witnessed manoeuvres of the army and fleet, which were so impressive that they forgot their object and returned to Rome in a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, bidding Scipio sail for Africa with the blessing of heaven. (8:173)

Despite Scipio's emergence with a clean slate, the investigations augured ill for his political standing with the all-powerful Senate.

Meanwhile in Africa Syphax, who was nominally friendly with the Romans, was introduced to Hasdrubal's daughter Sophonisba and soon married her. He then signed a treaty with Carthage. Hasdrubal asked Syphax to notify Scipio of his new alliance and advise him that any previous agreements were nullified. The Numidian messengers delivered the bad news to Scipio; stunned, he feared for the morale of his troops if that word spread. Therefore, he announced that Syphax was urging him to attack at once. (8:175) After completing all preparations, Scipio amassed his force of around 35,000 men and sailed for Africa in the spring of 204 (8:175).

Upon arrival in northern Africa, Scipio looked for a base of operations and found it in Utica, which he unsuccessfully besieged the rest of the year (8:195). Forced to winter on a headland near Utica (later called Castra Cornelia, or Cornelian Camp), he nevertheless dealt a devastating blow to the Carthaginian forces

located nearby. In the spring of 203, he set fire to the two camps (8:203). Laelius and Masinissa were guarding the exits with strong forces and cut down the Carthaginians as they fled the burning camps. Hasdrubal and Syphax managed to escape, but a large part of their armies was destroyed (8:204). After a second loss to Scipio in the Battle of the Great Plains, the Carthaginians sent an envoy to recall Hannibal. Scipio had irrevocably brought the war to Africa. (8:214)

Scipio captured Tunis, within eyesight of Carthage, but was unable to successfully besiege Utica. Masinissa, with the help of Laelius, had gone in pursuit of Syphax in order to win back his kingdom (8:216). His people were delighted at his return, and Syphax was driven back to the borders of his kingdom. At the urging of his wife Sophonisba (Hasdrubal's daughter), Syphax raised a new force, mostly raw recruits, and met Laelius and Masinissa in battle. Although the Roman cavalry was outnumbered, it was reinforced by the light-armed infantry and carried the day. Syphax, whose horse was shot out from under him, was taken prisoner and sent to Scipio. Masinissa then went on to capture Cirta, Syphax's headquarters, where he was met by Sophonisba. Much taken by her charms, he decided to marry her at once. Laelius strongly disapproved and relayed the situation to Scipio (8:210-211).

Remembering Syphax's earlier hospitality, Scipio treated him courteously. Syphax blamed his conduct on his wife (Sophonisba). When Masinissa arrived, Scipio privately chided him on his lack of self-control and his appropriation of Roman booty (8:218).

Abashed, Masinissa wished to keep his wife (!) from falling into Roman hands and thus sent her a cup of poison, which she drank. To divert Masinissa from these events, Scipio on the following day hailed him as king and afforded him great honors (8:218).

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, with Scipio's presence visible daily, debated what to do. Partly in earnest and partly to stall for time until Hannibal could return, they sent a party to Scipio to sue for peace (8:219). Scipio, well aware of Hannibal's possibly imminent arrival, took advantage of the situation and offered the Carthaginians peace terms that were not unduly harsh, but would reduce their influence to within Africa (8:220-221). Then Scipio returned to Castra Cornelia for the winter. Masinissa returned to consolidate his kingdom with the territory of Syphax. Laelius, meanwhile, took Syphax and the good news to Rome. The year 203 drew to a close (8:221).

The Roman Senate, although forming a political coalition against Scipio (8:223), ratified his proposed peace terms with Carthage. However, with the election of two new consuls, both wanted Africa as their province, no doubt to share in the glory that was finally accruing to Rome. A supporter of Scipio's (one of the few left) got the Senate to put the question to the Romans, who again unanimously gave Africa to Scipio (8:224). Then the Senate let the consuls ballot for it, and the lot fell to Tiberius Claudius. Although he outfitted 50 ships and was named commander with Scipio, Claudius' procrastination and, later, storms at sea kept him from reaching Africa in 202 (8:224).

"While the peace negotiations of 203/2 were in progress, Hannibal left Italy." (8:225) Sailing in autumn of 203, he left a country where he had fought unconquered for 15 years; he had failed to achieve his goal, but was probably eager to test himself against Rome's most brilliant general (8:225). He returned early in 202, and the Carthaginians, their faith in him undiminished, decided to fight for it once again (8:226). Because there was still a truce and peace negotiations were still underway, they broke the truce by ambushing a Roman ship carrying Scipio's ambassadors (8:226-228). Scipio knew without doubt that he would meet Hannibal in battle for control of the Mediterranean world.

THE CLASSIC BATTLE: ZAMA*

(*NOTE: It is extremely unlikely that the battle took place at "Zama," of which there were several. Polybius called the locale Margaron, while Livy refers to it as Naraggara, which is modern Sidi Youssef. Since historic folklore has continued to refer to the site as Zama, for simplicity I will continue to use that name. Those interested in a full discussion of possibilities should review 7:543-554 and 8:310-317.)

Although hostilities resumed almost immediately, neither Scipio nor Hannibal was ready to meet the other in combat. Both generals lacked a cavalry force: Scipio sent immediately for Masi-nissa to bring reinforcements; Hannibal recruited a Numidian cavalry from Tychaeus, an ally of Syphax (8:230). Hannibal also recruited the son of Syphax, Vermina, who had not given up hope of

regaining his father's kingdom. Hannibal had used Hadrumetum as his winter quarters and operating base since his return (8:230). As Scipio moved west and inland to join with Masinissa, Hannibal moved his camp from Hadrumetum to Zama with the probable intent of catching Scipio before he acquired cavalry (8:230).

While at Zama, Hannibal dispatched three spies to discover the Roman position and camp. According to Polybius, the spies were caught but instead of being punished, were shown parts of the Roman camp that Scipio wished them to see. They returned to Hannibal with the additional news that Masinissa and his cavalry had arrived and reinforced Scipio (8:230). Hannibal then requested a meeting with Scipio, to which the latter agreed. Hannibal then moved his camp to a hill opposite Scipio's; the following day they met on the plain between them (8:230). Hannibal pointed out that the fortunes of war varied and that Scipio was now in the superior position. He then proffered peace terms to settle the war without further combat. (Liddell Hart remarks on the irony: it was Scipio the father that Hannibal first met in battle; now it is the son from whom he seeks peace.--4:170) Since his terms were more generous than Scipio's had been originally and since the Carthaginians had since ambushed his ambassadors, Scipio declined and the two withdrew to prepare for battle (8:232-235). (For Livy's more poetic version, see 7:473-485.)

For this decision on the following day two general's far and away the most distinguished and two of the bravest armies of the two wealthiest nations went forth, on that day either to crown the many distinctions heretofore won, or to bring them to naught.

Consequently a wavering between hope and fear confused their spirits; and as they surveyed now their own battle-line, now that of the enemy, while weighing their strength more by the eye than by calculation, the bright side and at the same time the dark was before their minds. What did not occur to the men themselves of their own accord the generals would suggest in admonition and exhortation. (7:487)

At dawn the following morning, in the fall of 202 B.C., the two brilliant generals formed their battle lines. Scipio drew his infantry up in the usual three lines, but instead of forming the cohorts in close contact, he left wide aisles between them where the elephants could go without affecting the ranks (7:489). On the left wing were Laelius and the Italian cavalry; on the right, Masinissa and the Numidian horse (7:489).

The open passages between the maniples of the front line troops Scipio filled with velites, the light-armed of that day, under orders that, upon the charge of the elephants, they should either flee behind the ranks in the line, or else dashing to right and left and closing up the maniples in the van, should give the beasts an opening through which they might rush among missiles hurled from both sides. (7:489)

Hannibal placed in the front 80 elephants, a greater number than he had ever used before (7:489). His front line consisted of 12,000 mercenaries--Ligurians, Celts, Balearic islanders and Moors--who were heavy-armed troops. Aligned with the elephants were his light-armed troops. Behind the front line and distinct from it was a second line, comprised of Libyans and Carthaginians. They were not to reinforce the mercenaries in front of them, but to advance with them. A third line was drawn up at a greater distance behind than the second to the first line.

. . . it was the Old Guard, the veterans who had fought for so many years in Italy and had crossed over with Hannibal. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, thus increasing still more the distance between themselves and the second line. All three lines were approximately the same strength. On the wings were posted the cavalry, Hannibal's weakest arm, the Numidians on the left, the Carthaginians on the right, perhaps 4000 in all. (8:238)




Figure III-4. The Battle Array at Zama. (4:176)

Hannibal had placed the elephants in the front to cause a panic in the Roman lines, but unexpectedly the Romans sounded horns, which frightened them (8:240).

Some turned back on the Numidians, who were also attacked by Masinissa; thus the Carthaginian left wing was exposed. The rest fell on the Roman velites, and were driven to the rear along the passages, which Scipio had left open, or fled to the right out of the action. Laelius used this disturbance to attack and drive off the field the Carthaginian cavalry. So the enemy's elephants and cavalry were accounted for, and the infantry could close. The Roman lines advanced keeping their

usual distance; the first two Carthaginian lines followed suit, but their third line remained still. At first the Carthaginian mercenaries made good headway, but Roman discipline and equipment began to tell. The Carthaginian second rank did not support their first, which thought itself betrayed, and so retreated, attacking all the Carthaginians it encountered. The Carthaginians had to fight against their mercenaries, and then came into contact with the Romans. However, pressing on, they confused some of the cohorts of the hastati. These were supported by the principes, with the result that the greater number of Carthaginian mercenaries were cut to pieces. Hannibal did not allow the survivors to mix with his own men, but forced them out on the wings. (8:240)

At this point both forces regrouped and then clashed again. All fought bravely until the Roman cavalry returned from pursuit and attacked the Carthaginian rear. Although survivors tried to flee, few escaped (8:241). The Romans lost 1500 men, compared with the Carthaginian 20,000 lost and a like number of prisoners (8:241). Hannibal fled without halt to Hadrumetum; thence he went to Carthage to plead for peace (8:249-250). Despite some clean-up operations remaining (8:249-250), the Second Punic War was finally over.

Terms were finally agreed on, and a formal end to the war occurred in 201 B.C. Hannibal remained in Carthage to help heal the wounds of both the war and the peace terms. Scipio returned to Rome a triumphant war hero but a political outcast. In the years that followed, he continued to serve Rome as statesman when he could, but his party was out of favor.

As an interesting footnote, according to an ancient source (Acilius), the two generals met again years later in the court of King Antiochus circa 196 B.C. In one alleged conversation, Scipio

asked Hannibal who he thought was the greatest captain; Hannibal replied Alexander had been. When Scipio asked about second place, Hannibal replied that Pyrrhus must be.

On Scipio proceeding to ask, "Whom he esteemed the third?" Hannibal replied, "Myself, beyond doubt." On this Scipio laughed, and added, "What would you have said if you had conquered me?" "Then I would have placed Hannibal not only before Alexander and Pyrrhus, but before all other commanders."

This answer, turned with Punic dexterity and conveying an unexpected kind of flattery, was highly grateful to Scipio, as it set him apart from the crowd of commanders, as one of incomparable eminence. (4:218)

Publius Cornelius Scipio, Africanus, died in 184 B.C., only a few months after his greatest rival committed suicide.

ANALYSIS

The Roman national objective was a simple one: survival, through the defeat of Hannibal. Whatever political differences there were between the patrician families represented in the Senate, they were united in doing whatever was necessary to counter the threat Hannibal presented. The Roman people were also united in the cause. Despite the heavy losses (especially in the early years), citizen conscripts served willingly and each increase in taxes to finance the war effort was met by an increasingly burdened people. The entire Roman populace, including the slaves, was behind the government.

The grand strategy was dictated by circumstances. Rome had relatively little economic or political power compared to Carthage. Furthermore, the First Punic War years earlier and

Hannibal's offensive beginning in 219 required response with military force if Rome was to survive and expand from an agrarian society.

Since the Romans elected consuls annually and those consuls served as the commanders in chief for the armies, there were a variety of strategies and tactics applied. The younger, more impetuous consuls met Hannibal head on, and as a result, their armies were decimated and several consuls died in the process. Quintus Fabius Maximus had argued for delay (Fabian tactics), which would preserve Roman life and wear Hannibal down through attrition over time. This worked successfully against Hannibal from 216 until Scipio fought him in 202. Cornelius and Gnaeus Scipio (Scipio's father and uncle) both believed that Spain was the key to Hannibal's defeat and that offensive action was the only way to take Spain. Unfortunately, they did not live to see their strategy prove correct.

Scipio's strategy was indeed his strong point. Recognizing his adversary's genius on the battlefield, he carefully planned how best to fight that adversary. He saw quickly, as had his father, that the reinforcements--money, supplies, and recruits--from Spain enabled Hannibal to operate successfully in Italy. He further saw that once the lifeline to Spain was cut, Hannibal would live entirely off Italy if possible. The only way to get Hannibal out of Italy was to take the war to Carthage. Despite political infighting and opposition, he managed to convince his government (through the people) that his strategy was correct;

as a result, he received more support and reinforcements than Hannibal did from Carthage.

To Scipio development of his forces was critical. Not only was it necessary to acquire the requisite number of men, but it was also necessary to have a disciplined, thoroughly trained army if he planned to fight Hannibal. Thus he spent winters in Spain and Sicily training and training his troops with exercise after exercise. His forces were not pitted against Carthaginians until he was assured that they could maneuver and operate as would be necessary in the field. To acquire the necessary fighting force, he not only won Spaniards over to his cause, but also, as a result of his statesmanlike handling of prisoners, won an ally in Masinissa, who enabled him to counter Numidian horse with Numidian horse on the plains of Africa.

Scipio's overall military strategy required that his forces initially deploy to Spain and then Africa. In contrast to the many who tried to conquer Hannibal in Italy, Scipio recognized that the Second Punic War could only be won away from home, hitting where it would hurt his enemy most. He aggressively pursued that strategy, despite political opposition.

Scipio also realized that employment of a potent ground force was not enough. He used the budding Roman navy at New Carthage, and he worked to acquire a cavalry that could ride against the Numidian ones serving the Carthaginians. Planning was critical, and all evidence supports Scipio's thorough and thoughtful planning prior to any military engagement.

While Scipio's battlefield strategy, or tactics, were considered innovative for Roman warfare, he obviously had carefully studied Hannibal's successes and applied that knowledge for his own use. His early morning raid on Carthaginian forces at Ilipa is strongly reminiscent of Hannibal's victory at Lake Trasimenus. Both did not allow the enemy to breakfast and wore them down faster as a result. The double envelopment moves, outflanking the enemy, at Baecula and Ilipa show an understanding of why Cannae was Hannibal's greatest success. His thorough knowledge of his adversary's tactics was evident at Zama, where he forestalled Hannibal's tactics with countermeasures of his own and then applied Hannibal's customary use of the cavalry to secure a Roman victory.

Scipio's linkage was strong, in that he regularly dealt with both his governmental body and the people of his country. The annual elections for posts and his dealings with the Senate, both by birth and by position, kept him closely tied to the national will and the national objective.

In applying the principle of future, Scipio saw many options not seen by his predecessors in the war. His thorough and detailed planning, accompanied by practice where possible, enabled him to eliminate many of the uncertainties about what he would face in battle. Additionally, careful study of the enemy enabled him to think out beforehand everything necessary to take advantage of his enemy's weakness and play to his own strength.

Scipio obviously dealt with reality rather than illusion. From his evident study of Hannibal he was well aware of the illusions that misled his predecessors and was very knowledgeable about what he could actually expect from the Carthaginians, both in Spain and in Africa.

Scipio's forte was obviously in his military strategy. His daring vision was not limited to the military sphere: as the military commander he made innovative diplomatic maneuvers such as his trip to visit Syphax and his generous treatment of the conquered, including his initial peace terms with Carthage. Scipio had the long-range vision needed to be the ultimate victor. Although Hannibal's superb genius at tactics won him many battles, it was Scipio's strategy that won the war.

TABLE OF KEY EVENTS
(All dates are B. C.)

236/5*	Scipio born	(*date approximate)
217	Served with Cornelius Scipio at Ticinus River	
216	Rallied the survivors after the Battle of Cannae	
213	Chosen to serve as aedile	
211	Elder Scipios killed in Spain	
	Elected proconsul for the province of Spain	
210	Arrived in Spain	
209	Capture of New Carthage	
208	Battle of Baecula	
206	Battle of Ilipa	
	Elected consul after return to Rome	
205	Sailed to Sicily as consul	
204	Sailed to Africa	
202	Battle of Zama	
201	End of Second Punic War	
184	Scipio died	

Chapter Four

COMPARISON

Hannibal Barca and Publius Cornelius Scipio "Africanus," despite being on opposite sides, had much in common. Both came from patrician families with political clout in the national government. Hannibal Barca's father, Hamilcar, had convinced the Carthaginian Senate to wage another war against Rome; thus the Barcine party was known as the "war party" in the Senate. The Scipios were equally influential in the Roman Senate, resulting in each Scipio's serving as consul at least once. Both men had the customary "gentlemen's schooling" while growing up.

Both leaders grew up watching their fathers serve in the military. Hamilcar Barca led the expedition to Spain, and Hannibal grew up in his father's camp. From the age of nine, when his father had him swear an oath of revenge, Hannibal prepared to wage war against Rome. Scipio's father and his uncle were citizen soldiers whose commands had come from serving in public (political) office. The young Scipio saw his father wounded at Ticinus River and witnessed the carnage at Cannae as well. The fathers of both men died while in military service, leaving their sons to continue where they left off. Both fathers also left their sons with an appreciation for taking the offensive to achieve their goals.

Both men were endowed with innate leadership abilities, including courage, daring, and especially charisma. The personal magnetism of Hannibal and Scipio impressed strangers and won them the unswerving loyalty of their men. This was especially evident in Hannibal's ability to get total personal loyalty from many of his mercenaries. In the interest of fostering alliances, both men were also diplomatic, as illustrated by their leniency toward most of their prisoners. Their individual courage and daring were amply demonstrated through their conduct in battle.

Both Hannibal and Scipio were also thorough planners. Neither man chose to deal with uncertainties if he could avoid it. Each studied his adversary: his character, his military style or tactics, and his potential weaknesses. Both men took advantage of terrain, weather, and any other environmental factor that could give their armies the edge. Both forced enemy armies to fight on empty stomachs, weakening their force. Before entering battle, each of them carefully considered every possible aspect and potential strength or weakness in their plans or the enemy's. Their careful analyses resulted in victory after victory during their campaigns.

They also shared common limitations in their military capability. Both fought wars out of their own countries; as a result, logistics was a consistent problem. Both Hannibal and Scipio convinced their governments to let them proceed, but neither was fully supported. Scipio, however, received more support over time than Hannibal; with the exception of his campaign to Sicily and

Africa, Scipio was provided citizen conscripts and large supplies of food and arms to field his army. Hannibal, on the other hand, had problems with resupply from Carthage even before Scipio's conquest of Spain and almost always had to feed and pay his army from the local lands in which he operated.

Despite the many similarities, Hannibal and Scipio differed in several respects. Of the two, Hannibal was more the quintessential military leader with his talents and expertise concentrated in that area. Scipio, while an extremely able military leader, was in many ways a statesman: his dealings with the Spanish and Syphax, his peace terms for Carthage on both occasions, all speak to his diplomatic vision. Scipio also became aware of Rome's metamorphosis from an agrarian society to one that was capable of economic, political and military power--and expansion into empire. With this realization, Scipio did much both during the Second Punic War and thereafter to foster Rome's growth and maturation as a power.

The key difference, however, between Hannibal and Scipio lay in their particular geniuses. Hannibal was unparalleled in battlefield strategy (tactics), and unconquered, he waged war in Italy for 15 years. But following Cannae, Hannibal lacked the strategic vision to follow up on his battlefield victory by marching on and seizing Rome. Scipio, on the other hand, was strategically brilliant, allowing him to realize that victory lay first in Spain, then in Africa. His long-range vision made the critical difference. Scipio gained his tactical skills for battlefield victories

from studying Hannibal and the latter's devastating successes against Rome. It was strategy that won the Second Punic War.

In conclusion, both Hannibal and Scipio were indeed great warriors with a number of similarities. The study of these two men not only offers the student insight through application of the ACSC Strategy Process Model, but also provides an interesting contrast in importance between strategy and tactics. By analyzing the military and political accomplishments of both warriors, the student can evaluate the art of warfare in context of a time and place: an ancient world, but one with all the elements we find in societies today. Learning from the past can only improve the insight and abilities of the modern professional officer.

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APPENDIX

ABOUT SOURCES

Since Carthage was razed to the ground following the Third Punic War, there are no primary sources per se that provide the Carthaginian version of the Punic Wars. Classicists, including the editors of The Oxford Classical Dictionary, consider two sources to be "primary" concerning these events. The first source is Livy, a Roman who wrote a version of Roman history with the intent of glorifying Rome and its past. The second is Polybius, a Greek tutor who lived with the Scipio family and wrote a history based on interviews with the family and with Laelius, Scipio Africanus' commander of the fleet and trusted lieutenant.

Of the two, Polybius is considered the more accurate and less prone to embroidering statistics and circumstances. Livy, on the other hand, used Polybius as well as other sources to create his Roman history. Both of these sources are available in a form of interlinear translation, i.e., Latin or Greek on the left-hand page with the English translation on the right-hand (or facing) page. Anyone wishing to study the events of the Second Punic War should start with one of these versions, since they are the closest to a literal translation available. The volumes of Livy that are available in the AU Library are excellent since the translator indicates in footnotes those areas in which Livy differs from Polybius' account.

Those interested in a readable and scholarly account of Scipio Africanus should request the H. H. Scullard book, Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War, through inter-library loan. The volume by Liddell Hart, A Greater Than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus, covers the battles accurately but is given to hyperbole and unsubstantiated conclusions.