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
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
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# Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000

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**PROJECT CO-DIRECTORS**  
William J. Taylor, Jr.  
Robert H. Kupperman  
(202) 887-0200

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Prepared for:

The Department of the Army  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS AND PLANS  
LONG-RANGE PLANNING GROUP

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
ARMY TO THE YEAR 2000  
AFRICA

ARMY 2000 PROJECT

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# Africa



**STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
ARMY TO THE YEAR 2000  
AFRICA**

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper, based upon the regional and functional papers of Army 2000 Project, examines the strategic requirements for the United States Army in Africa over the next two decades. While it does raise and examine a number of new issues, it essentially represents a synthesis of earlier research which will permit a regional specialist an understanding of the overall conclusions of the Project as they pertain to Africa.

Africa is a region of such size and diversity that its strategic importance is rarely understood or appreciated. In a sense, these characteristics have worked against its becoming a primary focus of American interests. Approximately three times the size of the continental United States in land area, it contains some 800 distinctive ethnolinguistic groups. Its component nations have only recently emerged from a colonial era from which they have inherited artificial boundaries drawn without consideration for the interests or composition of African populations.

These nations and their peoples are some of the poorest in the world. Yet their lands contain vast untapped natural resources which could cure these socioeconomic problems within a few generations. But African countries lack both the capital and infrastructure to exploit these opportunities. In the Sudan, for example, often referred to as the future bread-basket of the Middle East and North Africa, there are only 300 kilometers of

roads (most of which are little more than rough tracks) in a land area the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Many of the same conditions exist in relatively developed Zaire and Nigeria.

Together with this economic miasma, the high African birth rate (approching 4 percent per year) spells economic disaster. Even those nations which have experienced marginal success in economic development find themselves losing in this battle, and the rising expectations of this growing, increasingly younger population can only exacerbate the political instability and unrest described above.

It seems reasonable to assume, at least for the balance of this century, that all but a few of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa will remain fundamentally authoritarian in nature. This is built into their culture, and is further rationalized by a recognized need to impel traditionally hostile tribal, ethnic, and ideological factions to adhere to, or at least not frustrate, a prescribed set of common economic, political, and social goals. Nations at the lower end of the development scale need some kind of a unified national plan or vision to aim for an to guide the allocation of limited resources. This imposes a premium on discipline.

Typically the African governments will be run either the Armed Forces themselves or by an alliance between the armed forces and a dominant political faction. From this central fact of African life in the 1990s will flow a number of consequences of direct relevance to this study.

First, military governments tend to arm themselves initially to cement their domestic position and contain insurgency, later to project power in regional disputes. Since fiscal resources available for this purpose will inevitably vary from country to country, it is predictable that growing military imbalances will emerge. Thus the temptation to use force in the achievement of geopolitical goals will increase and the likelihood of interstate conflict will rise pari passu.

Second, an African arms race, however modest it might be in global terms due to resource restraints, is likely to escalate the scale of sophistication. Strongman one-upmanship in African councils will require that APC's be reinforced by tanks and F5's be replaced by F-16's. There are plenty of vendor countries, including the United States, who will see commercial and/or geopolitical advantage in meeting this demand.

Third and sequentially, the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry will require more professional military managers and technicians. The African military establishments will tend to look to the vendor countries for help in this regard, leading to bilateral advisory and training programs. These, in turn, will crystallize relationships, verging on alliances, between African countries and competing developed country patrons. Thus Africa is drawn into global rivalries that are essentially irrelevant to the continent's own needs and aspirations.

The potential losers in this scenario of military competition are those countries (e.g., the Ivory Coast and Niger) which have been pursuing the more rational course of placing top priority on balanced economic and social development. They may

find themselves by the year 2000 prosperous and enlightened enclaves in a slum suburb of jealous neighbors armed to the teeth who can absorb them at leisure. Such countries may thus seek to pursue their economic development under an umbrella of superpower military guarantee, opening yet another avenue for the neo-colonization of Africa.

Despite their desire to remain nonaligned, African nations are finding themselves subjected to increasing superpower interest. The Soviets, on their part, recognize the importance of Africa to the United States, and more critically, its European allies, and have embarked on a policy of exploitation and destabilization which threatens the political stability so necessary for economic growth. The United States, which has since African independence sought to prevent such destabilization, to assist economic development, and to encourage progressive social change (especially in Southern Africa), finds itself constrained by a declining world economy, fragmented allies and a domestic populace hesitant to support a direct confrontation with the Soviets in Africa.

The Africans view their political and economic condition with some trepidation -- but even more so fear the direct intervention of the superpowers and the loss of newly won sovereignty which it represents. Moreover, they see a rekindling of the Cold War in Africa as directly contrary to their interest in politically disinterested economic aid (e.g., from multilateral agencies) as the key to self-reliance and nonalignment.

For Army planners, strategic considerations are conditions by this situation, and by the continuing only marginal interest of American policymakers in Africa. Because of the lack of understanding described above, there is a pronounced tendency to see Africa in either global or regional terms, and to over or underreact to events there. Because Africa is only peripheral to other interests, it is considered only as an adjunct to the main action, e.g., Southwest Asia. Yet when critical interests appear to be threatened within the region, e.g., military access to the Sudan placed in jeopardy by Libyan invasions into Sudanese airspace, the reaction is often made without realistic appraisal of either the threat or of the local ability to accept aid in countering it.

Similar insights and observations will be made throughout this study. It will attempt to examine Africa in both regional and global terms, and to provide Army planners with a balanced appreciation of Africa, its problems, its importance to the United States, and its place in Army planning over the next twenty years.

Although military and diplomatic definitions of Africa and its subregions sometimes differ, for purposes of this analysis Africa includes all nations and territories on the continent except Egypt. Specific subregions will be identified within the text.

## ASSUMPTIONS

The analysis proceeds from a set of assumptions regarding the world political-military situation over the next two decades:

- o General war between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its allies) remains an exceedingly low probability unlikely to increase due to the threat of nuclear escalation.
- o Conventional or limited war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact remains an exceedingly low probability unlikely to increase due to the threat of nuclear escalation.
- o War, conventional or nuclear, between the Soviet Union and China is unlikely, as is the possibility of a full rapprochement.
- o Nuclear proliferation will not reach a destabilizing proportion.
- o NATO, as an alliance, will continue although great strains may be expected.
- o For the United States, resource constraints will continue and the economy, while never reaching conditions of full health, is unlikely to collapse.
- o American mood, while varying between "neoisolationist" and "interventionist" poles will be tending toward the latter in the 1990s.
- o Army strategic requirements for the future will be developed as part of and not separate from overall U.S. strategic requirements.

- o The most likely form of conflict will take place in the Third World, and consist of counter-terrorist unconventional and limited war operations.
- o This fact notwithstanding, the overwhelming importance of Europe and East Asia to U.S. interests will demand the maintenance of a credible deterrent, conventional, chemical, and nuclear-capable forces in-theater, or at the very least, earmarked for rapid deployment to these areas.
- o This demand will be further exacerbated by the growing potential for both vertical and horizontal escalation, whereby simultaneous threats of varying intensity will effectively fix forces in place and deny their redeployment elsewhere.
- o The Third World will be increasingly ripe for Soviet political-military initiatives in the 1990's. The pressures of skyrocketing population growth, especially in urban areas; food, water and wood scarcities, and competition by the industrialized nations for increasingly scarce energy and minerals resources will create conditions of intra- and inter-state violence which the Soviet Union will seek to exploit.
- o By 1990, major changes will have occurred in the Soviet military hierarchy. This next generation of military leaders will be younger, with no World War II experience. Having joined the military in the 1950s, these new leaders will only be able to relate to operations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan with

possible experience as military advisors in Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, or Angola. As a result, in the 1990's the Soviets will continue to support external communist parties and national liberation movements. To continue to exploit instabilities, the Soviets will rely on arms sales, military aid (little economic aid will be available), military advisors, support of terrorist activities and, above all else, the use of proxies - Cuba, South Yemen, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and North Korea. To continue the psychological battle for the spread of its communist ideology in 1990, the Soviets will pursue detente and additional arms control agreements but only as a means to achieve their ultimate goal of domination.

While the intensity of conflict may be lower than before, the frequency will most likely increase. The Army must prepare for an era of continuing "limited" war involving ourselves and the Soviets, but more indirectly than previously experienced. This will continue largely because both superpowers are experiencing particular economic difficulties which may allow continued expenditure of resources for military purposes, but not permit any significant increases in defense budgets. Thus, it is more likely for East-West competition to be expressed by conflict in the Third World, as each power seeks to exploit (or counter the exploitation of) the inherent instability of the developing world.

There are many reasons why a high frequency of violence will exist. Each specific case will have its own unique causes and characteristics. Each case will deserve consideration on its own merits. But it is feasible to advance some general propositions concerning developing nations in the coming decade. These states will fall into one of three categories: (1) those with sufficient resources to support economic development and growth to the point where the standard of living approaches (in some cases surpasses) that of the advanced industrialized states; (2) those with somewhat less resources but which conceivably can make steady progress, but just as conceivably can run into serious obstacles and stagnate or regress; (3) those, which are not going to make it, either because of gross mismanagement by political elites or due to a lack of economic resources. In all three categories, the promise of violence -- if not its realization -- will be high, though its specific form will vary.

In sum, the probability of central war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is low; conventional war involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact is unlikely; and large-scale war (either conventional or nuclear) between China and the USSR is not likely. In the developing world, the decade of the 90s promises to be a turbulent one, and it is clear that political violence at both the inter- and intra-state level probably will be endemic.

## U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA IN THE 1990s

In the 1990s -- as in the 1980s, the 1970s, the 1960s, and the 1950s -- assessments of the United States interests in Africa by those shaping this nation's foreign policy will remain imprecise and inconsistent.

Indeed, there are two schools of thought on U.S.-Africa policy. One school perceives that U.S. interests in Africa are dominated by global strategies--i.e., access to certain critical minerals, and strategic concerns, deterring or countering Soviet intrusions and retaining access to ports or other facilities necessary for U.S. power projection.<sup>3</sup> The other school emphasizes that the more effective policy in Africa is to focus on the intrinsic situation in Africa for its own sake--including the encouragement of the peaceful resolution of the local conflicts that attract external patrons and powers.<sup>4</sup>

- o For those who perceive Africa primarily as part of a global geostrategic chessboard, the U.S. national interests in the continent are almost exclusively (1) economic (notably retaining access to certain minerals in the southern zone critical to defense-related American industry,<sup>5</sup> and, to a lesser extent, oil); and (2) strategic (deterring and/or countering Soviet hegemonic intrusions into African countries and regions historically linked to the West, and cementing "special relationships" with governments willing to provide access to ports and other facilities supportive of a global U.S. military outreach).

o For those who believe that the most effective way of countering Soviet influence in Africa is to encourage peaceful resolution of the local conflicts that attract external patrons and arms, the crucial assumptions are (1) that intrastate and interstate conflict in Africa arises from indigenous social, political, and economic stresses and from institutional weaknesses; (2) that few, if any, African conflicts are attributable, solely or even chiefly, to Soviet machinations; (3) that political and military links established between external powers and African governments or liberation movements primarily on a basis of immediate needs and availability are highly fragile; and (4) that nationalism is a stronger force in Africa than ideology. Points (3) and (4) are illustrated by the withdrawal of a substantial Soviet presence from Ghana (1966), Sudan (1971), Egypt (1972), and Somalia (1977), and by declining Soviet influence in Guinea. Recent trends in Angola and Ethiopia, as well as current predictions of a waning of post-independence SWAPO's adherence to the Marxist rhetoric espoused during the 16-year Soviet-supported Namibian guerrilla war, raise new questions about premature boxing and labeling. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance characterized the U.S. operational mandate that flows from this set of perceptions of the African scene as affirmative employment of elements that promote sustained influence -- provision of capital, technological skills, access to

export markets -- which the Soviet Union is not inclined or able to provide to Africa.

As long as the perceptions on which U.S. policy is based continue to vacillate between these two schools of thought, the overall nature and extent of American interest in the continent will continue to defy simple categorization.

Political violence in Africa will not always involve interests that are vital or even important to the United States. The preeminent goal of the United States is domestic peace and tranquility, and the purpose of U.S. foreign policy is to make it possible to pursue the continuing American experiment with democracy. Thus, the United States will seek to avoid both the role of international policeman and the temptation of trying to impose a pax americana. By any standard of measurement, the United States does have interests in Africa, and it is clear such interests are more likely to expand than to contract in the coming decades. It is probable, then, that some of the political violence of the 1990s will require a positive response from the United States.

It is inevitable that the role of the United States, and therefore its interests, is intimately tied to the continuing transformation of the international political system. It is increasingly likely that disjunctions will arise between a state's willingness and ability to declare and to defend its interests by military means. As underscored by the Falklands crisis, there will always be something of a dilemma in choosing militarily to defend a far-flung outpost which is of limited

value to the overall interests of the state except as those interests that are seen by the state and others involved as part of an indivisible fabric, where a small rent or tear in one place threatens the integrity of the whole. At the same time, depending on the political leadership of the United States, the mood of the United States public, and the basic self-image in the United States of its role in the world, there may also be a tendency for previously undesignated missions to be suddenly announced as in the U.S. interest. Such declarations may be precipitated, for example, by the treatment of U.S. air or surface vessels or of the U.S. citizens abroad.

Recognizing that U.S. interests are neither static nor completely definable in objective terms, it becomes all the more crucial for the United States to develop an appropriate institutional mechanism for determining its interests among many competing and possibly contradictory goals and objectives. This implies a need not only for national leadership but also for the continued enhancement of the institutional infrastructure necessary to make and implement decisions to protect U.S. interests worldwide.

U.S. interests will remain based on maintaining a free society which preserves our national values. The notion of "freedom" includes the classically defined "four freedoms"<sup>6</sup> which underlie the spectrum of political, economic and social scales. This preoccupation with the values of our society establish the basis for our tendency to pursue, in the future, a neo-isolationist preference which will be balanced by the requirements stemming from more externally focused national

interests. Among those "outward" looking interests, the most significant will include:

- o the fundamental and possibly overriding interest, with the Soviet Union, to prevent nuclear war or its prospect to occur between us.
- o to prevent or contain regional conflict which could escalate into conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves.
- o to minimize or deflect the influence of potentially or currently antagonist states or groups from adversely affecting our relationships with friends, trading partners or other vital commitments.
- o to maintain access, at acceptable cost (however derived) to resources, markets, trading partners and allies to which we are bound by treaty commitment.
- o to promote basic human rights.

#### Vital Interests

Encouragement of the economic and political development of the countries in Africa. In the long-term, good bilateral and regional U.S. relations with African countries are important for strategic, political, and economic reasons. In the short-term, these relations are necessary to guarantee continued access to such critical minerals as chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum group metals. Apart from this self-serving rationale, the promotion of development in the Third World will contribute to long-term global harmony.

Maintaining the regional balance of power (and the power equilibrium within specific parts of the region). United States' Africa policy must be based on a more positive basis than simply denying access or influence to the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is essential that the Soviet or Cuban presence in Africa not compromise U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean.

Peaceful change in South Africa. The importance of South Africa to sea lines of communication, as a primary supplier of strategic minerals, and as a source of African attitudes toward American Africa policy will dictate U.S. involvement for the next two decades. Furthermore, it will remain a U.S. interest that South Africa not be controlled by a hostile power or a hostile indigenous government. The U.S. will want to avoid becoming the sole defender of an international pariah in the form of a South Africa that the U.S. cannot live with nor without. At the same time, the downfall of South Africa or the compromise of its integrity by subversive activities in its neighboring territories would be a serious blow to U.S. interests not only in Africa but also globally.

#### Important Interests

Oil imports from Africa amounted to 27 percent of American imports in the first half of 1980 (as supplied by Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria), as compared with the 22 percent supplied by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As an alternative to Middle East oil Africa may become increasingly important by the 1990s,

assuming U.S. dependence on imported oil does not significantly decrease.

Conflict in Africa threatens Allied interests. Western Europe is even more dependent upon Africa as a source of raw materials (in particular oil) and as an important market. Like Southwest Asia, American interests in the region are often more a reflection of U.S. interests in Europe.

As elsewhere, it will be in the U.S. interest that nuclear proliferation in, and conventional arms transfers to, African countries be managed in a responsible way. This may be particularly sensitive in regard to South Africa.

It is important that regional disputes, such as that in the Western Sahara, be settled at the regional level, e.g., in the OAU, rather than becoming an East-West or North-South issue in the UN. It would be distinctly damaging to U.S. interests in Morocco, if the Western Saharan dispute is not settled before it brings the downfall of Moroccan King Hassan.

Finally, American relations with the Third World and influence in the United Nations will largely be determined by relations with the 50 nations of Africa, which predominate in the non-aligned world.

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

In the period leading to the 1990s, the most desirable outcome in Africa would be the growth of sufficiently strong indigenous governments that the countries in that region of the world would become less pawns on the global geostrategic chessboard and more regional and international actors in their own right. But the likelihood of such a development is quite low. Economically, conditions will not dramatically improve<sup>7</sup> and, indeed, probably will worsen to the point where domestic discord will increase in intensity. The impact will be to reinforce political differences existing in the region but without creating major change in the pattern of relations with either East or West. It is probable that in the year 2000, the politics of the continent will be infinitely more complicated than in 1982, and that no single power or group of powers, either external or internal, will be dominant.

African politics are complicated by diverse geographic, demographic, historical and cultural factors which have effectively revolutionized the nature of conflict in the last half of the century. Conflict and warfare since 1945 have tended to occur in more peripheral regions of the developing world and be limited in scope, objectives, and participation. They have stemmed from longstanding, unresolved ethnolinguistic or religious rivalries and have been protracted in nature, only lapsing into de facto, unstable truces or ceasefires, pending acquisition by one or more combatants of the necessary resources or resolve to reinitiate hostilities.

They have also included a wide variety of forms of conflict, simultaneously or in patterns of escalation and de-escalation, from coercive diplomacy, terrorism and internal subversion, to conventional military intervention, and at least implicitly in some cases, the threat of nuclear war. Finally, they have most frequently not involved the superpowers or their immediate allies in direct confrontation with one another, but rather as conflicts between or against surrogates.

As increasingly constrained natural resources and food supplies have been subjected to even more demand for their use by the growing populations of the developing world, local conflicts have escalated rapidly to include the industrial nations directly or indirectly. A perceived balance of power between East and West, in which neither side dares risk the destruction of nuclear or major conventional warfare within its own region has led them to seek other areas and locations for political-military competition, primarily in the developing world.

The growing moral, political and economic costs associated with the use of military force to resolve issues among nations has resulted in the desire on the part of the major powers to seek diplomatic solutions to all problems despite a growing multipolarity in international relations (in which issues are defined as East-West, North-South, regional-global, developed-non-developed, etc.) which has virtually precluded such peaceful settlements. These factors have contributed to a breakdown of world order in the sense that nations are unable to control or regulate the actions of their populations within their

boundaries, giving rise and opportunity for small political factions to engage in "armed propaganda" and terrorism.

These small groups have achieved power largely because of the communications revolution which has permitted leaders to be aware of events immediately as they happen worldwide, but which also has constrained their decisions because such innovations subject them to the scrutiny and thus sanctions of others. There has also been a quantum increase in lethality and combat power created by the proliferation and deployment worldwide of "new conventional weapons." Finally, the continued national, economic and ideological rivalry between the superpowers leads them to seek opportunities short of direct conflict in order to impede their opponents.

These characteristics are the result of fundamental geopolitical and economic changes since WW II, stemming from the decline of colonial empires and a corresponding proliferation of sovereign, intensely nationalistic (toward the outside world at least), politically and economically fragile, nonaligned states. These nonaligned states have failed to cooperate either regionally or globally to create a stable environment invulnerable to either political or economic exploitation by East or West, and the growing interdependence of the world economy has made the developed nations vulnerable to indigenous instability in the developing world, fomented or exploited by their developed political or economic rivals.

Among the 20 African states that have acquired new heads of state in the past four years, 11 did so by coup d'etat or some other procedure that involved institutional as well as leadership

changes. In 10 states (Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Zimbabwe), a new head of government came to power by a pre-established constitutional process and institutional continuity was maintained. This record, which has some anomalous entries in both columns, is not sufficiently indicative of a clear trend to warrant eliminating any African state from a list of potential candidates for "political turbulence" in the 1990s. Among the existing or potential trouble spots, the following are or should be of particular concern to U.S. policymakers:

#### The Western Sahara and Namibia

The two major territorial disputes that must be resolved to complete Africa's decolonization concern the Western (formerly Spanish) Sahara and Namibia (the former German colony of South-West Africa administered by South Africa since World War I). Well before 1990, barring unforeseen developments, both of these questions should be off the United Nations agenda.

In the case of the Western Sahara, it is less important which of several plausible dispositions are made of the territory than that the dispute be resolved before it brings the downfall of King Hassan. How the results are obtained is also important. It is in the long-term interest of all parties, including the United States, that the Western Sahara be perceived and dealt with as a regional matter under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity rather than as an East-West theater of action.

In Namibia, the dual track policy now being pursued by South Africa should terminate (well before 1990) in acceptance of independence for the territory under the terms that will have been negotiated under the aegis of the five-nation Western "Contact Group" led by the United States. Factors moving Pretoria toward a settlement in the relatively near term include (1) the favorable negotiating environment under the Reagan Administration; (2) prospects of enhanced acceptability in the international community; (3) the high cost (est. one billion Rand per year) of the current level of South African military and administrative operations in the territory; (4) the prospect that a settlement would result in shortened lines of defense for the South African heartland; and (5) recognition that the military conflict in Namibia can go on interminably but cannot be won. The dangers for Pretoria arising from Namibian independence will be largely in the areas of domestic politics (see below), for no Namibian government can afford severance of the crucial economic ties that render it, like all the states of southern Africa, beholden to the Republic.

#### North Africa and the Horn

For geostrategic reasons that only coincidentally are related to indigenous political forces, both the United States and the Soviet Union are inclined to commit themselves, in one degree or another, to the preservation of selected regimes in North Africa and the Horn. As one indication of this commitment, U.S. military assistance (FMS, MAP, IMET) for the states in the northern tier (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Somalia) com-

prised 96 percent (\$650 million) of the total for all of Africa in 1981 and 93 percent (\$1.2 billion) of that proposed for 1982.<sup>10</sup> The fact that 80 percent of the northern tier aid goes to Egypt, which is outside the scope of this paper, does not invalidate the basic point; the other four North African countries get more than all of black Africa combined. The lion's share of Soviet military sales to the continent goes to Libya and Ethiopia. Algeria, seeking an identity as genuinely nonaligned, obtains its arms from increasingly diverse sources, East and West. The trend is toward escalation of both the amount and sophistication of arms acquired.

Given the continuing (negative) drift of American public opinion toward untied foreign aid, the focus is likely to remain on those nations perceived (correctly or not) as "proven friends," those having strategic assets (either location or resources), those prepared to grant the United States military access to facilities, and those perceived to be threatened by Soviet expansionism through a surrogate. These criteria would keep U.S. military assistance largely concentrated in the area north, northwest, and east of Sudan.

There is a growing concern among Africa's more farsighted leaders that the increasing flow of arms to the continent (not only from the United States and the Soviet Union, but also from France, Britain, West Germany, and Italy), as well as the proliferation of access, friendship, and cooperation agreements, may serve the short-term purposes of specific regimes but at great risk to the future economic and political stability of the

continent as a whole. The majority of the governments receiving the most superpower attention and arms are fragile regimes headed by charismatic leaders. In these circumstances, the risk is great that local ethnic and political differences will take on East-West connotations and that the inclination will be to resort to arms rather than bargaining and brokerage to settle both domestic and regional power games.

These concerns and a developing sense of resentment about being "used" and "bought" by external powers could develop into an African-generated initiative toward restriction of the arms trade. The OAU would be the logical vehicle.

The image of Africans as the passive victims of foreign powers in the pattern of the nineteenth century is obsolete, at least in 1982. It is African leaders who now make the decisions regarding whether or which foreign nations -- the Soviet Union, Cuba, France, Britain, the United States or others -- will become involved in the continent's internal and regional power struggles. It is in this context that American policymakers should weigh the kinds of relationships entered into with African leaders and governments. For example:

- o The United States should be very wary of entangling alliances with African leaders, however tempting the carrots offered, when the entanglement seems likely to result in U.S. arms or military presence being used to circumvent Organization of African Unity consensus on diplomatic solutions to unresolved regional power struggles (e.g., Morocco and the Western Sahara, Somalia and the Ethiopian Ogaden). In Africa, as

elsewhere in the Third World, the patron-client relationship can be a trap.

- o The United States should be wary of military arrangements with papier-mache regimes on the African mainland that involve the stationing of American forces within the country. What is the prospect that these forces might find themselves in the role of palace guard for a regime that has lost its popular support?
- o It is not in the American interest to encourage African clients to focus on fitting into a mold pleasing to the United States to the extent that they risk losing touch with their own countrymen. Mohammed Heykal, the distinguished Egyptian journalist and former editor of al-Ahram, addressed this "fatal flaw of American foreign policy ... to count too heavily on an individual rather than on across-the-board relations with a nation's people." Referring to Sadat's death, Heykal said: "I don't mean to be rude, but (Americans) killed him...He was addressing himself to you, the Barbara Walters of this world, the Walter Cronkites of this world...The friendship with the United States became a target in itself, not a means to achieve something."<sup>11</sup>
- o Conversely, it may be hoped that the United States will have learned by the 1990s to take stock of the negative consequences of pinpointing its own special villains in the Third World. As Tanzania's former minister for economic development, A.M. Babu, observed recently:

"President Kennedy's nemesis was Fidel Castro; President Johnson's was Ho Chi Minh; President Nixon settled on Salvador Allende of Chile; and President Carter on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Now President Reagan has his Qaddafi. All of these villains in one way or another challenged American policies in their regions, but none of them posed a serious security threat to the United States. Nevertheless, they have been presented consistently to the American public as if their power were deeply dangerous to U.S. survival and to world peace -- and their removal essential for the good of mankind..." It is Babu's view that the publicity given to these individuals by American presidents (and thus the world's media) was a significant factor in their becoming folk heroes throughout the Third World.

American policymakers must understand, as the French learned from their experience with the Emperor Bokassa, that in African politics today's "redeemer" may be tomorrow's "traitor", and vice versa. It is better to deal with governments as corporate entities than to put all our eggs in the basket of a mortal leader, however charismatic, popular, and pro-American he may appear.

It is in the U.S. interest to encourage and facilitate negotiated settlements of African conflicts. It should be noted that Africa's major prolonged liberation wars (Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea, the Sahara) were ended at the conference table or are still going on.

While it is sometimes argued that the most important accomplishment of the Organization of African Unity is that it has survived intact for 19 years, we should not underestimate the importance of this fact. Despite some structural and functional ambiguities agreed upon in 1963 to bridge major conceptual differences among its founders<sup>13</sup>, the OAU has exerted significant moral pressure in support of principles enunciated in its charter. These include mutual non-interference by member states in each other's internal affairs, respect for the borders of member states as they existed at independence, negotiated settlements of disputes, and nonalignment in the confrontational aspects of the East-West relationship. It is in the U.S. interest to do what it can to further the viability of the OAU in the 1990s and beyond.

The health of the American economy is the strongest weapon in the U.S. arsenal in dealing with Africa. Military muscle and transfers are no substitute for the capital, technology, and export markets that can address the poverty that is a basic cause of instability in many African states. Moreover, the Soviet Union simply cannot compete with the United States on this plane. In seeking to counter Soviet initiatives, therefore, we should lead from our strengths rather than play by rules that make it impossible for us to outbid Moscow. U.S. corporations and banks can play a more important roles in Africa in the 1990s than in the 1970s, and should be encouraged to do so.

### Soviet Objectives and Performance

The Soviet Union's objectives in Africa include validation of its role as a global power; undermining of the West's dominance in economic and political relations with the continent (but in ways that do not impose heavy economic burdens on Moscow or its allies); establishing and maintaining the option of future access to the continent's raw materials and minerals; countering and lessening Chinese influence; establishing and maintaining the capability to challenge the West's monopoly of adjacent sea-lanes; and furthering the radicalization of black politics, especially in the fluid southern region. The idea that there is a Soviet master plan for accomplishing these objectives is increasingly discounted, in part because Africa falls somewhere below Europe, East Asia, the southern rimlands of the USSR, and the Middle East in the hierarchy of Soviet geopolitical and resource allocation priorities. Contrary to the word as received in Pretoria, the Horn is and will continue to be of higher strategic importance to Moscow than southern Africa.<sup>14</sup>

Soviet policy in Africa has become increasingly cautious in terms of all-out new commitments since Moscow backed the losing horse (Joshua Nkomo's ZAPO) in Zimbabwe. This disappointing development was preceded by the dissolution of a range of other significant patron relationships -- with Ghana in 1966, with Sudan's Jafar al-Numeri in 1971, with Egypt's Sadat in 1975, with Somalia's Siad Barre in 1977, with Equatorial Guinea in 1979, and with Sekou Toure's Guinea over a period of years since the late 1970s. Recent developments in Angola and Ethiopia cast considerable doubt on the depth and breadth of the ideological

commitment of these "Marxists" states.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, it is the French government's view, shared by many other European Africa-watchers, that there are fewer Africans today convinced that Marxism offers the key to their country's or the continent's economic and political salvation than in the 1960s.<sup>16</sup> The major reasons for turning to Moscow for arms and support are likely to continue to be availability (as in the cases of Zambia in 1980 and the liberation movements of southern Africa) rather than ideology.

While there are varying African assessments of the significance of the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major actor on the African scene, the trend of particular interest to American policymakers should be the inclination of African leaders and commentators to take an increasingly cynical view of the Russians and Americans as parallel superpowers whose interests in their continent are those of self-centered geostrategic chess players. The shift in U.S. aid policy toward greater emphasis on security assistance to selected "anti-Soviet" countries reinforces this perception.

#### Cuban Activities

The bloom appears to be wearing off the Cuban-African connection, and the prospects are that the Cuban military presence on the continent will be markedly diminished from the present figure of 30,000+ well before the 1990s.<sup>17</sup>

Havana's new opportunity to exercise influence in various countries closer to home, as an individual actor rather than as a

Soviet surrogate, is a positive incentive for a shift of priorities to the Western Hemisphere. Negative developments include the Angolans' growing dissatisfaction with the level of the Cuban technical skills for which they are paying out millions of Gulf Oil's petrodollars every year, and the alternative options being dredged up by the West as part of the Namibian negotiations. These alternative options include encouragement of rapprochement between Luanda and Lisbon and the quiet return to jobs in Angola of a growing number of the Portuguese who left en masse when colonial rule ended in the mid-1970s.

The Cuban relationship with Ethiopia has never been entirely comfortable, in part because language and cultural differences are more of a problem here than in Angola, but also because Havana has remained ambivalent on repression of the Eritrean separatist movement and some other key issues. In Ethiopia's disputed Ogaden region, as in southern Angola, Cuban forces maintain a symbolic presence in major towns but are rarely used in military actions involving unfriendly neighbors.

All generalizations about Africa must be qualified, and the caveat here is that events in a post-Mobutu Zaire could unfold in such a way that Cuban troops now in Angola might be deployed across the border in support of a Soviet stratagem. (See "Some Likely Trouble Spots: Zaire" below.)

#### France: The Most Influential External Power

Barring some unforeseen misstep, the most influential external power in Africa in the 1990-2000 period will be neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, but France. Contrary to the

expectation of some observers that a Socialist victory in the 1981 elections would presage less French involvement in the intricacies of African politics, the trend is clearly toward devoting more senior-level attention to a widening range of African relationships. A chronology of French ministerial travels in Africa and of official and unofficial visits by African heads-of-states to Paris in the first year of the Mitterand era reveals increasing emphasis on building economic and diplomatic linkages outside the cluster of francophone states that were formerly French colonies.<sup>18</sup> For example, a number of English- and Portugese-speaking African countries joined the 19 francophone regulars at the eighth annual (1981) Franco-African summit in Paris; the next of these summits is scheduled for 1982 in the former Belgian colony of Zaire.

France (in consort with West Germany, another actor of increasing importance in Africa) takes issue with the present thrust of American policy in Africa insofar as that policy is premised on an inclination to identify African personalities, governments, and issues in a bipolar (East-West) context. Arguing that "defending Angola against South Africa and avoiding the division of Ethiopia were not unjust causes,"<sup>19</sup> Mitterrand is establishing a rapport with Africans along a wide ideological spectrum -- a rapport that is not enjoyed by a United States perceived to be forever on safari rediscovering Africa by bits and pieces, or by a Soviet Union available to fill military vacuums (especially with Cubans and/or for hard cash) but

disinclined to commit the economic development aid that would further Africa's eventual self-reliance.

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Indications are that France's military presence in Africa will not diminish but may be employed somewhat differently in the years ahead. The coming to power of Francois Mitterand as President of France has thus far not materially altered France's military role in Africa. The initial prediction of the Socialists was to shift the emphasis from "intervention" to "security assistance", and the French force in Africa was renamed to reflect this shift. Recent French soundings with francophone African leaders, however, have convinced Paris that the Africans still want to be able to call on French Troops for combat support in an emergency. A likely outcome is that the French will retain an in-theater deterrent/reaction capability, but will use it more sparingly keeping in mind broader French geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

Meanwhile, economic realities in France itself and the lingering Gaullist mystique will remain central elements of French policy toward Africa, allowing Mitterrand (and successor governments) concurrently to take a strong rhetorical position in support of all measures to end "racist policies in Africa," and yet honor the various contracts signed "in the name of France" by previous governments for substantial trade with South Africa in fields as controversial as military hardware, nuclear reactors and enriched uranium. Maintaining domestic support or tolerance of this degree of emphasis on Africa will require continued proof of the policy's benefits to the French economy and avoidance of involvement in a major African war.

### Constraints on Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts

Any predictions concerning the future of Africa must take into account the reality that this regions 50+ political entities are the products of arbitrary decisions made at European bargaining tables in the nineteenth century, and that the shapes, sizes, and arrangements of the various colonial territories were not determined by geographic, ethnic, linguistic, or economic considerations related to any notion of their ever becoming self-governing states. Nevertheless, when decolonization of Africa began in the middle of the twentieth century, independent Africa's first generation of heads-of-state concluded that a Pandora's box of trouble would be opened up if any attempt were made to redraw the map inherited from the colonial era.

At the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, and in reaffirming actions taken at each annual meeting of heads-of-state in the succeeding 18 years, the governments of independent Africa have maintained a high degree of consensus on two points: (1) the inviolability of borders of member states as ascertained at the time of independence remains the basis for OAU policy on territorial disputes; and (2) the OAU cannot condone any activities that are aimed at subverting governments of member states, or any form of interference by one state in the affairs of another. Deviations from these two principles (e.g., Somalia's 1977-78 military campaign to establish sovereignty over the Somali-inhabited Ethiopian province of Ogaden; the Eritrean, Biafran, Katangan, and southern Sudanese secessionist movements; Tanzania's 1979 military intervention in Uganda to assist in the

overthrow of Idi Amin; Israel's 1967 takeover of Egypt's Sinai) have been dealt with by the OAU, sometimes explicitly and sometimes by indirection, as breaches of the organization's charter.<sup>21</sup> Given the consistency of African consensus in this area (even in cases of misrule as flagrant as that of Uganda's Idi Amin), it was both prudent and predictable that one of Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings' first public statements after seizing power for the second time in Ghana in December 1981 was to issue a generalized warning (clearly aimed specifically at nearby Nigeria) emphasizing that his return to power was an internal Ghanaian matter.

It seems reasonable to assume that the OAU consensus on the sacrosanct character of the national sovereignty and borders of African states will remain a brake on irrendentism and cross-border wars in the last decades of the century. Adherence to these principles does not preclude, of course, the continued flaring of disputes over borders imprecisely demarcated (especially when the fuzzy border areas are found to contain potentially valuable minerals or oil); responses by neighbors to requests from recognized governments for aid in quelling insurrections.<sup>22</sup> Covert relationships between African governments and anti-government forces in neighboring states will inevitably remain another gray area.

#### Populist Time-Bombs

The papier-mache character of state structures in many African countries continues to facilitate the use of economic resources to boost political power in ways that do not take the

national economy forward and that often widen the gap between "haves" and "have-nots." In these circumstances, coups by individuals or groups espousing populist/puritanical anti-corruption goals<sup>23</sup> (e.g., Liberia's Doe in 1980 and Ghana's Rawlings in 1979 and again in 1981) will continue to spark intense emotional support among the disadvantaged, at least in the early stages.

In countries with Muslim majorities, the frustrations of the "have-nots" may be channelled into some version of the Islamic fundamentalism that has become a major political factor in the Middle East. As recent developments in Iran and Egypt have demonstrated, the armed forces and educated technocrats are not immune from the frustrations and yearnings that propel Moslems into fundamentalist movements that would replace politicians or governments perceived as corrupt and elitist by a vaguely egalitarian (some would say anarchic) polity based on the teachings of the Koran. These movements inevitably have an anti-Western component, to the extent that corruption is identified with Western tendencies toward materialism and secularism.

As the 1980s get under way, African leaders are far more aware of and concerned about the existence of these populist time bombs than they were a decade ago; but the will and ability to find ways of defusing them in non-repressive ways is as yet spotty at best.

### Economic Stresses

As Africa moves toward the 1990s, it will remain (as Dr.

Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, reported in July 1981) "the least economically developed of all continents, the most dependent on the industrialized market economies, and therefore the most vulnerable to any setback in these economies..." A 1981 study commissioned by the World Bank takes the position that only fundamental structural reforms facilitated by increased aid from the industrialized countries offers any hope of reversing the continuing downward trend in the economies of all but a few African countries:

Between 1960 and 1979, per capita income in 19 countries grew by less than one percent per year, while during the last decade 15 countries recorded a negative rate of growth of income per capita. And by the end of the 1970s, economic crises were battering even high-growth countries like Kenya, Malawi, and Ivory Coast...Output per person rose more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other part of the world, particularly in the 1970s, and it rose more slowly in the 1970s than in the 1960s...The tragedy of this slow growth in the African setting is that incomes are so low and access to basic services so limited. Per capita income was \$329 in 1979 (excluding Nigeria) and \$411 when Nigeria is included. Death rates are the highest in the world and life expectancy is the lowest (47 years). Fifteen to 20 percent of the children die by their first birthday, and only 25 percent of the population have access to safe water. Of the 30 countries classified by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as the poorest in the world, 20 are

African. Of the 36 countries listed in the World Bank's World Development Report, 1981 as "low income" (a per capita income of less than \$370), almost two-thirds are African.

The economic crisis is especially evident in agriculture...Total food production rose by 1.5 percent per year in the 1970s, down from two percent the previous decade. But since population was rising rapidly -- by an annual average of 2.5 percent in the 1960s and 2.7 percent in the 1970s -- food production per person was stagnant in the first decade and actually declined in the next. Imports of food grains (wheat, rice, and maize) soared -- by nine percent per year since the early 1960s -- reinforcing food dependency.

The deterioration in agriculture and other internal and global factors led to widespread balance-of-payments crises in the 1970s. Current account deficits in the region as a whole rose from a modest \$1.5 billion in 1970 to \$8 billion in 1980. External indebtedness climbed from \$6 billion to \$32 billion between 1970 and 1979, and debt service increased from 6 to 12 percent of export earnings in the same period. Foreign exchange reserves, which were comfortable in 1970, fell sharply...<sup>24</sup>

The picture is not entirely bleak, however, in part because the intensive search for oil and other minerals of commercial significance is producing results that could change dramatically the economic profiles of a number of countries and regions that have suffered acutely from the sharp rise in energy costs in the

1970s. Perhaps more important in the longer run, there is a new willingness on the part of African governments (as evidenced by the hard-hitting language found in the proceedings of the first OAU economic summit held in Lagos in 1980) to take greater individual and collective responsibility for the "continuing decline of our economies," especially the neglect of the crucial agricultural sector.

"The Lagos Action Plan" would appear to be more optimistic than is warranted in its projection of the creation of an African energy common market by 1990 and a continental economic community by 2000,<sup>25</sup> but progress is discernable toward the first decade objective of strengthening existing, and creating new, regional and functional economic groupings ("building blocks"), with special attention to "harmonization" in the crucial areas of food production, energy, industry, transport, and communications.

#### The Continuing Refugee Crisis

An estimated half of the world's 10 million displaced persons (refugees) from civil wars and various forms of political repression and economic deprivation are found in Africa. In keeping with African tradition, and a 1969 OAU declaration, "the granting of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state." Between 1969 and 1981, the number of Africans categorized as bona fide refugees rose from 750,000 to approximately five million. The greatest burden has fallen on some of the poorest states -- e.g., 1.5 million from Ethiopia's Ogaden in Somalia; 400,000 or more from Eritrea, Chad, and Uganda in Sudan.

Zaire, sharing borders with nine states, is host at any given time for perhaps half a million refugees, many from Angola.

Repatriation of Zimbabweans has progressed to a point where the office of the UN High Commission for Refugees is winding up its operations, and there is now hope that many of the Chadians who fled to Cameroon and Sudan in the course of the 16-year civil war may soon be able to migrate homeward. The human crisis in Africa's Horn, however, appears likely to remain grim into the indefinite future. And as we move toward the 1990s, mounting friction between blacks and whites in South Africa and/or a failure to resolve the Namibian issue could see southern Africa's present trickle of political refugees to bordering states increase to proportions that would gravely strain the already ailing economies of the region and place host countries in increasing military peril.

### Minerals

The heavy reliance of the United States and other industrial democracies on minerals imported from the region of Africa southward from Zaire is undisputed. Concern about continued access focuses particularly on South Africa, which dominates world exports of four minerals (chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum) that have both industrial and military significance. South Africa has some two-thirds of the world's known reserves of chromite and vanadium, a third of the manganese, four-fifths of the platinum, and half of the gold. The importance of these reserves to the West is underscored by the fact

that the Soviet Union is the principle alternative source of gold, vanadium, and platinum, and an important alternative source of magnesium.<sup>26</sup>

There are various schools of thought on (1) the weight that should be given to the prospect of an interruption of supply from this area of Africa, and (2) the likelihood of such an interruption under various alternative political scenarios. While recent authoritative surveys suggest that American dependence on Southern African minerals is not "absolute or final" (e.g., stockpiles could fill the gap while other sources and/or more costly substitutes are brought on line), the effect on Western Europe and Japan could be acute and lasting.

The circumstances in which South African supplies might be cut off can be loosely grouped and evaluated in four categories:

- 1) The imposition by United Nations action of an across-the-board trade embargo (sanctions) against South Africa would greatly inconvenience the United States and would impose severe economic hardships on Western Europe as well as nearby African states whose economies are deeply enmeshed with that of the Republic. For these reasons, and because past experience in the much easier case of land-locked Rhodesia/Zimbabwe has demonstrated the difficulties of enforcement, a proposal for sanctions of this order of magnitude would almost certainly be vetoed in the Security Council unless South Africa were to commit an act of such egregious nature (e.g., a nuclear attack against a neighboring state) that a Chapter VII UN action could not be avoided.

2) Periodic threats by South Africa to demonstrate the country's crucial importance to the West by imposing its own ban on mineral exports must be taken with a grain of salt, since mineral exports are the primary source of the foreign exchange earnings that finance the imports of capital goods required for South Africa's commitment to continuing industrial and military expansion.

3) The emergence of a radical "pro-Soviet" government in South Africa sometime over the next two decades could result in a political decision to deny minerals to the West. Such a sequence would be a deviation from the Western-oriented trading policies that Moscow has heretofore encouraged its African client states (e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea in the days of its close association) to follow, but South Africa is, of course, in a different league as a mineral source.

4) If South Africa were to slide into a prolonged and indecisive civil war, the flow of minerals to the West would be seriously jeopardized, but the South African scenario does not envisage a prolonged and indecisive civil war.

While South African minerals are of special and immediate importance, any U.S. minerals policy that focuses exclusively on the Republic would be short-sighted. By the 1990s, other central and southern African countries (notably Zambia, Zaire, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique) have the potential to become increasingly significant suppliers of a variety of still largely unexploited metallic ores.

### Nuclear Weapons

As of 1982, South Africa and Libya are the two African nations possessing the combination of financial resources, nuclear infrastructure, and political incentive to develop a nuclear weapons capability by the end of the century. Faced with a confirmed South African or Libyan capability, Nigeria or Algeria might also be moved, at some point in the future, to channel petrodollars out of economic programs into nuclear development.

The possibility that South Africa already has a nuclear weapons capability is suggested by the circumstantial evidence gathered in the wake of what may have been a nuclear detonation in the south Atlantic in September 1979. The uranium enrichment facility has been able to obtain additional enriched uranium from abroad despite international restrictions imposed following its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).<sup>27</sup> Several aircraft in the South African inventory are capable with slight modifications of delivering nuclear weapons, and South Africa/Israeli defense cooperation on missile system development could include nuclear delivery systems.

South Africa's interest in developing a nuclear weapons capability appears to be focused on the symbolic benefits of prestige and/or deterrence. It is difficult to envisage any scenario, short of imminent and absolute defeat of the Afrikaner government, in which Pretoria would utilize such power. Indeed, South Africa may never formally acknowledge its capability in this area for fear of sparking an OAU nuclear weapons development effort.

The interest of Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is well-established. After China refused the Libyan leader's request to buy an atomic weapon outright in the early 1970s, Qaddafi reportedly financed Pakistan's nuclear development program until 1978, and supplied the project with uranium purchased from Niger. Libya's nascent nuclear infrastructure is known to include a Soviet-built research reactor near Tripoli. Either an enrichment or a reprocessing facility must be acquired, however, if Tripoli is to develop its own weapons grade material; as a signatory of the NPT, Qaddafi could justify the purchase of such a facility as necessary to support the research reactor. Several aircraft of Soviet and French origin in Libya's order of battle could easily be modified to deliver nuclear weapons. Considerable attention has been focused on a facility operated by the West German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen-Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) at Jarmah, 430 miles south of Tripoli, from 1979 until late 1981. Although the facility was described by OTRAG sources as a test-launching base to develop inexpensive rockets for peaceful uses such as scientific research, press and intelligence sources have noticed that a significant part of the budget of Libya's Ministry of Atomic Energy was devoted to OTRAG-related activities. It may or may not be relevant that several Libyan students are currently studying nuclear physics in the United States.

## SCENARIOS OF CONFLICT

The foregoing regional analysis depicts an Africa in the 1990s that will be deeply disturbed by the stresses of a growing imbalance from country to country in rates of economic growth (or deprivation), in military prowess, and in ideological orientation. By and large it will be a region of authoritative governments struggling to maintain internal stability and discipline as a precondition for the pursuit of economic growth and regional geopolitical ambitions. Contending world powers (notably the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and France, but to a lesser extent countries like India, China, and Brazil) will be vying for turf in the region, each for its own strategic, economic, or cultural purposes. Africa is the heart of the uncommitted Third World - resource-rich, cash-poor, geographically strategic, numerically potent in the UN, vulnerable, and volatile. That there will be indigenous inter-and intra-state conflict is a virtual certainty. That Africa will become an arena for East-West proxy conflict is at least a possibility.

The three scenarios depicted below, though intrinsically important and plausible, should be taken as illustrative of the kind of violence which could break out almost anywhere in the region. Because Africa is where it is, significant conflict will require some kind of U.S. response, whether diplomatic or military. The percentage figures cited by each scenario heading represent the likelihood of military conflict in the underlying dispute in question - not necessarily the full enactment of the scenario.

### South Africa (40%)

The most dynamic entity in Africa -- politically, economically, and socially -- is South Africa. The changes that it will undergo before the year 2000 will be revolutionary when measured against 1982, but not necessarily apocalyptic. The following scenario, which falls into the non-apocalyptic range, is not a prediction but a plausible option on a spectrum of worst-case to best-case possibilities that have been carefully studied and evaluated:

- o The Both government's decision to opt for a five to six percent real growth rate annually was taken with the clear recognition that achievement of this goal requires that blacks must be brought into the economy in skilled and semi-skilled positions in massive numbers. To control this process, the South African government took the watershed step of permitting the formation of black unions. The long-term implications of labor reform, coupled with a "one economy" policy (which tacitly admits the infeasibility of the apartheid vision of many separate economies within one nation) include vastly expanded educational opportunities for blacks at all levels, the formation of a black middle class, relaxation of the group areas restrictions, and, ultimately, political rights and considerable economic clout for blacks.
- o A Namibia settlement which seems inevitable despite South African resistance to SWAPO) will deepen the fissures within Afrikanerdom, with a majority of

National Party members of parliament moving toward the left and a minority turning to the right and the laager.

- o By the year 2000, the already weakened (whites only) parliamentary system will have given way to a series of authoritarian reformist regimes with military backing or components, culminating in the emergence of a coalition regime centered in a presidency on the de Gaulle model and a multiracial assembly of representatives from largely autonomous states and city-states.
- o One of the first steps in the political reform process will be the restoration of the franchise to Coloureds and Asians. The South African government will seek to co-opt the middle class elements of these groups, with the object of creating a buffer to keep the pace of social change from accelerating to unmanageable proportions. Further in the future, however, these co-opted groups will join the new black middle class and proletariat (created by the country's ongoing shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy) in pressing for greater equity.
- o Leaders of the "independent" black homelands that were to have been the pillars of apartheid are already showing signs of discontent with their lot. In the years ahead, the homelands are likely to (1) seek greater autonomy; (2) serve as staging areas for guerrilla activity against the South African government;

(3) be directly and forcibly controlled by South African security forces; and (4) eventually be co-opted into a new political structure that will include the territories of the present Republic.

- o The process devised by the white reformists for bringing blacks into the system in a controlled manner will not meet black expectations. Clashes between an expanding and increasingly sophisticated black labor movement and the government security machine will increase. Militant black political forces, probably operating under the rubric of the African National Congress (ANC), will move from the present pattern of sporadic guerrilla activity against symbolic targets (property) toward more extensive violence ranging from industrial sabotage to assassination. The guerrilla forces will be hampered by fissures and rivalries within their leadership ranks; by a government security machine possessing the capability and the will to invoke strong repressive and divisive measures; and by uncertain grass-roots support. The economy will be the key determinant of the level of violence during this interim period, with a generally expanding economy tempering the mood of the day.
- o South Africa's neighbors will be largely unable or unwilling to prevent their territory from being used as staging areas by guerrillas seeking to overthrow the Pretoria government. The South African government, rather than risk international condemnation or worse by

seeking to overthrow those governments harboring "hostile elements," can be expected to undertake to bring its weaker neighbors to heel by the use of economic coercion, proxy troops, and/or direct military raids (or the threat thereof) against ANC bases and/or "uncooperative" neighboring governments themselves.

- o If Cuban forces are still deployed in Angola and Mozambique, they and their Soviet partners will seek to exploit the situation by offering troops and/or advisors to the ANC guerrillas. The host governments, however, will almost certainly prefer to look to the OAU, or failing that the UN, if they need help in deterring or containing South African raids. The probability of U.S. ground forces becoming involved is extremely small, the USAF airlift may be sought to transport OAU supporting forces into the border area.
- o Following this scenario, South Africa would remain at the turn of the century the dominant economic and military power in the southern region, but its social hierarchy would be based increasingly on economic and class considerations rather than almost exclusively on racial considerations.

#### Zaire (603)

Although Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko would be a relatively young 70 years old in the year 2000, it is a reasonable assumption that the Mobutu era will come to an end, in one way or

another, well before the turn of the century. The discontent that increasingly pervades both urban and rural Zaire stems from the failure of any government since independence in 1960 to pass to the citizenry any sense of sharing the benefits that are, or could be, derived from the country's vast mineral resources. The existence of this mineral wealth (some of it in the strategic category) also explains why each instance of insurrection in the past 20 years (1960-65, 1977, 1978) has been viewed by the United States as an international crisis with East-West dimensions.

The scenario that would be most pleasing to Zaire's patrons and creditors in the West would call for Mobutu to prepare the ground (i.e., groom a technocrat successor) and relinquish power voluntarily in the way that Senegal's Leopold Senghor transferred the presidency to Prime Minister Abdou Diouf in 1980. Present evidence does not suggest, however, that Mobutu is thinking along these lines. From Washington's standpoint, the next best case transition would be one comparable to that of Master Sergeant Doe's takeover in Liberia in 1980 -- an elitist-to-populist transition involving no diminution (perhaps a strengthening) of the American patron role. A worst case scenario, following the Ethiopian or Iranian model, would result in a major reduction of U.S. influence, or even the expulsion of the American presence.

While France, Belgium, and the United States would exert a maximum effort to align themselves with whatever individual or group takes power after Mobutu, it is not at all certain that any alternative exists that can hold the country's disparate parts together for a reasonable testing period. Although Mobutu's rise to power was through the Belgian and subsequently Zairian

military, there is reason to doubt that the Zairian officer corps would respond to Mobutu's demise with the coherence and sense of national purpose displayed by their Egyptian counterparts following Sadat's death. Indeed, it is not unlikely that Zaire, like neighboring Chad, could splinter into several regionally based warring factions. The size of the country (comparable to the United States east of the Mississippi) and the deterioration of the rudimentary but effective transport network inherited from the colonial era add credence to this scenario.

If post-Mobutu Zaire comes to resemble the Zaire of the early 1960s, a United Nations peacekeeping force may once again be the only feasible vehicle to prevent the Soviet Union and its surrogates from moving in as major actors in what could be a prolonged power struggle. The role of neighboring Angola would be critical at various junctures -- which suggests another reason why settlement of the Namibian dispute (and the related reduction or elimination of the Cuban presence in Angola) should remain a priority U.S. policy objective.

In sum, the tendency of geostrategists to think of Zaire as an entity unto itself should be reconsidered; by virtue of its proximity to Angola, it should henceforth be viewed as part of the unfolding drama of southern Africa.

#### Western Sahara (80%)

The ongoing conflict between Morocco and Polisario insurgents represents one of the most direct and destabilizing threats to American interests in Africa. Aside from the actual fighting

itself, the conflict holds the potential for a number of unpleasant developments in the region.

First, there is the pronounced negative effect which recognition and treatment of the Polisario has caused among the members of the Organization for African Unity. This issue, taken together with the general approbation associated with the 1982 OAU President Muammar al-Qaddafi has split the Organization into two camps and effectively prevented its meeting this year.

The long term effects of this discord -- centered on whether to recognize and seat the Polisario representatives as OAU members -- can only hurt the conflict resolution and reduction functions of the OAU. In prior similar instances, member nations have been able to put away their differences (even to recognize Idi Amin as president) and hold the Organization together. Since the OAU represents the best hope for regional solutions to internal conflicts and the provision of acceptable peacekeeping forces, such a development can only be interpreted as hurting overall U.S. interests in stabilizing the region.

Second, the conflict may result in the downfall of King Hassan, and the loss of recently acquired basing and access agreements with Morocco. The imposition of a leftist or more outspoken non-aligned regime in that state could severely constrain U.S. ability to project forces in or through the region. Although the possibility of conflict between Algeria and Morocco seems dampened, again the probability of a protracted conflict may bring about a serious restructuring of alignments in the area.

Third, it would appear that by achieving a separate settlement with Mauritania, Polisario has positioned itself well to prolong the conflict and achieve recognition as the defacto government of Western Sahara.

It would appear that some negotiated settlement is very likely over the next few years, but at what cost to Morocco and the United States is difficult to determine. Although U.S. security assistance to Morocco has been able to insure that Morocco will not be defeated militarily, continued Soviet and Eastern bloc military aid through Libya and other countries appears to preclude their defeat as well.

The question is whether American aid reduces the chances for a truly negotiated settlement or simply encourages King Hassan to prolong the conflict. In the absence of a viable alternative regime in Western Sahara (perhaps loosely federated with Morocco), the chances quite simply are that Polisario will win through endurance and avoiding defeat, while an illusory goal of Moroccan victory leads to such internal discord that King Hassan either falls, or must accept any terms to resolve the conflict.

The Western Saharan conflict must not be taken lightly by American leaders and military planners. Morocco is our only friend in Northwest Africa. Our access to Moroccan bases is important to our global air-routes and to the Sixth Fleet. It would be vital in World War III, or in a major Middle East contingency. If Polisario pressures should bring the downfall of King Hassan and a new regime ideologically oriented to Libya and Algeria, our access rights would almost certainly be withdrawn and our military use of the Strait of Gibraltar might

come into question. This conflict scenario thus becomes the one in Africa most likely to require an American military reaction. Later in this paper we will address the force requirement which might be needed in this century to address that contingency.

## STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

On the global level, Africa in the 1990s will be affected by the Soviet Union trying to improve its global status as a superpower and to create a worldwide socialist community. This continued drive will primarily be characterized by low cost, low risk operations particularly with extensive visible involvement in the Third World.

In Africa, the Soviets will only be able to protect their previous gains through continued use of proxies and military assistance to national liberation movements. The Soviet Navy will continue to demonstrate the Soviet commitment. However, the level of Soviet effort will be reduced to include a decreased level of proxy involvement as a result of their own economic problems. The Soviets will attempt to maintain their position in Ethiopia, but may see a significant reversal of their role in southern Africa. There will be no introduction of Soviet ground or air forces into this area. Soviet actions could interfere with, but not necessarily curtail, U.S. access to strategic mineral resources.

On the regional level, Africa in the 1990s will be affected by the political, economic and social factors described above, and the actions of the emerging regional military powers: Libya, Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria.

These two very different trends, while related, will dictate very different strategic requirements for the Army in the year 2000. While it must be prepared to meet the Soviet threat, it must also consider the ability of local forces to counter either

the Soviets or U.S. attempts to deal with them directly or indirectly.

Since the likelihood of direct American intervention is very low, the Army must consider the ways in which it can support both its European and African allies in defense of common interests. This does not mean that American involvement will be unimportant -- quite the contrary -- as it may be most critical as a catalyst for effective, timely response to Soviet or surrogate challenges in the region.

Furthermore, the importance of Africa in a supporting role in the protection of American interests elsewhere (NATO, Middle East, Southwest Asia) makes it especially crucial that the U.S. react appropriately to events in Africa, whether global or regional in nature, and in a manner best calculated to preserve facilities and access which may be most critical to American military actions over the next twenty years. A number of factors will influence these requirements and reactions.

#### American Moods

The U.S. mood, which has been in a phase of relative isolationism since about 1970, will continue in that state until about 1986-87 when there will appear the first signs of a shift toward American willingness to support interventionism abroad. Extrapolating from signals evident in 1980-82, by 1983-84 there is high probability of public disaffection with high defense spending largely at the expense of domestic social programs and in view of a failure of the Reagan Administration to deliver on promised tax cuts. The fragile defense "consensus," promulgated

by the Administration as a sweeping mandate for change, called for increased defense preparedness, but not at the cost of the dismantling of American social welfare programs. Neither did it demonstrate, necessarily, greater American willingness to support military intervention. Part of the coming public reaction to defense spending perceived as excessive will be stimulated by problems in U.S. alliances. Working class Americans will be unwilling to tolerate conditions in which lower-working class Americans are forced to shoulder the cost for the security of the European and Japanese middle and upper-class rich. Through this short-term period (to the late 1980s) the attentive American public increasingly will resent West European unwillingness to share U.S. perceptions of a Soviet threat and their increasingly close economic ties with the East.

Soviet military power and power projection capabilities will continue to grow with likely emphasis on the use of Third World proxy forces to undermine vital Western interests, without risking direct U.S./Soviet military confrontation. By the end of the 1980s there will be a general public perception that America's leadership position in the Western World has been eroded. A consequent mood shift will emphasize rebuilding the American image abroad, reconstituting alliances, and exercising American military power. Weapons procurement decisions not taken in the mid-1980s will impact directly on U.S. military capability to act in the 1990s.

Intervention/isolation cycles forecast the first signs of a shift toward a willingness to accept intervention when perceived

U.S. interests are threatened by 1983-84. The current involvement of the U.S. in global economic, political and military affairs will continue to consolidate in this period. By the late 1980s, several challenges from abroad could stimulate a return to extroversion. These challenges include the range of: (1) Third World hunger and population problems; (2) problems in southern Africa; (3) an increasing energy crisis; (4) international, long-standing "feuds"; (5) the economic and psychological burdens of the nuclear arms race; (6) communist expansion; and (7) possibilities in a major threat from the Soviet Union or from a Sino-Soviet conflict.

After 1989, depending on the nature of the challenges, the U.S. could be expected to either emphasize: (1) a major military response -- the use or threat to use force to insure a stable world order; or (2) to exercise political, economic, cultural and moral leadership. But, until the 1980s are over, it is likely that threats to the interests of the U.S. will not elicit public willingness to support direct military intervention abroad, or public support of Pentagon appeals for massive, new weapons systems (perceived as necessary by the Defense Department for the challenges of the 1990s, but deemed excessive by the public) until the 1990s.

Based on the events of the past few years and the probable world context previously described, this is likely to be a traumatic period for the U.S. Although the U.S. currently is in a trough regarding isolationism, a chain of adverse developments, including the invasion of Afghanistan, repression in Poland, and serious further deterioration of the situations in the Persian

Gulf, Central or Latin America, or elsewhere which appears to seriously threaten U.S. interests, may well set the foundation of support for larger, better equipped, and better trained Army forces. The competing demands of domestic programs, of course, will mitigate against such a shift in mood for the near term, barring catastrophic reversals for U.S. interests abroad. Given the long lead time essential for the effective development of military resources, the unwillingness of the public to support changes now will quite likely preclude our ability to respond to challenges that lie ahead. In turn, our inability to respond particularly to multiple or unconventional situations will encourage our adversaries to promote instability, secure in the knowledge that the risk of U.S. reaction is very low.

However interventionist the American mood may become over the next twenty years, it is highly unlikely that the public would support direct American intervention in Africa, especially if it was in support of the current regime in South Africa. Indirect support of, for example, the French and Belgians in Eastern Zaire is much more likely, together with increased support for OAU peacekeeping forces.

The stationing of large numbers of Americans in other than a security assistance role is most likely to be constrained by African perceptions and moods, and while joint exercises, mobile training teams and the building and manning of some logistical facilities are feasible, they will not amount to a significant U.S. presence. The American public might be brought to understand the importance of Africa as a transit point or staging

area for RDJTF operations in the Middle East, but it will probably consider local intrastate, or even interstate, violence as an OAU, or perhaps a British/French/Belgian, problem.

#### Changed U.S. Interests

U.S. interests are unlikely to change over the next two decades. Africa will remain secondary to major U.S. interests, but will increase in importance as events occur peripheral to it, but which require African access, cooperation or support. While there exists the likelihood of a "resource war" in southern Africa, the conflict is likely to be largely internal in nature, exploited by the Soviets. The U.S. would do well to counter this effort more by indirect military means, viz; for the Army, the employment of security assistance forces on a more intensive basis and larger scale than before.

#### The Role of American Force in Africa

The use of American force on the continent of Africa is clearly conditioned by the importance of our interests there and by the willingness of the American public, as expressed through the Congress, to commit American lives to defend them.

It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that our interests in Africa are something less than vital. Until the 1950s Africa was a European colonial preserve. A few Americans, mostly black, sensed a feeling of kinship for the Liberian enclave. Most black Americans today have become increasingly conscious of their African roots, and some American companies have significant investments there, chiefly in South Africa. To

the American voter at large, Africa is a turbulent, mismanaged continent which consumes our foreign aid and then ungratefully frustrates our initiatives in the UN.

African perceptions of the United States are equally vague and elliptical. More than a few African elitists have studied in the U.S., but relatively few of them are in positions of real political leadership. To them the developed world is personified by the British, French and Belgians. Americans are looked upon as a marginal source of aid and technical assistance, but unaccountably reluctant to come forward with the kind of massive sharing of wealth which they think we can afford and which they know they need. Few African leaders understand us very well and still fewer have intuitive attachment to our global strategic objectives. Despite their tendency to experiment with both Western and communist models of government, the Africans are, by and large, genuinely neutral in the East-West superpower confrontation. They do not feel immediately threatened by it. They see it rather as an opportunity to play one side against the other in their search for the foreign assistance crucial to their very survival. If a certain amount of ideological window-dressing and strategic accommodation is needed to open the tap, they will provide it. But they will resent and resist any attempt by the donor patron to interfere in their domestic affairs or their value system. That is called neo-colonialism.

Most thinking Africans perceive that superpower interest in their continent is only superficially related to African needs and aspirations. Thus they recognize that our overriding

strategic interest in Africa is to use it as an avenue to other, more compelling, theaters of conflict. They probably understand that the Soviet interest in Africa is mainly to deny us this avenue, and perhaps to use it themselves to outflank NATO and move against the Western Hemisphere. While they welcome our largesse, they see us both as destabilizing forces trampling around in their political garden with the sole intent of gaining turf in a global strategic football game.

It is such a potential which worries Africans -- they recognize that it is unlikely that the superpowers would fight over Africa. But they might very well fight in Africa through the support and encouragement of proxy forces or African allies who could endanger their respective interests in the region. This would destabilize Africa even further, shattering what remains of African unity, and draw Africans into a larger conflict from which they would derive no benefit.

In the meantime the Africans have their own disputes. Three areas of potential conflict, probably the most likely three, are identified in our scenarios. But there are plenty more. In a continent of authoritative governments still groping for a management system that will work and an ideology that will invoke popular support, there is not a country that lacks a determined opposition. Ex-colonies bereft of an overarching colonial discipline quickly fractionalize. There will be sporadic intrastate insurgency, often launched from neighboring states sympathetic to the insurgents. This phenomenon, combined with externally financed military build-up which will be asymmetric from country to country and with a few important irridentist

issues, will probably spark interstate conflict of whatever intensity the antagonists have the assets to generate.

These internally inspired African conflicts are not, a priori, an American problem and we should not even consider intervening in them militarily (except as necessary to evacuate threatened American nationals) unless some or all of the following conditions are present:

- o The U.S. has a treaty obligation to defend the country under attack
- o That country has formally requested U.S. troops
- o U.S. bases or other important national strategic interests are at risk
- o All other means of resolving the dispute (e.g., UN sanctions or economic embargoes) have failed
- o Other sources of military support, preferably African or ex-colonial patron, are unavailable or inadequate

Even if the President should decide to intervene militarily, he would probably first explore the feasibility of achieving the objective "at arm's length", e.g., by logistical or indirect fire support to host government forces, rather than by sending in ground troops.

As of now we have no U.S. bases in Africa. We have, however, standby base access agreements with Morocco, Somalia and Kenya, these rights are important, and perhaps vital, to our strategy in Southwest Asia, and thus these are the countries (at least from the perspective of 1982) most likely to have a claim on U.S. military intervention in the 1990s. We also have a

formal defense agreement with Liberia [see U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, Volume 10, Part 2, p. 1598] but no external threat to that country is foreseen in the 1990s.

If our most important strategic interest in Africa is to use it as a way station for our RDJTF deployment to Southwest Asia, it would seem logical that the RDJTF should be given the mission of defending its African LOC's from hostile interdiction. This is appropriate from several standpoints:

- o All three countries in question are maritime; any operation in their support would probably be a joint operation for which the RDJTF is (or will be) best suited.
- o If recommendations made elsewhere in this study are adopted, army components of the RDJTF will have the quick-light configuration and unit size flexibility to meet quickly the spectrum (low to medium intensity) of conflict likely to emerge in these areas.
- o RDJTF units will have more familiarity with the general region than other U.S. forces, due to periodic maneuvers in the Middle East.

There is, of course, some anomaly in focusing Army attention on the northern tier when most of the continent's strategic resources and population is concentrated in central, West and Southern Africa, and while some 30,000 Cuban soldiers are deployed in Angola and Mozambique. If that is the part of the region that appears to interest the Soviets, why is it not of equal interest to us.

A 1979 report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, GPO Document 35-9950, pp. 127-128) put it thus:

"An American military response to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa is unlikely at the present time because this presence has not yet endangered vital American interests. Soviet reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic from Guinea and Angola were once reported, but these flights were of little military consequence. The Cuban presence in Angola, where there may be as many as 20,000 Cuban troops -- may raise questions about the security of the mineral resources of southern Africa and Zaire, but the answers to these questions are by no means clear at the present time.

"Angola, it is interesting to note, has kept up its exports to Western countries despite the presence of Cuban troops. Indeed, Cuban troops are actually guarding Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda. No doubt the Angolan Government is anxious to retain the income its resource exports produce, and this motive may be an important one with other resource-rich countries in the future.

"In any event, there is an inherent weakness in the Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa in that Soviet advisors and Cuban troops there are thousands of miles from their own home bases and sources of supply. Their supply lines extend over the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, and these lines are vulnerable to attack by forces based entirely outside Africa."

This commentary still appears essentially valid today. It would appear that the Cubans are in Angola and Mozambique because that is where they were invited to be. It is doubtful that they pose a credible threat to Zaire or Zambia, much less to South Africa or Nigeria. We have earlier alluded to the likelihood that the Cubans may eventually withdraw from Africa to address more tempting targets in the Caribbean. In the meantime Angola and Mozambique seem to be turning away from Marxism.

The Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia is more ominous on the face of it, since it potentially threatens Kenya and Somalia. Indeed any contingency we might be called upon to address in those countries could well be generated from Ethiopia. On the other hand, the Soviet influence there also seems to be on the wane rendering new Ethiopian aggression against Soviet-selected targets less likely.

A major constraint on the use of American power in Black Africa is the widespread anti-American animus of the region. An intervention anywhere would poison our image everywhere. Any African country which invoked our military support would be, under current conditions, ostracised by all the others. It is not worth it to them and not worth it to us. This situation may change. An arms race in Africa could force some of the more moderate and less militaristic countries to seek a European or American defense umbrella. Liberia, in particular, would tend to look to us and we are treaty-bound to listen. But all such requests must be critically examined with our broader interests

in mind. One of those interests is to avoid using American troops to bolster authoritative regimes of dubious legitimacy.

On balance, we consider it less than a 5 percent chance that the Army will be called upon to deploy into West, Central or Southern Africa before 2000.

## POSSIBLE MISSIONS

The only significant mission now being performed by the army in Africa is the training of host country personnel in the use and maintenance of U.S.-supplied army equipment. This mission will continue through the 1990s and may expand if there is an African arms race.

A possible mission will be the evacuation of U.S. nationals from countries under siege from invasion or insurgency. At first blush, this would seem a formidable undertaking. There are, for example, about 6,000 Americans in South Africa, some 4,000 in Kenya, and perhaps 3,500 in Nigeria. In practice, however, only a hard core of embassy and AID personnel and some obdurate missionaries are likely to be still in-country when the situation gets desperate enough to justify a military rescue mission. The possible scenarios for such a mission traverse a wide spectrum. It may be seaborne, airborne, airmobile, or by road from a neighboring country. It will require an elite Special Operations Force of up to battalion strength. Traditionally, this has been a USMC mission; but if the army has the right kind of force in the right place it could get the assignment. This kind of operation, involving close inter-service coordination and a mixture of air and ground mobility to carry evacuees as well as the force itself, merits tailor-made doctrine and tactics.

The only other potential African mission of importance to the Army is the deployment of security assistance or expeditionary forces to secure vital RDJTF LOC's under attack in the Northern Tier of Africa. Given the redundancy of USAF air routes to the Persian Gulf, it is far from clear that a threat to

any single intermediate station would necessarily justify U.S. intervention on purely military grounds. On the other hand, a country which has committed itself to the point of granting base access and overflight rights to the U.S. has a reciprocal right to expect some measure of diplomatic and, if necessary military support from us in an emergency. This is a contingency for which the RDJTF Command, and its Army components, should be planning.

#### Force Mobility, Design, and Employment Considerations

If we accept the premise that the only plausible combat missions for the Army in Africa through 2000 will be to help defend (if invited to do so) air and naval bases to which we have contingent access in the Northern Tier, and possibly to conduct quick-in-quick-out evacuation missions anywhere on the continent, then it would appear that the logical force for these purposes is the RDJTF. Since the African missions are of relatively low probability and the alternative scenarios of conflict are so varied, it would not appear cost-effective, feasible or desirable to designate and design specific units to address them. Thus the issue of force mobility and design for Africa is subsumed by the broader issue of RDJTF configuration.

It is fitting that mobility and design be discussed together, because the availability of the former is a constraint on the latter. Obviously, the nature, intensity and environment of the projected conflict must remain the principal determinant of force design; but if rapidity of deployment is a key precondition to success on the battlefield, as it probably will

be in Africa, we must have a design that will deliver the optimum mix of manpower, firepower and ground mobility to the battle theater in the initial trooplift cycle.

Morocco is about 3,500 miles by air and sea from Norfolk. Kenya and Somalia are closer to 6,000 miles. It has become commonplace to note that the U.S. has consistently neglected air- and sea-lift assets in favor of line equipment like tanks, fighter aircraft, and ships. Currently, the nation's airlift assets are sufficient to close a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division in about 48 hours, and deliver the whole division, including about 15 days' supplies, in two weeks. The Defense Department also has purchased 8 SL-7 fast sealift vehicles which, when converted to roll-on/roll-off configuration, will be able to deliver a mechanized division to Morocco in about 15 days or to Somalia in about three weeks, assuming it takes 5 days to load another 5 to unload the ships. If the issue is moving armored units, these times increase and force sizes decrease substantially.

There are two issues here; how much lift can the nation buy between now and the 1990s and what kind should it buy? Sealift may be slow, for example, but if the nation is prepared to exploit it properly, it has several advantages. It delivers an entire unit and its equipment all at once to the theater. It is relatively less provocative in deployment and, hence, easier to alert than airborne units. Sealift is generally cheaper and more easily obtainable. Finally, ships can carry the kind of tanks the Army has developed far more easily than aircraft, of which only the C-5 can carry any tanks at all. While the U.S. clearly

needs to augment its airlift capability, the time and expense involved suggest that beyond a certain point, it would do better to concentrate on sealift.

In either case, however, it seems unlikely that the nation will augment its current force substantially by the 1990s. In part, this is a technical matter. Even the current C-5B will not produce new and improved airlift until the end of the present decade, and then in relatively small numbers. It is also partly a political matter, however; the current budgetary feast is likely to subside by the middle of the decade, and with budgetary fasting will come cuts that historically have been aimed at lift assets. The latter problem is a matter of political will, of course, and can and should be changed. Even if it is, however, the nation's lift assets will be limited through the end of the century.

In Europe, the U.S. has sought to compensate for its lift deficiencies by prepositioning full sets of divisional equipment. Such is not likely to be the case in the Northern Tier of Africa, however. For the foreseeable future, states in the region are, at best, going to give the U.S. "access rights" to their own bases only in emergencies, and while they will entertain a limited amount of prepositioning at those bases, the notion of divisional sets is far beyond what they have in mind.

This means that the Army's contingent of the RDF will have to carry most of its fighting equipment with it to the region. In view of the probable future size of U.S. lift assets, this suggests strongly that Army RDF forces be as light and as self-

supporting as possible. Note that the issue of force size is bound up in this set of assumptions: simply put, the lighter and more supportable the force, the more of it can be carried to the region for major contingencies. Thus, there is simply no sense talking about an augmentation in the U.S. force posture to meet Southwest Asian and on-route African contingencies until the Army, as well as the other services, comes up with units light enough to be taken in large numbers to the area.

"Jaeger-style" infantry might be an effective solution. These forces, used by the Germans and now by the British in low-intensity conflicts abroad, operate in independent well-coordinated units without large-scale support from heavy artillery and tanks. Jaeger tactics concentrate on ambush and flank attack -- not conventionally-oriented defense and firepower. Jaeger forces, combined with tactical air support, ostensibly act as commandos and precursors to main forces.

There are numerous logistical advantages to Jaeger infantry constructs. They are one-third lighter than conventional forces and require less operations and maintenance support (POL, etc.). Airlift requirements and elaborate basing requirements are therefore reduced. Finally, as with perhaps all light infantry forces, Jaeger forces are more easily extractable from the combat environment than heavier, "dug-in" units.

Another solution to future mobility requirement shortfalls is to maximize the role of the host government in providing facilities access and in assuming transportation responsibilities. These forms of mobility assistance could prove extremely helpful in the African environment.

The relatively unsophisticated ground transportation network (including basing infrastructures) and the uncertainty over where a war might actually be fought in Africa, suggests the importance of intra-theater mobility in this region. Tactical airlift no doubt must play a greater and more flexible role in combat logistics in such a conflict than it should in a NATO war. For this reason, a small transport and/or cargo helicopter which could carry oversize cargo and operate on small airfields would be especially appreciated. Regrettably, as it was discovered with the Advanced Medium Short-Takeoff-and Landing Transport (AMST) program, it has been difficult to procure a major weapons system whose utility in a major NATO/Warsaw Pact War was not sufficiently justified. The importance of local mobility support becomes accentuated when U.S. mobility shortfalls are clear.

The size of units assigned to assist in the defense of host country bases in the Northern Tier may vary from a light infantry battalion (i.e., a security assistance force) to a heavy brigade (i.e., an expeditionary force) depending on the size and sophistication of opposing forces and the intensity of combat. Though lightness is important to their mobility, they must have the firepower to resist a concerted conventional attack, along with the training and equipment to cope with sporadic guerrilla infiltration and sabotage. Their mission will be essentially defensive in mode, but they should have a search and destroy capability. They will be essentially conventional in design.

Units designated for evacuation missions, by contrast, must be specially trained, elite, Special Operations Forces, highly

mobile but lightly armed. Since they may have to fan out into the countryside to collect groups of evacuees they will need helicopters and the best available communications equipment at the small unit level. Their purpose is to avoid fire fights and to get in and out as fast as possible. The underlying conflict is not their concern and they must not get bogged down in it. The host government will not necessarily be friendly, so they must be self-contained in all respects. Such units will not necessarily be a part of the RDJTF. Evacuation missions are not unique to Africa or the Middle East. The kind of unit we envisage could be global in focus and based in CONUS. But it must be constantly in a high state of readiness, have guaranteed airlift, and pre-structured procedures for joint operations with the Air Force and Navy. It would probably be under the operational control of the Crisis Management Committee of the White House, either directly or through the JCS.

The characteristics of the RDJTF are not those of an assault team seeking to hold a bridgehead for routine reinforcements to then exploit. In the mid-term world, the RDJTF must resemble the 19th Century expeditionary force -- mobile, independent, and with achievable, relatively short-term objectives. Its battlefield will be the subtropics or the arid regions of North Africa. The war is likely to rely heavily on the use of geography to organize maneuver and countermove, and the assumption must be made that the indigenous population, rural or urban, is as likely to be in opposition as in support. An RDJTF on extended service in the arid terrain of Africa must be a competent fighting force in face of severe shortages of fuel, water, and normal expandables.

The RDJTF can afford little in the way of support services: equipment must be rugged, soldier-maintainable, fuel-efficient, light and inherently "stealthy"; hardware must be designed for low cost to allow deployment of large numbers; ready commitment to action, abandonment if necessary, and simplified airdrop resupply.

In sum,

- o It must be strategically mobile to a degree approaching that of the airborne division, and capable of being supplemented and sustained by available sealift
- o It must be tactically mobile to a degree approaching that of the Air Assault division
- o It must be able to survive on a battlefield whose lethality may approach that of the European battlefield
- o The organic and supporting administrative and logistics requirement must be geared to realistic levels of sustainability by programmed lift
- o The force and its supporting echelons must be acclimatized to the physical, political and cultural environments of North Africa and the Red Sea. The strategic and tactical intelligence systems must be in place and must contribute to the year-in, year-out training and orientation of the force
- o The force must contain the units and equipment to make precise applications of military force, from interposition to confrontation to full-scale combat operations

- o In a phrase, units assigned to African contingencies must be ready to go "quick and light." But there must be some very careful definition of those two terms.

#### Manpower and Mobilization Considerations

Foreseeable African contingencies will not, in themselves, require special manpower or mobilization planning. The scenarios are too uncertain and the likely force requirement too small to justify that.

The general recommendations in the Manpower and Mobilization papers of this study, however, which address the probability of a wide spectrum of low intensity conflict in the Third World, certainly apply to Africa. Potential conflict in Africa will require trained professional soldiers, with the stamina, adaptability and resourcefulness to function in a harsh alien environment, against unconventional foes unconstrained by the traditional rules of civilized warfare, and in small units isolated from their bases and American-style support infrastructure. It will require an officer corps that is not only professionally competent but also politically sophisticated, and able to function effectively in combination with friendly forces of lower sophistication and with a different value system. It requires a command structure capable of judging, with no time for quiet reflection, the precise mix of manpower, firepower and mobility appropriate to the contingency. Above all it requires an unparochial readiness - indeed an eagerness - to take full advantage of the potential for joint operation with the other services. The Army won't get there without the Air Force and it

may not survive without both Air Force and naval fire support and resupply.

Officer in-service education programs should obviously stress Arabic language and area training. It is, in a sense, a convenience that the Arab world, from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, speaks a common language and has a common religious and philosophical ethos. Although there are important differences in dialect and in the details of moslem theology from place to place, it is perfectly feasible to train RDJTF officers in the language, culture and politics of the Arab world under a single, unified curriculum. If our officers are to work effectively with friendly forces in the region they must be able to communicate with their counterparts in the broadest sense of the word. An understanding of Arabic values, taboos, inhibitions and motivation is as important as fluency in the language itself. In most of the Middle East and North Africa, French is also a common lingua franca among the elite.

#### Forward Basing and Prepositioning Considerations

It would be difficult to justify the political and fiscal cost of a permanent U.S. Army base in Africa to address African contingencies. They may never arise and would in any case not be significantly deterred by the presence of an American force. A force based in Morocco, for example, would still have to be air or sea-lifted to a conflict in Somalia.

Moreover, for our friends in North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) a permanent American Army base would be an

unacceptable political liability. It would deprive them of their neutral posture and further split the Arab world into East and West factions. This could change if such a split occurs for other reasons or if the Soviet or Islamic fundamentalist threat to Arab stability becomes more immediate, but we cannot plan on that assumption.

If the RDJTF takes on the task of defending its African LOC's, it will therefore presumably operate from bases in CONUS unless a European country (e.g., Spain or Turkey) can be found which would permit a locally-based RDF/NATO unit to respond to non-NATO contingencies, or unless a Middle Eastern country (e.g., Oman or Bahrain) permits RDF basing on its territory. Neither alternative is very likely at this time.

Prepositioning in North Africa is constrained by some of the same strictures. We have no formal allies there, and we cannot predict where, or precisely what types of, equipment will be needed. Also, U.S. depots in Africa would make attractive targets for saboteurs. A possible alternative, and one worth considering, would be to provide our military assistance recipients (at our expense) with a redundancy of selected heavy or outsized items with the understanding that these would be maintained as a part of the host government inventory but would be promptly made available to any U.S. units invited in to help cope with an emergency. Such an arrangement would, of course, have to be classified to protect host government sensitivities, but it could save worthwhile airlift. The equipment would also be that much closer to a possible battlefield in Southwest Asia.

Maritime prepositioning would enable the United States to escape some of the local sensitivities associated with the deployment of U.S. forces and supplies on foreign soil. It also adds an element of flexibility not found in permanent, land-based stocks (e.g., POMCUS) since maritime prepositioned stocks will go where the troops are, and not vice-versa. However, there are inherent weaknesses in relying too heavily on prepositioned ships. Concentrations of equipment and supplies at distant ports make them highly vulnerable to preemptive attack before U.S. forces can deploy. Intra-theater transportation almost certainly will be required to move heavy prepositioned stocks from the initial prepositioning site (Diego Garcia is 2800 miles, or about 5 sailing days, from the nearest point in Africa). Over-the-shore equipment, such as the Container Off-Loading and Transfer System, Offshore Bulk Fuel System, POL Tactical Marine Terminal, and other cargo handling and support facilities, must be available in the absence of adequate port complexes. Furthermore, the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) "force", manned by civilian crews, must rely either on a friendly reception ashore -- while offloading -- or on a successful Marine assault. Neither event should be assumed, given current political trends and RDJTF force planning.

Overflight Rights: Although the details of America's overflight agreements with foreign governments are classified, CSIS has no reason to believe that U.S. military aircraft would experience serious diplomatic difficulty in reaching any conflict theater on the African continent. Most of the African states, including Morocco, Kenya and Somalia, are maritime and thus

accessible over international waters. Where this is not the case, it is a reasonable assumption that on-route maritime states would permit overflight for the sole purpose of evacuating threatened U.S. nationals.

The more important issue is whether African countries will permit overflights for military aircraft enroute to a conflict in the Middle East. CSIS understands that the U.S. has a redundancy of air-routes, both over and around Africa, to reach the Persian Gulf, even though rights via NATO Europe cannot be assumed. A logical routing, though certainly not the shortest, would cross Morocco into the Mediterranean and cross Egypt to reach the Red Sea. Flights via Algeria and Libya will presumably not be feasible. Access from Diego Garcia over the Indian Ocean should be trouble-free. In any case, this is a subject to be addressed in the context of Southwest Asia.

Research and Development Implications: While new conventional weapons and the entire range of modern military technology offer significant increases in firepower and lethality in virtually all conflict scenarios, alone they are no substitute for well-trained, fit manpower to operate and maintain them. Furthermore, considering difficulties posed by the self-containment requirements of forces operating in the developing world, especially Africa, any equipment which requires sophisticated maintenance, or demonstrates any especially fragile characteristics should be avoided. In essence, what this means is that highly sophisticated weapons are only as good as the men operating them, and are unsuited for limited war if they are not

totally reliable in such an environment. This notion is further highlighted by the fact that such weapons may not be appropriate to the level of conflict -- smart munitions may be good for taking out key ground targets, but are not necessarily adapted to unconventional warfare. While it appears that this is simply another variation on the technology/tactics trade-off, it actually is much more fundamental: It would be better to field and support a small, lightly-armed force (say with LAVs) that was 90 percent effective than a force twice as large (with M-1s and IFVs) which is only 45 percent effective. The only way to measure these factors or readiness and reliability is to conduct exercises which demand the most of men and equipment, providing them with the support slice they would realistically receive, and see how they fare.

The development of new weapons must be undertaken considering the organizations which will be employing them (especially if they are intended for transfer to friendly Third World nations).

It is clear enough that as long as world conflict scenarios are dominated by geographically scattered, unconventional engagements in countries with primitive communications infrastructures, the Army will need light and simple weapons systems and a generation of air-mobile ground vehicles that can move rapidly over difficult terrain. Our preoccupation with preparation for high intensity warfare in Europe and Korea has left us ill-equipped for Third World conflict. Army R & D lead times are too long to redress this situation before the 1990s. Therefore, we should be looking for adaptable hardware in other

armies and in the private sector. In the meantime, the Army should start now to generate new technology in-house for the 21st century when we are likely to be facing more of the same.

Even if there is a World War III in our future, we can assume that if it is fought below the strategic nuclear level (a distinct possibility), many important engagements are likely to be contested against Soviet Troops and their surrogates in the tropical Third World. If superior Soviet conventional forces dislodge us from Europe, for example, Northern Africa will become the new front line. In that environment, we will need high ground mobility over desert terrain and weapons systems sufficiently flexible to engage both guerrillas and conventional forces. We will need sophisticated equipment for the perimeter security of fixed installations against sabotage and terrorist attack. All such equipment would be equally relevant to isolated Third World conflict unrelated to World War III

Strategic Directions for the Army. Based upon the preceding regional and functional analyses, some conclusions may be drawn regarding the role of the Army in Africa over the next two decades and beyond.

- o Africa is a vast and infinitely complex region. There are no easy, quick or simple solutions to its problems.
- o As a result, American planners and policymakers must carefully balance the U.S. interests and the appropriate level of military involvement necessary to protect them.

- o While there are important U.S. interests in Africa, very often it is Africa's location adjacent or enroute to more critical regions that dictates American actions there. This notwithstanding, African interests and problems should not be viewed insensitively as unimportant or easily disregarded. Well designed U.S. economic and political programs will do more to resolve potential conflict than a strong U.S. military capability in the region.
- o The likelihood of conflict and instability in the region is very high over the next 20 years. The U.S. should carefully consider whether to intervene directly or support more indirect means of countering Soviet attempts to exploit such instability.
- o Clearly, European and African allied interests in the region are more vital. A more rational strategy may be to follow their lead here, while predominating elsewhere (e.g., NATO, Southwest Asia).
- o The American mood, while likely to become more interventionist, is unlikely to support direct intervention in Africa (except in a supporting role for intervention elsewhere).
- o American interests in Africa are unlikely to change over the next two decades; yet, the Army must do more to prepare for events there and, in a sense, catch up with the demands of the Third World generally as the center of future conflicts.

- o Probably Army missions in Africa will emphasize security assistance and limited intervention in low-intensity conventional and unconventional war along the RDJTF's LOC's in the Northern Tier. Stabilizing Africa to insure access and overflight rights in support of force projection in Southwest Asia will predominate as Army concerns in the 1990s.
- o It is extremely unlikely that the Army will be called upon to address contingencies in sub-Saharan Africa, with the possible exception of commando-type rescue missions to evacuate endangered American citizens.
- o Human resources will be most important in the accomplishment of Army missions in Africa. Quality personnel, highly skilled not only in combat activities but also languages, political-military analysis and security assistance management will be required in increasing numbers.
- o Research and development will need to focus on the design of exportable, supportable and absorbable military technology for transfer under the security assistance program and use by expeditionary forces.
- o Force employment will emphasize smaller, self-contained units with limited missions. They must be highly trained to perform well without a strong logistical base, and be capable of sufficient combat power to do the job in a specified time frame.
- o Mobilization requirements will be minimal for the African scenario, except as they require the tapping of

skilled manpower pools for expeditionary and security assistance forces.

- o Mobility requirements will be heavy in any African conflict because of Africa's vastness, its primitive indigenous infrastructure, and the lack of American bases there.
- o Africa may generate a wide spectrum of conflicts. While general conventional war remains unlikely (and unfeasible) in Africa, its possibility should not be totally disregarded in selected subregions.
- o Prepositioning is an unlikely option in North Africa under current conditions. A possible alternative would be to supply a redundancy of selected heavy or outsized items to friendly recipients of military assistance for possible U.S. use in the event of emergency.
- o Army forces need to be redesigned to provide the units and individuals trained and equipped to operate in Africa and like environments and to accomplish appropriate expeditionary and security assistance roles there. Ideally, these roles would be played by active duty forces, while reserve elements take on the burden of conventional defense in Europe and Northeast Asia.
- o Army doctrine needs to be redesigned to deal with the realities of the world environment of the 1990s, in particular the development of a sound doctrine for limited war.

NOTES

1. See "The Mitterrand Era," African Index, Vol. IV, No. 13 (August 20, 1981), pp. 51-52; and Lance Taylor, "The Costly Arms Trade," The New York Times, December 2, 1981.

2. See, for example, the statement delivered at the 1978 Organization of Africa Unity summit by Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, then Nigeria's head of state, as quoted in African Index, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 31, 1978), p. 7.

3. See "Options for U.S. Policy Toward Africa," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. I, No. 1 (1979).

4. Ibid.

5. See Robert A. Kilmarx and Amos A. Jordan, "Strategic Mineral Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma" The Washington Papers V 70: 1979 (Sage Publications, CSIS).

6. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, speech, January 6, 1941.

7. World Bank, World Development Report 1982.

8. See "Where Does The OAU Go From Here?," CSIS Africa Notes, No. 3 (September 1, 1982), pp. 1-12.

9. See Robert I. Rotberg, "Why Namibia Matters," African Index, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 22, 1982), pp. 1-4.

10. For review of the U.S. aid planning process, see Frank C. Balance, "U.S. Aid to Africa -- Bilateral," African Index, Vol. IV, No. 15 (September 30, 1981), pp. 57-60.

11. From an interview with David Ottaway, published in The Washington Post on February 20, 1982.

12. Mr. Babu, who now teaches at Amherst College in the United States, made these observations in a contribution to The Sun (Baltimore, Maryland), January 10, 1982.

13. Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Organization of African Unity," in Africa: From Mystery to Maze, ed. Helen Kitchen (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1976), pp. 195-217.

14. David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa," African Index, Vol. III, No. 19 (November 3, 1980), pp. 71-74.

15. See respectively "Angola: Some Economic Notes," African Index, Vol. V, No. 5 (April 15, 1982), pp. 17-20; and Gerald A. Funk, "Some Observations on Strategic Realities And Ideological Red Herrings On the Horn," CSIS Africa Notes, NO. 1 (July 1, 1982), pp. 2-6.

16. "The Mitterrand Era," African Index, op. cit., p. 52.

17. On the current distribution of Cuban forces on the continent, see the entry for Cuba in the latest edition of The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies).

18. "The Mitterrand Era," African Index, op. cit.

19. Ibid., p. 52.

20. Ibid. Some 14,200 troops and advisors as of mid-1981.

21. Claude E. Welch, Jr., op. cit.

22. e.g., Zaire in 1977 and 1978, Gambia to Senegal in 1981, Sierra Leone to Guinea in 1971, or even, by the OAU's implicit interpretation at its 1981 annual summit in Nairobi, Chad to Libya in 1980.

23. See "Whence Liberia?", African Index, Vol. III, No. 7, (April 20, 1980), pp. 21-24; and "Letter from Ghana," African Index, Vol. III, No. 13 (July 29, 1980), p. 49.

24. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, 1981.

25. See "Semi-Weekly Interafrican News Survey" (in English), Agence France-Presse, May 2, 1980, p. 1.

26. See Kilmarx, op. cit.

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
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