**The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon: Implications for Modern Conventional Warfare**

**Abstract**

This paper focuses on the lessons learned from examination of the June 1982 Israeli Defense Forces Invasion of Lebanon—Operation Peace for Galilee. A brief description of the national goals of the campaign and an historical perspective with respect to previous Israeli wars establishes the introduction. These are followed by summaries of the ground, air and naval operations of the campaign. Lessons learned from analyses of Israeli military operations and innovations are reported and implications for modern conventional warfare, which may involve the projection of US forces into the Middle East.
ABSTRACT CONTINUED

East in the future, are drawn therefrom.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC STUDY

THE 1982 ISRAELI WAR IN LEBANON:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon: Implications for Modern Conventional Warfare

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This paper focuses on the lessons learned from examination of the June 1982 Israeli Defense Forces invasion of Lebanon--Operation Peace for Galilee. A brief description of the national goals of the campaign and an historical perspective with respect to previous Israeli wars establishes the introduction. These are followed by summaries of the ground, air and naval operations of the campaign. Lessons learned from analyses of Israeli military operations and innovations are reported and implications for modern conventional warfare, which may involve the projection of US forces into the Middle East in the future, are drawn therefrom.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Colonel Gordon M. Clarke, USA, (M. Engr., Texas A&M University) has served in armor and engineer units and has developed a keen interest in Israeli army operations. His assignments have included duty with the 4th Armored Division in Germany and the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas; as a combat engineer company commander in Vietnam and a divisional engineer battalion commander in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He holds the Legion of Merit and the Bronze Star Medal. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Colonel Clarke is also a graduate of The National War College, Class of 1983.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 6 June 1982, Israeli armed forces invaded Lebanon and within eight days destroyed most of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) infrastructure, dealt Syrian occupation forces a harsh defeat in the Bekaa Valley, and held more than 6,000 PLO soldiers hostage in the besieged capital city of Beirut. In little more than one week Israeli combat units brought the nation within reach of the five main national objectives underlying Operation Peace for Galilee, which were to:

1. establish a 25 mile buffer zone in southern Lebanon to eliminate the terrorist haven for cross-border attacks against Israeli territory;
2. destroy the PLO as a military threat and political adversary in the region;
3. expel Syrian peacekeeping forces from Lebanon;
4. stabilize the Lebanese political situation and promote the installation of a government sensitive to Israeli's security concerns; and
5. improve Israel's ability to control the West Bank.

The centerpiece of the Israeli joint operation was the advance of three independent combined arms teams northward along separate axes of attack. The two westernmost forces routed PLO forces from coastal and inland strongholds while eastern axis units challenged Syrian domination of the Bekaa Valley and control of the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway. Each attacking force moved rapidly, avoided involvement in prolonged major engagements for non-essential territory,
and kept Israeli and civilian casualties and contact with Syrian forces to a minimum.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) employed versatile combinations of mechanized and airborne infantry, self-propelled artillery, and armor to deal with varied terrain and enemy defense. Maneuver was the dominant tactic as helicopter airlift repositioned forces rapidly to achieve tactical advantage, and naval amphibious forces inserted army blocking units along the coast behind enemy lines and well ahead of the main IDF force. Strong pockets of resistance were bypassed and follow-on forces used superior firepower to overcome the enemy with minimum Israeli losses. Logistical support for the rapid advance was sustained by establishing forward supply and repair facilities deep in Lebanese territory and close to the battle area.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) achieved air superiority early in the campaign and provided close air support for the army from the initial attack through the siege of Beirut. In the most sophisticated air operation ever conducted by the IAF, the Israelis used remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) as decoys, army artillery fire, and ground and air launched anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to disable 16 to 19 Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in the Bekaa Valley. When the Syrians widened the air battle by launching masses of MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighter aircraft against Israeli ground and air forces, the IAF used a sophisticated command, control, communications and
intelligence (C³I) system and high technology weapons and aircraft to destroy 85 Syrian planes without suffering the loss of a single Israeli fighter. The flexible employment of advanced airborne weapons delivery systems and precision guided munitions also significantly enhanced the IAF's capabilities in its close air support (CAS) role.

Israeli Naval Force (INF) missile and patrol boats provided shore bombardment support for the army's advance along the coastline and shelled enemy positions in the city during the siege of Beirut. There is also reason to believe the Israelis may have embarked army artillery, barrage rockets or tanks on lightly armed ships to enhance their shore bombardment capability. Concurrent with their naval gunfire support (NGFS) role, the same INF forces conducted blockade operations along the Lebanese coast with the assistance of early warning information on distant surface activity provided by Israeli submarines. The navy's most important role in the invasion was the amphibious landing of troops, tanks, and vehicles well behind enemy lines to block the PLO's retreat with flanking maneuvers. Amphibious landing craft were also employed to provide logistics support for the deployed fleet, transportation for heavy equipment to and from forward areas, and offshore platforms for NGFS weapons.

Many implications can be drawn from the Israelis' experience in Lebanon, but only some have significance in the context of U.S. force procurement, training and employment. Most of the lessons learned
by the IDF are peculiar to the Israeli situation; consequently, their relevance is lessened when critical factors such as the following are changed: the geo-political situation; the opportunity to plan, train, and conduct surveillance of enemy territory and forces; the size of the theater of operation; the length of logistical supply lines; the enemy's combat capability; and the aggressor nation's role in the international political system. However, implications that are appropriate for consideration by U.S. planners and decisionmakers include:

a. The allocation of resources, planning, coordination, and training required to accomplish effective joint operations.

b. The "force multiplier" effects afforded by the employment of weapon systems with a qualitative advantage in the specific area of application.

c. Tactical advantages that can be achieved through promoting, training for, and employing innovative use of off-the-shelf technology.

d. The expanded array of combat capability produced by a flexible command and control system and the immediate use of operations analysis on the battlefield to enhance tactical maneuver.

e. The impact of accessibility to real time intelligence information.

f. The importance of combat experience, particularly in leadership positions at the fighting unit level.

g. The ability of IDF forces to mutually support one another unhindered by the dogma of doctrinal roles and missions.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When Israel came into being in 1948 the armed forces were small, under-manned, ill-equipped and segmented. Within a short time, however, they were molded into a cohesive force capable of conducting effective operations against larger and more modern enemy forces.

In 1956 and 1967 Israel went to war to eliminate the threat of Arab attacks and terrorism on her borders. In 1973 she repulsed the combined, surprise attacks of Egypt and Syria but at great cost. Each conflict reinforced Israel's goal of self-reliance in its military capabilities and spurred the continued upgrading of the IDF's strength, organization, doctrine, training and equipment.¹

Despite an impressive buildup of Israeli military power between 1974 and 1982, sporadic terrorism was planned and carried out from Lebanon. Moreover, by 1982 PLO forces in Lebanon had started to amass a considerable quantity of conventional armament, including artillery and rockets, which posed a potentially serious threat to civilians in Northern Israel.² This development, plus periodic clashes with Syria, set the stage for "Operation Peace for Galilee," a massive, combined arms attack across the Lebanese border that commenced at 1100 on Sunday, 6 June 1982. The principal political and military objectives were articulated as follows:
Establishment of a 25 mile buffer zone to protect Israeli villages from attack by PLO artillery and rockets in southern Lebanon.

- Destruction of the PLO as an effective military and political force.
- Expulsion of the 26,000-man Syrian peacekeeping force from Lebanon.
- Political stabilization of Lebanon that would restore peace to the country and neutralize it as a base for military operations against the Jewish state.
- Facilitation of Israel's efforts to control the West Bank as a result of the diminution of PLO influence.

The invasion was so well planned and coordinated that by June 14, only 8 days after the preemptive strike was launched, the IDF completed the encirclement of Beirut, destroyed the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and dealt Syria a harsh battlefield defeat. The Israeli master plan was no secret. While the details of military strategy of the invasion might not have been known to all leaders, the broad war objectives of destroying the PLO military and political infrastructure and creating a situation for a new and friendly government in Lebanon were known. Although many specific operational aims and some of the strategic aims were achieved, the full accomplishment of others remained contingent on post invasion
negotiations.  

The incursion into Lebanon demonstrated the importance of readiness and training to the outcome of combat operations; the positive impact of leadership, innovation and flexibility in all operations; and the value of superior organization throughout the active and reserve units of all types. More specifically, Israeli operations were marked by skillful application of modern technology, highly effective tactics, and the aggressive employment of heliborne and special forces. Of particular note was the Israeli conduct of naval and amphibious operations and the IAF's suppression of Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries.

The IDF's success was not surprising in view of its historical reputation for innovation, daring, adaptation, use of technology, surprise and so forth. Past wars had taken place in a unique geopolitical context that contributed to the evolution of an equally unique and particularly effective force structure, doctrine and strategy.

Over the years the U.S. has maintained a special interest in the reasons for the IDF's successes and their implications for the future structure and possible deployment of U.S. forces in the Middle East. If anything, this special interest was accentuated by the 1982 conflict in Lebanon because of the use of American and Soviet military hardware, some of which reflected the latest state of the art.

Although strains in relations between Washington and Jerusalem
have precluded a full sharing of information about the war, it is important to synthesize and assess what we do know. Besides improving our general understanding of what transpired in the Lebanese War, a preliminary analysis of Israeli military operations and innovations can enhance the agenda for further investigation once new and more complete data becomes available. It can also suggest potentially important implications for the possible projection of U.S. forces in the Middle East in some future crisis.

In pursuit of these aims the analysis undertaken herein relies on data from a number of sources, including articles, newspapers, intelligence documents and reports, as well as interviews with U.S. government officials and representatives of the IDF. For the most part, the methodology is qualitative. The study is organized into chapters which cover ground, air and sea operations as well as significant lessons learned from the war in Lebanon and implications for modern conventional warfare and conclusions. Of special interest are Israeli national strategy pertinent to the war; military doctrine and strategy; evolving military force structure; and, command and control, or decisionmaking processes.
CHAPTER II
GROUND OPERATIONS

Introduction

At its inception, Israel had no colonial military forces to draw from to establish and shape its armed forces. Rather, it developed those forces from armed security groups that had formed to protect the Jewish settlements in what was the Palestine Mandate administered by Great Britain. Jewish immigrants brought with them military experience from both eastern and western European countries. In addition, the British occasionally provided Jewish settlements aid in the form of military training and arms. Melding different military methods into workable doctrine and military practices was a considerable challenge, and led to the development of this cardinal rule: If it works use it. If it doesn't, change it or reject it. The development of Israel's armed forces was, therefore, "marked by a turmoil of innovation, controversy and debate." This turmoil led to a primacy of ideas over the development of tradition.

The historical and geopolitical factors that shaped the IDF include the lessons learned from previous conflicts and the changes those lessons produced. (See Appendix B for a more complete historical treatment of IDF development.) All of these factors had significant bearing on the development of the IDF that invaded Lebanon. The
emphasis in the IDF has been on the interaction of combined arms in a doctrinal context where the principles of surprise, fighting in enemy territory, and the indirect approach are central. Armor formerly was the primary striking component of the ground force. However, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and airborne infantry components are now integrated into virtually all operations. All these changes appeared to provide a solution to the doctrinal and structural problems encountered by the ground forces in 1973 and previous wars, but it was not until Operation Peace for Galilee that the validity of the changes were tested in sustained combat.

Israeli preparations for Operation Peace for Galilee commenced at the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. (See Appendix C for a more detailed account of Operation Peace for Galilee.) In the following decade, the Israeli military-industrial community became virtually independent from the world in military ground equipment production. Innovation and change spearheaded Israeli thinking in all military areas. As the 1980's approached, tactics were tailored to the anticipated threat and the terrain. Combat service support (forces and supplies) was readied, and quality personnel were highly trained and motivated. Above all, a well integrated master plan involving all components of the IDF was conceived and thoroughly rehearsed. The result was that only eight days after the start of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the IDF had destroyed the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon, dealt the Syrian armed forces a costly setback, and completed the encircle-
ment of Beirut. A discussion of major areas of lessons learned from ground combat operations follows.

Deception

Pursuant to the doctrinal stress on surprise, Operation Peace for Galilee battle plan called for desensitization of the Syrians by conducting repetitive northern border training exercises which were actually rehearsals for the forthcoming invasion. These maneuvers, conducted over the 13 months preceding the invasion, achieved the desired objective since Syria discontinued credible responses after the fifth exercise. Upon completion of the eighth feint, the Israelis were satisfied that the time was right to strike. Preparations were complete, intelligence updates were current and the element of surprise was basically assured. As the ninth "rehearsal" began the invasion was underway.

Force Structure

When the invasion began, a predominantly armored force of over 20,000 Israeli soldiers crossed the Lebanese border and split into three division-equivalent axes of advance. The invasion force was designed for breakthrough tactics and ground forces were formed into three independent armor/infantry combined arms teams. To support these forces, mobile equipment repair facilities and supply depots were established in forward areas to maintain the momentum of combat forces. Ground forces were thus able to move exceptionally fast with minimum losses against enemy strong points. The
integration of forces into combined arms teams was achieved by a complex system of coordination and cooperation among all branches of the Israeli military forces.

Military Doctrine and Strategy

Israel's leaders believe strongly that offensive conflict is more economical and decisive than a defensive war of attrition. Moreover, the dictum that the side with inferior numbers (Israel vis-a-vis Arab world) will never win if it remains on the defensive has become fixed in Israeli military strategy. Therefore, this massive attack employing breakthrough battle tactics reflected IDF doctrine and national strategy. This offensive philosophy was displayed throughout the conflict—from the decision to invade to the siege of Beirut.

The linchpin of the IDF during the Peace for Galilee operation was the simultaneous, combined-arms firepower of armor, mechanized infantry, artillery, air, and naval gunfire. Though tested for the first time in the limited 1978 Litani Campaign in southern Lebanon, this was the first significant test of integrating air with ground forces. This proved successful and the IAF's air supremacy allowed ground forces to move with virtual impunity.

Enemy anti-tank firepower, villages and towns and mountainous terrain placed severe maneuver constraints on the IDF, but reduced mobility and speed were accepted in order to reduce military and civilian casualties. Throughout the operation, paramount concern was the minimization of manpower and equipment losses. Self
propelled artillery and assault helicopters were employed with great innovation (to lessen pressure on armor and dismounted mechanized infantry). Israeli ground forces and equipment (to include tanks) were moved by heliborne assault around enemy strong points to more tactically advantageous terrain, thereby outflanking the enemy and diffusing his battlefield resources. The IDF maintained pressure and momentum by bypassing enemy strongpoints, leaving them for elimination by follow-on forces (the indirect approach).

The elements of surprise, speed, mobility and firepower were significant in the IDF's Lebanon strategy. This war, like the 1973 war, underscored the first element. Just as Israel was not prepared for the Arab attack in 1973, neither the PLO nor the Syrians were prepared adequately for the Israeli invasion, in part because of the Israeli's use of deception. Surprise and breakthrough battle tactics resulted in quick achievement of objectives in all sectors of this operation. Momentum was sustained by self-propelled artillery, CAS, heliborne repositioning of supporting arms, and far sighted logistical preparation.

Quality and Innovation

Underlying all preparations and fighting was the IDF's commitment to quality in leadership, manpower, training, motivation and equipment. Combat veterans of past wars were the cadre for this conflict. As in the past, leaders set the example by positioning themselves in
the front rather than the rear areas. Virtually every maneuver commander personally reconnoitered far north of the border prior to the invasion. Additionally, prior to the fighting field commanders had open channels through which they conveyed ideas into the military-industrial community in order to improve war machinery. Innovation was promoted in every area. The IDF technical edge remained significant because of large investments that had been made on research and development. Rather than avoiding change, IDF leaders earnestly sought brilliant young people to challenge their system.7

Command and Control

In Lebanon, as in past wars, initiative, flexibility and adaptability marked decision styles of IDF commanders. Though hard data is not yet available, there is reason to believe that the IDF's war fighting decision processes were supported by an effective command, control and communication (C^3) system. Indeed, the absence of such would make the simultaneous integration of all supporting arms and the extraordinary control of the air battle, hard to explain. Technically sophisticated or merely a simple, well-practiced system, it passed the ultimate test of success. Support for such precise command and control came from a state-of-the-art, real time intelligence system. Remotely piloted aircraft supported this system and gathered real time battlefield intelligence via sophisticated television cameras and transmitted it to ground commands so they could "see" enemy
positions and movement without risk to personnel. Pulling all these forces together was the IDF command structure. Far superior to the Syrians in mobile combat, Israeli commanders located themselves far forward in the battle area for optimum control. Israeli unity of command, integration of supporting arms, and positioning of headquarters allowed for optimum command and control and application of forces.
CHAPTER III
AIR OPERATIONS*

Introduction

Peace for Galilee progressed well for the first three days until the IDF engaged elements of the Syrian armed forces. Before further progress could be made the Israelis had to achieve freedom to operate in the Bekaa Valley secure from enemy air attack and unhampered by ground-based threats opposing IAF close air support and interdiction operations.

SAM Suppression

A major obstacle to this objective was the extensive air defense system which the Syrians had built up during their years of occupation in the area. The heart of the system consisted of 19 SAM sites defended by approximately 450 to 500 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) pieces. This threat included 40 to 60 SA-6 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) with 180 missiles ready to fire, 12 SA-2 launchers with 12 missiles, and 7 SA-3 launchers with about 21 missiles.

To neutralize this threat, the Israelis used a plan developed in the late 1970's as a result of lessons learned in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The plan was designed specifically to suppress heavy concentrations of surface-to-air missiles and called for extremely precise coordination of drones, electronic jamming, ground artillery, standoff missiles and
strike aircraft. It was the most sophisticated air operation ever undertaken by the IAF and required central control by the Northern Regional Control Unit (RCU) as well as 100 percent effectiveness by each component function.

The operation was initiated at 1500 hours (local) on 9 June when a large force of glide and power driven unmanned drones was launched to approach the Bekaa Valley from the South and West. The axis of the attack placed the bright afternoon sun behind the drones and thus degraded the enemy's optical tracking systems. This forced the defenders to rely on radar detection and tracking information that decreased their ability to discriminate between attack aircraft and electronically enhanced drones. It also dictated prolonged radar operation and increased the system's vulnerability to anti-radiation weapons.

As the SAMs engaged the approaching drones and subsequently went into their reload cycle, one squadron of IAF F-4 aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles entered the area at high speed and low altitude masked by the rugged terrain. Syrian missile radar guidance systems pre-occupied with the "attacking" drones and extensive airborne jamming were easy prey for the F-4's anti-radiation missiles. And to further confuse the Syrian's the Israelis coordinated artillery fire and possibly ground launched anti-radiation missiles positioned within range of the SAM sites. Once the majority of SAM guidance and
control systems had been neutralized, follow-on waves of fighter-bombers--about 60 to 80 aircraft: F-4s, A-4s, and KFIRs--attacked additional targets in the area. Even though all the SAM radar systems had not been destroyed by the first wave of anti-radiation missiles, the attacks had been so successful that the Syrians elected not to turn on those systems that did remain operable.

The Air Battle

Having lost the surface-to-air missile portion of their air defense system, the Syrians widened the battle for air superiority as they launched masses of fighter aircraft to attack Israeli ground and air forces. The Syrian air armada consisted of MIG-21s and MIG-23s attempting to employ Soviet radar controlled intercept and surface attack tactics.

The IAF was well prepared. The Northern RCU received data-link information on enemy air activity from airborne RC-707 and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft as well as information from spotters, spotter aircraft and balloon supported radar. Intelligence elements also monitored Syrian airfield tower frequencies and the frequencies used by enemy strike fights. Battle managers in the RCU were thus able to maintain a relatively clear picture of the tactical situation at all times.
As the air battle developed, the RCU communicated directly with operational units and ordered flights committed to air combat. The battle manager then allocated these fighters to individual controllers who directed them for specific engagements. Israeli pilots were constrained by only two formal rules of engagement (ROE): they could not fly over Syria, even in hot pursuit; and they were required to identify the enemy visually before firing. The first rule was a clear signal to the Syrians that Israeli objectives and intentions were limited to the confines of Lebanese territory and air space.

The Israelis encountered some communication interferences, but were able to operate effectively with the aid of good anti-jamming radio procedures, numerous pre-briefed frequencies, and dual radios. In the early engagements IAF fighters were loaded with the new and expensive AIM-9L heat seeking missile. However, after analysis of initial attacks indicated that many shots were being taken from conventional, rear angle approaches, the aircraft flown by senior IAF pilots were loaded with the older, less maneuverable and less costly models of the AIM-9 missile. The Israelis were able to achieve an unprecedented kill rate employing the AIM-7 radar guided missile carried on F-15 aircraft along with the above mentioned heat seeking missiles.

The Syrian Air Force (SAF) demonstrated it lacked the training, experience, organization, and leadership needed to perform its
mission. Some aircrews tasked to attack Israeli ground positions were unable to navigate at low altitude and were shot down when they popped up to reorient themselves or search for a non-existent ground target. Others attempted to engage Israeli combat air patrols (CAP) by ingressing at one level and then zooming up to the enemy's altitude--they often zoomed right into the sights of a covering aircraft. In those few instances when a Syrian fighter did become a threat to an IAF aircraft, the Israelis used communications jamming and deception techniques very effectively. In some cases the Syrian pilots became so confused they simply leveled off and headed straight back to Syria only to be shot down by the stalking IAF. The battle for air superiority was over when the Syrians had lost 85 aircraft without winning a single air combat victory from the Israelis.

Close Air Support

Israeli CAS operations were conducted efficiently, effectively and with relatively light opposition following the achievement of air superiority. There were reports of untimely responses to CAS requests, but overall the tactical air control system functioned essentially according to plan. Immediate air strike requests were forwarded from the ground force unit level, and pre-planned strikes were coordinated by intelligence elements of the battle management staff. Air allocation and mission tasking were accomplished at the Northern RCU, and field intelligence reports were forwarded directly
to operational flying units to provide them with near "real time"
intelligence data. The Israelis did not depend on airborne forward
air controllers for command and control in the target area.

Throughout the ground forces offensive operations, the IAF
demonstrated excellent flexibility by re-rolling tactical fighter assets
to support CAS requirements. For example, some of the aircraft
initially identified for SAM suppression missions were subsequently
committed to CAS as early SAM strike missions proved more success-
ful than had been anticipated. Later in the campaign even CAP resources
were diverted to CAS when they were not required to counter an enemy
air threat. Both F-15 and F-16 aircraft configured for the air
superiority role were employed to strike enemy ground positions with
20mm cannon fire.

Probably the most demanding phase of CAS operations in the
Lebanese campaign occurred during the siege of Beirut. With Israeli
ground forces established in static positions in and around the city and
elements of the PLO intermingled with the town's Lebanese population,
the IAF was forced to adopt tactics suitable for "urban terrain."
Specifically, the IAF had to execute every bombing attack with extreme
discrimination and accuracy. In some instances this meant destroying
a particular building without hitting or damaging other property
immediately adjacent to the target even at night. The high success
rate achieved on these "surgical" bombing missions was due in large
part to the technology of precision guided munitions and computer assisted weapons delivery systems.

*Note: Information contained in this chapter has been synthesized from multiple sources, including interviews with Department of Defense and Israeli military officials. It has been declared unclassified for publication in its present form by the Defense Intelligence Agency. That agency should be contacted for more detailed classified information pertaining to Israeli air operations in the 1982 war in Lebanon.
CHAPTER IV
NAVAL OPERATIONS *

Introduction

While the Israeli navy has been given low priority in the overall allocation of personnel, its developing prestige was making it more competitive on the eve of the Lebanon war. Although historically allocated far less resources than the rest of the IDF, the INF had become a small, elite service that relied primarily on small fast craft equipped with Gabriel and Harpoon missiles to achieve its objectives.

All aspects of the INF's operations in support of Operation Peace for Galilee were highly successful. The ability of the navy to mobilize virtually all of its Mediterranean fleet attests to a high state of combat readiness. Additionally, training played a major role. The INF operating forces engaged in frequent exercises afloat and supplemented those ashore with sophisticated computer simulations designed to provide realistic training under combat conditions.

Particular emphasis was placed on offensive missiles firing exercises, missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, conventional and unconventional amphibious operations, and, to an increasing extent, coordinated naval-air-ground operations. One of the most important observations of this operation was that team work among naval units and land and
air forces proved vital. Previous conflicts, specifically in 1967 and the 1973 war, found the Israeli navy fighting naval battles at sea while the ground forces conducted their operations with little thought given to mutual support. For this operation in particular the navy trained extensively for about 18 months for joint operations with ground and air forces.

**Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS)**

Israeli naval operations in the form of shore bombardment began on the evening of 4 June on selected targets from the coastal city of Zahrani southward. This bombardment, in conjunction with air and ground attacks, continued until 9 June when a coordinated IDF attack on all enemy positions pressed north of Damur to the Beirut International Airport and the towns immediately south of Beirut. Though interrupted by ceasefires, naval bombardment coordinated with air strikes and ground artillery continued through early August. West Beirut and outlying suburbs were subjected to intense and heavy bombardment from the sea suggesting that the INF may have supplemented its limited naval gunfire assets with non-organic means, such as army artillery pieces, barrage rocket launchers and possibly even tanks mounted on their amphibious ships.

**Blockade**

INF surface craft and submarines conducted blockade operations to prevent the Palestinians from fleeing southern Lebanon by sea.
conducting terrorist attacks along Israel's northern coast, or being resupplied by sea. Operation Peace for Galilee was the first time INF submarines were used with such great intensity to support Israeli combat operations. In June, there were several instances of Israeli blockade enforcements where ships were stopped and searched. A ship carrying students from the University of Beirut was seized and diverted to the Israeli port of Haifa where it was detained and the passengers questioned. The ship was subsequently permitted to continue on its journey to Cyprus. The only known instance of a vessel actually being denied entry to Lebanese waters occurred on 21 June. A vessel carrying Red Cross Relief supplies to Sidon was turned away by the INF on the pretext that approaches to the port had been mined by Palestinians. The ship eventually docked in Haifa after a thorough inspection by the INF.

The naval blockade of the central and southern Lebanese coast remained in effect through August and prompted many shipping companies to divert Beirut-bound cargo to Cyprus and Syrian ports. The Beirut port was officially closed on 14 and 15 June; however, activity in the port gradually resumed after 15 June and continued through July under close INF control.

Naval Landing Operations

The INF's most significant contribution to the successful military conclusion of Operation Peace for Galilee was the landing of troops,
tanks and vehicles behind the enemy's lines in a classic flanking movement. This was an incredible feat in light of the limitations of INF amphibious landing assets. The INF fleet conducted extensive conventional and commando type landings in addition to seaborne resupply of IDF ground forces from 5 June through 10 August along the Lebanese coast. The INF employed one tank landing ship (LST) and three medium landing ships (LSM) in landing operations.

The Palestinians attempted to repel the landings, but without success. A senior Israeli naval officer reported that terrorist shore batteries fired all they had at the craft and the navy hit back destroying guns and radar installations. Just as in the Yom Kippur War, the navy emerged without losing any men or craft.

Command and Control

A flexible approach to command and control was largely responsible for the INF's operational superiority and contributed to the successful military conclusion of Operation Peace for Galilee. Additionally, the INF relied on current tactical intelligence and instantaneous communications. A maze of coastal radar stations reported directly to Naval Headquarters where a central plot of the eastern Mediterranean situation was maintained. If necessary, radar stations could communicate directly with afloat units. Most of the INF missile fleet is equipped with Naval Tactical Command and Control Systems (similar to the US Naval Tactical Data System) which
correlate and display real time tactical data for surface units, aircraft and shore sites.

**Summary**

The INF's two most significant contributions to the successful military conclusion of Peace for Galilee were the amphibious landing of troops, tanks and other equipment north of Palestinian positions, allowing the Israeli ground forces to encircle their Palestinian opponents; and the coastal blockade which was successful in preventing Palestinian resupply by sea as well as bottling up escape routes for those who attempted to retreat. These actions, in combination with massive naval bombardment, made an important contribution to the ground forces' rapid advance and success in the coastal sector. They demonstrated that the need for better integration of the various ground and air arms was a lesson from the 1973 war that was not only well learned but effectively expanded to include the navy.

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CHAPTER V
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR MODERN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Significant Lessons Learned

During Operation Peace for Galilee the Israelis succeeded, as they had planned, in achieving many of those objectives outlined in Chapter I.

The following are the most significant findings of this study that should be of special interest to all observers.

National Security

- Israeli military objectives in Lebanon were supportive of the national goal of security.
- Israel's geo-political situation in the Middle East continues to dictate her drive for security in the region based on the development of superior military power and self-reliance to the extent possible.

Military Doctrine

- Israeli military doctrine stressing surprise, transferral of the fighting to enemy territory, the indirect approach and so on is derived from national political goals and has evolved through forty years of testing on the battlefield.
- The IDF constantly improves its organization and equipment through combat experience, technological innovation and leadership.
Operations are planned deliberately and in great detail. An integrated, combined arms approach is taken to all operations.

Careful consideration is given to how the Army can support the Air Force (SAM suppression) and how the Air Force and Navy can support Army objectives (tactical air, movement of tanks, shore bombardment).

Tactical innovation, training, adaptability, battlefield initiative and combat leadership all have a positive, synergistic effect on conduct of combat operations.

**Force Structure**

Evolutionary changes have produced combined arms elements that are tailored and outfitted to fight specific threats.

Application of technology and extensive modification and modernization of existing and captured weapons systems and equipment have contributed significantly to the IDF's success on the battlefield and to reduction of equipment costs.

The direct link between field commanders and Israeli industry has enhanced the development of required operational capabilities of all systems.

**Decision Making**

Command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities extending from the national level down to
operational units provided the IDF with an important "force multiplier" effect on the battlefield.

- Details are left to subordinate commanders so long as they accomplish their missions. This promotes effective decision-making and initiative.

- Combat leadership comes from the front, where command, control and the use of real time intelligence can best affect the outcome of the operation.

**Implications for Modern Conventional Warfare**

It is difficult to envision the involvement of U.S. forces in a combat scenario with major strategic characteristics similar to those experienced by the Israelis in Lebanon. U.S. forces would most likely enter combat in a hasty defensive or at best counteroffensive role, and as a result, detailed planning time is likely to be extremely short. There will probably not be any opportunity to achieve surprise through repetitive feinting maneuvers or covert prepositioning. Established communications and intelligence networks most likely will not be available; and American units presumably will not have extensive experience in the combat area nor be familiar with the enemy's terrain. If the U.S. should deploy forces to fight in a regional or limited confrontation, there are several major facets of Israeli operations in Lebanon which yield important implications for American force planners.
**Joint Operations**

Israeli joint combat operations are closely integrated and coordinated, and their command and control arrangements seem to be simple, yet effective. They avoid being encumbered with a traditional division of labor (roles and missions in military parlance) and this fosters innovative tactics which capitalize on the capabilities of each component. And perhaps most importantly, resources are allocated to achieve maximum combat capability for the IDF as a whole, thus ensuring adequate provisions for integrating systems such as command and control, communications, and intelligence. To achieve the IDF's effective integration of all services displayed in Operation Peace for Galilee, it has taken 35 years, numerous conflicts, and daily pressures of protecting state borders from Arab incursions. Therefore, perhaps the true lesson for U.S. forces to learn in the area of joint operations is that it is highly unlikely that we can achieve a similar level of integration and coordination among our land, sea and air forces. Total size of U.S. forces and lack of daily survival pressures militate against our ability to overcome human and organizational biases. Therefore, U.S. forces should seek revolutionary ways to achieve maximum joint force effectiveness and not waste efforts in thinking a level of integration in the Israeli context can be achieved for all U.S. forces. The pragmatic requirement for effective joint force war fighting capability is not debated, but the U.S.
should orient its joint service integration efforts to joint service commands sized similarly to the U.S. Central Command. It then becomes obvious, based on Israeli history, that such joint service commands must operate "daily" under "pressure" to even come close to achieving the level of smooth, effective integration of war fighting evident in the IDF.

Quality vs Quantity

The Israelis probably could have achieved air superiority in the Bekaa Valley with a much less sophisticated and considerably less expensive air force. It is doubtful, however, that they would have achieved the level of effectiveness (81 fighter kills), efficiency (zero losses) and timeliness without the aid of advanced technology of the F-15, F-16, and F-4 aircraft; AIM-7F and AIM-9L missiles; and integrated complex C³I systems. Obviously, the results of this single air battle do not provide the basis upon which to make sweeping generalizations about the outcome of possible U.S.-Soviet air forces engagements, but it is difficult to ignore the general implications that qualitative superiority can be a very cost effective "force multiplier" in the air combat arena.

In a similar vein, the IAF probably could have carried out its surface attack missions without the aid of computerized aircraft delivery systems and high technology precision guided munitions. Again, however, it is doubtful if the pinpoint accuracy demanded for
surgical attacks in "urban terrain" during the siege of Beirut or the selective destruction of SAM guidance systems in the Bekaa Valley could have been accomplished so effectively in the absence of this qualitative edge. This same argument can be made for the quality of Israeli ground and naval forces.

It is imperative that U.S. force planners maintain a focus on providing appropriate levels of high quality, sophisticated weaponry. To do otherwise will deny field commanders the capability to provide a broad spectrum of military options that can accommodate corresponding array of political constraints.

**Innovative Application of Technology**

Israeli successes in combat were sparked by the innovative tactical application of "off-the-shelf" technology. The emphasis was not so much on the introduction of new technology as it was on new ways of employing already existing weapons and equipment capabilities. Two examples of this type of innovation were the use of RPVs and ground launched ARMs. Such a capability appears attractive for U.S. forces in search of efficient means of accomplishing similar missions with limited air resources. The concept may have even broader applications when viewed in the context of a European scenario in which Soviet forces attempt to maintain a SAM umbrella well within missile range of U.S. ground forces. Taken one step further, the integration of sea launched ARMs to suppress land based SAMs raises...
interesting possibilities in force projection scenarios involving U.S. Navy and Marine forces.

Force Flexibility

The IAF's ability to rapidly re-role aircraft and to divert air resources from one mission to another enabled the IDF to focus essentially all of its airpower on the most pressing priority mission. This same flexibility was demonstrated by the INF in the performance of a variety of missions and by Israeli ground forces in overcoming unexpected obstacles, terrain and unconventional enemy forces. U.S. battle management staffs should develop this flexibility—psychologically and physically—for the most optimum employment of all forces in combat.

Conclusion

General Andre Beaufre, a noted French strategist, was quoted as follows in Paris Match, June 24, 1967, with regard to the IDF conduct of the 1967 Middle East war:

The recipes used are all well known: Surprise, resolve and speed, air superiority, a large degree of decentralization of command, ardent troops unencumbered by the complex of rigid and inhibited actions which still prevails all too often in the European, and even the American armies, a simplified logistics system. The utmost maneuver is thus made possible....

The IDF demonstrated once again in Lebanon an adherence to military doctrine and fundamentals in the preparation for and execution of
combat operations. Few mistakes were made and the results were highly impressive and successful. There is no question that the Israeli attitude that promotes a national drive for constant improvement of its forces, proper utilization of combat experience and leadership, detailed planning and coordination, and an aggressive determination toward the accomplishment of military objectives is the very basis of their success in combat. U.S. forces should adhere to these same principles and should receive the necessary national support to maintain a similar level of combat readiness.
APPENDIX B
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISRAELI ARMY

The foundation of the Israeli Army was laid before Israel became a state in 1948. During the tumultuous years of the Palestine Mandate, Arab envy and resentment of the increasingly numerous and prosperous Jewish settlements led to Arab attacks on those settlements. To protect their lives and property the Jews formed several armed defense groups. At first these groups were strictly defensive. However, as Arab attacks increased in frequency and ferocity, the Jews made intensive efforts to increase the offensive competence of their defense forces. Lacking any definitive military tradition, they drew on the varied military background of the immigrant Jews from both eastern and western Europe. In addition, for a brief period, the British authorities who governed the Mandate also provided military assistance in the form of arms and advisors. The most important advisor, from the Jewish perspective, was Orde Wingate (later a general in the WWII Burma campaign). His expertise and prestige as a military professional led to the development of a highly competent force of Jewish light infantry that specialized in night operations. With this force the Jews began to exact retribution on the Arabs whenever they attacked Jewish settlements.

Eventually, and because of a variety of political and procedural
disagreements within the Jewish community, three distinct military
groups developed. Each had its own political philosophy and tactical
methodology, but all were innovative in their approach to military
operations. Eventually the three groups were melded to form the
Israeli Army. These groups were the:

- Haganah
- Irgun Zva'i Leumi (National Military Organization) (shortened
to Irgun).
- Lohamie Herut Israel (Fighters of the Freedom of Israel)
  (shortened to Lehi, but also known as the Stern Group).

The Haganah was the first formed and by far the largest of the
three groups. Created as the military wing of the Labor-Zionist
movement in Palestine, its approach to the protection of Jewish
interest in Palestine, was, in general, defensively oriented. Between
its birth in the 1920's and the establishment of Israel in 1948, the
Haganah evolved into an increasingly professional force. In 1939, a
Supreme General Staff was formed to direct the military development
of the Haganah and plan for future military operations. The establish-
ment of the General Staff coupled with the experience gained by Jewish
forces with the British in World War II proved to be key factors in the
Israeli victory during the War for Independence in 1948.

The other two military organizations cited above, the Irgun and Lehi,
were much more aggressive in protecting Jewish interests in Palestine
than the Haganah. Both these groups carried out terrorist attacks against the British and the Arabs. Some were considered so extreme that the Jewish Agency, which functioned as an underground Jewish government in Palestine, sought through the use of both persuasion and force to bring these two groups back into the mainstream of its defensive policy. These actions were unsuccessful, however, until after Israel was formed as a state. And even then the fractiousness of the Irgun was so disruptive that civil war within the Jewish community was a real possibility.

The threat of civil war was eliminated, however, through a combination of expert political leadership and the immediate Arab threat. These two factors served to fuse the military experience and expertise of the Haganah with the drive and fierce aggressiveness of the Irgun and Lehi.

However, even while these efforts to reduce internal friction were occurring, all forces were increasingly active in fighting the Arabs that shared the Palestine Mandate with the Jews. This fighting continued from 1947 through 1949. It intensified on 15 May 1948. On that date Israel became a state and five Arab armies crossed its borders.

In its war for independence, Israel's most significant weakness, at least initially, was its shortage of heavy weapons, armor, and combat aircraft. To offset this weakness the Israelis had the following strengths:
- An experienced General Staff to provide centralized direction of the armed forces.
- Interior lines of communication.
- Officers and enlisted men with combat experience in World War II.
- A high level of motivation and cooperation at all levels.

With these advantages the Israelis were able to move their forces more efficiently and effectively than the Arabs. Consequently, they were able to achieve battlefield superiority at decisive times and places of their own choosing. Then, tactical innovation and daring were used to overcome the equipment superiority of the Arabs. This approach worked well in almost all instances except where the Arabs were able to establish a set-piece defense. When that occurred, the Israelis usually suffered heavy casualties. It was a lesson well learned, and it would play an important part in the development of Israeli doctrine.

As the war progressed, a well organized, world-wide weapons procurement program brought a broad range of badly needed weapons to the army. With characteristic adaptability, these were modified where needed and quickly brought into decisive use on the battlefield.

Viewed in retrospect, the War for Independence was essentially a scramble for better weapons and a search for battlefield doctrine and techniques that would be successful against Israel's adversaries. The Israelis won that war because, overall, they demonstrated better
organization, initiative and leadership on the battlefield than their opponents. These characteristics were evidenced by four techniques that have come to characterize Israeli forces:

- Careful, thorough planning at the highest levels.

- A command doctrine that "left the details of tactics and methods to the discretion of unit commanders, so long as they achieved their objectives." \(^4\)

- Leadership that called for officers to "pull" their men after them rather than push them from the rear. \(^5\)

- The use of darkness to cover troop movements and assaults on enemy positions.

Israeli victory on the battlefield resulted in the Armistice of 1949. However, it was readily apparent that despite the armistice, the Arab powers were still intent on the destruction of Israel. Acknowledging that intent, the leadership of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) began a complete review of the strategic, doctrinal, tactical and organizational requirements of the IDF. \(^6\) "Instead of preserving the fairly successful Army of Independence, new structures and new doctrines were formulated on the basis of rational thought." \(^7\)

That review revealed the following factors concerning Israel's geo-political situation: \(^8\)

- Due to its size, it has no strategic depth, and it is surrounded by enemies.

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- Its armed forces will continue to be outnumbered by the combined Arab armies.

- Once a conflict starts, the time available to its armed forces to achieve assigned objectives will be limited by great power politics (i.e., the pressures exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union to end the conflict).

Those conclusions led to the following requirements that continue to drive the structure of the IDF today:

- The ability to quickly mobilize the entire society in order to meet the threat of war.

- Qualitative superiority (doctrine, manpower, and equipment) of the IDF that will allow it to concentrate and shift its forces rapidly on the battlefield.

- An alert system that will provide adequate warning of an enemy attack.

- An operational doctrine that will compensate for the lack of strategic depth.

To satisfy those requirements the IDF General Staff restructured the organization and doctrine of the armed forces as follows:

- The ground force was structured around an active, highly trained reserve force. As the IDF Chief of Staff said, "Every civilian is a soldier on eleven months' annual leave." The standing ground force during peacetime would serve mainly as an experienced...
cadre to provide high quality training for the conscripts used to maintain the strength of the reserve units. Standing forces would also include the intelligence, air force and naval components of the IDF. The air force was needed as a swiftly moving covering force that would protect the ground force during the mobilization period. The naval component was also needed as a mobile covering force and to maintain a naval presence at sea. The intelligence component was needed to provide sufficient early warning of an attack so that all forces could be alerted and the ground force mobilized. To give the ground force greater staying power in the field, the self-contained brigade was made the primary unit of military operations. In addition to three combat battalions of infantry or armor, the brigade included an appropriate contingent of service and support units. This reorganization helped provide for a mobile, armored army capable of operating simultaneously on more than one front and of carrying the battle swiftly into the enemy's territory.

These fundamental changes in organization and doctrine, while sensible, were not implemented easily.

- The doctrine of the IDF was developed to emphasize the offensive. Lacking strategic depth, it was essential that the armed forces strike deep into enemy territory for several reasons:

-- To spoil enemy attempts to seize vital population, economic or industrial centers in Israel.
To gain advantages for use in future negotiations.

To reduce casualties and loss of equipment.

To obtain a favorable outcome before the great powers can force a cease fire.

To maintain national morale.

Resource constraints and competition for resources severely slowed the process of change. However, by the time the IDF went to war again in 1956 it had completed the task. In all following conflicts with the Arabs up to the present, those changes and the observations on which they were based remained valid. This is not to say that the structure and doctrine of the IDF remained static, but only that further change was a matter of emphasis and degree rather than one of fundamental concepts.

For example, the 1956 war, despite the availability of armored forces, was fought primarily with mobile infantry forces. The air force acted primarily as "flying artillery" for the ground forces. The IDF was able to strike fast and deep into enemy territory in the Siani, but many formations were plagued by serious "flaws and shortcomings in the sphere of supply, communications and transport." To correct these deficiencies and improve its capabilities, the IDF again thoroughly reviewed its performance. In the "give and take" of that debate, it decided to increase the role of armor in the ground forces and to allocate the necessary means to improve the quality of service.
support. In addition, heavy emphasis was placed on the quantity and quality of training provided at all levels of the IDF. These changes paid off handsomely in the 1967 war.

In six days in 1967, the Sinai, Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights were captured, much of the Egyptian army and air force were destroyed, and the Jordanian and Syrian armies were thoroughly defeated. All this was achieved at a relatively small cost in casualties, fewer than 700 dead and 3000 wounded. The magnitude of the victory surprised the Israelis. The pre-emptive air strike that virtually destroyed the Egyptian air force and the combination of air force and armored strikes on the battlefield proved more successful than they thought possible. With the complete air superiority and ground air support provided by the IDF air force, the armored forces operated and advanced almost as a separate entity. Mechanized infantry forces were mostly confined to mopping up operations. This technique seemed invincible. The completeness of the victory led General Sharon three days afterward to state, "We managed to finish it all...we have now completed everything in such a way that the enemy is not going to be able to fight for many years to come." 15

However, the brilliance of the victory did not lull the IDF into complaisance. Battlefield performance was again critiqued to correct perceived weaknesses. One of the principal changes concerned the self-contained brigade. Study of the battlefield revealed that such brigades
no longer operated alone on the battlefield. All the decisive engagements were now fought at the "ugda" (roughly divisional) level. Given the battles fought then and probably in the future, the brigade no longer had the strength to operate independently. Consequently, the IDF organization was changed to reflect that reality. Henceforward, self-contained, task organized "ugdas" would replace the brigade as the primary ground force in the IDF.

In addition to that structural change, there was also considerable debate over the wisdom of armored forces acting unilaterally on the battlefield well in advance of their mechanized infantry and artillery support. However, those arguments could not prevail against the victory of the 1967 war. Most of the IDF seemed to believe that the Arabs simply could not stand for long in front of an unsupported Israeli armored assault. Israeli confidence had given way to hubris. That hubris led the IDF to seriously underestimate the capability and determination of their Arab enemies and their chief supporter, the Soviet Union.

Within months of the Arab defeat in 1967, massive amounts of sophisticated Soviet military hardware were transported to the Arab confrontational states. This transfusion not only made good the losses of the 1973 war but actually increased the military strength of the Arabs. To offset that gain, Israel also built up her forces with modern equipment. Some of this was built inside Israel using the
spoils of the 1967 war, other equipment was procured from the United States and other countries. In addition, the length of male conscript service was increased to three years and the annual period of reserve duty was increased from one to two months per year for some combat troops. These precautions all seemed adequate to contain the Arab threat. However, their economic cost was enormous for Israel. To contain those costs and to retain the good will of its principal benefactor, the United States, Israel decided against a preemptive strike against the Arab states. Instead she decided to gamble that her new territorial acquisitions and her clear military superiority over the Arabs would be an adequate buffer against a future attack. That gamble proved ill-advised.

After months of building their forces along Israel's border and conducting endless attack feints, the Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked on 6 October 1973, the day of Yom Kippur. The attack caught the IDF by surprise both strategically and tactically. For the first three days of the battle the IDF skated along the edge of defeat. Massive Israeli tank attacks in the Sinai were ambushed with Saggar anti-tank missiles and defeated. When the IAF went in to protect the tanks, an integrated anti-air umbrella of missiles and small-arms fire destroyed the air attack and inflicted severe losses. Two factors saved the IDF from defeat: The superb resilience, adaptability and training of its forces and the inflexibility and unimaginative tactics of the Arabs. Once the IDF realized that its armored assaults could
not be successful without additional artillery fire and infantry support, it quickly task organized its forces so that all future assaults combined tanks with mechanized infantry and artillery. Once these assaults punched through the enemy ground forces, the fixed anti-air missile and small-arms installations were overrun or forced to displace. This action allowed the air force to provide air cover against Arab air attacks.

Using that basic tactical approach, the IDF won their victory and preserved Israel's territorial gains from the 1967 war. However, it was a much shaken IDF that set about reviewing the results of the Yom Kippur War. The hubris created by the 1967 victory had been replaced by a healthy respect for the Arab forces. The price for that lesson was formidable: nearly 3000 dead or 11,000 total casualties in 19 days of war. On the basis of population, it would be equivalent to the United States suffering 132,000 dead or 543,000 total casualties.¹⁷

That experience led to a close look at IDF doctrine and operational procedures. The critique revealed that, fundamentally, the doctrine and structure of the IDF were sound. However, some operational procedures, derived principally from the 1967 war, but also from an underestimation of Arab capabilities, needed correction. First, it was obvious that tank forces could not operate in isolation on the modern battlefield. A combined arms approach was necessary for success. As a result, the proportions of artillery and mechanized infantry to tanks were drastically increased in the IDF.¹⁸ Second, it was also
apparent that the achievement of air superiority over the battlefield would increasingly rely on a combination of two factors:

- Imaginative use of electronic countermeasures to overcome the anti-aircraft threat.

- The use of ground forces to either overrun or force the displacement of anti-aircraft sites.

In summary, it was clear that the IDF must achieve both a better integration of its ground, air and naval forces and maintain or improve the technical sophistication of its weapons if it was to maintain its clear superiority on Arab battlefields. The fulfillment of these requirements bore directly on the success of the ground force in Operation Peace for Galilee.
APPENDIX C

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE; THE BATTLE

Operation Peace for Galilee became known to the world as a 20,000-man Israeli force invaded Lebanon on Sunday, 6 June 1982. Israel invaded with a massive, combined arms attack launched along three separate axes of advance. So powerful and well coordinated was the invasion, that by the 14th of June, only eight days after the preemptive strike was launched, Israeli defense forces (IDF) completed the encirclement of Beirut, destroyed the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and dealt Syria a harsh battlefield defeat.¹

The Israelis had seven years to prepare for this invasion and did so in earnest during the last 12-18 months prior to the conflict.² Tactics were tailored to the threat. Emergency stores were filled and support forces readied. Once again the Israeli military achieved success. Moreover, every objective set by the IDF was obtained.³

As Israeli assault forces crossed the Lebanese border, the impressive coordination of IDF combined arms support became immediately obvious. A large scale air attack quickly secured IAF supremacy of the skies and was followed by total integration of air support with the advancing Israeli ground forces. Close air support to soften ground objectives and assault helicopter support were combined with massed artillery
fires, amphibious assaults and naval gunfire to maintain the IDF's momentum northward. One Israeli force punched west, then north along the sea towards PLO strongholds of Rashidiyah and Tyre. Central axis forces rolled towards the PLO vantage point of Beaufort Castle and then northward blocking the western side of the Bekaa Valley effectively stopping any Syrian attempt to reinforce the PLO to the west. The third Israeli ground force opened an eastern front and headed straight into the Syrian stronghold of the Bekaa Valley.

The coastal ground assault was swift as the IDF closed on the port of Tyre during the first day. Simultaneously, amphibious and heliborne assaults surprised the PLO defenders by placing troops and even tanks in blocking positions as far north as the Zahrani River. By Tuesday 8 June, though drastically constrained by terrain, the Israeli armored column with its continuing combined arms support fought its way through Sidon and on towards Damur and therein initiated the collapse of the PLO infrastructure. Behind the IDF's advance however, PLO fighters were left for mopping up operations by follow-on forces. On Wednesday, bypassing a determined and barricaded PLO force at Sidon, another Israeli amphibious landing was attempted at Khaldah but was repulsed by PLO defenders. The Israeli speed of advance slowed on 10 June as Israeli coastal forces now cautiously moved north and east of Damur into Beirut suburbs.
The coordination of all arms of the Israeli military machine was as impressive along the central axis as it was on the coast. On 6 June Israeli planes bombed the PLO stronghold of Nabatiyah. This action was followed by commandos of the Golani Brigade capturing the important Beaufort Castle in a night attack. By Tuesday, 8 June the central column, moving up the interior, threatened Syrian control of the Beirut-Damascus Road. Two days later, after particularly difficult fighting, the IDF was only a few kilometers from this road, which served as a major logistical route for the Syrians.

On Monday 7 June, the Israelis moved swiftly on the eastern flank catching Syria unware. For the first time, Israeli ground forces met Syrian patrols in minor skirmishes. In a coordinated air-ground offensive on 9 June, the Israelis attacked Syrian missile sites and tank positions in the Bekaa Valley and successfully destroyed the missile threat. On Thursday, 10 June, while the IAF continued its elimination of all missile batteries in the Bekaa, IDF ground forces inflicted serious losses on Syrian forces in the south of the valley forcing them to retreat north of Lake Al Qir'awn.

During 11-13 June, the IDF consolidated its encirclement of Beirut while mopping up efforts continued along all axes. By the 14th of June the encirclement was complete. The Lebanese presidential palace at B'abda was occupied with
the Israeli Defense Minister Sharon in personal command, and
the Beirut-Damascus link was cut. Israeli forces now moved
within two kilometers of the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian
camps, and took control of the airport. The military battle
was, in essence, over.

Two distinctly separate campaigns had been fought in
Lebanon: one against the PLO and another against the Syrians.

The PLO campaign itself had two stages; the first in the
central and coastal regions south of Beirut and the second
in the Beirut area. South of Beirut, the PLO was destroyed
rather easily. This was an unambiguous PLO defeat despite
their infrastructure, numerous weapons, and semi-regular units
Pitted against a few thousand unorganized guerrillas came
the modern Israeli armed forces with plentiful armor, artil-
lery and air power. Though it can be argued that this was
an easy Israeli victory, it was also a Palestinian failure.
The PLO had been unable to properly employ its assets. They
failed in the use of their artillery and tanks, thousands
of mines went unused, and bridges along the Israeli axes
of advance were not destroyed. What the PLO initially faced
was a vanguard of the IDF that was ordered to head north
toward Beirut without stopping. If fired on the Israelis
were to return fire but press on.

PLO forces were ill prepared for such conflict. Israeli
ground forces won their initial victories against less than
8,000 PLO guerrillas whose training, leadership and tactic
were poor. As an example, the battle for Beaufort Castle involved some of the most bitter initial fighting of the invasion. PLO defenders initially numbered about 200 yet only 30-40 remained when it was captured.

During the second stage of PLO fighting (Beirut area), the battle took a different form. The PLO had regrouped and successfully stood its ground despite massive artillery and air attacks. Israeli ground forces never forcefully entered the city to destroy their enemy, but the Israeli siege and military and psychological pressures finally forced PLO removal from Beirut.

The second campaign was fought against the Syrians. Though capable, the Syrian army fought seriously only when it felt Damascus was threatened and even then, Syrian armor retreated up the Bekaa Valley the moment it began to take significant losses. The fighting between Israel and Syria for control of the Beirut-Damascus Road appeared more a Syrian test of the seriousness of Israel's intentions than a battle for a strategic position.

In the Bekaa, the battles were limited in duration and scope. Neither side deployed more than a fraction of their available forces. While keeping pressure in the south of the valley, the IDF repeatedly outflanked Syrian defenders by deploying helicopter lifted tank-killer teams to superior tactical positions.
In both campaigns (PLO and Syrian) and along all three axes of advance, Israeli attackers bypassed and isolated enemy held built up areas. No effort was made to reduce them initially. Instead artillery and air suppressed enemy fire while IDF maneuver forces continued their advance northward. Follow on forces were designated to reduce the remaining resistance. Israeli casualties were kept to a minimum in these operations so few frontal assaults were conducted. Instead, the attackers advanced until serious resistance was met and then massed air, artillery and/or tank fire on the target. Often in concert with massed supporting fires, special operations such as amphibious landings or heliborne assaults enveloped built up areas and blocked enemy retreat. Once resistance was reduced the advance proceeded as before until the process had to be repeated. Israeli city fighting proved as deliberate as their breakthrough battle strategy, yet, as mentioned before, efforts were made to minimize civilian casualties.

When ground forces, supported by off shore Israeli naval forces, had completed encirclement of Beirut, the IDF strategy changed. No military objectives within the city were specified, according to the IDF Chief of Staff. Rather, Beirut's surrounding hilltops were seized and main supply routes to and from the city were choked off.

From the 15th of June until the final PLO and Syrian withdrawal from Beirut on September 3rd, the IDF settled
into consolidation operations. Lebanon became a political football typified by heavy IDF artillery, air and naval gunfire bombardments of selected Beirut targets, by cease-fires, and by proposals, counter-proposals and international criticism of Israel.

The IDF had swiftly fought across difficult, mountainous and constraining terrain and through built up areas. It fought well equipped but untrained PLO guerrillas. Moreover, it fought against a standing Syrian army supported by armor, a sophisticated air defense system, modern Soviet weapons, and deadly anti-tank commando squads. It was a limited conflict with a single front, conducted in fair-weather and over an area smaller than the size of Luxemburg. Once again the IDF stood successful on the field of battle and every military objective was achieved. Perhaps it was not a true contest of military skills since opposing forces were so unequal. Nonetheless, it was a superbly executed military success; one based on well conceived doctrine and strategy securely linked to national goals.
APPENDIX D
EVOLUTION OF THE IAF*

Background

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) achieved unprecedented victories during Operation "Peace for Galilee." It is now a modern, mature organization which has evolved steadily during decades of low intensity combat punctuated by three major wars. The factors which shaped the IAF's evolutionary development through the years are many and varied, but four assumed special significance and had great bearing on the outcome of the 1982 campaign.

Pre-eminence of the Air-to-Air Combat Role. Even though the IAF has demonstrated its ability to perform many diversified missions, there is clearly a sharper focus on the air-to-air combat/air defense role than on any other single task. This pre-occupation with air superiority is seated in the nation's continuing precarious geo-political situation. Israel's neighbors are hostile, they possess formidable military capability, and their close proximity to major Israeli population/industrial centers makes the country vulnerable to enemy air attack. By necessity the maintenance of air superiority over the homeland occupies a dominate position among Israel's top defense priorities.

Force structure, personnel and policies of the IAF clearly reflect this national emphasis on air combat.
capability. A review of the Israeli air order of battle (AOB) indicates that no expense has been spared in procuring the very best air-to-air combat aircraft available—the F-4, the Mirage, their own KFIR, the F-15 and most recently the F-16. Only the best pilots and weapon systems officers are assigned duty in new aircraft committed to the air superiority mission. Each has to earn such an assignment by proving his capabilities first in older aircraft employed primarily for surface attack.

For much the same reasons, the Israelis have placed great emphasis on developing and maintaining an effective command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) system. Their streamlined procedures insure both timely dissemination of information and rapid response of air defense forces. Here again, only top notch people are entrusted with critical responsibilities such as those of Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) for which officers must be highly skilled. Israeli fighter pilots have great respect for GCI controllers and follow their directives diligently.

**Air Doctrine.** At the beginning of the 1967 "Six Day War," the IAF conducted pre-emptive air strikes which destroyed a large number of enemy tactical fighters on the ground and essentially neutralized the Arab's surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat. The success of these early offensive counter air (OCA) and defense suppression (DS) operations
cleared the way for Israeli Defense Force (IDF) ground units to pursue their objectives without the threat of enemy air attack and with the almost unhampered assistance of friendly air support. In fact, the pre-emptive strike strategy proved to be so successful that the IDF based subsequent doctrine and force development efforts on the perception that the 1967 scenario could be "replayed" at will to achieve similar results should the Arabs ever doubt the "invulnerability" of the Israelis again.

The Arabs, on the other hand, learned many valuable lessons from Israeli success. They gained additional appreciation for the effectiveness of the pre-emptive attack strategy and recognized that the Israeli's over confidence in a predominately offensive scenario significantly increased in the IDF's vulnerability to a reciprocal surprise attack. Thus, the Arabs began preparations which culminated in a well conceived and executed offensive at the opening of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The Israelis were caught in October 1973 in a peacetime posture and initially faced overwhelming numerical opposition in defensive battles on two fronts. IAF resources were dedicated immediately to close air support in an effort to slow rapidly advancing enemy armor which was inflicting unacceptable losses on Israeli ground forces. Without the opportunity to conduct pre-emptive or collateral OCA operations, the IAF was forced to conduct close air support
in an extremely hostile environment rife with sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and enemy fighter aircraft. The Israelis suffered inordinately heavy air casualties during the early stages of the war and were able to stem their losses only after the ground war situation had improved and air assets could be spared to neutralize enemy air defense systems. Although the IDF subsequently recovered from the initial setback and eventually resecured all the territory that had been won in 1967, a thorough review of the nation's defense strategy was clearly in order.

As a result of the 1973 war experience, close air support and interdiction were subordinated to air superiority and defense suppression in the order of air operations priorities, and planners were informed that IAF resources would most likely not be made available for close air support during the early stages of future Arab-Israeli wars.

Conservation of Resources. The Israeli's limited ability to produce/replace personnel, materiel and financial resources--particularly when compared to their Arab adversaries--has forced them to emphasize both conservation and efficient utilization of resources in every endeavor. As a result, they have developed perspectives and methods which some western observers consider unique but essential. For example, captured equipment is often adapted for IDF use. Older systems are modified to combat the capabilities or
exploit the vulnerabilities of new enemy threats. And, the development and application of new tactics which employ existing systems to gain an advantage is the rule rather than the exception. For the Israelis, the acquisition of new systems which provide the "force multiplier" effect through the application of advanced technology is a mandatory investment, even though the cost of "quality" may require a sacrifice in "quantity." They are committed to procuring modern equipment which is the most efficient for their particular requirements.

Combat Leadership. Combat leadership is fundamental to the IAF. Strong national support for the military and a history of fighting for survival form the basis for a system which promotes proven combat veterans to command positions and thrusts young aviators into combat at every appropriate opportunity. Having instituted this system to select only the most seasoned leaders for supervisory responsibilities, there is substantial flexibility in the IAF system for commanders to exercise judgement and initiative in their leadership role. Furthermore, higher echelons of command have great confidence in their subordinates in the field and respond accordingly to their requests and recommendations.

It is important to note that an Israeli commander's effectiveness may well be judged more on his ability to limit casualties than on his rate of advance or ability to hold a position on the battlefield.
*Note: Information contained in this appendix has been synthesized from multiple sources, including interviews with Department of Defense and Israeli military officials. It has been declared unclassified for publication in its present form by the Defense Intelligence Agency. That agency should be contacted for more detailed classified information pertaining to Israeli air operations in the 1982 war in Lebanon.*
NOTES

CHAPTER I


6. Ibid.
NOTES

CHAPTER II


2. Ibid.


NOTES

APPENDIX B


4. Luttwak and Horowitz, p. 54.

5. Ibid., p. 61.


7. Luttwak and Horowitz, p. 89.


9. Luttwak and Horowitz, p. 79.

10. Ibid., p. 13.


12. Tal, p. 25.


15. Ibid., p. 299.

16. Ibid., p. 327.

17. Dupuy, p. 603.

18. Ibid., p. 595.
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APPENDIX C


8. Rosen and Eshkol, p. 47.

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