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STUDENT REPORT

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF
CHANCELLORSVILLE

MAJOR ELTON RAY STEPHENSON

84-2490

"insights into tomorrow"

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Chancellorsville and provide historical support for the principles of war espoused in Air Force Manual 1-1. The first section describes the battle. Section Two analyzes how the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia applied and/or violated the principles of war. The final section reinforces the impact of the principles of war by providing discussion questions concerning the application of the principles of war during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

The relative sizes of the opposing armies at Chancellorsville impacted on the strategy and tactics that were applied. Though references often differ as to the specific numbers of Union and Confederate troops which participated in the various phases of the battle, the proportional differences in the strengths of the two armies are consistent. To obtain consistency throughout this paper, the West Point Atlas of the Civil War, edited by Esposito, 1962, is used as the only source of troop strengths for each participating army.

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Section One

DESCRIPTION OF BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

In April 1863 General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and Major General Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac were facing each other across the Rappahanock River at Fredericksburg, Virginia. Hooker was the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, having replaced General Ambrose E. Burnside, who had suffered a humiliating defeat from Lee at Fredericksburg in December 1862. President Lincoln gave the command to Hooker in January 1863 with the mission to, "Go forward and give us victories" (10:90). This section describes Hooker's only attempt to accomplish his mission--the Battle of Chancellorsville. This section begins with a brief description of the organization, force development, and force deployment of both armies prior to the battle. Next, Hooker's plan for the Chancellorsville Campaign is presented. Then a description of Hooker's execution of his plan and Lee's reaction is provided. The section concludes with the outcome of the Battle of Chancellorsville.

ORGANIZATION

Army of Northern Virginia

The Army of Northern Virginia was organized with two corps commanded by Lieutenant Generals Longstreet and Jackson (10:73-74). During the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee was without the services of Longstreet and two of Longstreet's divisions which were in the Carolinas, "to gather badly needed supplies and to check secondary Union movements that were threatening Richmond" (8:73). Present with Lee at Fredericksburg were Major General Anderson's and Major General McLaws' Divisions of Longstreet's Corps, Jackson's II Corps of five divisions and Major General Stuart's Cavalry Division (10:73-74). Lee's total personnel strength for the Chancellorsville Campaign was approximately 60,000 compared to Hooker's 128,000 (4:84).

Army of the Potomac

Major General Hooker made two significant organizational changes after assuming command. First, he established an intelligence and counterintelligence network (8:73). This intelligence organization consisted of riders, scouts, spies and informants which provided Hooker with a reasonable estimate of the strength of Lee's army--an advantage previous commanders did not have (8:73).

Second, he integrated the numerous cavalry units into one Cavalry Corps under the command of Brigadier General Stoneman and:

Within a month his troopers were doing what no other Union Cavalry in the East had yet done: carrying the fight to J.E.B. Stuart [Lee's Cavalry Commander] and his Virginia horse (8:73).

In addition to his Cavalry Corps, Hooker organized the remainder of his army into seven Infantry Corps commanded by Major Generals Meade, Slocum, Howard, Sedgwick, Couch, Sickles, and Reynolds (10:374).

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Army of Northern Virginia

Appendix A depicts the Army of Northern Virginia's supply artery. General Lee's supply lines around Richmond were critical to the survival of his army. His main supply line was the railway which connected Richmond and Fredericksburg. Richmond was his main supply base (10:66). The Virginia Central Railroad connected his main supply base with forward and intermediate supply bases at Hanover Junction, Hamilton's Crossing, Guiney's Station, and Gordonsville (10:66).

By the time of the Chancellorsville Campaign, Lee was not experiencing an ordnance problem of a significant magnitude to impact on his army's performance at Chancellorsville (10:66-67). Lee was, however, unable to adequately clothe his army and had critical problems with:

. . . the procurement of food, forage and horse replacements, and the addition of recruits to make good the losses suffered during the recent campaign. The shortage of food in the Army of Northern Virginia was so acute as to threaten the dissolution of the forces (10:65-66).

Though Lee's army was experiencing significant problems with absences without leave (10:68), the morale of the soldiers is believed to have been high (3:260) and, ". . . they found confidence and courage in the knowledge that they had never been beaten" (8:73).

Army of the Potomac

Hooker assumed command of an army which had severe morale and discipline problems (10:14). Hooker deserves credit for solving these problems (3:260). Desertions and absences without leave were, ". . . occurring at the rate of some two hundred daily" (10:14). In February, ". . . over 85,000 officers and men were absent without leave" (10:14). The sick rolls were also large.

More than ten percent of the officers and men were being carried on the sick roll. . . . The common complaints of dysentery, typhoid fever, and a variety of respiratory diseases accounted for much of the illness, but there were also cases of scurvy caused by diet deficiencies (10:14-15).

Hooker solved these problems with reforms:

. . . designed to improve the sanitary and social aspects of the camp, [and] soon reversed the trend towards demoralization within the Army of the Potomac Hooker's Chief of Staff, General Dan Butterfield, introduced a system of corps and division badges to give the men common symbols of which to be proud (and also for quick identification). Mock battles and grand reviews brought back a spirit of efficiency and professionalism to the army (8:73).

By April 1863, Hooker had his army ready to return to battle and, ". . . many qualified observers believed it to be at the peak of condition" (10:15). Hooker's efforts were effective and:

By the end of April it [the Army of the Potomac] was the largest, best organized, and best equipped army ever to be assembled on the continent (3:260).

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

The deployment of both armies prior to the Chancellorsville Campaign was dictated by both Commanders' concern for the defense of their respective capitols and lines of communications (see map at Appendix B). The armies faced each other across the Rappahanock River in Eastern Virginia at Fredericksburg. The Army of the Potomac was located on Stafford Heights at Falmouth, which lay north of and adjacent to the Rappahanock (10:87). The Army of Northern Virginia was located in a strongly fortified defensive position southeast of and looking down on Fredericksburg (10:88). Lee's defensive line extended for approximately 25 miles from Port Royal to U.S. Ford (8:73). From this position Lee repeatedly repulsed the attacks of the Army of the Potomac under Burnside in December 1862.

HOOKER'S EMPLOYMENT PLAN

Hooker had his mission, "Go forward and give us victories" (10:90). More specifically, Hooker was to, ". . . keep Lee's army from threatening Northern territory and to destroy it as soon as possible" (10:33). To accomplish his mission, Hooker wanted to make Lee abandon his strongly fortified defensive position and fight at a time and place conducive to the Army of the Potomac (6:186). Therefore, Hooker's concept of operation was to lure Lee out of his defensive position. The con-

cept was sound. Hooker planned to split his army into two wings for what today's doctrine would call an envelopment (see map at Appendix C). Hooker's left wing, consisting of Sedgwick's VI Corps, Reynolds' I Corps, and supported by Sickles' III Corps would cross the Rappahanock River below Fredericksburg at Franklin's Ford (10:113). The mission of the left wing, under Sedgwick's command, was to conduct demonstrations or holding attacks against Lee to divert his attention from the right wing (10:96).

The right wing, consisting of Howard's XI Corps, Slocum's XII Corps, and Meade's V Corps, would march about 20 miles northwest of Falmouth to Kelly's Ford and secretly cross the Rappahanock River (10:95-96). The right wing, under the command of Slocum, would then cross the Rapidan River at Germanna and Ely's Fords (10:95-96). After completing the river crossings, the right wing would then swing east, through the Wilderness, toward Fredericksburg, for about ten miles before halting momentarily to consolidate at Chancellorsville. Hooker would join and take command of the right wing at Chancellorsville (10:95-98).

The march through the Wilderness would be difficult. The Wilderness consisted of thick undergrowth, small streams, and swamps which made movement and control of maneuvers extremely difficult (10:98-102; 4:85). The dominant terrain in the Wilderness was a hill at Hazel Grove (4:85). With the exception of Hazel Grove, the Wilderness precluded the operation of artil-

lery and cavalry except on the few roads and, ". . . the full force of numbers could not be employed because there was little opportunity to deploy or maneuver" (4:85).

The right wing would have to move approximately two or three miles east of Chancellorsville before clearing itself from the Wilderness. After quickly consolidating at Chancellorsville the right wing was to continue its eastward march to uncover U.S. and Banks Fords for the crossing of Hooker's center (10:96).

The center would consist of Couch's II Corps minus Gibbon's Division which would remain at Falmouth (9:127). Couch's mission was to draw Lee's attention to U.S. and Banks Ford while Slocum and Sedgwick maneuvered their wings into position (10:113). Couch would then prepare to deploy across the river to join the right wing (9:127).

Hooker's plan also had high expectations for the new Cavalry Corps. Stoneman was to begin operations with his Cavalry Corps two weeks prior to the main effort. Stoneman was to cross the Rappahanock approximately twenty miles northwest of Fredericksburg with his 10,000 man cavalry minus Brigadier General Pleasonton's Brigade (10:97). After crossing the river, Stoneman's mission was to sweep into Lee's rear:

. . . for the purpose of turning the enemy's position on his left, throwing the cavalry between him and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking retreat, and tend to his discomfiture (10:104).

Pleasanton's Cavalry Brigade would remain with Hooker to screen maneuvers and river crossings, exploit successes and conduct reconnaissance (10:97).

Appropriate logistical support was critical to the success of the Army of the Potomac and Hooker planned accordingly (10:102).

Pack mules would replace the cumbersome ration and ammunition wagons, officers would dispense with their comfortable wall tents and strip down to bare essentials. Finally there would be pontoon bridges in place and on time, if the rivers had not subsided to permit fording (10:102).

Hooker's logistical plan was designed to support the rapid movement and river crossings required to execute his strategy.

If Hooker successfully maneuvered his army in accordance with his plan, he would surprise and place Lee in a precarious situation. Four days after leaving Falmouth, Hooker would have Lee flanked with Slocum's right wing of 54,000 while Sedgwick's left wing of 59,000 conducted a holding attack and Stoneman's 10,000 man cavalry disrupted Lee's rear. Each of Hooker's wings would consist of the approximate force of Lee's total army of 60,000. Such odds and positioning would appear to offer certain victory. The next step in Hooker's planning should have specifically addressed how he planned to exploit the success of his maneuver. If Hooker looked that far in advance he failed to execute accordingly.

THE EMPLOYMENT

On 27 April 1863, Hooker's plan started to unfold as shown at Appendix C. The Cavalry Corps, which by this time was to

have been raiding Lee's supply lines around Richmond, was still north of the Rappahanock. Stoneman did not get his cavalry across until after most of the right wing had crossed (10:111). Two weeks earlier Stoneman's indecisiveness coupled with heavy rains delayed departure of the cavalry. Stoneman's Cavalry finally rode south only to be virtually ignored by Lee and had little impact on the Battle of Chancellorsville (10:106; 4:91).

Slocum's right wing (Howard's XI Corps, Meade's V Corps, and Slocum's XII Corps) started crossing the Rappahanock at Kelly's Ford the night of 28 April (9:130-132). The right wing's crossing of the Rappahanock was completed with the crossing of Meade's Corps on 29 April (9:132). The XII and XI Corps moved on to Germanna Ford and crossed the Rapidan River. The V Corps crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford. Sedgwick also began moving his left wing to Franklins Ford below Fredericksburg to begin his demonstrations in front of Lee (4:84). Sickles' III Corps was held in reserve and Couch's II Corps, minus Gibbon's Division, arrived at its position near Banks Ford (4:84). Late on 29 April, Hooker ordered Couch to depart Banks Ford and join the right wing at Chancellorsville (4:85).

During the evening of 28 April, Stuart reported to Lee that Federal forces were moving toward Kelly's Ford (10:128). On 29 April, Lee received another report that Stuart had captured soldiers from three Federal corps that crossed at Kelly's Ford (10:128). Both reports were vague however, and Lee was also aware of Sedgwick's demonstrations at Fredericksburg and

Couch's at U.S. and Banks Fords (10:113.129). Lee refused to react too hastily and without caution. He moved the three divisions on his right flank closer to Fredericksburg and ordered Anderson to move two of his brigades from Banks Ford (left anchor of Lee's defense) to Chancellorsville to delay the Federal advance (4:84).

On 30 April Hooker's right wing began to arrive at Chancellorsville (6:186). The advance elements drove Anderson back from Chancellorsville to an imaginary line between Tabernacle Church and the Turnpike and Plank Roads where he established a defensive position (see map at Appendix D) (10:151). By the afternoon of 30 April all three of Hooker's right wing corps had arrived at Chancellorsville ready to consolidate and move out of the Wilderness to uncover U.S. and Banks Fords (2:240). However, before they could depart, Hooker made his first mistake. He sent Slocum an order to stop at Chancellorsville and wait for reinforcements from Sickles' Corps (4:84). This delay gave Lee the time he needed to react whereas, "A prompt advance would have gotten this force [Hooker's right wing] into more open ground, cleared Bank's Ford, and halved the distance between it and Sedgwick" (4:84).

On 30 April Lee decided Sedgwick's demonstrations were a diversion and Hooker's right wing was the main effort (6:186-187). Though Lee now realized what Hooker's plans were, he was still in a difficult position.

If he stayed where he was he would be crushed between Hooker and Sedgwick. If he turned to meet the Chancellorsville thrust he would have to strike at a force

that could quickly be made much stronger than his, and John Sedgwick would be right on his heels. If he tried to retreat toward Richmond, Hooker could easily cut across, strike him in flank, and cut off his escape. All of the choices open to him were bad . . . (2:240).

During the evening of 30 April, Couch's Corps crossed at U.S. Ford and joined Hooker's right wing (10:374). At the same time Lee was deciding to attack. In Lee's words, "It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of our army give battle to the approaching column" (6:186-187). After Lee made his decision, he ordered McLaws' Division to reinforce Anderson. He also ordered Jackson to move his corps toward Chancellorsville to join McLaws and Anderson (10:174). Lee had taken his first bold gamble. He had split his forces leaving only Major General Early's 10,000 man division of Jackson's Corps to oppose Sedgwick at Fredericksburg (4:85; 3:261).

Instead of Hooker taking advantage of Sedgwick's numerical superiority at Fredericksburg and ordering an attack, he detached Sickles' Corps from Sedgwick with the order to join the right wing (10:147). Sickles arrived at Chancellorsville on 1 May bringing the strength of the right wing to about 73,000 (4:86). Hooker could have recovered from his overnight delay at Chancellorsville by using his 73,000 to quickly attack McLaws, Anderson and Jackson. He delayed his decision. Finally, at 1100 on 1 May, Hooker gave the order to move out (10:176). The situation of 1 May is depicted at Appendix E.

The quick night move of Jackson and McLaws to join Anderson, surprised Hooker (10:187). At 1200 Hooker learned that Sykes Division of Meade's Corps had been pushed back through Hancock's Division of Couch's Corps on Turnpike Road three miles east of Chancellorsville (6:187; 4:85). Hancock stopped McLaws' advance (4:85). On Hancock's right Slocum's Corps was holding its ground on Plank Road (4:85). Both Hancock and Slocum were in a strong position on open ground (4:85). Meade and the remainder of his corps was moving east on River Road to the left of Hancock (4:85). Meade had not met any resistance and was in position to easily flank Lee's right as depicted in Appendix E (4:85). Hooker appeared to lose his nerve and at 1300 made his second major mistake by ordering the right wing back to Chancellorsville and into a defensive posture (6:187; 10:189). Hooker gave his order over the protests of his corps commanders (4:85). Couch was especially upset and wrote,

Proceeding to the Chancellor House, I narrated my operations in front to Hooker, which were seemingly satisfactory, as he said: "It is alright, Couch, I have gotten Lee just where I want him, he must fight me on my own ground." The retrograde movement had prepared me for something of the kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets, was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man (10:190).

Hooker then sent word for Sedgwick to order Reynolds' Corps to join the right wing. By the end of 1 May, Hooker was still in the Wilderness preparing to fight a defensive battle. His

initial strategy was to lure Lee out of his fortified position. He was successful. After arriving at Chancellorsville, Hooker exclaimed that Lee must, ". . . either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him" (6:186; 2:241).

Hooker was right, Lee came from behind his defensive positions and prepared to give battle, but Hooker appeared surprised that Lee did not "ingloriously fly" (6:186). According to Major General J.F.C. Fuller, in his study of Lee, "He [Hooker] little knew his enemy, and this mental picture [that Lee would retreat] of him proved his ruin" (6:186). Regardless of the reason, by the afternoon of 1 May, Hooker had relinquished his role as the initiator and lost the momentum for which he had so diligently planned. Lee immediately started looking for the best way to exploit his opponent's indecisiveness.

At 2200 on 1 May, Jackson and Lee met to plan their next move (6:187). Lee knew he could not assault Hooker's strong front. Thinking offensively, Lee asked, "How can we get at these people?" (5:520). Stuart's scouts provided the answer (10:195). The right end of Hooker's position was defended by Howard's XI Corps. Howard's defensive positions were facing south and he was not defending his right flank (10:196). This, of course, meant that Stuart had found Hooker's right flank exposed and vulnerable. Lee decided his action quickly. Jackson would march his corps of 26,000 across Hooker's front, around to his right flank, organize battle lines in the Wilder-

ness, and attack (4:86). Lee would hold Hooker in place and occupy his attention with about 17,000 men by actively demonstrating (3:261; 4:86).

Lee's decision for the flanking attack was another bold gamble for four reasons. First, it required Lee to split his forces into three separate locations (Early at Fredericksburg, Jackson moving to Hooker's flank, and Lee holding Hooker), each too far away to support the other (4:86). Second, it required that Jackson move his corps parallel to Hooker's front for about 14 miles to get to Hooker's right flank (4:86). Third, it required Lee to hold Hooker's 73,000 with 17,000. Finally, even if Jackson succeeded in getting on Howard's flank, he would have to form his battle lines and coordinate his attack through the dense Wilderness. Nevertheless, Lee gambled wisely (6:188). Jackson was a master at maneuvering forces. Additionally, Lee knew Hooker had sent his reconnaissance capability, Stoneman's Cavalry, to the south, and he also knew the forest would help conceal the small force he was using to hold Hooker (6:188). If Hooker had used his cavalry for reconnaissance he would have discovered Lee's weakness (1:188).

Jackson found a road to Hooker's right flank (Appendix F). However, a portion of the road ran along uncovered high ground which exposed Jackson's move. Therefore, Hooker knew Jackson was moving across the Union's front (1:178; 9:154). This discovery provided Hooker with another opportunity to regain the initiative by either attacking Jackson's moving flank or Lee's

numerically inferior holding forces. Hooker, however, appeared satisfied with his own defensive posture and ordered Sedgwick to attack Major General Early's Division at Fredericksburg and pursue, what seemed to be, a fleeing Lee. At 1600 he sent the order to Sedgwick to, ". . . capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. . . . We know that the enemy is fleeing. . . ." (7:217) Less than two hours later this fleeing enemy caved in Hooker's right flank.

Even though Hooker and Howard received numerous intelligence reports of Jackson's move and the possibility of a flank attack, they both preferred to believe that Lee was fleeing (1:177-184). Hooker took two "half-hearted" actions. He allowed Sickles, at the urging of Sickles, to use a portion of his corps to harass Jackson's column--an action Jackson all but ignored (1:178; 10:216-217). Second, he ordered Howard to strengthen his flank, but did not follow through with his order by inspecting Howard's position (10:219-220). Howard, agreeing with Hooker that Jackson was withdrawing and believing that an attack through the Wilderness on the XI Corps' flank was impossible, did little to strengthen the right flank. Therefore, at 1715 on 2 May, Howard and Hooker were unprepared, if not surprised, when Jackson's massed forces charged out of the Wilderness routing the XI Corps and began rolling up Hooker's defense toward Chancellorsville (6:189). The attack is depicted at Appendix G. Darkness and the Wilderness halted Jackson's advance around 2030 (6:189). Jackson, however, was intent on

keeping the momentum as soon as he could reorganize his confused corps and find a way to exploit his success.

During the night of 2 May, Jackson went on a personal reconnaissance mission to gather information for his next move. What Jackson had in mind will never be known. He did not confide with his subordinates concerning his plan and he was mortally wounded by his own outposts while returning from the reconnaissance (1:188). Stuart assumed command of Jackson's Corps around midnight (6:190).

Stuart was also an aggressive general and wanted to continue the offense, but he had problems. His new corps was disorganized and chaos was prevalent throughout the Wilderness. Stuart's major problem was that he:

. . . had no information . . . concerning his [Jackson's] plans . . . and he was of course ignorant of the position of the troops . . . the fall of Jackson developed the fact that no one of his subordinates had received from him the least intimation of his plans and intentions . . . (6:190).

Again, Hooker had an opportunity to snatch victory from defeat, but again he delayed and acted defensively.

Stuart's and Lee's forces were still separated on the morning of 3 May (see map at Appendix H). Hooker's superior numbers could have overrun either Stuart or Lee. He did not attack. At 0845 Stuart continued the attack but was repulsed (6:190). The attack shook Hooker and at 0945 he gave the order to withdraw (6:90). The withdrawal caused Hooker to give up the high ground of Hazel Grove which was critical for the

employment of artillery. Stuart did not waste time moving his artillery to Hazel Grove where he could place destructive fire on Hooker's new defensive position (4:88). By 1200 Hooker had pulled back into a tight defensive horseshoe covering the Rappahanock bridgeheads required for his escape (2:243). Hooker's withdrawal allowed Stuart to reunite forces with Lee and occupy Hazel Grove (2:243; 4:88).

An hour earlier Sedgwick, responding to Hooker's order of the previous day, finally broke through Early's Division at Fredericksburg and started moving for Chancellorsville (6:191). Sedgwick's attack divided Early's Division. Part of Early's Division withdrew on Orange Pike Road while the remainder withdrew on Telegraph Road (6:191). When informed of Sedgwick's capture of Fredericksburg, Lee responded, "We will attend to Mr. Sedgwick later" (5:545). While continuing to hold Hooker, Lee sent McLaws to help Early's force on Orange Pike Road where they engaged Sedgwick at Salem Heights (6:191). On 4 May Lee continued to pressure Sedgwick and virtually ignored Hooker's 90,000 (Reynolds' Corps was then available to the right wing) by sending Anderson's Division to reinforce McLaws and Early as depicted on map at Appendix I (6:191; 4:87). By the evening of 4 May Sedgwick was pushed north of the Rappahanock and Hooker had had all he could take (10:344). The following day he withdrew his army across the river and back to Falmouth (6:191).

In summary, though Hooker had several chances to regain the initiative, he lost the battle because:

. . . at the very moment when initiative and firmness were essential, [Hooker] threw the principles of objective, offensive, maneuver and mass to the four winds (3:261).

Whereas, Lee was successful because he, ". . . demonstrated the tactical application of the principles of offensive, objective, mass and economy of forces" (3:261).

OUTCOME

Lee drove the Army of the Potomac from Virginia's soil. The Army of the Potomac's personnel losses were 16,845 and the Army of Northern Virginia 12,764 (6:191). Lee's losses, however, were proportionately greater, and more devastating. He had lost the aggressive Jackson. Lee also knew the victory was incomplete for he had allowed the enemy's escape to fight again. However, the confidence of Lee's army had never been higher as Lee began reorganizing and preparing to invade the North (1:121).

The morale of the Army of the Potomac was down again (3:265). Hooker's generals were close to mutiny (2:243). Couch even stated that he would not again serve, "under such an officer" (10:298). On 28 June 1863, after invading the North, Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had a new commander. Hooker had been replaced by Meade (3:265).

Section Two

BATTLE PRINCIPLES

This section analyzes how the principles of war, contained in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, were or were not applied at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Quotes from AFM 1-1 are used to define each principle. After the definition of each principle, examples are provided concerning how the principle was or was not applied by the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia.

OBJECTIVE

The objective defines what the military action intends to accomplish and normally describes the nature and scope of an operation. An objective may vary from the overall objective of a broad military operation to the detailed objective of a specific attack.

Army of the Potomac

The objective of the Army of the Potomac was to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia (10:33). Destruction of an opposing force requires aggressive offensive action, relentlessly pursued until the enemy can no longer fight or loses the will to fight. Hooker's decisions at Chancellorsville were made as though his objective was the defense of Chancellorsville rather than the destruction of Lee's army. Two examples indicate that Hooker lost sight of his objective. First, after he enveloped Lee's

army with two wings (each the approximate size of Lee's total army) he failed to maintain the initiative required to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. Instead of pushing his right wing out of the Wilderness past Chancellorsville on 29 or 30 April, he waited till noon on 1 May. This delay gave Lee the time he needed to react and initiate his own offensive action. Second, Hooker's decision to fight a defensive battle at Chancellorsville indicated that he had forgotten his objective. He was content to watch Jackson's corps (about one-half of Lee's total army) move across the front of the Army of the Potomac without initiating an offensive action. If Hooker had recalled his objective, he would have taken advantage of Lee's split forces and, as a minimum, vigorously attacked Jackson's column. Hooker's failure to remember his objective and act accordingly, resulted in Jackson's successful attack on Hooker's right flank. Also, as Hooker demonstrated, the commander who does not adequately apply the principle of objective will find it difficult to apply other key principles such as offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, and timing and tempo.

Army of Northern Virginia

. . . to survive, the Confederacy needed but to maintain successfully its existence as a separate nation, whereas the North, to preserve the Union, must defeat its enemy in battle and occupy his territory. Hence, from Lee's viewpoint, to permit his opponent the first move was consistent with his strategic defensive mission and in no way implied any intention of surrendering the tactical initiative (3:260).

Lee allowed Hooker the first move (crossing the Rappahanock) but, he immediately began to look for a way to actively pursue his objective other than from a static defense. Though Lee's military strategy was the armed defense of the Confederacy, his immediate tactical objective was to destroy the Army of the Potomac or, as a minimum, drive the enemy from the soil of Virginia. Lee's objective provided him with a vision of the results. With a specified objective he could logically look for the best way to apply the appropriate principles of war. Unlike Hooker, Lee's decision making was guided by his objective. For example, as soon as Lee verified that the Union right wing at Chancellorsville was the main effort, he reacted to gain the offensive initiative required to accomplish his objective. He split his forces to meet Hooker's right wing and then gained the initiative by again splitting his forces for Jackson's flank attack. Lee continued to pursue his objective until Hooker slipped from his grasp back across the Rappaharock.

OFFENSIVE

The principle of offensive is to act rather than react. The offensive enables commanders to select priorities of attack, as well as the time, place and weaponry necessary to achieve objectives.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker's initial objective, the destruction of Lee's army, should have driven him to offensive action. The Army of the Potomac's envelopment of Lee initiated the type offensive action needed to accomplish Hooker's objective. But, after his right

wing arrived at Chancellorsville, Hooker relinquished the offense in favor of the defense. This allowed Lee to become the initiator and Hooker the reactionist. Hooker's choice of defending rather than continuing his pressure on the Army of Northern Virginia provided Lee with the opportunity and the time necessary to choose his priorities plus the time and place of attack. Hooker violated the offensive principle at Chancellorsville on several occasions. On 30 April he halted his army for the evening at Chancellorsville which provided Lee an additional eleven to twelve hours to react by reinforcing Anderson's Division with McLaws' Division and Jackson's Corps to block Hooker's advance. On 1 May when Hooker did try to advance his right wing he abandoned his offensive action at virtually the first sign of enemy contact even though his forces had made significant gains and Meade's Corps had flanked the Confederate forces. On 2 May Hooker failed to take advantage of the situation after Lee split his forces into three locations for Jackson's flank attack. He had several choices for offensive action--Jackson's moving column, Lee's holding force, and/or Early's Division at Fredericksburg. Finally, Hooker could have regained the offensive by ordering a counterattack on the morning of 3 May against the divided and unorganized forces of the Army of Northern Virginia. Instead he chose to withdraw, giving up the key terrain of Hazel Grove, and establish another defensive position.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee's actions at Chancellorsville provide an outstanding example of the offensive principle. Of particular importance

is Lee's example of how to use the offense in a strategic defensive operation. Lee used the reconnaissance of Stuart's Cavalry and the probing of Anderson's Division (at Chancellorsville on 29 April) to obtain the information needed to select an offensive course of action. Also, Lee effectively took advantage of each mistake Hooker made to gain the offensive. For example, when Hooker stopped at Chancellorsville, Lee grabbed the chance to obtain the offense. Rather than wait on Hooker to launch an attack out of Chancellorsville, Lee found Hooker's weakness on the right flank and did not hesitate to exploit it with Jackson's flank attack.

SURPRISE

Surprise is the attack of an enemy at a time, place and manner for which the enemy is neither prepared nor expecting an attack. . . . Surprise is achieved through security, deception, audacity, originality, and timely execution. . . . Surprise gives attacking forces the advantage of seizing the initiative while forcing the enemy to react. When other factors influencing the conduct of war are unfavorable, surprise may be the key element in achieving the objective.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker's incomplete application of the principle of surprise provides an excellent lesson. The definition of the principle of surprise includes the word "attack." Though Hooker's maneuver of his right wing to Chancellorsville surprised Lee, he violated the principle by not exploiting the surprised Lee with a mutually supporting attack from the right and left wings. As Hooker demonstrated, a surprise maneuver to fight a defensive

battle is not a correct application of the principle of surprise.

The beginning of Hooker's execution of the Chancellorsville Campaign is an excellent example of how to obtain the opportunity to apply the principle of surprise. He successfully used security, deception, and audacity to surprise Lee with the maneuver of the Union right wing to Lee's left flank and rear. Before sending the bulk of his cavalry off to the south, Hooker used it to secure or screen the maneuver of the right wing across the Rappahanock and Rapidan Rivers. Sedgwick's and Couch's demonstrations provided deception and reinforced Lee's belief that an attack would be launched, ". . . within the line Port Royal-Banks Ford . . ." (10:130). Hooker demonstrated audacity by the bold maneuver of his right wing. This bold move contributed to Lee's surprise because, ". . . such an exhausting round-about approach march by infantry, involving the passage of two rivers and the tangle of unmaneuverable forest . . . would be the last thing Lee would expect . . ." (10:98). The surprise provided Hooker with the initiative. He had Lee "pinched" by two forces, each the approximate size of Lee's total force. Hooker, however, evidently forgot the requirement for attacking after he had accomplished the surprise. He began to delay and think defensively rather than rapidly and aggressively pursue his objective. His plan and initial execution for surprise were almost perfect, but when the moment came to obtain the "pay-off" he faltered and threw away the advantage he had gained by surprise.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee surprised Hooker by attacking his right flank at Chancellorsville. Obtaining surprise requires audacity and Lee's execution of the flank attack has been called a "masterpiece in audacity" (6:185). Lee exhibited boldness by splitting his army into three locations to execute Jackson's 2 May flank attack. The climax to Lee's audaciousness however, was the movement of Jackson's Corps across Hooker's front and into the Wilderness for the flank attack. Lee's boldness probably contributed as much as any other factor to the success of the flank attack. Hooker was aware that Jackson was moving across his front. He was also informed that Jackson might be moving for a flank attack. Hooker did not, however, believe an attack on his right flank was possible because of the Wilderness. He also believed Jackson's movement was Lee's attempt to escape from the center of two superior Union forces. Therefore, though Jackson's flank attack may not have been a classic example of surprise, it accomplished the same purpose--it caught the enemy unprepared.

SECURITY

Security is taking continuous, positive measures to prevent surprise and preserve freedom of action. Security involves active and passive defensive measures and the denial of useful information to an enemy attack through defensive operations and by masking the location, strength, and intentions of friendly forces.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker's violation of the principle of security directly contributed to his defeat at Chancellorsville. After his right wing crossed the rivers on 29 April, he dispatched his Cavalry Corps south of Richmond. Therefore he did not have sufficient cavalry available at Chancellorsville to screen his operations or gather intelligence to prevent a surprise. Effective cavalry operations could have screened his right flank and possibly prevented Jackson's flank attack. Also, effective use of cavalry could have informed Hooker that Jackson's maneuver was not a withdrawal and that Lee was holding the right wing in place with a force less than one-third the size of Hooker's. Finally, Hooker failed to provide security for his defensive forces by not insuring that Howard had followed his order to strengthen the right flank. Hooker did not personally inspect or send one of his staff officers to insure that Howard was adequately defending the flank.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee provided security for Jackson's maneuver to Hooker's right flank by diverting Hooker's attention with active demonstrations using a force less than one-third the size of Hooker's. Additionally, Stuart's Cavalry contributed to the security of the Army of Northern Virginia by keeping Lee informed of the movement of Hooker's right wing. Lee used Stuart's intelligence to move Anderson to protect his army's left flank and to determine that Hooker's right wing was the main effort.

Anderson's initial contact with Hooker's right wing secured Lee's left flank by contributing to Hooker's delay and providing the time necessary for Lee to deploy the bulk of his army to Chancellorsville.

MASS

Concentrated firepower can overwhelm enemy defenses and secure an objective at the right time and place. The impact . . . can break the enemy's defenses, disrupt his plan of attack, destroy the cohesion of his forces, produce the psychological shock that may thwart a critical thrust, or create an opportunity for friendly forces to seize the offensive.

Army of the Potomac

Prior to the Chancellorsville Campaign, Lincoln told Hooker, ". . . this time, put in all your men" (4:91). Despite Lincoln's plea, "Hooker allowed nearly one-third of his army to stand idle during the heaviest fighting" (4:91). As a result, Hooker never did achieve superior mass over Lee even though his army was more than twice as large as Lee's (4:91). He did not mass Sedgwick's forces at Fredericksburg for an attack on Early's Division. He did not mass his forces at Chancellorsville for an attack on Lee's 17,000 with his 73,000 on 2 May. The worse violation occurred on 3 and 4 May when Hooker sat passively in his defensive position without committing his 90,000 man right wing in a mass attack on Lee. Rather, he allowed Lee to release two divisions to counter Sedgwick's march to Chancellorsville.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee had to carefully plan for the application of mass at Chancellorsville because of his numerical inferiority. Though he split his forces several times, which would appear to violate the principle of mass, he managed to mass the necessary forces at the opportune time to take advantage of an enemy weakness. For example, after he found the weakness of Hooker's right flank, he sent sufficient forces (Jackson's Corps minus Early's Division) to provide the mass required to exploit the weakness.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

. . . economy of force permits a commander to execute attacks with appropriate mass at the critical time and place without wasting resources on secondary objectives. War will always involve the determination of priorities. . . . Commanders at all levels must determine and continually refine priorities among competing demands for limited aerospace assets. This requires a balance between mass and economy of force, but the paramount consideration for commanders must always be the objective. . . .

Army of the Potomac

Hooker's failure to adhere to the principle of objective resulted in his failure to apply economy of force. He certainly did not have limited assets compared to his enemy. However, without an objective, he could not establish priorities required to achieve a balance between mass and economy of force. Both mass and economy of force require a commander to act decisively to gain the initiative. Once Hooker lost the initiative at Chancellorsville he made no attempt to regain it; thus, violating the principle of economy of force by not effectively

using his army to gain the offense to achieve a specified objective.

Army of Northern Virginia

At Chancellorsville, Lee provided a text book example for the application of the principle of economy of force. He was able to make the correct decision in economizing his forces because he never lost sight of his objective to destroy the Army of the Potomac or, failing that, drive it from the soil of Virginia. To accomplish his objective Lee established priorities. First, he recognized that Hooker's right wing at Chancellorsville was the main effort. Therefore, his number one priority was to destroy the right wing. Once that decision was made he had to determine the best way to economize his forces. He decided to leave one division at Fredericksburg to hold Sedgwick's left wing to give sufficient time to take care of Hooker at Chancellorsville.

His next decision concerned how to destroy the right wing with the remainder of his forces. After discovering Hooker's undefended right flank, he again had to economize his force to achieve mass for the attack on Hooker's flank. Therefore, Lee held Hooker in place with a force of approximately 17,000 while Jackson moved his 26,000 to Hooker's flank for the attack. Lee used his forces wisely. The division at Fredericksburg gave Lee the time he needed to attack the right wing.

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the movement of friendly forces in relation to enemy forces. Commanders seek to maneuver their strengths selectively against an enemy's weakness while avoiding engagements with forces of superior strength. Effective use of maneuver can maintain the initiative, dictate the terms of engagement, retain security, and position forces at the right time and place to execute surprise attacks. Maneuver permits rapid massing of combat power and effective disengagement of forces.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker applied the principle of maneuver in about the same way he did the principle of surprise. That is, he used both principles to obtain a significant advantage over Lee, but failed to follow through with his initial success.

The maneuver of Hooker's three corps right wing was a brilliant exercise in coordination, and command and control. He maneuvered them to Lee's left flank and rear by coordinating two river crossings and through the Wilderness to Chancellorsville. The maneuver was successful. He flanked the Army of Northern Virginia before Lee could react. However, after arriving at Chancellorsville he threw away the advantage the principle of maneuver had given him. Throughout the remainder of the campaign he did not apply the principle of maneuver except to disengage his forces.

Like other principles (mass, economy of force and offensive) Hooker did not adequately apply, his reluctance to continue the maneuver of his army can be traced to his failure to apply the principle of objective. He allowed Lee the advantage of maneuver at Chancellorsville by choosing to fight a defensive battle.

It must be recognized however, that Hooker did a superb job of using maneuver to disengage his army for its escape back across the Rappahanock River.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee's application of the principle of maneuver was a key factor in his success at Chancellorsville. His bold maneuver of Jackson's Corps for the attack on Hooker's flank incorporated all the elements of the definition of maneuver. He used his strength, Jackson's proven ability to effectively maneuver his corps, against Hooker's weakness, his undefended right flank, while avoiding an engagement with Hooker's superior force. Jackson's maneuver produced mass and positioned Southern forces at the right time and place to execute a surprise attack and gain the initiative.

TIMING AND TEMPO

Timing and tempo is the principle of executing military operations at a point in time and at a rate which optimizes the use of friendly forces and which inhibits or denies the effectiveness of enemy forces. The purpose is to dominate the action, to remain unpredictable, and to create uncertainty in the mind of the enemy. Commanders seek to influence the timing and tempo of military actions by seizing the initiative and operating beyond the enemy's ability to react effectively. Controlling the action may require a mix of surprise, security, mass, and maneuver to take advantage of emerging and fleeting opportunities . . . Timing and tempo require that commander's have an intelligence structure that can identify opportunities

Army of the Potomac

The effective application of timing and tempo requires a commander to have the initiative to exploit his advantages and his

adversary's weaknesses. Hooker violated the principle of timing and tempo by giving away his initiative and choosing to fight a defensive battle at Chancellorsville. He violated the principle of timing and tempo by failing to exploit his numerical superiority and the advantageous position he had gained in the maneuver to Lee's flank. The use of timing and tempo requires decisive action. Hooker's actions were indecisive as he missed those "fleeting opportunities" to obtain victory. For example, his overnight stop at Chancellorsville on 29 April and his reluctance to decisively move out of Chancellorsville on 30 April and 1 May resulted in his failure to maintain the timing and tempo of the battle. Also, the lack of reconnaissance capability caused Hooker to miss an opportunity to regain the control of the timing and tempo of the battle by attacking Lee's small holding force while Jackson maneuvered his corps on 2 May. As Hooker's actions at Chancellorsville prove, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a commander devoted to defensive tactics to influence timing and tempo in his favor.

Army of Northern Virginia

The intelligence provided by Stuart's Cavalry coupled with Lee's patience and decisiveness allowed Lee to seize and maintain control of the action at Chancellorsville and thus influence the timing and tempo of the battle to his advantage. Lee did not overreact after discovering the 59,000 enemy to his front and receiving Stuart's 28 April report of a possible three corps element moving to his flank and rear. He waited patiently

to confirm the enemy's main effort. On 30 April, after Stuart confirmed the three corps flanking movement from the west, Lee acted decisively. He did not hesitate to split his forces in an effort to gain the initiative. He maneuvered in time to block Hooker's meek attempt to clear his army of the Wilderness. However, Lee was not satisfied to remain defensive. Again Stuart's reconnaissance paid off in finding Hooker's weak right flank. Lee's decision to attack this weakness on 2 May by economizing his forces, for Jackson's flanking maneuver and mass flank attack, resulted in Lee establishing the timing and tempo of the battle.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Unity of Command is the principle of vesting appropriate authority and responsibility in a single commander to effect unity of effort in carrying out an assigned task. Unity of command provides for the effective exercise of leadership and power of decision over assigned forces for the purpose of achieving a common objective. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by giving a single commander full authority.

Army of the Potomac

The reason for the principle of unity of command is to obtain a unity of effort necessary to accomplish the objective. This principle was violated by the Army of the Potomac because the single commander, who was vested with the appropriate authority and responsibility, did not achieve unity of effort. His failure to obtain a unity of effort was a result of contra-

dictionsin his communications and actions concerning the objective. For example, Hooker communicated the objective to destroy Lee's army, yet he chose to fight a defensive battle in the Wilderness. Another example was Hooker's order to the right wing on 1 May to move out of the Wilderness toward Fredericksburg to uncover Banks Ford but, an hour later, at the first sign of enemy contact, he gave the order to withdraw. As a result of Hooker's indecisiveness his commanders became confused and finally demoralized. This demoralization and confusion was compounded when Hooker tried to change his 1 May withdrawal order and continue the attack. Since the withdrawal had already started and Confederate forces were advancing, it was too late to continue the attack. Couch replied to the countermanding order, "Tell General Hooker he is too late. The enemy are on my right and rear. I am in full retreat" (10:190).

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee had the appropriate authority and responsibility to obtain a unity of effort toward accomplishing his objective at Chancellorsville. He also invested his commanders with the necessary authority to accomplish their assigned mission. Lee insured that everyone was aware of the objective, destruction of the Army of the Potomac, and then provided the commanders with their mission. He then left it up to the individual commanders to determine how. The planning for Jackson's flanking movement provides an example of Lee delegating authority. Lee told Jackson that he wanted Jackson to turn Hooker's right flank

(5:520-521). Lee also informed Jackson that, "General Stuart will cover your movement with his cavalry" (5:521). This was all the guidance Lee gave Jackson. Jackson responded, "My troops will move at 4 o'clock" (5:521). Jackson then departed the meeting. Jackson, ". . . was thus intrusted with the execution of the plan that Lee had determined upon" (5:521). The next morning Jackson reported to Lee how he planned to carry out his mission (5:523). This example demonstrates how unity of command can be enhanced by providing subordinate commanders with their mission and the authority to plan and execute the actions required to accomplish the mission.

Jackson, however, violated the principle of unity of command by not insuring that unity of effort would continue to exist if he were not available. Jackson did not inform his staff how he planned to pursue the success of his flanking attack (6:190). Therefore, when he was wounded, Stuart assumed command of a corps whose staff and subordinate officers had no idea of what the former commander's intentions were (6:190).

SIMPLICITY

Simplicity promotes understanding, reduces confusion, and permits ease of execution in the intense and uncertain environment of combat. Simplicity adds to the cohesion of a force by providing unambiguous guidance that fosters a clear understanding of expected actions.

Army of the Potomac

Controlling divided forces is not easy. Hooker, however, had the additional problems of controlling forces in the dense

Wilderness and getting three corps across two rivers, without the enemy's knowledge, and four more corps across one river. Commanding divided forces and coordinating river crossings are not simple tasks. The Wilderness terrain complicated these problems (6:185). The tangled undergrowth made command, control and maneuver difficult (6:185). Ironically, Hooker initially overcame these complex problems to get his army into an advantageous position for offensive action only to fail when the time came to exploit the success of his complex plan.

Hooker's failure to apply the principle of simplicity after his right wing arrived at Chancellorsville contributed to his defeat. First, his commanders did not have a clear understanding of their mission after they arrived at Chancellorsville. They were under the impression they were to pause at Chancellorsville only long enough to consolidate before moving on to uncover Banks Ford. Hooker added to their confusion by ordering their halt to wait reinforcements. Second, Hooker added complexity to his campaign with the on again, off again movement of his right wing on 1 May. Finally, he violated simplicity by trying to fight a defensive battle in the Wilderness. The complexity of commanding, controlling, securing, and obtaining required intelligence for a defensive operation within the Wilderness was extremely complex and provided Lee with an advantage. Lee used the Wilderness to screen his offensive maneuvers and conceal the locations and strength of his holding forces

during Jackson's flanking maneuver. Therefore, though Hooker overcame the complexity of his envelopment strategy, his change to a defensive plan, made complex by the Wilderness, removed his flexibility and contributed to his inability to regain offensive momentum.

Army of Northern Virginia

Lee's strategy and tactics at Chancellorsville were also complex. During Jackson's flanking movement of 2 May, Lee's forces were split into three separate locations. Early's Division was more than ten miles away at Fredericksburg while Lee and Jackson were separated by the Wilderness. Jackson had to expose his corps to Hooker's front for about 8 miles while marching to Hooker's flank. Jackson's flanking maneuver and the separation of Lee's forces were difficult to coordinate and invited disaster.

Though Lee's tactics were not simple, they were bold and calculating. Hooker had shown little decisiveness at Chancellorsville and appeared content to let Lee bring the fight to him. Also, Lee knew the Wilderness would assist in screening his boldness and that Hooker was without an able reconnaissance capability since Stoneman's Cavalry was not available. Though Lee's strategy and tactics were not simple they were well conceived, bold, and contributed to his successful application of the principles of surprise, mass, economy of force, and offense.

LOGISTICS

Logistics is the principle of sustaining both man and machine in combat. Logistics is the principle of obtaining, moving, and maintaining war fighting potential. Success in warfare depends on getting sufficient men and machines in the right position at the right time. This requires a simple, secure, and flexible logistics system to be an integral part of an air operation.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker's logistical planning and the resulting support for the Chancellorsville Campaign was excellent. He based his logistical requirements around the operation they were to support. He designed his logistical plan to support the rapid movement and multiple river crossings required to execute his strategy. For example, he replaced ration and ammunition wagons with pack mules, and allowed individuals to carry only essentials (officers were not allowed to carry their wall tents). Also, he had pontoon bridges in place ahead of time at all possible river crossings to use if the rivers could not be forded (10:102).

Army of Northern Virginia

The Battle of Chancellorsville was no exception to the continual logistics problems Lee faced throughout the war. Lee was without the services of Longstreet and two divisions who were south of Richmond, "to collect provisions and forage from the territory . . . (7:208). Therefore, Lee's logistical problems had the effect of reducing his available forces for the Chancellorsville Campaign by about one-quarter (7:208). Lee

was effectively using Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway as his logistical transportation system. He had established Richmond as his main supply base and the railway connected Richmond with several forward and intermediate supply bases. The problem was the lack of food, forage, clothing and horse replacements to place in the system (10:65-66).

COHESION

Cohesion is the principle of establishing and maintaining the warfighting spirit and capability of a force to win. Cohesion is the cement that holds a unit together through the trials of combat. . . . Commanders build cohesion through effective leadership and generating a sense of common identity and shared purpose. Leaders maintain cohesion by communicating objectives clearly, demonstrating genuine concern for the morale and welfare of their people, and employing men and machines according to the dictates of sound military doctrine.

Army of the Potomac

Hooker established and then lost cohesion within the Army of the Potomac. He obtained the cohesiveness by demonstrating concern for the morale and welfare of his soldiers. For example, he reduced the sick rolls by improving sanitary and dietary conditions (8:73). He reduced desertions and absences without leave by instituting a firm discipline and liberal leave policy (1:145). He provided a sense of togetherness and belonging by adopting a system of corps and division badges (8:73). He promoted discipline, professionalism and expertise in the army through mock battle training and grand reviews (8:73). Most importantly, was the objective he clearly communicated to his army and toward which they trained--the destruction of Lee's

army. Therefore, when Hooker launched the Chancellorsville Campaign he had successfully applied the principle of cohesion.

However, he violated the principle by failing to maintain cohesion during the campaign. His failure was the result of making tactical decisions not in keeping with the objective he had previously taught his army. Failure to exploit the principles of offense, maneuver, surprise and mass are specific examples of mistakes he made by not employing his men according to the dictates of sound military doctrine. These mistakes resulted in the loss of cohesion as exemplified by Couch's statement that he would never again serve, ". . . under such an officer" (10:298).

Army of Northern Virginia

The cohesiveness of the Army of Northern Virginia was directly related to their pride in never having been beaten (8:73). This cohesiveness was a result of the soldier's confidence in Lee's competence as a leader. Lee earned their confidence by exhibiting professional competence in clearly communicating objectives and employing his forces according to the dictates of sound military doctrine. Chancellorsville was no exception. He gained and maintained the offensive by establishing a firm objective, and using surprise, mass, and economy of force. Such professional competence coupled with his genuine concern for the welfare and morale of his army contributed to the cohesiveness in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Section Three

GUIDED DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTION

This section provides questions to facilitate guided discussion of the application of the principles of war, contained in AFM 1-1, at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The purpose of the discussion is to reinforce and emphasize how the principles were or were not applied at Chancellorsville. The discussion should allow participants to expand on the principles by relating their significance, based on lessons from Chancellorsville, for today's battlefield.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Question

Which principles of war appeared to be the most significant in Hooker's plan for the Chancellorsville Campaign?

Discussion

The success of Hooker's plan depended on the effective maneuver of his forces. His plan was centered around enveloping Lee's army with a large force on the flank and rear while an equally large force held Lee in place. If maneuver was the key principle in Hooker's plan, the principles of surprise and security

were the keys to Hooker's successful maneuver. Hooker's army was most vulnerable during the initial stages of deployment as his widely separated forces negotiated the river crossings and the Wilderness terrain. Therefore, surprise and security were essential to getting his right wing across both rivers and through the Wilderness, to Lee's flank before Lee could react.

2. Question

In your opinion, which violated principle of war had the greatest impact on Hooker's defeat?

Discussion

Hooker's failure to apply the principle of objective obstructed his ability to apply other principles of war critical to success. Though the destruction of Lee's army was the stated objective prior to the campaign, Hooker appeared to lose sight of this objective during the "fog of battle." His decisions after arriving at Chancellorsville appeared based more on a defense of Chancellorsville than the destruction of his enemy. Without a clearly defined objective a commander cannot doctrinally employ the tactics required to support the principles of war. Hooker's violation of the principle of objective led to his abandoning the offense, failing to maneuver for mass, surprise, or economy of force, and as a result losing control of the timing and tempo of the battle. Another answer might address Hooker's failure to provide security for his right flank on 2 May.

3. Question

What was the significance of the principle of offense at Chancellorsville?

Discussion

The appropriate application of the principle of offense brought victory to the Army of Northern Virginia. The principle of offense was critical to Lee's success because it allowed him to effectively apply other principles and to choose the time and place of attack. For example, the principle of offense allowed Lee to act rather than react. It gave him the capability to effectively use maneuver, mass, and surprise to establish the timing and tempo of battle in his favor. While the Army of the Potomac was sitting in a defensive posture on 1 and 2 May, Lee was able to locate Hooker's weakness (choose the place of attack) and then exploit it by choosing the time and method (maneuver, surprise, and mass).

4. Question

How was Lee able to gain the offense?

Discussion

The answer to this question points out how several interwoven principles contributed to Hooker's failure and Lee's success at Chancellorsville. First, it can be argued that Hooker willingly relinquished the offense (for some unexplainable reason). This argument is supported by Hooker's unnecessary delays before trying to move out of Chancellorsville and his withdrawals when confronted with inferior enemy forces on 1, 3

and 4 May. Regardless, to gain the offensive initiative, Lee was willing to exploit Hooker's violation of the offensive principle. He did this by applying five principles (security, economy of force, maneuver, mass, and surprise) which resulted in Lee gaining the offense and establishing the timing and tempo of battle. These five principles contributed to Lee obtaining the offense as follows:

a. Security--Stuart's Cavalry provided security by screening Lee's position at Fredericksburg and reporting Union troop movements across the river. On 29 April, after learning that Union forces were on his left flank, Lee sent Anderson's Division to secure the flank. On 30 April, Lee left Early's Division at Fredericksburg to secure the rear of the remainder of his army which was deploying to Chancellorsville for offensive action.

b. Economy of Force--Lee economized his forces by establishing priorities. His number one priority was Hooker's right wing. Therefore, he left sufficient forces, one division, to hold Hooker's left wing, and sent the remainder of his army to attack Hooker's main effort, the right wing. Lee economized his forces for Jackson's flank attack by allowing Jackson to maneuver sufficient forces to obtain the mass necessary for the flank attack while leaving only those forces necessary to hold Hooker's right wing in place. Lee economized forces a third time when he sent McLaws and Anderson's Divisions to attack Sedgwick at Salem Heights on 4 May.

c. Mass--Lee achieved mass at the critical time and place because of his employment of maneuver. He was able to provide sufficient mass east of Chancellorsville to discourage Hooker's advance on 1 May. On 2 May he provided sufficient mass with Jackson's Corps for the attack on Hooker's right flank.

d. Surprise--Lee was able to surprise Hooker with Jackson's mass flank attack because of correct application of security and maneuver. Lee provided security for Jackson's move to Hooker's flank by using Stuart's Cavalry to screen the movement, keeping Hooker in place with a holding force and allowing Hooker to think that Jackson's move was a retreat.

All of the above principles contributed to Lee's success in applying the principles of offense.

5. Question

Explain how Lee's application of the principle of security differed from Hooker's.

Discussion

Lee effectively used his cavalry for reconnaissance and to screen his positions and maneuvers. Hooker was without the services of most of his cavalry. Also, as soon as Lee learned of a possible attack on his left flank he took necessary precautions by sending Anderson's Division to block the Federal advance. Hooker, on the other hand, failed to insure the security of his right flank even though he received numerous warnings of a possible flank attack.

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
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Bigelow, John Jr. The Campaign of Chancellorsville. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1910.

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
APPENDICES

Appendix A




Lee's Supply Artery (10:93)

Appendix B




Force Deployment (4:84)

Appendix C




Hooker's Plan (10:93; 4:84)

Appendix D




Anderson's Blocking Action (4:84)

Appendix E




Situation 1 May, 1200 (4:85)

Appendix F




Jackson's March (4:87)

Appendix G




Jackson's Flank Attack (6:188)

Appendix H



Situation 3 May, 0830 (6:190)

Appendix I



Sedgwick's Situation, 4 May (6:192)