MANPOWER MOBILIZATION POLICY:
IMPACT OF RESERVE AND RETIREES CALL UP
ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
This study centers on the potential problems of U.S. Government agencies upon mobilization of the military reserves and retired personnel and the state of planning within the various agencies for dealing with this manpower loss.
THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MOBILIZATION STUDY

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION POLICY: IMPACT OF RESERVE AND RETIREE CALL-UP ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

by

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ABSTRACT

This study centers on the potential problems of U.S. Government agencies upon mobilization of the military reserves and retired personnel and the state of planning within the various agencies for dealing with this manpower loss.

Analysis was accomplished through interviews with key military and government officials and an extensive survey of government agencies. An assessment is made of current programs to identify those reservists key to their agency during mobilization and screen them from the Reserves. Also, an analysis is made of efforts to identify military retirees in key government positions and exempt them from recall to active duty.

Findings/Conclusions

The study concludes with a series of recommendations to enhance the planning process for manpower mobilization and ensure minimum impact on both the Federal Government Agencies and the military services.

Recommendations

Annual screening of military retirees (in addition to ready reservists) emphasized by Federal agencies should be required. Those occupying a "key position" should be identified.

All Federal agencies should be required to maintain a permanent record on each agency retiree for at least 5 years for use in a national emergencies.

Periodic screening of all ready reservists and military retirees not employed by Federal agencies should be required.

Required data on retirees should be maintained by the services and adequate recall procedures be developed.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This short chapter sets the stage by reviewing the contents and structure of the paper and providing a statement of the problem. An overview of the importance placed on the "total force concept" by the U.S. military is provided. Only by the use of an expanding force made up of active and reserve components, supplemented by draftees and volunteers, can the U.S. meet its war fighting and deterrence commitments, at a reasonable cost.

A review is also provided of the methodology for this study. The approach consisted of a literature search, personal interviews, and an extensive survey of federal agencies. The survey provides the heart of the study and is the basis for the findings and recommendations.

Definitions of Terms

To establish a common base for understanding the issues in this study, an extensive set of definitions was required. It was found that in many cases terms were given several different meanings, and great effort was taken to ensure that correct definition was provided.

Military Manpower

This chapter provides an outline of current military personnel policies and procedures. It outlines many of the problems associated with maintaining the proper force structure in a dynamic world situation, and doing so within cost constraints. The methods of raising a military force through conscription and the all volunteer force are discussed. Of particular significance are the problems of maintaining the Reserve components, especially the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) at required levels with the current all volunteer force. Finally, suggestions are made as to ways to help solve the IRR shortages in the long run.

History of Manpower Mobilization Problems

A review is provided of some of the problems encountered in the past in the area of manpower mobilization. Over the years, there has been substantial activity by the Congress, Federal Government agencies, and the military concerning mobilization. On several occasions the Congress has expressed concern that the Federal Government would be crippled by mobilization because a large number of Federal Employees belong to Reserve components. The Department of Defense has taken positive action, as a result of the Congressional concern, to screen hundreds of federal employees from the Reserves. Each year a report on the screening process is provided to Congress by DOD. In addition, military retirees are expected to be available for mobilization within seven days. Because a large number of federal
employees are also military retirees the government could again suffer a crippling blow to its workforce upon mobilization. Action to resolve this retiree problem has been little more than conversation at this point. The chapter concludes that there would be a detrimental impact on the Government should the U.S. mobilize for war.

Survey of Federal Agencies

This chapter outlines the results of the survey of 75 U.S. Federal Agencies on the question of manpower losses to military mobilization. Of the 75 questionnaires mailed, 50 were returned which represents 88 percent of the military reservists in the Federal Government. Generally, the results of the survey indicate that the DOD screening program has been effective. Hundreds of key employees have been screened from the active reserve. However, questions still persist on the level within the agencies at which key employee decisions are made, and the seriousness with which each agency views the screen process. It was found that there is great variety in the way the agencies approach the task. Also, there was evidence of a lack of overall planning within the agencies for dealing with the manpower losses during mobilization. The data gathered in the survey is presented in a series of charts and tables to aid in understanding the approaches taken by each agency. This display also helps to pinpoint where particular problems lie.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This short chapter draws several conclusions from the study. The screening of reservists in Federal employee has worked realistically well, but work needs to be done on the screening of retirees. Also, we need a better feeling for the impact of mobilization on key civilian industries which are critical to national defense. The need for better mobilization planning in the area of manpower needs is evident. Good planning accomplished during peacetime may prove critical to providing the needed manpower, in a timely manner, for wartime.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This report explores the impact of mobilization of Reserve Military Forces and the recall of retired military personnel on government agencies. It seems obvious that the loss of thousands of employees, potentially with little warning, must have some effect on the Federal Government's capability to perform its essential wartime missions. Failure to accomplish their mission is just as detrimental to national security interest as the inability of the military to accomplish its mission.

This investigation was accomplished in three major ways. First, a review of all available literature pertaining to this area was made. This included several studies in the general area of manpower mobilization, a number of reports concerning this subject, and the pertinent government directives and laws. Next, extensive interviews with civilian government and military officials were conducted (Appendix A). Last, a survey of government agencies was conducted--Appendix C is a copy of the survey. Replies were received from 50 of the 75 agencies surveyed. The replies were thorough, candid, and of great value in the study.

In order to establish a common base of understanding, it is necessary to define several terms, spell out the various categories of military reserves and retirees, and list the levels of mobilization. Next is a section on the military manpower requirements and plans for achieving these levels. To
understand the total picture of actions taken and planned to minimize the
impact of mobilization on the Federal Government, a review is made of
legislation, directives and other actions taken since 1947. The next chapter
is a report of the survey results and a status of the current level of
compliance with existing directives and laws. The report ends with
conclusions drawn from the research and a series of recommendations for future
actions.

In order to put this potential manpower loss in perspective, it must be
considered in light of the total mobilization effort. Personnel will also
withdrawn from all other levels of government and the private sector. To:
extent, key people will be pulled from all portions of the economy to ente
military service. Many will be key to the mobilization effort in their
civilian capacity. Today, we really do not have a good feel for the extent of
the loss to the total effort by withdrawing these people from the civilian
workforce. However, the military must depend on the rapid reinforcement of
the active force from the civilian sector.

Both to provide the manpower required for a major war and to provide the
deterrent force necessary to prevent such a war, the United States depends on
an expanding force. This force consists of the active duty military which
must be rapidly reinforced by units from the Selected Reserve. In addition,
already trained personnel must be available to fill active and reserve units
to wartime strength and provide replacements for casualties from the beginning
of the war until draftees and volunteers can be processed into the services
and trained for duty. This pretrained group consists of the Individual Ready
Reserve and military retirees.
Only with reliance on the citizen soldiers and draftees in time of war can this country meet its defense objectives at a cost that would be considered reasonable by the general population. This manpower pool used to supplement the active force in the war mobilization process is critical to the defense efforts and relied upon to be ready when needed. In this effort, each government agency involved and each military service must insure that all pre-war actions which will enhance reserve readiness are taken. These actions include the streamlining of rules and regulations, requests for legislation as needed, and recruiting actions to insure that units of the Selected Reserve are fully manned and manpower needs of the Individual Ready Reserve are met.

The Services must also insure they are capable of recalling active reserve retirees on a short notice basis. While actions are being taken to provide for this rapid recall, a great deal remains to be accomplished. The Army has helped to resolve this problem by issuing orders in peacetime which assign selected retirees to specific units upon mobilization.

Since the expanding force is critical to the U.S. warfighting and deterrent force, the military must be insured that the citizen soldiers will be available for duty when needed. A part of this process is to screen government employees in key civilian positions from the reserve rolls. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has taken positive actions to screen hundreds of federal employees from the Reserves because they occupied key government positions and could not be mobilized in wartime. This paper will assess the success of this effort and address the need for similar action to screen the military retirees occupying key government positions.
A. **Ready Reserve.** Units and individual reservists liable for active duty as outlined in 10 U.S.C. 672 and 673 [reference (b)]. Title 10, U.S.C. 268 provides for an authorized strength of 2,900,000 in the Ready Reserve which includes members of the Reserve components on active duty.

B. **Selected Reserve.** Part of the Ready Reserve of each Reserve component consisting of units and individuals who actively participate in drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days (exclusive of travel time) each year.

C. **Standby Reserve.** Units or members, or both, of the Reserve components other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve who are liable for active duty as provided in 10 U.S.C. 672 or 674 [reference (b)].

D. **Key Position.** A direct hire or statutory civilian position which requires a minimum of 90 days of specialized training or experience in a Federal, State, Commonwealth, Territory, or local Government agency or Defense supporting industry having a current shortage of qualified personnel and which position is:
1. Necessary to the mobilization or emergency functions of such industry or agency, or
2. Essential to the continuity of operations or the leadership of such agency or industry.

E. **Key Employees.** Any civilian employee of a Federal, State, Commonwealth, Territory or local Government agency or Defense-supporting industry who occupies a key position for whom no qualified and immediate replacement exists and whose duties cannot be reassigned to other employees or has a civilian mobilization assignment, and whose immediate recall to active duty during an emergency would seriously impair the effective functioning and continuity of such agency or industry with regard to:
   1. Production and research vital to the national defense effort; or
   2. Activities necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest.

F. **Critical Military Skill.** A skill which is on the "DOD list of Critical Military Skills for Use in Screening the Ready Reserve" [reference (g)] published by the Department of Defense. This list is subject to periodic revision by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).

G. **Government Agency.** The head of any Department, Agency or Office of the Federal Government. Requests for a Ready Reserve Screening
Determination must be signed by this individual or a designated representative.

H. State, Commonwealth, Territory and Local Governments. The Head of any Department Agency, or office of a State Commonwealth, Territory or local Government. Requests for a Ready Reserve Screening Determination must be signed by this individual or a designated representative.

I. Defense-Supporting Industry. The Chief Personnel Officer of any business or corporation determined by FEMA to be defense-supporting. Requests for a Ready Reserve Screening Determination must be signed by this individual or representative designated by the individual.

J. Extreme Community Hardship. A situation which would result from the recall to active duty of a reservist in an emergency, in that the individual's withdrawal from a particular community would have a substantially adverse effect on the health, safety, or welfare of that community. (Any request for a determination of such hardship will be initiated by the reservist, and must be supported by documentary evidence as deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.)

K. Extreme Personal Hardship. A situation in which, through the reservist's recall to active duty in an emergency, the reservist's
dependents because of the reservist's absence, would suffer extreme hardship, substantially greater than any hardship other reservist's dependents under similar circumstances can be expected to experience. (Any request for a determination of such hardship will be initiated by the reservist and must be supported by documentary evidence as considered necessary by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned. In order to ensure a uniform standard the criteria for such evidence should conform generally to the current Service regulations on determining cases of extreme hardship.)

L. Statutory Military Obligation (Obligor). All persons who become members of the Armed Forces before their twenty-sixth birthday shall serve in the Armed Forces for a total of 6 years unless they are discharged earlier because of personal hardship by any appropriate authority. Any part of such service that is not active duty or active duty for training shall be performed in a Reserve component.

M. Individual Ready Reserve. In the event of a large-scale war, the Military Services must have an immediate supply of military personnel who are already trained. These personnel would be used to bring Active Force units and Selected Reserve units to full strength and to replace casualties suffered in the first few months of combat. The pool of "pre-trained" individuals must be large enough to meet emergency manpower needs in the period before new draftees and volunteers can be trained. During the first 90 to 120 days of a war the nation
will be very dependent upon pre-trained manpower, especially if the war begins with little warning or if the nation does not act upon whatever warning is provided by raising the number of accessions and the output of the training base.

N. **Reserve Categories.** Guard and Reserve Component personnel are accounted for in three categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.

O. **The Ready Reserve.** The Ready Reserve consists of individuals and units which augment Active Forces in any contingency requiring the ordering to active duty of National Guard and Reserve forces. Within the Ready Reserve are Selected Reserve units, pretrained individual reservists, and reservists in the training pipeline.

Selected Reserve units are composed of drilling National Guard and Reserve Members and full-time unit support (FTUS) personnel. Drilling Guard and Reserve members are unit members who are not FTUS for that unit. The majority of drilling reservists are employed in the private or government sector and do not derive their primary source of income from the military. The other members of the Selected Reserve, FTUS unit members, provide support to that unit on a full-time basis and will mobilize with the unit. They include Guard and Reserve members on active duty solely to provide full-time support to the unit to which they belong. The individuals are categorized at Active Duty.
Guard and Reserves (AGR). FTUS also includes military technicians, (federally employed civilians who occupy technician positions in National Guard Reserve component and are members of the unit they support) and Active Component personnel who are assigned to the unit, but do not occupy unit positions.

A typical member of a Selected Reserve unit has completed initial training and is assigned to the unit for which he or she receives pay for required training. This training includes an annual active duty training period and a minimum of 40 inactive duty training (IDT) assemblies per year. The annual training is 14 days or more and is performed either with the member's National Guard or Reserve unit, at a service school, or in other duties appropriate to the mobilization mission. IDT assemblies are of four hours minimum duration and may be conducted over a weekend, during an evening, or a combination of both.

Pretrained individual reservists have completed initial training but are not members of Selected Reserve units. These members are grouped into four categories: full-time augmentation support (FTAS), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) [formerly known as Mobilization Designees (MOBDES) in the USAR inactive National Guard (ING)], and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Individuals classified as FTAS (1) provide full-time support to a National Guard or Reserve unit, but may not be aligned with a military position in a Selected Reserve unit, or (2) are not members of the unit they support and will not mobilize with the unit.
IMAs are pretrained individual reservists preassigned to a specific mobilization wartime job to which they must report on M-Day and at which they train in peacetime. Those in the ING are preassigned to a specific Guard unit and will mobilize with that unit. IRR members are available when needed and may be assigned as fillers or replacements.

The training pipelines, the third portion of the Ready Reserve, are made up of National Guard and Reserve Members who have not yet completed initial training.

In addition to regular annual active duty for training, National Guard and Reserve Members can volunteer for special tours of Active duty during which they perform missions in support of the Active Forces.

P. Standby Reserve. This reserve category is comprised of the Inactive Status List and the Active Status List. Personnel in an inactive status are not required by law or regulation to remain in the Reserves, but want to retain their Reserve status without participating in training. They are a source of trained manpower to serve as fillers and replacements in full mobilization. The Active Status List of the Standby Reserve is comprised of reservists transferred out of the Ready Reserve because they are key employees, are temporarily disabled, or are unable to participate in Ready Reserve training because of temporary hardship or other reason, but who expect to return to the Ready Reserve at a future date.
Q. **Retired Reserve:** The Retired Reserve is made up of eligible personnel who have 20 or more qualifying years of National Guard and Reserve or combined National Guard or Reserve and Active service who are eligible for retirement at 60.
CHAPTER III

MILITARY MANPOWER

There are three types of Defense manpower: active military, reserve component military, and civilian employees. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total U.S. military capability; hence they constitute the "Total Force."

To bring the full national power to bear in a major war, the Active Force must be rapidly reinforced by units of the Selected Reserve. In addition, individuals who are already trained must be available for two purposes: to fill active and reserve units to wartime strength, and to provide replacements for casualties from the beginning of a war until the training base can begin to turn out enough newly trained people. Finally, draftees, along with volunteers, must be brought into service rapidly so that they can be trained and used to sustain the force in the longer run.5

The All-Volunteer Force has been able since 1972 to keep the Active Force at, or very close to authorized strength. The AVF was much less successful, particularly in the mid-1970's, in maintaining the strengths of Selected Reserve units, and the pool of trained members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

The Selected Reserve—the organized units of the Army and Air National Guard and the Reserve of each service—provides a large part of the potential combat power and support of U.S. forces for wartime. The main manpower problem of the Selected Reserve in the mid-1970s was the loss of strength in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. However, the strength of these
Components has now recovered to approximately pre-AVF levels through the application of dedicated recruiting resources and incentives for enlistment and reenlistment.

The current manpower challenge is to fulfill present plans to raise Selected Reserve strength by 13 percent, with most of the increase in the two Army components, by the end of 1987. This increase will raise the strength of units to a level closer to wartime strength.6

There is currently a serious shortage of manpower in the IRR. The shortfall will be reduced to some extent by 1988, but there will be a shortage of about 240,000 enlisted soldiers with combat-related skills who would be required to replace wartime casualties in the event of a major war that begins with little warning.7

All people who enter the Active Force or Selected Reserve incur a Minimum Service Obligation (MSO) of six years. The remainder of the MSO after discharge is spent in the IRR. This system kept the IRR filled during the draft era because of greater Active Force turnover brought about by the short active service of draftees, but under AVF conditions it produces fewer IRR members and shorter periods of membership in the IRR. To correct the strength shortfall, it is recommended that the following legislation be enacted:

. Legislation to permit the Secretary of Defense to extend the MSO from six years up to eight years.
. Legislation for a bonus to induce IRR members to extend their period of membership.
. Permission for each Service, at its option, to impose an IRR obligation as a condition of enlistment.
. Actions to improve the management of the IRR.8

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Defense Department Civilians provide support services to the active reserve military in all of those functions that do not require a military incumbent. Of a total population of over one million civilians, 67 percent repair airplanes, ships, and tanks, provide logistical support, or operate and maintain military installations. Another 11 percent provide research and development, medical and communications support. These activities contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces.

Both Congress and the Office of Management and Budget set ceilings on DOD civilian employment. The intended purpose of the ceilings is to control the number of government employees and force more efficient use of those on hand. However, ceilings can lead to work slippages, insufficient hiring practices, and a reluctance to covert appropriate military positions to civilian incumbency. The OMB ceiling is particularly restrictive because it does not allow the Secretary of Defense to use the authority that Congress grants to exceed the ceiling by up to 2 percent. However, the OMB ceiling is useful as a tool to help the Administration control overall Federal employment.*
CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PROBLEMS

The Armed Forces Reserve Act established the first requirement for screening Ready Reservists in 1952. This was the outgrowth of hardship situations that came to light in mobilization for the Korean War. Since the National Security Act in 1947 gave authority to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, formerly OEP) to manage the nation's manpower in the event of war, that the agency initially issued the circulars/directives requiring screening of Federal employees who were also Ready Reservists. In 1964, an Executive Order was issued re-emphasizing the screening program and giving DOD a more active role. As a result, several Congressmen were involuntarily removed from the Ready Reserve, and the Reserve units on Capitol Hill were disestablished. In 1977, Congress once again voiced its concern that there might be a large number of Federal employees in the Ready Reserve and that their mobilization could cripple the Federal Government at a critical time. DOD then intensified the screening program by providing lists of Ready Reservists in their employ to all three branches of the government. Each agency was asked to identify for transfer from the Ready Reserve employees considered to be "key" those who cannot be mobilized with the Armed Forces because in their civilian role they are vital to the nation's defense. This screening program is now conducted annually throughout the Federal Government and the results are forwarded to the Congress in an annual report.10
The employee screening program has not been expanded into the private sector. The necessity for such screening has been studied, and in the 1980 Screening Report to the House Appropriations Committee the statement was made that no occupational areas have been identified outside the Federal sector which would be severely impacted if all Ready Reservists were mobilized. Consequently, there is no evidence justifying the cost of about four million dollars required for DOD to conduct a single screening of this scope. In addition, the 1968 Statement of Understanding between DOD and FEMA indicated that FEMA was to conduct all screening outside the Federal sector. However, recent events highlight the continuing high visibility of this program outside DOD.

Employment screening of Ready Reservists who are Federal employees is now conducted annually by DOD as directed by the House Appropriations Committee Report 95-451 of 1977. Lists of Ready Reservists who are employed by each Federal Agency are sent to the appropriate agency, which then designates "Key Employees" and requests the applicable Service to remove them from the Ready Reserves. The practice is to remove elected officials, high level appointees (Presidential or otherwise) and others as appropriate from the Ready Reserve. Since 1980 the screening program has expanded within the Federal sector to include the Legislative Branch and Excepted Agencies (those who do not list their employees with OPM, such as TVA, CIA, and the Library of Congress). "Key Employees" may be discharged, retired, or placed in the Standby Reserve, where they may earn retirement points, drill without pay, and even be considered for promotion. When they are no longer "key," they are encouraged to return to the Ready Reserve.
The Army has been faced with a significant shortage of manpower for several years. Since September 1975, considerable attention has been directed toward improving the overall U.S. Army strength, especially in the area of pretrained manpower. To alleviate the manpower shortage, the Army plans to use retirees as mobilization assets. Retirees, having served many years in the Armed Services, would require minimal orientation upon being recalled in the event of a national emergency. It is believed that recall of retirees for assignment to posts, camps, stations and nondeploying MTOE units within the Continental United States would assure efficient operations while permitting reassignment of significant numbers of Active Army personnel for deployment or performance of tasks inappropriate for retired personnel. For planning purposes, retirees are expected to be available for duty within seven days of full mobilization. This short time frame is important if the experience of retirees is to be exploited in manning installations during the early stages of mobilization to receive and process the thousands of people being ordered to active duty. Timing also becomes critical in identifying and releasing the active duty personnel manning the support mission of an installation for other assignments.

Retirees are identified in three categories: Category I are those who meet the age/grade criteria, not retired for permanent disability, and have been retired for less than five years. Category II—same as Category I but have been retired five years or more. Category III—all others.

The program of identifying, classifying, and assigning retirees is managed by the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) at St Louis, Missouri since the Center is the repository for the records of all
retirees. Prior to August 1977, very few data items were placed on the RCPAC automated Personnel Master File. Since that time, RCPAC has maintained more complete and current data on retirees and has instituted a program of capturing data on retirees who meet mobilization criteria which will enable the Army to quickly mobilize them. Age ceilings, below which retirees are subject to preassignment, are as follows: Warrant Officers--62; all others--60. All General Officer assignments will be determined on a case by case basis by the General Officer Management Office, ODCSPER, Washington, D.C.

A "Hip Pocket" orders system for retirees has been operational for more than a year. Preassignment of Category I and II RA retirees to CONUS mobilization stations commenced in November 1981. More than 100,000 orders have been issued. To date the Army is the only service which has issued "hip pocket" orders.

DOD 1100.19-H, Wartime Manpower Program Guidance, provides instructions for the preparation and submission of military and civilian manpower data for the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The Military Services are required to submit WARMAPS data on military manpower in conjunction with the annual POM submission and assesses periodically the status of manpower mobilization planning. The suspense date of the POM submission is determined by the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) calendar, which is revised annually. The periodic manpower mobilization review is normally conducted in conjunction with and just before the biennial federal mobilization exercise. WARMAPS data on civilian manpower is submitted by the Military Services, OSD, CCJS, and the Defense Agencies in conjunction with a
periodic assessment of the status of manpower mobilization planning. This periodic assessment normally will be conducted in conjunction with and just before the biennial federal mobilization exercise. These reports are submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

A recent report on civilian manpower indicates that in the event of a full mobilization the DOD would lose 111,000 civilian employees to the military services, through the reserves. Requirements data indicates that an additional 253,000 civilian new hires would be needed (in addition to the 111,000 that must also be replaced) bringing the total to 364,000.11
CHAPTER V

SURVEY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

General. In order to develop further insight into the problems associated with a nation-wide manpower mobilization and to indentify impact on the operations of governmental agencies, a questionnaire was developed and sent to 75 Federal agencies listed in Appendix B. The questionnaire was designed to cover the following four areas of interest:

1. Annual screening process on federally employed military reservists.
2. Quantity and distribution of retired military personnel federally employed.
3. Utility of organizational records maintained by federal agencies of retired agency personnel.
4. Organizational plans to replace recalled reservists and mobilized military retirees.

A statistically significant response was made; 50 of 75 agencies responded which accounted for over 88 percent of the military reservists employed as civilians in Federal agencies. A summary of responses made by question to the survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix C. The four part questionnaire was designed to obtain insight into the following areas:
1. Mobilization impact on manpower in Federal agencies.
2. Planning for manpower losses in the event of mobilization.
3. Key position determinations made by Federal agencies and their impact on mobilization considerations.
4. Use of retired agency personnel to meet mobilization manpower needs.

A summary by area of the significant results of the survey are shown below.

Our recommendations resulting from this review have been consolidated and are reported in Chapter VI of this research paper.

**Mobilization Manpower Impact.**

Mobilization of ready reservists and retired military employed by Federal government agencies will materially impact the Department of Defense and selected other Federal agencies through reduced manpower during periods of national emergency. At least 16\(^{\text{a}}\),000 individuals (80,300 reservists and 83,700 military retirees) are subject to recall and mobilization into the active armed forces. This number represents nearly 6 percent (2.9% reservists, plus at least 3.0% military retirees) of the total current civilian Federal workforce. These statistics are based on the FY82 end strength of ready reservists reported by the Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and military retirees as reported by 31 of the 75 Federal agencies sent the questionnaire.

Ready reservists are somewhat evenly spread (with one exception) throughout Federal agencies as can be seen in Table 1. This data was taken from the 1982 Report to the House Appropriations Committee, as provided by the Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), December 1982.\(^{12}\)
### Table 1
READY RESERVISTS BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY
(000s)

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<td>Army**</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>433.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy**</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force**</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>235.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency**</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency**</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Service</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>655.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Administration</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>226.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>130.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Human Services</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUD***</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>108.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Government</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>2771.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes technicians (totals may not add due to rounding).

** Major departments and selected agencies only; will not add to rolled up Defense total shown in DASD (RA) 1982 report.

*** 1981 data.
Employed retired military are not as evenly distributed between Federal agencies, see Table 2. Most important to note is the fact that the largest numbers and highest percentages are employed within the Department of Defense. Proud Saber (a 1982 mobilization exercise) highlighted to some organizations, such as the U.S. Navy, that employed retired military are not evenly distributed throughout the department. This fact, unfortunately does not show in the statistics presented.

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Retired Military Employed</th>
<th>% Retired Military in Work Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington HQs Service</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Administration</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others*</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total U.S. Government Agencies Surveyed</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 16 agencies with 100 or less employed military retirees per agency. With four exceptions, military retirees were less than 2 percent of each agency's work force.
### TABLE 3

CONSOLIDATED READY RESERVISTS AND MILITARY 
RETIREE IMPACT ON SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES 
(000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Total Reservists and Retirees</th>
<th>% of Total Work Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense (total)</td>
<td>111.1*</td>
<td>14.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Administration</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total U.S. Government</strong></td>
<td>**</td>
<td><strong>5.9</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: DMIC-Potential Mobilization Losses

** Incomplete data available, not computed.

*** Percent of work force is minimum as it is based only on 31 agencies reporting data on reservists and retirees.

As can be seen above in Table 3, significant manpower losses (or personnel shifts) caused by a nation-wide manpower mobilization of both ready reservists and military retirees can impact significantly certain Federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, its services and agencies. If losses (or shifts) of personnel resources are unanticipated by the agency (or organization or subelement within the agency which can be expected to experience the direct loss or shift), a significantly decremented capability is likely to result in a major impact on accomplishing wartime missions. The
impact of this direct loss (or shift) of manpower resources that could be sustained under a nation-wide mobilization needs to be recognized by all Federal agencies, and contingency war/emergency plans, as appropriate, need to be developed.

Planning for Manpower Losses.

Federal agencies for the most part are unprepared to address the manpower losses that can be anticipated at the time of a nation-wide mobilization. The vast majority, 88 percent (44 of 50) of the government agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated they did not have a written plan to replace those individuals (reservists and military retirees) subject to mobilization and recall. The six agencies reported as having a plan were: Defense Mapping Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Small Business Administration, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and the Veterans Administration.

Key Position Determinations.

Key position determinations are not required or generally made on those positions occupied by military retirees, and although required and made for those civilian positions occupied by ready reservists, frequently such determinations have been made by individuals who are not the head of the agency.

A Department of Defense requirement exists for the positions occupied by military reservists to be reviewed and a determination made as to whether such positions are "key" to the agency in time of a national emergency. Each position which is designed "key" should be made known to the reservist member's service. The service will make a decision as to whether the
individual can fulfill his military obligations as a ready reservist and whether his services are critical to DOD's needs. In selected instances when DOD and the agency employing the reservist cannot agree on the mobilization priority need, a final determination may have to be made by FEMA as to which government agency has the greatest need during a national emergency for the services of a given individual. This key position determination requirement applies only to those civilian positions occupied by military reservists. It does not apply at the present time to those civilian positions occupied by military retirees, even though they too are subject to recall by DOD during a national emergency.

In the case of ready reservists where a key position determination is required, the chief of the agency makes such determinations in less than 25 percent (12 of 50) of the government agencies. Table 4 lists those agencies where the chief administrator makes "key position" determinations. In over 75 percent (38 of 50) of the agencies, the determination is delegated to various key managers, subordinate element commanders or directors, personnel directors, or administrators. Nearly all government agencies make key position determinations following DOD criteria and apply the criteria uniformly. DOD criteria was believed to be adequate by nearly all (46 of 50) agencies responding to the questionnaire.

Not all agencies (11 of 50) receive and review the DOD list of "Civil Service Personnel in a Reserve Status" distributed annually by ODASD (Reserve Affairs). Within DOD, Washington Headquarters Services was not passing the list to the 24 supported agencies for verification. Although not required, in 44 percent of all Government agencies reporting (22 of 50), the DOD list (or partial list) was not provided to the ready reservist's immediate supervisor.
Without the DOD list (in agencies not receiving it and management not reviewing it), effective screening actions and "key" position determinations may not have been made. All agencies receiving the list believed that DOD guidance was adequate to accomplish the list review and attesting functions.

During 1982, the number of ready reservists declared as being unavailable for mobilization based on the DOD annual screening action was nearly two and one-half times greater than the number during 1981. (Data based on ODASD (Reserve Affairs), 1981 and 1982 Reports to the House Appropriations Committee). In order to assure that only truly "key" positions in national emergencies are so identified, we believe the head of each agency should be the one responsible for their designation and that this responsibility should not be delegated.

**TABLE 4**

"KEY" POSITION DETERMINATIONS MADE BY HEADS OF AGENCIES ON CIVILIAN POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY MILITARY RESERVISTS

Civil Aeronautics Board
Commission on Civil Rights
Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Defense Mapping Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. International Trade Commission
Department of Justice
National Labor Relations Board
National Mediation Board
Office of Personnel Management
Selective Service Systems
Based on the responses to the questionnaire, it was found that "key" position determinations, although not required, were made in 13 of 50 government agencies on positions occupied by military retirees. See Table 5 for those agencies making such a determination. In only one agency was there one individual occupying a designated "key" position. All agencies need to make determinations as to whether positions occupied by military retirees are "key" in national emergencies and provide the name of those individuals in "key" positions to DOD.

TABLE 5

"KEY" POSITION DETERMINATIONS MADE BY AGENCIES ON AGENCY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY MILITARY RETIREES

Commission in Civil Rights
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Defense Mapping Agency
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Maritime Commission
U.S. Government Printing Office
Department of Interior
Department of Justice
Security Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Business Administration
Department of Army
Use of Retired Agency Personnel.

As a means of replacing high manpower losses (or personnel shifts) during mobilization, use of retired agency personnel represent a prime source of potentially available and experienced manpower replacements for vacated positions. In order to effectively tap this source of manpower, adequate records on retired personnel need to be maintained which show such information as name, current address and phone number, date retired and position(s) occupied prior to retirement. No government policy exists requiring the maintenance of such records. Of 50 government agencies responding to the questionnaire, one-half claimed to have adequate or limited records on retired personnel; see Table 6. Of these 25 maintaining records, the length of time the records were maintained ranged as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Agencies</th>
<th>Records Maintained</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 to 3 months</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 to 5 years</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>8 years to indefinite</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixty percent of the agencies maintaining records (15 of 25) believed their records to be useful or limitedly useful in contacting retirees during a national emergency; see asterisk retention periods in Table 6 for these agencies.

Of the 25 agencies maintaining records, nearly all (22 of 25) believed the retirees (assuming they were still alive and available) would be able to fill the positions vacated by mobilized reservists and recalled military retirees.
Over one-fourth (7 of 25) believed a high percentage (at least 50 percent, but most up to 100 percent of the vacated positions) could be filled by past agency retirees. Sixty percent of the agencies (15 of 25) did not know or express the degree to which retirees could fill vacated positions. Forty percent (10 of 25) of the agencies maintaining records on retirees indicated that nearly all the vacated positions would be needed in the event of a nation-wide, full mobilization. The remaining 60 percent (15 of 24) did not know how many of the vacated positions would still be required under full mobilization. Of the 25 agencies not maintaining records, only 2 agencies (Defense Mapping Agency and the U.S. Information Agency) acknowledged that past agency retirees could fill positions vacated by mobilized reservists and recalled military retirees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Record Retention Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Army</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aeronautics Board</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of U.S. Courts</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
<td>1 year*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Credit Administration</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deposit Insurance Corp</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
<td>2 years*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Maritime Commission</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government Printing Office</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
<td>3 months*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission on Intergovernmental Relations</td>
<td>20 years*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. International Trade Commission</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Department of Labor</td>
<td>18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
<td>8 years*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
<td>10 years*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labor Relations Board</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Mediation Board</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Navy</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
<td>2 years*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
<td>Indefinite*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Service System</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Treasury</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Administration</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Records reported as useful or limitedly useful in contacting retired agency personnel in the event of a national mobilization.
Federal agencies need to identify the impact of the mobilization of ready reservists and military retirees on agency operations during a national emergency and develop plans to maintain necessary wartime operations.

Annual screening of military retirees (in addition to ready reservists) employed by Federal agencies should be required. Those occupying a "key" position should be identified.

In those instances where an individual reservist or military retiree occupies a "key" position, such should be reported to the individual's Service. Only those individuals occupying positions designated "key" using the Department of Defense criteria should be reported.

To exercise comprehensive screening action, the head of each agency should make the final determination of "key" positions.

All Federal agencies should be required to maintain a permanent record on each agency retiree for at least 5 years for use in a national emergency. The record should be required to be updated in order to retain its utility as a reliable data (address and phone number) source to establish contact with the past employee. Potential use of past agency retirees should be considered by each Federal agency in obtaining needed manpower to meet national emergency requirements.

Periodic screening of all ready reservists and military retirees not employed by Federal agencies should be required. Initially such screening
should be conducted as self screening supplemented as determined necessary by employer screening. An example of screening questions with explanatory definition that could be used for self screening is shown in Appendix D.

Recommendations:

(1) Key position decision to be made at agency head level.

(2) A formal plan to be developed by each agency for the accomplishment of each function normally performed by a member of the reserves or a military retiree.

(3) The proposed Department of Defense Directive requiring screening of military retirees be implemented.

(4) Required data on retirees be maintained by the Services and adequate recall procedures be developed.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF VISITS

During the course of this study, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and other organizations were visited. Interviews were conducted with the military headquarters staff agencies responsible for the mobilization of pretrained individuals. In addition, visits were made to the appropriated Service Reserve and active Air Force military personnel activities. When necessary, other organizations were visited to gather facts for the study. A list of agencies visited follows:

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) (Reserve Affairs)

Army

Headquarters, Department of the Army
The Adjutant General's Office (TAG)
National Guard Bureau
Director Army National Guard, Personnel Division.

Navy

Headquarters, Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Director of Naval Reserve (OP-09R)
Air Force

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel (AF/MP)
Office of the Air Force Reserves (AFRES)
Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center (AFMPC) San Antonio, Texas
Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), Denver, Colorado

Other Organizations

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
U.S. Coast Guard
Department of Transportation.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Department of State Building
Washington, D.C. 20451

Panama Canal Commission
Office of Personnel Administration
APO Miami, Florida 34011

Civil Aeronautics Board
1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20428

Commission on Civil Rights
1121 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
2030 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20581

Community Services Administration
Office Deputy Director
1200 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Consumer Product Safety Commission
Association Executive Director, Administration
1111 Eighteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20207

Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Director, Office of Administration
2401 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Department of Labor
Assistant Secretary for Administration & Management
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210

Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350
Department of State
Assistant Secretary for Administration
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Department of Transportation
Assistant Secretary for Administration
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

Department of the Treasury
Office, Assistant Secretary For Administration
Fifteenth Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220

Action
Assistant Director, Administration and Finance
806 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20525

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Suite 2000 Vanguard Building
7711 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20575

Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

Department of Commerce
14th Street Between Constitution Avenue and E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

Director of Personnel & Security
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 38347, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Department of Energy
Director of Administration
Washington, D.C. 20545

Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201
Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20202

Department of Housing and Urban Development
Attention: Pers/Pay
451 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20410

Department of the Interior
Office of Personnel, Room 5201
C Street Between 18th and 19th Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240

Department of Justice
Constitution Avenue and Tenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Export-Import Bank of the United States
Vice President, Administration
811 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20571

Farm Credit Administration
Office of Administration
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20578

Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Director, Personnel Management
550 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20429

Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Manager for Administration
1700 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20552

Federal Maritime Commission
Director, Office of Personnel
110 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20427

Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service
Director of Administration
2100 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20427
Interstate Commerce Commission
Chief, Section of Administrative Services
Twelfth Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20423

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Administrator/Comptroller
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20546

National Credit Union Administration
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20456

National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities
2401 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

National Labor Relations Board
Director, Division of Administration
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20570

National Science Foundation
Assistant Director For Administration
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20550

National Transportation Safety Board
Director, Bureau of Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Commission
2708 N. Fourth Street, Suite E-1
Flagstaff, Arizona 86001

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Director, Office of Administration
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
1825 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Office of Personnel Management
1900 E. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20527

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
2020 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Railroad Retirement Board
Director, Bureau of Personnel
425 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Room 444
Washington, D.C. 20004

Securities and Exchange Commission
Director, Administrative Services
500 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20549

Selective Service System
National Headquarters
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20435

Small Business Administration
Assistant for Administration
1441 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20416

Smithsonian Institution
Assistant Secretary for Administration
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20560

U.S. International Trade Commission
Director, Office of Administration
701 E. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20436

U.S. Postal Service
Senior Assistant Postmaster General
475 L'Enfant Plaza-West, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20260

U.S. Soldiers' and Airmens' Home
Rock Creek Church Road at Upshur Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20011

Veterans Administration
Assistant Administrator for Personnel
810 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420
Water Resources Council  
2120 L Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037

Merit Systems Protection Board  
1717 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20419

National Mediation Board  
1425 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20572

U.S. Metric Board  
1815 N. Lynn Street  
Arlington, VA 22209

Maritime Mammal Commission  
1625 I Street, N.W., Room 307  
Washington, D.C. 20006

U.S. Tax Court  
400 Second Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20217

Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20472

Domestic Policy Staff  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Federal Labor Relations Authority  
1900 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20424
APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE

In an attempt to evaluate the impact of Reserve Mobilization on U.S. Government Agencies, Department of Defense DOD Directive 1200.7, November 28, 1978 was created. This directive applies to all DOD and other Federal Governmental Agencies, and is based on the delegated authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The questions below are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of this Ready Reserve screening process within the various federal agencies. The question should be self explanatory; however, should you need assistance, please reference the directive or contact one of the individuals listed in the cover letter.

The following definitions from the Directive are especially important considerations in your completion of the form:

Key Position. A direct hire or statutory civilian position which requires a minimum of 90 days of specialized training or experience in a Federal, State, Commonwealth, Territory or local Government agency or Defense-supporting industry having a current shortage of qualified personnel and which position is:

1. Necessary to the mobilization or emergency functions of such agency or industry, or
2. Essential to the continuity of operations or the leadership of such agency or industry.
Key Employee: Any civilian employee of a Federal, State, Commonwealth, Territory or local Government agency or Defense-supporting industry who occupies a key position for whom no qualified and immediate replacement exists and whose duties cannot be reassigned to other employees, or has a civilian mobilization assignment, and whose immediate recall to military active duty during an emergency would seriously impair the effective functioning and continuity of such agency or industry with regard to:

1. Production and research vital to the national defense effort; or

2. Activities necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest.
A. SCREENING PROCESS FOR EMPLOYED MILITARY RESERVISTS:

1. Is a list of "Civil Service Personnel in a Reserve Status" received from DOD? (If "no," go to question A8)
   39--Yes
   9--No
   2--Do not maintain list or data

2. What office receives the list for action?
   Varied, but all cited such offices as Personnel, Administration, Emergency Preparedness, and Security office.

3. Who reviews the list (level or position)?
   19--Distributed to and reviewed by major agency elements
   19--Reviewed centrally; does not go to supervisors.
   12--Not received, used, etc.

4. Who attests to list accuracy and completeness (level or position)?
   18--Director of Personnel or Human Resources
   7--Various Headquarters and field Departments or Personnel Heads
   8--Supervisory Personnel Assistant, Personnel Staffing Specialist, Branch heads
4. (continued)

4.--Immediate Supervisors

13--Other, not attested to, not used, not received, not applicable, etc.

5. Does the list (or partial list) go to the immediate supervisory level of each reservist?
   16--Yes
   21--No
   1--Unknown
   12--Not applicable

6. Is there adequate guidance (external and internal) available to accomplish the review of the list and attesting function?
   38--Yes
   1--No (internal)
   11--Not applicable

7. What use is made of the list?
   All, except four not responding, indicated that the list is used to verify reservists, update or double check internal records, confirm that reservists are not in key positions, and monitor reservist status.
8. Who makes "key position" determination(s)?
   12--Head of agency
   5--Top agency positions
   10--Administrative/Personnel Director
   7--Lesser positions, committee
   10--Delegated to major subordinate elements
   6--No key positions, no one designated or not stated.

9. What is the criteria for a "key position"?
   34--DOD criteria or similar
   1--Varied, based on agency mission
   5--Other unique
   10--No key positions, not applicable

10. Are there any exceptions to the application of the "key position" criteria?
    47--No or not applicable
    3--Yes

11. Is adequate guidance available to make "key position" determinations? If not, what specifically would be desirable?
    46--Yes or not applicable
    4--No
B. **IDENTITY OF RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED**

1. What is the number and percentage of total full-time workforce of retired military employees?

31 Agencies reported--83,656
14 Agencies reported--not available or unknown
5 Agencies reported--zero or not applicable
14 Agencies reported--percent unknown or not available
5 Agencies reported--zero percent or not applicable
15 Agencies reported--less than 2%
16 Agencies reported--2% to 35%

2. Has a determination been made as to whether any of these retirees are occupying a "key position"?

13--Yes
23--No
10--Not applicable
2--None in a key position
2--Unknown or no study

3. What number and percentage of total full-time workforce of retired military employees occupy a "key position"?

31--Not applicable or zero
18--Unknown or not available
1--One individual, less than 1%
C. ORGANIZATIONAL RECORDS OF RETIRED AGENCY PERSONNEL:

1. Are records maintained which include name, address, telephone numbers, date retired and position occupied (retired from) of each retired individual?
   25--Yes
   25--No

2. How long are such records maintained (i.e., how far back do they go)?
   3 Agencies--1 to 3 months
   10 Agencies--1 to 5 years
   12 Agencies--8 years to indefinite
   25 Agencies--Not maintained, not applicable

3. Are such records realistically useable in contacting retirees in the event of a national emergency?
   14--Yes (limited)
   36--No, not applicable

4. Would these retirees be able to fill (assume still alive and available) any of the positions vacated by mobilized reservists and recalled military retirees?
   25--Yes (probably, some)
   16--No, not applicable, zero
   9--Unknown

   Of those maintaining records (ref Cl, above):
   22--Yes
   3--No
5. If so, what percent of vacated positions?
   10--100%, majority
   21--Unknown, low percentage
   19--None, not applicable

   Of those maintaining records (ref Cl, above):
   7--100%, or over 50%
   15--Unknown, or under 50%
   3--Zero or not applicable

6. What percent of these vacated positions would not exist (be needed) in
   the event of a nation-wide, full mobilization
   11--All needed, a high percent needed
   21--Unknown
   18--None, not applicable

   Of those maintaining records (ref Cl, above):
   10--All needed, a high percent needed
   15--Unknown

D. ORGANIZATIONAL PLANS TO REPLACE CALLED RESERVISTS AND MOBILIZED RETIREES:

1. Does a written plan or policy exist? If so, please provide a copy.
   6--Yes
   44--No
2. What is the number (and percent of total full-time workforce) of military reservists?

45 Agencies reported--71,165
5 Agencies--data unavailable, unknown
12 of 50 Agencies reported 3% or more reservists.
Majority had 2% or less
One DOD agency exceeded 5%

3. What number (and percent of total full-time workforce) of military reservists occupy a "key position"?

41--None, not applicable, no data
5--Reported 142, all less than 1% of workforce
4--Unknown, not available

4. What number and percent of total full-time workforce are occupying both a full-time civilian position and a part-time reservist position within the same agency?

One agency reported 12, less than 1% of workforce.
Army, Navy, Air Force, DLA all reported unknown
All other agencies reported none, not applicable

5. Of these individuals, how is double counting (civilian and reserve positions) expected to be handled during a mobilization . . . that is:

   a. What percent of the vacated civilian positions (in the event of mobilization and recall of reservists) would still be required to be filled?
b. What specific plans/policies does the organization have to fill these vacated civilian positions (in the event of mobilization and recall of reservists)?

Nearly all reported none, not applicable or unknown.

Navy, Air Force, and Defense Intelligence Agency--reported most positions would still be required.

Army and Defense Logistics Agency--reported unknown.

5 agencies reported their plans.
APPENDIX D

SELF SCREENING QUESTIONS FOR RESERVISTS EMPLOYED BY NON-FEDERAL AGENCIES

1. I do/do not work in a civilian position which I believe my company would determine to be "key" in providing support to the defense of the nation and, as a result, would not support my mobilization with the Armed Forces during a national emergency. Give employer's name and address in the event DOD determines further screening action is necessary.

2. I do/do not work in a civilian position which could directly assist supporting the defense of the nation, but depending upon Federal Government priorities I would be considered available to fulfill military reserve/guard commitments.

3. In the event of national mobilization, I am/am not available to fulfill military reserve/guard commitments. If not available, explain.

4. I am/am not working for a defense contractor or subcontractor.

5. I am/am not working in a company who directly supports with one or more contracts or subcontracts the DOD or a defense contractor.
6. I am not working in a company who indirectly supports the DOD or defense contractors or subcontractors in a vital national industry. Identify industry.

7. I am not working on a defense contract or subcontract 50 percent or more of the time.

8. I am not working on a U.S. Government contract or subcontract (from any Federal Agency) 50 percent or more of the time.
APPENDIX E

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1. **Cadre.** A nucleus of trained personnel capable of assuming control of a unit, training others, or performing administrative tasks. This includes Navy precommissioning crews.

2. **C-Day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment (contingency) operation commences or is to commence.

3. **Delayed Entry Program (DEP).** A program under which an individual may enlist in the Reserve of a Military Service and specify a future reporting date for entry on active duty that would coincide with personal plans such as high school graduation. Upon entry on active duty, the reserve enlistment is terminated and replaced by a regular enlistment contract.

4. **Direct Hire.** A civilian employee hired directly and paid directly for personal services from appropriated funds.

5. **DOD Wartime Medical Planning Factors Data Base.** A DIA-prepared and updated data base which catalogs and provides weapons effects data in terms of the wounding effects. It also provides data to determine disease, nuclear, biological, chemical, and special condition casualty rates.
6. **Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP).** The official data base or report that summarized the resources provided for Secretary of Defense-approved programs for the Department of Defense. The FYDP identifies funding for each appropriation, manpower authorizations and programs, and selected types of units or equipment authorizations by resource management packages called program elements (PE).

7. **Force Structure.** The totality of authorized or required military and civilian manning for all units in a DOD Component.

8. **Holdee (PE 887210).** Active duty military personnel who have been dropped from the the assigned strength of an operational unit and attached to a holding or detention activity by reason of medical, disciplinary, or preseparation nonavailability.

9. **Host Nation Support.** The logistics, administrative, and other support to be provided to U.S. forces by the host nation (the nation within whose territory or alongside whose forces the U.S. forces will operate).

10. **Inactive National Guard (ING).** A member of the Ready Reserve who is in an inactive status and assigned to a National Guard unit for mobilization.

11. **Indirect Hire.** A civilian employee hired in a foreign area under an agreement providing that the host government is responsible for ensuring that the local civilian labor needs of the U.S. forces are met. An indirect hire employee is appointed or paid by the host nation but is under the daily operational control of the U.S. forces.
12. **Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA).** A trained member of the Selected Reserve who is not assigned to a reserve component unit but is preassigned to a specific M-Day position in an active component unit.

13. **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).** A trained member of the Ready Reserve who is not assigned to a Selected Reserve unit but is available as a filler or replacement for mobilization.

14. **Manpower Demand.** The number and kind of people who can be used productively on tasks that further the war effort at any time during the course of a postulated conflict, considering the constraints imposed by projected lift capacity and the projected inventory of equipment, munitions, and spares; that is the program force.

15. **Manpower Requirements.** The number and kind of people needed to achieve and sustain full manning for all units in the approved force structure throughout the course of a postulated conflict, assuming the availability of adequate equipment, munitions, spares, and lift; that is the planning force.

16. **Military Functions.** Those functions of the Department of Defense and its Components that are carried out to (a) prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war; (b) develop, maintain, and provide bases and installations with administrative and logistic support; and (c) assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.
17. **Peactime Strength.** The end fiscal year strength authorized and programmed for active forces, the Selected Reserve (to include drilling reservists, military technicians, and active Guard and Reserve), and appropriated-fund civilian employees in the DYDP.

18. **Pretrained Individual Inventory Objective (PIIO).** The time-phased requirement for Pretrained Individual Manpower to meet the military manpower filler and replacement requirements of the Military Service during a specified wartime (mobilization) scenario.

19. **Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM).** Personnel with prior military training or experience who are in one of the following three categories: pretrained individual reservists (PIRs, IRR and ING). Standby Reserve, and retired military personnel from the active or reserve components.

20. **Student (Resource Identification Code (RIC) 0041-0044, 0031-0134).** Active duty military personnel attending noninitial entry schools of 20 weeks or longer duration as a FCS duty assignment or in a temporary duty status while on permanent change of station (PCS) orders.

21. **Trainee.** A service member with no prior service who requires initial entry training before being assigned to an operational unit and an accessed member with prior service who requires refresher training before being assigned to an operational unit.

22. **Transient (PE 887320).** Active duty military personnel in a travel, proceed, leave en route, or temporary duty status while on FCS orders.
23. **Unmanned Unit.** A unit having a mobilization or fill schedule and for which equipment stocks exist, are programmed, or could be made available under emergency conditions to meet required delivery date, but that has no manpower programmed or authorized during peacetime.

24. **Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS).** A standardized DOD-wide procedure, structure, and data base for computing, compiling projecting, and portraying time-phased wartime manpower requirements, demand, and supply of the DOD Components.

25. **Wartime Strength.** The required strength of the planned and programmed Military Service force to accomplish effectively the prescribed mission and capability of the force.
FOOTNOTES


4See Bibliography--Definitions taken from multiple sources included in the Bibliography.


6Ibid., p. VI-4.

7Ibid., p. VI-7.

8Ibid., p. VIII-3.

9Ibid., p. VII-3.

10Department of Defense, 100.19H. Wartime Manpower Program for the 1980's. March 1982. Chapter IV.

11Ibid., Chapter VI.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


