# Training for Desegregation in the Military

## Abstract

This report presents a model of interethnic behaviour, summarizes the more than a decade of race-relation's training in the U.S. Military, reviews the evaluations of that training and, finally, relates the training designs to the presented model.
TRAINING FOR DESEGREGATION IN THE MILITARY

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This chapter has three aims: First, a theory of interethnic behavior will be presented and, one can hope, related to the military situation. In keeping with the focus of this book, the theory is appropriately psychologically and behaviorally based. Second, we shall describe the history and current status of race-relations and equal opportunity training programs in the U.S. military. We will also take a look at the evaluations that have been performed on these programs and attempt to relate those findings to the theory developed here. We say "attempt" since the evaluations rarely, if ever, have a clearly defined and articulated theoretical base. Finally, we shall make some recommendations for the future conduct of training for desegregation in the military. It is not our purpose to completely review the many and varied attempts by the military to make desegregation a practical reality. That has been done elsewhere and done well (e.g. Hope, 1979; Day, 1983). Rather, your focus will be on the presentation of a model of interethnic behavior that could be used to guide desegregation training efforts. If there is any contribution in this chapter, it is,
thus, in the model, which is very much a tentative statement, and its applicability to the military and other similar situations.

A model of Interethnic behavior

It seems quite clear from the various reports reviewed both here and elsewhere that the race-relations programs in the military has suffered from a lack of guidance from a consistent theory. Thus, there have, in reality been a number of programs, the total being only limited by the unique character of each base and commander. Unclear has been not only the behavior which is desired but also a coherent conceptualization of the links between the desired behavior and possible program modules. The importance of looking at these links was demonstrated in a recent study by Hulgus and Landis (1979) in which counterbalancing the order of two common types of cross-cultural training produced quite different results.

If we take the luxury of standing back from the organizational contraints (cf. Dinges & Maynard, 1983; Mumford, 1983), we can sketch the outlines of a model of interethnic behavior. For a variety of reasons, (e.g. our own disciplinary backgrounds) the focus of this model is individualistic. That is, we shall be concerned with defining interethnic competent behaviors (Dinges, 1983) at the level of an individual's actions. To be sure, there will be organizational impacts and restrictions on this behavior. We shall include, wherever possible such variables in our model.

The model presented below also draws some of its inspiration
from the discussion and research on the so-called contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; 1976). That is, it is taken as axiomatic that the aim of interethnic training is to produce interpersonal contact situations which are positive and lead to further interactions of the same type. However, as Amir (e.g. 1976) has pointed out, not all contact situation produce positive results and the findings particularly in the military have been mixed (e.g. MacKenzie, 1948; Amir, Bizman and Rivner, 1973). Further, contact does not occur as a full-blown act without history and preparation. That is, it would seem obvious that there is a rather involved set of cognitions and behaviors which precede any contact situation. Those variables act to set up expectancies and behaviors on the actor as well as the others in the situation. So, depending on the stages that the person has gone through to arrive at the contact situation, there will be a heightened willingness to interpret the reactive behavior of the other in positive or negative fashion. The hypothesis of contact provides a critical, but perhaps not very useful, backdrop to understanding the integration situation. For, without a clear idea of the cognitive history of the person, we cannot predict how he/she will categorize the behavior of the other and thus how those actions will reinforce the actor. We are left simply with the fact of contact, good or bad. We feel that we must go beyond the rather surface and somewhat naive analyses and attempt to see the integration situation from point of view of the actor. The model in this section is put forward in that spirit.
It is our basic thesis that desegregation becomes a reality when people feel, as well as become, inter-ethnically competent. That competence comes about when appropriate behaviors are elicited and reinforced. This rather facile statement begs the real issues, of course: how are the "appropriate behaviors" elicited and, how, once emitted, how is the reinforcement provided and by whom? To provide a beginning for an answer, we shall use a model of inter-cultural behavior recently proposed by Brislin, Landis and Brandt (1983). This model is schematically shown in Fig. 1.

As the criterion behavior, Brislin, et. al. proposed that such actions should be defined in terms of their impact on others. So, these authors see "...intercultural behavior as action that produces a significant change in the judgments of the actor's social or skill competence by people from another cultural background." (p.3. emphasis in the original). Thus, as the actors, cultures, and settings change, the desired behavior may, and should, change. Further, the definition leaves open the possibility that the behavior may be judged positively, negatively, or neutrally from time-to-time. We would argue, however, that the total set of interethnic behaviors are those that result in a positive change in minority perceptions of whites' social or skill competence. For as that subset (of positive behaviors) is emitted, it is likely to be reinforced by
minities and become part of the actors preferred repertoire.

Now, how does this desired set come about?

The model proposed by Brislin, Landis, and Brandt (1982) suggests a number of factors needed to elicit the desired set of behaviors. Some of the antecedent variables are conceptually and temporally close to the desired action and some are quite distant. All, however, are hypothesized to contribute to the nature of the "intercultural" act. As we discuss each variable in the model, we shall relate it to the military setting—as we understand that setting.

The person entering the integrated situation is not, in most cases, without intercultural experiences. He/she comes complete with a packet of experiences, beliefs, and expectations about people of other racial groups. These originate deep in the past as well as just yesterday. The most salient variables are:

1. The affect associated with the sum total of past interactions with members of the other group. These experiences may be real or imagined. So, a person who comes from an urban area where he/she had negative experiences with members of a minority group would have one set of experiences; similarly, a person whose experiences were positive would have another view.

2. The past experiences lead to certain expectations of differences in role and norm behaviors. The contrast here is between the actor and the perceived other (Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Ross, 1977). If the difference is perceived to be great, there may be little attempt to interact so that the behavior rarely, if ever, occurs. For example, a soldier who sees blacks
as being very different, wanting different things from the military, and sharing few values, might avoid interaction whenever possible. And, when avoiding is not possible, the interaction would be kept on a task basis with little cognitive or affective evaluation of the experiences.

On the other hand, when no differences are perceived, the same result might obtain. That is, a belief of sameness might lead to a loss of any motivation to associate except as necessary and accidental during the normal work day. The often used statement in the Army "there is no black or white, only (Army) green" is, perhaps, an expression of this idea.

The above two paragraphs suggest something like the Yerkes-Dodson curve. There is some optimum perceived difference that is a motivation for a person to engage in behavior directed at changing the other's perceptions.

3. Intercultural behavior is arousing. This statement finds some theoretical support in the speculations of George Kelly (1955). Kelly's suggestion was that if personal constructs are in danger of being changed due to external experience, anxiety is the affective state which results. Later, we will discuss the directional properties of this state. However, here we note that there are individual differences in the normal level of arousal, in particular anxiety. If a person is chronically highly anxious, his/her willingness to engage in intercultural behavior may well be compromised. This trait anxiety (Spielberger, 1966) probably functions, we would think, in a more linear fashion than anxiety associated with a particular event. So, we might predict that the level of anxiety is inversely related to willingness to
enter intercultural settings. For example, all things being equal, if a white soldier is invited for a drink by two other persons, one white and one black and he has a choice of going with one or the other, level of state anxiety will be a predictor of the choice.

4. Intercultural behavior is only one category of activities that may engage a person's attention at any given time. Each such set of activities is viewed by the person as more or less important to achieve more a less critical goals. To the extent that the behaviors are perceived as related to central goals, the person will be more likely to engage in such behaviors. The major effect of the various Directives (see below p. 000-000) has probably been to increase the centrality (ie. perceived relationship to promotion) of positive intercultural behaviors. We would suspect that the perceived centrality of goals is quite similar to, and related to, the perceived consequences of behaviors that Triandis (1976) has included in his model.

All of the above distal variables are alike, we believe, in one important relationship. Each impacts on the individual's seeking of new social situations, which Brislin, et. al, called behavioral seeking. We believe that this function is critical and central to an understanding and maintence of intercultural behavior.

Behavioral seeking involves the deliberate placing of oneself in situations for which the interpersonal action cues are ambiguous, at best. Since these are situations that are likely to be anxiety arousing, there are good reasons for them to be
avoided. Yet, without this volitional behavior, the individual may never have the opportunity to try out new responses and have them potentially reinforced. In the military setting, we would note that behavior seeking is taking place when individuals begin to interact with others on matters not strictly related to the mission at hand. Those activities may be social or work focused but extended in time. But, whatever and whenever, these new behaviors are not required and occur at the expense of previous learned activities. Our caveat that behavioral seeking involves behavior not work focused has support in the many studies that have found little or no reduction in prejudice when contact was restricted to occupational interaction (e.g. Minard, 1952).

Behavioral seeking is, in our view, effected by another set of individual traits. These have to do with the way in which the person constructs social reality. In particular, we would point to the tendency to use wide or narrow categories to deal with people, things, and situations. Detweiler (e.g. 1980) has presented some evidence that wide categorizers (a trait that seems quite similar to cognitive complexity cf. Mayo and Crockett, 1964) are able to function more effectively in an intercultural situation. On the other hand, Kealey and Ruben (1982) have been unable to find such a relationship when dealing with people being sent overseas to provide technical assistance. Indeed, the latter authors find just the opposite relationship from that reported by Detweiler. Perhaps, the cognitive-perceptual set (e.g. Gardner, et al, 1953) is moderated by the situation (see Detweiler, Brulín, and McCormack, 1983) to a greater extent than previously suspected. It would thus seem
reasonable to suggest that these "sets" are related to the tendency to over-stereotype and, we would suspect, maintain the belief in the face of overwhelming evidence.

Behavioral seeking, it would seem, by virtue of generating new experiences, lead to changes in expected role and normative behaviors. By this we mean that new conceptions of the "oughts" and "shoulds" of behavior become consolidated, or even take the place of, old ideas about what are proper intercultural behaviors. Critical to the occurrence of these new beliefs is the flexibility of the person's conception of him/her self. If there are rigid boundaries to the behaviors that he/she considers proper for the self, then the new experiences may be reinterpreted in a limited fashion. For example, the results of behavioral seeking (social interaction with black soldiers) can often be misinterpreted when the minority individuals spend some time among themselves or express a tolerance for behavior that seems unacceptable. The person with a relatively rigid self-conception may then distance him/herself rather than seem to accept what has previously been unacceptable. This willingness to accept traits in others—to take the viewpoint of others—is what we mean by the term "lability" of self perception.

Under favorable circumstances, not only is there a change in perceived role and norm differences but also the individual's self conception has shifted. This shift is toward the inclusion of other's characteristics in the person's own view of him/herself in such a way that the person can visualize engaging in behaviors and being judged as a member of another cultural
group. Most importantly, he/she can take the view of the other and judge it in the same terms that the other would. This move away from egocentrism is, in our view, a critical element in the development of desegregation supportive behaviors.

Despite important changes in the world view of the person, appropriate intercultural behaviors may still not occur; and, not occurring, their failure to be reinforced will lead to fewer and fewer such behaviors in the future. We hypothesize that an important precursor to the "intention" to engage in intercultural acts (which the studies and conceptualizations of Fishbein and Triandis have shown to be highly related to behavior) is the engaging in behavioral training rehearsal. We have captured the description of this variable from the early learning literature. Cognitive rehearsal of lists was shown to be effective in their later recall. Related here is Piaget's Law of Relative Centrations in which the interaction of sensory mechanisms and stimuli are used as the basis for illusions. Landis and Harrison (1966) showed that similar effects occur in fantasy. Playing potential intercultural behaviors in an imaginary situation may not only produce more stable behaviors but allow a relative emphasis on certain aspects. So, a soldier may think about how he will give an order to a black man, or how he will respond to being insulted, or any one of a myriad of possible and imagined situations. In any case, for each, he can rehearse actions and contemplate possible reactions and rewards.

As rehearsal continues, the intention to perform, or not (which is, of course, an intention) is gradually taking shape.
As this cognition is forming, its elements may trigger (probably through a mechanism much like Osgood's, 1953, r) anxiety responses. Brislin (1981) drawing on the theorizing of Harold Kelley (1967) and the work of Guthrie (1966) and Szanton (1966) has suggested that an effect of cognitive instability is the formation of many "new" attributions. It seems reasonable to interpose a motivational force in between the "instability" and the new cognitions. A further interesting piece of work is that of Weiner, Russell, and Lerman (1976) noting that there are affective associates to causal attributions. As the attributions change, arousal is likely. If these affective responses are powerful enough, then either other behaviors will be substituted or some form of desensitization applied as a therapy. In any case, the level of state anxiety, or even some more positive emotions, will either aid or hinder the formation of an appropriate intention.

Once the desired behavior has occurred, its future course depends almost entirely, we would think, on the reactions from the "others" and the surrounding social network. If the other reacts negatively—as Japanese often do for someone imperfectly speaking their language (Ramsey and Birk, 1983)—then the future responses may be considerably muted. Similarly, if the social system (e.g. the Chain of Command) is not supportive, then, also, the responses will degrade (Fontaine, 1982; Brislin, 1981). Fortunately, as the next pages of this chapter seem to show, the military has been attempting to provide appropriate support mechanisms for the kind of desegregative behaviors that are desired.
The model presented here is, of course, largely speculative. The links seem reasonable and supported by evidence (piecemeal, to be sure) from a variety of non-military and largely laboratory sources (e.g. Amir, 1976). Nevertheless, it still needs to be investigated within the desegregation setting. It is our thesis, along with Pettigrew (1969) stated once again for emphasis, that true integration is not the same as desegregation. The former requires significant changes in the behaviors and cognitions of the individual. Without such changes desegregation becomes hostage to changes in the prevailing political view. Recent (i.e. late 1982) pronouncements by the Federal government that certain affirmative action requirements will not be as strongly enforced are such changes. If those ideas became standard within the military (and we don't know that they have not!), then desegregation behaviors will cease to the extent that real cognitive and affective change has not yet occurred in the individual military person. Lacking good evidence to the contrary, we have to assume that the military's program has had marginal impact on the intrapsychological variables. Certainly, the tendency for black officers to not re-enlist would suggest that all is not well. (Hope, 1981)

Structure of the Military's Race-Relations Training Program

The description that follows of the history and current status of the U.S. Military's Race-Relations program will, of necessity be brief. A much fuller description is given in Day, 1983. While we would prefer not to use acronyms, and will use
them sparingly, their non-use would make the chapter much longer than is justified. In addition, we will allude to administrative arrangements (e.g. command reporting structure) when it seems pertinent to the functioning of the program. This is justified because in the military the place of a program in the command structure may be as important (in terms of day-to-day operations) as the actual actions by program personnel. To understand the current program, a brief history of the military's past efforts is necessary.

It is safe to say that the U.S. military, despite room for improvement, represents the most desegregated sector of American society. This has not always been true. For example, Abraham Lincoln accepted black soldiers only when casualty rates became so high it was politically inexpedient not to use them (Forner, 1974). Black Buffalo Soldiers were set against another minority, the Native Americans. In both world wars, although extensively represented among American soldiers, all-black units were commanded by white officers and were rarely relied upon for important duty.

The modern period of race-relations in the military began clearly with President Truman's Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948. This order, which took undoubtly a great deal of political courage, made it the policy of the government that integration and equal opportunity was to be the norm rather than the exception in the armed forces. One of the factors contributing to this decision was able performance of black soldiers in the
European and Pacific campaigns; this performance was documented by the now-classic Stouffer Report (Stouffer, et al., 1949) and the later Gillian Committee Report (Quarles, 1974). Unlike the aftermath of previous wars in which outstanding black performance had been denigrated upon cessation of hostilities, these reports must have contributed to a new perception (Hope, 1979). In any case, Mr. Truman must have been convinced that no degradation of military efficiency would result from racial integration of the armed forces.

The Army's response to Truman's order was the adoption of a policy statement issued in January, 1950. Coincident with this policy statement, and probably due to the training demands of the Korean "police action", the commander of Fort Ord, California began integrating training companies. Other similar actions were taken and desegregation, at least at the lower ranks, became the norm rather than the exception. However, desegregation at this level did not lead to similar action at other levels. During the 1950's blacks although found in all units, remained concentrated in the lower enlisted ranks and in certain military occupational specialities (e.g. food service). The Army's lead in desegregation was followed by similar, though often not as effective, actions by the other services.

The black-white tensions during the 1960's were reflected in the military as one might expect. The growing awareness of the facts of disadvantagement among blacks in the military lead to an assertion of demands for equal treatment as well as a rise of racial sensitivity, white anxiety, and open hostility. The
increased tension and continually escalating hostilities throughout the 60's, exacerbated by the disproportionate numbers of blacks among the lower enlisted ranks, a dearth of black officers, and the high casualty rates for blacks in the Vietnam war culminated in open conflicts within the military which were often described as "race riots". These conflicts were experienced by all branches of the service. However, those occurring in the Army (e.g. in Germany) and in the Navy (e.g. the U.S.S. Kittyhawk) received the greatest public attention.

This situation led to a series of investigations and appointment of task forces in an attempt to resolve the problems. For example, an investigating team was sent to Europe by President Nixon and found a high level of frustration and anger among black troops. The team concluded that the problem lay in the perceived failure of the military leadership to exercise adequate authority and responsibility in monitoring the equal opportunity aspects of military regulations. At about the same time, an Interservice Task Force on Education (created by the Secretary of Defense), was assigned responsibility for developing an effective race relations education program which would be applicable to all the services. The Task Force called for:

. Creation of a mandatory program in race relations education for all military personnel.
. Establishment of a Defense Race Relations Institute; and
. Formation of an interservice race relations board.

All of these recommendations were officially implemented by Department of Defense Directive 1322.11 issued in June, 1971.
The program which resulted included a formal DoD support structure, key components of which were the Defense Race Relations Institute and the Race Relations Board. In addition, local units were required to provide race relations training (instructors coming from the Defense Race Relations Institute) to all troops under their control.

The existence of racial discrimination in the military can be attributed to the fact that individuals who enter the military service bring with them the prejudices and stereotypes acquired prior to enlistment. Further, the military services, like other types of institutions in American tended to reinforce discriminatory attitudes and behaviors by not recognizing the possibility of an institutional racist aspect to many policies and practices. Hence, despite equal opportunity directives throughout the fifties and sixties, the United States military services simply reflected discrimination found in the society as a whole. When the racial situation became serious enough to threaten the survival and efficiency of the military, the institution reacted with an ambitious and comprehensive program. While the various service programs will be described here, for a more detailed history of race-relations in the U.S. military, the reader is referred to Day, 1983 and Hope, 1979.

Even though military organizations are highly authoritarian and hierarchical social structures, the statement of policies and directives by no means assures automatic implementation and achievement of goals. In reality, military personnel have a considerable latitude for non-compliant and self-directed
behavior. This latitude, while present at all times, is even more obvious during peace time. On the other hand, most other American institutions are hardly governed by *laissez-faire* rules allowing full and unrestrained individual freedom and autonomy. Thus, while the military has some unique organizational aspects, these, we would feel, tend to be more matters of degree, rather than qualitative differences. On this basis, it would seem reasonable to look at the military's experience with race relations and desegregation for lessons to be applied in other sections of our society.

**The response to the problem: Inception of the program at Defense Department**

One cannot understand the current program of race-relations and its effects without understanding the organization that was created to develop that program. Further, since the implementors of the race-relations program were all trained, initially at least, by the Defense Race Relations Institute, much of what has happened subsequently to both the trainees and the trainers can be better understood by looking at the institution. For that reason, we shall rather carefully describe the training institute and its history within the military establishment.

The mandate of the Defense Race Relations Institute, upon its creation, was to develop and implement a program of classes in race relations. These classes were to be designed to prevent "racial unrest, tension or conflict" from impairing "combat readiness and efficiency." The following specific tasks of were
identified, although the emphasis has always been on the first of these responsibilities.

- educate and train instructors in race relations;
- develop doctrine and curricula;
- evaluate program effectiveness; and
- develop and disseminate guidelines and materials to be used throughout the military services.

While there is some question about the achievement of the last two goals, there is no question that an educational program was developed and implemented. The instructional program to be given to individuals who were to become race-relations trainers at bases in the Army, Navy, and Air Force was described as:

The program of instruction consists of 75 hours of instruction in the history and contributions of major minority groups, 42 hours of instruction in the psychological, social, and cultural factors directly related to the dynamics of race-relations, 40 hours of community interaction activities, four hours for guest speakers, 70 hours devoted to practicum in group leadership dynamics and reentry into their military units, and an added four hours for orientation, critique, and graduation. A total of 235 hours over a six week period...

(Commander's Notebook, 1971)

The fundamental mission of the institute has not changed since its beginning in 1971, even though its mission statement was revised in 1976. The new statement included the "training of Army and Navy personnel designated as equal opportunity/human resources management specialists". There is considerable debate within the military as to the effects and rationale for this change. In effect, it took away from race-relations/equal opportunity the distinctness that the trained personnel had
enjoyed. Concerns of race-relations were now seen as merely one problem concerned with the functioning of personnel within an organization. So, the new trainees would be concerned with the whole range of human resource management problems (e.g., disciplinary actions, drug abuse, etc). Given that there is a fixed amount of time that a particular individual has to spend on each part of his assigned duties, it is understandable if some people wondered about the military's continued commitment to good race-relations. The concern extend to the present time, with no good resolution.

In 1974 (September), the training was expanded to two phases. Phase I emphasizes the use of small-group discussion or seminar methods as a means of exposing students to the differing racial and ethnic life styles and cultures. The objective is to open channels of communication among individuals, identify potential intergroup problems, and provide an arena where constructive recommendations can be made to appropriate local commanders. Phase II is the more service specific portion of DRRI training. Instruction is carried out by personnel assigned by the individual Services. The instruction in Phase II provides training in educational techniques and other Service-unique areas of instruction. Students receive information on small group leadership, specific Service policies and procedures, and special preparation required for carrying out the unique race relations and equal opportunity programs of the individual Service.

The Phase I program is between seven and five weeks with instruction in minority studies and behavioral sciences and
basically includes the original six week instructional material. The Phase II portion of varies in length in accordance with Service requirements. Currently the total training program, including Phase II, does not exceed sixteen weeks.

At the present time (1982), DoD and the military services are implementing comprehensive Equal Opportunity/Human Relations programs with varying degrees of intensity. The chain of command within each service has the primary responsibility to promote and support the equal opportunity program. As one component of the program, current and potential commanders, commanding officers and other senior commissioned and non-commissioned personnel are to be provided education and training specifically related to their equal opportunity responsibilities. This education is to be included as part of the curricula of various institutions within the military system (e.g. the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas). The following section presents a summary of each service's approach to providing equal opportunity education and training. There is probably more detail here than is, at first blush, necessary. However, since the ultimate implementation of the trainer education at the Defense Race Relations Institute (or Equal Opportunity Management Institute) is in the hands of the individual services, a knowledge of the organizational setting is necessary to form an opinion of effectiveness.
Functional Implementation and Practice within the Branches

The Army Equal Opportunity Program

The official responsibility for race relations and equal opportunity is lodged with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. However, the program is actually run at the Army General Staff level. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has responsibility for all plans, policies, and actions involving the Army’s equal opportunity program. The Director of Army Equal Opportunity Programs serves as the principal staff assistant to Personnel Deputy on equal opportunity matters. The Director also reports to the Director of Human Resource Development which is responsible for related areas such as law enforcement, leadership, and organizational effectiveness. Thus, the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs has direct access to the highest levels of the Army General Staff through both a two and a three star general simultaneously. This office has ten main areas of responsibility, only two of which pertain to race relations training:

1. Developing policy for EO programs in the Army to include education and training; and
2. Monitoring EO training conducted at the Equal Opportunity Management Institute, the successor to DRRI

Several major Army commands have supporting roles in the implementation of the training part of the EO program. For example, the Commanding General of the Military Personnel Center sets military and civilian student quotas at the training
Institute. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve send students for training and must coordinate with the Military Personnel Center on the selection process. The Commanding General of the Forces Command -- the basic combat groups of Army -- is charged with the supervision and evaluation of the unit EO training program in the reserves. Finally, the Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command has the critical role to ensure that the Army EO education is appropriate to the needs of the students and is provided in all service schools and training centers.

All Army EO instruction and associated training materials is developed by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This Command also has an important evaluative function; to monitor the effectiveness of the Equal Opportunity Management Institute in meeting Army requirements. At one time, TRADOC was also responsible to conduct the Army specific part of EDMI training. Now, however, since the Army instructors at EDMI are attached to the Defense Department rather than TRADOC, the Army's involvement with EDMI has diminished.

Each field commander is responsible to develop and implement the EO program in their units. Hence, the field commander is the EO officer, assisted by staff members having EO expertise. Primary Duty EO personnel, with equal opportunity as their primary responsibility, are assigned to staff positions at all levels down to and including brigades or equivalent. At lower levels (e.g., battalion and below) EO is an added duty for assigned personnel.

Although the authorized number of EO positions is clearly
specified, few commands are at full strength. This is most worrysome at the officer corps level as well as in Germany. Nevertheless, there are almost two hundred officers and eight hundred enlisted persons in primary duty EO staff positions. These individuals serve a force of approximately three quarters of a million persons. Additionally, there are a substantial number of personnel who have EO responsibilities along with other duties. If all these persons exercise their responsibilities as charged, this represents the single largest number and most organizationally pervasive force available for EO training within any single institution in the world. However, the degree to which EO is implemented is substantially less than at full potential and is apparently diminishing over time.

It is difficult to say from the perspective of apparent organizational commitment whether the Army EO program is stronger or weaker in reinforcing the Human Goals Program than during the early to mid seventies. At that time, there was a sense of creating something that had not existed before and more of the EO specialists actually carried out RR instruction at the unit level. However, it is clear that race relations training as a component of the EO program has been substantially reduced and institutionalized, deliberately so, since its high point of emphasis some ten years ago. (Hope, 1979; Day, 1983)

The Navy Equal Opportunity Program

The first Navy Manual on Equal Opportunity was issued by the Secretary of the Navy in 1965. However, little was
accomplished until the issuance of Admiral Zumwalt's Z-Grams creating programs for "people" and equal opportunity in the Navy. The first of these Z-Grams was issued in the Fall of 1970. Since Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations, his orders carried considerable weight. In 1971, Z-Grams were issued initiating the Navy's affirmative action plan and race relations education program. These programs included seminars for all levels of command including the highest flag levels. In 1972, Zumwalt addressed equal rights and opportunities for all Navy women. As might be expected, since Z-Grams bypassed the chain of command and were sent directly to command officers, support was often lacking from higher echelons.

Zumwalt decided that a new program was needed to involve all levels of command in dealing with human resource problems. Thus the Navy Human Resource Management Support System was created and Human Resource Management centers were established. These centers were to carry out programs in race relations, organizational development, overseas diplomacy, and drug/alcohol abuse. This system, with a sophisticated consultant assistance program, operates at all levels throughout the Navy chain of command. Such a widespread structure serves to institutionalize and integrate (at least in theory) Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action with other human resource management functions. As such, the program is now more human resource management oriented, rather than human relations oriented, as originally conceived.

At the headquarters level, HRM and EO are under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, a Rear Admiral,
acts for Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and is also the Director of Human Resources Management Division. This division has the specific functions of establishing the HRM system objectives, exercising control over system design and implementation, providing policy coordination, specifying training requirements, and providing evaluation criteria for all of these tasks. Through a sophisticated system of diagnostic together with a delegation of responsibility down through the Chain of Command, the Navy placed the ultimate responsibility for race-relations and equal opportunity with the individual commander.

In the early seventies, the Navy assigned staff with EO responsibilities further down in the chain of command, as the Army is still doing. However, now it is rare for ships or wings, other than carriers and some shore installations, to have Equal Opportunity personnel permanently attached. The Navy is relying on a more centralized and less dispersed system of EO/RR staff support than the Army. Whether the Navy's approach will be more effective than the Army's remains to be seen.

The Air Force Program.

The Air Force EO program, as with the other services, arose out of a number of racial disturbances, the most serious occurring at Clark AB in the Philippines (1968), Sheppard AFB in Texas (1969), Osan AB in Korea (1970) and Travis AFB in California (1971). In 1971, a Human Relations Team from the Air Training Command toured ATC bases and made a report to the Chief of Staff. A result of that report was the formation of a DoD Military
Justice Task Force as response to finding regarding inequities in military justice. Subsequent visits by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity to Air Force installations in the Pacific Command yielded recommendations to strengthen the EO program through moving from a crisis management approach to a goal-oriented, prevention model.

The Air Force placed Equal Opportunity and Treatment and Human Relations Education under the umbrella of the Social Actions Program and made it a career field—a significant change from the other services. Included under the social actions rubric was drug and alcohol abuse as well as equal opportunity and human relations. In some respects, then, the Air Force program closely resembles the Navy model with the EO/RR effort tied closely to other "social problems". However, it is significantly different from either the Navy or the Army in that Social Problems is a legitimate career field.

The Air Training Command is responsible for developing standardized education packages for Social Action training programs and provides continuing research and evaluation of these packages. While previously, the Air Force, through an in-house agency, carried out its own training, this is no longer true. Rather, all Social Actions Training occurs at the Equal Opportunity Management Institute (formerly, Defense Race Relations Institute). This change together with the gradual evolution of a merged equal opportunity and human relations program, will result in a single Social Action job speciality in which EO/RR is subsumed as a less salient, non-separate...
The Social Actions effort is performed at two levels in the field: the major command and the wing or base level. There are two separate sets of Social Actions personnel at installations which house both a major command and a wing. Unlike the Army, and even more so than the Navy, the Air Force concentrates its Social Actions personnel at headquarters levels. No full time equal opportunity/human relations personnel are assigned to squadrons or other subordinate units.

Major Commands are charged with specific Social Actions responsibilities including ensurance that subordinate command EOT/HRE personnel receive on-going, formal training, and guidance in their appropriate specialities. It is expected that major command's will conduct periodic workshops to exchange information and increase cooperation among bases. These Social Actions workshops are generally held once a year.

The organizational structure at the base/wing level is generally similar to that at a major command. The base Social Actions office implements the EOT/HRE program at the troop level. This includes staff assistance visits to subordinate units, counseling and processing of discrimination complaints, providing human relations instruction, and helping to prepare and monitor the base Affirmative Action Plan.

The Marine Corps Program

To deal with growing problems in the area of race relations arising out of the Vietnam War era, the Marine Commandant issued
Marine Corps Bulletin 5350 "Leadership and Race/Human Relations" in September of 1969. An Equal Opportunity Branch was established at Marine Corps Headquarters to provide guidance and policy on race relations for field commanders. In 1971, an education program in race relations was started at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego to train Human Relations Specialists. These specialists in turn were to train other Marines at commands throughout the Corps. When the Defense Department decided to establish DRRI in 1971, the Marine Corps was commended in its early commitment to race relations training and allowed to continue its own program. Thus, the Corps did not have to send any personnel for training to DRRI, even when the Human Relations School at San Diego was terminated and responsibility for human relations training transferred to Quantico. This shift in training function was made to shift emphasis to leadership and human relations per se, rather than on race relations specifically, and to place equal opportunity responsibility on leaders rather than on specialists. Training from 1974 on was to be conducted by officers and senior NCOs in command leadership. Thus, the Marine Corps began contracting their program at the same time the other services were expanding theirs. Consequently, the Marine Corps program has consistently been and continues to be the most unique among the services in approach and organizational structure.

Full-time ED personnel are authorized in the field at major commands down to the regiment level. However, while authorized, such slots are not all filled at the present time. Furthermore, persons in such roles receive little or no training specifically
related to equal opportunity/race-relations. Actually, their training is often heavily weighed with information on drug and alcohol abuse reflective of local commander concern with the latter problems. They also seem to have no specific expectation for training troops relative to EO/RR, which is supposed to deal with in the annual leadership/training and in unit discussion. In other words, the Marine Corps lacks the type of trained EO/RR personnel that the other services have found so valuable.

Since the RR training in the Marine Corps, to the extent that it occurs, come by way of the Leadership Program, a discussion of the main features of that program is in order. The basic mission is to develop qualities of leadership in all Marines which will enable them to assume greater responsibilities to the Marine Corps and to society. This is attempted to be achieved via a "values oriented" program which deals with contemporary problems in leadership, discipline, and military professionalism. The program is said to be characterized by research and experimentation, inter-group discussion, and a behavioral/action-oriented approach (Adelman, et al., 1980). The basic objectives are to teach and foster application of concerned and responsible leadership; to promote harmonious interaction among Marines across "barriers" of race, ethnic group, grade, age, and sex; and to promote fair treatment of all Marines. At one time specified amounts of annual leadership training were mandated. Now (since December 17, 1979) no specific hours or frequency of leadership training is indicated.
Summary

All of the branches, except the Marines, seem headed toward assimilating equal opportunity/race-relations concerns under other "social problems" (e.g. drug and alcohol abuse). In this situation, there is a real danger that RR/EO problems will be allowed to simmer in these branches until once again there are explosive consequences.

All the military services currently seem intent on phasing out their race relations training as an approach to desegregation and turning toward a "management approach" to equal opportunity. Whether the new directions taken by the military prove to be efficacious and sufficient remains to be seen. The next section of this chapter will examine the evidence of program effectiveness during the first decade.

DRRI/EOMI Training Evaluated

In evaluating the success of the military establishment's attempts at integration, we find ourselves hampered by a clear lack of specific behavioral goals. The program was instituted without much thought being given to evaluation, either at the base or DRRI/EOMI level. Indeed, as Hope (1979) noted, DRRI was specifically prohibited from assessing training effectiveness once their students had left the training site. So, much of the evaluative reports were based on goals which were retroactively formulated and imperfectly measured. By in large, the evaluations seem to focus on attitudinal and self-report measures, with occasional forays into archival (e.g. incident reports) data. At the same time, there appears to be a dearth of model formulation which would tie the various dimensions together.

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in a meaningful fashion. This lack will remain, we fear, the major obstacle to determining the worth of the military's integration efforts.

The model which we presented earlier suggested the importance of societal norms in the development and maintenance of interethnic behaviors. The presence of social support groups at both the peer and superordinate levels would seem to be quite important, if not critical. It is not surprising, therefore, that a good deal of the military evaluation effort has been devoted to an examination of commander support.

Command support and the impact of RR/EO

As the RR/EO programs are reviewed and evaluated over the last eleven years, it becomes clear that the commander's support is critical to the success of these programs. Because the importance of administrative support is a factor well recognized in social action programs (e.g. Allport, 1954; Fontaine, 1982; Brislin, 1981), we included it as a critical aspect of the model presented earlier. Within the military, most of our information is focused on the role of the commander. However, the behavior of peers and, in particular, members of the minority groups, is critical to (but unstudied) the maintenance of behaviors which lead to good race-relations. So, the comments which follow in this section, are, of necessity quite limited.

During the period when race relations seminars were the primary focus, attendance, involvement, and ultimately improved understanding between minority and majority, black and white, male and female, was directly influenced by the degree of
participation of commanders at all levels of administration. (Heitt, McBride and Fiman, 1974). The vital importance of the Commander in the effectiveness of the RR/EO program was emphasized in an analysis of the Army unit race relations training program in 1976 (Hiett and Nordlie, 1976). Perceptions of DRRI/EOMI graduates in the study further reinforced the critical role of command. The amount of command support most strongly distinguished higher and lower quality RR/EO programs, and it also correlated strongly with the overall job satisfaction of the graduate (Hope, 1979).

Awareness of the important role of the commander in this process of improving intergroup behavior has lead to the Services shifting emphasis on the role of the professional RR/EO person. As noted earlier, the role has become more of a consultant to the Commander and less involved in direct instruction with service personnel. While some DRRI/EOMI graduates still serve in the instructor role, this is not their exclusive role; and, time spent in other roles, especially the equal opportunity staff role often takes precedence.

In recognition of the changed role of the RR/EO person, the instructional program at the Equal Opportunity Management Institute appears to be gradually shifting to reflect the current situation. The focus on the chain of command presupposes an awareness on the part of the commander. Thus, the final question of evaluation must rest with the commander and his or her knowledge and appreciation of the requirements of a military free of discrimination. Most commanders are not sent to DRRI/EOMI
today. It is assumed that what awareness there is comes primarily from the traditional military schools which have added courses on the Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Program of the services. Preliminary indications are that the more voluntary instructional program of these schools are limited in the detail and scope necessary for a fully informed commander.

**Quality of the trainer's training**

The seeing of oneself as a person who is interethnically competent and who, therefore, has the skills for postive interactions appears in several parts of the model presented earlier. For example, we would expect that as one feels more competent, the boundaries of the self image expand and include other points of view. We might also expect that competence and behavioral seeking and rehearsal are intimately related, even prior to actual interethnic behavior. While these relationships seem reasonable, the emphasis in one set of evaluations on the perceptions by DRRI graduates of their training was not based on such a theoretical statement. Rather, the interest was in providing a mechanism of feedback to the instructional and evaluation staff of DRRI (as well, perhaps, to serve as an early warning system on the attitudes by field commanders of this new and largely untried function).

The perceptions of Defense Race Relations Institute/Equal Opportunity Management Institute training are quite clear and consistent from students, faculty, graduates, and Service personnel. Based on agreement type items, Phase I training is dramatically endorsed as highly satisfactory training experience,
with between 85 and 90 percent of all graduates claiming satisfaction with the training. (Hope, 1979, p. 65). It is seen by most students of Institute as an important life experience leading to changes in racial and sexual awareness and profound changes in feelings about one's self.

Criticisms of Phase I training are similar to those found throughout the eleven years of evaluations. Graduates emphasize the need for more non-black minority group minority group content and more practical, job-relevant, skills training. More contact after graduation was desired to remain current in the field in terms of new educational literature and periodic refresher courses. In response to these evaluations training staff have repeatedly requested data from the field describing the specific job requirements and the effectiveness with which the graduates perform their jobs. Unfortunately, the assessment of these graduates was always considered the prerogative of the Services and not DRRI/EOMI. Consequently, measurements of performance in the field were difficult if not impossible to obtain. And, without such measurements, it is impossible to relate program components to personnel statistics.

Phase II training has been in even greater flux than Phase I. Graduate assessments of Phase II training, while generally positive, have been mixed and indicative of the confusion associated with these changes. One study conducted in 1977 noted:

Since Phase II training emphasizes skills development, it is particularly vulnerable to criticism about the lack of instructor job experiences. The large variation in training RR/EO job experience and intellectual aptitude has resulted in some difficulties for Phase II in developing an optimal training
program for all trainees. Separate training models based on rank have not been sensitive to the more important dimensions of trainee experience and aptitude. Also the Phase I--Phase II integration of the overall DRRI training experience has not been entirely successful in taking advantage of the changes in awareness and self, associated with Phase I.

(Fiman, 1977, p. 84)

In evaluating the impact of the DRRI/EOMI program, the gap between mission/objectives and application looms large. The basic mission of the training programs changed very little since the inception of DRRI but the uses of its graduates changed drastically between 1971 and the present. The mission of DRRI/EOMI is established by the Department of Defense but the role of the graduates is defined by each branch of the Services in accordance with their own requirements.

This gap between mission and application often resulted in DRRI/EOMI graduates being assigned to job and activities for which they were untrained. For example, the original Army Race Relations and Equal Opportunities Training Program (RAP #1) was a mandatory 18-hour course taught by DRRI graduates. The primary responsibility for graduates at that time was as race relations instructors. DRRI training was geared toward developing "instructors in race relations" as required by the mission statement.

By early 1974, the program was changed by revised Army regulation to create RAP #2 which places the primary responsibility for conducting training in the chain of command and required seminars to be conducted with platoon sized units. This regulation effectively took the DRRI/EOMI graduate out of the training business. Most of the RAP #2 became discussions lead by a commander or his designee who rarely was DRRI/EOMI.
trained. Indeed, an evaluation conducted by Hiett and Nordlie (1978) found that race relations training conducted by the commander rather than DRRI trained instructors had limited impact. Many commanders, not being trained as race-relations instructors, were often not appreciative of the possible benefits of an effective race relations instructional program. And, as a consequence treated this program requirement as just another bureaucratic requirement on top an already overburdened set of role expectations.

Other regulations continued to make these graduates advisors to the "chain of command". These new rules increasingly defined DRRI/EOMI graduates as administrators and managers and not instructors. During all of these changes in the role of these graduates, the basic mission of training "instructors in race relations" was not changed to comply with these new regulations. As Hope, 1979 demonstrated, this conflict has produced occupational stress and burnout in DRRI/EOMI graduates. Since individuals under such stress are likely to be less effective in what they perceive their mission to be, the impact on the program is most likely negative.

On the other side of this issue, the Services rarely made decisions to change the role of the DRRI/EOMI graduate on the grounds of improving the effective utilization of this resource. Rather, these decision were made primarily to protect the management decision making within the chain of command. It was felt that the proliferation of these graduates throughout the Services was undermining the authority of the unit commander.
(Heitt and Nordlie, 1978). In the early days of DRRI this was accurate to some extent. Given the lack of precedent for this type of job in the military, independent actions were taken by the trained graduates without consulting the commander. After 1974, this behavior did not persist because of the addition of Phase II which was designed to concentrate on Service specific requirements. Presumably, as the unit commanders began to take over responsibility for training, independent action by DRRI graduates was not reinforced.

Field Evaluations

Few field evaluations were conducted to determine the impact of the intergroup relations training program on the average soldier. Part of this was due to the inability of the DRRI staff to follow-up on their graduates. And, part was due to the difficult of the research problem. However, one such study, representing the only replication investigation, sought to analyze attitudes of Army personnel in 1972 as compared to 1974 (Brown, Nordlie, and Thomas, 1977). This study concluded that "sharp and pervasive differences" still existed, two years later in 1974, between blacks and whites; however, most of the changes in the differences were in the direction of a reduction of prejudice. Blacks continued to see a great deal of racial discrimination (as measured by forced-choice attitude-type items, but whites saw little or no evidence of discrimination against blacks. Blacks did see the state of race relations more favorable in 1974 than the two previous years. The training programs had shown little impact on the perceived importance of
accepting race relations and equal opportunity as part of leadership responsibility. Lower ranking enlisted personnel did not see officers and non-commissioned officers using this definition of leadership in annual evaluations even though this was a policy requirement.

Although we discussed the findings on command support earlier, the Brown, Nordlie and Thomas, 1977 study also had some things to say on this issue. They noted that the Chain of Command was "pushing" the program as indicated by a significant increase in the knowledge of the program by the enlisted respondents.

"Large numbers of both blacks and whites continue to report that they have personally benefited from the Army's race relations training program. At the same time, however, there is still an absence of any widespread feelings that race relations training and education programs will achieve the objective set for them." (Brown, Nordlie and Thomas, 1977. p.V)

In general the data shows that white and black soldiers are coming together in their interracial attitudes. And, this convergence was, according to Brown et. al. in the direction desired by the goals of the race relations programs.

The second major field evaluation (Hiett and Nordlie, 1979), looked at the Unit Race Relations Training Program. As noted above, this was an attempt to put the training and leadership back, for the Army, in hands of the unit commander, and remove it from the primary responsibility of the DRRI/EDMI graduate.

The evaluation of Hiett and Nordlie (1979) of this unit
training program was not favorable. The Army had reported in 1976 that less than half of all companies in the United States were conducting monthly unit race relations seminars which were required by policy. They went on to say:

The quality of training is low and its relationship to RR/EO (race relations/equal opportunity) often minimal. There is much evidence that the unit training program is largely a "paper program" and for most company commanders its priority is extremely low. It seldom reaches personnel about the rank of E5; those persons who (by virtue of their role in the organization) have the most power to effect change, if change is needed, are least likely to participate in the seminars. The sensitive nature of the subject matter coupled with the specialized background knowledge required to make it nearly impossible for untrained chain-of-command personnel to conduct effective RR/EO seminars.

Hiett and Nordlie, 1979, p. 4.

This 1976 data gathering also found the racial climate to be steadily declining from its high in 1972. Hiett and Nordlie noted that despite the low frequency of overt violence, race-related tension perceptions persist and may be increasing.

While field evaluations based on clear linkages between training components and personnel attitudes and behaviors are not available, there is some data on the change in perceptions over the time period (1972-80) in question. During this period, Nordlie and his colleagues performed a number of surveys. These surveys were designed to probe the perceptions of race relations in various Army commands. Data were gathered in 1972, 1974, 1976 (Continental United States--CONUS--only), Korea in 1976, U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) in 1976 and a sample of Army Leaders in 1977. Since there were a number of common items in each of these surveys, it is possible to track at least two dimensions over time and location. (Day, 1983).
Table 1 (taken from Day, 1983) presents data on the perceptions of the status of race relations and the perceptions of trends in the same variable. It should be noted that the time period covered represents the most active period in the Army's program.

Insert Table 1 about here

The general impression from the data in Table 1 is that the positive perceptions of whites reached a peak around 1976 and has declined somewhat since then. The perceptions of blacks followed a similar trend. Another impression is the unreal perception by Army leaders in 1977; these persons see the situation as much better than the mass of personnel. It should be noted that the downturn appears at about the same time as the shift from a race relations focus to a management concern was taking place. Whether these events are related is hard to tell; yet the suspicion of linkage seems reasonable.

While the above findings deal with the situation in the Army, similar data appear in evaluations of the other services. We concentrate here on the Army for two reasons: a) the Army has had the most active research and evaluation program, perhaps due to the obvious fact that it is the largest of the services and b) the documentation of the evaluation efforts within the Army are easily available to the scholarly community. Furthermore, the Army represents a closer approximation to the racial distribution
in the general population than the other services.

A fair assessment of the evaluations carried out on the various services equal opportunity/race-relations programs would find a focus on attitudinal measures divorced from a clear theoretical conception or model. Self-report measures loom large with little serious attempt at multi-trait and multi-mode measurement. Further there is often a lack of relating the effects of training (obtained through attitudinal and self-report) to the putative objectives of the training. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible to form any reasonable judgment of the effectiveness of this vast and complicated structure that the military has put in place to deal with the goal of integration. What does seem clear, however, is that as the race-relations training programs (at least in the Army) were turned over to the generally untrained unit leadership, the racial climate deteriorated. Our earlier model would suggest that what happened was a decrease in the black and white enlisted personnel's perception of the interethnic competence of the commanders. Thus, we could note that as professional intergroup training increased between the late 1960's and early 1970's, racial harmony, as measured by attitudinal as well as archival measures, improved. However, as this training was put in the hands of less well-trained unit leaders, the level of intergroup competence decreased along with the interracial climate.

**Gross measures of DoD-wide Impact**

One can, of course, evaluate the gross effect of the total Department of Defense program by examining minority
representation figures. These figures, available in Nordlie (1973) and Adelman, et al (1980) make a comparison between 1972 and 1979 possible. Such data suggest that each service increased its representation of e.g. Blacks at all levels over that period with the greatest change being at the enlisted ranks. The Army apparently was the most successful in attracting and retaining minority personnel. For example, in 1972 17.5% of Army enlisted personnel were Black; in 1979 this figure had increased to 32%. Comparable figures for the Navy were 7.2% and 11%. Summaries of these figures are given in Day, 1983.

These figures should not be overinterpreted. Just as Amir and others have suggested that not all contact situations produce reductions in prejudice, so a rise in minority representation may not indicate success of the desegregation program. Indeed, the suggestion made earlier, that racial climate, at least in Army units, seems to be deteriorating over the same time period would suggest that not enough attention has been paid to the conditions of interethnic interaction. And, since we have no information on actual interethnic behavior, it is difficult to predict the joint effect of increase in minority representation and decrease in racial climate under present training models.

Theory as a guide to training design in the military program

The qualitative data clearly show that the military's program, while ambitious, was often of the "shotgun" variety. There is often a distressing emphasis on structure to the detriment of clearly defined objectives and training module tied
to those goals. Quite different, and perhaps conflictual, programs are mixed with little thought or attention to their interactions or even how to evaluate their effects. Further, there has, as far we can tell, been little cross fertilization from the field of cross-cultural training (e.g. Weeks, Pederson and Brislin, 1979; Landis and Brislin, 1983). To be sure, the Army Research Institute did sponsor a number of projects in which some new approaches were developed (Landis, Day, McGrew, Miller and Thomas, 1976; Landis, Tzeng, and Thomas, 1981) and subjected to field evaluation. These efforts, which involved use of an approach—the culture assimilator—which followed from the isomorphic attributions notion of Triandis (1976), in the present model focussed on producing an increase in behavioral rehearsal, do not seem to have become institutionalized. These studies would bear a closer look since they represent, to our knowledge, the only attempt in the decade and a half of serious military desegregation programs, to develop and training program based on a reasonable theoretical formulation. However, these efforts did not, and do not, play a significant part in the military program at this time. Thus, they are somewhat beyond the scope of this chapter. Good summaries are available in Albert, 1983.

Recommendations

The above observations lead us to make a number of recommendations. Such recommendations are made in the spirit of one of the founders of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Kurt Lewin.

First, we would suggest that the military critically
evaluate its programs in terms of developing, and stating, just what behaviors are desired.

Second, once a clear conception of desired behavior is made, then consider what are the potent precursors of those behaviors. Some model like the one presented in the first section of this chapter might be useful.

Third, develop exemplery programs around the desired behaviors and their precursors and allow those programs to operate a reasonable length of time.

Forth, evaluate the programs using the model. To be sure, other measurements can, and should, be taken. But, the conceptual model should be the critical underpinning for the evaluative strategy.

Fifth, recognize that the similarities in military service are greater than the differences, at least at the desegregation level. The inter-service rivalries that have surfaced from time to time have given a patina of difference, based on uniform color, which hides the true state of affairs. So, unified policies and training, using common models and techniques, will show a greater committment to desegregation than the present fractionated approach.

Sixth, it is imperative that more attention be given to increasing the fit between the training models and the requirements in the field for the Equal Opportunity Management Institute graduate.

Seventh, the development of a professional and well trained training cadre cannot be overestimated. Having people
who are committed to the goal of integration will help as both role and training models to the large mass of military personnel. While this may mean returning to the professional race-relations training school concept, the military should recognize that any objective levied on the commander which does not directly relate to his combat mission will not enjoy a high priority. To believe otherwise flies in the face of not only the psychological facts but also the evaluations that have been performed.

**Conclusion**

In the early 1970's, the military embarked on a great social experiment. By the end of the decade, the experiment was becoming institutionalized and incorporated in other concerns. It is clear that concern with race relations has decreased in the military establishment without an accompanying decrease in prejudical acts in the ranks. One of us (Day) in surveying the Army program likened it to the stages of a fire. Certainly, there are not the blazing incidents that we show early in the decade; the embers are dying, some think. But, are they? What evidence there is would suggest that, at least, the great majority of soldiers see no change in the situation and that there is some increase in the number who sees things as getting worse. If these trends continue, a point may be reached in which direct action becomes the norm instead of the exception, as it is now. Without being overly dramatic, we can wonder if when the fire burns again, will it be hotter and more destructive than before?
Footnotes

* Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by Contract N0014-83-K-0021 from the Office of Naval Research to the first author. The opinions here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, the United States Government or its agencies. The writing of the chapter was also facilitated by the first author's tenure as Fellow at the Culture Learning Institute, East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii during 1983.

1. We shall use the words "intercultural" and "interethnic" interchangeably.

2. The Black officers in the Army held steady at a little over 3 percent, the highest of all branches; whereas, the percentage of blacks in the both the enlisted military population and American society was at least four times as large.

3. This Institute is now known (since 1978) as the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (EOMI) reflective of a new stage in the military training program (ie. a shift toward a management oriented approach).

4. The authors are indebted to the recent and extensive report of Adelman and her colleagues (Adelman & Larkin, 1980; Adelman, et al, 1980) on EO as practiced in DoD.
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Fig. 1.1. Cognitive behavioral picture of intercultural behavior
### TABLE 1
DIFFERENCES IN STATIC AND DYNAMIC PERCEPTIONS OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE ARMY

PERCEPTIONS OF ARMY RACE RELATIONS ACROSS TIME AND LOCATION

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PERCEPTIONS OF TRENDS IN RACE RELATIONS ACROSS TIME AND LOCATION

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From Brown et al., 1977
From Hiett and Nordlie, 1978
From Edmonds and Nordlie, 1977
From Gilbert and Nordlie, 1978
From Brown et al., 1979

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.
### LIST 1
**MANDATORY**

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<th>Organization</th>
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<td>ATTN: DTIC DDA-2 Selection and Preliminary Cataloging Section Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314</td>
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<td>Science and Technology Division Washington, D.C. 20540</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Naval Research</td>
<td>Code 4420E 800 N. Quincy Street Arlington, VA 22217</td>
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<thead>
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</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Chief of Naval Operations Head, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Reserves Team (Op-964D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
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