


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
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AFTER ACTION REPORT

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

7 MAY 1980-19 FEBRUARY 1982

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VOLUME I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART I (Introduction) to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

The mass exodus of refugees from Cuba to the United States was a sudden culmination of a pattern of individual escapes dating from the early days of the Castro regime. Citing reasons of strict rationing of essential life support materials, economic sanctions, and no personal or religious freedom, refugees began seeking asylum in other Latin-American embassies in Havana. The world-wide news media attention focusing on the thousands of Cubans seeking asylum was the likely cause for a change in Cuba's highly restrictive emigration policies. Beginning with authorizing small numbers of asylees to leave, the situation rapidly developed into approximately 10,000 potential asylees occupying the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

As an act of humanitarian relief, President Carter authorized up to 3,500 Cubans to enter the United States and promised that additional resettlement arrangements would be sought in other countries. This in turn resulted in the Cuban government announcement that any Cuban wishing to emigrate could do so from Mariel Harbor, 20 miles from Havana.

While the United States government was trying to establish an orderly exodus from Cuba, residents of the US who were friends and relatives of the emigrees, hired, bought, or commandeered a flotilla of boats of all shapes and sizes, beginning an uncoordinated exodus of refugees from Cuba to southern Florida.

The Cuban government, in turn, saw this situation as an opportunity to rid the country of undesirables. At Mariel Harbor, Cuban troops began forcing the boats arriving from Florida to take on these undesirables as a precondition to taking on those refugees desiring to leave Cuba for the United States.

The processing facilities in Florida soon became over-saturated with refugees and could not cope with the large influx yet to come. By Executive Order, additional processing centers were established at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, and at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

This after action report describes the activities of Task Force Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during the period 7 May 1980 to 19 February 1982.

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Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

Task Force Resettlement Operation was a joint venture combining the efforts of the following military and civil agencies: Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Health and Human Services, General Services Administration and United States Marshals. In addition to the Federal governmental agencies, volunteer agencies constituted an important part of the refugee center operations. To present an overall perspective of the refugee operations at Fort Chaffee, it is necessary to review the chronology of key events throughout the existence of Task Force Resettlement Operation.

7 May 1980

Phase I - Preparation and Establishment Phase began

Commander, FORSCOM, and MG Jack N. Merritt, Fort Sill Commander, ordered by Secretary of Defense to establish a refugee center at Fort Chaffee.

BG James E. Drummond named to command Task Force.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activated at Fort Sill.

FEMA tasked with responsibilities for overall coordination of agencies involved in the refugee center. Mr. William C. Tidball appointed as On-The-Scene Coordinator.

8 May 1980

EOC at Fort Chaffee activated.

BG Drummond and Staff arrived from Fort Sill.

Units, supplies, and equipment began arriving at Fort Chaffee.

9 May 1980

The first plane with 122 refugees arrived at Fort Smith airport.

10 May 1980

Refugee population reached 2,386.

Active Army troop strength reached approximately 1150.

The Cuban newspaper "La Vida Nueva" commenced publication.

11 May 1980

MG Merritt, Fort Sill Commander, arrived at Fort Chaffee for update on the operation.

Refugee population rose to 3,988.

Active Army troop strength reached approximately 1,470.

12 May 1980

Undersecretary of the Army, Robert H. Spiro, Jr., visited the center.

The State Department representative, Mr. Buzz Johnson, arrived to coordinate activities of the volunteer agencies (VOLAG).

First two VOLAGs-US Catholic Conference and Southwest Baptist Convention-began operation.

Post Office was established to handle mail for military personnel and ZIP code for Fort Chaffee activated.

Establishment of a "Tent City" to accommodate Reserve Component Units for Annual Training began.

Refugee population reached 5,993.

Active Army troop strength reached approximately 1,580.

13 May 1980

Active Army troop strength reached 1,725.

Refugee population reached 7,387.

The "Chaffeegram" newspaper commenced publication for military and civilian personnel in the Task Force.

14 May 1980

Refugee population reached 8,878.

First Active Army soldiers departed Fort Chaffee.

First Reserve Component (RC) units arrived for Annual Training.

15 May 1980

First three refugees released.

Refugee population rose to 11,414.

16 May 1980

Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark), William V. Alexander (D-Ark) and Allen E. Ertel (D-Penn) visited the center.

18 May 1980

Last scheduled flight of refugees arrived at Fort Chaffee.

Refugee population reached 18,975.

19 May 1980

Phase II - Establishment of a Throughput Phase began

Inprocessing center for refugees closed down.

21 May 1980 Mr. David O. Cook, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Administration and Justice Paul Michel, Associate Deputy Attorney General, visited Fort Chaffee to discuss responsibilities for internal camp security.

Stockade was opened to hold refugees identified as criminals, and refugees who were picked up off post.

23 May 1980 Throughput Phase began

Congressman Alvin J. Baldus (D-Wis) visited the refugee center.

MG Merritt returned to Fort Chaffee for update on the operation.

73 more refugees arrived at Fort Chaffee bringing total number of arrivals to 19,048.

24 May 1980 Approximately 15 members of the KKK demonstrated opposite the Fort Chaffee main gate.

26 May 1980 A demonstration of several hundred Cubans, protesting the delays in being released, resulted in 300 or 400 jumping barriers and running off Fort Chaffee. All were peacefully gathered and returned by State and local police officers assisted by US military personnel.

27 May 1980 The Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, visited the refugee center to evaluate the state of security at Fort Chaffee.

28 May 1980 As a result of the 26 May incident, a reaction force of 160 soldiers from Fort Sill was deployed to Fort Chaffee.

Another demonstration of approximately 1,000 Cubans took place. The issue again was the slowness of their release.

29 May 1980 Unrest among the refugees continued because of delays in outprocessing.

30 May 1980 Demonstration of approximately 300 Cubans blocked the road to the main gate again demanding reasons for delays in outprocessing and their release from the camp.

31 May 1980 The first baby, a boy, was born at the camp.

1 June 1980 A rock throwing incident involving 300 Cubans occurred opposite the INS building. This sparked a day long series of demonstrations and incidents which culminated in a major riot involving about 1,000 Cubans, during the course of which 5 buildings were burned and approximately 50 injuries were sustained. Five Cuban refugees received gunshot wounds when fired upon by Arkansas State Police.

1-2 June 1980 Governor Clinton of Arkansas, Gene Eidenberg, Presidential Aide, and Tom Casey, head of FEMA, arrived to evaluate the situation at Fort Chaffee.

600 soldiers of the 142d FA Bde (Arkansas NG) deployed to Fort Chaffee as perimeter security under Title 10 USC.

2 June 1980 Senators Dale Bumpers (D-Ark) and David Pryor (D-Ark) and Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark) arrived at Fort Chaffee to assess the situation.

3 June 1980 Military population of Task Force rose to 3,375.

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, Mr. Gibbs, visited Fort Chaffee.

142d FA Bde (Ark NG) released from Task Force mission.

4 June 1980 Soldiers sent to Fort Chaffee from Fort Sill to perform security duties organized as TF Collins.

Barrier plan established and the erection of double string concertina around refugee area began.

Families seeking refugee relatives barred from Post.

6 June 1980 First search of Cuban refugee area conducted in 1600 and 1700 block. Large number of homemade weapons seized.

7 June 1980 Barrier fence project completed.

9 June 1980 Scouts from the Cincinnati Reds came to Fort Chaffee to look at Cuban baseball team and scout potential major league talent.

10 June 1980 BG Dinges, Assistant Commandant, Field Artillery School visited Fort Chaffee.

Another search in refugee compound was conducted and a still was seized.

11 June 1980 The Fort Chaffee bilingual radio station KNGB-FM 92.7 began operation.

13 June 1980 BG Drummond briefed the Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce on the refugee operation.

16 June 1980 General Shoemaker, FORSCOM Commander, visited the refugee center.

A Criminal Information Center (CIC) was organized to consolidate all criminal/intelligence information at a single location.

17 June 1980 Phase Down Plan for military personnel approved to begin implementation 21 June.

21 June 1980 Phase Down began with the return to Fort Sill of 410 soldiers from TF Dambrowski.

23 June 1980 Congressman Royball (D-Calif), a member of the House Appropriations Committee, visited the refugee center.

The proposed Task Force TDA was approved by BG Drummond and sent to FORSCOM for approval.

25 June 1980 Department of Health and Human Services began segregating unaccompanied minors from the rest of the camp.

Public Health Service assumed responsibility for refugee health care from the 47th Field Hospital.

26 June 1980 New policy approved allowing refugees with close relatives (first cousin or closer) to be released without final clearances.

27 June 1980 Nick Thorne, head of State Department Task Force for the overall resettlement operation, visited the center.

28 June 1980 Dr. Bob Maddox, White House Special Assistant for Religious Affairs, visited the center.

29 June 1980 God and Country Service conducted at First Baptist Church, Fort Smith. Service attended by BG Drummond, Dr. Maddox, refugees and Fort Smith community.

30 June 1980 35% of the refugees were released as of this date.

Representatives from the Department of the Army Inspector General's office arrived to investigate the events of 1 June.

2 July 1980 Special expeditious outprocessing center established to speed up the processing and releasing of refugees not requiring final clearances.

4 July 1980 Fourth of July was celebrated with a 50-gun salute, games, arts and crafts and picnics.

7 July 1980 MG Edward C. Dinges, the new Fort Sill Commander, visited the center.

Award of the Humanitarian Service Medal approved for military personnel who supported Cuban Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee.

7 July 1980 Richard Malon, member of the Congressional Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, visited the center.

The reduction of the cantonment area began as refugee population dropped to below 10,000.

10 July 1980 First refugee death occurred, a 22 year old woman died of acute tracheal bronchitis.

11 July 1980 A Magistrate Court was opened at Fort Chaffee.

12 July 1980 Reduction and reconsolidation of the cantonment area completed. Over 3,000 refugees were moved from north side of camp and north side was closed down.

Psychiatric clinic opened on post.

14 July 1980 First legal marriages between refugees conducted at the Sebastian County Courthouse.

Military population of Task Force dropped to 1,611.

15 July 1980 The State Department assumed operational control of the resettlement operation from FEMA.

MG Partain, 1st Infantry Division Commander, visited the center.

17 July 1980 William Clark, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, visited the center.

20 July 1980 Holding area was converted to a detention area for trouble-makers and escapees, and a protective custody compound. The area was divided in half to separate protective custody from the others.

21 July 1980 Department of the Army expenditures in support of the resettlement operation at Fort Chaffee went over the \$20,000,000 mark.

25 July 1980 White House Officials requested Governor Clinton's approval to use Fort Chaffee as the consolidation center for all Cuban refugees in the United States.

28 July 1980 Governor Clinton told federal officials that he disapproved of using Fort Chaffee as a consolidation center.

29 July 1980 Dr. Spiro, Under Secretary of the Army, Mr. Werner, Principal Deputy ASA, BG Renick, Acting Director of Military Support, Ambassador Palmieri, US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, and Mr. Thorne, Director of Cuban-Haitian Task Force visited Fort Chaffee to analyze its possible use as a consolidation center.

30 July 1980	Cantonment area reduced. North boundary moved to 14th Street.
1 August 1980	Cantonment area reduced further. North boundary moved to 15th Street.
2 August 1980	Cantonment area reduced further. North boundary moved to 16th Street.
<u>5 August 1980</u>	<u>Phase III - Consolidation Phase began</u> Gene Eidenberg, Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs announced that Fort Chaffee would be used as a consolidation center.
8 August 1980	Camp population dropped below 5,000.
14 August 1980	Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark) visited Fort Chaffee to view security.
17 August 1980	299th Engineer Bn began installing fencing around the enclave.
20 August 1980	General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, visited Fort Chaffee.
25 August 1980	299th Engineer Bn completed perimeter fencing.
29 August 1980	Last National Guard unit to support refugee operation departed Fort Chaffee.
31 August 1980	All US Army personnel relieved of security duties inside the enclave.
1 September 1980	US Army personnel relieved of security duties on the enclave gates.
3 September 1980	LTG Marion C. Ross, DCD FORSCOM, visited Fort Chaffee.
4 September 1980	Mr. Sergio Pereira, Presidential Aide for Cuban Affairs, visited Fort Chaffee.
5 September 1980	Last Army Reserve unit to support refugee operation departed Fort Chaffee.
10 September 1980	General Robert M. Shoemaker, Commander FORSCOM, visited Fort Chaffee.
12 September 1980	Fencing project completed.
14 September 1980	Sweep operation conducted inside enclave to identify and locate unaccompanied minors, medical problems, and selected individuals to be transferred to Level II area.

16 September 1980 Building was set on fire in Level II area. No injuries or damage to the building were sustained.

21 September 1980 Another building set on fire in Level II area. No injuries were sustained, but there was extensive interior damage to the building.

22 September 1980 Camp population dropped below 3,000.
Sara Lister, General Counsel, DA, and BG Hugh R. Overholt, Assistant JAG for Military Law, visited Fort Chaffee.

24 September 1980 Governor Clinton approved security plan.

25 September 1980 First plane of the consolidation arrived with 114 refugees from Eglin AFB.

26 September 1980 Last of 617 refugees from Eglin AFB arrived at Ft Chaffee.
Transfer of refugees from Ft McCoy began.

27 September 1980 Winterization of buildings began.

3 October 1980 Last of 3174 refugees from Ft McCoy arrived at Ft Chaffee.
Camp population rose to 6,576.

6 October 1980 Transfer of refugees from Ft Indiantown Gap began.

9 October 1980 Phase IV - Sustainment Phase began
Last of 1980 refugees from Ft Indiantown Gap arrived at Ft Chaffee completing the planned consolidation.
Camp population rose to 8,349.

23 October 1980 BG Drummond departed Ft Chaffee. Command of Task Force assumed by COL Don E. Karr.

26 October 1980 Red Cross began issue of winter clothing to refugees.

27 October 1980 Refugee escaped from maximum security area of the psychiatric ward and was subsequently shot by an MP, after assaulting the MP with a rake. Refugee transferred to hospital. CID investigation initiated.

28 October 1980 Fire within the refugee enclave resulted in extensive damage to interior of Bldg 1565. Arson was suspected.

29 October 1980 Public Affairs Office closed down, all public information regarding refugees was now handled by the State Department.

1 November 1980 Responsibility for Task Force Ft Chaffee passed from USAFACFS to FORSCOM.

14 November 1980 TF III returned to Ft Sill. Security operations assumed by 3/11th Infantry.
Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce toured Ft Chaffee.

20 November 1980 Bldg 1474 (General Population Area) received extensive damage from fire of unknown causes. Four refugees and two US Park Policement received minor injuries.

30 November 1980 Impromptu celebration held by refugees.

3 December 1980 COL Gibbons, III Corps PM; COL Kraak, FORSCOM PM; and COL Poole, TRADOC PM visit Ft Chaffee and discuss rotation of MP units.

7 December 1980 3/11th Inf replaced by A Co, 2/58th Inf. US Army security requirements reduced to two MP companies and one rifle company at Ft Chaffee and two rifle companies on-call at home station.

21 December 1980 Federal Protective Service (FPS) replaces US Park Service as lead law enforcement agency within refugee enclave.

1 January 1981 Control of resettlement operation passed from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to Health and Human Services (HHS).

19 January 1981 BG Farris, ADC Support, 4th Inf Div, and COL Thompson, LEC Cdr, Ft Carson, visited Ft Chaffee.

29 January 1981 EOC moved to MP desk.

1 February 1981 Task Force Ft Chaffee became solely a security force functioning under the PMO.
Cuban/Haitian Task Force became a normal tenant unit with support being provided by Ft Chaffee directly.

4 February 1981 COL Weinstein, LEC Cdr, Ft Lewis, and COL Kraack, FORSCOM PM, visited Ft Chaffee.

13 February 1981 Frank White, Governor of Arkansas, visited Ft Chaffee.

17, 18 February 1981 Remainder of GARDEN PLOT battalion (Ft Polk) called up to Ft Chaffee to test on-call security program.

6 March 1981 Governor Frank White of Arkansas, US Representative John Hammerschmidt, Deputy Attorney General Paul Michael, and BG James Moore, Jr., visited Ft Chaffee.

7 March 1981 COL Karr departed Ft Chaffee. LTC Charles Donovan, Jr., assumed command of Task Force.

13 March 1981 Peaceful demonstration by 30 to 50 refugees outside the US Catholic Conference building to show their impatience with the pace of sponsorships.

17 March 1981 With the departure of 3/10th Inf, US Army security forces reduced to two MP companies at Ft Chaffee, and an infantry battalion on-call at home station.

18 April 1981 Refugee disturbance occurred, sparked by the shooting of a refugee. Several crowds, of approximately 350 refugees each, threw rocks at civilians, military personnel and law enforcement officials and burned or destroyed 10 vehicles.

19 April 1981 Demonstration of approximately 150 refugees occurred, led by an individual who demanded release of his brother from Level II detention. This was followed by a confrontation between the first crowd and a vigilante group. Total casualties for 18 & 19 April were 109 injuries (84 US, 25 refugee) three of which were seriously injured.

30 April 1981 LTC Alfred Kinkead assumes command of Task Force.

4 May 1981 Camp boundary moved to 23d Street.

6 May 1981 Camp refugee population drops below 2,000.

13 June 1981 FPS and MP security teams conducted a joint weapons search of the general population area (Area II).

16 July 1981 Congressman Royden Dyson (D, MD) visited Ft Chaffee.

17 September 1981 COL Hattersley, Ft Ord, visited Ft Chaffee.

22 September 1981 MG Lawrence, CG, 1st Cav Div, visited Ft Chaffee.

19 October 1981 Bldg 502 (stockade) damaged by fire of unknown causes. Arson suspected.

20 October 1981 Disturbance by refugees in stockade area, damaging Bldg 502.

4, 5 November 1981 COL Kraak, FORSCOM PM, visited Ft Chaffee.

12 January 1982 COL Kraak, FORSCOM IM, visited Ft Chaffee.

19 January 1982 COL Hayward, Cdr, Ft Meade, visited Ft Chaffee.

21 January 1982 Phase V - Termination and Restoration Phase began

Custody of refugees passed from Health and Human Services to the Department of Justice.

26 January 1982 Refugee population drops to under 100 (29).

30 January 1982 Main body of 293d MP Co departs for Ft Meade. Twenty-man cell remains at Ft Chaffee to perform Provost Marshal mission.

4 February 1982 Last 23 refugees depart Ft Chaffee, raising the accumulative total to a final figure of 25,390.

11 February 1982 Twenty-man MP cell from Ft Sill arrives.


12 February 1982 Ft Sill MP cell assumes Provost Marshal mission at Ft Chaffee. Remainder of 293d MP Co departs.

19 February 1982 Task Force Ft Chaffee terminated and disestablished.

PART IV (DOD PARTICIPATION) to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a summary of DOD personnel involved in the Task Force Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee.
 2. Fort Chaffee is normally manned by the US Army Garrison (Semi-active) consisting of 14 permanent party military and 127 civilians, and a USACC office of 13 civilians. The primary mission of the Garrison was to maintain the post and to run Annual Training for the Reserve Components and National Guard. On 7 May 1980, when the order was received to establish a Refugee Resettlement Center, the mission of Fort Chaffee became two-fold; to establish the refugee center, and conduct annual training.
 3. To accomplish this mission, Fort Sill was tasked with the responsibility of establishing the Task Force to operate the refugee center. When this happened, BG Drummond was appointed as Task Force/Fort Chaffee Commander, and a staff was formed from Garrison and Fort Sill Staff Sections and, as a result, the US Army Garrison, and, hence Annual Training became absorbed into the Task Force.
 4. The Task Force as it was organized consisted of personnel from four sources.
 - a. Fort Sill personnel/units.
 - b. Fort Chaffee Garrison (Semi-active).
 - c. FORSCOM units from installations other than Fort Sill.
 - d. AT personnel/units who were utilized for the refugee operation.
- Additionally, several West Point cadets participating in Army Orientation Training at Ft Sill deployed to Ft Chaffee with their sponsor units in support of the operation.
5. The Task Force Commander established two policies to implement the smooth operation of the Task Force and the reduction of personnel required to operate the refugee operation.
 - a. First, the personnel normally assigned to the USAG would be released to AT support duties and be eliminated from involvement in the refugee operation as much as possible and as soon as possible.
 - b. Second, military and DAC's would be replaced by personnel from the civilian agencies as rapidly as possible.
 6. Effective 13 June 1980, the Task Force organization was altered to separate the Task Force and Fort Chaffee. A provisional headquarters company was established and the installation was made a separate command. Task Force personnel were attached to Fort Chaffee for administration and exercise of jurisdiction under the UCMJ.
 7. The attached annexes show the detailed breakout of units involved in the operation.
 - Annex A - Functional Organization of Task Force (7 May 80 - 1 Jan 81)
 - Annex B - RA Component Units
 - Annex C - Reserve Component Units

ANNEX A - (FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE) to PART IV (DOD Participation) VOLUME I to
 After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation



*Effective 7 May 1980 to 1 January 1981 when control of the resettlement operation passed from FEMA to Health and Human Services (HHS).

ANNEX B to PART IV to VOLUME I to After Action Report
 Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

The following RA Component units participated in the refugee operation at Ft Chaffee:

<u>Units</u>	<u>Dates</u>
46th Eng Bn (Ft Rucker)	8 - 14 May 1980
546th MP Co (Ft Sill)	8 - 15 May 1980
	14 Jun - 23 July 1980;
30th FIN Det (Ft Sill)	8 - 19 May 1980
545th AG Co (Ft Campbell)	8 - 21 May 1980
13th PA Det (Ft Hood)	8 - 24 May 1980
471st Trans Co (Ft Sill)	8 - 25 May 1980;
	3 - 11 June 1980
676th MED Det (Ft Benning)	8 May - 22 Jun 1980
675th MED Det (Ft Benning)	8 May - 24 June 1980
1/507th MED Det (Ft Sam Houston)	8 May - 31 June 1980
258th MP Co (Ft Polk)	8 May - 1 July; 8 September -
	16 November 1980;
	13 May - 6 July 1981
47th Fld Hosp (Ft Sill)	8 May - 3 July 1980;
	20 August - 27 August 1980
716th MP Bn (Ft Riley)	8 May - 9 August 1980
977th MP Co (Ft Riley)	8 May - 9 August 1980
1st PSYOPS Bn (Ft Bragg)	8 May - 21 August 1980
96th CA Bn (Ft Bragg)	8 May - 22 August 1980
299th Eng Bn (Ft Sill)	8 May - 12 September 1980
11th Sig Bde (Ft Huachuca)	8 May - 1 December 1980
225th Med Det (Ft Sill)	8 May - 31 June; 15 July - 10
	August; 19 August - 13 November 80
3/9th FA (Ft Sill)	8 - 29 May; 2 - 14 Jul;
	27 August - 15 October 1980
2/18th FA (Ft Sill)	8 - 21 May; 2 June - 17 July;
	3 August - 9 November 1980
439th MED Det (Ft Leonard Wood)	13 - 23 May 1980
2/36th FA (Ft Sill)	29 May - 21 June; 15 August -
	13 September 1980
1/12th FA (Ft Sill)	2 June - 15 July; 29 July -
	13 Aug; 8 Oct - 13 Nov 1980
2/12th FA (Ft Sill)	2-23 Jun; 9 Jul - 3 Aug;
	23 Aug - 11 Oct; 31 Oct - 13 Nov 80
1/17th FA (Ft Sill)	2 Jun - 6 Jul; 8 Sep - 25 Oct 80
2/18th FA (Ft Sill)	2 Jun - 17 Jul; 3 Aug - 9 Nov 80
3/18th FA (Ft Sill)	2 - 17 Jun; 2 - 19 Jul;
	3 Aug - 13 Nov 80
2/34th FA (Ft Sill)	2 - 4 Jun; 5 - 27 Jul 80
2/1st FA (Ft Sill)	3-13 Jun 80
4/31st Inf (Ft Sill)	3 - 10 Jun 80
6/33d FA (Ft Sill)	3 Jun - 30 Jul; 12 - 27 Aug;
	24 Oct - 13 Nov 80
4/4th FA (Ft Sill)	3 - 9 Jun; 26 Jul - 16 Aug;
	8 Oct - 13 Nov 80
2/37th FA (Ft Sill)	3 Jun - 4 Jul; 19 Jul - 23 Aug;
	13 Sep - 13 Nov 80

<u>Units</u>	<u>Dates</u>
214th FA Bde (Ft Sill)	3 - 9 Jun; 11 - 15 Jul; 26 Oct - 13 Nov 80
III Corps Arty (Ft Sill)	3 - 9 Jun 80
212th FA Bde (Ft Sill)	5 - 9 Jun; 21 Jun - 12 Jul; 25 Oct - 13 Nov 80
44th Med Det (Ft Bragg)	14 - 30 Jun 80
DENTAC (Ft Sill)	15 Jul - 14 Aug; 18 Aug - 13 Nov 80
4th CBT Hos (Ft McClellan)	8 Sep 80 - 4 Feb 82
C - 25th FA (Ft Sill)	8 Oct - 12 Nov 80
225th Maint (Ft Sill)	17 Jul - 13 Nov 80
720th MP Bn (Ft Hood)	30 Oct - 29 Dec 80
545th MP Co (Ft Hood)	1 Nov - 29 Dec 80
3/11th Inf (Ft Polk)	5 Nov - 7 Dec 80
410th MP Co (Ft Hood)	13 Nov 80 - 9 Jan 81
411th MP Co (Ft Hood)	13 Nov 80 - 9 Jan 81
2/58th Inf (Ft Hood)	7 Dec 80 - 7 Jan 81
19th MP Bn (Ft Carson)	28 Dec 80 - 25 Feb 81
4th MP Co (Ft Carson)	28 Dec 80 - 25 Feb 81
1/12th Inf (Ft Riley)	5 Jan - 5 Feb 81
9th MP Co (Ft Lewis)	7 Jan - 9 Mar 81
170th MP Co (Presidio)	7 Jan - 9 Mar 81
Co, USAG (Ft Lewis)	7 Jan - 9 Mar 81
3/10th Inf (Ft Polk)	5 Feb - 17 Mar 81
977th MP Co (Ft Riley)	24 Feb - 23 Apr 81
502d MP Co (Ft Hood)	6 Mar - 7 May 81
759th MP Bn (Ft Dix)	15 Apr - 18 Jun 81
511th MP Co (Ft Dix)	21 Apr - 18 Jun 81
437th MP Co (Ft Belvoir)	22 Apr - 18 Jun 81
978th MP Co (Ft Bliss)	5 May - 6 Jul 81
503d MP Bn (Ft Bragg)	10 Jun - 21 Aug 81
65th MP Co (Ft Bragg)	10 Jun - 21 Aug 81
108th MP Co (Ft Bragg)	30 Jun - 1 Sep 81
504th MP Bn (Presidio)	16 Aug - 19 Oct 81
571st MP Co (Ft Ord)	19 Aug - 19 Oct 81
463d MP Co (Ft Leonard Wood)	27 Aug - 30 Oct 81
545th MP Co (Ft Hood)	27 Aug - 30 Oct 81
89th MP Bde (Ft Hood)	13 Oct - 18 Dec 81
555th MP Co (Ft Lee)	26 Oct - 30 Dec 81
988th MP Co (Ft Benning)	26 Oct - 30 Dec 81
293d MP Co (Ft Meade)	18 Dec 81 - 30 Jan 82

ANNEX C to PART IV to VOLUME I to After Action Report
 Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

The following Reserve Component units participated in the refugee operation at Fort Chaffee:

<u>Units</u>	<u>Dates</u>
222d Hosp Sec PH (USAR)(IN)	10 - 24 May 80
496th Hosp Sec PH (USAR)(IN)	10 - 24 May 80
369th Sta Hosp (USAR)(PR)	14 - 23 May 80
225th MP Co (ARNG)(PR)	14 - 31 May 80
188th TFG (USAFNG)(AR)	15 - 19 May 80
314th MP Plt (USAR)(TX)	24 May - 4 Jun 80
315th MP Plt (TUAR)(TX)	28 May - 6 Jun 80
607th MP Bn (USAR) (TX)	28 May - 6 Jun 80
316th MP Plt (USAR)(TX)	31 May - 14 Jun 80
240th MP Co (ARNG)(PR)	31 May - 15 Jun 80
362d PSYOPS Co (USAR)(OK)	1 - 13 Jun 80
486th CA Co (USAR)(OK)	1-12 Jun 80
205th MP Cn (ARNG) (MO)	2 - 16 Jun 80
142d FA Bde (ARNG)(AR)	2 - 3 Jun 80
1139th MP Co (ARNG)(MO)	2 - 14 Jun 80
489th ENG Bn (USAR)(AR)	4 - 7 Jun 80
162d MP Co (ARNG)(MS)	6 - 29 Jun 80
1141st MP Co (ARNG)(MO)	7 - 21 Jun 80
102d MP Co (ARNG)(MO)	7-21 Jun 80
544th MP Co (ARNG)(PR)	15 - 29 Jun 80
547th MP Plt (ARNG)(MI)	21 Jun - 6 Jul 80
568th MP Plt (ARNG)(MI)	21 Jun - 6 Jul 80
5064th US Army Garrison (USAR)(MI)	22 - 29 Jun; 17 - 28 Jul 80
124th MP Bn (ARNG)(PR)	28 Jun - 12 Jul 80
755th MP Co (ARNG) (PR)	28 Jun - 12 Jul 80
269th MP Co (USAR)(TN)	4 Jul - 19 Jul 80
357th MP Co (USAR)(MI)	6 - 19 Jul 80
1140th MP Co (ARNG)(MO)	11 - 27 Jul 80
531st MP Co (USAR)(MI)	11 - 27 Jul 80
805th MP Co (USAR)(AR)	11 - 27 Jul 80
339th MP Co (USAR)(LA)	19 Jul - 3 Aug 80
2175th MP Co (ARNG)(MO)	26 Jul - 9 Aug 80
144th MP Co (ARNG)(MI)	2 - 16 Aug 80
146th MP Bn (ARNG)(MI)	2 - 16 Aug 80
198th MP Bn (ARNG)(KY)	8 - 23 Aug 80
223d MP Co (ARNG)(KY)	8 - 23 Aug 80
386th MP Co (USAR)(AL)	8 - 23 Aug 80
310th MP Co (ARNG)(AL)	16 - 30 Aug 80
423d MP Co (ARNG)(AL)	16 - 30 Aug 80
351st MP Co (USAR)(FL)	23 Aug - 6 Sep 80
363d SPT Gp (USAR)(TX)	9 May - 4 Jul 81
467th S & S Bn (USAR) (TX)	9 May - 4 Jul 81
300th MP PW Cmd (USAR)(MI)	31 May - 13 Jun 81
145th Army Band (ARNG)(OK)	24 Jun 81
372d Med Det (USAR)(TX)	24 Jul - 9 Aug 81

PART V (STATISTICAL SUMMARY) to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

Statistical Summary

Annex A - Refugee Demography Statistical Summary

Annex B - DOD and Civilian Personnel Strengths

Annex C - Medical

Annex D - C&E Statistical Summary

ANNEX A to PART V (STATISTICAL SUMMARY - REFUGEE DEMOGRAPHY) to VOLUME I to After Action Report
 Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

MONTH	CUMULATIVE ARRIVED (1)	DEPARTED	DAILY AVG IN CONFINEMENT	P. WARD	DAILY AVG IN HOSPITAL(2)	DEATHS	BIRTHS
May 80	19246**	439	*	*	*		
Jun 80		7126	*		37		
Jul 80		6284	64		54	2	
Aug 80		1789	45		72		
Sep 80	2379	863	29	105	19		4
Oct 80	3514(58)	1145	38	107	35	1	3
Nov 80	97(94)	994	37	123	53	2	1
Dec 80	44(43)	759	57	130	51	1	1
Jan 81	23(22)	792	39	139	46	1	1
Feb 81	10(8)	882	43	106	52	2	2
Mar 81	6(6)	938	51	95	54	1	
Apr 81	28(23)	993	62	85	38		5
May 81	11(8)	711	40	91	31		3
Jun 81	15(13)	642	37	95	19		2
Jul 81	5(3)	294	27	99	14		2
Aug 81	2(2)	29	20	100	13	1	
Sep 81	3(3)	109	16	111	10		
Oct 81	2(2)	97	14	104	10		
Nov 81	3(3)	61	4	105	7	1	1
Dec 81	2(1)	48		103	8		
Jan 82		371		86	10		
Feb 82		24					
	25390	25390			12	12	24

(1) Figures in () are returnees, counted in total arrivals.

(2) P. Ward and Hosp figures were combined until Sep 80.

* Figures not available.

** Figures adjusted in Jan 82.

ANNEX B to PART V (DOD AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTH) to VOLUME I to After Action Report, Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MONTHLY AVERAGE</u>	
	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN (1)</u>
May 80	1255	569
Jun 80	2440	546
Jul 80	1465	480
Aug 80	1275	398
Sep 80	1025	344
Oct 80	1027	392
Nov 80	1074	386
Dec 80	594	355
Jan 81	523	338
Feb 81	578	328
Mar 81	456	1961
Apr 81	351	1692
May 81	362	1489
Jun 81	393	1244
Jul 81	375	1079
Aug 81	345	991
Sep 81	266	876
Oct 81	255	748
Nov 81	205	705
Dec 81	200	653
Jan 82	162	575
Feb 82	24	140

(1) Reporting change in Mar 81 to reflect total civilian employees, whereas before only temporary hire and DAC were reported.

ANNEX C (MEDICAL) to PART V to VOLUME I to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaiffee

47th FIELD HOSPITAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY
8 May 1980 - 28 June 1980

HOSPITAL ACTIVITY:

	<u>INPATIENT</u>	<u>OUTPATIENT</u>
1. Active Duty Army	8	374
2. Refugees	204	22,728
3. X-Ray Procedures	343	18,752 (Incls 18,021 Scr X-rays)
4. Pharmacy	2,042	48,027
5. Laboratory	4,640	17,962 (Screening Lab procedures)
6. Orthopedic casts	12	
7. Inhalation therapy	238	
8. Electrocardiogram	6	95
9. Live births	3	
10. Deaths		

DENTAL ACTIVITY:

Dental Procedures.
(a) Military - 1195
(b) Refugee - 7321

PATIENT EVACUATION:

1. Air Evacuation Means - UH1 helicopter.
2. Air Evacuation Patients - 11
3. Ground Evacuation Means - Six M886 truck 1½-ton ambulances
4. Ground Evacuation Patients - 3,431
5. US Air Force Evacuation - not used

MEDICAL LOGISTICS:

1. Medical supply requisitions made - 2154
2. Medical supply requisitions completed - 2021
3. Medical maintenance work orders completed - 315
4. Whole blood units distributed - 40

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE:

Inspections for health and sanitation - 3276

VETERINARY ACTIVITY:

Inspection of food products - 29,984,144 pounds

POPULATION SERVED:

1. Cuban Refugees	18,975	4. National Guard	252
2. Active duty Army	2,585	5. Public Health Svc	38
3. Army Reserve	3,645		
		TOTAL	23,495

ANNEX D (C&E STATISTICAL SUMMARY) to PART V to VOLUME I to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. The following communications lines were installed in support of task force operations:

- 47 Watts lines
- 16 Additional city trunks (14 already in)
- 26 FTS lines
 - 6 Additional Autovon lines (22 total)
- 26 Key systems
- 32 Commercial telephone lines
 - 2 Data circuits for Ft Chaffee-Ft Sill
 - 3 Additional point-to-point circuits for Ft Chaffee switchboard - Ft Sill switchboard (4 total)
 - 1 Point-to-point circuit for Ft Chaffee EOC - Ft Sill EOC
 - 1 Point-to-point circuit for Ft Chaffee EOC - Ft McPherson EOC
 - 1 Point-to-point circuit for Ft Chaffee EOC - Ft Smith airport
 - 1 Point-to-point circuit for Ft Chaffee MEDEVAC - St. Edwards Hospital
 - 4 Units (T-carrier) 48 channels per unit or total of 192 channels
 - 1 DESTE (Mobile communications center)

2. Approximately 84 commercial pay phones, including coinless, were installed by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company.

PART VI (SPECIAL AREA OF CONCERN) to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. Throughout the Preparation and Establishment Phase and into the Throughput and Consolidation Phases, a critical issue was determining the legal restrictions of Army authority over the Cuban refugees, i.e., the proper application of the Posse Comitatus Act.
2. On 8 and 9 May, messages were received providing initial guidance on law enforcement responsibilities (Vol II, Part III, Annex A, B). These basically stated that the commanders of military installations are responsible for the security of the installation and may take such actions as are reasonably necessary to protect government property and personnel or maintain order therein. Additionally, that there is no authority vested in the armed forces to restrain or confine "Cuban aliens" for law enforcement purposes. Because of the generalities of those messages and on-going operations, BG Drummond directed the Task Force SJA to prepare a detailed memorandum of understanding on law enforcement and security responsibilities (Vol II, Part III, Annex C). After tentative approval by the on-site representatives of FEMA, INS, and the US Marshals, BG Drummond requested that the proposed memorandum be reviewed. It was ultimately forwarded to the Director of Military Support (DOMS) at DA, where after discussion DOMS directed that the memorandum not be executed but did not require any change in the on-going operation.

Thus, effective 12 May 1980, the status of security and law enforcement for the area at which the refugees were housed was as follows: the military would not perform police nor law enforcement activities within the perimeter, but would provide perimeter security and quell any emergency disorder, turning offenders over to the US Marshals Service (USMS). At the direction of BG Drummond, no force was to be used by military personnel if a refugee attempted to leave the area. In such cases, the civilian law enforcement agencies were to be called in. This was a conscious decision pursuant to verbal amplifying instructions from DOMS on the "reasonable measures" authority to contain the refugees within designated areas.

3. This guidance did not change until after the 1 June 1980 disturbance. On 2 and 3 June, messages were received from Department of the Army which modified the guidance regarding military jurisdictional control at facilities containing "Cuban aliens" (Vol III, Part IV, Annex E, F). These stated that the primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement and related activities concerning the Cuban detainee rested with civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers were not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander would exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon. Additionally, the military was tasked to take reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized passage outside the security perimeter, using the minimum force necessary to deter detainees. The messages also provided detailed instructions on the duties to be performed by military personnel.

This guidance was further amplified by a memorandum of understanding, dated 4 June 1980, between the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Justice (Vol III, Part IV, Annex D).

4. The final step in the delineation of responsibilities for law enforcement and security was taken on 24 September 1980, when the Governor of Arkansas approved the Joint Security Plan (Volume IV, Part II, Annex B).

PART VII (Problems, Lesson Learned and Recommendations) to VOLUME I to After Action Report, Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

- ANNEX A - Operations/Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
- ANNEX B - Departure/Arrival Airfield Control Group (DAACG) Operations
- ANNEX C - Personnel
- ANNEX D - Logistics
- ANNEX E - Facilities Engineering
- ANNEX F - Resource Management
- ANNEX G - Provost Marshal
- ANNEX H - Public Affairs
- ANNEX I - Legal
- ANNEX J - Psychological Operations
- ANNEX K - Task Force III
- ANNEX L - Field Hospital
- ANNEX M - Civil Affairs
- ANNEX N - Task Force Commander, 30 Apr-21 Mar 82

ANNEX A (Operations/EOC) To PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: On-location communications were inadequate to handle the demands when EOC was established.

LESSONS LEARNED: The ability to communicate was severely hampered until adequate communications could be installed.

RECOMMENDATION: A package system should be staged on location in a dormant mode, so that adequate communications can be activated in a minimum time period.

2. PROBLEM: The advance party arrived piecemeal resulting in confusion in the establishment of the EOC. It took a great deal of time to organize the EOC and to determine which individual would be responsible for which area.

LESSONS LEARNED: Command structure and organization must be made clear to avoid confusion and duplication of effort, and each staff representative must be an action officer with some authority.

RECOMMENDATION: Personnel should be identified early and their function defined so that in future operations there would be an organizational base which would greatly reduce confusion.

3. PROBLEM: The phone numbers of the EOC were released to the public resulting in large volumes of phone traffic coming into the EOC totally unrelated to the EOC mission.

LESSONS LEARNED: EOC personnel spent a great amount of time fielding phone traffic and long distance lines were constantly tied up with phone calls from reporters, relatives of refugees, and people volunteering help. The phone numbers of EOC should not be released for general dissemination.

RECOMMENDATION: That the EOC phone numbers be released on a "need-to-know" basis only so that phones can remain open for the conduct of operational business only.

ANNEX B - (DAACG) to PART VII to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: The system for messing airfield control group personnel was accomplished by the shuttling of meals between the Fort Smith airport and the mess facility at Fort Chaffee, a round trip distance in excess of ten miles. Meals were missed due to vehicle availability and the reluctance of the mess facility to prepare meals "to go."

LESSONS LEARNED: It would be best to have the Headquarters Commandant provide meal coupons for use in civilian eating establishments.

RECOMMENDATION: That airfield control group be issued meal coupons. These coupons could be drawn, maintained and issued by the officer on duty at the airfield.

2. PROBLEM: There was a problem receiving accurate flight scheduling information from Miami. Miami operations consistently provided inaccurate and misleading flight information.

LESSONS LEARNED: Flights arrived unannounced and scheduled flights were late or cancelled without DAACG being notified, causing long delays in unloading of aircraft. The FAA operates a Flight Service Station at Little Rock. The FSS provides flight following information for both civil and military aircraft. DCAAG should establish direct communications with the FSS, which can provide accurate flight information using the FAA computer network.

RECOMMENDATION: In future operations the assets of the FAA should be used in order to receive accurate and 24-hour a day information.

3. PROBLEM: DC-10 aircraft exceeded the runway weight limit at Fort Smith Airport, and also the DC-10 is designed for use with the "Jetway" mobil passenger walkway system.

LESSON LEARNED: The bearing capacity of the runways at Fort Smith was exceeded by the gross weight of the DC-10 which could result in extensive damage to runways. In addition, a special ramp had to be air freighted to Fort Smith to be able to off-load DC-10 aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: DC-10 aircraft should not be used to transport refugees in or out of Fort Smith.

4. PROBLEM: The 188th Tactical Fighter Group, Arkansas Air National Guard, stationed at Fort Smith Airport was employed in the support of the offloading of aircraft. Both their equipment and personnel were used when they had not been tasked by the National Guard Bureau to perform the refugee support mission.

LESSON LEARNED: The 188th facilities are the best to use for refugee offloading, but without tasking. The 188th doesn't have the funds or manhours available to support such a mission without using up that which is allocated for their annual training.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 188th Tactical Fighter Group be tasked by the National Guard Bureau through FORSCOM for support before the start of the operation.

ANNEX C (Personnel) To PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: Taskings were placed through several channels with no one agency as a central coordinating point.

LESSON LEARNED: A central point of contact must exist for all taskings to prevent overlap, double taskings, or any taskings being omitted.

RECOMMENDATION: Have all details, detail personnel and translators coordinated and tasked through the DPCA EOC.

2. PROBLEM: There were several units that had personnel available for details.

LESSON LEARNED: Details distributed to the detail personnel were not passed out fairly to different units.

RECOMMENDATION: Form the detail personnel under one staff (i.e., HHC) so that EOC has one POC and duty rosters can be formed.

3. PROBLEM: The translators received many taskings and requirements that were not fairly distributed or organized.

LESSON LEARNED: Translator commitments were passed to several different personnel instead of one POC.

RECOMMENDATION: Form a translator battery with a two to three-man staff so that duty rosters can be formed and so the EOC has one POC for coordination and tasking.

4. PROBLEM: With the large volume of taskings for translators, many were used in positions of a small priority.

LESSON LEARNED: Some means of recording data for all first-time key personnel should be maintained.

RECOMMENDATION: Have a sign-in roster at the entrance area of the EOC to enable DPCA to obtain essential unit data. The following information should be included:

Unit ID, home station, duty location, duty phone (if available), POC such as commander or executive officer, billeting area and room, phone of billeting area, and number of personnel with organization at present location.

6. PROBLEM: An up-to-date telephone roster of units and facilities was difficult to maintain.

LESSON LEARNED: Phone numbers change as buildings are activated and new phones become connected.

RECOMMENDATION: Keep a telephone roster of all POC as units and personnel call in.

7. PROBLEM. Continuity of tasking and job requirements throughout the operation.

LESSON LEARNED: A flow of information must be maintained between shifts as well as between replacements.

RECOMMENDATION: Keep an accurate staff journal log.

8. PROBLEM. One DPCA representative became extremely busy with the continuous request for personnel requests as well as the daily personnel status reports.

LESSON LEARNED: There is an essential need for at least two personnel (one an NCO) to adequately allocate the daily tasks.

RECOMMENDATION: Each shift be manned by at least two personnel.

9. PROBLEM: Requirements for the AG Inprocessing as well as requests from the AG personnel for assistance were overlapped or neglected.

LESSON LEARNED: It is essential that close coordination be maintained between the AG Inprocessing personnel and the DPCA EOC.

RECOMMENDATION: All requirements and requests to and from AG Inprocessing be coordinated through the EOC. The EOC be the POC for the AG.

10. PROBLEM: Personnel reported in to Fort Chaffee from various units without a method of accounting for them.

LESSON LEARNED: Personnel accountability is critical and must be maintained.

RECOMMENDATION: Have all personnel report to a specified location upon arrival, i.e., HQ CMDT or other established location and have responsible personnel there to insure personnel are properly accounted for.

11. PROBLEM: Initially there was no element in the EOC to handle aviation matters and arrival and departure information.

LESSON LEARNED: Personnel were arriving and departing without being properly accounted for.

RECOMMENDATION: Must maintain control of arrivals and departures and have airfield information available to the EOC. Recommend that a Departure and Arrival Airfield Control Group (DAACG) be implemented from the very beginning of operation to handle this.

12. PROBLEM: Transfer of personnel from supporting installation and supported installation was not adequately controlled.

LESSON LEARNED: Without knowing/controlling personnel going back and forth between installations, there is no way to maintain accurate accountability.

RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel being transferred between installations be coordinated through DPCA representative in the EOC. This should include not only original taskings but also one-for-one replacements at a later date.

13. PROBLEM: Must have a POC for each agency/unit involved and those personnel must be responsible for properly accounting for their personnel and reporting accurately to the EOC.

RECOMMENDATION: That a POC be appointed for each unit/activity to be responsible for personnel accountability prior to departure from the losing installation. Have this individual notify the EOC upon arrival so that POC can be established and individual be briefed on importance of personnel accountability.

ANNEX D (Logistics) to PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: The urgency of requirements and failure to process all requirements through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) made it extremely difficult to maintain property accountability.

LESSON LEARNED: At the initial meeting on 8 May, all personnel were instructed to pass all requirements to the Chaffee EOC, who in turn would pass to the Fort Sill EOC. Such action is necessary if the EOC is to effectively manage the operation. In spite of precise instructions, many units made taskings for equipment direct to Fort Sill. The situation was further complicated when Fort Sill responded to these direct taskings without coordinating with the Chaffee EOC. Many items were shipped to Chaffee without accountability documents. In several instances, the Chaffee EOC was then tasked to ascertain where and to whom the equipment was to go. Events such as this consumed many manhours.

Even in instances where requirements were properly channeled, accountability documents sometimes were not accomplished primarily because of immediate need. i.e., there wasn't time to prepare the necessary paperwork. This problem was alleviated somewhat when a continuous receipt system was established using DA Form 3161 (See sample attached).

RECOMMENDATION: If accountability is to be maintained, it is imperative that all requirements be coordinated through the logistics representative in the EOC. During the early phase of the operation, two dedicated personnel (each working a 12-hour shift) are required in both Sill and the Chaffee EOC. In addition, personnel, whose primary responsibility is to channel equipment to the property party, are required at both Sill and Chaffee.

2. PROBLEM: Transportation assets were insufficient to meet requirements.

LESSON LEARNED: Large numbers of support personnel were airlifted to Fort Chaffee; most were sent with little or no organic transportation. Almost simultaneously, the influx of refugees began. The number of vehicles at Chaffee was very limited (e.g., only eleven 44-pax buses). As the number of refugee arrivals increased (sometimes as high as 3,000 per day), the strain on transportation assets became critical, both for people and supplies (e.g., rations). Additional buses and a truck company were provided by Fort Sill early on; however, these additional assets did not provide total relief. Contracts were awarded for commercial buses; however, the contracts failed to provide for a 24-hour service. In one instance, commercial buses left the arrival airfield while a plane was unloading.

When 43 buses were obtained through GSA, and the number of support personnel was reduced, the problems were eliminated temporarily. Increased requirements for processing refugees, for transporting the relatives of refugees, and for AT 80, and the subsequent unrest and stationing of a 1500-man reaction force, however, again exhausted transportation assets and made it necessary to request additional buses through GSA.

RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient transportation assets be provided at the onset of such an operation.

3. PROBLEM: Initially, the receiving and warehousing operation was not sufficiently augmented to handle the quantity of supplies which accrued from support depots.

LESSON LEARNED: Without augmentation, the warehousing operation could not respond to either train personnel and to accept the quantity of supplies. The operation had to be augmented by temporary hire personnel who were unfamiliar with requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That a military supply and service company be furnished the logistics division on day one of this type operation.

4. PROBLEM: There were too many demands from too many sources to efficiently handle supply operations.

LESSON LEARNED: Too many unqualified demands, and lack of sufficient information to identify demands created a great deal of confusion as to where supplies needed to go, in what quantities, and when. This oftentimes doubled the same requirement. A central screening agency was needed to eliminate the problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That from the outset, the EOC screen requests for equipment and supplies and refer proper requestors to the supply division with sufficient information and documentation for supply to identify and furnish required support.

5. PROBLEM: There was not a current list of equipment in dining halls, also the condition of equipment was not known.

LESSONS LEARNED: Accurate inventory of each dining facility listing both non-expendable and expendable items must be available on all dining facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Inventory lists of dining facilities be maintained with lists of expendable and nonexpendable dining facility equipment.

6. PROBLEM: Opening of dining facilities should be predicated on barracks capacity, with a plan to fill barracks by area, i.e., 1700, 1600, etc. This was not the case, barracks fill was more or less on a hopscotch basis, and constant change was the norm. This did not allow opening of dining facilities on a planned, orderly basis. It created hardships on the contractor and resulted in the loss of food that was prepared for a refugee population that was placed in an area other than programmed. C ration requirements were heavy also, due to refugees being placed in other than programmed areas.

LESSONS LEARNED: The 96th Civil Affairs unit was severely understaffed, and this tended to result in numerous Civil Affairs personnel making decisions on refugee billets and dining areas on the spur of the moment.

RECOMMENDATIONS: In the future the Civil Affairs units be staffed sufficiently to allow developing of an orderly billeting and dining facility plan, and they must stay with the plan. Any actions on dining facilities must be coordinated with the Services Division Food Services Officer.

7. PROBLEM: Hiring of temporary civilian employees was accomplished in an outstanding manner by CPO; however, one major problem was in the placing of employees in their correct work centers or areas.

LESSONS LEARNED: Employees were given only a small white piece of paper which told them to report to building so and so. Sometimes the position was not noted. A tremendous amount of time was required to determine where the individuals should be working.

RECOMMENDATION: As a minimum, the TDA paragraph number and line number should be placed on the paper sent with the employee. The employee should be informed by CPO of the basic hourly rate of the position they were hired for.

8. PROBLEM: Installation of Dining Facility Equipment - After the identification of shortages in the 1000 and 1100 areas and the requirements were placed through EOC, it was found that Fort Chaffee DFAE was not staffed with sufficient depth of trained people to respond in the timeframe required.

LESSON LEARNED: Heating and plumbing personnel from Fort Sill had to be called in to install equipment, resulting in unnecessary delays.

RECOMMENDATION: At least six dining facilities should be maintained in stand-by status, fully equipped and ready for use in the 1000 and 1100 areas. Six could support a billet strength of 3600 based on a two-hour feeding period. This will prevent the urgent acquisition and installation of equipment in the future.

9. PROBLEM: Due to the unique storage areas for subsistence, materiel handling equipment was not readily available that could be used in the cold storage facility.

LESSON LEARNED: Only two forklift trucks were available at Fort Chaffee that could negotiate the doors in Cold Storage. They were both in the Ammo Section. Only one electric pallet jack was available. During the initial phase, most of the receipt and issue of perishable subsistence was performed with manual pallet jacks and manual labor. This is counterproductive when labor-saving equipment is available in the public sector.

RECOMMENDATION: Future purchase of warehouse MHE for Fort Chaffee should be of the height and width that will negotiate the doors of the Cold Storage warehouse. Manual pallet jacks should be replaced with electric jacks.

10. PROBLEM: Initial Phase Transportation, Delivery of Subsistence - Paper products and linen/laundry pick up and DX require dedicated vehicles daily.

LESSON LEARNED: Vehicles for subsistence and paper products delivery were from the 471st Transportation with back up from TMP. Initially the duty hours for the 471st were 0730-1130 and 1230-1630. This posed a problem in that a large number of deliveries were not pulled by 1630. Therefore, we would have to wait for TMP support. Sometimes TMP support was late due to other commitments. The late deliveries caused problems in dining facilities because items delivered were sometimes for the dinner meal and were frozen. Items could not be thawed in time to prepare. The same type of problems were encountered in the paper products warehouse.

RECOMMENDATION: Dedicated vehicles should be furnished for subsistence, and paper products warehouse, and laundry/DX; and they should not be dispatched for other use.

ANNEX E (Facilities Engineering) To PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

PROBLEM: Cuban refugee sanitary habits and living habits were not anticipated. Their lack of knowledge of modern plumbing, and lack of general concern for general sanitation caused a heavy workload for the preventive maintenance teams and plumbers. Refugees were using paper towels and sheets for toilet paper and causing extensive sewage and plumbing problems.

LESSON LEARNED: A "reeducation" program is necessary to inform refugees of how to use plumbing and general information on sanitation. This can be done through the use of native language posters, signs, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: In future operations, native language signs and posters should be made up describing use of plumbing and sanitation in advance of their arrival.

ANNEX F (Resource Management) To PART VII To VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: There was conflict between FEMA and Army guidance on financial control. The On-Site FEMA representative stated that the President's declaration of National Emergency effectively waives all statutory and regulatory restraints by Public Law 93-288. Confirmation through Army channels restated Army guidance that no DOD/DA regulatory requirements were waived.

LESSON LEARNED: This conflict hindered early efforts to establish financial procedures.

RECOMMENDATION: Financial responsibilities and procedures must be clearly established from the outset of such an operation to avoid confusion.

2. PROBLEM: A military TDY policy was not established for both civilian and military support of the refugee operation.

LESSON LEARNED: There was a great deal of conflict reference to availability of quarters and mess as well as rates of allowable per diem. Also, there was confusion over the conditions for separate rations when mess is available.

RECOMMENDATION: A definitive TDY policy must be established before the outset of such an operation.

3. PROBLEM: Billeting had no guidance as to the differentiation between AT personnel and active Army support of refugee operations as far as collecting for maid services and BOQ/BEQ.

LESSON LEARNED: Billeting needs to centrally collect for maid services and BOQ/BEQ.

RECOMMENDATION: A billeting policy should be established to reduce the confusion in collecting.

4. PROBLEM: There was no delineation of financial support conditions for National Guard versus Reserve Units, both in conditions of AT, and refugee support.

LESSON LEARNED: This had to be sorted out as the operation progressed, and again, policy had to be established as the problem arose.

RECOMMENDATION: Policy for financial support of Reserve and National Guard units must be established before the operation begins.

5. PROBLEM: The limits of financial support for non-DOD and volunteer agencies were not clearly defined.

LESSON LEARNED: As the executive agency, the US Army had the responsibility to support and bill for non-DOD and volunteer agencies on the military installation. In lieu of clear policy this resulted in a great deal of confusion.

RECOMMENDATION: A clear-cut policy must be established early to outline the degree of financial support to be provided to these agencies.

6. PROBLEM: On several occasions, FEMA has disapproved requests for support submitted by Army representatives.

LESSON LEARNED: Clear guidelines should be established concerning funding with a beginning estimate made and monthly updates thereafter.

RECOMMENDATION: FORSCOM should establish a policy to fund those requests disapproved by FEMA that are identified as valid requirements in support of the refugee effort.

ANNEX G (Provost Marshal) To PART VII To VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: The problem of the limited authority and jurisdiction of the Military Police over the refugee population (see Part VI).

LESSON LEARNED: The parameters of Military Police authority and jurisdiction (A&J) were inconsistent with the size and scope of the operation. Although the US Marshal Service had complete A&J over the refugees, the fact that the Military Police could not use any force to contain refugees caused serious problems. This lack of authority was quickly perceived and exploited by those refugees bent on making trouble.

RECOMMENDATIONS: In future operations, the MP's must have greater latitude in order to perform their mission efficiently from the outset. The authority to use non-lethal force must be established at the very beginning of such an operation, especially in light of the limited manpower available to the Military Police.

2. PROBLEM: The lack of knowledge of the Cuban mentality, and the inability of MP's to communicate with the refugee population widened the gap of misunderstanding causing refugee and Military Police confusion and frustration.

LESSON LEARNED: It would have been extremely beneficial for the Military Police to have been briefed on the nature of the Cuban refugee. With this information, understanding would have certainly increased. In addition, the MP's must be able to communicate with the refugee population. With the exception of the MP's from the Puerto Rican National Guard, the Military Police were unable to communicate effectively with the refugee population. Interpreters were provided on a recurring basis, but there were no dedicated interpreters. Thus, there was no continuity in translator support. Interpreters were unfamiliar with MP requirements, and without permanently dedicated translators, they could not be trained to maximize their effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION: Military Police must be familiarized with the refugee population in advance of such an operation, and permanently dedicated interpreters must be available to them.

3. PROBLEM: Communications between agencies was not centralized resulting in loss of command and control and inadequate coordination.

LESSON LEARNED: All agencies involved in law enforcement must be able to communicate through a central location. Due to the number of various agencies, each with its own specialty, in a crisis situation agencies were employed in other areas, but this fact was never communicated, or actually controlled with a resultant loss of continuity.

RECOMMENDATION: There must be a central command facility, preferably the EOC, which is a central point of contact and direction for all agencies involved in police functions.

ANNEX H (Public Affairs) To PART VII To VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: Initial selection of Operations Public Affairs Officer.

LESSON LEARNED: The selection of the on-site PAO is critical due to the immediate need to establish a firm working relationship with the Task Force Commander. During the initial implementation phase of the operation, the need for accurate and timely media responses are essential to establish a positive media atmosphere. A PAO who knows and understands the TF Commander has established his credibility and is prepared to function as the TF Commander desires without the three or four day "break-in time." This facilitates the establishment of a positive press relationship.

RECOMMENDATION: The Task Force Commander should initially utilize his own PAO assets until the PA office be fully staffed and operational. A transition phase can then be established to assume duties of the PAO by a dedicated assistant.

2. PROBLEM: Media accreditation.

LESSON LEARNED: The need to recognize, organize and register media elements is essential on the first day of the operation. This established a point of contact for the media and provides a daily log of representatives by name, agency, location and phone number.

RECOMMENDATION: An officer or senior NCO should be identified to register all press elements and be able to provide telephone numbers of media queries and points of contact for press.

3. PROBLEM: Media escort.

LESSON LEARNED: Control and escort of media elements by qualified PAO escort officers was an early recognized requirement. An escort OIC to manage and direct the escort officers is necessary to control escort utilization and prevent duplication of effort. Three vans with dedicated drivers who also served as interpreters provide adequate transportation. From 0830 until 1000 hours and 1500 until 1800 hours we provided individual or small group media requirements. 1200 until 1500 hours was utilized for established group tours with a maximum of six persons, but no more than two TV crews per vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: Assign five escort officers, three drivers, and three vehicles.

4. PROBLEM: Media queries.

LESSON LEARNED: Questions from the press continually interrupt the operation of the PIO organization.

RECOMMENDATION: Press queries should be taken by the escort OIC or secretary and directed to the appropriate agency by the PIO/PAO for response. Provide a filed response for future use.

5. PROBLEM: Press briefing.

LESSON LEARNED: When attempting to develop answers to or anticipate questions from the press crossing a number of different agencies, the various agency PAO's developed a very thorough and accurate daily press briefing which in many cases, provided information unknown to the other staff members catching them by surprise when the next issue of local papers hit the street.

RECOMMENDATION: Immediately following the morning press briefing, the notes should be consolidated, typed and distributed to at least each press officer, TF Commander, FEMA Director and file.

6. PROBLEM: Staff press clipping service.

LESSON LEARNED: There is an immediate need to collect, clip and distribute all area news articles pertaining to the operation. Regular subscriptions through the mail are entirely unresponsive in terms of immediate starts and timely receipt. Daily newspaper reports concerning the operation are needed to keep abreast of the press atmosphere and accuracy of reporting. Copies are provided to major staff agencies on a daily basis.

RECOMMENDATION: This shortcoming was immediately identified. Earlier requests for subscriptions were cancelled and the PAO purchased locally, filing a reimbursable claim with F&AO.

7. PROBLEM: Initial PAO requirements.

LESSON LEARNED: Even though the people staffed were experienced and highly professional in their respective areas, there was a need to provide assistance to the initial influx of missions that are normally assigned to CI and PI were overtaken by media requirements. After the influx of press dissipated, CI and PI were then able to start performing their normal mission.

RECOMMENDATION: PAO has many missions, but the first is to provide local, national and international media timely and accurate information. All other functions were suspended when the demand for press assistance dictated.

8. PROBLEM: PAO external communications.

LESSON LEARNED: Effective and immediate external communications are absolutely necessary in returning long distance press calls, seeking assistance from distant locations and making telephone press releases.

RECOMMENDATION: This potential problem was solved early in the operation when the FEMA PAO secured a priority for installation of a commercial telephone system within the Public Affairs Office and Press Center. Based upon this extensive previous experience in working various disasters, he requested one nationwide WATTS line, one statewide WATTS line, two FTS lines, four regular lines and one intercom for each (Press and PAO). This proved to be adequate, but never excessive.

ANNEX I (Legal) To PART VII To VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: The SJA, CPT McCloud, was assigned to Fort Chaffee for a 90 day period for the purpose of being the SJA for AT 80. When the refugee processing center was established, he was also designated as the Task Force Judge Advocate which made him the legal advisor for both AT 80 and the refugee operation; almost all SJA attention was devoted to Task Force legal matters.

LESSON LEARNED: It is essential that if refugee operations and AT are conducted simultaneously that at least one Judge Advocate be assigned to each.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in future refugee operations a Judge Advocate be assigned to handle Task Force matters only.

2. PROBLEM: The law library, as it exists at Fort Chaffee, is totally inadequate.

LESSON LEARNED: SJA cannot function properly without adequate references, and accurate interpretations of the law, especially as to jurisdictional matters, are critical.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in future operations, the SJA be provided, as a minimum, the US Code, Annotated, and the Arkansas Statutes.

ANNEX J (Psychological Operations) To PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: Credibility in HA (Audio & Visual) missions due to the many sudden changes of plans from the units HA teams supported.

LESSON LEARNED: Words without action to back them up are worthless. As soon as the refugees realized that bluffing was a common practice to control them they became reluctant to obey the announcements. i.e., Many times the refugees were told to make a straight line in the messhall or the place would be closed. It was never closed. On another instance they were told to go back to their barracks, that buses would pick them up at their buildings rather than the clothing pick up point that was already established. The buses never picked them up at their barracks, but clothing issue resumed from the pick up point. Like these, there were a few other mix ups and sudden changes of plan. As it can be seen, this indeed affects the HA team in further broadcasts due to the lack of credibility.

RECOMMENDATION: A common decision is indispensable as backup to the HA broadcasts. Never should the HA team be suspected by the refugees of saying something and doing another, or of trying to bluff. This will cause a long term damage to the credibility of the team that will considerably decrease their effectiveness.

2. PROBLEM: Lack of evidence for intelligence gathering.

LESSON LEARNED: It is essential to have a list of the EI before assuming the task of intelligence gathering. Without any prior guidance and planning, the intelligence field becomes very extensive and disorganized.

RECOMMENDATION: Before gathering any intelligence there has to be prior planning and EI's from the analysts to provide the intelligence team with a guideline as to what type of information to obtain. This, in turn, saves time and eliminates the collection of worthless information.

3. PROBLEM: Lack of security for intelligence gathering.

LESSON LEARNED: Personnel cannot perform at 100% in intelligence without facilities for debriefing since it was not a covert operation. Civilian clothes should be worn and the intelligence team should not be identified or mixed up with the other aspect of PSYOP (communication).

RECOMMENDATION: An intelligence gathering team should be maintained for that purpose only. Aside from the other aspect of PSYOP (communication). This, in turn, will enable the team to work closely with other agencies on the post. This team should not be identified with PSYOP, it should wear civilian clothing and it should have its own place for debriefing and work, to include an approved container for classified material.

4. PROBLEM: Lack of native linguists. DLI soldiers do not have level of knowledge necessary to translate for a newspaper. The target audience cannot understand the school-taught Spanish.

LESSON LEARNED: With acquiring a Cuban refugee staff for the newspaper there was no longer a problem with written communication. The refugee staff picked up on the job of translating, proof reading, typing (Spanish), reporting and writing.

RECOMMENDATION: Native linguists should be assigned to the unit. DLI trained soldiers need slang and street language training.

5. PROBLEM: Functional typewriter for speed, quality on and Spanish lettering capability.

LESSON LEARNED: Acquired a Spanish typewriter from Fort Bragg. The newspaper looked much better in Spanish type.

RECOMMENDATION: Efficient, fast and good quality typewriters are needed for the OPDET.

6. PROBLEM: PDC/media requires a final proof reader.

LESSON LEARNED: After the Cubans proof read their own articles those articles were read by an American-Spanish linguist.

RECOMMENDATION: Editor needs a native speaker (American) to be the final proof reader.

7. PROBLEM: Newspaper distribution.

LESSON LEARNED: As population of refugee camp increases, it will become more and more difficult to distribute. Make plans for future distribution.

RECOMMENDATION: From PSYOP, the papers were sent to CA. Civil Affairs gave papers to block leaders who would pass it to paper boys (Cubans) for delivery. Pinpoint type distribution did continue for Red Cross and Task Force Headquarters.

8. PROBLEM: Certain sizes of paper may take a while for delivery.

LESSON LEARNED: Do not count on material arriving when requested to show up. Have one or two pallets of sheet paper on hand. If particular sizes of cut paper ordered do not show up when desired, the stack sheets can be cut by your own team.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Locate large cutting machine, whether military or commercial, for emergency.

9. PROBLEM: Language capabilities are very limited even though we are the only Latin-American OPDET in the active Army.

LESSON LEARNED: School trained linguists are not maintaining their proficiency which is needed at Fort Chaffee.

RECOMMENDATION: Linguists should maintain a level of proficiency by continuous language training (language lab, library, games, music, etc.). Linguists must also learn Latin customs, eat Latin foods, drinks, and basically learn the Latin way of life. It is recommended that 4th Group look into the possibility of maintaining the LATAM OPDET II at either Key West, Puerto Rico, or Panama.

10. PROBLEM: Interrogators are not fully qualified to take on the task of debriefing refugees.

LESSON LEARNED: Interrogators are not receiving the advance training necessary to carry out debriefs in an organized and professional manner.

RECOMMENDATION: Interrogators must be made aware of debriefing methods and terminology in the particular target language. They should receive the advance training made available through "REALTRAIN."

11. PROBLEM: Lack of equipment to maintain a variety of programs.

LESSON LEARNED: Agency that provides funds for operation must be made aware of the problem as soon as it arises.

RECOMMENDATION: Insure for future operations such as this that facilities exist for the disc-jockies and recording at the same time.

ANNEX K (TF III) to PART VII to VOLUME I to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

PROBLEM.

a. In any operation involving equipment and manpower near the scale of the Task Force's deployment level, the need for a strong S-4 cannot be overly stressed. In essence, the major problem that has affected the logistical portion of the activities at Fort Chaffee has been the lack of an S-4 operating successfully from the initial staging of the force. That is not to say that there have not been S-4 operations, but that they have been limited in scope and continuity has been weak. Some of the problems generated by this lack of a strong S-4 includes:

(1) Method of hand-receipting property: Very little control was established on who would sign for property through the S-4. The result of a massive rotation of personnel and indiscriminate hand-receipting was many soldiers returning to home unit and still signed for equipment. This became the next problem.

(2) Accountability of Equipment. Items such as riot control equipment, linen, radios and fans were never totally accounted for at the Task Force level. The futility in accounting for an unknown number of items can be enormously compounded when there are many pieces of equipment following in the "unknown" category. This problem includes the rotation of non-expendable property between personnel such as between guard shifts without any paperwork. Shortages became frequent.

(3) Mini-Supply Operation. Some units determined the need to establish their own supply operations which, in itself, is not a major problem, however, when these units are allowed to establish their own accounts with all agencies on post, the situation can no longer be controlled. A perfect example of this case can be demonstrated with film distribution. The Post Exchange authorized the Task Force to leave three 16mm films per week. At one point and time, any unit could come in and sign for any or all of them, thus preventing other members of the Task Force from seeing them. Then it became a project just to track down the unit, have them turn in the films and put them into the S-4.

(4) Logistics Information Flow. Without a strong S-4, everyone can run into problems on how to get things they need, the procedures and sources. This problem is substantial when rotation of units results in new personnel constantly arriving on station. There is another aspect to this problem, the operations personnel contracting support agencies themselves in search of answers and not routing such requests through proper channels. This is a common problem that is difficult to contain.

b. Control of Vehicles. As mentioned in paragraph 1, equipment was never totally accounted for at the Task Force level and vehicle control was a continuous problem until accountability was established. Even the dispatching of vehicles was not completely functional until the S-4 assumed control of that function.

c. Personnel. The S-4, under the concept of operation established in July, was providing a variety of services that required a 15-man staff. The majority of men were originally gathered from different units and were utilized where their profiles and other limitations would allow them to operate. This usually meant difficulty in keeping track of them - - short timeframes in which they were available and constant difficulty in getting replacements.

LESSONS LEARNED:

a. One lesson that this operation has provided is the need to strictly limit the number of personnel who can hand-receipt for equipment from post agencies and from the S-4 for non-expendable equipment. Without such restrictions, personnel will rotate out of the Task Force without clearing their hand receipts. The end result being the absence of comprehensive accountability of equipment.

b. Perhaps the most important lesson is that an effective S-4 must be available from the earliest stage of any such operation. Many of the problems previously cited are a function of S-4 effectiveness at any point and time. There is no doubt that any failure to have accountability at the beginning of such an operation will make future accountability a demanding task.

RECOMMENDATION: Fort Sill contingency plans should be reviewed to examine the scope and manner in which logistical operations are provided. Ample personnel with logistical backgrounds should be ready to move first as part of any Advance Party. This is imperative.

ANNEX L (Field Hospital) To PART VII To VOLUME I To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: Upon the transition from a field configuration (tents) to a fixed facility (areas 3600 and 3700), numerous hospital utilities were inoperative either because of non-use over the years of being mothballed or because the existing utilities equipment was in a damaged state.

LESSON LEARNED: It is essential to address all utility needs as early as possible.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that utilities be checked for proper operations frequently, when hospital is in mothball status.

2. PROBLEM: Initial telephone communications - Initial investigation of existing hospital telephone lines revealed that rodents had totally destroyed and/or severely damaged all lines.

LESSON LEARNED: To establish quickly the use of field phones until commercial phones can be installed.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that rodent control measures be increased for the hospital area during mothball status.

3. PROBLEM: A Field Hospital (TO&E 8-510) is not optimally organized or equipped to perform a refugee support mission.

LESSON LEARNED: Consideration must be given to various non-combat missions for health care units.

RECOMMENDATION: A study be conducted to determine personnel and equipment needs for non-combat missions which could be assigned to a Field Hospital, i.e., refugee support, disaster relief, etc.

4. PROBLEM: Because the Cuban refugees had been given BGG serum routinely for tuberculosis prophylaxis, a tuberculin skin test would show up positive if the BGG vaccine had taken. The only other alternatives to screening for tuberculosis are sputum tests or radiological chest examinations. It was determined that chest x-rays would be taken for all Cuban refugees at the Ft Chaffee resettlement operation.

LESSON LEARNED: It is expensive to do 14" X 17" radiographs of the chest. Film alone for one exposure costs approximately \$2.00/radiographic sheet. Considering labor costs and salvage value of silver from exposed film, consideration must be given to more cost effective ways to handle the x-ray screening requirements for large numbers of people.

RECOMMENDATION: Spot filming by mobile x-ray teams for screening of tuberculosis utilizing 70mm photofluorographic techniques cost between 10¢ to 25¢ per radiographic sheet and requires much less time for labor implementation and processing of x-rays.

ANNEX M (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO PART VII To VOLUME 1 To After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. PROBLEM: Due to a lack of refugee demographic data prior to the start of sustained refugee flow it was extremely difficult to plan and prepare for the segregation of family groups, unattached males, and unattached females into separate "neighborhoods".

LESSON LEARNED: The refugee population segregated itself after being assigned to a barracks. The majority of refugees made at least one "unauthorized" move. This situation made it extremely difficult to locate individual refugees and impossible to outprocess refugees by barracks on a first in-first out basis, thus contributing to refugee uncertainty and frustration.

RECOMMENDATION: That in future refugee operations separate "neighborhoods" be provided for family groups, single/unattached males, and single/unattached females based upon the best available demographic projections.

2. PROBLEM: Active Army Civil Affairs assets are inadequate to support a mission of the magnitude of the Cuban refugee operation. In addition, Civil Affairs does not have the means to procure or maintain interpreter assets.

LESSON LEARNED: As the only Civil Affairs Battalion in the active force structure, the 96th had elements at Key West, Fort Chaffee, Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy, supporting the Cuban refugee operation. In addition, the battalion still had to be prepared to support the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg and its worldwide contingencies. At the time, the battalion only had 85 of its 115 personnel slots filled. Also, due to the lack of an internal language/interpreter capability, the unit's ability to effectively communicate was considerably hampered and the unit had to rely on hastily procured, unexperienced personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion be constantly maintained at its full authorized strength, and that the battalion be provided an internal interpreter capability.

3. PROBLEM: The initial lack of adequate civil information assets contributed to refugee frustration and confusion over camp policies, outprocessing procedures, and daily "community" activities.

LESSON LEARNED: Initially, the 96th CA and 1st PSYOPS detachment were unable to obtain funding and authority for a multi-page newspaper and for a radio station. Had these assets been available at the outset a great deal of refugee frustration may have been alleviated.

RECOMMENDATION: That in future operations, a multi-page newspaper and radio station receive a higher priority.

4. PROBLEM: The location of refugee services "outside the wire" resulted in a high degree of refugee frustration and confusion.

LESSON LEARNED: All agencies which impacted upon refugee outprocessing, sponsorship and naturalization were located "outside the wire." As a result, there was a tremendous lack of knowledge and understanding about the entire outprocessing procedure and an inordinate amount of coordination required to assemble and move refugees.

RECOMMENDATION: That the entire outprocessing complex be located "in the wire" in future refugee operations. This would reduce confusion, allow civilian agencies to be more directly involved in refugee outprocessing and allow these agencies to communicate outprocessing procedures directly to the refugees.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-TCDR

29 March 1982

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

Commander
US Army Forces Command
ATTN: DCSOPS
Fort McPherson, GA 30330

1. OFFICER REPORTING: Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Kinkead, US Army Task Force, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905.
2. DUTY POSITION: Commander, US Army Task Force.
3. INCLUSIVE DATES: 30 April 1982-21 March 1982.
4. GENERAL: This report provides a general overview of Army actions to support the Cuban Resettlement operation. It also provides lessons learned in those areas where Army forces may be required to participate in the future. This report specifically does not attempt to be a comprehensive After Action Report of the Cuban operation. The operational After Action Report preparation requirement has been tasked to Commander, USAFACFS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and will be published at a later date.
5. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The Army Task Force operated as a HQ, FORSCOM field command under control of FORSCOM DCSOPS, Current Operations Branch. One officer and one civilian secretary were permanently assigned to the Task Force Headquarters. Other command and control elements were assigned in a TDY status for sixty days and consisted of Battalion Headquarters or "cells" drawn from CONUS STRAF units. All elements provided to the Task Force were in an OPCON status. LESSONS LEARNED:
 - a. That the Task Force HQ must have a small nucleus of personnel that are permanently assigned or placed on extended TDY. If troop units are rotated periodically, the need for continuity is important and having a commander, S-3, S-4, and one clerk significantly reduces time spent in planning, training, rehearsal of contingency plans, and repetitive supply inventories and reissues.

29 March 1982

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

b. That the 60 day rotation cycle of the troop units is workable. This figure could fall as low as 45 days if necessary. Periods in excess of 60 days would create increased morale and family hardship problems.

c. The need for a battalion headquarters is questionable except when a multibattalion force is fielded. If properly staffed the Task Force Headquarters can control a sizeable number of companies direct.

d. Every effort should be made to deploy units as companies. Composite units made up of platoons from various installations required significantly increased training and were a constant source of personnel, administrative, and logistics problems. Experience clearly indicates that those units that deployed to Fort Chaffee as complete companies not only performed missions better, but returned to home stations as a better training company team with higher esprit, pride and unit cohesiveness. In particular, the unit NCO chains of command were significantly strengthened.

6. PERSONNEL: All personnel actions were performed by unit home station support agencies. The Task Force Headquarters entered into the personnel area only when an emergency arose or extensive coordination was required which would burden the company commander. LESSON LEARNED: This solution worked well and should be used in future operations where possible.

7. INTELLIGENCE: On arrival of the undersigned there was no intelligence gathering to keep the security forces informed on current or projected attitudes and activities of the Cuban population. Consequently all parties were habitually surprised at Cuban actions and crisis/over-reaction situations were commonplace. On Army initiative an informal intelligence committee was formed with representation drawn from each agency involved with security and/or law enforcement. This committee met weekly to review past events, identify specific troublemakers/potential threats, and to attempt to project Cuban reactions to future events. In addition, the Task Force Commander developed a very informal net of informants drawn from cooks, KPs, secretaries, volunteer agencies, interpreters, selected Cubans, and other employees in the Cuban enclave. In addition, the Task Force commander made daily visits inside the Cuban enclave at varying hours to sense the attitude of the Cuban population and reinforce the image of a concerned army presence. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Some sort of intelligence gathering system is an absolute necessity. The informal system described worked without creating an administrative or personnel burden or an atmosphere of mistrust among the Cubans.

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

b. The intelligence system should not be overly secretive or covert so as not to unduly alarm or disturb the population and create an air of mistrust.

8. OPERATIONS: Task Force operations fell into three distinct categories:

a. Civil Disturbance: The Civil Disturbance Reaction Force mission was managed as a separate entity. This mission required a standing force to be immediately available (5 minutes to disturbance site) which was supported by secondary reaction forces which could be used to reinforce the initial deployment if required. The standing force was available 24 hours a day in their billets or in a training site. The secondary forces were personnel in a break or off-duty status which could be recalled for duty within varying time limits ranging from 15 minutes to 2 hours. In normal operations the entire Army Task Force could be available within 2 hours. Various alert categories were developed to increase the status from normal operations to intensified status which required all personnel to be present, equipped, and loaded on vehicles at preplanned staging areas near the Cuban enclave. The alert status at any given time was based on conditions within the enclave and intelligence information. This system allowed for economy of force but required intensive planning, training/rehearsal, frequent practice alerts, and up to the minute coordination at all times.

b. Enclave Perimeter Security: The perimeter security for the enclave was provided by roving foot and vehicle patrols and static guard posts around the fence line.

c. Discipline, Law and Order: This mission was the traditional Installation Provost Marshal function to include traffic, patrols, physical security, Military Police Desk, and Military Police Investigation. For practical control reasons the Military Police Desk operated as the control element of the perimeter security force. Such integration allowed individuals to be rotated between positions thus reducing boredom and increasing alertness of the perimeter security force. The Military Police Desk functioned as the emergency operations center for day to day operations. In periods of civil disturbance or escaping Cubans, the Task Force Headquarters EOC was activated to separate the Discipline, Law and Order function from the crisis at hand.

d. The approach to the mission was that of a tactical combat operation and due to the history of violence by the Cuban population such was appropriate. Intensive planning, training/rehearsal, and practice alerts was essential, especially so as units rotated every 60 days. In effect, the Task Force was required to be ready for the worse case scenario at all times. All classical riot control formations and procedures were used and such training was

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

intense. In addition, special equipment was procured to enhance normal tactical operations. Through imaginative planning and development of tactical doctrine, this special equipment allowed significant force reductions while still retaining the capability necessary to control a major civil disturbance. In effect, the challenge was to expand the Army's capability to control a riotous situation while simultaneously reducing the size of the force. Through the use of combat tactics, improved intelligence, and special equipment the challenge was met successfully.

9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS/EQUIPMENT: A review of after action reports of previous riots at Fort Chaffee revealed a need for centralized control of certain activities and some equipment. The use of CS gas and other equipment was politically and media sensitive, therefore, control of such activities was reserved specifically to the Task Force Commander.

a. CS Gas: Authority to use CS Gas either by grenade or riot gas dispenser was closely controlled. In previous riots the control was decentralized resulting in gassing of friendly personnel or ineffective deployment based on wind conditions. Further, the use of gas by Army Forces was interpreted by the media as a loss of control of the situation. For these reasons a team was made up of headquarters personnel to respond to the Task Force Commander for the use of gas, forced entry into buildings, and loudspeaker. Through the use of this team (Force Team) the Commander controlled what was said to the crowd, how and where gas was used, and damage to federal property by friendly forces.

b. Water Cannon: In previous riots the only solution to the issue at hand was for the military force to confront the rioters face to face and reduce the situation by CS gas and/or hand to hand combat. Such an approach led to increased casualties on both sides and the danger of fatalities. To attack the problem, a water cannon was the most versatile piece of equipment available. While a water cannon proper was not available, research indicated that a fire truck could be used for such purposes if military/law enforcement personnel manned the equipment. Based on this research and using rules of engagement approved by the Fort Sill SJA, an installation fire truck was made available and the necessary training instituted. This piece of equipment greatly increased the Task Force capability to react to civil disorder with a broad spectrum of options. The availability of the water cannon had a very positive effect on the individual soldier.

c. Armored Personnel Carrier (APC): In riotous situations there was an ever present danger of civilian employees becoming isolated in the Cuban enclave and being forced to barricade themselves in buildings for their own protection. As part of the review of past riots it was clear no provision was made to rescue such personnel

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

other than to fight through to them in a riot control formation and come out the same way, with the personnel within the formation. To meet the need for rescuing barricaded personnel and provide cover for them with economy of force, an armored personnel carrier was borrowed from the Fort Chaffee Equipment Concentration Site. The APC also provided a capability of a "crowd breaker" and was a strong and viable psychological message to riotous Cubans.

d. Cracker Box Ambulance: A need existed for a method to evacuate wounded from the Cuban enclave under a barrage of rocks, bottles and paving stones. In previous riots open 1/4 ton vehicles were used and the wounded continued to receive "hostile fire" from the crowds. This covered ambulance provided the necessary protection and one was borrowed from the Fort Chaffee Equipment Concentration Site. This vehicle was also available to back up or substitute for the armored personnel carrier if necessary.

e. Wire Wagon: Using local fabrication a 2 1/2 ton truck was equipped with a device for dispensing and laying 1500 feet of double concertina in approximately 2 minutes, using only 2 men. The device could be reloaded in approximately 15 minutes. This equipment was critically needed as the Cuban enclave had no cross-fencing and rioters could roam the compound at will causing all sort of mischief. This device allowed the commander to rapidly establish barriers and man them with a bare minimum of force.

10. TRAINING: The overall training goal of the Task Force was to insure the maximum capability of the units to meet requirements of the Cuban operation while continuing to improve proficiency in SQT and ARTEP skills. In addition, specific emphasis was placed on junior leader training and utilization of unit chain of command. The Fort Chaffee mission afforded military police unit commanders the rare opportunity to have all their assigned personnel under their own control with ample training time and resources. By maintaining unit integrity, that time spent as "Alert Force/Standby" was converted into training time managed and conducted by first line supervisors. BTMS was the modus operandi and it worked very well. In every case unit commanders left Fort Chaffee reporting that the Cuban mission was the best thing that had happened to their unit in terms of leader development, training, chain of command and cohesiveness. LESSON LEARNED: With the use of a little imagination and willingness to make unit chains of command work, a mission such as the Cuban operation can be a major training vehicle for units, presenting them with opportunities seldom found in the press of home station activities. The areas most favorably received were:

- a. SQT skills.
- b. Junior Officer and NCO development.
- c. Platoon and squad missions/team work.
- d. NCO Development/Leadership experience.
- e. Company teamwork, esprit, morale and cohesiveness.

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

f. ARTEP tasks such as range firing, gas chamber, decontamination and unit NBC procedures.

g. Communications.

h. Maintenance.

11. COMMUNICATIONS: The primary mode of communications was civilian type motorola AM radios provided by FEMA. Where possible telephone was used but such was necessarily limited by location. There was no need for secure systems. The local news media, law enforcement agencies, and a surprising number of civilians monitored all task force nets 24 hours a day. The press habitually overreacted to transmissions and spent many hours on or near the installation looking for trouble that did not exist. Much of this media pressure was eliminated by development of task force brevity code. The units also used organic FM radios for internal control operations. This division of communications worked very well in both routine and emergency operations. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. That AM handy-talkie sets provided reliable communications and a convenient sized radio which is available through FEMA stocks.

b. That radio nets will be monitored by the local press and population. If they can draw the wrong conclusion from a transmission they will, and rumors will spread rapidly resulting in endless telephone calls and press visits/inquiries. A simple series of code words is mandatory.

12. VISITORS: The Task Force received a series of visitors which included Congressmen or their aides, Arkansas Governor, Oklahoma Governor, General Officers, and local elected officials. The development of a command briefing easily changed to reflect the latest Cuban and army force figures relieved much of the visitor pressure. In retrospect it appears that the visitor workload was reasonable considering the uniqueness of the mission and political sensitivities. The only area where visitors might have been considered as excessive was visitors from the troop units home stations. It was not uncommon for battalion and group level commanders to visit, but also staff officers, general officers and various sergeant majors. While general type visitors were handled at Task Force Headquarters, these "chain of command" visitors necessarily were involved with the line companies. Such visits, while commendable in concern for the units, cost planning and training time and unnecessary tension in the troop units. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Be prepared for a large number of visitors.

b. Prepare a solid command briefing which can be easily changed to fit the nature/requirements of the visitor.

c. In every possible case handle visitors at headquarters level to minimize impact on mission and training functions.

d. Don't be reluctant to refuse briefings and/or tour to individuals or groups that are purely curiosity seekers.

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

13. INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS: The Cuban operation was conducted in a command and control atmosphere which was devoid of unity of command. Each agency/department of this joint undertaking remained responsive to only its own chain of command with local operations conducted as a cooperative/coordinating venture. While such led to a very suspicious, tedious, and parochial atmosphere, the system worked even if painful and somewhat cumbersome. The civilian task force leadership were all temporary employees most of whom were occupying their first position as senior leadership/management. This element of the joint venture was overwhelmingly social welfare oriented and at the highest levels openly and vocally hostile to the military. Such attitudes required the Army to be extraordinarily diplomatic yet rock firm on issues which were security oriented, involved Army procedures, or Army requirements. The Task Force Headquarters made a concentrated and successful effort to keep such pressures removed from the line units. In review of the hostile Cuban incidents which occurred the causes of the incidents can be traced to the highly permissive atmosphere nurtured by the civilian Task Force leadership. Such an arrangement as existed at Fort Chaffee was an enlightening and character building experience.

14. LOGISTICS: Logistical support for the Army Task Force was provided by both the Fort Chaffee Garrison Headquarters and Department of Health and Human Services Supply Section. Both agencies were extraordinarily cooperative and responsive. The 60 day turnover of Task Force S-4 officers was a minor problem of continuity but did cause frequent 100% inventories of equipment. The Army Task Force closed out the operation with zero loss of property. Indicated below is the source and type of logistics support rendered. All funding was provided by Health and Human Services comptroller.

- a. Class I: Contract mess operated by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- b. Class II and IV: Units deployed with TOE equipment. Minor non-standard items provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- c. Class III: POL point operated by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- d. Class V: Provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee from contingency stock. Training ammunition also provided and charged against units home station DODAC code.
- e. Class VI: Provided by Fort Chaffee permanent Class VI store.
- f. Class IX: Provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- g. DS/GS Maintenance: Provided by TMP, USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- h. Commerical Vehicles: Provided by Health and Human Services Supply with back-up by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- i. Facilities: Provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee.

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

- j. Civilian Hire: Provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- k. Movements: Provided by USAG, Fort Chaffee.
- l. Local Purchase: Provided by Health and Human Services Supply using local GSA contracts.

15. MEDIA RELATIONS: The Cuban operation was the biggest media event to hit Arkansas since the Vietnamese Refugee operation. Local media sources were generally hostile to the Cuban operation in response to vocal public sentiment. The Task Force policy on press relations was to deal only with questions that were purely security or Army Task Force oriented. All other questions were referred to the civilian task force, or the USAG Commander, as appropriate. A specific effort was made to minimize contact with the media, however, if comment was appropriate it would be presented as precisely factual, open, honest, and the whole truth. Through this policy media relations were improved significantly. During the period of this report there was no media coverage that was not favorable to the Army image. LESSON LEARNED: Be honest, straightforward, and cooperative. Don't be intimidated by media aggressiveness.

16. COMMUNITY AFFAIRS: The Task Force was the most visible Army activity in Arkansas/Eastern Oklahoma during the period of this report. Therefore, a specific effort was made to create an image of a professional and tough unit interested in the local community. Units and individual members of the Task Force marched in local/area parades, provided traffic/parking assistance at local events, donated over 800 pints of blood, participated in local charity drives, and participated in Armed Forces, Memorial and Labor Day activities. During the period of this report not one soldier was involved in an off-post incident or was arrested for any reason. The local community responded with warmth, sincerity and respect for the soldier. All members of the Task Force worked hard at this job and it paid great dividends in mutual respect, understanding and cooperativeness.

17. RELATIONSHIP WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS: The Cuban operation was an unusually sensitive issue with area elected officials and a very emotionally charged issue with the general population. The offices of Governor White, Congressman Hammerschmidt, Sheriff Cauthron, Arkansas State Police, and Fort Smith Police Chief were especially interested and the Task Force made a special effort to build mutual confidence and trust with these officials. Due to the close relationships established, the Army was able to effect recurring troop reductions while other agencies found their attempts at reductions delayed or simply refused from Washington/Federal headquarters. Based on the credibility established by the Task Force Headquarters, the local reaction to Army actions was simply "if the Task Force Commander approves it, we support it." These same officials were also instrumental in reassuring the media, local citizens and business leaders that the Army was up to the task and could be depended upon. Such a comfortable relationship could not have

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29 March 1982

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee

been established without the assistance of the Fort Chaffee Garrison Commander and his support deserves special mention. LESSON LEARNED: Winning and keeping the confidence of local officials is essential to success of the Army mission in such a politically and emotionally charged atmosphere. The time spent paid significant dividends. A totally honest, open and frank approach combined with genuine concern for the local communities needs is the approach to take.

18. PERSONAL COMMENTS: This assignment was the most challenging enlightening and educational of any in my short career. The soldiers and junior leaders performed superbly. The latitude allowed the command and the unflinching support were the ideal we all hope for. I take such as a personal compliment. I appreciate the opportunity to have been given the command and such support.


ALFRED W. KINKEAD
LTC, Infantry
Task Force Commander

CF:

CG, Fort Sill, OK
HQ, DA DOMS (COL Meyers)
HQ, FORSCOM PMO (COL Kraak)
HQ, USAG, Fort Chaffee

VOLUME II

PREPARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT PHASE (7 May 1980 - 18 May 1980)

PART I (PREPARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT PHASE SUMMARY) to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a narrative summary of the activities of the Task Force during the period 7 May to 18 May 1980.

2. On 7 May 1980, MG Jack Merritt, Fort Sill Commander, received orders from the Secretary of the Army to establish a refugee resettlement center at Fort Chaffee (ANNEX A, B). BG James Drummond was immediately appointed Task Force Commander. Within 24 hours, Emergency Operations Centers were established at Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee, and military personnel to support the operation began to arrive from Fort Sill and other Army installations (ANNEX C).

The Task Force staff was quickly organized utilizing personnel from the staff section at the Field Artillery Center and Garrison personnel from Fort Chaffee (ANNEX D). The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) and elements of the 1st PSYOPS Battalion arrived to provide managerial support to the refugee center. In addition, Military Police support came from Fort Riley and Fort Sill; the 46th Engineer Battalion (-) arrived from Fort Rucker to provide engineer support; and administrative support came from Fort Campbell. A Headquarters Company (Provisional) was also established to provide management and support for the hundreds of soldiers arriving at Fort Chaffee to support the resettlement operation.

Within 48 hours of the receipt of the order, the 47th Field Hospital from Fort Sill had established a 100-bed hospital, the engineers had prepared barracks space for 6,000 refugees, security has been established around the cantonment area and the inprocessing center established.

As the task force prepared the center for operation, a Public Affairs Office was established using Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee personnel to handle the great numbers of press personnel from all media who were arriving daily. Their actions did a great deal to improve public relations by serving to change the adverse attitudes of many, especially in regard to the reports of the large criminal element contained in the refugee population.

3. Beginning 9 May 1980 and continuing through 18 May 1980, planeloads of refugees arrived bringing into Fort Chaffee an average of 1,875 Cubans per day. All the refugees required food, clothing, shelter and many required medical attention.

By 17 May 1980, the post engineers supported by the 46th Engineer Battalion had prepared barracks to accommodate the 20,000 refugees expected to arrive at Fort Chaffee.

The 47th Field Hospital was operating three dispensaries to handle outpatients in addition to the refugee hospital. The AG personnel kept up with the rapid influx of refugees and were inprocessing the refugees as they arrived. The Military Police handled security of the compound and quickly established control of the area.

The 96th Civil Affairs had the large responsibility of organizing and handling all affairs within the compound. They swiftly organized the refugee camp establishing a political infrastructure whereby the Cubans elected other Cubans to represent them at various levels. They managed barracks assignments, issued bedding, and generally controlled the refugees within the cantonment area. The 1st PSYOPS Battalion worked hand-in-hand with Civil Affairs and by establishing a Cuban newspaper, public address broadcasts, and various other literature did a great deal to allay the many fears and apprehensions of the Cubans, and provided a free flow of information into and within the cantonment area.

It should be mentioned that probably nothing would have gone as smoothly as it did if not for the dedication and professionalism of the some 200 Spanish speaking soldiers from Fort Sill who served as interpreters. Employed in nearly every location, their ability to overcome what could have been a severe communications problem aided greatly in the rapid inprocessing and settlement of the refugees.

By 18 May 1980, when the last scheduled flight of refugees arrived, the camp was fully established and the primary concern became one of making the stay of the refugees as pleasant as possible until they were released into the American society.

4. The following annexes are attached:

Annex A - Warning Order

Annex B - Execute Order

Annex C - Assignment Orders

Annex D - Task Force Organization

Annex E - Map of Fort Chaffee

Annex A (WARNING ORDER) to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

071500Z MAY 80
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-CO//
TO CDR III CORPS & FT HOOD TX
CDR XVIII ABN CORPS & FT BRAGG NC
CDR 1ST INF & FT RILEY KS
CDR 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) & FT CAMPBELL KY
CDR FT SILL OK
CDR FT RUCKER AL
DA WASH DC//DAMO-ODS//
USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL//ROJ3//
CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA
CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD
CDR USAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDR USASIX SFRAN CA
CDR JFKCENMA FT BRAGG NC
CDR FT CHAFFEE AR
UNCLAS FOUO

SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER - CUBAN REFUGEE SUPPORT

1. THIS IS A WARNING ORDER.

2. SITUATION.

A. LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN REFUGEES CONTINUE TO ARRIVE IN KEY WEST FL. AN INFLUX OF UP TO 20,000 REFUGEES ARE EXPECTED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

B. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESOURCES ARE SEVERELY STRAINED. THE LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES ARE OVERWHELMING AVAILABLE RESOURCES PRESENTLY ASSISTING AND CONTROLLING THE REFUGEES.

C. THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED FEMA TO COORDINATE FEDERAL EFFORT TO RECEIVE AND PROCESS REFUGEES. FEMA HAS REQUESTED DOD TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

D. THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS THE DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT, CDCSOPS, DA, IS REPRESENTING THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY IN DIRECTING DOD RESPONSE.

3. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, ADDRESSEES WILL DEPLOY TASK ORGANIZED UNITS TO FT CHAFFEE AR TO ORGANIZE AND OPERATE A REFUGEE CENTER.

4. EXECUTION.

A. COURSE OF ACTION. REFUGEE ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, MEDICAL SUPPORT, SECURITY, ENGINEER SUPPORT, PERSONNEL PROCESSING, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT.

B. CDR III CORPS AND FT HOOD: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE 13TH PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENT.

C. CDR, XVIII ABN CORPS AND FT BRAGG: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS.

D. CDR, 1ST INF DIV AND FT RILEY: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE 716TH MP BN (HHD) AND 977TH MP CO.

E. CDR 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) AND FT CAMPBELL: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE 545TH AC CO.

F. CDR, FT RUCKER: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE 46TH ENGR EN (-).


G. CDR, FT SILL: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FORCES TO ACTIVATE AND OPERATE FT CHAFFEE AS A REFUGEE CENTER. DESIGNATED AS BSI FOR OPS.

H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION IS 90 DAYS.

(2) MAINTAIN NORMAL DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE UNTIL DIRECTED THEREWISE.

(3) DESIGNATE A SINGLE POC FOR COORDINATION.



C O P Y

PAGE 3 (071500Z MAY 80)

- (3) ACCOMPANYING UNIT SUPPLIES WILL INCLUDE:
- (A) FIVE DAYS OPERATIONAL RATIONS.
 - (B) 15 DAYS MISSION ESSENTIAL CLASS II, LESS TENTS AND COTS FOR PERSONNEL.
 - (C) 15 DAYS CLASS III (PKG).
 - (D) MODIFIED CLASS V BASIC LOAD FOR WEAPONS TAKEN IAW PARA 4H(5).

C O P Y

Annex B (EXECUTE ORDER) to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

C O P Y

071716Z MAY 80
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-CC//
CDR III CORPS & FT HOOD TX
CDR XVIII ABN CORPS & FT BRAGG NC
CDR 1ST INF DIV & FT RILEY KS
CDR 101ST ASN DIV (AASLT) & FT CAMPBELL KY
CDR FT SILL OK
CDR FT RCKET AL
DA WASH DC //DAMO-CDS//
USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL//RCJ3//
CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA
CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD
CDR USAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDR USASIX SFRAN CA
CDR JFKCENMA FT BRAGG NC
CDR FT CHAFFEE AR
CDR HSC FT SAM HOUSTON TX
MAC SCOTT AFB IL
CDR USACC FT HUACHUCA AZ

UNCLAS FOUO

SUBJECT: EXECUTE ORDER - CUBAN REFUGEE SUPPORT

A. CDR FORSCOM 071500Z MAY 80 (WARNING ORDER).

1. THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

2. SITUATION. NO CHANGE FROM REF A. 13,000 CUBAN REFUGEES ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN ARRIVING AT FT CHAFFEE WITHIN 72 - 96 HOURS.

3. MISSION. ADDRESSEES WILL DEPLOY TASK ORGANIZED UNITS ASAP, BUT NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS, TO FT CHAFFEE TO ORGANIZE AND OPERATE A REFUGEE CENTER FOR 15,000 REFUGEES.

4. EXECUTION.

A. COURSE OF ACTION. DEPLOY TASK ORGANIZED UNITS ASAP TO FT CHAFFEE TO ORGANIZE AND OPERATE A CENTER FOR 15,000 REFUGEES. UNITS ARE TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT TO FT CHAFFEE ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS FROM N-HOUR (071530Z MAY 80).

B. UNITS. AS STATED IN REF A.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) AS STATED IN REF A.

(2) N-HOUR IS 071530Z MAY 80.

(3) UNITS ARE TO CLOSE ASAP IN FT CHAFFEE BUT NLT 10 MAY 80.

(4) DURATION OF OPERATION IS EXPECTED TO BE 90 DAYS.

(5) FORSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND/OR MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS.

(6) REPORT ESTIMATED UNIT DEPARTURE TIME, AND UNIT TASK ORGANIZATION, NLT 072400Z MAY 80 TO CDR FORSCOM//AFOP-CO// BY WES TLCF OR AUTODIN.

(7) DIRAUTH ALCON.

(8) REPORTS.

(A) DAILY SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-CO// IAW CHAPTER 2, FORSCOM REG 525-15.

(B) DAILY SITREP WILL BE AS OF 2000Z AND SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY CDR FORSCOM NLT 2200Z.

(C) ADVANCE, DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL EXMCVREPS WILL BE SUBMITTED BY PRIORITY MESSAGE IAW AR 55-113.

II-I-B-2

C O P Y

C O P Y

PAGE 2 (071716Z MAY 80)

(9) FORSCOM CRISIS ACTION TEAM (CAT) ACTIVATED AT 071700Z MAY 80.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. TRANSPORTATION, REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED TELEPHONICALLY TO HQ FORSCOM (AUTOVON 386-3747/4241) BY THE INSTALLATION TRANSPORTATION OFFICER (ITC). IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP WILL BE MADE BY PRIORITY MESSAGE.

B. FUNDING. PER REF A.

C. LOGISTICS. PER REF A.

D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS. PER REF A.

6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

A. TASK FORCE CDR WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THIS HQ. DEPLOYED UNITS WILL BE OPCON TO COMMANDER, TASK FORCE CHAFFEE.

B. DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTH; KEEP CDR FORSCOM/AFOP-CO// INFORMED.

7. PROTECTIVE MARKINGS MAY BE REMOVED 1 JAN 81.

C O P Y

Annex C (ASSIGNMENT ORDERS) to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503

PERMANENT ORDERS 82-22

15 May 1980

US Army Task Force/Garrison, Resettlement Operation, Fort Chaffee
(Provisional) TC, (WOVBA A), Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905

Following organization/unit action directed.

Action: Organization

Assigned to: US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort
Sill, OK 73503

Mission: As stated in paragraph 5, section I, TDA TCWOVBAA TC
0180, and operate a Resettlement Center for Cuban Refugees.

Effective date: 7 May 1980

Military structure strength: Not applicable

Military authorized strength: Not applicable

Civilian structure strength: Not applicable

Civilian authorized strength: Not applicable

Accounting classification: Appropriate allotments will be
obligated to the extent necessary (AR 37-100 series).

(Authority: DA Message, DACA-BUE, 071630Z May 1980, subject:
CONUS Support of Cuban Refugee Situation, and FORSCOM message
082015Z May 1980, subject: CONUS Support of Cuban Refugee
Situation)

Authority: AR 220-5. Verbal orders of the Commander, 7 May 1980.

Additional instructions: (a) TDA TCWOVBAA TC 0180 and TDA
TCWOVBAA TC 0176, (TDA Task Force New Arrivals) EDATE 750701, as
amended 12 July 1979, will be used for personnel fill.

(b) Variation of operating strengths will be determined by the
Commander, US Army Task Force/Garrison, Resettlement Operation,
Fort Chaffee (Provisional). However, this headquarters will be
informed if there is a significant deviation from the manning
document.

(c) TOE equipment, belonging to a TOZ unit supporting the
operations, will be withdrawn when the TOE unit departs.
Garrison (commercial) type equipment will be substituted for this
TOE equipment. Replacement equipment will be made available from
existing equipment pools and excesses or commercial lease
contract.

(d) Command relationships are as stated in FORSCOM message,
071500Z May 1980, subject: Warning Order Civilian Refugee
Support.

(e) Individuals on temporary duty will be attached to US Army
Task Force/Garrison, Resettlement Operation, Fort Chaffee
(Provisional), for the exercise of jurisdiction under Uniform
Code of Military Justice. May be further attached by Commander,
US Army Task Force/Garrison, Resettlement Operation, Fort Chaffee
(Provisional) for the exercise of jurisdiction under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.

(f) Files/records will be established and maintained in
accordance with AR 340-18 series.

Format: 740

PERMANENT ORDERS 82 22, HQ USAFACFS, 15 May 1980

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DISTRIBUTION:

C plus

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HQDA (DAAG-AMO-D) Washington, DC 20314 (10)

HQDA (DAMO-FDA) Washington, DC 20310 (1)

HQDA (DAMH-HSO) Washington, DC 20314 (1)

Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-O, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 (2)

Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFPR-PR, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 (2)

Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFFM-PS, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 (2)

Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFFM-DD, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 (2)

Cdr, US Army Task Force/Garrison, Resettlement Operation, Ft Chaffee (Prov) Ft Chaffee, AR 72905 (20)

ATZR-AGP, ATTN: Cpt Foster (5)

Annex D (TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION) to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The mission of the Task Force was to establish and operate a Resettlement Center for Cuban refugees. To accomplish this mission, the DoD assets were initially functionally organized as shown in Appendix 1.

2. A description of each element is as follows:

a. Headquarters-provided command and control for the Task Force and consisted of the following staff sections:

(1) Command Group-Commanding General and Chief of Staff.

(2) EOC-functioned as the S2/3 for the Task Force and coordinated the necessary support activities to move effective operation of the refugee operation. Besides staff representatives from each area, the EOC also had two additional elements.

(a) DAACG-coordinated all flights arriving with refugees from Florida (Appendix 2).

(b) WWMCS-handled WWMCS message traffic.

(3) DPCA-functioned as the Task Force S1 and provided all personnel services and personnel management for Task Force personnel and established Morale Support Activities for the refugees.

(4) DIO-functioned as Task Force S4 and managed all logistics functions, to include transportation and procurement of personnel and supplies.

(5) DRM-managed funding for the Task Force.

(6) JAG.

(7) PAO.

(8) PMO.

(9) Protocol.

(10) Chaplain

(11) CPO

(12) DEH-coordinated all engineering support for the installation.

(13) Headquarters Commandant.

b. Transportation Services-provided transportation for refugees and supplies and was supported by units shown in Appendix 1. These services were

transferred to civilian contract as of 23 May 1980, and DoD personnel returned to Fort Sill.

c. Supply and Food Services. These services were contracted by DIO and no DoD personnel were assigned to these duties.

d. General Support. Various details were provided by personnel of the III Corps Artillery units shown in Appendix 1. A linguist battery was formed from Spanish-speaking soldiers to perform interpreter duties for the Task Force.

e. Housing Service. Coordinated by DEH and augmented by units shown in Annex 2. Their mission was to prepare all buildings for occupancy, construction of barriers, guard shacks, and general construction.

f. Refugee Inprocessing Center. Had the mission of inprocessing all refugees. This included issue of ID cards, meal cards, and obtaining personal data on all incoming refugees, and computerizing the data. The inprocessing center closed 19 May 1980, and the responsibilities for inprocessing were transferred to civilian control.

g. Civil Affairs. Responsible for the operation of the cantonment area. They had the mission of billeting, issuing supplies, and the general welfare of the refugees.


h. Public Information. The PAO was augmented as shown in Appendix 1.

i. Medical Service. The mission of these units was medical support for all military personnel in the Task Force and the refugees. This also included medical screening for outprocessing of refugees (Appendix 3).

j. Community Service. These units, with the exception of the 11th Signal Bde, provided security around the cantonment area and general police duties for the Task Force and Fort Chaffee. The 11th Signal Bde had the mission of providing all communications support for the Task Force.


APPENDIX 1 (FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION) to ANNEX D to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
DOD ELEMENT
CUBAN RESETTLEMENT OPERATION



APPENDIX 2 (DAACG ORGANIZATION) to ANNEX D to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee


DAACG ORGANIZATION - PHASE I
Sustained 24 hour operations



Total Strength: 2 officers, 16 enlisted
(Medic and driver for ambulance furnished by 47th Field Hospital).

*Also serves as a driver at night

APPENDIX 3 (MEDICAL ORGANIZATION) to ANNEX D to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee




* The 47th Field Hospital Chaplain served as Task Force Chaplain.

Annex E (MAP OF FORT CHAFFEE) to PART I to VOLUME II to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



○	MOBILE BARRIER
⊞	CONCERTINA
⊞	FENCE
□	ADMIN



1 MP PATROLS EACH AREA
 4-MOTORIZED 2-MAN PATROLS
 2-WALKING 2-MAN PATROLS

PART II (CAMP OPERATIONS) to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force
Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. Part II covers the resettlement camp operations for Phase I, 7-18 May 1980.

2. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was assigned the responsibility for the administration of the resettlement community. This community was originally divided into four "neighborhoods", with an area leader, a block leader per row of barracks, and a barracks leader per barracks. Military personnel were to be assigned at the neighborhood level, reporting to a military community leader. Refugees would not be allowed to hold a position higher than the neighborhood level in order to prevent influence peddling and to prevent the impression that a refugee had more authority than the military neighborhood leader.

The 96th CA Bn would have representatives at the inprocessing station to issue meal cards and assign billets to incoming refugees. Initial refugee density per barracks would be 70.

Due to a lack of any reliable demographic data, but based on the sketchy information that indicated that the majority of refugees would be families and the remainder young, unattached males (and that over half of the barracks were not fully prepared for occupancy), unattached males would be billeted on the upper floors of the barracks and families would be on the lower floors.

3. With the arrival of the first plane load of refugees, the Bn had to alter the proposed organization. This was due to the lack of interpreters to man the leadership positions, and the need to devote the majority of available personnel to billeting the refugees. This organization is depicted at Annex A.

4. As the pace of refugee arrivals increased, it was determined that a need for a holding area existed. This was due to the fact that the AG Inprocessing Section could only process 90 to 150 refugees per hour. Additionally, personnel were needed to supervise the moving of refugees through the inprocessing system, to oversee the double bunking of neighborhoods three and four, and to act as dining facility coordinates (responsible for assisting with operations, preparing meal cards, and staffing the dining facilities with refugee KP labor). This major organizational change is at Annex B.

5. The attached annexes show the battalion organizations and detail functional areas within camp operations.


Annex A - 96th CA Bn Organization (initial)

Annex B - 96th CA Bn Organization (revised)


Annex C - Inprocessing/Billeting

Annex D - Outprocessing

Annex A (96TH CA BN ORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



Annex B (96TH CA BN ORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



Annex C (INPROCESSING/BILLETING) to PART II to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. When the refugees landed, they were transported from the airport to the inprocessing station in the 2500 area of Fort Chaffee. At the inprocessing station, the following actions took place:

a. INS Processing. The Immigration and Naturalization Service would issue an I-94 (Alien Status Card) and give the refugees alien numbers.

b. AG Processing. Military personnel would issue ID cards, record basic essential information, and feed the refugees (if needed).

c. Clothing Issue. Personal toilet items and shower clogs were issued.

d. Medical Screening. Public Health Service (PHS) screened the refugees for disease. This included blood tests and x-rays.

e. Barracks Assignment. The refugees were assigned a barracks, issued a meal card, and briefed on camp operations.

2. After the inprocessing station, the refugees were bussed to the camp inprocessing supply room where they were issued their bedding and moved to a holding area. From the holding area, the refugees were taken to their preassigned barracks, escorted to the assigned bunks, and given another briefing on the location of dining facilities and medical clinics, housekeeping, supply procedures, and the importance of cooperating with the military area leaders. Additionally, the billeting team would select the barracks leaders (later, the refugees would elect their own).

This system continued for the first 3 or 4 days. At this time, the refugees began to relocate on their own; families reuniting, and people of common background moving in together. With this massive immigration taking place, it was impossible to follow the barracks assignments made at the inprocessing center. The billeting procedures were changed as follows: The billeting team was given a blank 3x5 card with the refugee's name and alien number. When a barracks space was found, the barracks assignment was recorded on the 3x5 card, which was then returned to the inprocessing center. Additionally, the billeting teams constantly scouted for empty spaces to house refugees.

3. Attached as appendixes are copies of the forms used for inprocessing.

Appendix 1 - Cuban Refugee Checklist

Appendix 2 - Consent Form

Appendix 3 - Information Sheet

Appendix 4 - Revised Information Sheet

Appendix 5 - Refugee Meal Card

CUBAN REFUGEE CHECKLIST

NAME	ID CARD #
#1 - BRIEFING _____	_____
#2 - INS _____	_____
#3 - ID SECTION _____	_____
#4 - COLLECT INFO SHEET _____	_____
#5 - MEDICAL _____ TO HOSP _____	_____
#6 - BILLETING _____ BLDG # _____	_____
#7 - MEAL CARD _____	_____
#8 - QA _____	_____

CONSENT

I _____ give my permission to be interviewed, photographed,
and have my name released to the news media.

Signature _____

CONSENTIMIENTO

Yo _____ doy mi permiso para ser entrevistado, fotografiado
(Nombre En Letra De Molde)

y que mi nombre sea dado a las agencias noticieras.

Firma

Fecha

- INFORMATION SHEET
 (Hoja de informacion)
 Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72901

1. NAME _____ ID NUMBER _____ SEX _____ DATE OF BIRTH _____
 of all family members (Numero de (Sexo) (Fecha de
 identificacion) nacimiento)

(nomires de toda la familia)

2. RELIGION (Religion): _____

3. PLACE OF BIRTH (Lugar de nacimiento); _____

4. DATE DEPARTED CUBA (Fecha que salio de Cuba): _____

5. LOCATION OF LAST PROCESSING AREA IN THE UNITED STATES (Lugar de la ultima area de procesamiento en los Estados Unidos).

EGLIN _____ INDIANTOWN _____ OTHER (Otra) _____

6. MILITARY POSITION IN CUBA (Posicion militar en Cuba): _____

7. LEVEL OF EDUCATION MILITAR: _____
 (Nivel de educacion CIVIL: _____)

8. ENGLISH PROFICIENCY (Fluidez en el idioma ingles): _____

READ (Leer)	EXCELLENTE _____	SATISFACTORIO _____	NADA _____
SPEAK (Hablar)	EXCELLENTE _____	SATISFACTORIO _____	NADA _____
WRITE (Escribir)	EXCELLENTE _____	SATISFACTORIO _____	NADA _____

9. OCCUPATION (Occupacion) _____

10. SPONSOR AGENCY CODE (Individual make choice - if no choice select either 1 or 2 for them.

- Agencias Voluntarias: CWS (Servicio Christiano del Mundo) (1)
 IRC (Comite International de Refugiados) (2)
 USCC (Servicio Unido de la conferencia Catolica) (3)

11. RELATIVES RESIDING IN US.
(Familiares residiendo en los Estados Unidos)

YES(SI) _____ NO (no) _____

NAMES (Nombres)

ADDRESS (Direccion)

12. SINCE LEAVING CUBA, HAS ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY BEEN SEPARATED FROM YOU IN THE US? (Ha sido algun familiar separado de usted al llegar a los Estados Unidos?)

YES (SI) _____

WHO (Quien)? _____

NO (no) _____

WHERE (Donde)? _____

13. TALENTES OR OTHER ABILITIES IN THE ENTERTAINMENT FIELD.
(Talentos y otras habilidades en el campo de entretenimiento)

PARA USO OFICIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14. BUILDING NUMBER TO WHICH ASSIGNED.
(Número de edificio asignado) _____

INFORMATION SHEET
 - (Hoja de información)
 Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72901

Date Today; 80 / /
 (yr) (mo) (day)

1. NAME: _____
 (Father Last NME) (Mother Last NME) (Individual First NME)

2. ID NUMBER: A _____ FAMILY ID NUMBER: A _____
 (Número de identificación) ~~(nombrados de toda la familia)~~

3. SEX: M F DATE OF BIRTH: _____
 (Sexo) (Circle one) (Fecha de nacimiento) (yr) (mo) (day)

4. RELIGION (Religión): _____

5. LEVEL OF EDUCATION (Nivel de educación): NUMBER OF YEARS

6. ENGLISH PROFICIENCY: (Check one of each) READ YES NO
 (Fluidez en el idioma inglés) SPEAK YES NO
 WRITE YES NO

7. SPONSOR AGENCY CODE (Individual make choice - if no choice select one for ^{him} them.)

CIRCLE ONE

- Agencias Voluntarias: (1) CWS (Servicio ^{Mundial} Cristiano ~~del Mundo~~)
 (2) IRC (Comité Internacional de Refugiados)
 (3) USCC ~~(Servicio Unido de la~~ Conferencia Católica de Estados Unidos
 (4) SBC ~~(Southern Baptist Convention)~~
 (Convención Bautista del Sur)

8. PLACE OF BIRTH: _____
 (Lugar de nacimiento)

9. OCCUPATION: _____ LOCATION: _____
 (Occupación) (Lugar)

10. MILITARY SERVICE IN CUBA AFTER 1968? NO YES Rank: _____ Branch: _____
~~(Posición en el ejército) (Servicio Militar en Cuba desde 1968)~~

11. FRIENDS AND RELATIVES RESIDING IN U.S. (check one or both) Relative: _____ Friend: _____
~~(Familiares de sangre)~~ ^(Parientes) o amigos ^(viviendo) ~~residiendo~~ en los Estados Unidos

12. SINCE LEAVING CUBA, HAS ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY BEEN SEPARATED FROM YOU IN THE U.S.?
 (Ha sido algún familiar separado de usted al llegar a los Estados Unidos?)

YES (SI) _____ WHO? (¿Quién?) _____

NO (NO) _____ WHERE? (¿Dónde?) _____

NAME IS INCORRECT? YES NO

APPENDIX 5 (MEAL CARD) to ANNEX C to PART II to VOLUME II to After Action Report
 Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

MAY-MAYO		
AREA _____		
ÁREA		
MESS HALL _____		
COMEDOR		
NAME	BLDG #	I.D. CARD#

B L D 1	B L D 2	B L D 3	B L D 4	B L D 5	B L D 6
B L D 7	B L D 8	B L D 9	B L D 10	B L D 11	B L D 12
B L D 13	B L D 14	B L D 15	B L D 16	B L D 17	B L D 18
B L D 19	B L D 20	B L D 21	B L D 22	B L D 23	B L D 24
B L D 25	B L D 26	B L D 27	B L D 28	B L D 29	B L D 30
B L D 31					

(Front)

27

MEAL HOURS
HORAS DE COMIDA

(DESAYUNO) B _____
 (ALMUERÓ) L _____
 (CENA) D _____

(Back)

Annex D (OUTPROCESSING) to PART II to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The basic procedure to outprocess a refugee was a simple, yet, time-consuming process. INS would screen the refugees and request clearance for alien status from Washington. This would take 5 to 7 days. The FBI/CIA would further screen selected refugees, who as a result of initial screening, were believed to be potential security problems. The refugee would then be checked by PHS. If further medical treatment was needed, the refugee was called back and treated. The VOLAGS would interview the refugee, arrange for his sponsorship, and coordinate his travel arrangements to his new home.

As their scheduled departure date approached, the refugees would be instructed to gather their personal belongings and bedding, and report to their neighborhood supply room. There they would turn in their bedding, have their departure status verified, and be transported to the holding area. When they arrived at the holding area, their status was again verified, and they were issued one blanket and a meal card for the holding area dining facility. The refugees were to remain at the holding area for no more than 72 hours before departing Fort Chaffee.

2. In addition to the basic procedure, many refugees were specially outprocessed. These personnel with prioritized departures were handcarried through the outprocessing network by FEMA. Military personnel were also used to expedite the processing of designated refugees.

**PART III (REFERENCES) to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task Force
Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee**

Annex A - DOD Guidance

Annex B - US Marshal Message

Annex C - Memorandum of Understanding

Annex A (DOD GUIDANCE) to PART III to VOLUME II to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

B

C O P Y

082155Z MAY 80
FM HQ DA WASHDC//DAMO-ODS//DAJA-AL//
TO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-PL/AFPA-PP//
INFO CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA//ATORI-OP-DR/ATOPA-PI//
CNO WASHDC//CODE 403//
CSAF WASHDC//XOOTA//
CMC WASHDC//OTOC//
JCS WASHDC
CDRDLA CAMERON STATION VA
CDRUSACC FT HUACHUCA AZ//CC-OPS-OS//
CINCREC MACDILL AFB FL
HQS TAC LANGLEY AFB VA//DE//
HQS AFCC ANDREWS AFB MD//DE/PA/TE//
HQS MAC SCOTT AFB IL//DO//
HQS AFECs TYNDALL AFB FL//DED//
HQS ADTC EGLIN AFB FL//CC//
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD
CDRUSAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDRUSASIX SFRAN CA
CDR MOW WASHDC
CDRPHSC FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDRDARCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//DRCPA-M//
CDR67THSTGCOMD FT RITCHIE MD//CCN-PO-OB//
CDR MTMC WASHDC//NT-PL//
HQ DA WASHDC//DATO/DAPC/DALO/DARC/OGC/NGB/DAAG/DAPE/DACA-BUE/DAEN/DAEN-MPZ :
DACG/DAMO-ODO/DAMO-ODM/DAMO-ODR.DASG/DAJA/DAMI/DAMA/DAAP//
HQ DN WASH DC//CHINFO//
HQ5 USAF WASH DC//SAFPA//
HQS USMC WASH DC//DOI//
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CNET PENSACOLA FL
CHNAVMP PFRSCOMD WASH DC
CDR FT CHAFFEE AR
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASH DC
DEPT OF STATE WASHDC/FEMA WASH DC

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFICIALS CONCERNING SAFETY AND SECURITY
ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AT FACILITIES DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE
"CUBAN ALIENS" IN SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)
1. COMMANDERS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY
OF THE INSTALLATION AND MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY
TO PROTECT GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL OR MAINTAIN ORDER THEREON.
2. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE ARMED FORCES TO RESTRAIN OR
CONFINE "CUBAN ALIENS" FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES. THIS DOES NOT
LIMIT THE AUTHORITY OF ANY COMMANDER TO DETAIN PERSONS WHEN NECESSARY
TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER, TO INCLUDE THE SUPPRESSION OF RIOTS OR
OTHER MAJOR DISTURBANCES. HOWEVER, IN SUCH INSTANCES IMMEDIATE ASSIS-
TANCE FROM CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND ANY
CIVILIAN DETAINED IN SUCH A SITUATION IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO CIVILIAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS.

C O P Y

PAGE 2 (082155 MAY 80)

3. INTERNAL SECURITY OF THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION DEDICATED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE "CUBAN ALIENS" MISSION SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE FEMA REPRESENTATIVE AT THE INSTALLATION.

4. YOU MAY TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO LIMIT THE ENTRY OF "CUBAN ALIENS" ONTO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION WHERE THEIR PRESENCE IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE, OR WOULD CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO PEACE AND ORDER. YOU MAY EXCLUDE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FROM THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION DEDICATED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE "CUBAN ALIENS" MISSION.

5. FEMA, WASHINGTON, DC PASS TO FEMA, MIAMI, KEY WEST, EGLIN AND CHAFFEE.

C O P Y

Annex B (US MARSHAL MESSAGE) to PART III to VOLUME II to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

C O P Y

018 15:50:40 05/09/80

PP AA MWARD

010 16:23:28 05/09/80

FM HOWARD SAFIR, ASST DIR FOR OPS
TO MACK BURTON USM W/AR
INFO DEPUTY DIRECTOR J. TWOMEY USM S/FL
SUBJECT: CUBAN REFUGEE SITUATION FT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

AS PER OUR CONVERSATION THIS DATE THE FOLLOWING IS OUR MISSION AT THIS TIME. WE WILL PROVIDE ON A 24-HOUR BASIS TWO DEPUTY US MARSHALS AS A MINIMAL POLICE PRESENCE TO RECEIVE THOSE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY THE MILITARY OR OTHER AGENCIES FOR TRANSPORTATION TO COURT OF PRISONER FACILITIES. THE INTERNAL POLICING OF THE CAMP IS NOT OUR RESPONSIBILITY AND WE DO NOT HAVE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO PROVEE SUCH PATROL ACTIVITIES. IN THE EVENT OF DISTURBANCE, WE WILL ASSIST OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO THE EXTENT OF OUR LOCAL CAPABILITIES IN RESTORING ORDER IF REQUESTED. WE ARE NOT AT THIS TIME, REPEAT NOT, RESPONSIBLE AS THE INTERNAL POLICE AUTHORITY AT THE CAMP. AS INDICATED TO YOU TODAY, THE COORDINATION FOR USMS ACTIVITY IN THIS ENTIRE OPERATION IS THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR WHO CAN BE REACHED AT (305) 358-0964. ALL INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THIS OPERATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS OR BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FROM MIAMI. NO CHANGE IN OUR MISSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT NOTIFICATION FROM THE ABOVE. YOU SHOULD PROVIDE THIS OFFICE WITH A DAILY REPORT BY TWX EACH MORNING INDICATING THE CURRENT CONDITIONS AT YOUR LOCATION AND ANY ITEMS THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO OUR MISSION. YOU SHOULD ALSO SEND INFORMATION COPIES OF THESE MESSAGES TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR THROUGH THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OFFICE. ANY QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO THE ABOVE CAN BE ADDRESSED TO HOWARD SAFIR 285-1004, FRANK VANDEGRIFT 285-1125.

II-III-B-2

Annex C (MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING) to PART III to VOLUME II to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, FORT CHAFFEE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72901

Annex C (Memorandum of Understanding) to PART III Special Areas of Concern to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation--Fort Chaffee 10 May 1980

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN

OFFICES OF US MARSHAL, INS, FBI, AND CUBAN REFUGEE TASK FORCE COMMANDER (

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement and Security

Recognizing that this Cuban Refugee Operation involves the concerted efforts of the above Federal Agencies, under overall control of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for the processing and ultimate resettlement of the refugees being delivered at Fort Chaffee under the constructive custody of INS for illegal entry, the following authority and responsibilities are acknowledged:

1. Jurisdiction over offenses by Army personnel remains unaffected by the current temporary situation and is as established by statutory and case law.
2. Jurisdiction over all offenses by all civilians, including refugees, on the Fort Chaffee Military Reservation is exclusively with Federal law enforcement and judicial officials.

a. Army involvement in civilian offenses on the reservation will be limited to that necessary to maintain safety of military personnel and property and good order. Civilian personnel observed committing an offense threatening good order and safety may be temporarily detained by military police for the purpose of turning them over to the US Marshal's office or issuing citations and notices to appear in Magistrate's Court.

b. The Army will provide perimeter security for the areas on Fort Chaffee to which refugees are restricted. Except to quell emergency disorders, the Army will not engage in police work within such areas. Any investigation or other law enforcement activity within such areas will be by the FBI.

3. The Army has no jurisdiction over civilian offenses committed off the reservation and will not be expected to engage in any police work in such



SUBJECT: Law Enforcement and Security

10 May 1980

locations. Any investigation or other law enforcement activity within such areas will be by the FBI. This does not preclude escorting refugees from airport facilities to Fort Chaffee.

4. Because many refugees arriving here are understood not to have been previously processed or screened in any way, there is a clear necessity to search their person and belongings and seize weapons and contraband for the protection and welfare of the military personnel involved in this operation. The US Marshal's office disclaims authority and responsibility. INS currently does not have sufficient regular personnel to accomplish this requirement. That agency desires to appoint certain military members as "designated immigration inspectors" to do so. Because of the clear military necessity for this action, the undersigned Task Force Commander agrees to such designation and to perform such searches and seizures upon the initial entry of the refugees into the reception area. There is no intent to use any item seized as evidence in any prosecution of the person from whom seized. INS agrees to take over this function as soon as possible.

JAMES E. DRUMMOND
Brigadier General, USA
Task Force Commander

BILL TIDBALL
FEMA Coordinator

JOEL ROGERS
INS Associate Regional Commissioner

MACK BURTON
US Marshal

FBI

US Attorney

VOLUME II.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A THROUGHPUT PHASE. (18 May - 7 Aug 80)

PART I (ESTABLISHMENT OF A THROUGHOUT PHASE SUMMARY) to VOLUME III to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a narrative summary of the activities of Task Force Resettlement Operation from 18 May to 5 August 1980.

2. By 18 May 1980, the camp population had reached 18,975 and the establishment of the throughout phase began. The inprocessing center run by the 545th PSC, Fort Campbell, and elements of the AG Division from Fort Sill was closed down and the center was turned over to FEMA to use during outprocessing. AG personnel returned to their home stations leaving only a skeleton crew from Fort Sill. Every effort was being made to reduce the number of military personnel at Fort Chaffee and increase the duties of the various Federal agencies.

The Civil Affairs program to let the Cubans manage themselves was expanded upon. Each barracks chose a leader, as did each block and area. These people managed the affairs and voiced the problems of the people they represented through regular meetings with key military and civilian officials.

Many of the refugees were eager for employment and they were utilized in every area that could be made available to them. Cubans were assisting in the operation of area supply rooms, clothing issue, publication of the newspaper, and recreation services. This accomplished two things: one, it allowed the refugees to manage their own affairs as much as possible, and two, it relieved the boredom of many who were much happier with something to do.

Recreation services provided boxing and softball gear, musical instruments for a band which some refugees organized, showed movies at night, and arranged for English classes to be taught. The Chaplain's office established regular services for both Catholics and Protestants and organized a variety of religious activities which were well received by a large number of the refugees.

A big negative morale factor within the camp had been the virtual lack of cigarettes and it seemed that all Cubans smoked. Several refugees had been picked up off post apparently while trying to find cigarettes, and cigarettes had become the medium of exchange within the camp. Daily cigarette sales within the compound were coordinated through the PX to alleviate what could have become a serious problem.

3. One source of refugee frustration that did become a serious problem was the slowness of the outprocessing system. After two weeks, only about 100 refugees had been released. Families were arriving to pick up relatives but they were being told that the refugees could not be released because they had not finished outprocessing. This all led to a growing sense of impatience, displayed in a series of demonstrations and culminating in a riot on 1 June (Annex A).

With the riot came a dramatic change in security at Fort Chaffee. Nearly 2000 soldiers from Fort Sill were flown in and organized into Task Force Collins (later TF III), responsible for providing perimeter security and two battery-size reaction forces. A barrier plan was established and the 489th Eng Bn was tasked with building a double strand concertina barrier around the entire refugee area. Military police patrols, both mounted and walking, were also established within the cantonment area.

On 6 June, it was decided to begin conducting "search and seizure" operations within the compound to seize contraband. The first operation was conducted on this date, and two 1/4-ton trailer loads of homemade weapons, liquor, and other miscellany were seized. Another such operation on 10 June yielded a still. There were no serious incidents involving refugees during this period, and considering the increased security, none were to be expected.

Effective at noon on 4 June, Cuban-American families looking for relatives would not be allowed on post. This measure was implemented largely due to the unrest and agitation which these families had caused. Families who were already on post were allowed to take their relatives and by noon on 7 June, no families remained on post. Effective that date, no refugees would be allowed to leave without complete processing.

4. By mid-June, the appropriate federal agencies began assuming responsibility for the refugee operation, and a Phase Down Plan for military strength reduction was approved. This would see the first reduction of security forces and the 47th Field Hospital turning over its operation to the Public Health Service.

In order to speed the release of the refugee population, a change in the outprocessing policy was announced on 26 June. The new policy allowed those refugees having close relatives (first cousin or closer) in the United States to be released without a final clearance. Additionally, the Department of Human and Health Services began separating unaccompanied minors from the rest of the compound, and those minors identified as having close relatives in the United States were given priority for processing and release.

5. This phase was highlighted by the celebration of Independence Day. A 50-gun salute was fired by members of III Corps Artillery and this, along with outdoor cook-outs, an arts and crafts fair, and various games, made it a memorable occasion for all, refugees and Task Force personnel.

ANNEX A (MAY/JUNE 1980 DISTURBANCES) to PART I to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. The series of demonstrations that occurred from 26 May to 1 June 1980 were generated by a mounting sense of impatience with the outprocessing system.

On 26 May 1980, the frustration came to a head when a demonstration of several hundred refugees, apparently agitated by families visiting relatives, began to run down the road parallel to the cantonment area and headed out a range road to the back gate of Fort Chaffee. An estimated 300 to 400 Cubans actually left the post and had to be collected by State and County police officers. While no one was seriously injured and no property damage was reported, the potential for trouble was immediately recognized.

This incident led to a strong reaction from the local community which was rife with rumors and a great deal of fear developed. As a result, on 27 May 1980, the Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, came to Fort Chaffee to express his concern over what he viewed as a lack of security and notified President Carter of the same. The Governor activated approximately 65 guardsmen to patrol the perimeter of Fort Chaffee, and Fort Sill was tasked to provide a 160-man reaction force which arrived on the afternoon of 27 May 1980.

Throughout the period of 26 May to 31 May 1980, demonstrations occurred daily, all with the same theme - - "Why aren't we being released?" Each demonstration dissipated after several hours without incident.

2. On 1 June, the lid blew off. Beginning at about noon, a group of refugees began throwing rocks and debris at cars near the main gate. At about 1330, a crowd of about 300 moved out into the street and headed out the main gate. They turned west down Highway 22 where they encountered state troopers who were lined up on Highway 22. When the mob encountered the state police, approximately 200 of the cubans turned back and headed for the compound; meanwhile, the remaining 100 or so engaged in a rock throwing contest with the state police, who managed to break up the crowd and return them to the compound. Injuries were sustained by both groups.

Around the same time, another group of about 100 refugees left the compound and headed toward Gate 5. US troops broke up the group and returned them to the compound. By late afternoon, it was estimated that the Cubans who had left the compound had been returned.

Then at 1800, a group of 300 to 400 Cubans, apparently angered by the earlier encounter with the State Police, moved to the main gate where State Troopers were positioned. They stoned State Police cars and the police fired a combination of warning shots and shots into the crowd. The mob returned into the compound where they began throwing rocks and set fire to two of the guard shacks.

By this time, there were about 1000 refugees involved and groups of refugees were running through the compound and in the street. Buildings were set on fire and military forces and US Marshals were being employed at all locations to bring the situation under control. The riot was broken up by about 2030 hours and order was restored to the area. All fires were extinguished and a 2200 hour curfew was declared to keep people inside.

At approximately 2200 hours, Governor Clinton arrived to reanalyze the security at Fort Chaffee. White House Aide, Gene Eidenberg and Tom Casey, head of FEMA, arrived around midnight to get a first hand look at the situation. Fort Sill Commander, MG Merritt, also arrived.

During the night of 1-2 June, 300 soldiers arrived from Fort Sill to assist in post security, and a Field Artillery Brigade of approximately 1000 soldiers training at Fort Chaffee was federalized to be used in support of the refugee operation (the brigade was stood down two days later).

3. It should be pointed out that during the course of the riot groups of Cubans assisted in putting out building fires and made attempts to assist in the restoration of order. At least one vigilante group of Cubans was searching for the instigators in an attempt to turn them over to the authorities.

4. A total of 37 Cubans were injured, of which nine were admitted to the hospital, primarily for gunshot and stab wounds. Two military personnel and one fireman received minor injuries which were treated and the personnel released. Five buildings were burned, of which two were completely destroyed.

PART II (TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION) to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

Annex A - Task Force Reorganization

Annex B - Attachment Orders

Annex C - Task Force Collins Organization


Annex D - Task Force III Organization

Annex E - DAACG Organization

Annex F - Task Force TDA

Annex G - US Army Garrison Fort Chaffee TDA

ANNEX A (TASK FORCE REORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report
 Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



* Includes Protocol, Processing Div, Postal & ADP.
 ** Includes G1 (1 EOC), G2, G3, G4, Engr, Comp, DAACG & Airfield Opns.
 *** Includes DPT Sec (Trng Aids), DPCA (AG, MSA).
 **** Dual hatted position, full time function in Garrison.
 *****Dual hatted position, Deputy Task Force Commander.

ANNEX B (ATTACHMENT ORDERS) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503

PERMANENT ORDERS 110-34

1 July 1980

United States Army Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional)
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905

Following organization/unit action directed.

Action: Attached for all purposes to US Army Garrison
(Semi-Active) Fort Chaffee, AR 72905

Assigned to: United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort
Sill, OK 73503

Effective date: 13 June 1980

Accounting classification: Appropriate allotments will be
obligated to the extent necessary (AR 37-100 series).
(Authority: DA message, DACA-BUE, 071630Z May 1980, subject:
CONUS Support of Cuban Refugee Situation, and FORSCOM message,
082015Z May 1980, subject: CONUS Support of Cuban Refugee
Situation)

Authority: AR 220-5 and confirms verbal orders of Commanding
General, 13 June 1980).

Additional Instructions: Individuals on temporary duty with the US
Army Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional), will be
attached to Headquarters Company (Provisional), US Army Garrison
Ft Chaffee (Semi-Active) for administration and exercise of
jurisdiction under the uniform code of Military Justice.

Format: 745

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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ATZR-AGAR (1)

ATZR-KMMN (5)

ATZR-DI (5)

HQDA (DAAG-AMO-D) Washington, DC 20314 (10)

HQDA (DAIO-FDA) Washington, DC 20310 (1)

HQDA (JAMH-NSO) Washington, DC 20314 (1)

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
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Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFFM-FS, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 (2)


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Cdr, US Army Task Force Resettlement Operation (Prov), Ft Chaffee,
AR 72905 (20)


Cdr, US Army Garrison (Semi-Active) Fort Chaffee, Fort Chaffee, AR
72905 (5)



ANNEX C (TASK FORCE COLLINS ORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee




ANNEX D (TASK FORCE III ORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



ANNEX E (DAACG ORGANIZATION) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

DAACG ORGANIZATION - PHASE II



Total Strength: 2 officers, 8 enlisted
(Medic and ambulance driver furnished by 47th Field Hospital)

ANNEX F (TASK FORCE TDA) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

US ARMY TASK FORCE RESETTLEMENT OPERATION (PROVISIONAL)

Section I General

1. CHANGES TO: This organization is provisional; and, therefore, does not supersede any previous document. The manning level given for a refugee population of 20,000 is required for the initial phase of operational regardless of refugee population. To insure that present levels of support continue during the transitory period, the commander is authorized to retain necessary Task Force Resettlement Operational military personnel until such time as adequate civilian personnel fill is attained.

2. LOCATION: Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905

3. ASSIGNMENT: US Army Field Artillery Center & Fort Sill, Fort Sill, OK 73503

4. DATE OF LAST MANPOWER SURVEY: Not applicable

5. MISSION: Under the command of the Commander, USAFACFS, the following mission is assigned to the Commander, United States Army Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional), Fort Chaffee, AR:

Operate a Refugee Resettlement Center capable of accommodating up to 20,000 refugees for a sustained period of time (3 to 18 months). Refugee Resettlement Center functions will include, but not be limited to, arrivals, processing, departures, and providing a 24-hour a day Emergency Operations Center.

6. CAPABILITIES:

a. Workloads: Refugee population (maximum) 20,000.

b. This organization requires support from the following organizations/TOE units:

(1) US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA 30330

(2) USAFACFS, Fort Sill, OK 73503

(3) US Army Garrison (Semi-Active), Fort Chaffee (Augmented), Fort Chaffee, AR 72905

(4) Type TOEs as follows:

Approximate Strength at:

<u>Type TOE</u>	<u>M+0</u>	<u>M+1</u>	<u>M+2</u>	<u>M+3</u>	<u>M+4</u>	<u>M+5</u>	<u>M+6</u>
Engineer Battalion (-)	178	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transportation Co	148	0	0	0	0	0	0
Signal Bde	55	40	40	30	20	20	10
Civil Affairs Bn		50	45	40	40	30	30
PSYOPS Bn		30	18	10	8	8	8
Field Hospital (-) (Med Detachments)	220	220	220	0	0	0	0
Personnel Service Co	250	0	0	0	0	0	0
*Guard Personnel (Any type TOE) USNG, USAR		1500	1500	1000	500	500	500
Detail Co (any type TOE)	200	0	0	0	0	0	0
*Military Police	386	800	500	400	300	200	150

*Increased strength due to riot control.

(5) Other than Department of Army agencies:

Park Police

US Marshals

Public Health Service (PHS)

FBI

CIA

Red Cross

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

GSA


Various Volunteer Organizations (Church, etc)

7. TENANCY: This organization is a tenant of US Army Garrison (Semi-Active), Fort Chaffee (Augmented), Fort Chaffee, AR 72905.

8. AUTHORIZATION STATEMENT: Not applicable.

US ARMY TASK FORCE RESETTLEMENT OPERATION (PROV)

ORGANIZATION CHART



* Dual hatted position. Position recognized on Garrison (Augmented) TDA.

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.
DATE

1DA MDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BP	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMM
PAR	LINE									
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
001	00	Task Force Headquarters								
	01	Commander	FM	BG		00B00			1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	02	Deputy Cdr	FM	06		13A00	FA	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	03	Deputy Cdr/Garrison	FC	06		13A00	FA	K	0 - 0	- 0 - 0
	04	Chief of Staff	FM	05		13A00	FA	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	05	Aide-de-Camp	FM	02		13A00	FA	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	06	Secy Steno	FCT	06		00318	GS	C	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	07	Clerk Steno	FCT	04		00312	GS	C	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
									TOTAL	6 - 6 - 6 - 6
002	00	Headquarters Commandant								
	01	Headquarters Comdt	FC	05		13A00	FA	K	0 - 0	- 0 - 0
									TOTAL	0 - 0 - 0 - 0
003	00	G1								
	01	G1 Off	FM	04		40A00	AG	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	02	Historian	FM	02		00A00		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	03	Protocol Off	FM	02		13A00	FA	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
									TOTAL	3 - 3 - 3 - 3
003A	00	Admin/Postal/Typing Pool								
	01	Postal Clerk	FM	E4		71LF5		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	02	Msg Center Clerk	FM	E3		71L10		I	2 - 2	- 2 - 1
	03	ID Clerk	FM	E5		71L20		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1
	04	Clerk Typist	FCT	03		00322	GS	C	3 - 3	- 3 - 3
	05	Mail Clerk	FCT	03		00305	GS	C	1 - 1	- 1 - 0
									TOTAL	8 - 8 - 8 - 6
003B	00	Processing Div								
	01	Chief	FM	03		42A00	AG	K	1 - 0	- 0 - 0

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

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PAR	LINE									
	02	Processing Supv	FM	E8	71L50	NC	I	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	03	Processing Clerk	FCT	04	00301	GS	C	2 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	04	Mtr Veh Operator	FCT	04	05703	WG	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
								TOTAL	5 - 0 - 0 - 0	
003C	00	Statistics Branch								
	01	Chief	FM	E6	71L30	NC	I	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	02	Statistics Sp	FM	E4	71L10		I	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	03	Statistical Clerk	FCT	04	01531	GS	C	7 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	04	Clerk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	4 - 0 - 0 - 0		
								TOTAL	13 - 0 - 0 - 0	
003D	00	Photo Br								
	01	Chief	FM	E5	75E20		I	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	02	Photographer	FCT	04	01060	GS	C	2 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	03	Office Mach Op	FCT	02	00350	GS	C	2 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	04	Clerk Typist	FCT	02	00322	GS	C	4 - 0 - 0 - 0		
								TOTAL	9 - 0 - 0 - 0	
003E	00	ADP Division								
	01	ADP Sp Staff Off	FM	W0	741A0		P	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	02	Gen Comm Eq Op Supv	FCT	05	00392	GS	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	03	Gen Comm Eq Op	FCT	04	00392	GS	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	04	Gen Comm Eq Op	FCT	03	00392	GS	C	3 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	05	Supv Key Punch Op	FCT	05	00356	GS	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	06	Key Punch Op	FCT	04	00356	GS	C	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	07	Key Punch Op	FCT	03	00356	GS	C	5 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	08	Key Punch Op	FCT	02	00356	GS	C	2 - 0 - 0 - 0		
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**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
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TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

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	02	Data Anal Sp	FM	E5	75DW5		I	2 - 2	- 2 - 2	
	03	Data Anal Sp	FM	E4	75DW5		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
								TOTAL	4 - 4	- 4 - 4
004	00	Provost Marshal								
	01	PM	FM	04	31A00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	02	Op Off	FM	03	31A00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	03	Op Off	FM	03	31B00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 0	X
	04	USAR/USARNG Liaison Off		03	31A00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	X
	05	Physical Sec Off	FM	02	31D00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	06	Admin Off	FM	02	42A00	MP	K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	07	Op Sgt	FM	E8	95B50	NC	I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	08	Physical Sec NCO	FM	E6	95B30	NC	I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	09	Asst Op NCO	FM	E5	95B20	NC	I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	10	Admin Sp	FM	E5	71L20	NC	I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	11	Clerk Typist	FM	E3	71L10		I	6 - 6	- 6 - 6	
	12	Detective	FC	07	00083	GS	C	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
								TOTAL	17 - 17	- 17 - 16
005	00	Emergency Opns Ctr (EOC)								
	01	G3/EOC Chief	FM	05	54A00		K	1 - 0	- 0 - 0	
	02	G3/EOC Chief	FM	04	54A00		K	0 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	03	Opns Off	FM	04	54A00		K	2 - 2	- 2 - 2	
	04	Resource Mgt Off	FS	04	45B00		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	
	05	Engineer Off	FC	04		EN	K	0 - 0	- 0 - 0	X
	06	G4 Log Off	FM	04	70A00		K	1 - 1	- 0 - 0	

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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

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	09	G2 Intel Off	FM	03	36A00		K	1 - 0	- 0 - 0		
	10	G1 Pers Off	FM	03	40A00		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 0		
	11	Opns NCO	FM	E7	13E40	NC	I	3 - 3	- 3 - 3		
	12	Log NCO	FM	E7	76Y40	NC	I	3 - 0	- 0 - 0		
	13	Pers NCO	FM	E7	75Z40	NC	I	2 - 2	- 2 - 2		
	14	Intel NCO	FM	E7	96D40	NC	I	1 - 0	- 0 - 0		
	15	Clerk Typist	FM	E4	71L10		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1		
	16	Engineer Coord	FC	11		GS	C	0 - 0	- 0 - 0	XH	
	17	Engineer Coord	FC			GS	C	0 - 0	- 0 - 0	XJ	
								TOTAL	19 -14	-14 -13	
005A	00	Interpreter Pool									
	01	Chief	FM	02	36ASS		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	XC	
	02	Interpreter Ldr	FM	E6	96B3L	NC	I	10 - 4	- 4 - 4	XC	
	03	Interpreter	FM	E5	96B2L		I	50 - 8	- 8 - 8	XC	
	04	Interpreter	FM	E4	96B1L		I	70 - 32	- 32 - 20	XC	
	05	Interpreter	FM	E3	96B1L		I	70 - 31	- 31 - 20	XC	
								TOTAL	201 -76	-76 -53	
005B	00	DAACG									
	01	Cdr, DAACG	FM	03	95A00		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 0		
	02	Airfield OIC	FM	02	15A00		K	1 - 1	- 1 - 1		
	03	Shift NCO	FM	E6	13E30	NC	I	2 - 1	- 1 - 0	XC	
	04	Asst Shift NCO/Driver	FM	E5	13E20		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 0	XC	
	05	Airfield Opn NCO	FM	E6	71P30	NC	I	2 - 1	- 1 - 1		
	06	Airfield Admin Sp	FM	E5	71L20		I	2 - 1	- 1 - 1		

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	HR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RM
PAR	LINE									
#			d	e	f	g				
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	08	Passenger Asst	FM	E4	71P10		I	2 - 1	- 1 - 1	1
								TOTAL	11 - 7	- 7 - 4
005C	00	Airfield								
	01	Pilot	FM	W0	100B0	1P	P	2 - 2	- 2 - 2	2
	02	Avn Mech	FM	E4	67N10		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	1
	03	POL Sp	FM	E3	76W10		I	1 - 1	- 1 - 1	1
								TOTAL	4 - 4	- 4 - 4

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
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TDA

MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMP
PAR	LINE									
006	00	Hospital Augmentation								
	01	Commander	HS 06	60A00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	02	Ch Professional Svcs	HS 05	61H00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	03	Ch Nursing Svcs	HS 05	66A00	AN	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	04	Psychiatrist	HS 05	60U00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	05	Radiologist	HS 04	61S00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	06	Clin Lab Off	HS 03	68F00	MS	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	07	Prev Medicine Off	HS 03	60C00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	08	Pediatrician	HS 03	61P00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	09	OB/Gyn	HS 03	60J00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	10	Psychiatric Nurse	HS 03	66C00	AN	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	11	Pharmacist	HS 02	68H00	MS	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	12	Psychiatric Sp	HS E5	91G20	NC	I		2 - 2 - 0 - 0		
								TOTAL	13 - 13 - 0 - 0	
006A	00	Operating Room								
	01	General Surgeon	HS 04	61J00	MC	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	02	Anesthesist	HS 03	66F00	AN	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	03	OR Nurse	HS 03	66E00	AN	K		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
								TOTAL	3 - 3 - 0 - 0	
006B	00	Troop Medical Clinic (TMC)								
	01	Family Practitioner	HS 03	61H00	MC	K		4 - 4 - 0 - 0		
	02	Nurse Practitioner	HS 03	66H8E	AN	K		4 - 4 - 0 - 0		
	03	Med Surg Nurse	HS 03	66H00	AN	K		4 - 4 - 0 - 0		

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	RR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAP	LINE									
#	#		d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
							TOTAL	12 - 12	- 0	- 0
006C	00	Emergency Room (ER)								
	01	Head Nurse	HS	03	66H00	AN	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	02	Med Surg Nurse	HS	02	66H00	AN	K	4 - 4	- 0	- 0
	03	Community Health Nurse	HS	03	66B00	AN	K	2 - 2	- 0	- 0
							TOTAL	7 - 7	- 0	- 0
006D	00	Surgical Ward								
	01	Head Nurse	HS	03	66H00	AN	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	02	Med Surg Nurse	HS	02	66H00	AN	K	4 - 4	- 0	- 0
							TOTAL	5 - 5	- 0	- 0
006E	00	Med OB/Ped								
	01	Head Nurse	HS	03	66H00	AN	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	02	Med Surg Nurse	HS	02	66H00	AN	K	2 - 2	- 0	- 0
	03	OB Nurse	HS	03	66G00	AN	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	04	Pediatric Nurse	HS	03	66D00	AN	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
							TOTAL	5 - 5	- 0	- 0
006F	00	Dental Clinic								
	01	Oral Surgeon	HS	04	63N00	DC	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	02	Gen Dentistry	HS	03	63A00	DC	K	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	03	Dental Sp	HS	E7	91E40	NC	I	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	04	Dental Asst	FS	E5	91E20	NC	I	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
	05	Dental Asst	HS	E4	91E10		I	1 - 1	- 0	- 0
							TOTAL	5 - 5	- 0	- 0

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BP	IN	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMP
PAR	LINE									
a	b		d	e	f	g		h	i	j
005G	00	Food Service								
	01	Cooks	FCT 08	07404	WG	C		8 - 8 - 0 - 0		
	02	Asst Cooks	FCT 05	07404	WG	C		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
							TOTAL	9 - 9 - 0 - 0		
005H	00	Food Inspection								
	01	Food Insp/NCOIC	FM E6	94F30	NC	I		1 - 1 - 0 - 0		
	02	Food Insp	FM E4	94F10		I		3 - 3 - 0 - 0		
							TOTAL	4 - 4 - 0 - 0		

NOTE: Overall augmentation to the Field Hospital TOE is tailored to the Medical Intelligence Estimate received during the initial planning phase of the refugee build-up. After 30-60 days of operation, the majority of the Hospital Function is contracted out to a local hospital. The Public Health Service (PHS), which is not a Department of the Army Agency, continues a Preventive Medicine and Troop Medical Clinic for the remainder of the sustained operation.

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO. _____
DATE _____

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BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES _____

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMR
PAR	LINE									
			d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
		NONSTANDARD PERSONNEL REMARKS:								
		XA - Dual Position. Position is recognized as Commander, US Army Garrison (Semi-Active) Fort Chaffee (Augmented).								
		XB - Necessary personnel will be drawn from the Interpreter Pool, Paragraph 004A.								
		XC - MOS Immaterial								
		XD - Dual Position. Position recognized on US Army Garrison (Semi-Active) Fort Chaffee (Augmented) TDA. Para 011 Line 01								
		XE - Filled by ADT Reservist. Must be replaced by FORSCOM military by 1 Aug 80.								
		XF - Filled by ADT Reservist. Does not require replacement								
		XG - Dual Position. Position recognized on Garrison TDA. Para 010 Line 01								
		XH - Dual Position. Position recognized on Garrison TDA. Para 014 Line 01								
		XJ - Dual Position. Position recognized on Garrison TDA. Para 013 Line 01								

ANNEX G (US ARMY GARRISON FORT CHAFFEE TDA) to PART II to VOLUME III to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

US ARMY GARRISON (SEMI-ACTIVE) FORT CHAFFEE (AUGMENTED)

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

SECTION I GENERAL

1. CHANGES TO: This document is to be implemented for support of Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional) in lieu of TDA TCWOVBAA, CCNUM TCO180 and TCO181. In case where a military requirement is shown on the TDA but the function could be performed by a civilian, the Commander may, at his discretion, replace the military with civilian hire. Personnel, equipment, and other support will be released or discontinued when no longer needed.

2. LOCATION: Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72901.

3. ASSIGNMENT: US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503.

4. DATE OF LAST SURVEY: Not applicable.

5. MISSION: Under the command of the Commander, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the following mission is assigned to the Commander, United States Army Garrison (semi-active) Fort Chaffee (augmented) for Task Force Resettlement Operations (Provisional), Fort Chaffee, AR:

a. Provide, within available resources and limitations, all services necessary for the operation, security, and maintenance of the physical plant and facilities of the installation and satellited facilities.

b. Operate a transportation motor pool to serve the garrison, task force, and all assigned/attached units; and to maintain and repair all administrative, commercial, and tactical-type vehicles to include on-vehicle equipment, plus all vehicles on hand-receipt due to Task Force Resettlement Operations.

c. Provide transportation movement services to members of all branches of the Armed Forces within the assigned area of responsibility, i.e., 16 counties in Arkansas and 10 counties in Oklahoma, to include but not limited to, shipping household goods and effects, arranging for military and dependent travel, and moving in-bound and out-bound freight.

d. Provide appropriate support for active army, retired personnel, and eligible dependents.

e. Operate and maintain an Equipment Pool to support the Task Force and the garrison to include performing organizational and DS/GS maintenance.

f. Maintain adequate records in all areas to provide historical information.

g. Provide Equal Employment Opportunity and Community Action Programs consistent with workforce and community requirements.

h. Provide all garrison type support for the Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional) and all assigned/attached troop units. The level of support provided must be adequate to accommodate up to 20,000 refugees for a sustained period (3 to 18 months). Garrison support includes, but not is limited to, administration, logistics, housekeeping, messing, normal security, and recreational services.

6. CAPABILITIES:

a. Workloads:

(1) Average Post Population (at peak refugee population):

Military (includes those on compassionate assignment and awaiting retirement)_____	16
DA civilian (permanent hire)_____	127
Military personnel to support refugees_____	2,603
Civilian personnel to support refugees_____	553
Contractor employees (EST)_____	907
Refugee population (maximum)_____	20,000

(2) Motor Pool Operations. General transportation administrative motor vehicles supported_____ 423

(3) Facilities:

(a) Buildings_____ 4,856,000 sq ft

(b) Acreage_____ 71,080 acres Federally owned
883 acres leased

(c) Surfaced area_____ 3,454,750 sq yds
Hardstand_____ 1,106,965 sq yds

(d) Railroads_____ 7.75 miles connected with MoPAC

(e) Utilities:

Sewage Distribution----- 364,424 lin ft (plus 127,000 lin ft Air Distribution System and 56 acres Sewage Treatment Lagoon)

Gas Distribution----- 123,225

Electric Distribution----- 505,985

Water Distribution----- 307,599

(f) Range firing through entire year.

b. This organization requires support from the following organizations/
TOE units:

(1) US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA 30330

(2) USAFACFS, Fort Sill, OK 73503


(3) Military Police units at approximately 600 total strength to provide security and an immediate reaction force for the Task Force Resettlement Operation (Provisional). Military Police are under the control of the Fort Chaffee Provost Marshal.

(4) Contract Personnel. Approximately 1,300 personnel for custodial, refuse collection, air security, KP/cooks, and religious support.

7. TENANCY: Not applicable.

8. AUTHORIZATION STATEMENT: Not applicable.

US ARMY GARRISON (SEMI-ACTIVE)
FORT CHAFFEE (AUGMENTED)



**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO.
DATE

TDA M1DA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BA	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RM
PAP	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
001	00	Installation Cdr								
	01	Commander	FC	06		K		1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	02	Executive Asst	FC	13	00301	GS		1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	03	Secretary/Steno	FC	05	00318	GS	C	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
TOTAL								3 - 3 - 3 - 3		
002	00	PAO								
	01	PAO	FM	05	46A00		K	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	02	Comm Rel Off	FM	04	46A00		K	1 - 1 - 1 - 0		
	03	Secretary	FCT	03	00312	GS	C	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
TOTAL								3 - 3 - 3 - 2		
002A	00	Command Info Ofc								
	01	Command Info Off	FM	04	46A00		K	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	02	Journalist	FM	E4	71020		I	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	03	Journalist	FM	E3	71020		I	1 - 1 - 1 - 0		
	04	Photographer	FCT			GS	C	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
TOTAL								4 - 4 - 4 - 3		
002B	00	Public Info Ofc								
	01	Public Info Off	FM	04	46A00		K	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	02	Public Aff Supv	FM	E6	71030		I	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	03	Journalist	FM	E4	71030		I	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
	04	Journalist	FM	E3	71010		I	1 - 1 - 1 - 0		
	05	Journalist	FCT	04		GS	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	06	Photographer	FCT	04		GS	C	1 - 0 - 0 - 0		
	07	Clerk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1 - 1 - 1 - 1		
TOTAL								7 - 5 - 5 - 4		

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MST STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMY
PAP	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g				
003	00	SJA								
	01	SJA	FM	04	55A00	JA	K	1 - 1	1 - 1	
	02	Legal Off	FM	03	55000	IA	K	1 - 1	1 - 0	XD
	03	Legal Clerk	FM	E5	71020		I	1 - 1	1 - 1	
	04	Clerk Typ	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1 - 1	1 - 0	
004	00	Civilian Pers Ofc						TOTAL	4 - 4	4 - 2
	01	Supv Pers Mgt Sp	FS	11	00201	GS	C	1 - 1	1 - 1	
	02	Pers Staff Sp	FS	11	00212	GS	C	1 - 1	1 - 0	
	03	Pos Class Sp	FS	11	00221	GS	C	1 - 1	1 - 1	
	04	Pers Clerk	FS	05	00203	GS	C	1 - 1	1 - 1	
	05	Clerk Typ	FCT	04	00322	GS	C	2 - 2	2 - 2	
	06	Clerk Typ	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	2 - 2	1 - 0	
								TOTAL	8 - 8	7 - 5

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

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TDA [] MTDA []

TO: []

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MCS	BP	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMB
PAP	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g	A	i	j	k
005	00	Chaplain								
	01	Chaplain	FM	05	56A00	CH	K	1-1	0-0	
	02	Chaplain	FM	04	56A00	CH	K	1-1	1-0	
	03	Chaplain	FM	03	56A00	CH	K	0-0	1-1	
	04	Chapel Act Sp	FM	E4	71M10		I	1-1	1-1	
	05	Chapel Acct Sp	FM	E3	71M10		I	1-1	1-0	
	06	Interperter	FM	E4	96B1L		I	0-0	0-0	XL
	07	Clerk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	0-0	
								TOTAL	5-5	4-2
006	00	PM								
	01	PM		04	31A00	MP	K	0-0	0-0	XP

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
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DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MST STRUCTURE CODE	REG	ADJN	RMP	
PAR #	LINE #										
		Source									
007	00	Dir of Fin Mgt									
	01	Director	04	45B00		K		0-0	0-0	XL	
007A	00	Budget Div									
	01	Supv Bud Anal	FC			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	02	Bud Anal	FS			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	03	Bud Anal	FC			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	04	Acct Tech (Typ)	FC			GS	c	2-2	2-2		
	05	Clerk Typ	FCT			GS	c	3-2	2-1		
								TOTAL	8-7	7-6	
007B	00	Mil Pay Div									
	01	Finance Off	FM	02			K	1-1	1-1		
	02	Pay Sp	FM	F4			I	1-1	1-1		
	03	Pay Sp	FM	E3			I	1-1	1-1		
	04	Clerk Typ	FCT	03	00322	GS	c	2-2	2-1		
								TOTAL	5-5	5-4	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
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BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMA	
PAR A	LINE B										
		Source									
008	00	Dir Op & Admin (DPT/DPCA/DSEC)									
	01	Dir	FC	05	11A00	IN	O	1-1	1-1		
	02	Secretary (Typ)	FC	04	00318	GS	c	1-1	1-1		
								TOTAL	2-2	2-2	
008A	00	Admin Svcs Div									
	01	Admin Off	FC	11	00341	GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	02	Admin Sp (Pub/Rep)	FM	E5	71L20		I	2-2	2-1		
	03	Mail Clerk/Driver	FM	E4	71L10		I	1-1	1-1		
	04	Clk Typ	FCT	03	00322	GS	c	2-2	2-2		
	05	Offset Press Op	FC	07	04417	WG	c	1-1	1-1		
								TOTAL	7-7	7-6	
008B	00	Postal Br									
	01	Chief	FM	02	42B00	AG		1-1	1-1		
	02	Postal Clerk	FM	E4	71LFS			2-2	2-2		
	03	Postal Clerk	FM	E3	71LFS			1-1	1-1		
	04	Teller	FCT			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	05	Mail Del Clerk	FCT			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
	06	Clerk Typist	FCT			GS	c	1-1	1-1		
								TOTAL	7-7	7-7	

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

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BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY M.J.T. STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMP
PAR	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g				
0083	00	Rec Svc Div								
	01	Rec Svcs Off	FCT	03	43C00	AG	K	1-1	1-1	XE
	02	Rec Svcs NCO	FCT	E6	11B30	NC	E	1-1	1-1	XEXF
	03	Asst Rec Svcs Off	FCT	04		GS	c	1-1	1-1	XE
	04	Rec Asst	FCT	03		GS	c	3-3	3-3	
	05	Rec Asst	FCT	02		GS	c	5-5	5-5	XJ
TOTAL								11-11	11-11	
0085	00	Training/AV Spt Center								
	01	TASC Director	FC	09	00301	GS	c	1-1	1-1	
	02	Illustrator	FC	09	01020	GS	c	1-1	1-1	
	03	Tng Aids Sp	FC	07	00301	GS	c	1-1	1-1	
	04	Photographer	FCT	05	01060	GS	c	2-2	2-1	
	05	Sup Clk (Typing)	FC	05	02005	GS	c	1-1	1-1	
	06	Mdl Mkr Wood	FC	12	04614	WG	c	1-1	1-1	
	07	Mdl Mkr Wood	FC	11	04614	WG	c	1-1	1-1	
	08	Mdl Mkr Wood	FCT	09	04614	WG	c	1-1	1-1	
	09	Sign Painter	FCT	09	04104	WG	c	2-2	1-1	
	10	Warehouseman	FCT	05		WG	c	2-2	2-1	
	11	Laborer	FCT	04		WG	c	1-1	1-1	
TOTAL								14-14	13-11	

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TDA MTD A

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BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR	LINE									
		Source								
008E	00	Range Con Div								
	01	Range Con Off	FC	02	13A00	FA	K	1-1	1-1	
	02	Range NCO	FC	E6	11B30	NC	E	1-1	1-1	
	03	Asst Range NCO	FC	E5	13B20	NC	E	1-1	1-1	
	04	Asst Range NCO	FC	E4	13B10		E	1-1	1-1	
	05	Arty/SA Range Off	FC	07	00301	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	5-5	5-5

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
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MEUA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY REG STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	EMP
PAR	LINE									
		Source								
009	00	Dir of Industrial Opns								
	01	Director	FC	05	70A00	QM	O	1-1	1-1	
	02	Deputy Director	FM	04	70A00	QM	O	1-1	0-0	
	03	Secretary	FC	05	00318	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	3-3	2-2
009A	00	Plans/opns/MGI Div								
	01	Supply Tech	FM	W0	761A0	QM	P	1-1	1-1	
	02	Ch Sup Sgt	FM	E6	76Y30	NC	I	1-1	1-0	
	03	Clk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	2-2	1-1	
								TOTAL	4-4	3-2
009B	00	Supply Div								
	01	Supply Mgt Off	FM	11	02003	GS	K	1-1	1-1	
	02	Clk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	2-2	2-2
009C	00	Property Control Br								
	01	Supply Officer	FC	07	02005	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Accts Tech	FCT	05	00525	GS	C	1-1	1-0	
	03	Purchasing Agt	FC	07	01105	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	04	Purchasing Clk	FCT	04	01105	GS	C	1-1	1-0	
	05	Supply Clk	FC	05	02005	GS	C	2-2	2-2	
	06	Supply Clk	FCT	05	02005	GS	C	2-2	2-1	
	07	Supply Clk	FCT	04	02005	GS	C	2-2	2-1	
	08	Data Trans	FC	03	00356	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	09	Mtr Veh Op	FC	06	05703	WG	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	12-12	12-8

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TDA MTOA

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BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR #	LINE #									
		Source	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
009D	00	Stor/Inv Con Br								
	01	Whsmn FMN	FC	06	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Supply Clk	FCT	03	02005	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	2-2	2-2	
009E	00	Pol Section								
	01	Fuel Sys Dist Op Ldr	FCT	06	05413	WL	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Heavy MVO	FCT	07	05703	WG	C	1-1	1-1	
	03	Pump Attendant	FCT	06	05413	WG	C	4-3	3-2	
	04	Supply Clk	FCT	03	02005	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	7-6	6-5	
009F	00	R & V Whse Section								
	01	Whsemn Ldr	FC	05	06907	WL	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Whsemn	FC	05	06907	WG	C	1-1	1-1	
	03	Whsemn	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	3-3	3-3	
009G	00	Rec/Iss/Inv Con Sec								
	01	Whse FMN	FCT	04	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Whse Ldr	FCT	04	06907	WL	C	2-2	2-1	
	03	Inv Specialist	FCT	04	02005	GS	C	5-5	5-2	
	04	Supply Clk	FCT	03	02005	GS	C	2-1	1-1	
	05	Whsemn	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	10-9	9-3	
							TOTAL	20-18	18-8	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA

MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BP	ID	ARMY MST STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMP
PAR	LINE									
		Source								
09H	00	Services Division								
	01	Chief	FM				1-1	1-1		
	02	Adm NCO	FM				1-1	0-0		
	03	Secy/Typist	FCT	04	00318	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	3-3	2-2
09I	00	Laundry Branch								
	01	Chief	FS	07	01960	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Clerk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	2-2	2-2
09J	00	Laundry Opn Section								
	01	Chief	FCT	02	07403	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Laundry Worker Leader	FCT	02	07304	WL	C	5-5	4-2	
	03	Laundry Worker	FCT	02	07304	WG	C	12-12	10-6	
								TOTAL	18-18	15-9
09K	00	Shipping/Receiving Sec								
	01	Whse FMN	FCT	04	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Shift Leader	FCT	04	06907	WL	C	1-1	0-0	
	03	Ship/Rec Clk	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	6-6	4-3	
	04	Laundry Wkr	FCT	02	07304	WG	C	6-6	6-6	WAE
	05	Fork Lift Op	FCT	05	05704	WG	C	3-3	2-1	
	06	Whseman	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	12-12	8-6
09L	00	Whse Del Branch								
	01	Whse FMN	FCT	04	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Whse ldr (shift ldr)	FCT	04	06907	WL	C	1-0	0-0	
	03	Whseman	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	16-12	10-8	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX	PAR LINE	DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	RFO	AUTH	RMR
	04	Clerk	FCT	02	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	19-14	12-10	
09M	00	Food Svc/Comsy br								
	01	Chief	FS	07	01960	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Food Svc Tech	FM				W	1-1	1-1	
	03	Food Svc Advisor	FM				I	1-1	1-0	
	04	Food Svc Supv	FM				I	2-2	1-1	
	05	Clerk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	6-6	5-4	
09N	00	Child Care Sec								
	01	Nurse/Dietician	FM				K	1-1	1-1	
	02	Clk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	03	Food Svc Worker	FCT	02	07408	WG	C	9-9	6-4	
							TOTAL	11-11	8-6	
09O	00	Iss/Storage Section								
	00	Ofc of Chief								
	01	Chief	FS	09	2005	GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	1-1	1-1	
09P	00	Adm Unit								
	01	Acct Maint Clk	FCT	04	00525	GS	C	7-7	5-4	
	02	Clk Typist	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	3-3	2-2	
							TOTAL			
09Q	00	Cold Storage Unit								
	01	Whse FMN	FCT	04	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Whse Ldr	FCT	04	06907	WI	C	2-2	2-2	
	03	Whseman	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	23-23	16-10	
							TOTAL	26-26	19-13	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MEDIA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REG	AUTH	RMA	
PAR	LINE										
		Source									
09R	00	Dry Storage Unit									
	01	Whse FMN	FCT	04	06907	WS	C	1-1	1-1		
	02	Whse Ldr	FCT	04	06907	WL	C	2-2	2-2		
	03	Whseman	FCT	04	06907	WG	C	23-23	16-10		
								TOTAL	26-26	19-13	
09S	00	Procurement Div									
	01	Contr Off	FS	09	01102	GS	C	3-1	1-1		
	02	Proc Clk	FCT	04	01106	GS	C	3-2	2-2		
								TOTAL	6-3	3-3	
09T	00	Movements Div									
	01	Traffic Mg	FC	09	02101	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	02	Gen Trans Sp	FC	07	02101	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	03	Travel Clk	FC	05	02132	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	04	Shipment Clk	FCT	03	02134	GS	C	2-2	1-1		
	05	Traffic Coord	FCT	08	07003	WG	C	1-0	0-0		
								TOTAL	6-5	4-4	
09U	00	Motor Pool Maint Div									
	01	Mtr Trans Off	FC	10	02150	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	02	Adm Asst	FC	06	02150	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	03	Disp	FC	04	02151	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	04	Disp	FCT	03	02151	GS	C	3-3	2-1		
	05	Acct Tech	FCT	05	00525	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
	06	Driver Tester	FCT	04	0303	GS	C	1-1	1-0		
	07	Clk/Typ	FCT	03	0322	GS	C	2-2	2-1		
	08	Gate Guards	FCT	03	0085	GS	C	4-4	4-4		
								TOTAL	14-14	13-10	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK	
PAP	LINE										
a	b		d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	
		Source									
09V	00	Operations									
	01	Ldr MVO	FCT	07	05703			2-2	2-2		
	02	MVO	FM					34-34	0-0	XM	
	03	MVO	FC	08	05703			1-1	1-1		
	04	MVO	FCT	07	05703			89-89	88-60	XN	
		PARA TOTAL							126-126	91-63	
09W	00	Maint Br									
	01	Auto Mech FMN	FC	08	05823	WS	C	1-1	1-1		
	02	Auto Mech FMN	FM	03	05823	WG	K	1-1	1-1		
	03	Auto Mech	FM	10	05823	WG	K	6-6	5-3		
	04	Electronice Mech	FC	11	02614	WG	C	1-1	1-1		
	05	Electronics Worker	FCT	08	02614	WG	C	4-3	2-1		
	06	Auto Mech	FC	10	05823	WG	C	4-4	4-4		
	07	Auto Mech	FCT	08	05823	WG	C	17-17	14-10		
	08	Tool & Parts Man	FCT	05	05823	WG	C	2-2	2-1		
		PARA TOTAL							36-36	30-22	

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g				
010	00	DFAE								
	01	Facilities Eng	FC	05	21000	EN	K	1-1	1-1	
	02	Secretary (Typing)	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	2-2	2-2	
010A	00	Eng Plans & Environ								
	01	Supv Gen Eng	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	02	Civil Eng	FM	03	21000	EN	O	1-1	1-1	
	03	Mech Eng	FM	03	21000	EN	O	1-1	1-1	
	04	Elec Tech	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	05	Eng Tech (Inspector)	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	06	Realty Sp	FCT			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	07	Eng Tech Aid	FCT			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	08	Eng Draftsman	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	09	Sec/Steno	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	10	Clerk Typist	FCT			GS	C	1-1	1-1	
	11	Maint Mech Insp	FCT			WG	C	3-3	3-3	
							TOTAL	13-13	13-13	
010B	00	Work Coordinating Ofc								
	01	Supv Ind Eng	FC			GS	C	1-1	1-1	

**DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO.
DATE

TDA MTD A

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPLETION OF CHANGES

FUND	LINE	DESCRIPTION	Source	GRADE	MOS	HP	ED	ARMY MILITARY STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	MARK
	02	Ind Eng Tech (Estimator)	FC						1-1	1-1	
	03	Ind Eng Tech (Estimator)	FM	E7	51P00				1-1	1-1	
	04	Accounting Tech (Budget)	FC						1-1	1-1	
	05	Lead Work Order Clerk	FC						1-1	1-1	
	06	Accts Maint Clerk	FCT						1-1	1-1	
	07	Work Order Clerk	FM	E3	71110				2-2	2-1	
	08	Work Order Clerk	FCT						3-2	2-2	
								TOTAL	11-10	10-09	
010C	00	Billeting Ofc									
	01	Shift Leader	FCT						2-2	2-1	
	02	Assignment Clerks	FM	E3					2-2	1-1	
	03	Assignment Clerk	FCT						1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	5-5	4-3	
010D	00	Sup Ofc									
	01	Whseman, Foreman	FC						1-1	1-1	
	02	Whseman	FC						1-1	1-1	
	03	Whseman	FCT						1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	3-3	3-3	
010E	00	Util & Poll Control Div									
	01	Supr Engr	FC		00802			539961K1000	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	1-1	1-1	
010F	00	Maint/Mech Br									
	01	Maint Mech Foreman	FC		05451			539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	1-1	1-1	
010G	00	Plumbing Sec									
	01	Plumber Foreman	FC		04206			539961K9000	1-1	1-1	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA

MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
	02	Plumber Leader	FC	04206	WL	c	539961K9000	5-5	5-5	XA
	03	Plumber	FCT	04206	WG	c	539961K9000	18-18	18-18	XA
	04	Plumber, Helper	FCT	04206	WG	c	539961K9000	5-5	5-5	XA
							TOTAL	29-29	29-29	
010H	00	Heating Sec								
	01	Boiler Pl Eq Mech FMN	FC	05309	WS	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	02	Boiler Pl Eq Mech FMN (Hi-Pressure)	FC	05309	WS	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	03	Boiler Pl Eq Mech Ldr (Hi-Pressure)	FC	05309	WL	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	04	Boiler Pl Eq Mech Ldr (Hi-Pressure)	FCT	05309	WL	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	05	Boiler Pl Eq Mech Ldr	FCT	05309	WL	c	539961K9000	2-2	2-2	XA
	06	Boiler Pl Opr (Hi-Pressure)	FCT	05402	WG	c	539961J4210	6-6	6-6	XA
	07	Kit Eq Appl Mech	FCT	05309	WG	c	539961K9000	5-5	5-5	XA
	08	Boiler Pl Mech	FCT	05309	WG	c	539961K9000	5-5	5-5	XA
	09	Boiler Pl Eq Mech helper	FCT	05309	WG	c	539961K9000	4-4	4-4	XA
							TOTAL	26-26	26-26	
010I	00	Refrigeration Sec								
	01	A/C Eq Mech FMN	FC	05306	WS	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	02	A/C Eq Mech Ldr	FC	05306	WL	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	03	A/C Eq Mech Ldr	FCT	05306	WL	c	539961K9000	3-3	3-3	XA
	04	A/C Eq Mech	FCT	05306	WG	c	539961K9000	8-8	8-8	XA
	05	A/C Eq Mech Helper	FCT	05306	WG	c	539961K9000	3-3	3-3	XA
							TOTAL	16-16	16-16	
010J	00	Sanitation Br								
	01	Util Opr Sup	FC	05451	WS	c	539961J1000	1-1	1-1	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA

MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MST STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR	LINE									
1	2		d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
	02	Utility Opr Ldr	FC	05451	WL	c	539961J1000	1-1	1-1	
	03	Watr Trmt Opr	FCT	05409	WG	c	539961J1000	3-3	3-3	
							TOTAL	5-5	5-5	
010K	00	Electrical Br								
	01	Elect Inst Maint Foreman	FC	02801	WS	c	539961K9000	1-1	1-1	
	02	Elect Inst Maint Ldr	FC	02805	WL	c	539961K9000	4-4	4-4	XA
	03	Elect Inst Maint Ldr	FCT	02805	WL	c	539961K9000	2-2	2-2	XA
	04	Electrician (Int)	FCT	02805	WG	c	539961K9000	9-9	9-9	XA
	05	Electrician Hi-Voltage (Ext)	FCT	02810	WG	c	539961K9000	9-9	9-9	XA
	06	Electrician Helper	FCT	02805	WG	c	539961K9000	5-5	5-5	XA
							TOTAL	30-30	30-30	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA MTD

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK
PAR	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
010L	00	Bldg & grounds div								
	01	Maint Gen FMN	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	02	Clerk	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	2-2	2-2	
010M	00	Roads & Grounds Branch								
	01	Chief	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
							TOTAL	1-1	1-1	
010N	00	Insect & Rodent Control Shop								
	01	Pest Control Ldr	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	02	Pest Controller	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	03	Pest Controller	FCT			c		3-3	2-2	
							TOTAL	5-5	4-4	
0100	00	Grounds Shop								
	01	Foreman	FCT			c		1-1	1-1	
	02	MVO	FC			c		4-4	4-3	
	03	Tractor Operator	FCT			c		3-3	3-3	
	04	Laborer	FCT			c		4-4	3-3	
							TOTAL	12-12	11-10	
010P	00	Surfaced Area Shop								
	01	Foreman	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	02	Engr Eq Dp Ldr	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	03	Engr Eq Dp	FC			c		4-4	4-4	
	04	Engr & Eq Dp	FCT			c		2-2	2-2	
	05	Mason	FC			c		1-1	1-1	
	06	Mason	FCT			c		1-1	1-1	
	07	Asphalt wkr	FCT			c		1-1	1-1	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA

MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX	DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK	
										AR
010Q	08 MVO	FC					1-1	1-1		
	09 Laborer	FCT					3-3	3-3		
						TOTAL	15-15	15-15		
010R	00 Equip Maint Shop									
	01 Hvy Mbl Eq Mech FMN	FC					1-1	1-1		
	02 Hvy Mbl Eq Mech	FC					1-1	1-1		
	03 Hvy Mbl Eq Mech	FC					4-4	4-4		
	04 Hvy Mbl Eq Mech	FCT					6-6	6-4		
	05 MVO	FC					1-1	1-1		
	Tool & Parts Atnd	FCT					1-1	1-0		
						TOTAL	14-14	14-11		
010S	00 Bldg & Structures Br									
	01 Foreman	FC					1-1	1-1		
						TOTAL	1-1	1-1		
010T	00 Carpentry Shop									
	01 Foreman	FC					1-1	1-1		
	02 Carp Idr	FC					1-1	1-1		
	03 Carp Idr	FC					1-1	1-1		
	04 Carp	FC					4-4	4-4		
	05 Carp	FCT					8-8	8-8		
	06 Carp	FCT					2-2	2-0		
	07 Woodwork Mach Op	FC					1-1	1-1		
	08 Locksmith	FC					1-1	1-1		
	09 Maint Worker	FCT					5-5	4-3		
	10 Carp Helper	FCT					6-6	6-5		
						TOTAL	30-30	29-25		

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO.

DATE

TDA

MTEA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMY
PAR	LINE									
		Source	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
010U	00	Paint & Metal Shop								
	01	Foreman	FC					1-1	1-1	
	02	Paint ldr	FCT					1-1	1-1	
	03	Fainter	FCT					2-2	2-2	
	04	Sign Painter	FC					1-1	1-1	
	05	Sign Painter	FCT					4-4	3-1	
	06	Sheet Metal Mech	FC					2-2	2-2	
	07	Sheet Metal Mech	FCT					3-3	2-2	
	08	Paint Helper	FCT					1-1	1-1	
								TOTAL	15-15	13-11
010V	00	Fir Pvnt Scty Div								
	01	Chief, Firefighter	FC					1-1	1-1	
	02	Supv Firefighter	FC					2-2	2-2	
	03	Supv Firefighter	FCT					1-1	1-0	
	04	Secy	FCT					1-1	1-1	
	05	Fire Prot Insp	FC					1-1	1-1	
	06	Fire Prot Insp	FCT					3-3	2-1	
	07	Detective	FC					1-1	1-1	
	08	Medical Driver	FCT					4-4	0-0	XH
	09	Firefighter (Ldr)	FC					3-3	3-3	
	10	Firefighter (Ldr)	FCT					2-2	1-0	
	11	Firefighter (Driver)	FC					3-3	3-3	
	12	Firefighter (Driver)	FCT					2-2	1-0	
	13	Firefighter	FC					10-10	10-10	
	14	Firefighter	FCT					17-17	10-05	XH
		PARA TOTAL						51-51	37-28	

DETAILED TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO. _____
DATE _____

TDA MTDA

DESIGNATION

BASE FOR COMPUTATION OF CHANGES

INCL X		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	RR	ID	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	REQ	AUTH	RMK	
PAR	LINE										
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	
		Source									
011	00	HQ Comdt									
	01	HQ Comdt/HHC Cdr	05	13A00		K		1-1	1-1	XQ	
							TOTAL	1-1	1-1		
011A	00	PAC									
	01	PAC Supervisor	FC	E7	75240	NC	I	1-1	1-1		
	02	Data Anal Sp	FM	E5	75DW5		I	1-1	1-1		
	03	Data Anal Sp	FM	E4	75DW5		I	1-1	1-0		
	04	Pers Act Sp	FM	E4	75E10		I	1-1	1-1		
	05	Pers Mgt Sp	FM	E4	75C10		I	1-1	1-1		
	06	Clerk/Messenger	FM	E3	71L10		I	1-1	1-1		
	07	Clerk Typ	FCT	03	00322	GS	C	1-1	1-1		
							TOTAL	7-7	7-6		
011B	00	HHC									
	01	Commander/HQ Comdt	FM	05	13A00		K	0-0	0-0	XFXQ	
	02	XO	FM	03	13A00		K	1-1	1-1	XF	
	03	1SG	FM	E8	71L5M	NC	I	1-1	1-1		
	04	Sup Sgt	FM	E5	76Y20	NC	I	1-1	1-1		
	05	Admin NCO	FM	E5	71L20		I	1-1	1-1		
	06	Sup Clerk	FM	E4	76Y10		I	1-1	1-1		
	07	Sup Clerk	FM	E3	76Y10		I	1-1	1-1		
	08	Messenger/Driver	FM	E3	71L10		I	1-1	1-1		
							TOTAL	7-7	7-7		

SOURCE INFORMATION

- FC - Fort Chaffee
- FCT - Fort Chaffee-Temporary
- FM - FORSCOM
- FS - Fort Sill


PERSONNEL NON-STANDARD REMARKS

- XA - No change in workforce at reduced refugee strength because a portion of the workforce will commence close out operations.
- XB - Contracted out after build-up phase.
- XC - Draw from Interpreter Pool (Task Force Resettlement Operation).
- XD - Filled by ADT reservist. Should be replaced by FORSCOM military by 1 Aug 80.
- XE - Filled by ADT reservist. Should be replaced by temporary civilian by 1 Aug 80.
- XF - MOS Immaterial. Can be filled with any MOS.
- XG - Filled by ADT reservist. Does not reservist. Does not require replacement.
- XH - Reduction of personnel is dependent upon the early consolidation of refugees and the reduction of the full time requirement for crash equipment at the airfield.
- XJ - Primarily function as lifeguards. Not required during winter.
- XL - Dual position. Also serves as Resource Management Officer, Paragraph 04, on US Army Task Force Resettlement Operation TDA.
- XM - Use of user buses for Re-Act Team (24 hour stand-by) will change this line to read: 10-10-0-0.
- XN - Use of user buses for Re-Act Team (24-hour stand-by) will change this line to read: 89-89-76-54.
- XP - Dual position. Also serves as PM for US Army Task Force Resettlement Operation.
- XQ - Incumbent serves as HQ Commandant, HHC Cdr, and HQ Commandant Liaison for US Army Task Force Resettlement Operation.

PART III (CAMP OPERATIONS) to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. Part III covers the refugee camp operations during the period 18 May to 5 August 1980.
2. After the last arrival of refugees, the 96th CA Bn reorganized its operation, as reflected in Annex A. This remained in effect until the end of June 1980 when the EOC, US Marshal and mess liaison officers, holding area and intermediate processing teams were no longer needed. Additionally, by mid July 1980, neighborhood #4 and portion of neighborhood #3 were closed down (Annex B).
3. Within the refugee enclave, the processing procedure and the day-to-day activities began achieving some regularity. Each neighborhood's leadership chain had been established and began functioning. Initially, the refugee leaders were selected by the military leaders, but as these refugees departed Fort Chaffee, their replacements were elected by their peers. Daily meetings were held between the military and refugee leadership, and between them, they were responsible for insuring that their refugees were properly fed, clothed, and processed; they set up and operated the neighborhood supply centers, supervised mess line order and the distribution of mail, insured that the refugees received proper medical attention, conducted police call, conducted regular census counts, distributed newspapers and inspected the barracks for cleanliness. In effect, they were each mayors of a town of 5,000.
4. Another facet of camp operations was the recreation services provided to the refugee enclave. Initially operated by personnel from Fort Sill, by mid June the operation became FEMA's responsibility. It included sewing centers, athletic issue centers, art centers, TV rooms, a library, a music center, boxing clinics, movies, and sports contests. English language classes began in mid June. Day care centers, nurseries, and baby care centers were established to meet the demands of the refugee families.
5. An additional outlet for idle hands was the refugee self-help program. Coordinated through the post facility engineers, refugees built small projects such as constructing bleachers, building picnic tables, and scraping old paint off the barracks. Also, some 350 refugees were employed in the dining facilities and over 180 worked in the supply rooms. Additional refugees (20) were used on the newspaper and radio station staffs and 15 at camp operations as receptionists, clerks, and draftsmen.
6. Attached as annexes are the following:
 - Annex A - 96th CA Bn Organization
 - Annex B - Camp Consolidation

ANNEX A (96th CA BN ORGANIZATION) to PART III to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



ANNEX B (CAMP CONSOLIDATION) to PART III to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. During the month of June 1980, the Task Force Commander directed his staff to prepare a plan to reconsolidate the cantonment area once the refugee population had dropped below 10,000 inhabitants. By 3 July, the number of refugees was 10,500 out of an original population of more than 19,000. It was projected that by 5 July the population would dip under the 10,000 mark.

The purpose of reconsolidation was two-fold: First, a reconsolidated cantonment area would cut the total cost of daily task force operations by reducing the size of the security force necessary for guard duties, and the number of mess halls, child care centers and other support facilities that were originally established. Second, the reconsolidation would provide an atmosphere more conducive to the family living by separating families from single adults. Families would be further subdivided into those with and without children. The friction that existed between the single adults and families, particularly during meal hours, was a constant source of turbulence within the refugee community.

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was given the responsibility of preparing a Letter of Instruction (LOI) for the operation. After receiving approval from the Task Force Commander, the initial LOI for this operative was issued on 3 July with execution scheduled for 5 July. The reconsolidation plan received a cool reception from the refugee representatives and block leaders who were brief prior to the planned start of the operation. Due to some scheduling conflicts within the area to be cleared and a request from refugee leaders for more time to inform the population, the original implementation date was pushed back to 7 July with a new LOI for the operation being issued on 7 July (Appendix 1). The additional time was used to inform the refugee population of the details of the relocation program. This was accomplished by publishing an article in the camp newspaper "La Vida Nueva" on 8 July and by airing special broadcasts explaining the program via the camp Spanish speaking radio station.

2. The reconsolidation and reduction of the cantonment area began in earnest on the morning of 8 July. From each building where refugees were being required to move, the 96th CA Bn (which had primary responsibility for relocating the refugees) encountered peaceful resistance to the move. As groups of single adults or families were separated from each other, the 96th CA was able to persuade the occupants to vacate the buildings. Several minor problems that slowed up the relocation program arose as the effort gathered steam:

a. The definition of a family: As each legitimate family was approached to move, as many as 15 to 20 people claiming to be members of that family attempted to move with them. The decision was made that only maternal or immediate members of a family would be relocated into the family of the cantonment area.

b. As single adults were approached for relocation (both male and female), many of these adults claimed to be married to another person living in the same barracks. Many of these claims were difficult to verify, but using the census information that was completed during the initial phase of the resettlement operation, each claim was investigated.

c. In an attempt to avoid relocation, some refugees left their area in hopes that if they could not be found, they would not be relocated. This brought up the question of what to do with the personal belongings of individuals who could not be immediately located. As each instance occurred, those missing individuals' belongings were packed up, tagged with the name (if known), building number where belongings were removed from, and building number where belongings were to be sent.

d. Several of the refugee families were not satisfied with the condition of the barracks where they were being moved. In an effort to appease those families who were genuinely concerned with this issue, arrangements were made for the family leaders to inspect their designated barracks prior to relocation. Attempts that were made to satisfy each family were generally successful. These few family leaders who could not be satisfied were moved without incident.

The reduction program began again at 0830 hours, 9 July. As was the case the preceding day, most of the resistance to relocation was peaceful and quickly settled. There were a few instances where people had to be forced to leave. Five people were arrested during the operation. Resistance to being moved was strong enough to warrant calling out the first element of the military police reaction force which consisted of 20 men. The reaction force responsibilities included keeping crowds from gathering around the building being cleared and keeping other refugees from entering the building where the movement operation was being conducted. As each refugee was identified for refusing to cooperate, each was brought to the attention of the Park Police which had the responsibility of the actual arrest and filing of charges. The deployment of the initial contingent of the reaction force also served to show the refugees the Task Force's determination to affect this reconsolidation, as ordered, in the most expeditious manner possible. After the reaction force was dismissed, resistance received during the rest of the day's operation was minimal and quickly resolved. Approximately 25 per cent of the consolidation had been completed by the end of this day. During the course of the day, representatives of the 96th CA Bn had been encouraging those refugees who preferred to move themselves to do so. The initial reaction to this was nil but by the end of the day a small number of refugees were seen moving themselves.

The initial phases of the operation on 10 July closely patterned the sequence of events occurring on the preceding day. The reaction force was called out once and a total of seven arrests were made by the Park Police. Those arrested were charged with unlawful trespassing. Word seemed to be spreading that those buildings earmarked for clearing would be emptied no matter what type of resistance was applied. As a result, by the end of this day's operations, many refugees were observed moving not only themselves, but helping other refugees also move. Approximately 65 per cent of the reconsolidation was completed by the end of this day. The reconsolidation on 11 July and again on 12 July was completed with no

enforcement problems. By noon on 12 July, 3,000 refugees had been relocated.

3. Due to the sensitive nature of the reduction program, special security precautions were devised and implemented prior to the start of the reconsolidation program. Because of the negative reaction the refugees had to the reconsolidation program, the possibility of individual conflicts blossoming into widespread turmoil was considered to be real. The Provost Marshal was given the responsibility for planning and executing the security aspects of the reduction program. A contingent of 12 MP's was stationed in the area as each building was cleared. They were responsible for crowd control, eviction of uncooperative residents and insuring that once residents were cleared from a particular building, they did not sneak back inside. Each bus filled with refugees being relocated was provided MP escort to a destination. At the destination, the MP's stayed with the refugees until they and their belongings were inside the building.

The United States Park Police provided an on-site liaison officer to assist the MP's. As the MP's identified disorderly refugees, the liaison officer summoned other Park Police officers who were responsible for the actual arrest and booking procedures. Reaction forces were prepositioned at strategic locations near the area of operations in case isolated conflicts spread. The MP's provided a 20-man reaction force and a 40-man backup reaction force. In addition, the Task Force III reaction force was put into a state of increased readiness. The 20-man reaction force was deployed twice during the reduction program to support clearing barracks where more than a few residents refused to leave. Special MP teams were provided assigned to patrol the reconsolidation areas during hours of darkness.

APPENDIX 1 (LOI FOR REDUCTION OF THE CANTONEMENT AREA) to ANNEX B to PART III to
VOLUME III to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 96TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION
~~FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28507~~
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

AFJK-CAB-C

7 July 1980

SUBJECT: LOI for Reduction of the Cantonement
Area

See Distribution

1. An operation to reduce the cantonement area in size and to create two separate family living areas will be conducted commencing 8 Jul 80. The family areas will be further subdivided into groups for families with and without children. In addition, special areas within the camp will be designated for prostitutes and homosexuals. Resettlement will be conducted by barracks group from one area to another, to the maximum extent possible. Normal processing activities will continue as scheduled. The operation will be conducted in two phases. A time schedule is attached at inclosure 1.

2. The following responsibilities are assigned:

a. 96th CA Bn (+) will:

(1) Relocate refugees per schedule at inclosure 1. Movement will begin after individuals on the daily hit list have been transported to the departure area.

(2) Insure that all activities are coordinated with military, federal and volunteer agencies so as not to disrupt scheduled outprocessing of refugees.

(3) Coordinate the termination/relocation of support activities north of Fort Smith Blvd with appropriate agencies.

(4) Coordinate transportation requirements.

(5) Notify EOC (G-3, G-4), PMO and TF III security elements as each block is cleared.

AFJK-CAB-C

7 Jul 80

SUBJECT: LOI for Reduction of the Cantonement
Area

- (6) Reissue meal cards as required
 - (7) Coordinate relocation of partitions to Area III from Area I and IV.
 - (8) Coordinate with DIO (G-4) for appropriate signs to mark the perimeter of the family/female areas.
 - (9) Re-allocate Area IV supplies to other facilities in the camp.
 - (10) Re-align the geographical and political boundaries of the camp as indicated at inclosure 2.
 - (11) Relocate prostitutes to Bldgs 1513 & 1514, on order.
 - (12) Relocate refugees living in Bldgs 1272 - 1283 to billets south of 14th St as space becomes available.
 - (13) Conduct a census at the end of the operation.
- b. Elements of the 486th CA Co (USAR) will assist the 96th CA Bn during 12 & 13 July.
- c. PSYOPS will:
- (1) Prepare an article explaining the relocation program for publication in the camp newspaper.
 - (2) Be prepared to provide loudspeaker/radio broadcast support as required.
- d. EOC (G-4) will:
- (1) Close mess facilities per schedule at inclosure 1.
 - (2) Be prepared to close additional mess facilities south of 14th Street.
 - (3) Close the laundromat in Bldg 1159 on 9 Jul 80, and open a new facility in Bldg 1349 NLT 11 Jul 80.

AFJK-CAB-C

7 Jul 80

SUBJECT: LOI for Reduction of the Contonement
Area

(4) Close Child Care Centers in Bldgs 1165 and 1571 on 12 Jul 80. Supplies and equipment from these centers will be moved to the existing center located in Bldg 1352. Establish a new center in building 1735.

(5) Procure necessary signs to mark the perimeter of the family/female area.

e. The Task Force Chaplain will coordinate the closing/relocation of chapels and religious activity centers with the Camp Admin office.

f. DFAE will:

(1) Insure the barriers are moved as each block is cleared.

(2) Provide assistance in moving partitions from Area IV to Area I and Area III family living areas.

(3) Procure and coordinate the installation of triple strand concertina around the female barracks. (Bldgs 1513/1514)

(4) Construct a movie screen vic Bldg 1406, within the Family Area.

g. PMO will:

(1) Monitor progress of the operation.

(2) Provide necessary assistance/security forces as may be required to complete the operation.

(3) Provide security for empty barracks buildings.

h. FEMA (NSA) will:

(1) Close Sewing Centers in Bldg 1157 on 10 Jul 80. Coordinate with the Camp Admin office for a suitable location for a new facility in the Family Area.

(2) Close Youth Centers in Bldgs 1157 & 1573 on 10 Jul 80, and consolidate assets in Bldgs 1306 & 1730.

AFJK-CAB-C

7 Jul 80

SUBJECT: LOI for Reduction of the Contonement
Area

(3) Terminate English classes in Bldg 1109 on 10 Jul 80. Relocate English Class from Bldg 1305 to another classroom within Area III. Coordinate with Camp Admin for a suitable building.

(4) Close Recreation Center in Bldg 1217 on 8 Jul 80. Close Recreation Center in Bldg 1147 on 10 Jul 80. Consolidate assets into existing facilities.

i. HHS will close TMC 4 on 11 Jul 80 and reopen TMC 2 on 13 July. (Bldg 1686)

3. The 96th CA Bn (+) will be primarily responsible for conducting the physical relocation of the camp population. All Task Force elements and agencies on Ft Chaffee will be available to render all assistance necessary.

Kenneth M. Biser
KENNETH M. BISER
CPT, IN
Acting Commander

2 Incl
as

Distribution:
"A"
"E"

PHASE I
(8-10 July 1980)

- 8 July: Close Dining Facility, Bldg 1214
Close Recreation Center, Bldg 1217
- 8-9 July: Area III; Move refugees from Bldg 1200 - 1270
into barracks south of 14th St.

Move single males out of family area. Relocate
homosexuals into Bldgs 1414 - 1416.

Area I & II; Relocate scattered families into
the family living area south of 28th St in
Area I.
- 9 July: Close Dining Facility, Bldg 1224
- 10 July: Close Recreation Center, Bldg 1147
Relocate Barber Shop, Bldg 1082 to Area III
Close English Class, Bldg 1109
Move laundromat, Bldg 1159 to Bldg 1349
Relocate Youth Center, Bldg 1157 and Bldg 1573
to Bldg 1730.
Move Sewing Center, Bldg 1157 to Area I, family
division

PHASE II
(11-15 July 1980)

- 11 July: Close Dining Facilities, Bldgs 1076, 1081, 1086
Close TMC 4, Bldg 1189, move to Bldg 1186
- 11-12 July: Area IV; Move refugees into appropriate billets
south of 14th St. The operation will begin on
2d St and move south towards 8th St.

12 July: Close Baby Care Center, Bldg 1165
 Relocate Baby Care Center, Bldg 1571 to 1735.
 Close Dining Facilities, Bldgs 1141, 1111, 1107

13 July: Close Dining Facility, Bldg 1163

15 July: Relocate prostitutes into Bldg 1513/1514
 Conduct census

AREA BOUNDARIES

- Area I: No change to boundary. A family living area will be established in Bldgs 1734 - 1754.
- Area II: New north/south boundary runs from 23d St to 18th St. A special area for prostitutes will be located in Bldgs 1513 & 1514.
- Area III: Readjusted north/south boundary will run from 18th St to 11th St. A family living area will be formed between 16th St and 11th St. Homosexuals will be relocated to Bldgs 1414 - 1416. As space becomes available, families located between 11th and 12th streets will be moved south of 14th St. Once this move is complete, the northern boundary of Area III will become 14th St.

PART IV (SECURITY) to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. Part IV describes the security program for Fort Chaffee during the period 18 May to 5 August 1980.
2. The security program was a multi-faceted operation, drawing from military and civilian law enforcement agencies, and after the riot, military combat soldiers. The division of duties was basically the refugee enclave; inside was the responsibility of the civilian law enforcement agencies and the Army maintained the perimeter security outside (while still responsible for the overall protection of the installation and government property (Annex D).

Before the riot, the primary mission of the military police was to man the enclave perimeter and the gates to Fort Chaffee. Stationary guard posts were located approximately 100 meters apart. They also maintained an immediate reaction platoon which was on call 24 hours a day. After the arrival of Task Force Collins, the military police began patrols inside the refugee enclave, four motorized and two walking.

Army combat units from Fort Sill comprised Task Force Collins (later Task Force III). Arriving after the riot on 1 Jun 1980, TF Collins was assigned the mission of perimeter security. It also relieved the military police of the immediate reaction force requirement. As federal law enforcement manpower increased, and they were able to assume more of the security responsibilities, the Army forces were slowly phased down.

3. DOD guidance on the limits of safety and security activities by military personnel also changed due to the riot. The military was now given authority to hold and detain refugees attempting to depart the enclave, and to use that minimum physical force necessary to accomplish it (personnel were excluded from hitting a refugee about the head or shoulders (Annex E, Annex F). This also applied to maintaining camp discipline and the protection of government property.

4. The following annexes are attached:

Annex A - Task Force Security Plan

Annex B - Badge System, 21 May 1980

Annex C - Badge System, 25 June 1980

Annex D - Memorandum of Understanding

Annex E - DOD Guidance, 2 June 1980

Annex F - DOD Guidance, 3 June 1980

ANNEX A (TASK FORCE SECURITY PLAN) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, FORT CHAFFEE
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72901

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

8 JUN 80

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Task Force Security Plan

1. Reference: Task Force Security Map attached.
2. Priorities for protection:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
a. TF Ft Chaffee Headquarters to include Commo Center (Bldg 1370)	PMO
b. Commo Center (WWMCCS)/(Bldg 1375)	Task Force
c. Dial Commo Center (Bldg 1321)	Task Force
d. MP Station (Bldg 1355)	PMO
e. Federal and Operational Dets (Bldg 1479)	PMO
f. Weapon Storage Area (Bldg 460)	Task Force
g. TMC's (Bldg 1786/1686/1593/1189)	Task Force
h. Officer/NCO Clubs (Bldg 1683)	Task Force
i. Hospital	PMO/Task Force
j. DIS/CID (Bldg 1180)	Troop Command
k. 1st PSYOPS (Bldg 2535)	Troop Command

3. Security Measures:

- a. Security for each "area" within the enclave will be provided by MP Patrols:

- (1) Four motorized-2 Man Patrols
- (2) Two walking-2 Man Patrols

- b. Enclave perimeter will be provided by the Task Force.



c. Mobile barriers will be closed on order of the EOC as follows:

<u>Barrier</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
54	TF	On call
55	TF	Always closed
56	MPs (Hosp)	On call
57	PMO	On call
58	PMO	On call
59	TF	Close COB/Open 0530
60	TF	Close COB/Open 0530
76	TF	On call
77	TF	Always closed
78	TF	Close 2000/Open 0530
79	TF	On call

4. Coordinating Instructions:

a. 1st PSYOPS-Provides PA System for Deputy CO for internal security; report to EOC on alert. Additional system with linguist to airfield for airborne system.

5. Command and Signal:

a. Command: Deputy CDR is responsible for internal security. PMO and CDR, Task Force, are responsible for respective mobile barriers. EOC will transmit alert notifications.

b. Signal:


- (1) TF Resettlement Operation CMD Net: F1
- (2) Task Force CMD Net: FREQ 40:05
 ALT (1) 37:50
 ALT (2) 35:25
- (3) MP Net: FREQ 48:90

DISTRIBUTION:

CG
DCO-IS
C/S
TASK FORCE (5)
PMO (5)
C/A
PSYOPS
DFAE


MICHAEL A. ROWE
MAJ, FA
Chief, EOC

"Task Force Defence Plan"



1 MP PATROLS EACH AREA
 4 MOTORIZED 2-MAN PATROLS
 2 WALKING 2-MAN PATROLS

○	MOBILE BARRIER
▬	CONCERTINA
—	FENCE
■	MIN

ANNEX B (BADGE SYSTEM, 21 MAY 1980) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

TASK FORCE
RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE

Bearer is authorized
unlimited access to
refugee facilities.
Misuse of this pass
will result in
confiscation.
(See reverse side)

NO. _____

(white)

TASK FORCE
RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE

The below named individual
is authorized access to the
Refugee cantonment area
From _____
To _____

By order of the
Task Force Commander:

HENRY J. SALICE
CPT, INF
Chief TF Security

NO. _____

(blue)

ANNEX C (BADGE SYSTEM, 25 JUN 1980) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

Personnel badges were divided into three categories:

a. BROWN - Permanent, unlimited access. This badge will permit permanent access into the refugee cantonment restricted area on a continuous basis for personnel whose duties require routine entry and exit. Recipient's name will be printed on the reverse.

b. DARK GREEN - Permanent, limited access. This badge will permit permanent access into the refugee cantonment restricted area support facilities (dining halls, medical clinics, processing centers) on a continuous basis for personnel whose duties require routine daily presence in these areas. Recipient's name, work area, and building number will be printed on the reverse.

c. BLUE - Temporary, unlimited access. This badge will permit temporary 24-hour or less entry into the refugee cantonment area on a one-time basis for personnel whose duties require unlimited access. These passes will be issued to individuals as needed. Used passes will be returned to PMO after use.

ANNEX D (MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

Relief Dept.
UNITED STATES PARK POLICE *Yrloop*

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR DETAINEES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have reached the following agreement. Those agencies intend hereby to delineate and clarify respective responsibilities of all involved agencies for peacekeeping, law enforcement and related activities concerning the Cuban detainees* at military installations. Consistent with this agreement, the responsible military commander and the FEMA Officer-in-Charge, or other proper on-scene authorities, may establish and implement additional security procedures as necessary.

The primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the Cuban detainees rests with civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers are not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander will exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon.

Such temporary emergency measures by the military, however, do not constitute an exercise of the law enforcement authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or any other Federal agencies regarding laws for which they have been assigned jurisdiction by statute or otherwise.

I

Because of the present unavailability at certain locations of sufficient civilian law enforcement officers of the Federal Government, the following duties will be performed at those locations by personnel responsible to the Department of Defense, through its executive agent, the Department of Army, and the responsible military commander at each location. Current efforts

*Persons entering United States territory without visas or other authority who have not been admitted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are subject to detention under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, pending completion of inspection and processing to determine eligibility for admission.

to provide civilian law enforcement officers at the earliest possible time shall be continued. As sufficient police officers become available from a federal civilian law enforcement agency, that agency, with DOJ and FEMA concurrence, will deploy its force and assume responsibility from military police at a base designated by FEMA and DOJ for preventive patrols as described in (1) below and related law enforcement efforts. This responsibility should be assumed as soon as feasible and at as many of the bases as possible. If the number of bases should be reduced enough for the civilian law enforcement agency performing preventive patrol at a base to also maintain the perimeter as set forth in (2) a. below, it shall do so. Otherwise, maintenance of the perimeter will remain a military responsibility. In any event, responsibility for providing a response force in case of riot or other such large scale disorder will be with the military. In all cases, however, nothing contained herein shall affect the authority and responsibility of the military commander to assure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control.

(1) Preventive Patrols

Adequate police presence and visual surveillance shall be maintained at all times in the area in which the detainees are located (detainee enclave) on the installation through such patrols and stationary posts as may be necessary. The purpose of such patrols shall be to deter, detect and prevent disorder, criminal offenses, and any serious harm from any cause to the Cuban detainee(s), as well as to protect other personnel, buildings, and equipment.

(2) Securing the Perimeter

a. A perimeter shall be established around the detainee enclave on the installation. This perimeter shall be clearly marked and posted with signs in English and Spanish prohibiting Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure from the detainee enclave. Military personnel shall maintain this perimeter and shall be stationed along this perimeter and at any gates or openings to deter, detect and make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized departures. They shall take reasonable action to prevent unauthorized passage outside the perimeter, using oral warnings and, if those fail, reasonable, but wholly non-lethal measures to deter detainees from attempting to cross the perimeter. Use of physical barriers is also permissible at the option of the military commander. Military personnel shall not leave the installation to pursue or apprehend detainees.

b. Detainee(s) found on the installation outside the detainee enclave shall be returned under escort to the enclave and their unauthorized departure shall be reported to FEMA, the United States Marshals, and the representative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Similarly, any detainee(s) returned to the installation by civilian authorities or otherwise shall be escorted back to their enclave and similarly reported.

(3) Response Force

A reserve force of military or security (air) police shall be maintained at all times with sufficient capacity to respond promptly (1) should large scale disturbances occur on the installation which are beyond the capacity of the responsible law enforcement agencies, (2) in the event that federal officers become unable to perform their law enforcement functions on the installation, or (3) in the event the safety of federal officers on the installation becomes threatened by detainees.

II

In every case, and without regard to whether law enforcement functions at a particular installation are being discharged primarily by military or by civilian officials, the responsibilities of FEMA and civilian law enforcement agencies shall include the following:

(1) Immediate Response for Arrests

A lead civilian law enforcement agency shall be designated by FEMA and DOJ at each installation. That agency shall be prepared to react immediately to calls from military personnel or civilian law enforcement personnel in connection with circumstances requiring detainee(s) to be arrested, searches to be conducted, investigations to be undertaken or other similar law enforcement activities to be conducted. The lead agency may be assisted in any or all of the above activities by other agencies, although nothing stated herein shall alter normal division of jurisdiction for enforcement of specific statutes by various agencies. Accordingly, the lead agency shall transfer responsibility for further response to the particular Federal agency with jurisdiction for the statutory violation or circumstance.

(2) Advice

The lead agency shall also provide advice to FEMA representatives and military authorities with respect to law enforcement matters. In addition, the lead agency shall regularly assess the need for police presence within the enclave. The FEMA Officer-in-Charge, the responsible military commander, and the Officer-in-Charge of the lead law enforcement agency at each installation shall confer with regard to the type and level of law enforcement presence appropriate for the circumstances which obtain at that installation at the particular time in question. However, the final decision on the deployment of military personnel, both on the perimeter and within the enclosed area, must rest solely with the military commander or his designee.

(3) Custody of Persons Detained or Arrested

The United States Marshals Service (USMS) shall be responsible for custody of all arrested persons and their safe and secure transport to stockade, segregated detention, or jail facilities.

(4) Guarding Persons in Punitive Detention

In consultation with FEMA, one of the civilian law enforcement agencies shall be assigned responsibility for guarding detainees at the stockade or segregated detention facility.

Whenever appropriate, the senior INS official present and the base commander may issue regulations which may expressly prohibit Cuban detainee(s) from departing from the detainee enclave without authority. The regulations shall be issued in both Spanish and English and posted conspicuously at reasonable intervals along the perimeter. The regulations may contain a section providing sanctions and advising that violators may be subject to segregation and removal to a separate detention facility and to delay in completion of the inspection and processing procedure until such procedures have been completed for all other detainee(s) at the camp.

John W. Macy, Jr.
John W. Macy, Jr.
Director
Federal Emergency Management Agency
June 4, 1980

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
4 June 1980

Charles B. Rangel
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
June 4, 1980

ANNEX E(DOD GUIDANCE, 2 JUN 1980) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

022010Z JUN 80
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-COF//
TO CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD
CDR FT CHAFFEE AR

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFICIALS CONCERNING SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AT FACILITIES DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE "CUBAN ALIENS" IN SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

- A. DAMO-DOS MSG 282155 MAY 80, SAB.
- B. CA CIVIL DISTURBANCE (GARDEN PLOT), DTO 2 Aug 78.
1. REF A PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO DOD OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S MISSION CONCERNING CUBAN DETAINEES BEING PROCESSED ON DOD INSTALLATIONS, THAT GUIDANCE REMAINS IN EFFECT, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN. REF B PROVIDED STANDARD GUIDANCE FOR USE OF FORCE.
2. A PERIMETER SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE AREA IN WHICH THE DETAINEES ARE LOCATED (DETAINEE ENCLAVE). THIS PERIMETER SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED AND POSTED WITH SIGNS IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH PROHIBITING CUBAN DETAINEES FROM UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FROM THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THIS PERIMETER AND SHALL BE STATIONED ALONG THIS PERIMETER AND AT ANY GATES OR OPENINGS TO DETER, DETECT AND MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURES. USE OF PHYSICAL BARRIERS IS ALSO PERMISSIBLE AT THE OPTION OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER.
3. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PASSAGE OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER, USING ORAL WARNINGS AND, IF THOSE FAIL, REASONABLE, BUT WHOLLY NON-LETHAL MEASURES TO DETER DETAINEES FROM ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE PERIMETER. ONLY THE MINIMUM MEASURES REQUIRED TO DETER DETAINEES IS AUTHORIZED. SUCH MEASURES SHOULD NOT IMPOSE A THREAT OF DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM. MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO USE NIGHTSTICKS AND RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT. USE OF THE NIGHTSTICK OR BATON AS A BARRIER MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER INDIVIDUALS FROM LEAVING THE ENCLAVE. HOWEVER, INDIVIDUALS SHOULD NOT BE STRUCK IN THE HEAD OR OTHERWISE SUBJECTED TO EXCESSIVE MEASURE. FIREARMS WITHOUT AMMUNITION MAY BE USED.
4. AN OUTER PERIMETER SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE FEDERAL INSTALLATION, AND APPROPRIATE REACTION FORCES SHALL BE MAINTAINED. IF THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE IS BREACHED, THE SAME MEASURES DISCUSSED ABOVE SHALL BE APPLIED TO PREVENT DETAINEES FROM LEAVING THE FEDERAL INSTALLATION.
5. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL NOT LEAVE THE INSTALLATION TO PURSUE AND APPREHEND DETAINEES.

BT

#9567

ANNEX F(DOD GUIDANCE, 3 JUN 1980) to PART IV to VOLUME III to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

032250Z JUN 80
FM HQ DA WASHDC//DAMO-ODS//
TO AIG 9182

UNCLAS

SECTION 1 of 2

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFICIALS CONCERNING SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AT FACILITIES DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE "CUBAN ALIENS" IN SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

1. THIS MSG SUPERCEDES DAMO-ODS MSG, SAB, DTG 082155Z MAY 80 AND 021835Z JUN 80.

2. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD), THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (THE DEPARTMENT) HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DETAINEES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE SET FORTH BELOW. CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT, THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE FEMA OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, OR OTHER PROPER ON-SCENE AUTHORITIES, MAY ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES AS NECESSARY.

A. THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE-KEEPING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES CONCERNING THE CUBAN DETAINEES RESTS WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES. WHEN CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN ADEQUATE NUMBERS TO CARRY OUT THIS RESPONSIBILITY AT A MILITARY INSTALLATION, THE MILITARY COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY TO MAINTAIN ORDER ON THE MILITARY INSTALLATION AND TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO PROVIDE FOR THE SAFETY OF PERSONS AND FACILITIES THEREON. SUCH TEMPORARY EMERGENCY MEASURES BY THE MILITARY, HOWEVER, DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXERCISE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE OR ANY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES REGARDING LAWS FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED JURISDICTION BY STATUTE OR OTHERWISE.

B. BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT UNAVAILABILITY AT CERTAIN LOCATIONS OF SUFFICIENT CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE FOLLOWING DUTIES WILL BE PERFORMED AT THOSE LOCATIONS BY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THROUGH ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, AND THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDER AT EACH LOCATION. CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME SHALL BE CONTINUED. AS THESE OFFICERS BECOME AVAILABLE TO REPLACE THE MILITARY, THEY WILL ASSUME THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS IN THE ORDER LISTED BELOW. IN ALL CASES, HOWEVER, NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN SHALL AFFECT THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER TO ASSURE THE ORDERLY FUNCTIONING OF THE MILITARY BASE UNDER HIS CONTROL.

(1) PREVENTIVE PATROLS. ADEQUATE POLICE PRESENCE AND VISUAL SURVEILLANCE SHALL BE MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES IN THE AREA IN WHICH THE DETAINEES ARE LOCATED (DETAINEE ENCLAVE) ON THE INSTALLATION THROUGH SUCH PATROLS AND STATIONARY POSTS AS MAY BE NECESSARY. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH PATROLS SHALL BE TO DETER, DETECT AND PREVENT DISORDER, CRIMINAL OFFENSES, AND ANY SERIOUS HARM FROM ANY CAUSE TO THE CUBAN DETAINEE(S), AS WELL AS TO PROTECT OTHER PERSONNEL, BUILDINGS, AND EQUIPMENT.

(2) SECURING THE CONTROL ZONE.

(A) A CONTROL ZONE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE ON THE INSTALLATION. THIS CONTROL ZONE SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED AND POSTED WITH SIGNS IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH PROHIBITING CUBAN DETAINEES FROM UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FROM THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL MAINTAIN THIS PERIMETER AND SHALL BE STATIONED ALONG THIS CONTROL ZONE AND AT ANY GATES OR OPENINGS TO DETER, DETECT AND MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PASSAGE OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ZONE, USING ORAL WARNINGS AND, IF THOSE FAIL, REASONABLE, BUT WHOLLY NON-LETHAL MEASURES TO DETER DETAINEES FROM ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE PERIMETER. USE OF PHYSICAL BARRIERS IS ALSO PERMISSIBLE AT THE OPTION OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL NOT LEAVE THE INSTALLATION TO PURSUE OR APPREHEND DETAINEES.

(B) DETAINEE(S) FOUND ON THE INSTALLATION OUTSIDE THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE SHALL BE RETURNED UNDER ESCORT TO THE ENCLAVE AND THEIR UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURE SHALL BE REPORTED TO FEMA. THE US MARSHALS, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, SIMILARLY, ANY DETAINEE(S) RETURNED TO THE INSTALLATION BY CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES OR OTHERWISE SHALL BE ESCORTED BACK TO THEIR ENCLAVE AND SIMILARLY REPORTED.

(3) RESPONSE FORCE. A RESERVE FORCE OF MILITARY OR SECURITY (AIR) POLICE SHALL BE MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES WITH SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO RESPOND PROMPTLY (1) SHOULD LARGE SCALE DISTURBANCES OCCUR ON THE INSTALLATION WHICH ARE BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF THE RESPONSIBLE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, (2) IN THE EVENT THAT FEDERAL OFFICERS BECOME UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS ON THE INSTALLATION, OR (3) IN THE EVENT THE SAFETY OF FEDERAL OFFICERS ON THE INSTALLATION BECOMES THREATENED BY DETAINEES.

C. IN EVERY CASE, AND WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS AT A PARTICULAR INSTALLATION ARE BEING DISCHARGED PRIMARILY BY MILITARY OR BY CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEMA AND THE CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHALL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FOR ARRESTS. A LEAD CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SHALL BE DESIGNATED BY FEMA AND DOJ AT EACH INSTALLATION. THAT AGENCY SHALL BE PREPARED TO REACT IMMEDIATELY TO CALLS FROM MILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING DETAINEE(S) TO BE ARRESTED, SEARCHES TO BE CONDUCTED, INVESTIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN OR OTHER SIMILAR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES TO BE CONDUCTED. THE LEAD AGENCY MAY BE ASSISTED IN ANY OR ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES BY OTHER AGENCIES, ALTHOUGH NOTHING STATED HEREIN SHALL ALTER NORMAL DIVISION OF JURISDICTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIFIC STATUTES BY VARIOUS AGENCIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE LEAD AGENCY SHALL TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER RESPONSE TO THE PARTICULAR FEDERAL AGENCY WITH JURISDICTION FOR THE STATUTORY VIOLATION OR CIRCUMSTANCE.

(2) ADVICE. THE LEAD AGENCY SHALL ALSO PROVIDE ADVICE TO FEMA REPRESENTATIVES AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT MATTERS. IN ADDITION, THE LEAD AGENCY SHALL REGULARLY ASSESS THE NEED FOR POLICE PRESENCE WITHIN THE ENCLAVE. THE FEMA OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDER, AND THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE LEAD LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AT EACH INSTALLATION SHALL CONFER WITH REGARD TO THE TYPE AND LEVEL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PRESENCE APPROPRIATE FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OBTAIN AT THAT INSTALLATION AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME IN QUESTION. HOWEVER, THE FINAL DECISION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, BOTH ON THE PERIMETER AND WITHIN THE ENCLOSED AREA, MUST REST SOLELY WITH THE MILITARY COMMANDER OR HIS DESIGNEE.

(3) CUSTODY OF PERSONS DETAINED OR ARRESTED. THE US MARSHALS SERVICE (USMS) SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CUSTODY OF ALL ARRESTED PERSONS AND THEIR SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORT TO STOCKADE, SEGREGATED DETENTION, OR JAIL FACILITIES.

(4) GUARDING PERSONS IN PUNITIVE DETENTION. IN CONSULTATION WITH FEMA, ONE OF THE CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHALL BE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR GUARDING DETAINEES AT THE STOCKADE OR SEGREGATED DETENTION FACILITY.

3. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL IS PROVIDED:

A. IN ACCOMPLISHING THE CONTROL ZONE SECURITY MISSION, USE OF THE NIGHTSTICK OR BATON AS A BARRIER MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER INDIVIDUALS FROM LEAVING THE ENCLAVE, HOWEVER, INDIVIDUALS SHOULD NOT BE STRUCK IN THE HEAD OR OTHERWISE SUBJECTED TO EXCESSIVE MEASURES. FIREARMS WITHOUT AMMUNITION MAY BE USED.

B. MILITARY POLICE PERFORMING THE PREVENTIVE PATROL MISSION SHALL BE EQUIPPED WITH STANDARD MILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT.

4. AN OUTER PERIMETER SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE FEDERAL INSTALLATION, AND APPROPRIATE REACTION FORCES SHALL BE MAINTAINED. IF THE DETAINEE ENCLAVE IS BREACHED, THE SAME MEASURES DISCUSSED ABOVE SHALL BE APPLIED TO PREVENT DETAINEES FROM LEAVING THE FEDERAL INSTALLATION.

5. NO CUBAN DETAINEE SHALL BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE INSTALLATION WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY.

VOLUME IV
CONSOLIDATION PHASE (5 Aug - 9 Oct 80)

PART I (CONSOLIDATION PHASE SUMMARY) to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a narrative of the activities of Task Force Resettlement Operation from 5 August to 9 October 1980.

2. On 5 August 1980, Gene Eidenberg, Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs, announced that Fort Chaffee would be used as the consolidation center for all Cuban refugees currently contained at other camps in the United States, and that the first refugees would arrive around 1 September from Elgin AFB. This announcement set off a storm of protest from Governor Clinton and other elected officials and laid the groundwork for a political battle which would be waged for another month. Amid this storm, the US Army and the federal agencies at Fort Chaffee began planning in earnest for the arrival of more refugees.

It was anticipated that Fort Chaffee would house approximately 10,000 refugees after reconsolidation and planning was based upon this figure. Two immediate problems which had to be addressed were the construction of perimeter fencing, and the delineation of responsibilities to include state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, the camp population had to be reduced to such a level as to allow for an influx of refugees without exceeding the camp capacity of 10,000. Another primary concern of the military was the further "civilianization" of camp functions before the consolidation began. BG Drummond was extremely anxious to completely remove US Army personnel from non-military functions before consolidation. On 5 and 6 August, the majority of the 96th Civil Affairs Bn and the 1st Psyops Bn departed Fort Chaffee having turned their operations over to the State Department. Their departure was an important step in this transfer of duties to the federal agencies.

On 17 August, the 299th Engineer Bn began construction of the chainlink fence around the perimeter. The fence project, which called for 15,500 feet of chain link fence, ten feet high, topped with six-strand barbed wire to be erected, was expected to take three weeks to complete. The 299th Engineer Bn, working around the clock, completed the massive project by 25 August. Upon completion of this task, the battalion began Phase II of the project which required the various segregation areas within the enclave.

In the continuing effort to "civilianize" the operation, on 31 August, the military was relieved by the US Park Police of all security duties and patrols inside the enclave. The next day (1 September), the military was also relieved of the responsibility for manning the gates to the enclave.

On 12 September, the 299th Engineers completed the remainder of the fencing project, and all fencing was now erected as outlined in the security plan. Part of the fencing plan called for a segregated area known as Level II to be constructed. This area, controlled by INS, would contain habitual troublemakers and for persons attempting to leave without authority. On 14 September, a "sweep" operation was conducted inside the enclave by military and civilian personnel to locate and transfer appropriate individuals to the Level II area. The operation was successful, and Level II began functioning as outlined.

3. One concession gained by Governor Clinton in the dispute over consolidation was that no additional refugees would be sent to Fort Chaffee until he approved the camp security measures. The Joint Security Plan was thus sent to the Governors' office for approval after being signed by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice on 5 September 1980. After the resolution of several conflicts over the plan (Annex A-D), Governor Clinton approved it on 24 September 1980.

4. On 25 September, the first refugees were sent from Elgin AFB to Fort Chaffee. This transfer was completed on 26 September with 617 refugees arriving. Fort McCoy completed on 3 October with 3174 refugees being transferred, and Fort Indiantown Gap completed on 9 October with 1980 refugees arriving. With the last plane load, camp population stood at 8349.

ANNEX A (LETTER, GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS) to PART I to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

Bill Clinton
Governor

September 11, 1980
For more information contact:
Robert Lyford 371-7535 or
Freddie Nixon 371-5486

For Immediate Release:

I want to commend the federal officials for the cooperation they have shown in working with State and Local officials in the development of the Joint Security Plan. The Plan reflects a genuine concern and effort on their part to provide adequate security for both the refugee population and the citizens of the surrounding communities. A review of the plan reveals many fine features including but not limited to the installation of an additional fence, the continued presence of the federal military at a reasonable level, the funding of additional civilian law enforcement officers, and the improved communications with State and local law enforcement officials. However, after talking with the two Senators, congressional representative and local officials, I would like to enumerate the following concerns with the security plan:

1. No minors should be sent to Ft. Chaffee. They would present additional security problems. Also, no mentally disturbed refugees should be sent to Ft. Chaffee for the same reason.
2. Before movement to Ft. Chaffee, the current population at Camp McCoy should be screened to remove any hardcore troublemakers. When the transfer of McCoy refugees does occur, it may be necessary to take extra security precautions not outlined in the present security plan.

3. A state/local liaison for security should be named and given complete access to the Ft. Chaffee installation.
4. Military personnel should be physically present during the unloading of refugees at the Ft. Smith airport.
5. The authority of the federal military forces should be clarified so that it is clear that they have access to areas of concurrent jurisdiction.
6. Any reduction in federal enforcement strength should be approved by the Security Advisory Group.
7. The Border Patrol should be increased to at least twenty (20).
8. Additional Cubans should not arrive until the federally funded enforcement officers for local communities are hired.
9. After the arrival of refugees from one installation, refugees from another installation should not arrive until the Security Advisory Group has given its approval.
10. Federal enforcement officials should inspect as well as patrol the cyclone fence surrounding the refugee enclave.
11. The Security Plan states that the primary responsibility for the planning and coordination of overall internal enclave law enforcement operations rest with the Department of Justice and the designated lead agency is the U. S. Park Police. The command authority of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator over the other federal law enforcement agencies should be clarified. Also the principle spokesman for the Justice Department at Ft. Chaffee should be identified.
12. Federal civilian law enforcement personnel should not be required to work shifts of lengths which detract from their performance.

13. A head count of the refugees should be taken regularly to insure accurate accountability.
14. Regular meetings of the Security Advisory Group should be held.
15. Adequate communications between the EOC in Bldg. 1370 and the U. S. Park Police in Bldg. 1396 should be insured.
16. The uncompleted section of the security plan (Appendices B, tab 10, D, J, and N) should be submitted to the Governor for his review.
17. Refugees should arrive by air only on Mondays through Fridays during the hours of 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.
18. Actual federal military strength should be reflected in the plan.
19. The overall population at Ft. Chaffee after consolidation is completed should not exceed 10,000.

There are also some other concerns that do not relate directly to the security operations at Fort Chaffee. We would like a response on these before the arrival plans on additional refugees are finalized.

1. The State and local entities should be reimbursed for expenses incurred subsequent to June 1, 1980. Periodic statements will be submitted to F.E.M.A. pursuant to their guidelines for this purpose.
2. The reimbursement request now pending should be processed as soon as received from the State authorities.
3. Refugees who return to Fort Chaffee after being sponsored should be allowed to reenter the installation and be housed there until

a new sponsorship is arranged. This approach raises less security concerns for the community and is fairer to the refugees.

4. The refugee operation should clarify its intentions about the refugees coming into Key West, Florida and their relationship to the operation at Fort Chaffee.
5. The findings of the F.B.I. report on the disturbance of June 1, 1980, should be returned to the Governor.
6. Appendix O should be expanded to include a description of the powers of local and State authorities to arrest or detain refugees who leave the installation without permission.
7. The Administration should vigorously support and attempt to enact before Congress recesses pending legislation which will insure that the voluntary agencies receive the necessary funds to continue their efforts to promptly resettle refugees.

I want to reiterate that I appreciate the attitude of the federal officials and especially the White House and feel certain that these concerns and questions can be worked out in the near future.

ANNEX B (LETTER, STATE DEPARTMENT) to PART I to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 15, 1980

Dear Governor Clinton:

I am happy to be able to respond to the points which you have raised in your statement of September 11, 1980 regarding further enumeration of your concerns with the Joint Security Plan for the Cuban Entrants Processing Center Resettlement Operation. Understandably, the issues which have been stated are of paramount concern to all of us involved in this resettlement effort.

Though our security plan for relocating Cuban entrants at Fort Chaffee is reflective of our overall concern for the health, welfare and dignity of these people, of equal importance is our genuine concern for the rights and security of the citizens and members of the local communities of the State of Arkansas. I feel confident that the following comments will alleviate your apprehensions in this matter.

1. We do not expect unaccompanied minors to be billeted at Fort Chaffee, except for a few individual hardship cases; each such case will be brought to the attention of the Security Advisory Group for their concurrence. Mentally disturbed entrants also will not go to Fort Chaffee. They will be relocated to Federal hospital facilities yet to be designated.

2. The current population at Camp McCoy, as well as the population of all processing centers, is continually being monitored to better identify those individuals who are hardcore troublemakers. Every effort is being made to identify and isolate those Cuban entrants responsible for the recent disorder at Fort McCoy. Known hardcore troublemakers will not be moved to Fort Chaffee. The present security plan reflects what the U.S. Government believes to be adequate reasonable measures to secure and control the Cuban entrant population based on current assessments of the situation. Security precautions can and will be increased when justified by a continuing assessment of the situation at Fort Chaffee.

The Honorable
Bill Clinton,
Governor of Arkansas.

IV-I-B-2

3. The Arkansas Governor's Office, the Arkansas State Police, the Sebastian County Sheriff's Office, the Fort Smith Police Department, the Barling Police Department, the Arkansas Army and Air National Guard, the Greenwood Police Department, the Crawford County Sheriff's Office, the Van Buren Police Department, and the Department of Public Safety are currently represented on the Security Advisory Group at Fort Chaffee. If some additional or special state/local liaison is necessary or if a single state/local security liaison is desirable, this individual should either be appointed by the State of Arkansas or be selected by the state and local members of the Security Advisory Group. With regard to granting complete access to Fort Chaffee, the Military Post Commander retains the sole authority for granting access to the installation.

4. Current plans call for some 36-40 civilian federal law enforcement personnel to be present during debarking of Cuban entrants at the Fort Smith airport. Twenty of those personnel will be uniformed, riot-equipped Border Patrol officers; an additional 12 uniformed INS detention officers will also be present. The remaining law enforcement personnel will be in civilian attire. The Border Patrol officers will be used to provide a cordon between the aircraft and buses. Cuban entrants will be debarked in increments of five or ten at a time to eliminate the possibility of any sort of mass escape. Given this additional knowledge, security precautions at the airport are considered adequate.

5. There is no question regarding the authority and jurisdiction of federal military forces. Federal military forces have jurisdiction and full authority to act throughout the Fort Chaffee federal military reservation; the U. S. Park Police have the responsibility for areas outside the federal military reservation. This authority is clearly stated in the Joint Security Plan and well known to all senior military commanders at Fort Chaffee. State Highway 22 is not within the geographical boundary limits of Fort Chaffee; thus, the responsibility for this road would not fall within the jurisdiction of military forces.

6. The Senior Civilian Coordinator at Fort Chaffee will ensure that the Security Advisory Group is consulted prior to any reduction or major change in security forces. However, in accordance with the Joint Security Plan, reductions in federal security forces--either military or civilian--can only be approved by the Departments of Defense and Justice.

- 7. Current plans call for the use of 20 Border Patrol officers, 10 more than the minimum called for in the Joint Security Plan. This number will be further increased if necessary. (Border Patrol responsibilities deal with the return to custody of escapees found outside the military reservation rather than the prevention of escapes.)

8. The Joint Security Plan allows for the funding of various additional law enforcement positions, however, the actual hiring of those individuals is the responsibility of local officials who are also in the position to determine the best available talented persons. Contracts for these additional positions have been let and funds made available for this purpose.

9. The timetable for the arrivals of Cuban entrants is dependent upon many factors including proper security arrangements and transportation schedules. All movement of personnel into Fort Chaffee will be coordinated through the Security Advisory Group.

- 10. Fences surrounding the Cuban entrants enclave are subject to continuous inspection by both exterior military patrols and interior civilian federal law enforcement patrols.

11. The authority of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator is contained in Appendix N of the Joint Security Plan, which will be published prior to September 18, 1980. Essentially, it will place all civilian law enforcement agencies under the direction of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator (SCLEC). The SCLEC, the Senior Commander of the U. S. Park Police at Fort Chaffee, will have authority over law enforcement and security operations except in the event of civil disorder, on post when the responsibility passes to the Commander, U. S. Army Task Force as reflected in the Joint Security Plan. The SCLEC will be the principal spokesman for the joint civilian federal law enforcement operation at Fort Chaffee and will serve as the Department of Justice representative at Fort Chaffee.

- 12. Under non-emergency conditions federal civilian law enforcement personnel at Fort Chaffee will not be required to work under any conditions which might lead to impaired performance.

13. Body counts of Cuban entrants within Fort Chaffee will be conducted on a periodic basis.

- 14. The Senior Civilian Coordinator at Fort Chaffee has advised that the Security Advisory Group, which he chairs, will meet every other Wednesday commencing September 24, 1980. More frequent meetings will be held as required.

- 15. Adequate communications are an essential element of security planning. Both telephone lines and radio links are being installed between the Fort Chaffee EOC and the U.S. Park Police operations center in Building 1396.

16. The uncompleted appendices and tabs of the Joint Security Plan will be hand carried to the Governor's office when they are completed.

- 17. As currently envisioned, the arrival of Cuban entrants to Fort Chaffee will coincide with normal working hours of the general populace. The intention is that the relocation of all personnel in any given day is accomplished prior to the evening meal. Every effort will be made to accomplish these movements Monday thru Friday between 9-3, barring unforeseen emergencies.

- 18. Federal military strength used for security purposes will remain at approximately 1,000 during Phases II and III. Military strength requirements during Phase III will be reviewed continually. This review may lead to either an increase or decrease in military security forces as dictated by the size and nature of the entrant population. The scaling down of military forces will be accomplished by DA after consultation with DOJ, who will fully consider any recommendations of the Security Advisory Group at Fort Chaffee.

- 19. We fully intend to keep the population at or below 10,000, as announced in the August 5 briefing. The population should not exceed that number.

Other concerns, which I share with you, regarding matters outside the realm of the Joint Security Plan but which impact upon this particular situation are understandable. Many of the challenges are already in the process of being solved and the current status of each is set forth below:

1. The State of Arkansas is currently preparing a submission for expenses incurred in accordance with FEMA guidelines. FEMA has been in contact with Administration and Finance personnel from the State and provided them with appropriate documents and guidelines for submitting the bills for processing. The State can of course submit bills for expenses incurred after June 1, which will be paid in accordance with FEMA guidelines.

2. The reimbursements will be processed as soon as the bills are received. As noted, the process will be in accordance with FEMA guidelines, which are identical to billings for any expenses relating to a declared emergency under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL-93-288). FEMA personnel stand ready to provide whatever advise is necessary to overcome the technical problems of the guidelines which ordinarily relate to natural disasters.

3. Generally, the policy is to disallow re-entrance. Cuban entrants who return after being sponsored will be allowed to enter the Fort Chaffee installation and be housed there until a new sponsorship is arranged.

4. Since the Administration has put in place its strict enforcement measures to cut off the flow, most of the Cuban entrants have been family reunification cases and have been resettled within days from processing centers in the South Florida area. With regard to the remaining incoming Cubans, it has been and remains our policy to engage the Volunteer Agencies in direct resettlement out of these same South Florida processing centers. In general, recent entrants, who are not family reunification cases, have not required the sort of intensive resettlement efforts which are available in a processing center such as Fort Chaffee. There is no present expectation that Cuban entrants from Southern Florida would be relocated at Fort Chaffee barring unforeseen circumstances.

5. The results of the FBI investigation of the June 1st disorder at Fort Chaffee will be made available to the Governor of Arkansas at the earliest possible date. As soon as the FBI investigation is completed, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and the U.S. Attorney will provide a complete briefing for the Governor regarding the details of their investigation.


6. Appendix O of the Joint Security Plan reflects the views of the Department of Justice concerning the authority of local and state authorities with regard to the arrest or detaining of aliens, which, essentially, is that state and local authorities may arrest and/or detain only for violation of the laws of the State of Arkansas. In the final analysis, however, the actions of State and local law enforcement officers would of course be governed by legal guidance provided by the State of Arkansas.

7. The Administration supports the enactment of both the pending Fascell/Stone Amendment and the prompt enactment of a \$65 million appropriation to finance the resettlement of Cuban and Haitian entrants and the operation of Federal processing facilities in the post-October 1, 1980 period. The \$65 million was specifically requested by the President and should be available on October 1, 1980, to fund the private voluntary resettlement agencies for their costs in resettling the Cuban and Haitian entrants.

I trust these responses to the questions you have raised provide you the further reassurances necessary for your approval of the Fort Chaffee Joint Security Plan.

In closing, let me say that the Federal Government is firmly committed to making Fort Chaffee a safe, efficient and effective resettlement operation. Officials and citizens of the State of Arkansas have been most cooperative in helping us to carry out this commitment. I greatly appreciate your assistance in this endeavor and look forward to working with you in the future.

Sincerely yours,



Christian R. Holmes
Director
Cuban-Haitian Task Force

ANNEX C (LETTER, GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS) to PART I to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

Bill Clinton
Governor

September 19, 1980

Mr. Christian R. Holmes, Director
Cuban - Haitian Task Force
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Holmes:

I have received your letter of September 15, 1980 and appreciate your promptness in responding to my concerns with the Joint Security Plan for the Cuban Entrants Processing Center Resettlement Operation. As I stated earlier, these concerns reflect the comments I have received from our Congressional delegation, state and local law enforcement officials, as well as my own review of the document.

I would first like to inform you of the points in your letter which adequately address the issues expressed in my letter of September 12, 1980. We are in agreement on the following security points: 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19. The other category of concerns I listed which you have satisfied are points 1, 4, and 7.

We seem to be in agreement on several other points but, in order to be completely certain, I want to state my interpretation of your responses. On security point one, although my letter stated no minors, I am satisfied since the Security Advisory Group must approve any exceptions to this position. Mentally disturbed entrants are also mentioned in point one. I believe that this category includes those entrants with drug related problems.

On point six, I have consulted with Captain Deloin Causey of the Arkansas State Police and Sheriff Bill Cauthron of Sebastian County who are members of the Security Advisory Group. They feel confident, that due to their close working relationship with the federal members of the Security Advisory Group, adequate consultation will be sought prior to any modification of the federal security forces. No reservations about this point have been expressed by other state and local officials.

On point nine, I requested approval by the Security Advisory Group of the arrival schedule for Cuban entrants. I am assuming that your statement indicating coordination through the Security Advisory Group denotes that schedule must meet with their approval.

On point eleven, I requested clarification of the command authority of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator. In light of Appendix N, which I have now received, and your letter of September 15, 1980, it appears clear that

the Senior Commander of the U.S. Park Police has such authority over federal civilian law enforcement agencies at Fort Chaffee unless such control is relinquished to the Military Post Commander. This point is very crucial with so many different federal civilian law enforcement agencies at Fort Chaffee. On a day to day basis and in time of crisis a concise chain of command is imperative.

On point two of the other concerns, I am submitting at this time to FEMA the audited billings for expenses incurred prior to June 1, 1980. When you have had sufficient time to review these documents, I would like to know which expenses you will allow and when we can expect payment. Simply stating that the bills will be processed is not the assurance which the State desired. We first submitted an itemized billing as requested on June 24, 1980, and have been told repeatedly it would be processed promptly. Although this is not directly connected to the security plan, a speedy handling of this submission should create an excellent climate of cooperation on security as well as other matters. I am hopeful that this point can be resolved at the same time we are discussing the remaining security issues and that the reimbursement question will not act to delay the entire resettlement process.

On point three of the other concerns, I am satisfied with your response, since I am assuming that allowing Cuban entrants to reenter Fort Chaffee means that returning entrants will no longer be housed off the installation. Under no circumstances should an entrant be given the option of remaining outside Fort Chaffee in an unsponsored situation. This concludes those points on which I wanted to state my interpretation of your responses.

The following points require additional clarification. On item three of the security concerns, I have selected Colonel Bill Cook of the Arkansas National Guard to serve as a single state/local security liaison. This selection meets with the approval of Sheriff Cauthron and Captain Causey. These two individuals represent the law enforcement agencies which have had the greatest responsibility for the safety of the citizens near Fort Chaffee since the resettlement effort began. The question of access for Colonel Cook needs to be resolved by the Military Post Commander at Fort Chaffee.

Security point four reflected my concern for handling of the unloading of entrants at the Fort Smith Airport and their transportation to Fort Chaffee. In spite of your response, Captain Causey still believes that more precautions need to be taken in regard to this operation. I will not be satisfied on this point until he is. For this reason, I suggest that you designate a security representative to deal directly with Captain Causey on this issue. I will await his response to such a visit.

Security point five states that U.S. Park Police have the responsibility for areas outside the federal military reservation. We can find no such references in the Joint Security Plan. Additionally, I am seeking further verification of the geographical boundary limits of Fort Chaffee.

As of this date, all of the contracts for the federally funded law enforcement offices for local communities have not been received. Until these positions are available for the local authorities, I will not be able to approve the Joint Security Plan.

On point thirteen of the security concerns, the periodic body counts of Cuban entrants should be conducted on at least a weekly basis.

As of this date, I have only received Appendix N. Appendices B, tab 10, D, and J still need to be submitted to me for review.

In point five of the other concerns, I requested the findings of the F.B.I. investigation. In your letter you state that as soon as the investigation is completed I will receive a complete briefing from the U.S. Attorney. The findings of this investigation will greatly aid the local authorities in determining the scope of their authority if a similar situation should ever arise.

In point six of the other concerns, you state that the actions of State and local law enforcement officers would of course be governed by legal guidance provided by the State of Arkansas. Therefore, I am requesting an expedited official opinion on this issue from the Attorney General of Arkansas. After this opinion has been received and reviewed, the local officials will be in a much better position to evaluate their authority or lack thereof to arrest or detain Cuban entrants. I cannot emphasize enough how important this point is to those officials.

Finally, your assurance in regard to the removal of hard-core troublemakers from the population of the other processing centers is accepted. However, the public concern and my concern over the recent events at Fort McCoy is of such magnitude that I have decided to send a small fact finding delegation to that installation. Following the delegation's assessment of the procedure for removing those entrants who should not be sent to Fort Chaffee, I will be able to assess the need for further security precautions at Fort Chaffee. I want to assure you that these measures are not being taken to needlessly delay that arrival of additional entrants but to address the legitimate concerns of state and local officials.

I want to again thank you for your cooperation and assistance in the formulation of a Joint Security Plan for Fort Chaffee. We must continue to make every effort to relieve the anxieties of the local citizens otherwise any plan we develop could not be properly implemented. Your aid and understanding in this endeavor is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON
Governor

BC:RL:frrssttj

ANNEX D (LETTER, ARKANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL) to PART I to VOLUME IV to After Action
Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



STEVE CLARK
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
JUSTICE BUILDING, LITTLE ROCK 72201

RECEIVED SEP 25 1980
11:05 a.m.

September 25, 1980

For Hudson??
D.

The Honorable Bill Clinton
Governor
State Capitol
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Dear Governor Clinton:

The Office of the Attorney General is in receipt of your letter of September 19, 1980, in which you request an opinion for resolution of the following question:

What authority, if any, do State and local law enforcement officials have to arrest or detain Cuban entrants who leave Fort Chaffee without permission?

Any person not a citizen or national of the United States is defined under the Immigration and Naturalization Act as an alien. 8 U.S.C. et seq. Determination of alien status and whether or not they may remain in this country is made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and, for the most part, enforcement authority over the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act lies with the Attorney General of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §1103.

Law enforcement authority over alien persons located within the jurisdiction of the United States generally falls within the duties of officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States Marshals and their deputies. Immigration officials have the power to arrest an alien in cases of administrative deportation under 8 U.S.C. §1252. The warrant of arrest is an administrative rather than a judicial warrant. See, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, L.Ed. 668 (1960), reh. denied. They may also arrest an alien without a warrant when they believe the alien is in the United States illegally and likely to escape before an arrest warrant can be obtained. 8 U.S.C. §1357. Further, under 18 U.S.C. §3053, a United States Marshal and his deputies may arrest an alien for any criminal offense against the United States committed in their presence or for a felony recognized under the laws of the United States.

The Honorable Bill Clinton
September 25, 1980
Page Two

Enforcement of the criminal, highway and traffic laws of the State of Arkansas, however, is statutorily the duty of State and local law enforcement officials. These officials include city police, sheriffs and their deputies and the State Police. See, in this regard, Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-115(12) (Repl. 1977); §42-1001(a) (Repl. 1977); §43-406 (Repl. 1977); §42-407 (Repl. 1977). Alien persons have a duty to obey the laws of this State. If Cuban entrants violate the criminal, highway or traffic laws of this State, they may be arrested by State and local officials for such violations. Hellenic Lines Limited v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (1969).

In exercising their duties as law enforcement officials, the State and local authorities, as in making any criminal arrest, may not exceed the scope of their lawful authority with regard to civil rights of arrestees. The protection of the civil liberties of aliens is statutorily protected pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1983. Aliens as well as citizens of the United States enjoy the rights protected by these two statutory sections because they are extended to every person within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether that person is a citizen or not. These protected rights include a prohibition against the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process or equal protection of the laws. See, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) and Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).

The specific question you ask is whether the State and local officials have authority to arrest and detain Cuban entrants who leave Fort Chaffee without permission. There is State statutory authority, under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.1, Ark. Stat. Ann. Vol. 4A, p. 438 (Repl. 1977) which enables a law enforcement officer to stop and detain a person who the officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit:

- (1) a felony, or
- (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property.

The officer detaining the person under this section may do so for a period of not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained must either be released or arrested and charged with an offense.

The Honorable Bill Clinton
September 25, 1980
Page Two

I am unaware of any law of this State which prohibits or makes it a crime for an alien person to leave a federal compound or institution without permission. It is my opinion, then, that State and local authorities would have no authority to arrest or detain Cuban entrants for this reason alone.

Sincerely,




STEVE CLARK
Attorney General

SC:mgv

PART II (SECURITY) to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

- ANNEX A - Diagram of Law Enforcement Security Relationships
- ANNEX B - Joint Security Plan (Appendix Q deleted)
- ANNEX C - Memorandum for Record
- ANNEX D - Task Force Security Plan
- ANNEX E - Perimeter Guard Instructions
- ANNEX F - Leaders Pass
- ANNEX G - Refugee Pass System

ANNEX A (DIAGRAM OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS) to PART II to VOLUME IV
to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



ANNEX B (JOINT SECURITY PLAN) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee




**JOINT SECURITY PLAN
REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
RESETTLEMENT OPERATION**

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS



PREPARED BY



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



This document contains material prepared by a number of federal, state, and local military and civilian agencies concerned with providing law enforcement and security services in connection with the movement and housing of Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. In its totality it represents the Joint Security Plan of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Defense.

This plan reflects the status of law enforcement and security planning for refugee resettlement at Fort Chaffee as of September 6, 1980. Although this plan is under continuous revision, it reflects current policy and is authoritative for both planning and operations. Substantive changes or revisions must be approved in advance by appropriate DOJ and DOD authorities.

Paul R. Michel

For the Department of Justice

Acting Deputy Attorney General

Date: 9/5/80

Robert D. Spiro, Jr.

For the Department of Defense

Date: 9/5/80

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I. MISSION

Provide security and law enforcement during movement, consolidation, and sustaining of refugees at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Ensure coordination with local, state and Federal government agencies for security of local population. Prepare for civil disturbance operations-maintaining full control of all refugees at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. PURPOSE

To detail the joint security plan and establish requirements for the refugee movement, consolidation and transition to normalization at Fort Chaffee, and for the surrounding area.

B. SITUATION

1. Fort Chaffee has been designated the consolidation center for Cuban refugees which have not been relocated from centers at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. The movement will start only when the security measures in the plan have been implemented and will be a coordinated movement, occurring sequentially from camp locations. The total consolidated refugee population to be located at Fort Chaffee will not exceed 10,000 persons at any one time.
2. This plan is written as a joint security plan detailing those requirements which are or have been assigned and tasked to military and civil agencies.
3. This plan is understood to be binding on those agencies which are responsible for performing certain tasks. A Security Advisory Group will be established to review and advise on the implementation of this plan and to recommend any changes that may be required. Members of the Security Advisory Group will be drawn from the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and the military security forces. The Group will be chaired by the Senior Civilian Coordinator.

C. ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made with the understanding that they are to be considered as requirements prior to movement.

1. Security measures detailed in this plan have been implemented at Fort Chaffee and the surrounding location.

2. That a lighted security fence made of a 10' chain link material topped with concertina will be in place
3. That approximately 500 refugees will be scheduled to arrive sequentially from other locations during the hours of daylight daily.
4. That all personnel to be sent to Fort Chaffee will have been fully oriented and their records checked and confirmed.
5. That a segregated living area to be manned by a federal civilian law enforcement agency (INS) has been established at Fort Chaffee for habitual trouble makers and for persons who attempt to leave without authority.
6. That a thorough search will be made of all refugees and their possessions prior to boarding aircraft at the departure location and also after arrival at Fort Chaffee.
7. That demographic data will be provided one week prior to shipment to Fort Chaffee detailing the number of single males, females, families (and make-up of families), unaccompanied minors, etc.

D. OPERATIONAL PHASING.

Physical Security for the Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee is organized into three phases:

1. Phase I - Movement. The movement of incoming refugees from other refugee centers through the Air National Guard facility at the Fort Smith Airport to the refugee enclave at Fort Chaffee.
2. Phase II - Transition. The physical security arrangements during the consolidation and transition of the Fort Chaffee refugee enclave.
3. Phase III - Sustaining. The physical security arrangements during the sustaining period of the refugee enclave.

E. MOVEMENT SECURITY

The following requirements are established for movement from each refugee center to Fort Chaffee.

1. U.S. Army. Will provide MP and security force at departure and arrival airports when located on DOD property. Troops will be provided at the processing site to assist in crowd control.
2. INS. Will provide guard personnel on board aircraft and at the departure and arrival points to conduct physical searches, and as bus guards enroute to Fort Chaffee. FAA security (Sky Marshals) will support INS movement security operations as necessary.
3. Arkansas State Police. Will provide personnel to escort busses from Fort Smith Airport to Fort Chaffee.
4. Arkansas Air National Guard Police. Will assist INS security force at Fort Smith Airport as required.

F. POST AND ENCLAVE SECURITY

1. Physical Security.
 - a. A lighted security fence to be constructed at least 10' in height topped by a concertina wire. Gates will be placed at critical intersections and will be manned 24 hours per day. Three gates will remain open under guard for traffic and contraband control purposes.
 - b. Pass and Entry System. Administered by the Department of State and executed by USPP. Guidance is outlined in Phase II of the Concept of Operations.
2. Security Forces.
 - a. U.S. Army. The Army will provide approximately the following forces:

(1) Movement/Transition Phases.

	<u>TFIII</u>	<u>MP</u>	<u>OTHER*</u>
● Movement Phase	540	267	--
● Transition Phase	540	174	--

*Garden Plot Unit on call

(2) Sustaining Phase

As in Phase II, with continuing reassessment based on the security situation and the size and nature of the refugee population.

- b. Federal Civilian Forces. The Department of Justice has designated the United States Park Police, Department of the Interior, as the lead civilian law enforcement agency responsible for coordinating the total security/law enforcement effort for the refugee center at Fort Chaffee. Other federal law enforcement organizations have major supporting missions.

(1) For all phases.	
U.S. Park Police (Interior)	73
U.S. Marshals Service (Justice)	10
Federal Protective Service (GSA)	62
Border Patrol-INS (Justice)	10
Detention/Deportation Division- INS (Justice)	65
Bureau of Prisons (Justice)	5
	<u>225</u>
(2) Phase I	
Federal Aviation Administration	15

G. LOCAL COMMUNITY SECURITY

Will be provided by state and local law enforcement agencies who may have liaison personnel co-located in the Emergency Operation Center during critical periods. Communications system and alert notification are provided in Tab 5 and Tab 8, Appendix B.

H. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command.

- a. Airport. INS and Arkansas State Police.
- b. Fort Chaffee. Commander, U.S. Army Task Force.
- c. Enclave. U.S. Park Police. (Escalation to a civil disorder within the enclave area will require change of command in that whenever Military Police or other U.S. Army personnel are committed, command will be changed from USPP to the senior military Commander.)

- d. Local Civil Police. Chief of Local Force.
- 2. Civil Disorders.
 - a. On post. Commander, U.S. Army Task Force.
 - b. Off post. Arkansas State Police
- 3. Control.
 - a. Joint Emergency Operations Center will be established on 2nd Floor, west side of Building 1370. Telephone 484-2400, 484-2231.
 - b. Communications as noted below and in Communications Tab 8, of Appendix B.

<u>TITLE/NAME</u>	<u>RADIO</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>QUARTERS</u>
Commanding General BG Drummond	F1	163.5625	2545/2561	3288
Deputy Commander COL Karr	F1	163.5625	2545/2561	2637
Chief of Staff LTC Rowe	F1	163.5625	2545/2547	2659
Commander, TF III LTC Bailey	F1	163.5625	2910/2291	3276 2291
Emergency Operations Ctr. Shift Leader	F1	163.5625	2400	2728
Provost Marshal MAJ McHugh	F2	164.10000	2813/3104	3265
State Dept. Coordinator Donald E. Whitteaker			2008	785-4121
FEMA Coordinator James G. Licklider			2008	452-6824
U.S. Park Police MAJ James R. Turner			2751/2461	
U.S. Marshal Robert S. Wisnant			2625/2332	

Arkansas State Police	783-5195
Sebastian County Sheriff	783-1051
Fort Smith Police Department	785-4221
Barling Police Department	452-1550
Arkansas Air National Guard (Municipal Airport)	646-1601
Arkansas Army National Guard (8400 Highway 59T)	452-6484

I. ESTIMATED PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

A. MILITARY

Approximate military personnel requirements for each phase are:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Phase I</u>	<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Phase III*</u>
Task Force III			
Perimeter	180	180	---
Immediate Reaction Force	180	180	---
Patrol/Reaction Force	<u>180</u>	<u>180</u>	---
Total (All Shifts)	540	540	
Military Police			
Enclave Patrols	18	0	0
Post Patrols	22	12	12
MP Desk	5	5	5
Post Security	192	137	0
Cordon Security	10	0	0
Immediate React/ Security**	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>157</u>
TOTAL (All shifts)	267	174	174
Garden Plot Unit	***	***	****

* Military requirements for Phase III will be determined on a continuing basis based on the size and nature of the refugee population. Scaling down of military forces will be accomplished by DA after consultation with DOJ.

** Also provides post security.

*** Some forward element may be present.


**** Tasked to respond as required.

B. FEDERAL CIVILIAN

Federal law enforcement agency* personnel requirements are:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Phase I</u>	<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>
U.S. Park Police Enclave Patrol	73	73	73
U.S. Marshals Service	10	10	10
Federal Protective Service	52	62	62
Immigration & Naturalization Service			
Detention	65	65	65
Border Patrol	10	10	10
	<u>75</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>75</u>
Bureau of Prisons	5	5	5
Federal Aviation Administration	15	0	0
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	230	225	225

* An additional estimated 70 contract guards will be required by USMS and BOP.



III. DEFINITIONS

Federal Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Those federal non-military units performing major security and law enforcement functions at Fort Chaffee under the overall coordination of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). These units include:

U.S. Park Police (USPP), Department of the Interior
Federal Protective Service (FPS), General Services
Administration
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), U.S. Department of
Justice
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), U.S. Department of Justice
Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, U.S. Department of Justice
Detention and Deportation Division, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation

Movement Phase. Phase I, the period during which refugees are being moved into Fort Chaffee for consolidation. This planning phase is primarily concerned with the movement process.

Refugee Enclave. That portion of Fort Chaffee designated for Cuban housing or administrative purposes and enclosed in a chain link security fence. The stockade and some Cuban-related facilities are located outside of the refugee enclave.

Security Advisory Group. Security and law enforcement coordinating body created at Fort Chaffee. Composed of members of civilian and military security forces and chaired by the Senior Civilian Coordinator.

Senior Civilian Coordinator. The State Department Coordinator on site at Fort Chaffee.

Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator. The senior U.S. Park Police Commander on site at Fort Chaffee.

Senior Military Commander. The senior military commander on site at Fort Chaffee.

Sustaining Phase. Phase III, that time period subsequent to Phase II during which enclave operations have become normalized.

Transition Phase. Phase II covers the period between the arrival of the first relocated refugee at Fort Chaffee and completion of inprocessing of the last relocated refugee around September 30, 1980. This phase also envisions a "settling-in" period during which enclave operations are normalized, extending the end of Phase II to mid or late October 1980.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense will have primary responsibility for perimeter security of the enclave, for the apprehension and return of escapees who are outside of the designated enclave but within the boundaries of the military installation, and for providing a reactive response force of sufficient size to handle situations beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement.

B. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Under the overall coordination of the Department of Justice, designated federal civilian law enforcement components will be responsible for patrolling, policing, and peace-keeping activities within all interior areas of the refugee enclave, including access control to the enclave and such other processing and support areas as may be designated. The federal civilian law enforcement agencies will also be responsible for security during the movement of refugees and for the implementation of appropriate administrative and criminal justice procedures.

The following federal civilian law enforcement organizations are assigned to specific responsibilities indicated:

1. The U.S. Park Police.

- a. Peacekeeping, law enforcement, and security operations within the refugee enclave.
- b. Immediate reaction to requests from military and civilian personnel in situations requiring refugees to be arrested, searches to be conducted, investigations to be initiated or similar law enforcement activities to be carried out. (Appendix C)
- c. Submission of timely and accurate consolidated law enforcement reports to the U.S. Department of Justice.

2. The U.S. Marshals Service

- a. Operation of segregation areas for refugees in protective custody and for unattached personnel under the age of 18. (Appendix D)
- b. Operation through September 15, 1980, of the refugee stockade.

- c. Transportation of prisoners and support of court functions.
- d. General liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies on behalf of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator.
- e. Such additional short-term or immediate law enforcement or security missions as may be assigned on an emergency basis.

3. Federal Protective Service

- a. The protection of all civilian personnel associated with the refugee operation; and for the areas in which others work, except in those areas within the jurisdiction of other agencies. FPS will also provide access control of personnel and vehicle at interior and exterior enclave gates. (Appendix E)

4. The Border Patrol (INS)

- a. The pursuit and apprehension of refugees who flee or otherwise leave the boundaries of Fort Chaffee without authorization is the responsibility of the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol is also responsible for escape notification to all necessary state and local jurisdictions, including police agencies and airport authorities. (Appendices F and O)
- b. Liaison with state and local authorities on matters relating to unauthorized refugee departure and return.

5. Detention and Deportation Division (INS)

- a. Security and operation of Level II housing (detention) area. (Appendix G)

6. Immigration and Naturalization Service

- a. Design and implementation of a system of uniform and strict rules of conduct for refugee behavior and the application of disciplinary procedures where warranted. (Appendix H)

7. Bureau of Prisons

- a. Security and operation of the refugee stockade facility at Fort Chaffee, after September 15, 1980. (Appendix I)

8. Federal Aviation Administration

- a. Assure preboard security screening with walk-through and hand wand devices is accomplished on all Cuban refugees being transported via commercial aircraft. Assure X-ray examination of all Cuban carry-on and checked baggage.
- b. Assign sufficient number of Federal Air Marshals to refugee flights to assure control of Cubans and protection of crew and aircraft. (Appendix P)

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. For security and law enforcement purposes the Fort Chaffee refugee processing center has been divided into five areas.

a. Enclave Area. That area designed for the housing of the refugee population. Six categories of segregated housing will be available, with refugee assignments to each based on a classification to be assigned by INS.

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>CRITERIA</u>
Stockade	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Awaiting Transfer to Federal Prison● Serving Magistrate's Sentence● Awaiting Trial
Protective Custody	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● In Danger of Harm From Others
Level II Housing (Detention) Youth & Adult Separation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Anti-social Camp Behavior● Gang Member● Convicted of Minor Offense● Completed Stockade Sentence● Pending Trial
Youth Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● 17 Years of Age or Under & Unattached
General Population	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● 18 Years of Age and over & unattached.
Family Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Family Member

Enclave security and law enforcement responsibilities rest with the U.S. Park Service, with the following exceptions:

Stockade	Bureau of Prisons
Youth Section	U.S. Marshals Service
Protective	U.S. Marshals Service
Custody	
Level II Housing	Immigration &
(Detention)	Naturalization Service

- b. Support Area. This area includes refugee processing, educational, training and related support facilities comprising some 50 buildings. Security and law enforcement for the support facilities and personnel is provided by the Federal Protective Service through a mixture of foot and vehicle patrols and stationary guards.
 - c. Perimeter Area. That area within the military reservation but outside the enclave. This perimeter is secured to prevent the unauthorized departure of refugees or the entry of unauthorized personnel or materials. Perimeter security is the responsibility of military forces, except that enclave gates will be manned by the FPS.
 - d. Remainder of the Military Reservation. That area of Fort Chaffee exclusive of the refugee enclave and support areas. Security and law enforcement responsibilities on the remainder of Fort Chaffee are the responsibility of the Post Commander.
 - e. Civilian Area. That area outside of Fort Chaffee and under the jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas. Security and law enforcement responsibility in this area rests with the appropriate state and local authorities. (Appendix O)
2. There are three notable exceptions to the general responsibilities outlined above:
- a. Nothing contained herein shall affect the authority and responsibility of the military commander to assure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control.

- b. A reserve military force shall be maintained at all times with sufficient capacity to respond promptly:
- Should large scale disturbances occur on the installation which are beyond the capacity of the responsible law enforcement agencies,
 - In the event that federal officers become unable to perform their law enforcement functions on the installation, or
 - In the event the safety of federal officers on the installation becomes threatened by detainees.
- c. Nothing stated herein shall alter normal division of jurisdiction for enforcement of specific statutes by various agencies. Accordingly, each agency shall transfer responsibility for further response to the particular federal agency with jurisdiction for the statutory violation or circumstance.

B. OPERATIONAL PHASES

Physical Security for the Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee is organized into three phases:

- Phase I - Movement. The movement of incoming refugees from other refugee centers through the Air National Guard facility at the Fort Smith Airport to the refugee enclave at Fort Chaffee.
- Phase II - Transition. The physical security arrangements during the consolidation and transition of the Fort Chaffee refugee enclave.
- Phase III - Sustaining. The physical security arrangements during the sustaining period of the refugee enclave.

C. PHASE I -- MOVEMENT

1. A decision has been made to consolidate the resettlement activities of the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. This will involve the transfer of an estimated 7,000 refugees to Fort Chaffee from Eglin Air Force Base (1,000), Fort McCoy (3,000) and Fort Indiantown Gap (3,000). It is expected that Cuban refugees will start arriving at Fort Chaffee in early September in increments of about 500 persons per day. Transfers will proceed one camp at a time in the following order:

- Eglin AFB Early September 1980
- Fort McCoy Mid September 1980
- Ft. Indiantown Gap Late September 1980

2. Movement from the home center to Fort Chaffee will be by air to Fort Smith Airport and then by bus to Fort Chaffee. INS and FAA will be responsible for security of the movement as far as Fort Smith Airport. (Appendix K)

3. Ground security in the Fort Chaffee area will commence upon the arrival of each aircraft at Fort Smith Airport and continue until the refugees are delivered to the enclave. Security will be provided by federal and state law enforcement and military resources. Organizational responsibilities are as follows:

MP - Escort during ground movement within Fort Chaffee.
- Traffic control at Fort Chaffee
- Reaction Force on call.


AP - General Airbase security.


INS - Security at Airbase.
- Bus guard during ground movement.
- Security during inprocessing.

FPS - Security of inprocessing area and personnel.

USPP - Internal Security of enclave.

Civilian - General security external to Airbase.
Law Enforcement - Traffic control enroute from Airbase to Fort Chaffee.
- Escort enroute.





Empty Bus Area

Security Force

Bus Staging Area

South Gate

**FORT SMITH AIRPORT
STAGING AREA**

4. Estimated Personnel Requirements

- a. Approximate military personnel requirements for Phase I are:

UNIT	PHASE I
Task Force III	
Perimeter	180
Immediate Reaction Force	180
Patrol/Reaction Force	180
Total (All Shifts)	<u>540</u>
Military Police (per shift)	
Enclave Patrols	18
Post Patrols	22
MP Desk	5
Post Security	192
Cordon Security	10
Immediate React/Security	20
	<u>267</u>
Garden Plot Unit (On Call Status)	*

The Garden Plot Unit will be organized and equipped to perform the mission of performing crowd/riot control functions. Upon arrival at Fort Chaffee the Unit will be under the operational control of the Task Force Headquarters.

* Some forward command element may be present.

- b. Approximate federal law enforcement agency personnel requirements for Phase I are:

AGENCY	PHASE I
U.S. Park Police	
Enclave Patrol	73

AGENCY	PHASE I
U.S. Marshals Service	10
Federal Protective Service	52
INS*	
Detention	65
Border Patrol	10
Bureau of Prisons	5
Federal Aviation Administration	15
	<u>230</u>
*At Fort Chaffee	

D. PHASE II - TRANSITION

The consolidation and transition phase covers that period between the arrival of the first relocated refugee and the inprocessing and "settling-in" of the last relocated refugee. This period is expected to last until early or mid October 1980. During this period physical internal security of the refugee enclave will be provided by the USPP and other civilian law enforcement agencies. Security of Fort Chaffee is the primary responsibility of the Military Police with assistance from TF III and civilian law enforcement agencies. Arkansas civilian law enforcement agencies are responsible for security of the areas external to Fort Chaffee.

1. Estimated Personnel Requirements

- a. Military. Approximate military personnel requirements for Phase II are:

UNIT	PHASE II
Task Force III	
Perimeter	180
Immediate Reaction Force	180
Patrol/Reaction	<u>180</u>
Total (All Shifts)	540

Military Police (per shift)	
Enclave Patrols	0
Post Patrols	12
MP Desk	5
Post Security	137
Cordon Security	0
Immediate React/Sec.	20
	<u>174</u>

Garden Plot *
(On Call Status)

* Some forward command element may be present.

- b. Federal Civilian. Approximate federal law enforcement agency* personnel requirements for Phase II are:

AGENCY	PHASE II
U.S. Park Police	
Enclave Patrol	73
U.S. Marshals Service	10
Federal Protective Service	62
INS	
Detention	65
Border Patrol	10
Bureau of Prisons	5
	<u>225</u>

2. Physical Security Measures

During Phase II physical security will be provided by fencing and perimeter guards/patrols. An improved system of personnel control will also be instituted during this Phase.

a. Perimeter Physical Security.

- (1) Fence. The perimeter of the refugee enclave will be established by a ten foot chain link fence with double bayonet on top which supports concertina wire on six horizontal rows of barbed wire. An additional roll of concertina

*Plus an additional estimated 70 contract guards in support of BOP and USMS missions.

is emplaced along the bottom inside of the fence and fine mesh hardware cloth is attached on the top of the chain link fence.

- (2) Lighting. The security lighting is designed around the existing street lights and available secondary power poles in the vicinity for economy of design. Mercury vapor lights will be installed to supplement the existing lighting.

b. Access Control.

- (1) Fort Chaffee. Control of personnel and vehicle entrance and movement on Fort Chaffee are the responsibility of the Garrison Commander. Vehicle security inspections on the post are the responsibility of the military police. Vehicle security inspections are an integral part of gate guard operations. All vehicles entering or leaving post are subject to inspection for contraband or refugees. Vehicles identified as carrying refugees or contraband are subject to seizure and charges may be brought against the occupants through the U.S. Magistrate.

The Garrison Commander will establish and maintain appropriate vehicle and personnel controls. (Tab 10, Appendix B)

- (2) Refugee Enclave. Control of personnel and vehicle entrance and movement within the refugee enclave is the responsibility of the U.S. Park Police and FPS. Vehicle security inspections at enclave gates or interior are also the responsibility of the U.S. Park Service and FPS.

- c. Enclave Pass System. Issuance and control of passes for all personnel authorized into the refugee enclave, including refugee passes, are the responsibility of the State Department. Three types of passes are authorized:

Unlimited, limited, and temporary. Unlimited passes allow free movement throughout the enclave. Limited passes restrict movement in the enclave to one specific area. Temporary passes authorize the bearer entrance to the enclave for a specified time, and, when appropriate, for a limited area.

- (1) Official Personnel. Police, fire, medical, and military personnel on official business do not require passes.
- (2) Privately owned or rented vehicles must bear a resettlement operation pass in order to be admitted to the enclave. The Provost Marshal controls and issues these passes. Emergency vehicles, government owned or rented, and commercial delivery vehicles do not require vehicle passes. However, all occupants of the vehicles must be either emergency workers or have personnel access passes appropriate for their reason for entry.
- (3) Refugees. Refugee leaders are issued passes based on their position in the chain of command. These passes enable the bearers to aid in problem solving and the maintenance of order within the enclave. In addition, barracks leaders are issued a pass which permits them to move about in the enclave after curfew. This pass does not permit them to leave the enclave unaccompanied. The U.S. Park Police issue the barracks leader pass.

3. Internal Enclave Law Enforcement

The primary responsibility for the planning and coordination of overall internal enclave law enforcement operations rests with the Department of Justice. The lead civilian site law enforcement agency is the U.S. Park Police, whose commander serves as the senior civilian law enforcement coordinator. Other federal civilian law enforcement agencies perform support missions as assigned.

4. Command, Control and Coordination

- a. Security during the consolidation of refugees at Fort Chaffee will be a coordinated effort involving the following agencies:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>
U.S. Military	BG James E. Drummond
State Department	Donald E. Whitteaker
FEMA Coordinator	James G. Licklider
U.S. Park Police	CAPT Rick Qusick
U.S. Marshals Service	Alfonso Solis
Immigration & Naturalization Service	LaVerne Nielsen
Federal Protective Service	
Bureau of Prisons	
Arkansas Governor's Office	Bob Lyford
Arkansas State Police	COL Doug Harp
Sebastian County Sheriff's Office	Bill J. Cauthron
Fort Smith Police Department	Henry J. Oliver
Barling Police Department	
Arkansas Army National Guard	MG James H. Jones
Arkansas Air National Guard	Charley Harris
Greenwood Police Department	Marvin Booker
Crawford County Sheriff's Office	Trellon Ball

Van Buren Police
Department

Virgil Goff

Department of Public
Safety

Joe R. Jones

A Command Post will be established in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (Building 1370) for those agencies listed above as a joint Command Post (CP) enabling immediate coordination between affected agencies.

Communications. See Tab 8 to Appendix B, Communications Plan.

In the event of a disturbance, escape or practice alert, CP will have the responsibility of notifying each of the agencies in accordance with Appendix B, Tab 5.

A Security Advisory Group consisting of the representatives listed above will meet periodically as deemed necessary to discuss security problems, develop plans and coordinate implementation of security measures. Members of this group will consist of all military and civil law enforcement/security elements. The group will be chaired and meetings called by the Senior Civilian Coordinator.

E. PHASE III - SUSTAINING

The physical security portion of the sustaining phase of the consolidation of refugees is basically the same as that for Phase II.

1. Estimated Personnel Requirements.

- a. Military. Approximate military personnel requirements for Phase III are:

UNIT	PHASE III*
Task Force III	
Perimeter	---
Immediate Reaction Force	---
Patrol/Reaction	---
Military Police	
Enclave Patrols	0
Post Patrols	12
MP Desk	5
Post Security	0
Cordon Security	0
Immediate React/Sec.	157
	<u>174</u>
Garden Plot (On Call Status)	**

** Tasked to respond as required.

- b. Federal Civilian. Approximate federal law enforcement agency* personnel requirements for Phase III are:

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>PHASE III</u>
U.S. Park Police	73
U.S. Marshals Service	10
FPS	62
INS	75
Bureau of Prisons	5
	<u>225</u>

* Plus an estimated 70 contract guards in support of BOP and USMS missions.

* Military requirements for Phase III will be determined on a continuing basis based on the size and nature of the refugee population. Scaling down of military forces will be accomplished by DA after consultation with DOJ.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A

GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS

- TAB 1 -- 3 JUNE GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFICIALS
 - TAB 2 -- 4 JUNE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
 - TAB 3 -- 5 JUNE MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 - TAB 4 -- 10 JUNE MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
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JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A TAB 1

Memorandum Dated June 3, 1980

GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFICIALS CONCERNING SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AT FACILITIES DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE "CUBAN ALIENS" IN SUPPORT OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

1. This MSG supercedes DAMO-ODS MSG, SAB, DTG 082155Z May 80 and 021835Z June 80.

2. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Justice (The Department) have reached an agreement concerning law enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities for detainees at military installations. Pertinent portions of the agreement are set forth below. Consistent with the agreement, the responsible military commander and the FEMA Officer-in-Charge, or other proper on-scene authorities, may establish and implement additional security procedures as necessary:

- A. The primary responsibility for peace-keeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the Cuban detainees rests with civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers are not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander will exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon. Such temporary emergency measures by the military, however, do not constitute an exercise of the law enforcement authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or any other federal
-

agencies regarding laws for which they have been assigned jurisdiction by statute or otherwise.

B. Because of the present unavailability at certain locations of sufficient civilian law enforcement officers of the Federal Government, the following duties will be performed at those locations by personnel responsible to the Department of Defense, through its executive agent, the Department of Army, and the responsible military commander at each location. Current efforts to provide civilian law enforcement officers at the earliest possible time shall be continued. As these officers become available to replace the military, they will assume the following functions in the order listed below. In all cases, however, nothing contained herein shall affect the authority and responsibility of the military commander to assure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control.

(1) Preventive Patrols. Adequate police presence and visual surveillance shall be maintained at all times in the area in which the detainees are located (detainee enclave) on the installation through such patrols and stationary posts as may be necessary. The purpose of such patrols shall be to deter, detect and prevent disorder, criminal offenses, and any serious harm from any cause to the Cuban detainee(s), as well as to protect other personnel, buildings, and equipment.

(2) Securing the Control Zone.

(A) A control zone shall be established around the detainee enclave on the installation. This control zone shall be clearly marked and posted with signs in English and Spanish prohibiting Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure from the detainee enclave. Military personnel shall maintain this perimeter and shall be stationed along this control zone and at any gates or openings to deter, detect and make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized passage outside

the control zone, using oral warnings and, if those fail, reasonable, but wholly non-lethal measures to deter detainees from attempting to cross the perimeter. Use of physical barriers is also permissible at the option of the military commander. Military personnel shall not leave the installation to pursue or apprehend detainees.

- (B) Detainee(s) found on the installation outside the detainee enclave shall be returned under escort to the enclave and their unauthorized departure shall be reported to FEMA, the United States Marshals, and the representative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Similarly, any detainee(s) returned to the installation by civilian authorities or otherwise shall be escorted back to their enclave and similarly reported.
 - (3) Response Force. A reserve force of military or security (AIR) police shall be maintained at all times with sufficient capacity to respond promptly (1) should large scale disturbances occur on the installation which are beyond the capacity of the responsible law enforcement agencies, (2) in the event that federal officers become unable to perform their law enforcement functions on the installation, or (3) in the event the safety of federal officers on the installation becomes threatened by detainees.
- C. In every case, and without regard to whether law enforcement functions at a particular installation are being discharged primarily by military or by civilian officials. The responsibilities of FEMA and civilian law enforcement agencies shall include the following:
- (1) Immediate response for arrests. A lead civilian law enforcement agency shall be designated by FEMA and DOJ at each installation. That agency shall be prepared to react immediately to calls from military personnel or civilian law

enforcement personnel in connection with circumstances requiring detainee(s) to be arrested, searches to be conducted, investigations to be undertaken or other similar law enforcement activities to be conducted. The lead agency may be assisted in any or all of the above activities by other agencies, although nothing stated herein shall alter normal division of jurisdiction for enforcement of specific statutes by various agencies. Accordingly, the lead agency shall transfer responsibility for further response to the particular federal agency with jurisdiction for the statutory violation or circumstance.

- (2) Advice. The lead agency shall also provide advice to FEMA representatives and military authorities with respect to law enforcement matters. In addition, the lead agency shall regularly assess the need for police presence within the enclave. The FEMA Officer-in-Charge, the responsible military commander, and the Officer-in-Charge of the lead law enforcement agency at each installation shall confer with regard to the type and level of law enforcement presence appropriate for the circumstances which obtain at that installation at the particular time in question. However, the final decision on the deployment of military personnel, both on the perimeter and within the enclosed area, must rest solely with the military commander or his designee.
- (3) Custody of persons detained or arrested. The United States Marshals Service (USMS) shall be responsible for custody of all arrested persons and their safe and secure transport to stockade, segregated detention, or jail facilities.
- (4) Guarding persons in punitive detention. In consultation with FEMA, one of the civilian law enforcement agencies shall be assigned responsibility for guarding detainees at the stockade or segregated detention facility.

3. The following additional guidance is provided:

- A. In accomplishing the control zone security mission, use of the nightstick or baton as a barrier may be sufficient to deter individuals from leaving the enclave. However, individuals should not be struck in the head or otherwise subjected to excessive measures. Firearms without ammunition may be used.
 - B. Military police performing the preventive patrol mission shall be equipped with standard military police equipment.
4. An outer perimeter shall be established around the federal installation, and appropriate reaction forces shall be maintained. If the detainee enclave is breached, the same measures discussed above shall be applied to prevent detainees from leaving the federal installation.
5. No Cuban detainee shall be allowed to leave the installation without proper authority.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A TAB 2

4 JUNE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR DETAINEES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

The Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have reached the following agreement. Those agencies intend hereby to delineate and clarify respective responsibilities of all involved agencies for peacekeeping, law enforcement and related activities concerning the Cuban detainees* at military installations. Consistent with this agreement, the responsible military commander and the FEMA Officer-in-Charge, or other proper on-scene authorities, may establish and implement additional security procedures as necessary.

The primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the Cuban detainees rests with civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers are not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander will exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon.

Such temporary emergency measures by the military, however, do not constitute an exercise of the law enforcement authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or any other Federal agencies regarding laws for which they have been assigned jurisdiction by statute or otherwise.

I

Because of the present unavailability at certain locations of sufficient civilian law enforcement officers of the Federal Government, the following duties will be performed at those locations by personnel responsible to the Department of Defense, through its executive agent, the Department of Army, and the responsible military commander at each location. Current efforts

*Persons entering United States territory without visas or other authority who have not been admitted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are subject to detention under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, pending completion of inspection and processing to determine eligibility for admission.

to provide civilian law enforcement officers at the earliest possible time shall be continued. As sufficient police officers become available from a federal civilian law enforcement agency, that agency, with DOJ and FEMA concurrence, will deploy its force and assume responsibility from military police at a base designated by FEMA and DOJ for preventive patrols as described in (1) below and related law enforcement efforts. This responsibility should be assumed as soon as feasible and at as many of the bases as possible. If the number of bases should be reduced enough for the civilian law enforcement agency performing preventive patrol at a base to also maintain the perimeter as set forth in (2) a. below, it shall do so. Otherwise, maintenance of the perimeter will remain a military responsibility. In any event, responsibility for providing a response force in case of riot or other such large scale disorder will be with the military. In all cases, however, nothing contained herein shall affect the authority and responsibility of the military commander to assure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control.

(1) Preventive Patrols

Adequate police presence and visual surveillance shall be maintained at all times in the area in which the detainees are located (detainee enclave) on the installation through such patrols and stationary posts as may be necessary. The purpose of such patrols shall be to deter, detect and prevent disorder, criminal offenses, and any serious harm from any cause to the Cuban detainee(s), as well as to protect other personnel, buildings, and equipment.

(2) Securing the Perimeter

a. A perimeter shall be established around the detainee enclave on the installation. This perimeter shall be clearly marked and posted with signs in English and Spanish prohibiting Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure from the detainee enclave. Military personnel shall maintain this perimeter and shall be stationed along this perimeter and at any gates or openings to deter, detect and make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized departures. They shall take reasonable action to prevent unauthorized passage outside the perimeter, using oral warnings and, if those fail reasonable, but wholly non-lethal measures to deter detainees from attempting to cross the perimeter. Use of physical barriers is also permissible at the option of the military commander. Military personnel shall not leave the installation to pursue or apprehend detainees.

b. Detainee(s) found on the installation outside the detainee enclave shall be returned under escort to the enclave and their unauthorized departure shall be reported to FEMA, the United States Marshals, and the representative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Similarly, any detainee(s) returned to the installation by civilian authorities or otherwise shall be escorted back to their enclave and similarly reported.

(3) Response Force

A reserve force of military or security (air) police shall be maintained at all times with sufficient capacity to respond promptly (1) should large scale disturbances occur on the installation which are beyond the capacity of the responsible law enforcement agencies, (2) in the event that federal officers become unable to perform their law enforcement functions on the installation, or (3) in the event the safety of federal officers on the installation becomes threatened by detainees.

II

In every case, and without regard to whether law enforcement functions at a particular installation are being discharged primarily by military or by civilian officials, the responsibilities of FEMA and civilian law enforcement agencies shall include the following:

(1) Immediate Response for Arrests

A lead civilian law enforcement agency shall be designated by FEMA and DOJ at each installation. That agency shall be prepared to react immediately to calls from military personnel or civilian law enforcement personnel in connection with circumstances requiring detainee(s) to be arrested, searches to be conducted, investigations to be undertaken or other similar law enforcement activities to be conducted. The lead agency may be assisted in any or all of the above activities by other agencies, although nothing stated herein shall alter normal division of jurisdiction for enforcement of specific statutes by various agencies. Accordingly, the lead agency shall transfer responsibility for further response to the particular Federal agency with jurisdiction for the statutory violation or circumstance.

(2) Advice

The lead agency shall also provide advice to FEMA representatives and military authorities with respect to law enforcement matters. In addition, the lead agency shall regularly assess the need for police presence within the enclave. The FEMA Officer-in-Charge, the responsible military commander, and the Officer-in-Charge of the lead law enforcement agency at each installation shall confer with regard to the type and level of law enforcement presence appropriate for the circumstances which obtain at that installation at the particular time in question. However, the final decision on the deployment of military personnel, both on the perimeter and within the enclosed area, must rest solely with the military commander or his designee.

(3) Custody of Persons Detained or Arrested

The United States Marshals Service (USMS) shall be responsible for custody of all arrested persons and their safe and secure transport to stockade, segregated detention, or jail facilities.

(4) Guarding Persons in Punitive Detention

In consultation with FEMA, one of the civilian law enforcement agencies shall be assigned responsibility for guarding detainees at the stockade or segregated detention facility.

Whenever appropriate, the senior INS official present and the base commander may issue regulations which may expressly prohibit Cuban detainee(s) from departing from the detainee enclave without authority. The regulations shall be issued in both Spanish and English and posted conspicuously at reasonable intervals along the perimeter. The regulations may contain a section providing sanctions and advising that violators may be subject to segregation and removal to a separate detention facility and to delay in completion of the inspection and processing procedure until such procedures have been completed for all other detainee(s) at the camp.

John W. Macy, Jr.
John W. Macy, Jr.
Director

Federal Emergency Management Agency
June 4, 1980

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
4 June 1980

Charles B. Rangel

Deputy Attorney General

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A TAB 3

5 JUNE MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Law Enforcement and Peace-Keeping Responsibilities for Detainees at Military Installations

I have reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding executed by the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Justice, dated June 4, 1980, which establishes responsibility for law enforcement and peace-keeping for Cuban detainees at military installations.

I approve of the division of responsibilities between the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. I hereby direct you to ensure that the Department of Defense fulfills the responsibilities assigned to it. By copies of this memorandum, I am also directing the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to fulfill the respective responsibilities assigned to them.

The Attorney General has advised me that the Department of Defense may lawfully perform the responsibilities it assumes under the Memorandum of Understanding. A copy of the Attorney General's advice to this effect is attached.

I have directed Jack Watson to act for me in coordinating the performance of the respective responsibilities assumed by the three agencies, and I request that you advise him promptly of any problems that may arise.



cc: The Attorney General
Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A TAB 4

10 JUNE MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Law
Enforcement and Peace-keeping Responsibilities
for Detainees at Military Installations

Attached for your information are copies of:

- a) Presidential Directive to the Secretary of Defense, dated June 5, 1980;
- b) Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Law Enforcement and Peace-keeping Responsibilities for Detainees at Military Installations, dated June 4, 1980;
- c) Memorandum for the President from the Attorney General, dated June 5, 1980.

I have directed the Attorney General to coordinate the use of federal law enforcement officers, including representatives of the U.S. Park Police and Federal Protective Service, for the maintenance of peace at military installations housing Cuban refugees. In order to ensure effective coordination of all phases of peace-keeping and law enforcement, continuous communications at both the field and headquarters level should be maintained by the Park Police and Federal Protective Service with the Department of Justice. Before U.S. Park Police and Federal Protective Service officers assume the law enforcement functions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, the Department of Justice and Federal Emergency Management Agency should be consulted and should concur that the functions be undertaken. Command and control of the actual operations of the U.S. Park Police and the Federal Protective Service will remain within your respective agencies.

I direct you to ensure that adequate personnel and support for those police forces are devoted to this assignment.



cc.: The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX A TAB 5

4 SEPTEMBER 1980 MEMORANDUM TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement at Fort Chaffee

When the remaining Cuban refugees are consolidated at Fort Chaffee, the problems of good order and discipline there are likely to be more difficult than at any of the four present processing centers.

Working with the lead civilian law enforcement agency, the Army must be prepared to contain disturbances within the compound or elsewhere on the installation as well as to use its best efforts for detecting and preventing unauthorized departures from the compound and for apprehending escapees on the installation.

Accordingly, you are directed to maintain the reaction force and the perimeter patrols now at Fort Chaffee at their current strengths. The perimeter patrol will continue to be responsible for patrolling the ten foot fence around the main compound.

The size of both the perimeter patrol and reaction forces will be reassessed jointly with the Department of Justice as time goes on and the Cuban population at Fort Chaffee is reduced.

W. Graham Clayton, Jr.
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

Copy to:

John W. Macy, Jr., FEMA
Victor H. Palmieri, State Dept.
Eugene Eidenberg, White House
Paul R. Michel, Justice Dept.


Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Use of Military Personnel to Maintain Order
Among Cuban Detainees on Military Bases

The Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and my Department have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 4, 1980, providing for the use of military personnel in the performance of certain peace-keeping, law enforcement, and related responsibilities concerning Cuban detainees located on military bases. Generally, military personnel are to be used for securing the perimeter of enclaves established within military bases to contain the detainees, for the conduct of preventive patrols within these enclaves, and for responding to any large scale disturbances that may occur at any place on the bases.

I have reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding and have concluded, based upon the legal analysis set forth in the attached opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel to me of May 29, 1980, with which I concur, that military personnel are not prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, from performing any of the functions contemplated in that Memorandum of Understanding. Specifically, I conclude that military personnel may lawfully conduct preventive patrols within the enclaves established on military installations to contain the Cuban detainees, secure the perimeters of those enclaves through the use of reasonable force to prevent unauthorized departure, and control any large scale disturbances that may occur on the military bases.


Benjamin R. Civiletti
Attorney General

6/5/80

Attachment

United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

1/02
Thanks. May 4
Ad Law old ca
This memo.
IB
4 Jun

ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

MAY 26 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: Use of Military Personnel to Maintain
Order Among Cuban Parolees on Military
Bases

This responds to your request for our opinion whether, consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, military personnel may be used to maintain law and order among the Cubans paroled into the United States and housed at various United States military bases, awaiting processing under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act of 1980. The answer to your question turns on general principles which this Department and the courts have considered over the years. Based upon this prior consideration, as set forth below, I conclude that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit military commanders from directing the use of military personnel to maintain order among the Cuban parolees while on military bases.

Arrangements have been made for the Cuban parolees to be temporarily housed on three military bases: Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, Fort Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania, and Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. 1/ While the physical arrangements which have been made at each base differ in detail, certain features are common to all three. In each case, an area within the military reservation has been set aside for the parolees, and certain base facilities and supplies have been made available for their use while there. The area set aside has been cordoned off 2/ and the parolees are not authorized to enter

1/ The use of military facilities has been arranged by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under authority of Section 302(a) of the Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-288, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., 88 Stat. 143.

2/ At Eglin AFB a fence has been erected to surround the area in which the Cubans are being housed; at Fort Chaffee and at Indiantown Gap, the boundaries of the reserved area are marked only by saw horses and ropes.

other areas of the base except as the commanding officer may direct. At Fort Chaffee and at Indiantown Gap, the parolees are being housed in military barracks; at Eglin temporary shelters have been specially constructed of wood and canvas.

At all three bases military personnel have been sharing responsibility for the welfare of the parolees with state and federal civilian law enforcement and disaster relief personnel. Questions have been raised, however, as to the nature and extent of participation which may properly be expected of the military in this connection.

Historically, the commander of the military installation has had both the responsibility and the authority to maintain law and order in his command. This authority derives generally from the President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief, 3/ as well as from statutes, 4/ and more particularly from regulations applicable to the respective military services. 5/ Congress has implicitly recognized the existence

3/ We believe it beyond question that inherent in the President's power as Commander-in-Chief is the authority to see that order and discipline are maintained in the armed forces. In the chain of command, base commanders perform this function on behalf of the President, on their respective bases.

4/ Congress has provided that the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force "[are] responsible for and [have] the authority necessary to conduct all affairs" of their respective Departments, 10 U.S.C. §§ 3012(b) and 8012(b). As part of this authority, the Secretaries have been given the power to issue regulations for "the custody, use, and preservation of [the Department's property]." 5 U.S.C. § 301. See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 4832 and 9832. The Supreme Court has held that "Army regulations, when sanctioned by the President, have the force of law . . ." United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 301-02 (1842).

5/ Footnote 5 on page 3.

of this authority in two criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which makes it unlawful to enter a military base for an unlawful purpose, or to reenter a base after having been removed therefrom; and 50 U.S.C. § 797, which makes unlawful the violation of any "regulation or order" issued by "any military commander designated by the Secretary of Defense" for "the protection or security of" property and places subject to his jurisdiction, including "the ingress thereto or egress or removal of persons therefrom"

The military's power to preserve order among civilians on its own reservations has been recognized and affirmed by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), and by your predecessors. The first explicit formulation of the power of military officers to maintain order among civilians on a military reservation is apparently that given by Attorney General Butler in 1837, 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 268. In the course of affirming the power of the commandant of West Point to exclude civilians from that enclave, the Attorney General said that the commandant "has a general authority to prevent any person within [the base] limits from interrupting its discipline, or obstructing in any way the performance of the duties assigned" to military personnel there stationed. Id. at 272. Even with respect to civilians owning property within a military enclave, "there can be no doubt of [the commandant's] authority to exclude such person . . . from access to any part of the post not essential to the use of the building he may occupy, and to his ingress and egress from it."

Attorney General Butler's views of the broad discretionary power of the base commander were reiterated by Attorney General Hoyt in 1906: "The power of a military commandant over a reservation is necessarily extensive and practically exclusive, forbidding entrance and controlling residence as the public interest may demand." 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 92.

5/ [Footnote from p. 2]

Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Army state that a base commander is "responsible for the efficient and economical operation, administration, service, and supply of all individuals, units and activities assigned to or under the jurisdiction of the installation . . ." 32 CFR § 552.18. In the Air Force, base commanders are "responsible for protecting personnel and property under their jurisdictions and for maintaining order on installations, to insure the uninterrupted and successful accomplishment of the Air Force Mission." 32 CFR § 809a.1(a).

Numerous statements of the Army Judge Advocate General's Office reconfirm the long-standing power of commanding officers to control civilian access to and behavior on military bases:

It is well settled that a post commander can, under the authority conferred on him by statutes and regulations, in his discretion, exclude private persons and property therefrom, or admit them under such restrictions as he may prescribe in the interest of good order and military discipline.

JAG 680.44, October 6, 1925. See also JAGA 1956/8970, December 27, 1956.

The commander of a military base has broad responsibility for the maintenance of order on the base under his command, and a commensurate degree of authority follows that responsibility. In the recent case of Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971), the Supreme Court stressed "[t]he essential and obvious interest of the military in the security of persons and of property on the military enclave." A military base need not be segregated, and, indeed, generally cannot rationally be segregated into military and non-military areas for law enforcement purposes. Thus, a base commander may exercise his authority to maintain order base-wide, even in areas utilized for putatively non-military purposes. In Relford, the Court emphasized:

[t]he impact and adverse effect that a crime committed against a person or property on a military base, thus violating the base's very security, has upon morale, discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its personnel and upon the military operation and the military mission.

401 U.S. at 367. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) in which the Court again noted "the historically unquestioned power" of a commanding officer to prevent civilian disruption of the functioning of a military base.

It is necessary to reconcile this broad and accepted authority of military base commanders with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385. That statute, enacted during Reconstruction, provides:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, wilfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

The Posse Comitatus Act was passed as a partisan reaction to the equally partisan use of troops for law enforcement purposes in the civilian community after the Civil War. 6/ The Act was not intended, and has never been interpreted, to restrict military authorities' ability to maintain the security of a military installation.


In interpreting the applicability of the prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act to the use of military personnel, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense generally have been careful to distinguish between the use of such personnel on military bases, on the one hand, and off military bases on the other. 7/ And at least one court has specifically held that the Posse Comitatus Act was not intended to prohibit military personnel from arresting civilians on military bases who, by committing crimes, are a threat to military or other federal property or to the good order and discipline of the base. In United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected a civilian's claim that his arrest by military police on a military base for violation of federal narcotics law violated the Posse Comitatus Act. The court held that the Act "does not prohibit military personnel from acting upon on-base violations committed by civilians." 539 F.2d at 16.

6/ The practice of using troops in a Marshal's posse appears to have begun about 1854 during the bitter political struggle over the Fugitive Slave Act in the North, and was explicitly approved by Attorney General Cushing. See 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 466, 473 (1854). Following the Civil War, wide use was made of the military posse for law enforcement activities under the control of federal marshals, federal officers, and sheriffs. See 7 Cong. Rec. 3581 (1878) (remarks of Rep. Kimmel). During the congressional debates over the Act, a number of specific practices were cited as abuses: the use of troops by federal officials as guards during the 1876 presidential election, id. at 3850, 4185, and 4240 (1878) (remarks of Sens. Southard, Merrimon and Kernan); the widespread use of troops to assist revenue officers in destroying illegal stills, id. at 4248 (remarks of Sen. Hill); and the use of troops, without presidential authorization, to assist in the suppression of a labor dispute, id. at 3581 (remarks of Rep. Kimmel). The deleterious effect of the practice on the command structure of the Army, and criticism of the general practice by military leaders were also cited, id. at 3581 and 4241 (remarks of Rep. Kimmel and Sen. Sargent).

7/ Footnote 7 on page 6.

Applying this learning and experience to present circumstances, I conclude that the Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the broad authority of military commanders in their use of military personnel to protect the "morale, discipline, reputation and integrity" of the base while the Cuban parolees are housed there. To this end, military personnel may take any steps deemed by the base commander to be reasonably necessary to ensure that the Cuban parolees do not breach the peace of the base, even where disturbances are confined to the area to which the parolees are restricted. Military personnel may apprehend and restrain parolees for on-base violations of federal and state law which in the base commander's view threaten the security and good order of the base. 8/

The military has primary authority for the care of the Cuban parolees while they are housed on the bases, and it can use military personnel to protect the delivery of that care against any disruption. Military personnel may use necessary force against civilian conduct threatening military equipment or facilities provided for the use of the parolees, and may patrol within the reserved area for this purpose.

Finally, a military commander may lawfully restrict the parolees' access to areas of the base not specifically designated for their use, and may use military personnel to enforce this restriction. Specifically, military personnel may be used to contain the parolees within the area to which they have been assigned. However, a claim by a parolee of a legal right to depart a base should be evaluated by nonmilitary law enforcement personnel. 

[Footnote 7/ from page 5]

7/ For example, since 1942 an agreement has existed between the Departments of Defense and Justice permitting military lawyers to prosecute petty offenses committed on military reservations by civilian employees or visitors to the base. See paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Department of the Army Regulation 27-40. In 1962, after this arrangement had been in effect for over twenty years, both the Office of Legal Counsel of this Department and the Judge Advocate General of the Army reaffirmed that this practice does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.

8/ If a Cuban parolee is arrested, he should be turned over as soon as practicable to civilian authorities. See 32 CFR § 501.1(c).

It should not go unremarked that all or most of these measures seem to be well within the authority given the base commander in the regulations of both the Army and the Air Force. 9/

John M. Harmon
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

9/ See, e.g., 32 CFR § 552.18(f) (Army commandant may establish rules governing entry into and exit from the installation, and the search of civilians when entering, during their stay, or when leaving); 32 CFR § 851.13 (Air Force regulations on resource protection and visitor "control and surveillance" in controlled areas of the base). See also 32 CFR § 503.1 (Army personnel have "the ordinary right and duty of citizens to assist in the maintenance of the peace," and may apprehend and restrain persons committing a felony or breach of the peace in their presence).

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B

SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Special Military Operations which apply to the consolidation of refugees at Fort Chaffee are attached as Tabs 1 through 10.

- TAB 1 -- REACTION FORCE OPERATIONS
 - TAB 2 -- PROTECTION OF FIREFIGHTERS
 - TAB 3 -- CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE EVACUATION
 - TAB 4 -- PERIMETER GUARD ORDERS
 - TAB 5 -- ALERT PROCEDURES
 - TAB 6 -- REFUGEE WORK AGREEMENTS AND PASS PROCEDURES
 - TAB 7 -- TRAINING
 - TAB 8 -- COMMUNICATION PLAN
 - TAB 9 -- SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT
 - TAB 10-- POST ACCESS CONTROL
-

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 1

REACTION FORCE OPERATIONS

1. **SCOPE:** To establish a Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) for the Military Police Quick Reaction Force (QRF) while conducting discipline, law and order, and suppressing civil disturbances at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas in coordination with civilian law enforcement agencies.
 2. **PURPOSE:** To establish a policy which all personnel of the Reaction Force will adhere to while performing duties at Fort Chaffee as directed by Fort Chaffee Provost Marshal's Office (PMO)
 3. **EQUIPMENT:** Equipment for the Reaction Force will consist of six M151, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks (minimum) and an additional $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck in case of vehicle malfunction, twenty flak vests, twenty riot batons, twenty ballistic helmets with face shields and twenty body shields. Uniform for Reaction Force personnel will be fatigues with pants tucked into boots, rolled sleeves, MP brassard, lanyard, whistle, protective mask and soft cap. Soft cap will only be worn when not on alert status. Pistol belt will contain leather or OD first aid pouch, .45/.38 cal. pistol and holster, handcuff case, handcuffs with key, mace dispenser with holder, speed ring minus MP club, leather or OD ammunition carrier.
 4. **PROCEDURES:**
 - a. QRF personnel will maintain a twenty-four hour communications monitor. Tactical radio while on patrol, frequency: 48:90; one designated QRF person for telephone watch in billets #1498, phone number 2692.
 - b. Movement to staging area will be conducted within fifteen minutes of alert notification with all personnel, equipment and vehicles.
 - c. At the staging area, contact will be made with the Provost Marshal or his direct representative for briefing, assessment and determination plan of operation determined.
 - d. Deploy to troubled area and put into effect plan of operation.
 - e. Upon completion of operation, QRF personnel will return to staging area for debriefing.
-

5. TRAINING: All Reaction Force personnel will receive training in the following areas:

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| a. Civil disturbance | i. Hostage negotiations |
| b. Use of riot baton | j. Defensive driving |
| c. Use of force | k. Vehicle maintenance |
| d. Hand to hand combat | g. Radio procedures |
| e. Disarming techniques | h. Riot formations |
| f. Weapons training | |

and any other subjects QRF personnel need. In the event a situation arises and QRF personnel do not appear proficient, additional training in those situations will be conducted.


TASK FORCE III IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE

1. The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) is responsible for being assembled, transported and tactically deployed anywhere on Fort Chaffee within five minutes. Callout of the IRF is normally directed by TF III Operations or EOC.

2. The battery responsible for IRF is billeted in building 2210 (The Barn), telephone X-2837 during its shift. All required personnel and equipment will remain at that location except when alerted. The IRF BC will normally act as leader of combined forces when additional forces (Rover/30-Minute Reaction) are required.

3. Additional data concerning IRF:

a. **Composition:** One 58-man unit organized as follows: (Total includes three officers and 55-EM).



b. **UNIFORM:** Fatigues, M16 A1, helmet w/liner with face shield down, web belt w/canteen and first aid packet; flak vest, flashlight or lantern at night and M17A1 gas mask.

c. **COMMUNICATIONS:** One $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton w/VRC-46 or equivalent, three PRC-77's with Headset or Hand Set (H-189) and speaker: for platoon leaders and battery commander. One PRC-77 w/remote is located in building 2210. The commander and each platoon leader must be available on PRC-77 radio. Normal deployment will cause BC to be away from his $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton vehicle and PRC-77 w/operator is essential to command and control.

d. TRANSPORTATION: Two ½-ton w/VRC-46 and two School Busses. Vehicles will be parked at building 2210. IRF battery will be picked up at building 860 (X2085) when coming on shift.

e. LOGISTICS: Meals must be completed prior to going on shift. Flashlights and bunks are available at building 2210. Weapons, vests, helmets/liners/shields, riot baton will be drawn from S-4 prior to assuming IRF duties. Oncoming BC must complete all hand receipt signovers at least 15-minutes prior to assuming IRF duties.

f. TRAINING: IRF battery must conduct training in riot control formations, forming the wedge/skirmish line/general and lateral support, diamond and circle formations. Training with riot baton must also be conducted while on IRF in preparation for perimeter guard duties. Batteries can expect to be deployed in skirmish line to sweep through and search buildings on post, to search and sweep wooded areas on post, to surround/cordon/secure buildings that are burning, or are being used by rioters as headquarters/etc, or are important buildings which need protection (i.e., post headquarters, commo center, weapons storage area, etc). A minimum of one hour riot control/bus loading/baton training should be accomplished at the beginning of each shift.

REDLEG Roving Patrol/30-Minute Reaction Force

1. **MISSION:** REDLEG Roving Patrol will conduct dismounted patrol operations both inside and outside the concertina wire fence, as directed by TF Operations, to detect and/or apprehend Cuban refugee escapees located external to the enclave. An additional mission of the Roving Patrol is to be a 30 minute Reaction Force capable of responding to civil disturbances. This additional mission is in effect both while patrolling, after termination of patrols, and during daylight shifts.

2. EXECUTION:

a. Patrol Hours. REDLEG Roving Patrol will be on station by 2000 hours each evening and normally patrol until 0200 hours the following morning. Battery will revert to 30-minute alert status for remainder of tour. Battalion Rover/30 Minute schedule during the 0600 and 1400 shift will function as 30-minute Reaction detail battery.

b. Roving Patrol lettered checkpoints and numbered patrol areas to be patrolled will be assigned by Task Force Operations. A minimum of two walking guards will be used in each patrol area. Guards will walk in opposite directions unless otherwise directed by Task Force Operations during the operations briefing.

c. Patrolling personnel will utilize maximum stealth and noise discipline. Use of flashlights and/or lanterns will be held to a minimum so as to avoid disclosure of patrol locations.

d. Patrol personnel detecting Cuban escapees will attempt to surround and detain escapees. Voice and/or whistle notification will be used to summon adjacent patrol personnel for assistance. Incidents must be reported immediately through chain of command to TF Operations. Use of force in detaining escapees is authorized in accordance with TAB 4 to Appendix B. Once an escapee has been captured or detained, he will be immobilized and searched for weapons. Extreme caution must be used in searching escapees. Approach and searching of Cuban refugees will be conducted only after sufficient backup personnel have been summoned. Captured escapees will be turned over to the Park Police. Park Police will be notified by TF Operations.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. REDLEG Roving Patrol/Reaction Force equipment will be transferred to oncoming battery prior to shift change and stored in building 860. Equipment will be hand-receipted from representative of outgoing battery. Equipment consists of the following:

Body Armor Vests	60 Ea
Riot Batons	60 Ea
Face Shields	60 Ea
Flashlights or lanterns	60 Ea
Whistles	60 Ea
AN/PRC-77 Radios	4 to 6

Equipment will be returned to building 860 and secured upon completion of Rover duties and readied for Reaction Force employment if necessary.

b. UNIFORM:

(1) Uniform for the REDLEG Rover Patrol will consist of fatigues, helmet w/liner, pistol belt w/canteen and protective mask. Prior to going on duty, each rover will be issued a riot baton, flak vest, whistle and flashlight. While patrolling rovers will wear soft caps and secure helmets w/faceshields and flak vests on busses.

(2) Uniform, if deployed as a 30-minute Reaction Force, will be fatigues, helmet w/face shield, pistol belt w/canteen, protective mask, riot baton and flak vest.

c. MEALS: Early supper will be served to REDLEG Roving personnel at 1830 hours daily in building 857. Water, coffee, juice and fruit for patrol personnel should be picked up at building 859 and transported in appropriate containers on ½-ton vehicles by battery supervisors.

d. TRANSPORTATION: Transportation for Roving Patrol consists of two busses or four pickup trucks and will report to building 860 at 1930 hours daily. Transportation will remain with the roving patrol until 0600 hours at which time busses will park at building 860. Transportation must be kept in location so as to be immediately available to transport personnel in case of Reaction Force alert or changes in roving patrol missions or areas.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Normal battery chain of command will be in effect. The next higher headquarters for REDLEG roving patrol is TF Operations. The perimeter shift leader will conduct liaison and coordination with the roving patrol battery commander.

b. Battery commanders will report to TF Operations at 1800 hours daily for operational instructions and situation briefing.

c. Radio frequency for REDLEG Roving Patrol is: 45.90. Call sign is REDLEG. Normal battery suffixes will be used. Additional squad suffixes may be

designated by battery commanders as needed. TF Operations will utilize the call sign of REDLEG BASE.

d. A charge of quarters will be maintained in building 860 for tour duration. After termination of patrolling activities until 0600, a minimum of one officer, CQ and runner will be maintained in building 860 to facilitate 30-minute Reaction Force Alert operations. Roving patrol duty room is in the northwest end of the building.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 2

PROTECTION OF FIREFIGHTERS

1. Military Police personnel are tasked to provide security to fire fighting personnel in the event of a disturbance or riot situation.
 2. The senior Military Policeman on the scene will coordinate directly with the senior fireman on a designated liaison to insure adequate security and assistance is provided.
 3. Concept of Operation:
 - a. In the event of a fire within the enclave the following actions will be taken by the first military police unit arriving on the scene.
 - (1) Immediately notify the Military Police Desk of the location, the severity of the fire, and the type of structure involved.
 - (2) Stand by the location and prevent both pedestrian and vehicles from entering the area. Await the arrival of fire fighting equipment.
 - (3) The Desk Sergeant will immediately notify the Fire Department of the location of the fire, the type of structure and the severity of the fire.
 - (4) The Desk Sergeant will immediately dispatch as many additional patrols as necessary to form a protective cordon around the area.
 - (5) The senior Military Policeman at the scene of the fire will insure a protective cordon is established around all fire fighting equipment to include the hoses and hydrants being utilized.
 - (6) In the event fire fighting personnel come under attack by a crowd/ hostile individuals the senior Military Policeman will attempt to control the situation identifying ring leaders for detention and questioning.
 - (7) If the situation can not be controlled with the Military Police available the senior Military Policeman will notify the Military Police Desk Sergeant of the situation and request the reaction force be alerted.
-

(8) The Desk Sergeant will immediately notify either the Provost Marshal Operations Officer, the Deputy Provost Marshal, or the Provost Marshal in the order to authorize the employment of the Military Police Reaction Force.

(9) Once the approval is given to employ the Reaction Force the Desk Sergeant will notify the NCOIC of the Reaction Force (Radio Frequency 48:90 call sign 18 or telephone #2692) and inform him to place his personnel on alert and stand by for further instructions.

(10) The Reaction Force will deploy to the scene of the fire and on to a staging area as directed by either the Provost Marshal Operations Officer, Deputy Provost Marshal, Provost Marshal and await instructions.

(11) If the crowd is not hostile the Reaction Force should reinforce the protective cordon around the fire fighters, their equipment to include hoses and hydrants.

(12) If the crowd is hostile the Reaction Force will be utilized for crowd control employing riot control formations as needed.

b. In the event the situation worsens the Provost Marshal, Deputy Provost Marshal or Provost Marshal Operations Officer will notify the EOC and request the Task Force III immediate Reaction Force to assist in crowd control.

c. Once the fire is out and the situation has been returned to normal, the Task Force III and Military Police reaction forces will be released and the military police patrols will be directed to return to their patrol areas.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 3

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE EVACUATION

1. In the event of a civil disturbance of such magnitude as to warrant evacuation of civilian employees from the enclave, civilian supervisors will have the responsibility of insuring that all employees under their control are safely evacuated and accounted for.
 2. The decision to evacuate will originate with the EOC and will be relayed to civilian employees by the State Department.
 3. Evacuation will be through the open gates on 15th Street, at 3rd and 4th Avenues, and at 31st Street and 4th Avenue. On order, the gate at 25th Street just west of 4th Avenue will be opened and manned by Military Police to allow evacuation. Rallying points are established at the vicinity of Building 1794, between 2nd and 3rd Avenues at 16th Street, in the vicinity of Building 1479, and in the area to the west of Building 1683. Employees will be accounted for at the rallying point by their supervisors.
 4. Supervisors have the following responsibilities:
 - (a) Each employee must be briefed on evacuation procedures to include notification, routes of egress, rallying points and personnel accountability.
 - (b) Copies of evacuation procedures must be posted in a conspicuous location to include maps showing evacuation routes and applicable rallying points.
 - (c) Timely notification of all civilian employees when the order to evacuate is given.
 - (d) Head count of employees at the rallying points to ensure that all employees are accounted for.
-

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 4

PERIMETER GUARD ORDERS

1. Guard orders for the military guards who will be stationed on the enclave perimeter during Phase I and II, are as follows:

a. Your post will be maintained on the far side of the road surrounding the enclave perimeter.

b. Guard uniform includes fatigue boots, pistol belt, canteen, baton, helmet with camouflage cover and helmet visor, and protective mask.

c. Personal radios will not be allowed on the perimeter.

d. No reading material is authorized.

e. Guards will face the enclave when on post.

f. Entrance and exit from the enclave will be by pass or escort by authorized personnel.

g. Answer questions and assist in solving Refugee's problems conscientiously; however, no casual conversations at the barriers will be tolerated.

h. Buying, selling, trading or giving of personal items, military clothing, equipment or cigarettes to refugees is prohibited.

i. Drinking of alcoholic beverages while on duty or becoming intoxicated and unable to perform duty is prohibited.

j. Officers walking on the perimeter and vehicles bearing appropriate rank or position plates will be afforded normal military courtesy, i. e., standing at attention and saluting.

k. The highest standards of military courtesy, bearing and appearance will be maintained at all times.

l. Problems encountered while on duty will be brought up to the chain of command. Unit commanders, ISGs and NCOs will notify operations of all problems. Spot reports will be made on serious incidents.

2. The following situations or circumstances may require the use of force by Task Force III Guard/Rover/Reaction personnel when dealing with Cuban refugees:

- a. Self-defense.
- b. Preventing unauthorized entry into or exit from the controlled area.
- c. Returning refugees to the controlled area after an escape attempt.
- d. Detaining escapees caught outside the controlled area while awaiting arrival of the Park Police or Military Police.

3. The use of force by Task Force III personnel in these situations is authorized. Force applied should be the minimum force necessary to accomplish the objectives. Necessary force will be applied without hesitation and in a timely manner to immediately control any situation. The Riot Baton will not be used to deliver blows which could cause permanent injury or death. Under no circumstances will any guard strike a blow to the head or above the shoulders.

4. Personnel are cautioned that many refugees have been caught with homemade knives and other crude weapons. Caution, alertness and readiness to defend one's self must be maintained whenever a guard is in the vicinity of refugees.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 5

ALERT PROCEDURES

1. Alerts, either practice or actual, require the timely notification of all key personnel and activities. The following procedures will be followed:

a. Upon receipt of information of a disturbance or attempted escape which would warrant an alert, the EOC will notify personnel/activities as shown on the attached schematic.

b. Recall of personnel required within each listed activity will be the responsibility of that activity.

2. Alert Notification Plan:

ALERT ACTIVATED _____

ALERT NOTIFICATION ROSTER

		<u>ACTIVATE</u>	<u>TERMINATE</u>
*CG/DCO	2545/2561	_____	_____
*TF III	2910/2291	_____	_____
*C/S	2545/2547	_____	_____
*Fire Station (470)	2127/2128	_____	_____
*Searchlight	F1/3260/3280	_____	_____
State Department/FEMA	2008/2408/2600/3137	_____	_____
USMS	2625	_____	_____
US Park Police	2889/2548	_____	_____
*MP Desk	2666/2729/2812/HOT LINE 33	_____	_____


Camp Admin 3201/2762 night 2359 _____

USAG Fort Chaffee 3130/2480 _____

PAO 2081/2901 _____

CESO 763-1051 _____

*Will be notified by radio. EACH STATION WILL ROGER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. If no acknowledgement, ALERT BY TELEPHONE.



*During disturbances which necessitate establishment of CP

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 6

REFUGEE WORK AGREEMENTS AND PASS PROCEDURES

Refugees who are formally or informally contracted by any agency within Task Force Resettlement Operations to work as assistants, administrators, or laborers will not be permitted to leave the refugee enclave without escort and appropriate passes. No one escort will be accompanied outside of the enclave with a group larger than 15 refugees. Refugee passes will be issued and controlled in accordance with the Military Police Pass System

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 7

TRAINING

1. Emergency Operations Training (EOC). EOC personnel will be trained on EOC operations and procedures in the EOC facility. Primary training will be conducted during the three day overlap between personnel presently assigned and incoming personnel. Practice Alerts will be conducted periodically in accordance with Appendix R, Tab 5. The EOC Chief will have overall responsibility for training within the EOC. Each staff agency in the EOC will prepare and maintain current a book of instructions governing its activities. The book will contain as a minimum:

- a. Instructions on the conduct of routine matters.
- b. Points of contact with telephone numbers.
- c. Guidance on handling unusual circumstances.
- d. Actions required in the event of alerts.
- e. Samples of completed actions.
- f. Samples of periodic reports and information concerning input required.

2. Military Police Training.

a. Security personnel. Military police performing security functions such as gate guards or patrols are to be briefed daily during guard mount on their general responsibilities and specific situations as appropriate.

b. Reaction forces: Military Police reaction forces will receive daily training in the following subjects:

- (1) Perimeter reinforcement.
 - (2) Riot control.
 - (3) Sweep operations.
 - (4) Cordoning of facilities.
 - (5) Baton drill
-

3. Task Force III.

a. During each shift, reaction force personnel will receive training in those subjects listed in para 2b above. Military Police personnel may be requested to assist in this training. However, this training is the responsibility of the Task Force III Commander. The Task Force III Commander will conduct periodic practice exercises. Prior to and on conclusion of practice exercises, Task Force operations will notify the EOC giving specific geographical areas and the nature of the training to be conducted, i.e. sweep operations, securing of facilities, etc.

b. Daily shift briefings by Unit Commanders will include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following topics:

- (1) Duties, both specific and general.
- (2) Military courtesy.
- (3) Safety.
- (4) Rules of engagement.
- (5) Uniform.
- (6) Communications.

c. Daily training will be conducted on the following subjects as a minimum:

- (1) Manual of arms including baton.
- (2) Formations for riot control.
- (3) Communications.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 8

COMMUNICATION PLAN

1. MISSION: To provide joint command and control communications in support of the Joint Security Plan.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. The primary means of communications will be by telephone with FM radio utilized as emergency back up. The following command list with radio frequencies will be utilized for all Joint Communications. Call signs for US Army Tactical net are proper name or organization. Nets are uncontrolled "FREE ACCESS" net which may be entered by anyone.

b. Communications equipment will be provided by each unit with minimum capabilities for issue of equipment by the US Army. Liaison radio equipment may be exchanged on an as available basis.

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
BG Drummond	484-3288	BG Drummond	163.562
COL Karr	484-2545	COL Karr	163.562
Army EOC	484-2400	EOC	163.562
Provost Marshal	484-3104	MP Control	164.100
Don Whitteaker State Department Coordinator	484-2008	Don Whitteaker	
James G. Lickliger FEMA Coordinator	484-2008	James G. Lickliger	
US Park Police	484/2751/2461	Park Police	
US Marshal	484-2625	Marshal	
Arkansas National Guard	452-6484		

Arkansas State Police 783-5195

Sebastian County Sheriff 783-1051

Fort Smith Police Dept 785-4221

Barling Police Dept 452-1550

Arkansas Riot/Roving Net

37.24 mhz

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 9

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT

1. Special requirements for personnel and specialized equipment.

a. Personnel requirements for Phase II are as follows:

(1) The enclave perimeter security force provided by Task Force III consists of the following:

<u>Two Battery Size Security Elements</u>	<u>PERIMETER ESTIMATE</u>
Guards	88
Battery Cdr	2
Platoon Leader	4
Platoon Sergeants	4
Squad Leader	8
RTO/Driver	<u>4</u>
Approximately	110

Equipment to Support Enclave Perimeter

1/4 ton vehicles	4
Water coolers	4
Vehicular Mounted Radios	4
AN-VRC-46	
Back Pack Radios	8

Each Soldier of the TF III Security Perimeter will have as a minimum the following equipment:

Fatigue uniform
Pistol belt with canteen
Helmet with protective shield
Baton
Protective mask
First Aid pouch with dressing

NOTE: Reflectorized vest and flashlight for night operations.

(2) Crowd Control. Crowd control within the enclave is the responsibility of the USPP. The USPP will provide crowd control by the use of the required numbers of personnel on shift within the enclave at the time of the disturbance. When requested by the USPP, crowd control assistance will be provided by MP and TF III forces. MP resources available for crowd control are as follows:

(a) Personnel.

NCOIC Reaction Force	1
Section Leader	2
Military Police	<u>17</u>
TOTAL	20

(b) Equipment.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Total</u>
6	1/4 ton truck	6
6	AN-VRC-46	6

(c) Uniform. Each Military Policeman will have the following equipment

- Fatigue uniform
- Combat boots
- Ballistic helmet
- Flak vest
- Riot baton
- Body shield
- Ammunition pouch
- First Aid pouch with dressing
- Handcuffs with case
- .45 or .38 caliber pistol
- Holster
- Military Police brassard
- Night vision goggles
- Flashlight

NOTE: Reflectorized vest and flashlight for night operations.

(3) TF III resources available when requested by MP and USPP. These forces have been designated as the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and the Red Leg Roving Patrol/30 minute Reaction Force. These forces are equipped as follows:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>IRF</u>	<u>R Rover/30 min</u>	<u>TF III Crowd Control Total</u>
Battery Commander	1	1	2
Platoon Leader	2	2	4
Squad Leader	4	4	8
Drivers/RT0	1	1	2
Guards	<u>47</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>94</u>
Approximate	55	55	110

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>IRF</u>	<u>R Rover/30 min</u>	<u>TF III Crowd Con Total</u>
Bus with driver	2	2	4
½ ton with VRC 46	1	1	2
AN-PRC-77	3	4-6	7-9
Night vision goggles	3	23	23

Guard Uniform

- *M16 A1 Rifle
- Helmet with protective face shield "down"
- Web belt with canteen
- First aid pouch
- Flak vest
- Flashlight (night only)
- **Baton
- Protective mask

*IRF only
 **30 minute if notified while on Rover/otherwise M16 A1

(4) Patrols.

(a) During Phase II patrols within the enclave will be provided by the USPP. Patrols external to the enclave are provided by MPs. Personnel and equipment for five MP patrols are as follows:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Number</u>
Military Police Duty Officer	1
Patrol Supervisor	1
Military Police	<u>10</u>
TOTAL	12

Equipment

7 Commercial or ½ ton vehicles with radio

Uniform for Military Police Patrol Personnel

- Fatigue uniform
- Combat boots
- Soft Cap
- Whistle
- Military Police brassard
- Pistol belt
- .45 or .38 caliber pistol with either 15 or 12 rounds of ammunition respectively
- Night stick with carrier
- Ammunition pouch
- First Aid pouch with dressing
- Canteen with carrier
- Holster

NOTE: Flashlight will be added for night operations.

(b) TF III patrols (Red Leg Rover) is a system of mobile roving forces totaling 55 personnel which provides security and a perimeter in depth. The patrols operate from 2000 hours to 0200 hours each day, and conduct dismounted patrol operations both inside and outside the concertina fence. This mission of the patrols is to detect and detain refugee escapees from the enclave. Upon detection of escapees, patrol personnel notify TF III operations and surround and detain individuals. EOC will be notified for requests for assistance from MP and Federal Law Enforcement Agency. Detained escapees will be turned over to the Federal Law Enforcement Agency.

(5) Post Security. The Military Police will operate a Military Police desk on a twenty-four hour basis. The Military Police desk working twelve hour shifts will coordinate all military police activities, provide information and assistance to members of the military community and the general public. The Military Police desk operations is organized as follows:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Number</u>
Military Police Desk Sergeant	1
Radio Operator	2
Desk Clerk	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	4

Equipment

One building to house the Military Police Desk Operations.
Two commercial radio base stations for communications with post agencies, Military Police patrols and TF III elements.
One tactical radio (AN-VRC-46) to monitor patrol personnel operating 1/4 ton trucks.
One 292 antenna.

Uniform for Military Police Desk Personnel

Fatigue uniform
Pistol belt
.45 or .38 caliber pistol with either 15 or 12 rounds of ammunition respectively.
Military Police brassard.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX B TAB 10

POST ACCESS CONTROL

I. PURPOSE:

To establish and clarify responsibility for entry control of personnel and vehicles into the military post of Fort Chaffee and the movement of personnel and vehicles within the confines of that post.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

- That the military post of Fort Chaffee will continue to function as an independent military garrison under appropriate military command notwithstanding the operation of the refugee enclave.
- That control and access to those portions of Fort Chaffee designated as the refugee enclave are covered elsewhere in this plan as follows: Part V, Concept Opns. Pg. 23, 24, and 25, Appendix B - Tab 6, Appendix C, and Appendix E.
- Entry control of personnel and vehicles into the military post of Fort Chaffee and their movement thereon is the responsibility of the military post commander.

III. PROCEDURES:

The following procedures will be implemented by the military post commander:

1. Authorized entry to the post will be determined by evidence of proper vehicle registration. Vehicles not displaying registration tags or stickers must enter through the main gate, (Gate 3). Gate guards at that location will log visitors in and issue them a visitors pass. The visitors pass allows travel
-

to all post locations except the refugee enclave. Visitors passes must be returned to the MP when leaving the post.

2. Full time civilians or permanently assigned military will receive the regular Fort Chaffee bumper sticker.
3. All government vehicles (owned or rented) are not registered.
4. Vehicle inspections are the responsibility of Fort Chaffee PMO. Vehicle inspections are conducted at all post gates and by mobile inspection teams.
5. Inspections are an integral part of gate guard operations. All vehicles entering or leaving post are subject to inspection for contraband or refugees. Vehicles identified as carrying refugees or contraband are subject to seizure and those persons deemed responsible for the violation are subject to prosecution.
6. Mobile inspection points are established daily at random locations. Vehicles are stopped based on a numerical selection process or when probable cause exists.
7. Mobile inspections are accomplished using 5 MP reaction force personnel, a Military Police Investigator, and an officer in charge. Equipment used are traffic warning signs, traffic control devices, and pursuit vehicles.

IV. REGISTRATION:

1. Personnel

There is no requirement for a personnel identification system for Fort Chaffee, Task Force, or other agency personnel not working in the enclave.

2. Vehicles

- (a) All privately owned vehicles entering the installation must be registered with the Military Police (Temporary and full time civilians, and permanently assigned military).
- (b) Government owned or rented vehicles, and commercial delivery trucks are not required to register.

(c) Temporary post visitors must register at the main gate prior to entrance. They will receive a visitors pass at that time.

V. ENFORCEMENT:

Adherence to the pass system is insured by aggressive patrol action, gate searches and stops, and mobile inspection points; and through a systematic, accurate system of retrieving information from the issuance records.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX C

GENERAL ENCLAVE SECURITY PLAN

- I. SITUATION. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has been designated by the U.S. Department of Justice as the lead law enforcement agency at Fort Chaffee effective December 21, 1980. This appendix supersedes Appendix C dated September 5, 1980, and provides for the substitution of 'FPS' for 'USPP' wherever indicated in other sections of the Fort Chaffee Joint Security Plan. FPS will coordinate all security and protection activities for Cuban refugees temporarily housed at the Consolidated Refugee Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Specific areas of responsibility within the refugee center have been assigned to INS, FPS, USMS, and BOP. The U.S. Border Patrol has been assigned primarily responsibility for refugee absconder return to the Refugee Center and operational liaison with local law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Marshal for Western Arkansas has been assigned responsibility for all other liaison with local law enforcement agencies.
- II. ASSUMPTION. The Cuban-Haitian Task Force will provide sufficient bi-lingual interpreters for use by the civilian law enforcement agencies. These interpreters should, if possible, have previous law enforcement experience. They will be teamed with civilian law enforcement officials on patrol and investigative assignments.
- III. MISSION. The FPS, in addition to their refugee center security coordination responsibility, will provide 24 hours a day, high visibility, general law enforcement services including law enforcement patrols within the general population and the family areas of the enclave. The FPS will be responsible for the protection of all civilian personnel associated with the refugee operation; and for the areas in which others work, except in those areas within the jurisdiction of other agencies. FPS will also be responsible for security of all internal and external enclave gates, including control of personnel and vehicle access, follow-up investigations, and the submission of timely and accurate reports to the U.S. Department of Justice.

IV. OPERATIONS. The mission of the FPS at Fort Chaffee will be carried out primarily through the use of patrol and investigative functions. All incidents of crime, entrant misconduct, or other matters that affect the consolidated Refugee Center at Fort Chaffee should be reported; and, where necessary, a follow up investigation will be conducted.

A. Patrol. Enclave patrols will be conducted on foot and by vehicle. Foot patrols will be provided in those areas specifically identified as experiencing special problems. The purpose of these patrols is to deter anti-social actions by refugees, to respond to calls for service, provide on-site investigations of calls or problems found, and arrest civilians and/or refugees involved in criminal acts.

Central Dispatch capability through 2-way radio communications is essential to patrol activity and will be maintained 24 hours a day. All reports of criminal activity, anti-social activity, or disturbance will be directed to Building No. 1396 (Telephone: 2711-2846). Patrol units will be dispatched to all calls for service. Sufficient portable or fixed radio equipment will be maintained. The communications center will be responsible for immediately notifying all designated agencies of major incidents and providing both routine daily reports and emergency notifications to DOJ as indicated.

B. Criminal Investigations. Investigations of criminal acts reported within the refugee center will be conducted by FPS Officers and follow-up investigation, if needed, by FPS Investigators. As appropriate, cases will be presented to the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas for judicial action, the U.S. Magistrate at Fort Chaffee or referred to another agency for further investigation, if required. The FBI will be notified of all major crimes.

C. Civil Disorders/Emergencies. Specific contingency plans coordinating each civilian agency and the U.S. Army will be developed at the local level in Fort Chaffee. In principle, the FPS will respond to assist any agency with an emergency or disturbance within the enclave, BOP at the Stockade, or HHS at the Health Care Unit adjacent to the enclave. Coordinated response by all civilian law enforcement agencies will be ensured in support of the lead agency. Response by U.S. Army Units will be limited to requests from the Senior FPS Official on site. Once the U.S. Army Units respond, command of the emergency operation is shifted to the appropriate Military Commander until such time as order is restored.

- D. Arrests/Detention. Within Building No. 1395 is a temporary holding cell for those persons arrested for anti-social or criminal activities. After booking, which includes a photograph of the offender, arrested persons shall be transported as directed by INS to the Stockade or Level II housing area, as appropriate. Female and/or juvenile arrestees will not be housed in this holding area with male adults.

Notations regarding the booking of arrested persons will be made and will include all pertinent identifying information of the arrested person, offense, complainant information, and arresting officer's name. Also, the time of arrest, date, and final disposition will be recorded. Refugees arrested or detained inside or outside of the enclave by Military or other civilian law enforcement agencies will be brought to Building No. 1395 for processing and disposition.

V. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

- A. Staffing. All GSA Regions will provide manpower and resources as directed by the Assistant Commissioner for Federal Protective Service Management. Staffing of FPS personnel is based upon providing law enforcement and peacekeeping services as previously outlined. All FPS personnel assigned to Fort Chaffee will be carefully screened to ensure that every officer has either previous successful refugee camp experience and/or has received SORT training.

Deployment is based upon a maximum staff of 123 uniformed personnel to be committed.

1. Command Structure

Commanding Officer	1
Operations Officer	1
Administrative Officer	1
Watch Commander	2
Field Supervisors	2
Desk Sergeants	2
Team Leaders	8
Control Center	2
Uniform Officers	104
Total	123

2. Organizational Breakdown

123 Positions Total
 19 Staff (less)
104 Uniform Officers (Maximum Daily)

15 Daily Rotation (less)
89 Available (Minimum Daily)

3. Field Breakdown

Fixed Posts	21
Mobile Patrol	34 (20 days - 14 nights)
Foot Patrol	34 (20 days - 14 nights)
Total:	<u>89</u>

4. Fixed Posts

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>NO. OF POSTITIONS (DAY/NIGHT)</u>
Gate 55	3/3
Gate 42	3/3
Gate 40	1/1
TMC-2	1/1
1726	1/0
USPO/PX	1/0
2 Gates (4 hrs per day)	1/0
Post Theater	2/0
Subtotal	<u>38/8</u>
Total	21

5. Relief. Fifteen officers will be available to provide relief for fixed, foot, and mobile patrols.

B. Logistics/Administration. The Director of Region 7 FPS is responsible for the overall coordination of administrative and logistical support.

1. Logistics. Ensure that:

- a. Sufficient number of motorized vehicles to meet mission requirements are present.
- b. Two-way radios on a common frequency are present and a base station to coordinate with other on site law enforcement agencies.

- c. Transportation is provided for Federal Protective Officers from the airport to the Refugee Site upon their arrival to his region and provided with return transportation.

2. Administration:

- a. Ensure that arrangements are made with the Military Installation Commander for mess facilities and use of other facilities as permitted.
- b. Medical treatment be provided as needed.
- c. Uniform cleaning services are provided as needed.
- d. Provide detailed written instructions/orders to meet mission requirement.

C. Command and Communication

- 1. To ensure that all FPO's assigned to Fort Allen are receiving the same direction, the Assistant Commissioner for FPSM has been appointed GSA Oversight Coordinator. All activities and movements of FPS Officers will be coordinated by him with the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 2. The Senior Federal Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator at Fort Chaffee will be in charge of all FPS Officers at that site.
- 3. Once an FPS Operational Command Post has been established on site, daily summary of activities will be called into the Operational Services Division by 0330 hours EDT, Monday through Friday. Weekend activities will be reported the following Monday. This does not supersede reporting requirements established by DOJ.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX D

USMS OPERATIONS PLAN

I. MISSION:

- A. Provision of security and law enforcement for the segregated areas for refugees in protective custody and for unattached personnel under the age of 18.
- B. Transportation of prisoners and support of court functions.
- C. General liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies on behalf of the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator.
- D. Such additional short-term or immediate law enforcement or security missions as may be assigned on an emergency basis by the Department of Justice or the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Department of Human and Health Services will provide health services on a daily basis through their facility located in Fort Chaffee. Refugees who require more intensive medical care will be referred to the main refugee camp hospital operated by the Department of Human and Health Services.
 - B. The administration of the unattached juvenile facility is and will remain the responsibility of the Department of Human and Health Services.
 - C. Transportation for juveniles will be provided by the Department of Human and Health Services or the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
-

III. OPERATIONS

- A. Protective Custody Facility. The United States Marshals Service will administer the operation of the adult protective custody facility at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. This facility will provide a safe and secure living environment for persons who have assisted officials and are now threatened or who, because of some other circumstance beyond their control, are unable to reside in the general population safely. The United States Marshals Service supervisory personnel under the direct guidance of the United States Marshal for the District of Arkansas will provide daily control and supervision of the facility. They will operate with a team of regular deputies and contract guards. The Service will ensure that an adequate number of persons are available on duty consistent with the security needs of the refugees being housed in the unit. Supervisory personnel will remain on this assignment for the duration of the Fort Chaffee operation or until relieved by the United States Marshal. Rotation of regular deputy personnel will be staggered to provide continuity of operations.
- B. Unattached Juvenile Facility. The United States Marshals Service will provide security for the unattached juvenile facility. The detail will be staffed by a Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal, regular Deputy United States Marshals, and contract guard personnel. The Service will ensure that adequate number of personnel are available at all times to maintain an adequate standard of security.
- C. Reserve Force. In addition to the normal complement of personnel necessary to provide security to this facility an additional reserve force of personnel will be located at this facility to provide any additional assistance needed at the juvenile or adult facilities. In addition, the reserve force will provide for the movement of detainees from the Bureau of Prisons operated stockade at Fort Chaffee to the court on a daily basis for hearings before the U.S. Commissioner. This same unit will provide return trip transportation upon completion of all hearings.

- D. Criminal Investigations. All criminal activity taking place in the adult security facility and the unattached juvenile facility will be investigated. Crimes of a serious nature will be reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for investigation.

IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL

- A. Command. Under normal operating conditions, the United States Marshal for the District of Arkansas will command the operation of the United States Marshals Service detachment at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. During any disturbance of a major nature, the United States Marshal will provide all available assistance to the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator to assist in restoration of order.
- B. Communications. Adequate communications will be provided on the United States Marshals Service frequency to ensure that all elements of the Marshals Service operation at Fort Chaffee will be controlled from a single location. Additional communities for coordination with other military and civilian law enforcement/security organizations will be established as necessary.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX E

GATE AND SUPPORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN (FPS)

Office of Federal
Protective Service
Management - PS

I. SITUATION

The emergency situation involving the processing of Cuban refugees is continuing with the Federal Government relocating all Cubans to the processing center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. The refugees are now located at three centers and as events have shown in the past will continue to create a peacekeeping problem.

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has been assigned a support security mission at Fort Chaffee. Other enforcement agencies having a responsibility at Fort Chaffee are the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Park Police and the Bureau of Prisons. The U.S. Army will also provide a contingent of Military Police in a reaction force status and to patrol the perimeter installation exclusive of the refugee operation.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Until the consolidation at Fort Chaffee is complete, FPS will have responsibilities at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. These two facilities may remain in operation through October 1980.
 - B. Cuban refugees will start arriving at Fort Chaffee in early September in increments of about 500 per day.
-

- C. The eventual total population will approximate 10,000 people and consist of 80% single adults predominately male and 20% family and unaccompanied juveniles. Because of this make-up there will be significant potential for civil disturbance within the enclave.

III. MISSION

The Federal Protective Service will be responsible for the protection of all civilian personnel associated with the refugee operation; and for the areas in which others work, except in those areas within the jurisdiction of other agencies. FPS will also be responsible for security of all internal and external enclave gates, including control of personnel and vehicle access.

IV. EXECUTION

All GSA regions will provide manpower and resources as directed by the Assistant Commissioner for Federal Protective Service Management.

- A. **Limitations.** The maximum amount of manpower that can be committed without adversely affecting the mission of the FPS operation nationwide is determined to be 62 personnel.
- B. **Task.** The FPS will provide foot and mobile patrols for the protection of designated refugee areas within the Fort Chaffee compound. Security will be provided for 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
- C. **Deployment.** The following deployment is based upon a maximum staff of 62 personnel to be committed by September 30, 1980, for all phases. It is anticipated that at the beginning of Phase I, at least 32 personnel will be on site. By September 15, another 20 officers will be assigned and on site. The final 10 will be assigned by September 30 for a total of 62.

1. Fixed Posts.

- a. Gate 30 -- 2 x 2 shifts = 4
- b. Gate 31 -- 1 x 2 shifts = 2
- c. Gate 38 -- 2 x 2 shifts = 4
- d. Gate 40 -- 1 x 1 shifts = 1
- e. Gate 55 -- 1 x 1 shifts = 1
- f. Building 1780 -- 2 x 1 shifts = 2
 1 x 1 shifts = 1
- g. Building 1593 -- 1 x 2 shifts = 2
- Building 1598 -- 1 x 2 shifts = 2

2. Foot Patrol.
 - a. Volag area - Three 2-man patrols for day shift = 6
 - b. Theater Moine - Two men 7-10 PM daily = 2 (Part time)

3. Mobile Patrol
 - a. Two 2-man patrol (day) = 4
 - b. Three 2-man patrol (night) = 6

4. Command and Supervision

- a. On site commander - 1 Captain
- b. Administrator - 1 Lieutenant
- c. Shift Supervisors - 4 Sergeants
- d. Field Supervisors - 5 Corporals
- e. Clerk - 1 Federal Protective Officer

5. Relief

Six officers on each shift will be available to provide relief for fixed posts and foot patrol. Total 12.

- D. Logistics/Administration. The director of Region 7 FPS is responsible for the overall coordination of administrative and logistical support.

1. Lotistics. Ensure that:

- a. Sufficient number of motorized vehicles to meet mission requirement are present.
- b. Two-way radios on a common frequency are present and a base station to coordinate with other on site law enforcement agencies.
- c. Transportation is provided for Federal Protective Officers from the airport to the refugee site upon their arrival to his region and provided with return transportation.
- d. Federal Protective Officers will bring the following items of equipment.

(1) All items of SORT equipment as directed by PBS P 5930.17, Chapter 12.

- (2) Sufficient FPS uniforms for a month operation.
- (3) Weapon (Service Revolver) with accessories.
- (4) Appropriate civilian attire for wear after normal duty.

2. Administration:

- a. Ensure that arrangements are made with the military installation commander for mess facilities and use of other facilities as permitted i.e., gyms, limited post exchange privileges, theaters, etc.
- b. Medical treatment be provided as needed.
- c. Uniform cleaning services are provided as needed.
- d. Provide detailed written instructions/orders to meet mission requirement.

E. Command and Communication

1. To ensure that all FPO's assigned to Fort Chaffee are receiving the same and consistent direction, the Assistant Commissioner for Federal Protective Service Management has been appointed GSA Oversight Coordinator. All activities and movements of FPS Officers will be coordinated by him with the U.S. Department of State, Attorney General, DOD, and Regional Administrators.
2. The senior FPS Officer on site at Fort Chaffee will be in charge of all FPO's at that site and will coordinate all his activities with the lead law enforcement agency at Fort Chaffee, the USPP.
3. Once an FPS operational command post has been established on site, daily summary of activities will be called into the Operational Services Division (566-1429) by 0830 hours EDT, Monday through Friday. Week-end activity will be reported the following Monday. This does not supersede any reporting requirements established by DOJ and the USPP.
4. Serious incidents will be reported in accordance with Chapter 5, part 4, paragraph 33, a-c, FPS Staff Officers Handbook.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX F

BORDER PATROL APPREHENSION PLAN

- I. PURPOSE: The U. S. Border Patrol is responsible for the detection, apprehension and custody of Cuban refugees found outside the Fort Chaffee Reservation without permission.
- II. ASSUMPTIONS:
- The U. S. Park Police, U. S. Marshals Service, I&NS (excluding Border Patrol) and Bureau of Prisons will be responsible for internal security of the refugee compound.
 - The military will be responsible for patrolling the compound perimeter and for post security.
- III. OPERATIONS:
- A. To accomplish its mission the Border Patrol will:
1. Establish a high visibility presence to deter the escape of Cuban refugees.
 2. Establish liaison with all government agencies assigned to the refugee detail in order to insure timely reporting of all escapes.
 3. Establish liaison with local law enforcement agencies in the surrounding areas to request their cooperation in immediately reporting any person suspected of being a Cuban abscondee.
-

4. Establish liaison with public transportation facilities, including airports, bus stations, train stations, taxi companies, etc. to request their cooperation in reporting suspected escapees.
5. Establish relations with local businesses and city governments to solicit public support.
6. Upon report of an abscondee, respond immediately by placing appropriate lookouts and initiating actions necessary in order to apprehend the abscondee in a timely manner.

B. Manpower

- Beginning August 20, 1980, two Border Patrol Agents will be detailed to Fort Chaffee for 15 days to establish liaison with camp officials and local police agencies.
- August 30, 1980, the force will be increased to one Supervisory Border Patrol Agent and four Border Patrol Agents.
- When the refugees are moved into the Camp, the force will be increased to two Supervisory Border Patrol Agents and eight Border Patrol Agents. Further adjustments will be made as needed.

C. EQUIPMENT

- Appropriately marked vehicles are to be utilized to identify Border Patrol units and establish a high visibility presence. The unit will be provided with two sedans, two 4 x 4's, and one van, all fully equipped.

D. COMMUNICATIONS

- A communications network will be established with the military, Arkansas State Police, and local police agencies. One base station is to be installed inside the camp, ten walkie talkies equipped with chargers will be provided, and five Arkansas State Police radios installed in the vehicles.*

* An alternative is the military to provide a radio network for all agencies. This may be possible utilizing the equipment now being used at Fort McCoy.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION FACILITY PLAN

- I. PURPOSE: Security and operation of Level II housing (Detention) facilities at Fort Chaffee. The Level II Housing area will consist of 22 barracks which will accommodate 60 refugees per barrack for a maximum population capacity of approximately 1,320 refugees. BOP/INS Housing Survey of 8/16/80 identified a total of 794 refugees who are scheduled for Level II Housing upon consolidation of the camps.
- II. ASSUMPTIONS:
- That I&NS will assume responsibility for security of Level II Housing when perimeter and interior fencing is completed.
 - That food, medical, recreational, counseling, and other appropriate non-custodial support services will be provided by the Cuban/Haitian Task Force.
 - That I&NS will make the final decision as to which refugees are admitted to or released from Level II Housing once the consolidation process is completed.
 - That upon consolidation of the refugees, the initial total population of Level II Housing will not exceed 794 as identified in the BOP/I&NS Housing Survey of 8/16/80.
-

III. OPERATIONS:

The staffing of Level II Housing will be assumed by I&NS' Detention and Deportation Division and the following staffing plan will be implemented:

'Supervisory Detention & Deportation Officer (OIC)	1
Detention and Deportation Officer	5
Supervisory Detention Officers	5
Detention Officers	50
Clerks	4
TOTAL	<u>65</u>

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX H

REFUGEE RESTRICTIONS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES

I. PURPOSE:

The consolidation of the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee will require that uniform and strict rules be placed into effect with regard to those aliens whose conduct in the camp is of great concern not only to the citizens in the surrounding communities but to those camp aliens who are law abiding, fearful of their safety and interested only in early re-settlement. Of equal importance, there is the entitlement of all government employees and representatives of voluntary agencies to carry out their difficult duties in an atmosphere of maximum order. Experience at all the camps has shown that a small percentage of the population is responsible for internal disturbances and misconduct off-base.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

- That certain aliens within the camp will not conform to the established rules and will require confinement in administrative detention, a stockade or a federal correctional institution.
- That custody restrictions such as administrative detention, referral to a stockade or a federal correctional institution will be pursuant to written policy as set forth below.

III. PROCEDURES:

The instructions which follow relate to three categories of aliens: (1) those who leave camp property without authorization; (2) those whose conduct within the camp is detrimental to other aliens or groups of aliens; and (3) those who are determined to be instigators of or participants in

riots and other serious disruptions.

A. Unauthorized Departure from Camp

Aliens who leave the camp without permission but are not known to have committed offenses off-base are to be disciplined as follows:

1. First departure - three days in Level II Housing.
2. Second departure - two weeks in the stockade.
3. Third or more - thirty days detention in the stockade and such further detention as a review panel may determine. Review will be made at two week intervals after initial thirty day detention.

Should the "fence-jumper" engage in criminal conduct off-base, every effort is to be made to seek prosecution by local authorities. If this fails but the alien admits the elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, arrangements will be made to place the alien in a federal correctional institution to await exclusion proceedings. For a lesser off-base crime where prosecution is not pursued by local authorities, detention in the camp stockade will be imposed as set forth above.

B. Conduct Detrimental to Other Aliens in the Camps

Criminal conduct against another alien or group of aliens in the camp should be presented for prosecution by the appropriate authority. Should prosecution not be accepted, the alien engaged in such conduct will be placed (until resettlement) in the camp stockade for the time periods set forth in item A3 above. Federal correctional institution detention will be considered when the seriousness of the conduct warrants it. Such determination will be made by a review panel. Non-criminal harassment, badgering of, or interference with, innocent aliens by another shall be dealt with in the same manner as "fence-jumpers" above.

C. Instigators of Riots and Other Serious Internal Disturbances

It is essential that those identified as having instigated riots and other serious camp disturbances be removed from the camp permanently and placed in federal correctional institution. If prosecution is warranted, it should be pursued. If not, off-base detention should be imposed pending possible resettlement. Those aliens who, while not instigating riots or disturbances, have taken part in them

are to be placed in the stockade for a period of 30 days (less if resettlement is arranged).

The rules set forth above will be called to the attention of Cuban leaders in the camp. They will be translated into the Spanish language, and posted throughout the camp.

Implementation of these instructions will require careful coordination among all agencies involved in camp security.

The administrative detention periods set forth above are subject to termination upon resettlement of the alien.

D. Disciplinary Procedure and Notice of Hearing

Notices will be posted prominently, advising camp residents what activities are prohibited. These notices will be in Spanish and English. The principal offenses are: (1) unauthorized departure from camp; (2) conduct detrimental to other aliens in the camp; (3) instigation of or participation in riots or other serious internal disturbances.

When an individual is accused of a violation of posted rules of conduct, or other disruptive behavior, a written report of the incident will be necessary. That report must document, at a minimum, the name of the accused; date, time, and place of the infraction; name, title, and organization of the officer preferring the charges; and a brief narrative description of the incident. A sample of the incident report format is attached as Tab 1.

Upon review by the receiving officer, a determination will be made as to whether the charges warrant disciplinary hearing or if counseling will suffice to correct the behavior. If a decision is made that a hearing is warranted, a notice to the alien will be issued setting forth the charges and advising him/her of the date and time of a hearing before a disciplinary panel. Normally, the alien will be given no less than 24 hours notice of the hearing, but should the alien request or exigent circumstances dictate, the hearing may be held sooner. Such exception must be documented. A sample of the notice of hearing format is attached as Tab 2.

The disciplinary panel shall be comprised of no less than two officers, neither of whom shall have been the same officer who requested the disciplinary action. The panel shall view the evidence and reports in the matter and call such witnesses as they deem necessary to make a determination in the case. The accused should be allowed to present his

version of the incident unless his behavior is such as to preclude his appearance. The panel shall make a written finding of fact and recommendation of disposition. Their findings shall be based on the evidence and testimony received and briefly articulated in their notice of findings. That notice will be reviewed by the ranking INS officer of the facility. He may either concur with, or reject those findings and recommendations. If the latter, he will state his reasons for such rejection. The written notice of final decision will then be given to the alien and the decision carried out. A copy of all materials relating to the incident will be included in the alien's INS file. A sample of the notice of findings format is attached as Tab 3.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX H TAB 1

INCIDENT REPORT - INS FORM

INCIDENT REPORT

A# _____

Date of Incident _____

Name of Detainee _____

Time of Incident _____

Place of Incident _____

NARRATIVE: (Description of Occurrence and Parties Involved)

(name and title of reporting officer)

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX H TAB 2

NOTICE OF HEARING - INS FORM

NOTICE OF HEARING

A# _____

TO: (Name of Detainee)
FROM: (Supervisor Requesting Disciplinary Action)
SUBJECT: YOUR APPEARANCE BEFORE A DISCIPLINARY PANEL

DATE:

YOU ARE HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE THAT YOU ARE TO APPEAR BEFORE A PANEL
ON _____ AT _____ TO ANSWER CHARGES MADE TO
(date) (time)
ANSWER CHARGES MADE AGAINST YOU BY _____
(officer or supervisor)

THESE CHARGES IF UPHELD, COULD RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION BEING
TAKEN AGAINST YOU. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(Description of Charges)

YOU WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CALL WITNESSES AND TO PRESENT DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE AT THIS HEARING WHERE SUCH WOULD NOT BE UNDULY HAZARDOUS TO
INSTUTIONAL SAFETY OR GOALS.

RECEIPT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF HEARING IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED.
IT WAS DELIVERED ON _____ AT _____
(date) (time)

(signature of detainee)

(signature of officer or supervisor)

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX H TAB 3

NOTICE OF FINDINGS OF DISCIPLINARY PANEL

INS FORM

NOTICE OF FINDINGS OF DISCIPLINARY PANEL

A# _____

TO: (Name of Detainee)

DATE:

FROM: (Disciplinary Panel)

SUBJECT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RESULTING FROM THE HEARING AFFORDED YOU BY THIS PANEL.

ON _____ AT _____ A HEARING WAS HELD BEFORE
(date) (time)
THIS PANEL TO AFFORD YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST YOU BY _____ CONCERNING:
(officer or supervisor)

(Description of Charges)

ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WE FIND THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST YOU (HAVE, HAVE NOT) BEEN UPHELD.

WE RECOMMEND THAT IN YOUR CASE

(Recommendation of Panel)

(signature of Panel Members)

(signature of panel members)

[] I HAVE REVIEWED THIS CASE AND I CONCUR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PANEL.

[] I HAVE REVIEWED THIS CASE AND I DO NOT CONCUR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PANEL FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

(Description of Reasons)

ACCORDINGLY, I ORDER THAT THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST YOU SHALL BE:

(Action to be Taken)

(signature and title)

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX I

CUBAN REFUGEE DETENTION FACILITY (STOCKADE) PLAN

The Bureau of Prisons will administer the operation of the Fort Chaffee Detention Facility (Stockade) to house those Cuban refugees whom the U.S. Magistrate has deemed should be held for prosecution and for those refugees who have been found guilty of an offense and sentenced for a period of up to 60 days. Unsentenced detainees who require psychiatric or intensive medical care will not be housed in the stockade.

A Bureau of Prisons management team consisting of an administrator, records and booking specialist, and three Senior Correctional Officers will supervise the operation of the facility. The management team will be rotated approximately every 6 weeks but, individually, replacements will be staggered so as to provide continuity during the rotation period.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

1. Booking

The Bureau of Prisons's standard operating policy will be followed for booking prisoners received from the U.S. Marshals Service, Immigration and Naturalization Agents, and Park Police, and other officers with law enforcement duties and authority at the installation. Booking may be made on a round-the-clock basis.

2. Personal Property

The detainee's personal money, clothing, and other valuables will be recorded and inventoried, receipted, and safely stored for return to the detainee on release.

3. Clothing

Each new commitment will be given a standard issue of clothing and supplies for personal hygiene.

4. Supervision

Twenty-four (24) hour administrative supervision will be provided by Bureau of Prisons' staff. Direct, full-time supervision of inmates and security operations will be provided by the contract guard service.

Contracting for Non-Bureau of Prisons guards will be conducted by the Department of Human and Health Services. Bureau of Prisons's staff will interview candidates for guards service, however, and approve all selectees.

Staff will conduct four (4) official counts a day in addition to other unofficial counts to ensure adequate supervision of all detainees.

5. Health Services

The Department of Human and Health Services will provide 24-hour nursing service at the stockade to administer daily sick call and attend to minor illnesses or injuries. Detainees who require more intensive medical care will be referred to the main refugee camp hospital.

6. Transportation

The movement of detainees from the stockade to court will be provided by the U.S. Marshals Service.

7. Releasees

All detainees will be released at the expiration of their sentences and/or by order of the Magistrate. Detainees will be returned to their previous or other assigned housing as determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Transportation for this purpose will be provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

SECURITY/SAFETY PROCEDURES

1. Security Devices

The Bureau of Prisons will assign, as necessary, a security lock specialist to the stockade to repair or update all locking devices to meet Federal Prison's System standards.

2. Fire Safety Features

Night lights will be installed in all living quarters. A separate emergency lighting system also will be developed in case of power failure.

Fire escapes will be installed in both living units to provide emergency egress for those residents above the first floor.

3. Communications

Two-way radios will be provided for staff to use while on duty. Additional telephone service also will be installed, and emergency telephone service to the Park Police Command Post will be established in the stockade. Emergency control plans utilizing Park Police, U.S. Marshals Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service, if required, will be implemented if needed to control a disturbance or prevent an escape.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX J

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION

- I. PURPOSE. To establish uniform guidelines for the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions for misdemeanor and felony offenses committed at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Procedures for dealing with violations of an administrative nature and those acts prejudicial to the maintenance of order and safety in the enclave are covered in Appendix H of this Plan.
 - II. POLICY. Whenever possible misconduct by Cuban refugees will be promptly and thoroughly investigated to collect the evidence necessary to support appropriate legal or administrative action. The difficulties involved notwithstanding, fair and vigorous disposition of each incident of serious misconduct is necessary to the good order and security of the refugee population and is in the best interests of the U.S. Government.
 - III. ASSUMPTIONS.
 - That certain refugees will engage in anti-social and criminal activity.
 - That proper investigative and prosecutorial effort will be necessary to correctly identify those responsible for such activity and the facts surrounding the incident.
 - IV. PROCEDURES. The following procedures will be implemented in conjunction with those contained in Appendix H.
 - A. Reporting. All acts of a criminal nature, violations of established camp order, and any disturbance threat, or activity of a suspicious nature should be reported to the U.S. Park Police (USPP) at Building 1396 -- 24 hour phone 484-2171.
-

1. The USPP will respond to all requests for service and conduct appropriate inquiries to determine the facts. Incident reports will be made by the responding USPP officer. In those situations where criminal activity is discovered or where someone has been taken into custody for committing a criminal act, a report containing all of the details of the incident will be presented to the U.S. Attorney (USA) for the Western District of Arkansas for review.
 2. Whenever follow-up investigation is warranted, the USPP will refer the matter to the FBI or to a USPP investigator/detective for further action.
- C. FBI Notification. The local office of the FBI will be notified by the USPP of all major crimes and crimes that fall exclusively within FBI jurisdiction. The FBI also will be notified and consulted regarding any specific case designated by the USA.
- D. U.S. Attorney. The USA for the Western District of Arkansas has the primary responsibility for prosecution of any crimes which occur within the confines of the Fort Chaffee reservation or that otherwise involve federal jurisdiction. The USA will act in all matters involving Cuban refugees in accordance with Department of Justice policy.
- E. U.S. Magistrate. The U.S. Magistrate will conduct arraignments and preliminary hearings on matters referred by the USA. In cases involving acts that amount to a misdemeanor or less, the U.S. Magistrate will hear and adjudicate cases at the refugee enclave that are presented by the U.S. Park Police or other federal law enforcement agency with appropriate jurisdiction.
- F. Use of Summons. A summons procedure that has been developed at Fort Chaffee will continue to be employed in order to provide appropriate judicial action for minor offenses that do not warrant holding the violator in custody until the matter can be tried or otherwise adjudicated.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX K

INS REFUGEE MOVEMENT PLAN

I. PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE FOR A SAFE AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF REFUGEES FROM EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA, FORT MCCOY, WISCONSIN, AND FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA, TO FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

- That the transfer of the refugees to Fort Chaffee from the other camps will not occur until the perimeter and interior fencing is completed at that location.
- That the transfer of the refugees will proceed one camp at a time in the following order on dates indicated or earlier:
 - Eglin Air Force Base - September 11, 12, or 13, 1980*
 - Fort McCoy - September 18, 1980
 - Fort Indiantown Gap - September 30, 1980
- That the number of refugees transferred to Fort Chaffee will not exceed 500 per day.
- That INS will assume a lead role and have responsibility for coordinating the movements of refugees to Fort Chaffee from the other camps. U.S. Marshals Service, Park Police, Federal Protective Service, will assist in such movements as necessary.
- That prior to transfer of the refugees from the other camps to Fort Chaffee, Health and Human Services (HHS) will arrange for appropriate relocation orientation briefings for the refugees to ensure that they are fully aware of the plans for their transfer to Fort Chaffee.
- That all air and ground transportation will be arranged by INS in concert with FEMA.

* Information furnished by Cuban/Haitian Task Force and subject to change.

- That the plan, which is based on the population totals obtained from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)/INS housing assignment survey of 8/16/80 and revised on 9/4/80, and will accommodate any significant changes in the camp population.

III. OPERATIONS

A. OUT-PROCESSING FROM EGLIN, MCCOY AND INDIANTOWN GAP

Prior to boarding the buses, each alien will be physically searched, both by transfriskers and electronic devices. This will be a complete body search and will include the subject emptying his pockets. This will insure there are no weapons or contraband on the alien while enroute to Fort Chaffee.

Eglin Air Force Base

The U. S. Air Force will notify and escort the refugees from the tent areas to a specified building where the baggage will be examined. The baggage will be searched by the USAF, the U. S. Marshals Service and I&NS personnel. The baggage will then be tagged and loaded aboard military trucks and transported aboard the aircraft in the baggage compartment of the plane. The aliens boarding the aircraft will not be allowed any carry-on baggage or personal belongings.

The transfer of the Cubans from the designated search area will then begin as outlined. If an alien refuses to board the buses or the aircraft, I&NS personnel and U. S. Marshals Service personnel will then forcibly place the aliens aboard the aircraft and a decision on the use of restraints for the individual Cuban aboard the aircraft will be made at that time. The U. S. Marshals Service, USAF, and I&NS officials indicate there is adequate manpower available to perform the search and security procedures as set forth above. Level II housing and stockade aliens will be transported in handcuffs and restraints, as appropriate. Two FAA Sky Marshals will accompany each flight in addition to the INS personnel.

Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

The Liberty Gate complex (Buildings 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 239) will be utilized as the staging area.

Aliens are to be moved from their barracks area to the staging area the day before their scheduled departure.

On the day of departure, the baggage will be searched in front of the owner at the same time the personal physical screening of the Cuban will be conducted. All baggage will be placed in plastic bags and sealed in cardboard boxes by the searching officer. The boxes will then be loaded onto a government truck to be taken to the airport with the Cubans. After the physical screening and search, the alien will go directly to the bus for transportation to the airport.

The baggage search and physical screening of the aliens will be performed by the Federal Protective Officers and I&NS personnel with the assistance of the U. S. Marshals Service.

The baggage will be totally inaccessible to the aliens from the time it is searched until it is returned to them at Fort Chaffee.

In addition to the I&NS personnel on the flight outlined, there will be one Sky Marshal and a uniformed Federal Air Police Officer aboard the aircraft.

Level II housing and stockade aliens will be transported in handcuffs and restraints, as appropriate. The I&NS personnel aboard the aircraft will be the same as outlined.

Indiantown Gap

Each alien will be given a plastic bag for his personal belongings prior to departure from their living quarters to a designated staging area. Each alien on arrival at the staging area will pass through a magnetometer and then his person and belongings will be searched by an immigration officer. After the belongings are searched, they will be placed in cardboard boxes, sealed and transported by government trucks from the staging area to the airport and placed in the baggage compartment of the aircraft. The baggage search and physical screening of the aliens will be conducted by I&NS personnel and Federal Protective Service Officers.

Level II aliens and stockade aliens will be handcuffed and restrained. Two FAA Sky Marshals will accompany each flight in addition to the I&NS personnel.

At any point during the out-processing if the alien refuses to board the bus or the aircraft, the alien will be physically restrained by I&NS officers and placed on the aircraft.

B. MOVEMENT OF CUBANS FROM FORT SMITH AIRPORT TO FORT CHAFFEE REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER

Equipment

- 1 bus per 50 Cubans - Total 3 buses
- 1 bus - Additional transportation in case of mechanical breakdown or emergency
- 1 INS secured van - Van necessary for isolation of any trouble makers during the transfer from the aircraft to the buses
- 1 marked Border Patrol sedan
- 1 ambulance - Will remain stationed at the airport area
- 2 Arkansas State Police sedans
- Batons for INS personnel
- Supply of plastic flex-cuffs
- 20 orange traffic cones
- 1 INS sedan - For messenger to convey "A" files to INS compound
- 1 CJ-5 jeep, 5 handi-talkies - 4 use of D/AACG (departure/arrival airfield group)

Personnel

2 Border Patrol Agents - Agents will provide on scene direction of transfer of Cubans from aircraft to buses. Supervision of this operation will be handled by Supervisory Border Patrol Agent in charge assigned to Fort Chaffee.

2 Arkansas State Police Troopers - To be utilized in escort movement of Cubans and additional security as needed. Additional troopers are available if needed.

12 Border Patrol Agents - Will assist in security both during the actual transfer of Cubans as well as escort security on the buses.

4 D/AACG - Military personnel assigned to act as liaison between U.S. Army and Arkansas Air National Guard and INS personnel.

2 Ambulance Personnel - To be provided by on-base Public Health - Medical Technician will be made available at the Air National Guard Base in the event of a medical emergency. Additional medical services are available on military property if needed.

2 - 6 Immigration Detention Officers - IDO's acting as escort personnel on in-coming flights will be available at the scene to provide additional security if needed.

30 Border Patrol Agents - Ramp security to buses - Border Patrol Agents will provide a line of security between the bottom of the ramp to the buses.

Arkansas Air National Guard Security Personnel - Arkansas Air National Guard does not have the personnel to assist INS with the actual removal of the Cubans from the aircraft to the bus. They will however, provide the necessary security for the Airbase, aircraft, buildings, and other equipment. In the event of a disturbance or emergency, they will have approximately 3 security personnel on stand-by for communications purposes only. Emergency extension is 200.

Press Liaison - The Public Information Office of the on-base press relations has agreed to handle all press releases. Escort service by Public Affairs Office will be required.

Procedures

All personnel and vehicles involved in the transfer are to meet at the loading area of the Arkansas Air National Guard Base no later than 20 minutes prior to the arrival of each movement.

Arkansas Air National Guard safety procedures will strictly be adhered to at all times.

- A. There will be absolutely no smoking on the parking ramp.
- B. All vehicles will pass over the gravel guard when entering onto the parking ramp.
- C. The Air National Guard ground maintenance chief or his representative will have authority over all personnel and procedures in the event of an emergency involving the aircraft or any serious safety hazard.
- D. All drivers of vehicles entering on to, especially drivers of the buses will be extremely careful when approaching the aircraft. All drivers will be made aware of the safety restrictions and requirements.

Buses will line up single file facing west on the southside of the parking ramp inside the designated yellow lines. Border Patrol Agents on the scene will coordinate transfer of detainees from the aircraft to the buses.

Arkansas State Police troopers will station their vehicles so that they will be able to effect departure from the base. Troopers will coordinate the movement of the convoy from the base to Fort Chaffee. The troopers will provide emergency assistance if needed.

Upon arrival of the aircraft, Air National Guard personnel will park and secure the aircraft. No action will take place until the Safety Officer has advised the aircraft is parked and safe. No refueling will be implemented until the removal of the Cuban detainees from the aircraft has been completed.

The Border Patrol Unit and the secure Immigration van will be parked near the front of the aircraft no closer than 25 feet in the event they are needed.

At the command of the Border Patrol Agent in charge, Border Patrol Agents will proceed to the bottom of the ramp forming 2 lines of 15 men each from the bottom of the ramp to the bus. The bus will be loaded as close to the foot of the ramp as possible.

The Military D/AACG personnel will coordinate the movement of the vehicles to be utilized for transportation to the aircraft. The Border Patrol Agent in charge will board the plane first and coordinate the removal of the Cubans from the aircraft. He will communicate with the Cubans and advise them of the procedures to be taken. In the event that the Cubans refuse to exit the aircraft, immigration personnel on the scene will be utilized to physically convey the Cubans to the buses.

No unnecessary communication will be made with the Cubans by any personnel. At no time during the transfer of the Cubans will the drivers of the buses will communicate with the Cubans or leave their vehicles. One Border Patrol Agent will ascend the ramp and position himself at the top of the ramp. Another Border Patrol Agent will position himself at the bottom of the ramp.

"A" files and other related material will be transferred from the aircraft to a messenger for conveyance to Fort Chaffee. Two Detention Officers will position themselves in an area where they can be utilized if the removal of a trouble maker becomes necessary. Any Cuban detainees causing problems will be isolated from the group and placed in the secure INS van. The remaining 10 Immigration Detention Officers will stand by and be utilized as security during the transfer from the plane to the buses as well as escort security during the movement of the buses from the base to Fort Chaffee.

When a bus is fully loaded, the bus will proceed to the rear of the lead Arkansas State Police vehicle and await the remaining personnel. Buses 2 and 3 will proceed in the same manner after loading. Immigration Detention Officers will be aboard the buses at a minimum of 3 per bus. Additional Immigration Detention Officers being utilized as escort security on the aircraft will assist as needed.

Stockade and Level II detainees will disembark from the aircraft in groups of 5. General population, family groups, etc. will disembark from the aircraft in groups of 10.

Upon the successful loading of Cuban detainees into the buses, the convoy will proceed under the direction of Arkansas State Police to Fort Chaffee:

- 1 - Arkansas State Police vehicle
- 2 - Border Patrol Unit
- 3 - Buses, empty bus last
- 4 - Secured Immigration van
- 5 - Second Arkansas State Police Unit

Agreement has been reached with Commander of local Arkansas State Police Troop on route of travel to Fort Chaffee.

Miscellaneous Comments

In the event of a disturbance or dangerous situation, the Border Patrol Agent coordinating the movement will at his discretion notify emergency law enforcement personnel. Any loaded buses on the scene will be instructed to proceed immediately under Arkansas State Police escort to Fort Chaffee. Any remaining buses will stand by as needed.

Communication with the various relocation centers sending Cuban detainees to Fort Chaffee is essential prior to the arrival of Cubans. Possible problem areas should be identified and this information be given to INS personnel at Fort Chaffee.

Transfer of all detainees baggage will be coordinated by HHS personnel from Fort Chaffee. INS personnel will not be involved in this movement and it is recommended that this action take place after the removal of the Cubans from the aircraft.

Air National Guard (Arkansas)
Coordinator - Col. Moreland
Area Code - (501) 646-1601 ext. 227

Arkansas State Police Headquarters
Commander - Captain Del Causey
Area Code - (501) 783-5195

Arkansas Army National Guard
Commander - General J. Jones
North Little Rock Arkansas
Area Code - (501) 758-4053

D/AACG
Lt. Michael Mack
Area Code - (501) 484-2315 or 2400

C. EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE

As of 9/4/80 there were a total of 733 Cuban refugees at Eglin who have been classified for housing assignments at Fort Chaffee as follows:

Protective Custody	0
Level II Housing	47
Stockade	0
Youth Section	1
General Population	682
Family Members	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	733

- At least one week prior to the scheduled transfer of the refugees from Eglin to Fort Chaffee, a team of INS Detention and Deportation Officers will be detailed to the camp to coordinate the movement.
- To accommodate each movement there will be at least 6 buses made available.
- Each bus (capacity 43 - 47) will have one escort for general population and family members from the points of departure or arrival.
- Each flight will require at least two escorts for refugees in the general population, family members and youth category.
- Level II refugees will require one bus with 3 escort officers, plus one secure van with driver and escort.
- A decision whether to use restraints will be made by the senior INS official at Eglin, based on available information, prior to Level II refugees being placed on the aircraft.
- A total of six escorts will accompany the Level II refugees on the flight to Fort Chaffee.
- INS files pertaining to the refugees being moved will accompany the aliens and will contain appropriate information and color codes to facilitate housing assignments at Fort Chaffee.

The movement of the refugees will be accomplished over a two day period with general population, family members and youths being transferred in four separate movements of approximately 150 per movement during the two day period. The Level II Housing refugees will be transferred as a separate unit on the second day. Schedules are as follows:

EGLIN

Distance Eglin to Chaffee - 565 air miles
Flight time - 1.5 hours
Distance Eglin to airstrip - on base
Distance Fort Smith Airstrip to Fort Chaffee - 5 miles

Day One:

Movement #1 - Depart Eglin 9:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 10:30 a.m.

Group

Level II Housing - 47

1 bus and 1 secure van with 3 escorts on bus and 1 escort and driver in van.
6 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
1 bus and 1 van to meet plane and transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.
6 aircraft escorts will be used to transfer refugees to Fort Chaffee.
5 escorts on bus and 1 in secure van.

Movement #2 - Depart Eglin 11:30 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 1:00 p.m.

Group

General population	146
Family members	3
Youth	<u>1</u>
	150

Refugees will be transported in 4 buses from the camp to the airbase.

1 Escort and driver per bus.
2 escorts per aircraft enroute to Fort Chaffee.
Arrive Fort Smith 1:00 a.m.
4 buses to transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.
1 escort and driver per bus.
Aircraft and 2 escorts return to Eglin.
Depart Fort Smith 2:30 p.m.
Arrive Eglin 4:00 p.m.

Movement #3 - Depart Eglin 5:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 6:30 p.m.

Group

General population - 150

Buses and escorts similar to Movement #2.

Day Two

Movement #1 - Depart Eglin 9:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 10:30 a.m.

Group

General population - 150

Buses and escorts similar to Movement #2, day 1.

Movement #2 - Depart Eglin 11:30 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 1:00 p.m.

Group

General population - 150

Buses and escorts similar to Movement #2, day 1.

Movement #3 - Depart Eglin 2:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 3:30 p.m.

Group

General population - 86

Refugees will be transported in 2 buses from the camp to the
airbase, escorts similar to Movement #2, day 1.

D. FORT MCCOY.

As of 9/4/80, there were a total of 4,690 Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy who
have been classified for housing assignments at Fort Chaffee as follows:

Protective Custody	50
Level II Housing	261
Stockade	18
Youth Section	244
General Population	4,028
Family Members	89
TOTAL	<u>4,690</u>

Presently there is an on-duty force of 27 INS enforcement personnel at Fort McCoy who will effect the transfer of the refugees to Fort Chaffee.

The transfer of the total population will be completed in 12 days. The general population, family members and youths, will be transferred in two separate movements per day of 150 per movement during the last 11 days. The remaining 329 refugees comprising Protective Custody, Level II Housing and Stockade will be transferred in separate movements on the first day.

MCCOY

Distance McCoy to Chaffee - 612 air miles.
 Flight time - 1.75 hours.
 Distance McCoy to airstrip at LaCrosse - 25 miles
 Distance Fort Smith airstrip to Fort Chaffee - 5 miles

Day 1

Movement #1 - Depart Camp 8:00 a.m.
 Arrive LaCrosse 9:00 a.m.
 Depart LaCrosse 10:00 a.m.
 Arrive Chaffee 11:45 a.m.

Group

Level II Housing 150

Refugees will be transported in 4 buses from the camp to the airbase.
 3 escorts and one driver per bus.
 6 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
 Arrive Fort Smith at 11:45 a.m.
 4 buses to transport the refugees from airbase to Fort Chaffee.
 3 escorts and one driver per bus.
 Depart Fort Smith at 1:15 p.m.
 Arrive LaCrosse at 3:00 p.m.

Movement #2 - Depart Fort McCoy 11:00 a.m.
 Arrive LaCrosse 12:00 noon
 Depart LaCrosse at 1:00 p.m.
 Arrive Fort Smith at 2:45 p.m.

Group

Protective Custody - 50

1 bus and 1 secure van with 1 escort and driver on bus.
1 driver and escort on van.
2 escorts on aircraft enroute to Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 2:45 p.m.
1 bus and 1 van with 1 escort and driver per vehicle, to meet
aircraft and transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.

Movement #3 - Depart Camp 2:00 p.m.
Arrive LaCrosse 3:00 p.m.
Depart LaCrosse 4:15 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 6:00 p.m.

Group

Level II Housing	111
Stockade	18
TOTAL	129

Refugees will be transferred in 4 buses from the camp to the
airbase.

3 escorts and one driver per bus.
6 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 6:00 p.m.
4 buses to transport the refugees from airbase to Fort Chaffee.
3 escorts and one driver per bus.
Aircraft to return to home base.
Escorts to assist in transferring refugees to Fort Chaffee.

Day 2 through Day 12

Movement #1 - Depart Camp McCoy 8:00 a.m.
Arrive LaCrosse, Wisconsin 9:00 a.m.
Depart LaCrosse, Wisconsin 10:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 11:45 a.m.

Group

General population	135
Family members	10
Youth	5
	150

Refugees will be transported in 4 buses from the camp to the airbase.

1 escort and driver per bus.

2 escorts per aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.

Arrive Fort Smith at 11:45 a.m.

6 buses to transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.

1 escort and driver per bus.

Aircraft and 2 escorts to return to Fort McCoy.

Depart 1:15 p.m.

Arrive LaCrosse 3:00 p.m.

Movement #2 - Depart LaCrosse 1:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 2:45 p.m.

Group, buses and escorts similar to Movement #1.

Movement #3 - Depart LaCrosse 4:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 5:45 p.m.

Group, buses and escorts similar to Movement #1.

Group configuration on day 12 will be determined by the balance of the population in youth section, general population and family members.

E. FORT INDIANTOWN GAP.

As of 9/4/80 there were a total of 3,512 Cuban refugees at Indiantown Gap who have been classified for housing assignments at Indiantown Gap as follows:

Protective Custody	19
Level II Housing	247
Stockade	110
Youth Section	147
General Population	2,772
Family Members	217
TOTAL	<u>3,512</u>

Presently there is an on-duty force of 47 INS Enforcement personnel at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania who will effect the transfer of the refugees to Fort Chaffee.

The transfer of the total population will be completed in 14 days. The general population, family members and youths, will be transferred in two separate movements of 150 per movement from day 3 through day 14. The remaining 376 refugees comprising Protective Custody, Level II Housing and Stockade will be transferred in two separate movements on the first and second day. The schedule is as follows:

INDIANTOWN GAP

Distance Indiantown Gap to Fort Chaffee - 1,018 air miles.
Flight time - 2.5 hours.
Distance from Indiantown Gap to Harrisburg - 23 miles.
Distance from Fort Smith Air Strip to Fort Chaffee - 5 miles.

Day 1

Movement #1 - Depart Indiantown Gap 8:00 a.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 9:00 a.m.
Depart Harrisburg 10:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 11:30 a.m. (local time)

Group

Level II Housing 150

Refugees will be transported in 4 buses from the camp to the airbase.
3 escorts and one driver per bus.
4 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 11:30 a.m.
9 buses to transport the refugees from airbase to Fort Chaffee.
3 escorts and one driver per bus.
Depart Fort Smith at 1:00 p.m.
Arrive Harrisburg at 4:30 p.m.

Movement #2 - Depart Indiantown Gap 1:00 p.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 2:00 p.m.
Depart Harrisburg 3:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith at 4:30 p.m. (local time)

Group

Protective Custody 19

1 bus with 1 escort and driver on bus.
2 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 4:30 p.m.
1 bus with 1 escort and driver, to meet aircraft and transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.

Day 2

Movement #1 - Depart Indiantown Gap 8:00 a.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 9:00 a.m.
Depart Harrisburg 10:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 11:30 a.m. (local time)

Group

Level II Housing	97
Stockade	53
TOTAL	<u>150</u>

Buses and escorts similar to Movement #1 day 1.
Aircraft to return to home base.
Escorts to assist in transferring refugees to Fort Chaffee.

Movement #2 - Depart Indiantown Gap 1:00 p.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 2:00 p.m.
Depart Harrisburg 3:00 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith at 4:30 p.m. (local time)

Group

Stockade	57
----------	----

Refugees will be transported in 2 buses from the camp to the airbase.
3 escorts and one driver per bus.
6 escorts on aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 4:30 p.m.
2 buses to transport the refugees from airbase to Fort Chaffee.
3 escorts and one driver per bus.
Aircraft to return to home base.
Escorts to assist in transferring refugees to Fort Chaffee.

Day 3 through Day 14

Movement #1 - Depart Indiantown Gap 8:00 a.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 9:00 a.m.
Depart Harrisburg 10:00 a.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 11:30 a.m. (local time)

Group

General population	130
Family members	10
Youth	10
TOTAL	<u>150</u>

Refugees will be transported in 4 buses from the camp to the airbase.
1 escort and driver per bus.
2 escorts per aircraft enroute to Fort Smith.
Arrive Fort Smith at 11:30 a.m.
4 buses to transport refugees from airport to Fort Chaffee.
1 escort and driver per bus.

Aircraft and 2 escorts to return to Fort Indiantown Gap.
Depart Fort Smith 1:00 p.m.
Arrive Harrisburg 4:30 p.m.

Movement #2 - Depart Harrisburg 5:30 p.m.
Arrive Fort Smith 7:00 p.m. (local time) .

Group, buses and escorts similar to Movement #1.
Group configuration on day 10 will be determined by the balance of
the population in youth section, general population and family
members.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L

CONTINGENCY SECURITY PLAN FOR STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE

1. MISSION:

To provide protection for citizens and their property in the communities surrounding Fort Chaffee, and maintain peace and order in said area. Within established authority to do so, assist federal agencies at Fort Chaffee when requested to. (All actions taken by city/county or state agencies will occur outside the perimeter of the Fort Chaffee reservation).

2. GENERAL:

In the event that a situation develops where the possibility exists that unauthorized refugees will attempt to exit the Fort Chaffee reservation and enter the civilian community without proper supervision, and in numbers large enough to alarm the public population, immediate action will be taken in the form of a coordinated security operation by the ARKANSAS CIVIL EMERGENCY SECURITY OPERATION TASK FORCE (CESO). This will be accomplished through an immediate predetermined alert system that will activate responses from the Sebastian County Sheriff's Department, Arkansas State Police, Fort Smith Police Department, and Arkansas National Guard. See Tab 7 to Appendix C for officials comprising CESO). In addition to CESO, other surrounding civil agencies have been contacted to provide additional personnel and equipment as the situation dictates.

CESO will pre-position riot control equipment such as body shields, body armor, pepper foggers, and riot control chemicals so as to be available for immediate use.

In the event of night operations, search lights and floodlights will be employed to illuminate the immediate area of operation to afford additional safety and control measures as required.

All local or state agency personnel who will be involved with security operations will be in appropriate uniform of their respective department, or in civilian clothing with appropriate identification badges/shields prominently displayed.

All control measures employed will be of minimum force required to control the immediate situation. Lethal force will not be employed unless such lethal force is used in accordance with Arkansas State Statutes.

All persons apprehended outside boundaries of Fort Chaffee will be detained until determination of proper disposition or release of the individual has been coordinated with appropriate agencies.

State Department at Fort Chaffee will provide a liaison person to coordinate communications and operations between federal authorities and CESO.

To establish better immediate communication with all agencies operating on or off post a central communication center is needed. The physical design and location should be of such as to assure privacy and noise control consistent with the needs of a communication center. Existing radio communication frequencies used on a daily basis will be expanded to include transmitting and receiving capabilities on frequency 37.24 (Arkansas Riot and Roving frequency). This radio communication system will be augmented by establishing direct telephone lines between Fort Chaffee Communication Center and Sebastian County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) Communication Center, and between Fort Chaffee Communication Center and Arkansas State Police Communication Center. State Department at Fort Chaffee will provide additional radio communication equipment, and telephone services.

The Task Force Commander will provide CESO with four maps of Fort Chaffee showing where refugees are being housed, where various VOLAG are located, Security fence location of State Department agencies, and location of various elements of the military. Telephone list of various offices likely to interface with CESO.

Arkansas State Police and Fort Smith Police Department will provide escort and traffic coordination between Air National Guard Base and Fort Chaffee for buses carrying refugees when consolidation activities begin.

State Department will provide funds to acquire additional personnel for SCSD for the purpose of establishing a 24 hour patrol around the perimeter of Fort Chaffee. This will provide a high visibility of security to the population in the communities surrounding Fort Chaffee.

Additionally, State Department will provide funds to the communities of Barling and Greenwood for an additional patrolman and vehicle expenses for each community; and funds will be provided to the community of Jenny Lind for a nightwatchman and vehicle expenses.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 1

CESO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

CESO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

Central Communications Center at Fort Chaffee will be set up and operational by September 1, 1980.

Liaison Officer will be identified and functioning by September 1, 1980.

Liaison Officer will familiarize himself with Code Nomenclature (Tab 2 to Appendix C) and set up feed back mechanism within refugee enclave to provide indicators by September 1, 1980.

CESO will provide copies of Civil Contingency Security Plan to all agencies involved, and each agency will familiarize their key personnel with the over-all plan so as to assure response in accordance with CESO RESPONDING PROCEDURES TO CODE NOMENCLATURE (TAB 3 to Appendix C) by September 1, 1980.

CESO will determine available personnel strengths and the response time needed to assemble at a given location. (TAB 4 to Appendix C).

CESO will determine riot equipment available in each agency. (TAB 5 to Appendix C).

Additional information will be added to Civil Contingency Security Plan as needed.

Additional Emergency Resources (Fire and Ambulance) are at TAB 6 to Appendix C.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 2

CODE NOMENCLATURE

CODE GREEN: Normal conditions exist within the refugee enclave.

CODE YELLOW: POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCE - Indicators are: intelligence sources indicating agitators are at work to cause trouble, restlessness among refugees, normal routine disrupted, an isolated incident has occurred that might provide an excuse for those individuals who are predisposed to cause trouble to do so.

CODE ORANGE: DISTURBANCE IMMINENT - Indicators are: visible unrest among refugees, congregating of noisy crowds, previously identified trouble makers rallying forces, open defiance to established rules and procedures.

CODE RED: DISTURBANCE IN PROGRESS - Able to contain within fenced enclave area. Indicators are: crowds of uncontrolled refugees running about within the enclave, with such action posing a threat to the extent civilian personnel are evacuated from the refugee enclave, actual property damage has been sustained or the threat thereof imminent.

CODE BLUE: DISTURBANCE WIDE SPREAD with threat of breaching enclave area, and the unauthorized exit from Fort Chaffee of large groups of refugees.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 3

CESO RESPONDING PROCEDURES TO CODE NOMENCLATURE

CODE GREEN: Normal Operations.

CODE YELLOW: Liaison officer will notify SCSD Comm. Center (783-1051). SCSD will notify ASP & FSPD Comm. Centers. ASP Comm. Center in turn will notify ANG. NO ACTION WILL BE TAKEN OTHER THAN PRODUCING AWARENESS.

CODE ORANGE: Liaison officer will notify SCSD Comm. Center. SCSD will notify FSPD and ASP Comm. Centers. ASP will in turn notify ANG. Action taken will be for SCSD and ASP to start moving on duty units into the Barling area, FSPD will move east City Patrol Units towards eastern part of city limits. Alert will be given by each agency to their personnel to standby to respond within 15 minutes. Surrounding law enforcement agencies will be notified to stand by to respond.

CODE RED: Liaison officer will notify SCSD Comm. Center. SCSD will then notify FSPD and ASP Comm. Centers. ASP will in turn notify ANG. SCSD and ASP will respond by having all available units move to Barling area, and then units will be deployed along highway 22 and highway 59 for crowd control and traffic control to assure egress and ingress of emergency vehicles to Fort Chaffee. Assist in moving evacuee's from Fort Chaffee out of area. FSPD will move SWAT Team to National Guard Armory on highway 59, along with all other available personnel. SCSD will notify surrounding area agencies to move their units into area, and upon arriving assemble at Lock & Dam 13 parking apron area. Emergency service providers will be notified by SCSD Comm. Center to stand by to respond as needed. ANG will activate personnel to report to National Guard Armory on highway 59. CESO will immediately set up a Command Headquarters at the National Guard Armory, and hold a briefing of the situation for the commanding officers of each agency involved. Other actions will be taken as deemed necessary by CESO.

CODE BLUE: CESO will already have been advised and action taken as dictated by Code Red. CESO will deploy personnel to achieve pre-determined mission as outlined in the Civil Contingency Security Plan. Will make every effort possible to return refugees to the confines of Fort Chaffee within the parameter set out in the Civil Contingency Security Plan. Other actions will be taken as determined by CESO.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 4

PERSONNEL STRENGTHS AND RESPONSE TIME

Total number of Personnel at Time Intervals

<u>Agency</u>	<u>15 min.</u>	<u>30 min.</u>	<u>1 hr.</u>	<u>2 hr.</u>	<u>3 hr.</u>
SCSD	5	14	26	30	30
ASP	5	20	60	75	120
FSPD	13	50	65	75	100
ANG		20	60	120	As Needed
Crawford Co. S. O.	2	8	16	16	16
Franklin Co. S. O.	0	3	5	5	5
Logan Co. S. O.	0	0	2	2	2
Washington Co. S. O.	0	0	10	20	20
Van Buren P.D.	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	27	119	251	350	420+

SCSD	Sheriff Bill J. Cauthron	783-1051
ASP	CPT Deloin Causey	783-5195
FSPD	Chief Henry Oliver	785-2241
ANG	COL. Billy Cook	758-4053 x 223
Crawford S.O.	Sheriff Trelton Ball	474-2261
Franklin S.O.	Sheriff Bob Pritchard	667-4124
Logan S.O.	Sheriff William Hamilton	963-3271
Washington S.O.	Sheriff Herb Marshall	521-8400
Van Buren P.D.	Chief Virgil Goff	474-1234

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 5

EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE

Sebastian County Sheriff's Department

- 30 Riot Helmets
- 8 Riot Shotguns
- 30 Riot Sticks
- 1 1.5 caliber gas riot gun
- 4 CS tear gas cartridges for riot gun
- 8 CN 230 tear gas cartridges for riot gun
- 4 CS-501 muzzle blast duster cartridges for riot gun
- 1 Hughes Helicopter with search light
(Pilot: CFT Charles Bettis, FSPD)
(Contact Officer: Deputy Larry Kennon, SCSD)

Arkansas State Police - District H

- 100 Riot Shields
- Riot helmet for each officer
- Riot shotgun for each officer
- 1 Pepperfogger w/chemicals
- 1 1.5 gas riot gun
- 1 Gas & paint back pack equipment (capable of dispensing gas and paint under pressure)
- Riot sticks for each officer (Contact Officer: CPT Deloin Causey)

Fort Smith Police Department

- 1 Pepperfogger w/chemical
- 27 Riot shields
- 20 Riot control batons
- 15 CS gas grenades
- 10 Short range crowd control CS 1½ cartridges
- 25 Gas masks
- Riot helmet for each officer
- Video equipment (Contact Officer: SGT. Roy Freeman)

Arkansas National Guard

- Full Riot Control equipment for each man
 - 1 Portable generator with flood and search lights (to be moved from Little Rock to Fort Smith)
 - 100 Gas masks to be used by other agencies if needed
 - Additional riot control equipment as needed (Contact Officer: COL Bill Cook)
-

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 6

EMERGENCY SERVICES RESOURCES

FORT SMITH FIRE DEPARTMENT:

Chief Luther Bevel

OFFICE: 782-9131

HOME: 452-7764

Ass't Chief Carl Griggs

OFFICE: 782-9131

HOME: 782-4145

EMS AMBULANCE SERVICE:

Director Jack Hackney

OFFICE: 783-1078

HOME: 452-5049

RURAL FIRE ASSOCIATION:

Director Jerry Maxey

OFFICE: 783-3932

HOME: 452-2135

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX L TAB 7

"ARKANSAS CIVIL EMERGENCY SECURITY OPERATION TASK FORCE" (CESO)

SEBASTIAN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT: (SCSD)

Sheriff Bill J. Cauthron	OFFICE:	783-1051
	HOME:	452-0215
Chief Deputy Guy Wilkerson	OFFICE:	783-1051
	HOME:	452-5030
Communication Center		783-1051

ARKANSAS STATE POLICE: (ASP)

CPT Deloin Causey	OFFICE:	783-5195
	HOME:	474-6431
LT Wilson Wallis	OFFICE:	783-5195
	HOME:	452-2338
Communication Center		783-5195

FORT SMITH POLICE DEPARTMENT: (FSPD)

Chief Henry Oliver	OFFICE:	783-0114
	HOME:	452-2705
Ass't Chief Keith Daniels	OFFICE:	785-2241
	HOME:	783-5522
Communication Center		785-2241

ARKANSAS NATIONAL GUARD: (ANG)

COL Billy Cook--Little Rock	OFFICE:	758-4053 Ext. 223
	HOME:	835-8648

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX M

FEDERAL CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

I. PURPOSE

- A. To fulfill the request of the President that the Department of Justice serve as the coordinator of the civil law enforcement agencies involved at the various Cuban detainee centers, it will be necessary to establish and maintain a direct reporting process to ensure that accurate and timely information is available to the Department of Justice from the consolidated Cuban Refugee Center at Fort. Chaffee.
- B. Nothing in the establishment of this special reporting system is intended to supersede or modify the existing internal reporting procedures or requirements of any participating agency.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- A. Information Required. To implement this reporting system the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator at Fort Chaffee will be responsible for ensuring reporting to the Department of Justice Emergency Programs Center (202-633-2364) of the following information:
 - 1. Number and deployment of all civilian law enforcement resources on site.
 - 2. Law enforcement incidents, including violations, action taken, and disposition.
-

3. Number and status of Cuban detainees, including those segregated in stockades and other special areas on site.
 4. Conditions or circumstances actually or potentially causing law enforcement problems.
 5. Any changes in either the configuration of the security forces or the detention facility.
 6. An adverse community reaction to the Cuban detainees that might reasonably be expected to present a security risk.
- B. Routine Reports. Routine daily reports will be made in accordance with a schedule to be established by the Emergency Programs Center.
- C. Immediate Reports. Immediate reports will be made in the event of major civil disorder, serious injury or death, or similar emergency situations.
- D. Responsibilities. For the purpose of implementing this reporting procedure, all federal civilian law enforcement agencies represented on site at Fort Chaffee will provide information as required and requested by the Senior Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator.

The U.S. Park Police will be responsible for the timely submission of a consolidated report to the Department of Justice.

- E. Duration. This reporting system will be implemented immediately and will continue until terminated by the Department of Justice.

/S/ Charles B. Renfrew
Charles B. Renfrew
Deputy Attorney General

September 5, 1980
Date

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX M TAB 1

DAILY REPORT FORMAT

DATE _____

A. TOTAL POPULATION

- 1. Present Cuban Refugee Population _____
- 2. Increase or decrease during reporting period _____

B. AREA TOTALS

- 1. General Population _____
- 2. Family _____
- 3. Level II (Detention) _____
 - Youth _____
 - Adult _____
- 4. Protective Custody _____
- 5. Youth (Juvenile) _____
- 6. Stockade _____
 - a. Awaiting trf Prison _____
 - b. Sentenced _____
 - c. Awaiting Trial _____
 - d. Other _____
- 7. Local Jails _____
 - a. Hold Fed. Custody _____
 - b. Local Charges _____
 - c. Other _____

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT/SECURITY COMPLEMENT

	FEDERAL AGENCY PERSONNEL		CONTRACT GUARDS
1. USPP	_____		
2. FPS	_____		
3. USMS	_____	
4. Border Patrol	_____		_____
5. INS Detention	_____		
6. BOP	_____	_____

D. INCIDENTS

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LE RESPONSE</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>

E. ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

F. COMMUNITY REACTION

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX M TAB 2

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

SCOPE/TIME FRAME

The morning report will cover data as of the preceding midnight, incidents will cover previous 24-hour period.

REPORTING SCHEDULE

EPC will call the USPP Command Post at Fort Chaffee for the daily report between 8:00 and 9:00 AM Monday through Friday. The report will be taken over the telephone following the format indicated in Tab 1. Emergency incident reports will be submitted immediately by USPP to EPC 24 hours a day, seven days a week, by calling 202-633-2364.

STANDARD DEFINITIONS

Wherever possible in incident reporting the standard Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) definitions should be employed. Where appropriate the offense should be described as "attempted." In addition, the following special definitions will apply:

Unauthorized Departure. The unauthorized departure of a Cuban detainee from the secured area. (i.e., successful passage beyond the marked perimeter around the detained enclave or the installation.) Report should indicate whether the detainee was found in an unauthorized area of the military installation or completely off of the military reservation.

Refusal to Process. Refusal to participate in required processing activities.

Part I Offenses: (Uniform Crime Reports)

Criminal Homicide. a. Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, and justifiable homicides are excluded. Justifiable homicides are limited to: (1) the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty; and (2) the killing of a felon by a private citizen. b. Manslaughter by negligence: the killing of another person through gross negligence. Excludes traffic fatalities. While manslaughter by negligence is a Part I crime, it is not included in the Crime Index.

Forcible Rape. The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Included are rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape. Statutory offenses (no force used - victim under age of consent) are excluded.

Robbery. The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.

Aggravated Assault. An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded.

Burglary - Breaking or Entering. The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. Attempted forcible entry is included.

Larceny - Theft (except motor vehicle theft). The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another. Examples are thefts of bicycles, automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or any stealing of property or article which is not taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included. Embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, worthless checks, etc., are excluded.

Motor Vehicle Theft. The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle is self-propelled and runs on the surface and not on rails. Specifically excluded from this category are motorboats, construction equipment, airplanes, and farming equipment.

The Part II offenses are:

Other Assaults (simple). Assaults or attempted assaults where no weapon was used or which did not result in serious or aggravated injury to the victim.

Arson.¹ Any willful or malicious burning or attempts to burn, with or without intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle or aircraft, personal property of another, etc.

Forgery and Counterfeiting. Making, altering, uttering, or possessing, with intent to defraud, anything false which is made to appear true. Attempts are included.

Fraud. Fraudulent conversion and obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Included are larceny by bailee and bad checks except forgeries and counterfeiting.

Embezzlement. Misappropriation or misapplication of money or property entrusted to one's care, custody, or control.

Stolen property; buying, receiving, possessing. Buying, receiving, and possessing stolen property, including attempts.

Vandalism. Willful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of any public or private property, real or personal, without consent of the owner or person having custody or control.

Weapons; carrying, possessing, etc. All violations of regulations or statutes controlling the carrying, using, possessing, furnishing, and manufacturing of deadly weapons or silencers. Included are attempts.

Prostitution and commercialized vice. Sex offenses of a commercialized nature, such as prostitution, keeping a bawdy house, procuring, or transporting women for immoral purposes. Attempts are included.

Sex offenses (except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice). Statutory rape and offenses against chastity, common decency, morals, and the like. Attempts are included.

Drug abuse violations. State and local offenses relating to narcotic drugs, such as unlawful possession, sale, use, growing, and manufacturing of narcotic drugs.

Gambling. Promoting, permitting, or engaging in illegal gambling.

Offenses against the family and children. Nonsupport, neglect, desertion, or abuse of family and children.

Driving under the influence. Driving or operating any vehicle or common carrier while drunk or under the influence of liquor or narcotics.

Liquor laws. State or local liquor law violations, except "drunkenness" and "driving under the influence." Federal violations are excluded.

Drunkness. Drunkness or intoxication. Excluded is "driving under the influence."

Disorderly conduct. Breach of the peace.

Vagrancy. Vagabondage, begging, loitering, etc.

All other offenses. All violations of state or local laws, and traffic offenses.

Suspicion. No specific offense; suspect released without formal charges being placed.

Curfew and loitering laws. Offenses relating to violation of local curfew or loitering ordinances where such laws exist.

Runaway. Limited to juveniles taken into protective custody under provisions of local statutes.

¹ In October, 1978, arson was designated as a Part I crime. However, data collection did not commence until 1979.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX N

FEDERAL CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL

I. PURPOSE. To establish a clear chain of command and coordination for routine and emergency operations of the various federal civilian law enforcement agencies involved in security and police activities at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

II. POLICY.

- A. The U.S. Department of Justice is responsible for the overall coordination of law enforcement and security measures at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and serves as the final authority on law enforcement and security matters within the jurisdiction of civilian federal law enforcement agencies assigned to Fort Chaffee.
 - B. The Department of Justice will designate a Senior Federal Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator at Fort Chaffee who shall have overall responsibility for civilian law enforcement and security operations in accordance with the Joint Security Plan and/or such other guidance as shall be provided by the Department of Justice.
 - C. Each civilian law enforcement agency represented at Fort Chaffee shall be responsible, through its own chain of command, for the routine performance of its designated mission.
-

- D. Each civilian law enforcement agency represented at Fort Chaffee will respond to the direction of the Senior Federal Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator in the event of any emergency situation. When military assistance is requested and received control will shift to the military commander.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

- A. Until otherwise notified, by the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Park Police commander on site is designated as the Senior Federal Civilian Law Enforcement Coordinator (SFCLEC) at Fort Chaffee. The SFCLEC serves in a dual role, first as the SFCLEC reporting and responsible to the U.S. Department of Justice and secondly as the commander of the U.S. Park Police resources at Fort Chaffee.
- B. On a day-to-day basis the SFCLEC will review and coordinate the security and law enforcement activities of all federal civilian agencies at Fort Chaffee and make recommendations to the various commanders regarding security and law enforcement procedures and practices consistent with the Joint Security Plan. Any matters unresolved through this coordinating process will be referred to the Department of Justice.
- C. In any law enforcement or security emergency situation arising at Fort Chaffee the SFCLEC will, for the period of the emergency, direct and control federal civilian law enforcement resources on site and will be the sole official authorized to request military support in any situation beyond the control capabilities of federal civilian resources.
- D. The SFCLEC is responsible for the collecting and reporting of situation data to the Department of Justice as outlined in Appendix M of this Plan.
- E. The SFCLEC will establish and operate those systems necessary to ensure that he or his designated representative can be immediately contacted at any time, 24 hours a day.

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX 0

GUIDANCE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

1. The area outside of Fort Chaffee is under the jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas.
 2. In the event that Federal Civil Authorities or Military Authorities at Fort Chaffee learn of an escape of a refugee or of refugees, and the refugee(s) leaves the boundaries of the Fort, the appropriate local and state law enforcement authority will be notified.
 3. State and local law enforcement officials have, in accordance with the laws of the State of Arkansas, jurisdiction to detain any person who has violated state or local laws.
 4. If a Cuban refugee is found outside Fort Chaffee without authorization, the Border Patrol should be notified immediately to take custody of the individual. The Border Patrol is the only agency authorized by law to arrest illegal aliens.
 5. The Border Patrol force at Fort Chaffee can be contacted 24-hours a day by calling 484-2059.
-

JOINT SECURITY PLAN

APPENDIX P

AIR TRANSPORT SECURITY PLAN (FAA)

I. SITUATION

A high level strategy meeting was held at FEMA Headquarters on August 6, in which the FAA and other Government agencies were directed to participate in the airlift consolidation of Cuban refugees from Eglin AFB, Indiantown Gap Military Reservation and Ft. McCoy to Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas. This effort is to begin in early September and be completed by early October 1980.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

- FEMA will reimburse the FAA for all cost involved in this operation and previous operations in Key West, Florida.
 - Airlift operations will be limited to removal of refugees from one center at a time beginning with Eglin.
 - Total refugees to be transported will number between 7,500 and 10,000.
 - INS (male and female) personnel will be available to conduct preboard security screening of refugees.
 - Cuban refugees have been in this country long enough to acquire baggage that will require storage in cargo compartment of aircraft.
 - Cuban refugees have been in loosely controlled environments whereby they could have obtained weapons.
 - Walk-through and X-ray security equipment will be available at enplanement sites with non-FAA operators for security screening of passengers and their carry-on and checked baggage. FAA will assist in procuring needed screening equipment.
-

- That only DC-8 or B-727 aircraft will be used to move Cubans to Fort Smith, Arkansas.
- That no more than four flights per day will be scheduled, and that these flights will return to that enplanement area for the next day's operation, or military aircraft will be provided to shuttle Federal Air Marshals back to the enplanement area.
- That no more than 12 Federal Air Marshals and a staff of three (3) FAA coordinators will be committed to support this effort at the enplanement areas.
- That billets, office space and ground transportation will be provided to Federal Air Marshals at the enplanement areas. FAA will assist in procurement of same.
- That two telephones with direct dial capability and a minimum of two transceiver radios, and a base station will be provided the FAM coordination staff at the enplanement areas.
- That close and continuing coordination with the air carrier flight operations of the contracting carrier will be maintained by the FAA staff at the enplanement area.
- That access to a local Imprest Fund will be provided for supplemental travel advances for staff and FAM's as required. FAA will assist in such arrangements.

III. PURPOSE

The purpose of this plan is to delineate the Federal Aviation Administration's security role in support of the transfer of Cuban refugees from Ft. McCoy; Indiantown Gap and Eglin AFB, to a consolidation facility at Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas.

IV. STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS

- a. Assure preboard security screening with walk-through and hand wand devices is accomplished on all Cuban refugees being transported via commercial aircraft.

- b. Assure X-ray examination of all Cuban carry-on and checked baggage.
- c. Confiscate any weapons detected, and turn over to FBI any individuals found in possession of firearms or other dangerous weapons.
- d. Assign sufficient number of Federal Air Marshals to flights to assure control of Cubans and protection of crew and aircraft.
- e. Establish liaison with local law enforcement, the FBI, INS and DOD elements to assure assistance is available if needed.
- f. Establish direct contact with air carrier operations to assure adequate acquisition of data essential to scheduling of Federal Air Marshals on flights.
- g. Serve as law enforcement presence required by FAR for screening point.

V. CONCEPT OF CARRYING OUT REQUIREMENTS

- a. FAA staff personnel familiar with scheduling and required for liaison will be assigned from the FAA regions to the military bases from which the Cubans are to be moved. These individuals will arrive on station a minimum of two days in advance of the movement day in order to assure all security equipment is in place and functioning properly, appropriate liaison is established, flight schedules for Federal Air Marshals are prepared, and personnel are alerted and briefed.
- b. Federal Air Marshal personnel will be assigned from the FAA Washington Headquarters and the regions to the military bases from which the Cubans are being transferred. The number assigned will be governed by the number of flights per day and recovery plans. The Federal Air Marshals are directly responsible for the following:
 - (1) Serving as law enforcement presence at screening point.
 - (2) Observing the preboard security screening of personnel and carry-on items.

- (3) Inflight security from enplanement areas to consolidation center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
- (4) Confiscation of any weapons detected in preboard security screening.

VI. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. FAA staff in Washington Headquarters will work in close coordination with the Department of Army element handling air movements of refugees, and assure that scheduling information is provided to staff at enplanement locations.
- b. FAA staff at enplanement areas will maintain close contact with flight operations of the contracting air carrier to assure timely scheduling of FAM's is accomplished.
- c. Close coordination with local law enforcement and the FBI will be maintained by staff and FAM's at enplanement sites to accommodate arrest and detention of Cubans caught with firearms or weapons in the preboard security screening.
- d. Problems encountered with coordination will be referred to the Air Operations Security Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security for resolution.

VII. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

- a. Military provided shuttle flights for FAM's return to enplanement locations if contracting air carriers do not have round trip flights.
- b. Billeting for staff and FAM's at enplanement locations.
- c. Two vehicles for staff use at enplanement locations.
- d. Office space, with desk or table and typewriter, for staff use at enplanement locations.
- e. Walk-through and hand wand equipments at enplanement locations for security preboard screening of Cubans, and personnel to operate.

- f. X-ray equipment and operators for security screening of carry-on and baggage to be stored as cargo aboard aircraft will be provided for enplanement locations.
- g. Access to a local Imprest Fund for payment of supplemental travel advances to staff and FAM's.

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Two outside direct dial phones for exclusive use of FAA staff at enplanement locations.
- b. Two transceiver radios with recharge equipment, and a base station for FAA use at enplanement locations.

IX. PERSONNEL/ORGANIZATION

- a. Public relations matters will be handled by the FAA Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D. C.
- b. Three staff personnel and 12 FAM's will be assigned temporary duty at enplanement locations.
- c. Mission direction will be retained at Washington Headquarters.
- d. Augmentation with FAA Police will be accomplished on an as needed basis.
- e. FAM's completing the September 21-26 mandatory annual training at the FBI Academy, Quantico, will be utilized for relief or augmentation of those initially committed in support of this operation.

X. REPORTS

- a. FAA staff personnel will accomplish the following reports as required:
 - (1) Continuous chronological journal of activities.
 - (2) Flight schedules to show air carrier, flight number, date/time, FAM's covering, number of refugees transported.

- (3) Incident journal.
- (4) Time and attendance data to include time out and time of return of FAM's by date and duty hours of staff personnel.
- (5) Record of use of GTR's to include the following: issuer's name, who is covered by it, date, GTR number, cost of tickets, region/Headquarter to which GTR is charged, flight number, enplanement location and destination.
- (6) Imprest Fund data as required.

(signed)
RICHARD F. LALLY
Director of Civil
Aviation Security

August 12, 1980
Date

ANNEX C (MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

*File Security
in
File*

ATZR-B-TCS

15 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Troop Strength for Physical Security

1. On 4 Sep 80 the Secretary of the Army was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to maintain the physical security troop strength at Fort Chaffee at the amount present at that date. The strength is to remain at that level until all refugees are relocated at Fort Chaffee, at which time any strength reductions would be determined by DA after consultation with DOJ. On 4 Sep 80, DA reported physical security troop strength at 963 (total of TF III and active and RC MP).
2. On 14 Sep 80, DOJ prepared a response to questions/comments from Governor Clinton (D, Ark) which was intended to clarify all issues so as to gain the Governor's approval of the Physical Security Plan, thereby initiating the relocation from other resettlement centers to Fort Chaffee. As part of the DOJ response, troop strength was specified to be "approximately 1,000." After confirming figures with this Task Force, DA requested that the troop strength figure be changed to "approximately 950." DOJ refused to accept the change. The DOJ rationale for keeping the strength level at "approximately 1,000" is that they believe that is the figure the Governor wants to see.
3. Nine hundred fifty is a more accurate number and is the level of troop strength which the Task Force will maintain until DA and DOJ decide to reduce strength.

Michael A. Rowe
MICHAEL A. ROWE
LTC, FA
Chief of Staff

ANNEX D (TASK FORCE SECURITY PLAN) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-TEOC

20 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Task Force Security Plan

1. Reference: Task Force Security Map attached.
2. Priorities for protection are:

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>
a. TF Ft Chaffee Headquarters (bldg 1370)	PMO
b. Commo Center/(WWMCCS) (bldg 1375)	Task Force III
c. Dial Commo Center (bldg 1321)	Task Force III
d. MP Station (bldg 1390)	PMO
e. Weapon Storage Area (bldg 460)	Task Force III
f. Officer/NCO Clubs (bldg 1683/1178)	Task Force III
g. DIS/CID (bldg 1180)	Task Force III

3. Security Measures:

a. Security/law enforcement within the enclave is provided by US Park Police, Federal Protective Service, INS, and Border Patrol. US Park Police is lead law enforcement agency for security/law enforcement within the enclave.

b. Gates to enclave are manned and controlled by Federal Protective Service.

c. Enclave perimeter security is provided by Military Police. Positions are as indicated on the attached map. Each position is normally manned by one MP with radio communication to MP desk.

d. Gates to enclave will be closed by Federal Protective Service personnel on order of senior security force commander (senior US Park Police officer or CG Task Force if military forces have been committed).

e. Mobile barriers (external perimeter) will be closed on order of the EOC as follows:

<u>BARRIER</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>TIME OF CLOSURE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
20	PMO	On call	4th Ave at 10th St
21	PMO	Always closed	3rd Ave at 10th St
22	PMO	On call	2d Ave at 10th St
54	PMO	On call	31st St at 4th Ave
55	PMO	Always closed	Ark Blvd west of 4th Ave
56	PMO	On call	26th St west of 4th Ave
57	PMO	On call	Roberts Blvd west of 6th Ave
58	PMO	On call	Ft Smith west of 5th Ave
59	PMO	On call	Ft Chaffee Blvd w. NCO Club
60	PMO	Always closed	Ft Chaffee Blvd west of Main Gate
61	PMO	On call	4th Ave at Ft Chaffee Blvd
76	PMO	On call	31st St at 2d Ave
77	PMO	Always closed	Roberts Blvd at 2d Ave
78	PMO	On call	Ft Smith at 2d Ave
79	PMO	On call	2d Ave at Ft Chaffee
82	PMO	Always closed	23rd St at 2d Ave
83	PMO	On call	Ent. to Fire Sta Park. lot
84	PMO	Always closed	6th St at 2d Ave

f. Military mobile reaction forces are provided as follows:

(1) PMO-25 man reaction force mounted in six 1/4 ton vehicles.

(2) TF III

a. Two immediate reaction force batteries of 58 men each. Reaction force 1 is located in Bldg 2210 (Red Barn) and reaction force 2 is located in Bldg 1495 (White Barn).

b. One reaction force battery of 58 men on 30-min standby in the 800 area.

(3) EOC

a. EOC reaction vehicle (1/4 ton) with sound equipment and TV camera.

b. Whiplash-OH-58 helicopter with night sun searchlight on standby at Ft Chaffee airfield.

4. Coordination Instructions:

a. Barriers will be closed on order of EOC. EOC will designate selected barriers to remain open to allow deployment of reaction forces.

b. Selected barriers will be closed on order of EOC to assist in capture of refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.


c. Selected elements of TF III will be deployed on order of EOC to assist in apprehension of refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.

5. Command and Signal:

a. Command: Deputy Commander is responsible for security. PMO is responsible for respective mobile barriers. The senior PMO representative on the scene will coordinate the search for refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.

b. Signal:

- (1) TF Resettlement Operation CMD Net: F1
- (2) TF III CMD Net: FREQ: 38.40
- (3) MP Perimeter: Motorola PT 400 Series
- (4) Reaction Force/Roving Patrol: FREQ: 38.40/ALT 45.30
- (5) MP Net: FREQ: 48.90



THOMAS M. WALKER
LTC, TC
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

CG
DCO
C/S
TASK FORCE (5)
PO (5)
PSYOPS
DFAE


○ MOBILE BARRIER

● GATE

— VEHICLE ENTRY/EXIT
THROUGH 38 & 42

· · · PERSONNEL GATES 39 & 41

(23 SEP 80)



ANNEX E (PERIMETER GUARD INSTRUCTIONS) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, TASK FORCE III
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

ATZR-B-TIII

28 August 1980

SUBJECT: Perimeter Guard Mission Instructions


SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. COMPOSITION: One battery-size element consisting of a minimum of:

- 1 - Unit Commander
- 2 - Platoon Leaders
- 2 - Platoon Sergeants
- 36 - Stationary Guards
- 14 - Motorized Guards/NCO's
- 3 - RTO/Driver

(58-Man Battery)

Chain of command will be as follows when on shift:



28 August 1980

SUBJECT: Perimeter Guard Mission Instructions

i. Supervisors perform duties as required. All problems and requests for assistance will be made to operations base or shift leader.


j. Guard force relieved by next shift.

k. Commanders outbrief operations as needed.

5. PERIMETER "PUSH SYSTEM":

a. This system was instituted to move guards frequently to reduce boredom, reduce tendency to fraternize and to more effectively cover areas between the guard shacks.

b. A designated man will move from the first guard post of a group of three to relieve a guard at the second post. The newly relieved guard will then move to the third guardpost and repeat the action. This individual will return to the first guardpost and repeat the sequence with the unrelieved guards. (See diagram below). This procedure will be imitated upon going on shift on the perimeter. Supervisors must continually monitor the process to insure that it continues uninterrupted.



6. PROBLEMS: Spot reports will be made on serious incidents (attempted escapes, harassment of guards, etc). Requests for assistance will be made through operations (medical, interpreters, etc).

7. COMMUNICATION: Battery Commanders will maintain continuous radio contact with base operations. The two platoon leaders in each battery will maintain contact with their Battery Commander. Motorized patrol 1/4 tons will report to their battery commander in the event of an emergency. Task Force CEOI is in effect.

8. TROOP SUPPORT: Battery Commander will ensure water and other available resources from S4 are on line and distributed to troops to enhance morale and improve duty conditions. Ice, juice, fruit, coffee, etc., is drawn from building 859.

9. ALERTS: Personnel on the perimeter will take the following action when a general alert is called.

a. Motorized Patrol will continue as normal with intensified observation of perimeter fence area.

ATZR-B-TIII

28 August 1980

SUBJECT: Perimeter Guard Mission Instructions

b. Stationary guards will assume a parade rest position with baton held parallel to the ground in front in both hands. Face shields will be in the "down" position.

c. Barrier gates to be closed will be provided by Task Force Headquarters. Gates will be closed as directed and "tied" with rope. As gates are closed, TF Operations will be notified.


d. Keys for locked perimeter security fence gates will be maintained in the closest guardpost to that gate. These gates remain locked at all times unless specific orders are received from TF Operations to open them.

e. Commanders at all echelons will actively supervise subordinates. Key to mission accomplishment is the appearance of a designated and ready guard force. During alerts, normal assistance to Refugee Personnel will be kept to an absolute minimum. Exception should be based on emergency assistance.

10. Use of radios will be kept to a minimum so that priority traffic can be processed.

11. This supersedes letter, this headquarters, file and subject SAB dated 8 August 1980.

1 Incl
Perimeter Guard Inst.


MAX R. BARRON
LTC, FA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

CO	1
XO	1
Perimeter (Cdr)	1
CSM	1
S1	1
S3	20
S4	3
BC's	1
Chaplains	1

PERIMETER GUARD INSTRUCTIONS

1. Your post will be maintained on the outside of the fence surrounding the enclave perimeter.
2. Guard uniform includes fatigue boots, pistol belt, canteen, baton, helmet with camouflage cover and helmet visor and protective mask.
3. Personal radios will not be allowed on the perimeter.
4. No reading material is authorized.
5. Guards will face the enclave when on stationary post.
6. Motorized patrols will confine their activities to assigned sectors. Speed will not exceed 10 MPH except in emergencies.
7. Entrance and exit from the enclave will be controlled by Military Police. Task Force III personnel will not be involved in this process.
8. Answer questions and assist in solving Refugees' problems conscientiously; however, no casual conversations at the fence will be tolerated.
9. Buying, selling, trading or giving of personal items, military clothing, equipment or cigarettes to refugees is prohibited.
10. Drinking of alcoholic beverages while on duty or becoming intoxicated and unable to perform duty is prohibited.
11. Officers walking on the perimeter and vehicles bearing appropriate rank or position plates will be afforded normal military courtesy, e.g., standing at attention and saluting.
12. The highest standards of military courtesy, bearing and appearance will be maintained at all times.
13. Problems encountered while on duty will be brought up to the chain of command. Unit commanders, 1SG's and NCO's will notify operations of all problems. Spot reports will be made on serious incidents.

ANNEX F (LEADERS PASS) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is TAGO.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

ATZR-B-TPMO-PS


Leaders Pass

TO SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM Provost Marshal Office DATE 16 Aug 80
Physical Security Section
Ft Chaffee, AR 72905

CMT 1

1. Effective 16 Aug 80 the current leaders or curfew pass (see Incl 1) will no longer be valid.
2. It will be replaced at that time by a new leaders pass (see Incl 2).
3. The new leaders pass will be issued by the State Department ID Section, Bldg 1571.
4. All Cuban block leaders will receive one. Approximately 30 have been issued.
5. The leaders pass allows the bearer post curfew movement within the enclave. It does not allow exit from the enclave or any other privileges.
6. Questions of leader pass validity should be referred to the State Department ID Section, the MP Desk, or the PM Physical Security Section.



KEVIN M. BURR
1LT, MPC
Physical Security Officer


2 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

PM Opns - 5
MP Desk - 5
USPP - 5
MPI - 1
CID - 1
State Dept - 1
File - 1

IV-11-F-2

WHITE IN COLOR




REFUGEE INTERIOR PASS

MIGUEL PEREZ ALCANTARA
A24456637

IS A REFUGEE COMMUNITY
LEADER AND IS AUTHORIZED
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN
THE LIMITS OF THE REFUGEE
COMMUNITY AFTER CURFEW.

Lucious E. Delk
LUCIOUS E. DELK
MAJ, IN
Provost Marshall

OLD LEADER PASS



CHERRY IN
color

FRONT

BEARER IS A REFUGEE COMMUNITY LEADER AND IS AUTHORIZED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY AFTER CURFEW. PASS DOES NOT ALLOW EXIT FROM THE ENCLAVE AREA.

PROPIEDAD DEL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
(NO TRANSFERIBLE)

- MAL USO CASTIGADO BAJO TITULO 18 USC, SECCION 499.
- PASE SERA EXHIBIDO EN ROPA EXTERIOR DESPUES DE HORA DESIGNADA PARA ESTAR EN BARRACA.
- DEVUELVA PASE DURANTE PROCESO DE SALIDA.
- SECCION DE IDENTIFICAR CUBANOS SERA NOTIFICADA SI PASE ES ROBADO O PERDIDO.
- PASE NO PERMITE SALIDA DE AREA RESTRINGIDA.

BACK

NEW LEADER PASS

UNLIMITED ACCESS

CONTROL NUMBER

100073



PROPERTY OF THE
US GOVERNMENT
NOT TRANSFERABLE

Antonio Dalama Matienzo
NAME

X Antonio Dalama Matienzo
SIGNATURE

	<p>NAME: Antonio Dalama Matienzo TITLE: AREA LEADER A # <u>22679603</u></p>
	<p>APPROVED: <i>[Signature]</i> DON E. KARR, COL, SI Deputy Commander</p>
<p>SPECIAL PASS-----If verification is needed, call DCO at; OFFICE: 2545 or QTRS: 2637</p>	

NEW CAMP LEADER

69

UNLIMITED ACCESS

CONTROL NUMBER

100072



PROPERTY OF THE
US GOVERNMENT
NOT TRANSFERABLE

Eduardo Moreno Rodriguez
NAME

Eduardo Moreno Rodriguez
SIGNATURE



NAME: Eduardo Moreno Rdgupz
TITLE: AREA LEADER
A # 24455384

APPROVED:

Don E. Karr
DON E. KARR, COL, SIC
Deputy Commander

SPECIAL PASS----If verification is needed,
call DCO at; OFFICE: 2545 or QTRS: 2637

NEW

ASST CAMP LEADER

ANNEX G (REFUGEE PASS SYSTEM) to PART II to VOLUME IV to After Action Report -
Task Force Resettlement Operation - Fort Chaffee

DISSEMINATION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

ATZR-B-TIII0-PS

New Refugee Pass System

TO All Concerned

FROM Provost Marshal Office DATE 26 Aug 80 CMT 1

Physical Security Section 1LT Burr/jj/3104
Ft Chaffee, AR 72905

1. On 1 Sept 80 the new pass system will go into effect.
2. The passes described in Inclosure 1 will be the only means of gaining entry to the refugee compound.
3. Personnel not requiring passes to enter the compound are:
 - a. Law enforcement personnel.
 - b. Fire department personnel.
 - c. Medical emergency personnel on bona fide missions.
 - d. Commissioned Military Officers in uniform.
4. Vehicles not requiring passes are:
 - a. All U.S. Government owned, leased, or rented vehicles.
 - b. All marked commercial vehicles.
 - c. All military vehicles.
5. All occupants of vehicles described in paragraph 4 must have passes as described in Inclosure 1.

1 Incl
as




KEVIN M. BURR
1LT, NPC
Physical Security Officer

PASSES
(NON-REFUGEE) (PERSONNEL)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>ENTITLEMENTS</u>
UNLIMITED ACCESS	GREEN IN COLOR WITH PHOTOGRAPH AND SEAL. THE PHOTO BACKGROUND IS A DISTINCTIVE RED, WHITE, AND BLUE PATTERN.	PERMITS UNLIMITED MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE REFUGEE COMPOUND.
RESTRICTED ENTRY	YELLOW IN COLOR WITH PHOTOGRAPH AND SEAL. THE PHOTO BACKGROUND IS A BLUE AND WHITE DIAGONAL STRIPED PATTERN.	PERMITS ENTRY ONLY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES STATED ON THE FRONT OF THE PASS.
YOUTH AREA	ORANGE IN COLOR WITH PHOTOGRAPH AND SEAL. THE PHOTO BACKGROUND IS A BLUE AND WHITE DIAGONAL STRIPED PATTERN.	PERMITS ENTRANCE TO THE YOUTH/PROTECTION AREA AND LIMITED ACCESS TO THE MAIN ENCLAVE FOR YOUTH/PROTECTED AREA ACTIVITIES ONLY.
POV PASS	YELLOW IN COLOR, WITH THE WORDS POV PASS ON IT. IT SHOULD BE DISPLAYED ON THE DRIVERS SIDE DASHBOARD.	PERMITS PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ACCESS TO THE REFUGEE COMPOUND.
MEDIA PASS	WHITE IN COLOR WITH DATE AND TIMES VALID ON THE FRONT.	PERMITS MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA ENTRANCE TO THE COMPOUND ONLY WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE ESCORTS.
EMERGENCY ACCESS (PERSONNEL)	ORANGE WALLET SIZE PASS WITH PHOTO. THE PHOTO BACKGROUND IS A BLUE AND WHITE DIAGONAL STRIPED PATTERN.	PASS IS CARRIED BY INDIVIDUALS WHO'S ENTRANCE TO FT CHAFFEE OR THE ENCLAVE MUST NOT BE HINDERED DURING EMERGENCIES. THESE PASSES ARE ONLY TO BE DISPLAYED OR USED DURING EMERGENCIES.
EMERGENCY ACCESS (VEHICLE)	ORANGE IN COLOR WITH THE WORDS EMERGENCY ACCESS PRINTED ON IT.	PASS IS ISSUED TO INDIVIDUALS WHO'S ENTRANCE TO FT CHAFFEE MUST NOT BE HINDERED DURING EMERGENCIES. PASS IS ONLY TO BE DISPLAYED OR USED DURING EMERGENCIES.

ENCLAVE PASSES


PERSONNEL (NON REFUGEE)



PERSONNEL (REFUGEE)




VEHICLE PASSES




CUBAN IDENTIFICATION

PASS SYSTEM




WHITE

STOCKADE
PASS




BROWN

LEVEL II
AREA




YELLOW

PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY




PINK

YOUTH
AREA




BLUE

FAMILY
AREA



GREEN

GENERAL
POPULATION



VOLUME V
SUSTAINMENT PHASE (9 Oct - 20 Jan 82)

PART I (SUSTAINMENT PHASE SUMMARY) to VOLUME V to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a narrative summary of the operations of Task Force Resettlement Operation from 9 October 1980 to 20 January 1982.
2. With the arrival and inprocessing of the last Cuban refugee, the State Department and the other civilian agencies had complete control of the enclave and the refugees therein. Due to this reduced military commitment, and the military finally functioning as strictly a caretaker of post facilities, it was determined that a general officer was no longer required, and on 23 October, Colonel Don E. Karr assumed command of the Task Force from Brigadier General Drummond. Furthermore, other units and personnel from Fort Sill prepared for transfer of their duties to other FORSCOM units. On 29 October, the Public Affairs Office officially closed down, and this function was totally absolved by the State Department.

On 1 November, responsibility for the Task Force passed from USAFACFS to FORSCOM. Units from Fort Sill were slowly returned to home station until 14 November, when Task Force III departed Fort Chaffee and the bulk of 3/11th Infantry assumed the security duties. This security arrangement (two MP companies and one infantry battalion) would last only until December. Due to the decreasing refugee population, it was decided to reduce the military requirements to two MP companies and one rifle company at Fort Chaffee, with two rifle companies on stand-by at home station. On 17 March, the Garden Plot battalion requirement was altered to leave all three rifle companies on stand-by at home station. By the end of the phase, the MP strength would also be reduced, leaving one MP company responsible for security at Fort Chaffee.

3. The Cuban/Haitian Task Force went through several changes of its own. The Federal Protective Service replaced the US Park Service as the lead law enforcement agency within the refugee enclave in December 1980, and control of the resettlement operation passed from the Federal Emergency Management Agency to Health and Human Services on 1 January 1981. Additionally, it became a normal tenant unit on 1 February, with support being provided by Fort Chaffee directly instead of through the military task force.
4. There were several refugee disturbances during the phase, with the most major incident occurring on 18 and 19 April 1981 (Annex A).

Annex A (APRIL 1981 RIOT) to PART I TO VOLUME V to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

Task Force After Action Report on Military Police

Participation in Disturbances at Ft Chaffee, AK on 18 and 19 April 1981

FORWARD

The following is a comprehensive report of US Army Task Force activity on the evening of 18 April and late morning of 19 April 1981 when Military Police were directly involved along with Federal Protective Service personnel in confrontations with Cuban refugees within the enclave located at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. This report is based on the personal involvement and resultant observation of the undersigned as well as personal interviews, written reports of personnel involved, and observation of all available video tapes and television footage of the events on both dates in question.

SECURITY

At all times in Fort Chaffee there are Military Police forces in full standby alert status. On 18 April there were two Military Police companies assigned, the 977th Military Police Company, Fort Riley, Kansas and the 502nd Military Police Company of Fort Hood, Texas. Alert forces included a Special Reaction Team of 25 men who were on five minute stand-by. They are required from call to appear anywhere in or around the enclave within five minutes. One Military Police platoon, which is titled "White Barn" is also on five minute stand-by. Two backup platoon forces, one titled "White Barn Stand-by" and the other "DLO (Discipline, Law and Order) Stand-by" are on fifteen minute stand-by. There is also one Military Police platoon continuously providing DLO to the 72,000 acres of Fort Chaffee. They also man the three active gates, Gates 3, 5 and 9, and provide static security around the enclave itself. There are nine static points manned: three on the east side of the enclave, one on the north side, one on the south side, and four on the west side.

The compound itself runs north and south for approximately one mile in length and is about four hundred yards in width running east and west. The western side of the enclave requires more security than the eastern side because the buildings are in some cases within approximately eight feet of the enclave fence. In contrast, the eastern side has at least sixty yards separating the buildings from the fence line.

The fence surrounding the enclave is a 10 foot high chain link with concertina top and bottom as well as double top guard. Anti-climb fencing is attached to the top four feet of the chain link. Enclave security is also enhanced by protective lighting utilizing both sodium vapor and mercury vapor systems.

There are numerous gates, both vehicular and pedestrian, as part of the perimeter enclave fence. All of these gates up to and including the 18 and 19 April time frame were on a master lock key system. One master key would open locks on all the gates except for Gates 42 and 30 which are FPS manned 24-hour gates; Gates 41 and 39 which are pedestrian gates controlled and

operated by FPS at morning, noon and evening hours to allow civilian workers inside the enclave to enter and depart and Gate 40, which is a vehicular gate but normally only used for pedestrian traffic on a 24-hour basis (this is the gate closest to the consolidated club). All other gates are normally closed at all times. The master key system permits Military Police access via keys maintained at the static security point closest to one of these gates. The Military Police did not control the keys or access to Gates 38 thru 42. The forementioned gates played a significant role in the events related below.

PRE-DISTURBANCE CONDITIONS

In general for several weeks a peaceful atmosphere prevailed in the compound preceding the violence that occurred on the evening of 18 April. There were fewer reports of criminal activity recorded by FPS, and police-refugee relations were considered to be at a high level. Both of these conditions may be attributed to the increased rate of sponsorship of Cubans leaving the enclave over the last month. The population had significantly decreased to approximately 2700 Cuban refugees at the time of the disturbance on 18 April. Although sponsorship had been discontinued 17 April, mainly because of extensive Easter weekend traffic, this is not considered to have been a factor in the violence that did occur.

In the week or so prior to the disturbances there were "Conga lines" which are refugees dancing through the streets of the compound to Cuban drum music. These groups generally were very peaceful although noisy. There were also several marches or processions during the week of 18 April which were related and considered to have a religious significance to the Easter season. Again these were also peaceful.

The weather itself on the 18th was not unusual for the season and not excessively warm. The National Weather Service reported the high temperature on the 18th as 82 degrees and on the 19th as 81 degrees. The days were cloudy and there was some intermittent rain both days. The temperatures on the days preceding the riot were approximately in the same temperature range.

There is one incident worthy of note preceding the outbreak of violence on the 18th. During the evening hours of 11 April the Federal Protective Service was informed that a burglary was in process at the Mess Hall, building 1549. Upon responding, FPS officers found three men had broken into the building. One was arrested, while the other two were chased. Both fled from the building and entered into a "Conga line" which was in progress in the area. The Federal Protective Service officers decided not to pursue the men into the "Conga line" fearing that they might provoke a confrontation with the entire group of refugees. Several rocks were thrown from this Conga line group at the police officers, however, they were not struck. The two Cuban refugees who fled into the "Conga line" were identified and arrested the following day. The unusual aspect; here were that the group of refugees was used as a shield for these men, and that the rocks were thrown at the officers. This is the first known case of this type violence since the disturbances that occurred around the latter part of May and culminated in the 1 June 1980 riots.

PRECIPITATING INCIDENT

On the evening of 18 April during operation of mess halls for the evening meal a power outage within the compound occurred. The mess hall supervisors prepared to close down their operation at 1730 hours, however, power was restored in the compound and the mess halls remained open. About the time the power was restored, Federal Protective Officer Ray Barnes was on routine patrol in the area of mess hall 1549. He had stopped by the mess hall to speak to the Federal Protective Officers assigned there to maintain order during meal time. At approximately 1740 hours Barnes was informed by a civilian mess hall worker that a fight was occurring just outside and that a knife-type weapon was involved. He proceeded to an open area which is located directly east of mess hall 1549 and found two refugees holding a third refugee, later identified as Jose Maria Padron. Padron was being restrained by these men because he was attempting to attack a fourth refugee with a home-made knife. As Barnes arrived, Padron broke free of the men who were holding him and lunged at the intended victim. It was about this time that Barnes drew his service revolver and pointed it at Padron. The intended victim apparently tripped or fell to the ground in an attempt to get away from Padron. The subject then raised both of his arms above his head, knife in hand, and took a standing position over his intended victim. Barnes and a Federal Protective Interpreter told Padron in English and in Spanish to drop the knife. The interpreter repeated this command three times. Padron hesitated for a moment, looked directly at Barnes, then turned again to his intended victim and began a downward thrust with the knife. Barnes then used his service revolver to fire one shot, striking Padron in the chest area. The subject fell to the ground and the intended victim ran from the scene. According to information provided by the Federal Protective Service communications desk, the shooting was reported at 1746 hours. Additional Federal Protective Service units were requested and dispatched, as was an ambulance. Many refugees then began to run into the area from inside the mess hall as well as nearby barracks buildings used for housing of the refugees.

DISTURBANCE/RIOT

Within a matter of minutes large crowds of refugees had formed at the scene of the shooting. The FPS officers attempted to apply first aid to the subject while other officers took up positions to protect FPO Barnes from the crowd of Cubans. Barnes was being pointed out by members of the crowd as the officer who had "killed" Padron and the confused crowd began to shout loudly and make gestures at Barnes. Several individuals within the crowd were seen at this time by FPS officers picking up rocks. Additional FPS units were requested, the ambulance arrived, and the crowd continued to grow.

The FPS officers began to escort Barnes from the area by forming a group around him. Several refugees attempted to push their way into this group to get at Barnes. Officers were able to get Barnes to the booking van and used this vehicle to transport him out of the area. About the same time the ambulance departed the area with the shooting victim. The refugees made no attempt to interfere with the ambulance but did strike the booking

van with several rocks causing damage to the glass and some body panels. The crowd then began to heavily stone both FPS officers and the FPS vehicles at the scene. The FPS officers attempted numerous times to push the crowd back, however they were severely outnumbered. Night sticks were used and several one-on-one scuffles broke out between the officers and refugees.

By around 1750 hours the crowd was completely out of control. Crowd size was estimated to have grown to between 300 and 350 persons. The Federal Protective Service Operations Officer on the scene ordered all officers to withdraw from the area as quickly as possible and to regroup near Gate 42. Three FPS patrol cars that were on the scene, were abandoned and the Operations Officer requested military assistance. This request was received at the Military Police Desk/EOC at 1756 hours. As the FPS withdrew from the area refugees were observed tipping over the FPS patrol vehicles left behind. One vehicle was turned over while two officers were attempting to drive it out of the area. Both of the officers were injured but managed to escape. The FPS closed all enclave perimeter gates with FPS officers standing by outside the gates.

Upon notification of the MP EOC, the Task Force Commander was notified and immediately placed all static security points, DLO patrols, "White Barn" and the Special Reaction Team on alert. The SRT was dispatched to Gate 42 to assist the FPS officers. At 1800 hours, "White Barn" platoon arrived at Gate 42. At 1806, DLO Stand-by arrived at the PX parking lot near Gate 42 and White Barn Stand-by arrived at the same location shortly thereafter. Also at 1800 hours the three Ft Chaffee gates were placed on actual alert and closed to incoming traffic. DLO patrols all reported to pre-assigned gates as per the standard alert plan by 1805 hours. At 1815 hours the emergency room was notified to provide ambulance service to stand-by at the Post Exchange parking lot and also at the field near Gate 39. By 1815 hours both companies had been notified to place all personnel in a full-scale alert status and as soon as available to report to the field near Gate 39. This area is a large field separating the hospital area where all Military Police are billeted from the Cuban enclave.

At Gate 42 and being in radio contact continuously with Mr. Trini Martinez, Chief of Federal Protective Service, The Task Force Commander was informed that mess hall workers were trapped inside mess hall 1549 and FPS requested Military Police assistance in evacuating them from the building. The Special Reaction Team and "White Barn" force were directed to move into the enclave through Gate 42, turn south, proceed down Fourth Avenue with the Special Reaction Team turning east on 22nd Street, and "White Barn" force turning east on 21st Street. Both forces proceeded to a position approximately even with the mess hall itself.

At the sight of the military, the large crowd of Cuban fell back in a disorganized manner and stopped in the area of buildings 1551 and 1541. Upon arrival, the undersigned was approached by Camp Operations personnel who were on the scene and stated that the workers had been evacuated from the mess hall. They felt that they could control the Cubans and requested that the military leave the scene. They expressed concern that by our presence we would further aggravate the situation at that time. Since

military forces were directed into that area for the sole purpose of evacuating the mess hall, both the SKI and "White Barn" platoon were ordered to depart. There was no physical contact between the refugees and Military Police in this incident, nor was force or C/S deployed. In the area of 1549, three Federal Protective Service patrol cars, all of which were resting on their roofs with heavy body panel damage and all windows broken out, were observed.

It was reported by radio that a large group of Cubans were gathering in the area of Gate 40. Both the "White Barn" and Special Reaction Team were directed to proceed to the consolidated club parking lot.

Shortly thereafter, because of the large groups of Cubans forming at the gate, the "White Barn" was directed to assume a position in front of that gate. The group of refugees at that location had overturned a vehicle, later identified as a United States Catholic Conference lease vehicle, and were observed damaging building 1685. Also civilian vehicles parked outside the enclave were being damaged by large rocks thrown over the top of the fence. At this time the automobile previously overturned near Gate 40 was set on fire. The platoon on the scene backed away from the gate because of the heavy amount of rocks being thrown, however, injuries at this time were minor. The Special Reaction Team which had shields and C/S canisters in their possession, were brought forward and when the large Cuban crowd began forcing open the lower portion of Gate 40, C/S was employed. Upon employment, the Cuban crowd fell back from the gate and no further attempts were made by the refugees to leave the enclave area by that gate or any other position on the perimeter. The Fire Department, responding to a call, were stopped some distance from Gate 40 by Military Police personnel since the burning vehicle was obviously lost and injuries to Firemen and the fire vehicle would likely be sustained. No buildings or other property was threatened by the burning vehicle.

At approximately the same time, FPS Communications Center reported that FPS officers, inside of building 1780, FPS Operations, were trapped in the building by a crowd of refugees. Two platoons of Military Police that had been in an off-duty status prior to 1800 hours were dispatched to Gate 38, the 24-hour gate near the family area. They entered this gate and moved northward from the family area into the general population compound area using a two-platoon column formation. Upon entering the general population area the first platoon went into a wedge formation and the second platoon went into lateral support. As the platoons approached 1780 they began to receive a large and steady barrage of rocks, pipes, trash cans, etc., thrown by refugees in that area. The platoon in front forming a wedge came in physical contact with the Cubans on the scene. The platoon in lateral support broke into a separate wedge to push Cubans down one of the side streets. The military units managed to push back the crowd near 1780, however, they were not able to progress any further than 26th Street and Fourth Avenue. C/S gas was dispersed in order to protect the Military Police against the large crowd of refugees who were armed with rocks, sticks, trash cans and covers, bunk adapters, bottles and various other items that were continually thrown in the direction of the Military Police.

While this altercation was in progress another platoon along with FPS units entered the enclave through Gate 39. They were able to break through the crowd and reach mess hall 1628 by employing C/S. Civilian personnel and one FPS officer trapped in that building were evacuated without incident after the tear gas had forced the refugees to leave the area. Camp Operations personnel were continuously on the move within the enclave and were successful in evacuating many buildings during the confrontations. For the most part, the violence was not directed at the civilian personnel, but was aimed primarily at the Federal Protective Service and military personnel.

By 1935 hours mess hall 1628 was evacuated. A request was then received that civilians be evacuated from mess hall 1549, although it had been previously reported when this disturbance first began that 1549 was no longer occupied. In fact, it still was. As White Barn Stand-by, and "White Barn" and FPS forces went through Gate 42 and proceeded toward building 1549, civilian workers and Camp Operations personnel came out of the mess hall, ran toward military and FPS officers, and were removed from the compound.

The two platoons that had been sent to rescue the FPS officers trapped in building 1780 remained under heavy attack. The two platoons fell back between the buildings that are west of Fourth Avenue and began to move toward Gate 39. These two platoons went between the buildings at different locations; one platoon exited through Gate 39 but the other platoon found itself trapped by Cubans in the vicinity of buildings 1687 and 1688, and were unable to make it to Gate 39. The platoon leader called for assistance but his radio call was not readable and his position in the darkness and confusion could not be ascertained. However, after approximately five minutes his position was relayed by radio and Special Reaction Team personnel were sent in to assist. This reaction force also brought a vehicle with them because it was reported that one Military Policeman was unconscious and had been badly hurt. The 1/4-ton Military Police patrol vehicle that was driven into the compound was used to transport the wounded soldier out of the enclave to the ambulance. There were two Military Police enlisted personnel who were seriously injured during this incident. A third serious injury was sustained by Major Widman who was struck by a rock while directing Military Police forces outside of Gate 39 at approximately the same time as this incident was occurring.

All of the foregoing occurred and was completed by 1930 hours except for mess hall 1549. Evacuation there was completed by 1935 hours.

It was then reported that civilians were trapped inside of building 1622 and 1624. These two buildings are inside the minimum psychiatric area of the enclave.

Since refugee groups were still at large and mobile in the western side of the enclave, the Special Reaction Team, "White Barn" platoon and one Military Police platoon that had been off-duty were directed to proceed to Gate 33 on the east side of the enclave and to attempt removal of the civilians from the area of the minimum psychiatric compound (1622 and 1625).

However, when they had proceeded approximately 75 yards into the enclave notification was received from the FPS communications personnel that all personnel had already in fact been evacuated or instructed to stay behind to continue working with patients in that area. Military Police forces were directed to terminate and leave the enclave.

There was also a report of a hostage in building 1642 at approximately 1945 hours. Military Police and FPS personnel were informed, briefed, and issued C/S canisters in order to proceed to that location. However, just as the force began to enter the enclave at Gate 39, a report was received through FPS communications that apparently the hostage situation was unfounded and movement into the enclave was terminated.

It was determined by 2015 hours that all civilian personnel needing evacuation from the compound had been removed.

While the preceding was in progress, FPS units at approximately 1940 hours, evacuated several babies from the family area. They encountered no resistance, and in fact there was no known instance of violent behavior in the family area at any time during the disturbance. The only area where disturbances did take place was in the general compound in the vicinity of 1549 and along Fourth Avenue from approximately 25th Street through 28th Street.

By 2120 hours only small groups of approximately 10-40 personnel remained on the streets in the compound. The FPS slowly began to resume normal patrol of the compound and by 2130 hours most FPS units were back in service.


At approximately 2115 hours most Military Police forces were directed to return to their alert positions or barracks and remain on alert standby for the rest of the evening. The White Barn Stand-by platoon remained at Gate 40 for security and assisted Engineer personnel in replacing the gates at that location. This platoon also provided security to the two military wreckers used to remove damaged and destroyed vehicles from the enclave. At approximately 2300 hours all damaged vehicles had been removed by the two wreckers, one of which was obtained from the TMP motor pool, the other belonging to the 977th Military Police Company.

It was later learned that while Military Police were attempting to progress to building 1780, FPS units also attempted to reach the same area. They were able to progress as far as 25th Street near Gate 40. FPS ran into such heavy resistance from a crowd they estimated to be about 300 refugees who were armed with rocks, sticks, and various other weapons, that they were in imminent danger of being overrun, and were subsequently directed to leave the compound via Gate 40. Because of the damage caused to the gate previously, it was necessary for them to crawl under the gate to exit the compound and while doing so were struck by numerous thrown objects. White Barn Stand-by platoon assisted the FPS at this location.

From approximately 1745 through 2000 hours the FPS communications desk was flooded with numerous calls from people stating that civilians were trapped in various buildings throughout the compound. Military Police were also

flooded with numerous calls. Radio communications were extremely heavy and could at some times be considered frantic as units were directed from position to position.

The military wreckers removed from the compound a total of eight FPS patrol vehicles all of which can be considered not economically repairable. Also removed were two civilian vehicles which had received minor damage and one burned leased vehicle.



CHARLES F. DONOVAN, JR.
LTC, MP
Commander

EASTER SUNDAY, 19 APRIL 1981

The early morning hours of Easter Sunday, 19 April 1981 were calm and quiet in the Cuban resettlement enclave but yet another eruption of violence between the Federal Protective Service officers and the refugees interrupted that tranquility.

The disturbance on 19 April differs from that of the previous day in that Sunday's rioters had identifiable leadership, the number of refugees involved was of a lesser number and the disturbance was terminated with the assistance of a refugee group who were visibly upset by the previous evenings violence. FPS officers and Military Police units did form up outside the compound in the vicinity of Gate 41 and were prepared to enter however, they did not do so. C/S, which was considered to be extremely important in restoring order on Saturday, was not employed on Sunday.

CONFRONTATION & RESULTANT DISTURBANCE

At approximately 1012 hours, 19 April 1981 a group of about fifteen refugees began to approach Gate 42. The band of refugees were led by a single individual who, it was later learned, was attempting to use the group to obtain release of his brother from Level II detention. The brother had been placed in detention the previous evening by FPS after a curfew violation. FPS react team was dispatched to the area nearest Gate 42. Civilians in the area reported to the FPS that this group of individuals were armed with machetes as well as clubs, sticks, rocks, etc. FPS officers formed at Gate 42 and blocked the groups northward progress. The leader of the group, who spoke English fairly well, demanded that his brother be freed from Level II and threatened violence if his demand was not met.

More refugees began to gather around the area of Gate 42. Rocks and clubs were evident, however, no machetes were seen. Violence commenced although the group was still small in number. The groups' leader, upon learning that his brother was not scheduled for release from Level II until the following day, became highly excited and began to agitate the group surrounding him. The group quickly responded by attacking the Federal Protective Service Officers with rocks, sticks and clubs. One officer was assaulted with a mop handle that had a sharp metal edge on one end. This FPS officer required several stitches to close his wounds. Other Federal Protective Service officers also received injuries from rocks and clubs. The FPS officers withdrew to just behind Gate 42 and secured the gate.

Military Police/EOC was notified at 1030 hours that a disturbance had broken out and assistance to the FPS was requested. The refugee group at this time began to significantly grow in number. FPS officers at Gate 42 were struck by numerous rocks and other objects thrown in their vicinity. By approximately 1032 hours military units had been notified and had begun to arrive in the vicinity of Gate 42. By 1037 hours the Special Reaction Team, "White Barn," "White Barn Stand-by" and DLO stand-by were all in position either in the roadway facing Gate 42 or in the parking area of the Post Exchange which is adjacent to Roberts Boulevard entering Gate 42. Two other MP Platoons who were in an off duty status prior to the disturbance and riot on 18 April,

responded shortly thereafter. One of these platoons was dispatched to the rear of the consolidated club as a quick reaction force in case there were problems in the vicinity of Gate 40 as there were the previous evening.

At approximately 1945 hours, through notification by FPS, mess hall 1623 had been cleared of all female workers and most male personnel. Most of this evacuation was accomplished through the use of Camp Operations personnel as well as the assistance of friendly refugees. All gates were secured by 1050 hours.

At 1040 FPS and the Special Reaction Team as well as the DLO stand-by platoon were briefed, masked, and prepared to enter the enclave. However, the decision was made by the Task Force Commander to delay the move until absolutely necessary. The Center for Disease Control (CDC), had requested FPS assistance in evacuating their personnel because of a large crowd of Cubans in front of the building. As Gate 41 was opened to the enclave, Camp Operations personnel approached the gate and stated that they could, with the assistance of friendly refugees, easily escort the personnel in building 1592 to Gate 41. The undersigned determined that this was feasible and would prevent a serious confrontation between security forces and Cuban refugees. Forces were kept ready to move in case there was any adversity or threatening activity against the civilian personnel being removed or the escorting of Camp Operations personnel. Within thirty seconds the personnel inside of building 1592 were escorted to Gate 41 and the gate relocked.

It was determined in discussions with Federal Protective Service that an overt move inside the enclave at this time would only aggravate an already highly sensitive situation and cause confrontation with between 120-150 persons and probably result in more injuries and property damage. The crowd sporadically threw rocks and other objects at the Federal Protective Service and military units. The leader of the demonstration then came up to Gate 41 to press his demand for the release of his brother.


During this time other gates reported groups of refugees numbering between 40-50 people gathering, however, all groups remained peaceful. The group at Gate 41 under the direction of their leader continued to threaten additional violence. The decision was made that the mess hall personnel would not be placed back in the mess halls but instead Cuban and Camp Operations personnel workers only would be utilized to serve the noon meal. The leader of the group at Gate 41 after extensive negotiations between the undersigned along with FPS and Camp Operations personnel and aided by interpreters agreed to wait until 1200 hours so that the exact status of his brother could be determined. The group then pulled back to the eastern side of Fourth Avenue and ceased throwing objects in the direction of the enclave fence. Since the mess halls were in operation the group began to dwindle in size until it reached approximately 30 members with the same leader still in control. After discussion, a decision was made to release the brother from Level II detention by Immigration and Naturalization Service, FPS and other resettlement center officials. The two brothers then met in building 1781 while a group of thirty refugees remained outside the building. This meeting took place at 1230 hours.

Approximately twenty minutes later a group of about 40 Cuban refugees was reported heading toward building 1781. This second group of Cubans was seen carrying clubs and sticks. This crowd engaged the first refugee group with sticks and clubs. The refugee group headed by the brother was then chased from the area of 1781 and did not return or create additional problems. Shortly thereafter the band of "vigilante" Cubans arrived at Gate 40 and released to FPS three injured refugees, who were leaders or active participants in previous disturbances. They were transported via ambulance to the emergency room under FPS escort. After being treated and released they were brought to FPS headquarters for interrogation and booking.

Federal Protective Service began to slowly phase patrol units back into the enclave at approximately 1310 hours. Civilian workers for the mess halls and the minimum psychiatric area were escorted into the compound commencing at approximately 1400 hours and foot patrols of the compound by the FPS officers also began at this time utilizing four officers per patrol.

At one point the vigilante group grew to approximately 150 people. A parade like procession formed and moved through the compound, complete with Cuban drum music, shouting, and loud singing and dancing. They then dispersed in an orderly fashion on their own accord at about 1500 hours. Small bands of refugees continued to move around various areas of the compound however, no further violence or confrontation occurred.

After the earlier confrontation near Gate 41, military units remained on stand-by for approximately one hour. When the crowd of Cubans decreased to about 30 they began to move in a southerly direction toward building 1781. At that time Military Police forces were returned to their alert positions. C/S gas, which had been issued earlier, was maintained in possession until approximately 1600 hours when it was determined that the compound would most likely remain quiet and that further confrontation was not anticipated.


CHARLES F. DONOVAN, JR.
LTC, MP
Commander

PROCEDURAL REVIEW

1. COMMUNICATIONS

There is a requirement for direct communications between Camp Administration personnel and Federal Protective Service during a disturbance. It would also aid in total command, control and coordination if the Task Force Director, Camp Administrator, Federal Protective Service Commander and Army Task Force Commander were in constant communications. This will however, require both the FPS and Task Force Commander to carry two radios. Constant communications were maintained between the Commander of FPS and the Army Task Force Commander during the period covered in this report.

2. LOCK AND KEY CONTROL

Delay in reaction time was caused by the lack of immediate access to Gates 39 and 41 which were unmanned at the time of required entry. Keys for all gates including those gates which are used at various times for pedestrian traffic are now in the possession of the closest Military Police static security post, as well as Military Police duty officer, patrol supervisor, Operations Officer and Provost Marshal. Federal Protective Service has also modified its key procedures to insure ready access to and emergency egress from all available gates.

3. RIOT CONTROL AGENT

One case (16 canisters) of C/S riot control agent was immediately available and constantly in the possession of the Special Reaction Team. The rest of the riot control agent was maintained in ASP. Because of the distance involved in traveling to and from the ASP, access to C/S was delayed. A sufficient amount of C/S is now immediately available at the Military Police Station/EOC and arrangements are in progress to provide sufficiently adequate security to insure continued instant access.

4. EQUIPMENT

Although Military Police personnel were fully equipped with steel pots, face shields, flak vests and riot clubs, considerable injuries were sustained, especially on arms and legs. All Military Police personnel need to have access to body shields. All five minute alert personnel have now been issued these devices. Only the Special Reaction Team was in possession of the body shields at the time of the riot which prevented numerous injuries as evidenced by the number of marks and dents later observed on these shields. Other plywood shields have been brought to Chaffee by Ft Dix Military Police personnel. Although protective devices of this type are not practical in all instances they would have greatly decreased the number of injuries suffered on 18 April 1981. A search is now underway for additional shields. If none are found, construction of plywood shields will be requested utilizing post engineer resources.

PART II (SECURITY) to VOLUME V to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement
Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. During the Sustainment Phase, the military task force providing security to Fort Chaffee underwent numerous alterations.

As FORSCOM assumed responsibility for the task force, TF III returned to Fort Sill and was replaced by a civil disturbance trained infantry battalion. This was subsequently reduced to a rifle company on station and the remainder of the battalion on call at garrison, and later to the battalion being completely on stand-by at home station. Additionally, as the refugee population decreased, the MP support was slowly scaled down to one overstrength company. Annexes A through H document these changes.

2. The following annexes are attached:

- Annex A - TDA, October 1980
- Annex B - FORSCOM Personnel Taskings
- Annex C - Command and Control Arrangements
- Annex D - FORSCOM Unit Taskings
- Annex E - TDA, June 1981
- Annex F - Troop Reduction
- Annex G - Task Force Security Plan
- Annex H - Perimeter Guard Instructions
- Annex I - MP Alert Procedures
- Annex J - EOC Consolidation
- Annex K - Refugee ID Cards

Annex A (TDA, OCTOBER 1980) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

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CDR, US ARMY TASK FORCE, FT CHAFFEE, AR//
ATZR-B-TCG

CDR, FORSCOM, ATTN: DCSOPS//FT MCPHERSON, GA

INFO: HQ DA, DAMO-ODS, WASHINGTON, DC

HQ DA, DOMS, WASHINGTON, DC

CDR, USAFACFS, ATTN: ATZR-DPCA, FT SILL//OK

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SUBJECT: TDA SUSTAINING OPERATIONS.

1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF CONSOLIDATION IT IS PLANNED TO REDUCE THE TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF TO THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE TO PERFORM THE MISSION OF COMMAND/COORDINATION AND PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS ARE MADE:

- a. A GENERAL OFFICER WILL NOT BE REQUIRED.
- b. III CORPS ARTILLERY TROOPS WILL BE RELIEVED OF SECURITY MISSION.
- c. A GARDEN PLOT BN (450 PLUS) WILL BE PLACED AT FORT CHAFFEE ON A REACTION FORCE - AND TRAINING BASIS FOR A 45-60 DAY ROTATION.
- d. MILITARY POLICE FORCE WILL REMAIN CONSTANT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.
- e. THE JULY 80 TDA CAN NOW BE USED ONLY AS A GUIDE FOR STAFFING.

V-II-A-2

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f. THAT A PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS WILL BE REQUIRED TO CLOSE OUT THE REFUGEE ENCLAVE.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: THE TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS WILL PROVIDE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT FOR ARMY SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO FT CHAFFEE AND WILL BE THE COORDINATION ELEMENT AT CHAFFEE FOR ARMY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS TO THE CIVIL AGENCIES ON POST. KEY PERSONNEL IN THE TASK FORCE WILL BE ON LONG TERM TDY FOR CONTINUITY WHILE SECURITY FORCES AND SOME STAFF ELEMENTS WILL BE ON A 45-60 DAY ROTATION BASE. THE TASK FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE REDUCTION OF US ARMY REQUIREMENTS.

3. SUSTAINING FORCE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS:

<u>POSITION</u> <u>COMMAND SECTION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>SPECIAL NOTE</u>
TF CDR	06	LONG TERM TDY
SECRETARY	GS-6	TPT
DEPUTY CDR/OPS	05	LT
SECRETARY	GS-5	TPT
OPS/ICCO	E-7/8	LT

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DRIVER	E-4/E-5	LT
OPS OFFICER (2 each)	03/04	45 DAY
OPS NCO (2 EACH)	E6/E7	45 DAY
INTERPRETER (3 EACH)	E5/E6	45 DAY BILINGUAL-ACTS AS PART OF REACTION FORCE

ADMIN SECTION

ADJUTANT	03/04	45 DAY
JAG	03/04	45 DAY
ADMIN NCO	E6/E7	45 DAY
SECRETARY	GS-4	TPT

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION (NEW REQUIREMENT-TO BE FILLED NLT 15 OCT 80)

PROVOST MARSHAL	05	LT-BILINGUAL (DESIRED)
PM OPS NCO (2 EACH)	E6/E7	LT
SECRETARY	GS-4	TPT

AVIATION SECTION: 3 EACH OH-58C PROVIDED BY FT SILL

AV SEC CHIEF	03	45 DAY
PILOTS (2)	WO	45 DAY

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CREW CHIEF E4/E5 45 DAY

P/O HANDLER E4/E5 45 DAY

SECURITY FORCES:

1 MP BN HHD ACTS AS DPM AND PROVIDES PMO PERS.

2 EACH MP CO

1 GARDEN PLOT BN

TROOP MEDICAL CLINIC ATTACHED TO GARRISON

4. GARRISON SUPPORT WILL PROVIDE ALL LANDLORD FUNCTIONS SUCH AS POST ENGINEER, MESS, WAREHOUSING, BUDGETING AND LIMITED CONTRACTUAL SUPPORT.

ADDITIONAL STAFFING WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

*SUPPLY OFFICER CW2 MOS 761 USAR, 179 DAY

*SUPPLY NCO E7 MOS 76&40 USAR, 179 DAY

*FOOD SERVICE TECHICIAN, CW2-4 MOS 941, USAR, 179 DAY

CONSTRUCTION FOREMAN E6/E7 MOS 12B40 ACTIVE

OPERATIONS NCO E7/E8 MOS 13B40 ACTIVE

RECREATIONAL SPECIALIST GS-5 TPT

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5. REQUEST APPROVAL OF THE ABOVE TDA REQUIREMENTS WITH IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL CONCERNED.

DON E. KARR, TF DCO, ATZR-B-TDCO
962-2545/2547

COME BACK COPY REQUESTED

DON E. KARR, TF DCO, ATZR-B-TDCO 962-2545/2547

Annex B (FORSCOM PERSONNEL TASKINGS) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

271700Z OCT 80
 FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
 UNCLAS

SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED CUBAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

1. A FORSCOM TASK FORCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE CUBAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM AT FT CHAFFEE. THE TF CDR PSN HAS BEEN FILLED ON A PCS BASIS AND THE REMAINDER OF THE CMD/CONTROL ELEMENT AND SUPPORT POSITIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUAL PERS TDY FOR 90 DAY PERIODS. THE INITIAL TDY PERIOD VARIES FOR INDIVIDUALS TO STAGGER THE ROTATION AND PROVIDE FOR CONTINUITY WITHIN THE TF.

2. INSTALLATIONS ARE TASKED TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL TDY FOR PSNS INDICATED:

<u>TASKED INSTL</u>	<u>DUTY PSN</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>SSI/MOS</u>	<u>NO REQ</u>	<u>REPORT DATE</u>	<u>INITIAL TDY PERIOD</u>
CAMPBELL	OPS OFF	04/03	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	30 DAYS
RILEY	OPS OFF	04/03	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	60 DAYS
BENNING	OPN NCO	E8/9	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	30 DAYS
MEADE	OPN NCO	E7/6	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	60 DAYS
KNOX	OPN NCO	E7/6	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	90 DAYS
POLK	LT VEH DRVR	E4/3	IMMAT	1	4NOV80	30 DAYS
DEVENS	ENG NCO	E6	12B	1	4NOV80	30 DAYS
CAMPBELL	SUPPLY SGT	E7	76Y	1	4NOV80	30 DAYS
HOOD	FOOD SVC SUPV	E8	94B	1	4NOV80	60 DAYS
HOOD	ADJUTANT	04/3	41S	1	15DEC80	90 DAYS

3. SELECTED PERSONNEL WILL REPORT TO TASK FORCE CDR, FT CHAFFEE, BLDG 1370. installations will coordinate directly with ft chaffee, specific rotation dates at the end of initial tdy and subsequent 90 DAY PERIODS.

4. TASKED INSTALLATIONS WILL FUND TDY AND BE REIMBURSED WITH FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE (FEMA) FUNDS. QUARTERS AND RATIONS ARE AVAILABLE, AND THE DUTY UNIFORM WILL BE FATIGUES.

5. POC'S FT CHAFFEE, CPT SANCHEZ, AV 962-2545/2547; FORSCOM DC5COMPT CPT DECKER, AV 588-3913, AND FORSCOM DCSPER, MR. CAHILL, AV 588-2121.

Annex C (COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS) to PART II to VOLUME V to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

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ZNR UUUUU

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FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA //AFOP-COC//
TO RUEBJFA/CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD //AFKA-01//
RUWTFGA/CDR USAONE FT MEADE MD //AFKA-01//
RUWTFNA/CDR USAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON TX //AFKB-OP//
RUWTFROA/CDR USAFAC & FT SILL OK //ATZR-DPT//
RUCLBFA/CDR III CORPS & FT HOOD TX //AFZF-DPT//
RUCLBWA/CDR USAMEDDAC FT MCCLELLAN AL
RUWTFGA/CDR TF FT CHAFFEE AR
INFO RUEADWD/DA WASH DC //DAMO-OPS//
RUCLAIA/CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA
RUWTAHA/CDR 1ST INF DIV (M) & FT RILEY KS
RUCLDGA/CDR 5TH INF DIV (M) & FT POLK LA
RUWTFGA/CDR FT CHAFFEE, AR

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SUBJECT: COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS - SUSTAINED SUPPORT
OF CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CAMP, FT CHAFFEE, AR

A. DAMO-ODS MESSAGE 032250Z JUN 80, SUBJ: GUIDANCE FOR DOD OFFI-
CIALS CONCERNING SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL
AT FACILITIES DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE "CUBAN ALIENS" IN SUPPORT OF

PAGE 2 RUCLHTA6401 UNCLAS

THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) (U).

B. DAMO-ODS MSG 102155Z JUN 80, SUBJ: INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT,
REFUGEE CENTER SECURITY (U).

C. AFCC-PBO MSG 082015Z MAY 80, SUBJ: CONUS SUPPORT OF CUBAN
REFUGEE SITUATION (U).

D. AFCC-PBO/FAO MSG 291620Z MAY 80, SUBJ: BILLING AND REPORTING
COSTS FOR SUPPORT OF CUBAN REFUGEES (U).

E. DAOA-BUE MSG 021538Z OCT 80, SUBJ: FINANCING, BILLING AND
REPORTING OF COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF CUBAN
ENTRANTS DURING FY 1981 (U).

1. SITUATION.

A. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATION OF CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CENTER
WAS TRANSFERRED FROM FEMA TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

B. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REMAINS DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR
MILITARY SUPPORT OF CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CAMP OPERATIONS.

C. RESIDUAL CUBAN REFUGEE POPULATION HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED AT
FT CHAFFEE, AR.

D. CDR, FT CHAFFEE, PROVIDES REAL ESTATE TO STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. MISSION. FORSCOM ESTABLISHES A LIAISON/SECURITY ELEMENT TO
COORDINATE MILITARY SUPPORT REQUESTED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR

PAGE 3 RUCLHTA6401 UNCLAS

OPERATION OF CONSOLIDATED CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CENTER, FT CHAFFEE, AR.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR OPERATION OF CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CENTER AT FT CHAFFEE WILL BE LIMITED TO A LANDLORD/TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY AND DEPT OF STATE. CDR, FT CHAFFEE, PROVIDES BUILDINGS AND REAL ESTATE USE UNDER A PERMIT TO DEPT OF STATE AND MAINTAINS ARMY PROPERTY. CDR, TF, PROVIDES AN EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE AND ACTS AS SINGLE POINT INTERFACE BETWEEN CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND US ARMY ON CUBAN RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHER FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES FOR THE OPERATION OF THE CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CENTER WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPT OF STATE.

B. CDR, TASK FORCE.

(1) MAINTAINS LIAISON WITH DEPT OF STATE AND CDR, FT CHAFFEE, FOR MILITARY SUPPORT OF CONSOLIDATED RESETTLEMENT CAMP.

(2) PASSES UNRESOLVED REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY SPT THAT APPLY TO TF RESPONSIBILITIES TO HQ FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-COO, FOR RESOLUTION.

(3) PROVIDES EXTERNAL SCTY FOR CONSOLIDATED REFUGEE CENTER.

(4) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REINFORCING REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT OF INCIDENTS OF SERIOUS INDISCIPLINE.

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C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) TROOP MEDICAL CLINIC. PROVIDE LIMITED MEDICAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORTING THE CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CENTER.

(2) MP UNITS. PROVIDE RESETTLEMENT CENTER EXTERNAL SECURITY FORCES. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT OF REFUGEE DISTURBANCES.

(3) CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN. PROVIDES A REINFORCING REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS REFUGEE DISTURBANCES.

(4) WHEN CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN IS ON-CALL AT HOME STATION, REQUESTS FOR COMMITMENT WILL BE TELEPHONICALLY SUBMITTED TO FORSCOM OPERATION CENTER, AUTOVON 588-3222.

(5) SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES A AND B.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. PERSONNEL AND UNITS ON TEMPORARY DUTY TO OR UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FORSCOM TF WILL BE COMMITTED FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO 90 DAYS. EXTENSION BEYOND THE NORMAL PERIOD OF COMMITMENT WILL BE ON A "CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

B. UNITS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP WILL BE SELF-CONTAINED WITH MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY, AND MESS SUPPORT.

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C. BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

D. WHEN COMMITTED, THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN WILL DEPLOY WITH FIVE-DAY BASIC LOAD OF MCI.

E. BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION IS FT SILL, THROUGH FT CHAFFEE.

F. FUNDING GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN REFERENCES C THROUGH E.

G. REPORTS.

(1) STRENGTH REPORTS. DAILY TELEPHONIC STRENGTH REPORTS OF SITREP PARAGRAPHS 1 THRU 3A WILL BE SUBMITTED AS OF 2400Z TO ARRIVE NLT 1000Z.

(2) SITREP. WEEKLY AUTODIN SITUATION REPORTS AS OF 2400Z EVERY THURSDAY WILL BE SUBMITTED TO ARRIVE AT FORSCOM NLT 1000Z ON FRIDAY.

(3) SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT (SIR). SIR'S WILL BE SUBMITTED TELEPHONICALLY TO FORSCOM OPERATIONS CENTER, AUTOVON 588-4162/4170 OR "HOT LINE", AS INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. FRAGMENTARY REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED. AUTODIN REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN INFORMATION IS COMPLETE.

(3) AFTER ACTION REPORT. AN AFTER ACTION REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED. FORMAT AND SUBMISSION DATE TO BE DETERMINED.

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

A. UNITS AND PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT THE RESETTLEMENT CENTER WILL BE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CDR TF, FT CHAFFEE.

B. CHAIN OF COMMAND IS HQ DA, CDR FORSCOM, CDR TF.

C. TF IS TENANT UNIT ON FT CHAFFEE UNDER COMMAND OF HQ FORSCOM.

D. FORSCOM POC'S:

(1) DCSPER:	MAJ MURRAY	AUTOVON 588-2121/2124
(2) DCSOPS:	LTC COCHRAN	AUTOVON 588-4170/4162
	LTC SMITH/SGM MAXWELL	AUTOVON 588-3821/2720
(3) DCSLOG:		
	TRANS: LTC SANDS/SGM MOORE	AUTOVON 588-4241/3747
	SUPPLY: MAJ DUNN	AUTOVON 588-2052/3141
(4) PMC:	MAJ WEAVER	AUTOVON 588-3018/3439
(5) SURGEON:	SGM WEBB	AUTOVON 588-3673/2816

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Annex D (FORSCOM UNIT TASKINGS) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

The following are attached:

Appendix 1 - Message, 27 Oct 80

Appendix 2 - Message, 26 Nov 80

Appendix 3 - Message, 5 Dec 80

Appendix 4 - Message, 24 Feb 81

Appendix 1 (MSG, 27 OCT 80) to ANNEX D to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

271806Z OCT 80
FM CDR FORSCOM FT McPHERSON GA//AFOP-COO//
TO CDR III CORPS & FT HOOD TX
CDR 1ST INF DIV CMD & FT RILEY KS
CDR TF FT CHAFFEE AR
INFO CDR USAFAC & FT SILL OK//ATZR-DPT//
CDR 5TH INF DIV CMD & FT POLK LA
UNCLAS

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER - TOE BN, FT CHAFFEE AR

- A. AFOO-PBO MSG 082015Z MAY 80, SUBJ: CONUS SUPPORT OF CUBAN REFUGEE SITUATION (U)
- B. AFOO-PBO/FAO MSG 291620Z MAY 80, SUBJ: BILLING AND REPORTING OF COSTS FOR SUPPORT OF CUBAN REFUGEES (U)
- C. DAOA-BUE MSG 021538Z OCT 80, SUBJ: FINANCING, BILLING AND REPORTING OF COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF CUBAN ENTRANTS DURING FY 1981 (U)

1. SITUATION:

A. III CORPS ARTILLERY HAS BEEN PROVIDING A REINFORCING REACTION FORCE AT FT CHAFFEE SINCE 1 JUN 80.

B. ON 1 NOV 80, COMMAND OF THE FT CHAFFEE TF TRANSFERS FROM USAFACFS TO HQ FORSCOM.

C. ON 13 NOV 80, 5TH INF DIV (M) REPLACES III CORPS ARTILLERY IN PROVIDING THE REINFORCING REACTION FORCE AT FT CHAFFEE.

2. MISSION. FORSCOM PROVIDES THE REINFORCING REACTION FORCE AT FT CHAFFEE EFFECTIVE 12 NOV 80.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CDR III CORPS & FT HOOD TX: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED BN TO ARRIVE AT FT CHAFFEE O/A 27 DEC 80.

B. CDR 1ST INF DIV (M) & FT RILEY KS: BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED BN TO ARR AT FT CHAFFEE O/A 5 FEB 81.

C. CDR TF, FT CHAFFEE AR: BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ON-SITE REINFORCING REACTION FORCE TO HOME STATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOLLOWING SCHEDULE.

(1) TO FT POLK LA: O/A 29 DEC 80.

(2) TO FT HOOD TX: O/A 7 FEB 81.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IS 45 DAYS.

(2) UNIT WILL CONDUCT INDIVIDUAL/SMALL UNIT TRAINING AT FT CHAFFEE WHILE PROVIDING AN "ON-CALL" REINFORCING REACTION FORCE TO THE TF.

(3) EXMOVREPS WILL BE SUBMITTED BY PRIORITY MESSAGE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ALL DEPLOYMENTS IAW AR 55-113.

(4) DIRECT COORDINATION IS AUTH AND ENCOURAGED.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. TRANSPORTATION.

(1) MOST ECONOMICAL MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION WILL BE USED. CONTACT MAJ STEADMAN/SGM MOORE, AV 588-4241/3747.

(2) ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-ORGANIC TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES WILL BE ROUTED THROUGH INSTALLATION TRANSPORTATION OFFICER (ITO) BY THE REQUESTING UNIT.

(3) TRANSPORTATION COST ESTIMATES WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HQ AS SOON AS TRAVEL PLAN HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED. AV 588-3821/2720.

(4) ACTUAL COST EXPENDITURES WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HQ AS SOON AS MOVE IS COMPLETED, BUT NLT 14 DAYS AFTER COMPLETION.

(5) DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADVANCE PARTY IS AUTH.

PAGE 2

271806Z OCT 80

B. LOGISTICS.

- (1) MINIMUM EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSPORTED INCIDENT TO DEPLOYMENT.
MAXIMUM USE OF FT CHAFFEE ECS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
(2) CLASS I AND V WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED.
(3) CIVIL DISTURBANCE/RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED.
(4) DEPLOYED UNIT WILL BE SELF-CONTAINED WITH MESS, MAINTENANCE
AND SUPPLY SUPPORT.

C. FUNDING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED IN REFERENCE A THRU C.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

A. FORSCOM POC'S:

OPERATIONS AV 588-3821/2720
TRANSPORTATION AV 588-4241/3747

b. UNIT WILL BE OPCON TO CDR TF, FT CHAFFEE

Appendix 2 (MSG, 26 NOV 80) to ANNEX D to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1-Copy USA6.00
W

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ROUTINE
ALTROUTE

RTTUZYUW RUCLHTA9762 3 01163-11 1-ROUJTE-A.
ZNR 1111
R 262300Z NOV 89
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCMEYERSON VA /AFOP-CO 7
TO RUCLREFA/CDR 1ST CORPS & FT HOOD TX
RUWTAHA/CDR 1ST INF DIV (M) & FT RILEY KS
RUWTEGA/CDR TF FT CHAFFEE AR
INFO RUEADWD/VA WASH DC /DPA/2-005/1
RUCLDGA/CDR 5TH INF DIV (M) & FT POLK LA
BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN - FT CHAFFEE AR

A. MSG AFOP-CO 271847Z OCT 89. SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER - TOE BN,
FT CHAFFEE AR (U)

B. MSG AFOP-CO 271806Z OCT 89. SUBJ: WARNING ORDER - TOE BN,
FT CHAFFEE AR (U)

1. REFERENCE MESSAGES ESTABLISHED THE REQUIREMENT AND ROTATION
SCHEDULE FOR A CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED TOE BN TO SUPPORT THE
CURAN REFUGE CENTER AT FT CHAFFEE AR. THIS MESSAGE UPDATES THE
REQUIREMENT AND ROTATION SCHEDULE.

2. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE BATTALION TO BE ON STATION AT FT
CHAFFEE IS CANCELLED. THE BATTALION WILL NOW BE ON 43-HOUR "ON

PAGE 2 RUCLHTA9762 UNCLAS

CAL" STATUS AT HOME STATION.

3. CDR TF FT CHAFFEE, AR. REDEPLOY CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED BN
CURRENTLY AT FT CHAFFEE TO HOME STATION, FT POLK, NLT 7 DEC 89.
REPORT REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE TO FORSCOM, AUTOVON 58 -3121/2720
WHEN ESTABLISHED.

4. CDR 1ST CORPS & FT HOOD, TX. DESIGNATE CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED
TOE BN TO PROVIDE ON-CALL REACTION FORCE FOR FT CHAFFEE EFFECTIVE
061300Z DEC 89. PERTON OF CONTINENT IS 60 DAYS.

5. CDR 1ST INF DIV (M) & FT RILEY, KS. BE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE
CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED TOE BN TO PROVIDE ON-CALL REACTION FORCE
FOR FT CHAFFEE EFFECTIVE 061300Z FEB 91.

6. POC FORSCOM: SGM FAXTEL, AVN 58 -3121/2720.

BT

#9762

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TOR-3 016257
MLN-010273

ROUTINE
ALTROUTE

Appendix 3 (MSG, 5 DEC 80) to ANNEX D to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

CD CHAFFEE FTS

•
CD CHAFFEE FTS

ENGAFB C ALX
586353 5 DEC 1123 CST 12
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP COO//
TO CDR TF FT CHAFFEE AR
O 051315Z DEC 80

BT

SUBJECT: CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN - FT CHAFFEE, AR

A. MSG AFOP-COO 262300Z NOV 80, SAB (U).

1. THIS MESSAGE UPDATES THE REQUIREMENT AND ROTATION SCHEDULE AS SPECIFIED IN REF MSG.

2. THE CURRENT REQUIREMENT CONSISTS OF ONE COMPANY (MINIMUM STRENGTH 125 PERSONNEL) TO BE ON STATION AT FT CHAFFEE IN A TRAINING STATUS. THE REMAINDER OF THE BN WILL REMAIN ON 48-HOUR "ON CALL" STATUS AT HOME STATION.

3. CDR, TF FT CHAFFEE, AR: REDEPLOY CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED BN CURRENTLY AT FT CHAFFEE TO HOME STATION, FT POLK, ON 6 DEC 80.

4. CDR, III CORPS & FT HOOD, TX:

PAGE 2 RUC LH TA 1244 UNCLAS

A. DESIGNATE CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED BN TO SUPPORT FT CHAFFEE DURING PERIOD 7 DEC 80 - 7 JAN 81. PLACE ONE COMPANY (MINIMUM STRENGTH 125 PERSONNEL) ON SITE WITH BN (-) ON 48-HOUR ON-CALL STATUS AT HOME STATION.

B. ROTATION OF COMPANIES TO FT CHAFFEE WILL BE DETERMINED BY CDR, III CORPS. POSSIBLE ROTATION SCHEDULE IS:

FIRST CO	- ARRIVE FT CHAFFEE 7 DEC 80
	DEPART FT CHAFFEE 19 DEC 80
SECOND CO	- ARRIVE FT CHAFFEE 18 DEC 80
	DEPART FT CHAFFEE 28 DEC 80
THIRD CO	- ARRIVE FT CHAFFEE 27 DEC 80
	DEPART FT CHAFFEE 7 JAN 81

C. BN DESIGNATION AND ROTATION SCHEDULE WILL BE REPORTED TO FORSCOM, AUTOVON 588-3821/2720 NLT 051800Z DEC 80.

D. UNIT ON SITE WILL BE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CDR, TF FT CHAFFEE.

5. CDR, 1ST INF DIV (M) & FT RILEY, KS: BE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED TOE BN TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCE FOR FT CHAFFEE DURING THE PERIOD 6 JAN - 6 FEB 81.

6. POC, HQ FORSCOM, SGM MAXWELL, AUTOVON 588-3821/2720.

BT

Appendix 4 (MSG, 24 FEB 81) to ANNEX D to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

CD CHAFFEE FTS

PRIORITY

ENGAFB C ALA
580353 24 FEB 1955051 19
FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-CLC//
TO FT CHAFFEE AR
P 242000Z FEB 81

117

Reid
25 Feb 81

0750
(Handwritten mark)

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BT

SUBJECT: CIVIL DISTURBANCE BN - FT CHAFFEE, AR

1. THIS MESSAGE UPDATES THE REQUIREMENT FOR A CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED TUE BN TO PROVIDE A REACTION FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER AT FT CHAFFEE, AR.
2. THE REQUIREMENT FOR ONE COMPANY OF THE BN TO BE ON STATION AT FT CHAFFEE IS CANCELLED. THE ENTIRE BN WILL NOW BE IN AN "ON CALL" STATUS AT HOME STATION.
3. CDR IF FT CHAFFEE, AR. REDEPLOY CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINED COMPANY CURRENTLY AT FT CHAFFEE TO HOME STATION, FT PULK, LA, NLT 6 MAR 81. REPORT REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE TO FORSCOM, AUTOVON 588-3821/2720 WHEN ESTABLISHED.
4. CDR, 111 CORPS & FT HOOD, TX. DESIGNATE CIVIL DISTURBANCE

PAGE 2 RUCHTA8105 UNCLAS

TRAINED TUE BN TO PROVIDE ON-CALL REACTION FORCE FOR FT CHAFFEE EFFECTIVE 061300Z MAR 81. PERIOD OF COMMITMENT IS 45 DAYS. UNIT DESIGNATION WILL BE REPORTED TO FORSCOM, AUTOVON 588-3821/2720 WHEN DETERMINED.

5. FORSCOM POC IS SGM MAXWELL, AUTOVON 588-3821/2720.


ENGAFB C ALA

CD CHAFFEE FTS

M+

CD CHAFFEE FTS

ANNEX E (TDA, JUNE 1981) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report - Task Force Resettlement Operation-
Fort Chaffee



NOTE: MP Company to include CO HQ, CO Supply, CO Maintenance, Unit Clerk MP Platoons to include 1 officer and 40 EM (95B)

TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

<u>DUTY TITLE</u>	<u>MOSC</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>MINIMUM</u>
TF Commander/PMO	11A	05	1	1
DEP Commander/DEP PMO	31A	04	1	1
Supply Officer	91A	03	1	1
Secretary/Stenographer	CIV	05	1	1
<u>OPERATIONS SECTION</u>				
Operations officer	31A	03	1	1
Operations SGT	95B	E-8	1	1
Plans & Training NCO	95B	E-7	1	1
Clerk Typist	CIV	04	1	1
<u>TRAFFIC & SECURITY SECTION</u>				
Section NCOIC	95BH3	E-7	1	1
Traffic NCO/Investigator	95BQ9	E-6	2	1
Physical Security Inspector	95BH3	E-5	2	1
Crime Prevention NCO	95BH3	E-5	1	0
Clerk Typist	CIV	04	1	1
<u>MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION SECTION</u>				
MPI Supervisor	95BV5	E-6	1	0
MP Investigator	95BV5	E-5	2	2

Incl 3

MP STATION

MP Station OIC	31A	02	1	1
MP Station NCOIC	95B	E-7	1	0
Desk Sergeant	95B	E-5	4	3
Radio Telephone OPR	95B	E-4	8	6
Desk Clerk	71L	E-4	4	3

RECAPITULATION

	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>MINIMUM</u>
OFFICERS	5	5
ENLISTED	28	19
CIVILIAN	3	3
TOTAL	<u>36</u>	<u>27</u>

Incl 4

Annex F (TROOP REDUCTION) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-TCDR

28 September 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL REAGOR

SUBJECT: Troop Reduction, Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas

1. Reference: Phonecon, subject as above, 24 Sept 81.
2. Attached as inclosure 1 is a proposed organization which would effect a troop reduction from 266 to 169 personnel. This organization would provide a PMO/command and control cell, four line Platoons, and a support team.
3. Inclosure 2 reflects the major equipment items that each element should deploy with.
4. This organization will provide for both the Discipline, Law, and Order and Civil Disturbance missions. It also will allow for a nine and three work schedule thus allowing the troops reasonable time off for rest and recreation. Further, it will support a 70 Man Reaction Force available on 5 minute call.
5. I feel comfortable with these force levels providing all the Cubans don't riot at the same time in an unusually violent manner. Thus, while we are running a calculated risk to some degree, it is a risk I think we can take at this time.
6. These reductions have been coordinated with and concurred in by the Arkansas Governors office and all local law enforcement agencies. FPS, INS, and BOP also concur.
7. Recommend the timing for the reduction be as follows.
 - a. C&C Cell Advance Party arrive 13 Oct 81
 - b. C&C Cell Main Body arrive 15 Oct 81
 - c. 504th MP Bn (-) Depart 19 Oct 81
 - d. 571st MP CO Depart 19 Oct 81
 - e. Replacement with Advance Parties arrive 21 Oct 81
 - f. Replacement with Main Bodies arrive 26 Oct 81
 - g. 545th MP CO depart 30 Oct 81
 - h. Plat, 463d MP CO Depart 30 Oct 81

V-II-F-2


ALFRED W. KINKEAD
LTC, INFANTRY
COMMANDING

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LIN</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
01	00	<u>CMD & CONTROL CELL</u>			
01	001	TASK FORCE CDR/PMO	0-5	11A	1
	002	OPNS OFF/XO/DEP PMO	0-4		1
	003	ADMIN/LOG OFF/CO XO	0-2		1
	004	STATION DCR/CO CDR	0-2		1
	005	OPNS SGT/1SG	E-8		1
	006	STATION NCOIC	E-7		1
	007	SUPPLY SGT	E-6		1
	008	PHYS SEC NCO	E-6		1
	009	MP INVESTIGATOR	E-6		1
	010	DESK SGT	E-5		4
	011	DESK CLK/RTO	E-4		4
	012	CLERK STENO	GS-4		2
					<u>19</u>
02	00	<u>LINE PLATOONS, 4 EACH</u>			
	01	PLATOON LEADER	0-2		1
	02	PLATOON SGT	E-7		1
	03	SQUAD LEADER	E-6		3
	04	MILITARY POLICEMAN	E-3/4		30
					<u>140</u>
03	00	<u>DISTURBANCE SUPPORT TEAM</u>			
	01	TEAM SGT	E-6		1
	02	MILITARY POLICEMAN	E-5		3
	03	MILITARY POLICEMAN	E-3/4		6
					<u>10</u>

Incl 1

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

1. PMO/Command and Control Cell deploy with three Riot Control CS Gas Dispersers.
2. Each Line Platoon deploy with:
 - a. 11 ea 1/4 ton truck w/AN/VRC-46 Radio
 - b. 2 ea 1/4 ton trailers
 - c. Appropriate PLL
 - d. .45 CAL Pistols w/equipment
3. All personnel deploy with cold weather gear to include Pile Cap, Parka, and Insulated (Mickey Mouse) boots.

Incl 2

Appendix G (TASK FORCE SECURITY PLAN) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-TEOC

17 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Task Force Security Plan

1. Reference: Task Force Security Map attached.
2. The following facilities will be secured/protected on order by the indicated responsible agency with forces as determined necessary to meet the situation. In any instance, minimum force requirements shall not be less than one supervised squad.

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>
a. TF Ft Chaffee Headquarters (bldg 1370)	PMO
b. Commo Center/(WWMCCS) (bldg 1375)	3-11th Inf
c. Dial Commo Center (bldg 1321)	3-11th Inf
d. Officer/NCO Clubs (bldg 1683/1178)	3-11th Inf
e. MP Station (bldg 1390)	PMO

3. Security Measures:

a. Security/law enforcement within the enclave is provided by US Park Police, Federal Protective Service, INS, and Border Patrol. US Park Police is lead law enforcement agency for security/law enforcement within the enclave.

b. Gates to enclave are manned and controlled by Federal Protective Service.

c. Enclave perimeter security is provided by Military Police. Positions are as indicated on the attached map. Each position is normally manned by one MP with radio communication to MP desk.

d. Gates to enclave will be closed by Federal Protective Service personnel on order of senior security force commander (senior US Park Police officer or CDR Task Force if military forces have been committed).

e. Mobile barriers (external perimeter) will be closed on order of the EOC as follows:

<u>BARRIER</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>TIME OF CLOSURE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
20	PMO	On call	4th Ave at 10th St
21	PMO	Always closed	3rd Ave at 10th St
22	PMO	On call	2d Ave at 10th St
54	PMO	On call	31st St at 4th Ave
55	PMO	On call	Ark Blvd west of 4th Ave
56	PMO	On call	26th St west of 4th Ave
57	PMO	On call	Roberts Blvd west of 6th Ave
58	PMO	On call	Ft Smith west of 5th Ave
59	PMO	On call	Ft Chaffee Blvd w. NCO Club
60	PMO	Always closed	Ft Chaffee Blvd west of Main Gate
61	PMO	On call	4th Ave at Ft Chaffee Blvd
76	PMO	On call	31st St at 2d Ave
77	PMO	Always closed	Roberts Blvd at 2d Ave
78	PMO	On call	Ft Smith at 2d Ave
79	PMO	On call	2d Ave at Ft Chaffee
82	PMO	Always closed	23rd St at 2d Ave
83	PMO	On call	Ent. to Fire Sta Park. lot
84	PMO	Always closed	6th St at 2d Ave

f. Military mobile reaction forces are provided as follows:

- (1) PMO-25 man reaction force mounted in six 1/4 ton vehicles.
- (2) 3-11th Inf

a. Two immediate reaction force platoons of 60 soldiers each. Reaction force #1 is located in Bldg 2553 (Red Barn) and Reaction Force #2 is located in Bldg 1495 (White Barn).

b. One reaction force platoon of 60 soldiers on 30 min standby located in Bldg 836.

(3) EOC

a. EOC/3-11th Inf vehicle (1/4 ton) with sound equipment and TV camera.

b. Whiplash-OH-58 helicopter with night sun searchlight on standby at Ft Chaffee airfield. Reaction time during daylight hours is a function of aircraft and crew availability due to other support requirements. However, every effort will be made to achieve a 5-minute reaction time both day and night.

4. Coordination Instructions:

a. Barriers will be closed on order of EOC. EOC will designate selected barriers to remain open to allow deployment of reaction forces.

b. Selected barriers will be closed on order of EOC to assist in capture of refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.


c. Selected elements of 3-11th Inf will be deployed on order of EOC to assist in apprehension of refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.

5. Command and Signal:

a. Command: Deputy Commander is responsible for security. PMO is responsible for respective mobile barriers. The senior PMO representative on the scene will coordinate the search for refugees who cross the enclave perimeter.

b. Signal:

- (1) TF Resettlement Operation CMD Net: F1
- (2) 3-11th Inf CMD Net: FREQ: 34.80
- (3) MP Perimeter: Motorola PT 400 Series
- (4) Reaction Force/Roving Patrol: FREQ: 34.80/ALT 45.30
- (5) MP Net: FREQ: 48.90



THOMAS M. WALKER
LTC, TC
Deputy Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
TF Cdr
DCO/C of S
Park Police
State Police
PMO (15)
3-11th Inf (15)
DFAE


○ MOBILE BARRIER

● GATE

— VEHICLE ENTRY/EXIT
THROUGH 38 & 42

... PERSONNEL GATES 39 & 41

(23 SEP 80)



REACTION
FORCE #3

TASK FORCE
HQ & EOC

REACTIVITY
FORCE #2

REACTION
FORCE #1



AREA

AREA 1
AREA 2
AREA 3
AREA 4
AREA 5
AREA 6
AREA 7
AREA 8
AREA 9
AREA 10
AREA 11
AREA 12
AREA 13
AREA 14

Annex H (PERIMETER GUARD INSTRUCTIONS) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action
Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
TASK FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
5 December 1980

PERIMETER GUARD INSTRUCTIONS

1. PURPOSE: To establish standard procedures for perimeter guard personnel in support of the Cuban Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
2. APPLICABILITY: All units under the operational control of the Task Force Provost Marshal performing duties as perimeter security.
3. SCOPE: This SOP addresses the requirements for ~~military police~~ perimeter guard personnel and outlines responsibilities to be followed by their supervisors
4. GENERAL:
 - a. One platoon will occupy the enclave perimeter per 8 hour shift.
 - b. During the day shift, 0800-1600, thirteen(13) perimeter guard points will be manned; points B,C,E,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,P,R,T.
 - c. During swings (1600-2400) and mids (2400-0800), all twenty(20) perimeter guard points will be manned, A thru T.
 - d. Each platoon will also provide an OIC, NCOIC, and a "Comfort Wagon" designated as 36A.
 - e. EQUIPMENT: The following equipment is required:

1. 1/4 ton vehicles	3 each (OIC, NCOIC, 36A)
2. Bus	1 each
3. ANVRC46	1 each
4. Batons, flack vests, and helmets w/face shields.	1 per man
5. RESPONSIBILITIES:
 - a. Perimeter Guards
 1. Perform duties IAW perimeter guard instructions (Inclosure 1).
 2. Problems encountered will be reported to either the OIC or Patrol Supervisor at the earliest possible opportunity.
 3. Perimeter guard personnel will take the actions outlined in Inclosure 2 in the event of a General Alert.
 - b. Patrol Supervisor
 1. Will insure that all personnel performing duty as perimeter guards are briefed on their duties and responsibilities.

2. Insure guard personnel are posted and alert throughout their tour of duty.

3. Insure that personnel are rotated to prevent boredom and reduce the incidents of fraternization.

4. Will sign for all the PMO equipment located in the guard shacks and insure that each guard signs for the equipment in his shack.

c. OIC, PERIMETER SECURITY

1. Will be the platoon leader of the platoon pulling perimeter security.


2. The OIC will insure that his personnel are properly briefed prior to assuming their guard posts.

3. The OIC will be present at guard mount and inspect his personnel prior to posting.

4. Insure that all personnel are performing their duties IAW this SOP and in a manner in keeping with the highest Military standards.

5. Report problems or incidents to the MP Desk, # 2666/2312/2729/2812.

6. In the event of an alert insure that all personnel respond IAW Incl 2 and notify the MP Desk when all personnel are ready.



LARRY G. THOMAS
CPT, MP
Operations Officer

PERIMETER GUARD INSTRUCTIONS

1. Your post will be maintained on the outside of the fence surrounding the enclave perimeter.
2. Guards will face the enclave when on stationary post.
3. Entrance and exit from the enclave will be controlled by civil law enforcement persone. Perimeter Guard personnel will not be involved in this process.
4. Guards will physically check all culverts and drainage ditches in their immediate area at least once every hour for signs of tampering.
5. Guards will not permit privately owned vehicles to use the security road just west of 4th Avenue. You will inform the driver that this road is for security vehicles only.
6. Answer questions and assist in solving refugee's problems conscientiously; however, no casual conversations at the fence will be tolerated.
7. Buying, selling, trading or giving of personal items, military clothing, equipment or cigarets to refugees is prohibited.
8. Guards assigned to posts where gate keys are located will insure the security of the key at all times. The key will never be taken from the guard post area. Lost keys will be reported immediately.
9. Guards assigned to posts where keys are located will insure that the padlocks at the enclave gates are positioned on the outside of the fence.
10. Keys are located at the following guard posts:
 - a. Point E- # 12
 - b. Point F- # 11
 - c. Point H- # 10
 - d. Point J- # 09
 - e. Point K- # 08
 - f. Point T- # 02
11. Guards are responsible for inspecting the equipment at their guard shack and signing for that equipment if all is accounted for and in operable condition. The perimeter OIC or NCOIC will be notified of any discrepancies.
12. Complete military uniform will be worn at all times, to include headgear.
13. Reading material, radios, televisions, cassette players, etc, will not be maintained in or around gate shaks.
14. Guard shack area (inside and out) will be kept in a high state of police at all times.

15. Officers walking on the perimeter and vehicles bearing appropriate rank or position plates will be afforded normal military courtesy, e.g., standing at attention and saluting.

16. The highest standards of military courtesy, bearing and appearance will be maintained at all times.

17. Problems encountered while on duty will be brought to the attention of the OIC or NCOIC.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Guard post "BRAVO" will be responsible for opening Gate 31 to allow the fire fighting vehicles from building 2100 access to the enclave during emergency situations. Military police assigned to post "BRAVO" must be alert for the post fire alarm and be prepared to open the gate if necessary.

Incl 1

PERIMETER GUARD ALERT PROCEDURES

Personnel on the perimeter will take the following action when an alert is called:

a. Perimeter guard personnel will assume a parade rest position with baton held parallel to the ground in front with both hands. Flack vest, helmet, and face shield in down position will be worn when on alert status.

b. Keys for locked perimeter security fence gates will be maintained in the closest guardhouse to that gate. These gates will remain locked at all times unless directed by competent authority (OIC, Patrol Supervisor, PM, DPM, PM Operations Officer, MPDO) to open them.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Guard point "KILO" will be prepared to close Barrier # 54 (at 31st Street and 4th Avenue) upon instruction.

b. Guard point "JULIET" will be prepared to close Barrier # 76 (at 31st Street and 2nd Avenue) upon instruction.

Incl 2

PERIMETER GUARD UNIFORM

1. The following operational equipment is required for all personnel manning the perimeter guard points around the enclave area.

- a. Fatigues (pants bloused, sleeves rolled down)
- b. Pistol belt
- c. First aid pouch (Optional)
- d. Steel pot with face shield
- e. Riot baton
- f. Flack vest
- g. Protective mask

2. Helmet liner will be worn when not on alert status.

Incl 3

Annex I (MP ALERT PROCEDURES) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

MILITARY POLICE ALERT PROCEDURE

I. PURPOSE: To outline procedures for all military police patrols and gate personnel upon notification of alert by PMO or Task Force HQ.

II. APPLICABILITY: This SOP applies to all military police personnel providing law enforcement support to Fort Chaffee military reservation and the Cuban Resettlement Operation.

III. SCOPE: The following procedures are to be implemented upon notification of an alert by PMO or EOC.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Desk Sergeant:

a. If an alert is called by EOC, the Desk Sergeant shall notify PMO immediately of time of notification and the situation. If the alert is called by PMO then EOC shall be notified and the same information provided.

b. The Desk Sergeant shall insure that all units are advised of the situation by the RTO's and that appropriate instructions are transmitted.

c. The Desk Sergeant will telephonically provide the following instructions to personnel in below listed locations:

1. Gate #3: Close, but do not lock barrier #61 (at Chaffee Blvd and 4th Ave). One (1) gate personnel will be designated to remain at the barrier and await further instructions. Personnel at Gate #3 will deny incoming traffic entrance to the installation (EXCEPTIONS: Emergency vehicles and key personnel). Outgoing traffic will be allowed to leave the Fort Chaffee military reservation.

2. Gate #5: Close lane(s) to incoming traffic (EXCEPTIONS: Explained above). Outgoing traffic will be allowed to leave.

3. Gate #9: Standby and prepare to close on orders.

d. The Desk Sergeant shall provide periodic Sit-Reps to both PMO and EOC. These will include:

1. Time when all barriers are manned or closed.

2. Time when all patrols are at their posts.

3. Notification of any unusual or complicating developments.

e. Upon notification by either EOC or PMO to terminate the alert, the other shall be contacted and informed of the notification and all units advised to return to normal operations.

2. RTO's:

a. Upon notification of an alert, RTO's will first clear the net and advise all units that an alert is in progress. At this point traffic will be eliminated to emergency traffic only.

b. RTO's will inform all units to acknowledge with call sign when each unit has received their instructions, and also when they have arrived at their destinations and completed their mission.

c. RTO's will issue the following instructions to the appropriate units:

(1) UNIT 20

(a) Insure the alert procedures as outlined in this SOP are followed.

(b) Be prepared to adjust in the event the situation warrants or upon order of the EOC or Provost Marshal.

(2) UNIT 21

(a) Insure that all military police personnel on duty are thoroughly familiar with this SOP.

(b) Insure that all personnel respond to their designated ready position.

(c) Standby at Bldg 1370 and await further instructions.

(3) UNIT 22

(a) Proceed to Barrier #56, located on 25th Street.

(b) Close barrier to only one lane of traffic.

(c) Do not allow anyone to enter except emergency vehicles, police, task force or command personnel.

(d) Allow vehicles and pedestrians to exit. Suspicious pedestrians or vehicles will be detained, if possible. (Patrols will not leave their post to detain). All suspicious activity will be reported to the Military Police Desk.

(4) UNIT 23

(a) Proceed to Barrier #57, located on Roberts Blvd.

(b) Close barrier to only one lane of traffic.

(c) Do not allow anyone to enter except emergency vehicles, police, task force or command personnel.

(d) Allow vehicles and pedestrians to exit. Suspicious pedestrians or vehicles will be detained, if possible. (Patrols will not leave their post to detain). All suspicious activity will be reported to the Military Police Desk.

(5) UNIT 24

- (a) Proceed to Barrier #58, located on Fort Smith Blvd.
- (b) Close barrier to only one lane of traffic.
- (c) Do not allow anyone to enter except emergency vehicles, police, task force or command personnel.
- (d) Allow vehicles and pedestrians to exit. Suspicious pedestrians or vehicles will be detained, if possible. (Patrols will not leave their post to detain). All suspicious activity will be reported to the Military Police Desk.

(6) UNIT 26

- (a) Proceed to Bldg 1370.
- (b) Report to EOC duty officer or Duty NCO and obtain EOC Access Roster.
- (c) Establish access point immediately outside of entrance to EOC.

(7) UNIT 27

- (a) Close and lock Barrier #22, located at 2nd Ave and 10th Street.
- (b) Proceed to Barrier #79, located at 2nd Ave and Fort Chaffee Blvd.
- (c) Close barrier to only one lane of traffic.
- (d) Do not allow anyone to enter except emergency vehicles, police, task force or command personnel.
- (e) Allow vehicles and pedestrians to exit. Suspicious pedestrians or vehicles will be detained, if possible. (Patrols will not leave their post to detain). All suspicious activity will be reported to the Military Police Desk.

(8) UNIT 28

- (a) Close and lock Barrier #55, located at 4th Avenue and Arkansas Blvd.
- (b) Proceed to Barrier #78, located at Fort Smith Blvd and 2nd Ave.
- (c) Close barrier to only one lane of traffic.
- (d) Do not allow anyone to enter except emergency vehicles, police, task force or command personnel.
- (e) Allow vehicles and pedestrians to exit. Suspicious pedestrians or vehicles will be detained, if possible. (Patrols will not leave their post to detain). All suspicious activity will be reported to the Military Police Desk.

(9) UNIT 36A

- (a) Proceed to Bldg 1370.
- (b) Assist unit 26 as necessary.

(10) PERIMETER POINT "KILO"

(a) Prepare to close Barrier #54 (at 31st Street and 4th Ave) upon instruction.

(11) PERIMETER POINT "JULIET"

(a) Prepare to close Barrier #76 (at 31st Street and 2nd Ave) upon instruction.

d. RTO's are required to keep the desk sergeant informed immediately when all units have completed their mission and of any new developments which may occur.

e. When notified that the alert has been terminated, the RTO's will inform all units and instruct them to open all barricades and return to normal operations.



STEPHEN W. COTTRELL
1LT, MP
Operations Officer

Annex J (EOC CONSOLIDATION) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE/GARRISON, RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-TCDR

8 January 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: MS BARBARA LAWSON

SUBJECT: EOC Consolidation with MP

1. Over the past month the Army Task Force has changed it's method of operation from a primary Infantry Reaction Force with MP back up to a Military Police Reaction Force with Infantry reserves. In addition, the Infantry unit also mans 12-20 guard posts on the perimeter. This change was accomplished during same general period as the FPS and USPP made their transition.

2. Based upon the above changes - we now need to make several communication and personnel changes to more effectively control the reaction force mission while decreasing personnel where possible. Therefore, I intend to take the following actions - in the EOC area during the week of 26 January 1981:

a. Move civilian Police - (Sheriff and State Police) radio communications to FPS communication center in Bldg 1396.

b. Move civilian Police telephone Hot line to FPS communications center in Bldg 1396.


c. Move Task Force communications and EOC peronnel to Provost Marshal/MP desk - Bldg 1390. This will place all communications for Task Force Ft Chaffee into one location and under a single control.

d. Discontinue telephone answering service to Task Force Ft Chaffee and Cuban/Haitian Task Force after duty hours. (I will provide my Headquarters a key list of personnel and telephone numbers).

e. Discontinue the use of the EOC for work orders and administrative matters.

3. The above changes will insure that all elements of control are in their proper location and under Supervision of responsible agencies; civilian coordinator - FPS/and reaction force - MP/PMO.

4. These changes have been coordinated with the FPS - but not with any of the local agencies.


DON E. KARR
COL, Sig C
Commander

CF:
FPS - Trinidad Martinez
COL Ray Spence - Garrison Commander

V-11-J-2

Annex K (REFUGEE ID CARDS) to PART II to VOLUME V to After Action Report Task
Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

V-II-K-1



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CUBAN-HAITIAN TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR - CAMP OPERATIONS
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

27 May 81

MEMORANDUM TO: BARBARA K. LAWSON
DIRECTOR C.H.T.F.
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

FROM: *Gunther O. Wagner*
GUNTHER O. WAGNER
CAMP ADMINISTRATOR

SUBJECT: NEW ENTRANT ID CARDS

As per our discussion, I have directed my ID Section to prepare the issuance of new ID cards for the entire population concurrent with the issuance of Bonos.

The new ID cards are the same in color and correspond to the previous designated areas.

1. WHITE - FAMILY AREA
2. YELLOW - P.C.
3. GREEN - C.P.
4. BROWN - LEVEL II

In order to eliminate once and for ever "the accountability-myth" I, 1) changed the design of the ID cards and 2) will assign a control number to each Cuban resident in the enclave. INS will be supplied a carbon copy of the new ID cards, and by means of this simple method of arithmetic, we shall with certainty, and without any reasonable doubt, establish the exact number of Cuban refugees presently accommodated in Fort Chaffee.

ENCL: Samples of old and new ID cards
(NOTE control number block)

cc:
OIC INS
OIC FBI
Col. [unclear] ✓
[unclear]
C. [unclear]
[unclear]

CUBAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT CENTER
FORT CHAFFEE

DAILY REFUGEE STATISTICS

DATE: _____

TODAY'S POPULATION: _____

IN CAMP:

G.P. _____

FAM. AREA _____

P.C. _____

A.C.U. _____

OBS. I _____

OBS. II _____

PSY. WARD _____

STOCKADE _____

LEVEL II _____

SUB-TOTAL _____

OFF BASE:

ST. EDWARDS HOSP. _____

SPARKS HCSP. _____

LOGAN COUNTY HOSP. _____

PHS HOSP. _____

CIV. JAIL _____

SUB-TOTAL _____

TOTAL UNDER INS CONTROL: _____

ESCAPEES TODAY: _____

ESCAPEES PAST: _____

TOTAL: _____

RECAPTURED: _____

NO. UNACCOUNTED FOR: _____

RETURNEES TODATE: _____

RETURNEES RELOC. TODATE: _____

TOTAL IN CAMP: _____

ALIEN I.D. PASS
FT. CHAFFEE ARKANSAS

CONTROL NUMBER
081451

D.O.B. _____

SIGNATURE VOID

NAME _____

ALIEN NO. _____

 COMEDOR

 ALOJAMIENTO

Control # **081451**

Name: _____

Birthdate: _____

Meal # _____

Barracks # _____

Signature _____

Date: _____

Old Card

ALIEN I.D. PASS
FT. CHAFFEE ARKANSAS

CONTROL NUMBER

D.O.B. _____

SIGNATURE _____

NAME VOID

ALIEN NO. _____

 COMEDOR

 ALOJAMIENTO

Control # _____

Name: _____

Birthdate: _____

Meal # _____

Barracks # _____

Signature _____

Date: _____

VOID

VOLUME VI

TERMINATION AND RESTORATION PHASE (21 Jan-19 Feb 82)

PART I (TERMINATION AND RESTORATION PHASE SUMMARY) to VOLUME VI to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

1. The following is a narrative summary of the operations of Task Force Resettlement Operation during the period 21 January to 19 February 1982.
2. On 21 January 1982, the President signed an executive order transferring custody of the remaining refugees from Health and Human Services to the Department of Justice. On 22 January, the Justice Department announced that the refugees at Fort Chaffee would be transferred to Federal prison facilities in Atlanta, Georgia and Springfield, Missouri. This move to the prison facilities was selected over other options because it was less expensive. By 4 February, the last refugee had departed.

Coinciding with the departure of the refugees was a reduction in the military strength providing security options. On 30 January, the last support unit, the 293d MP Company, departed, leaving a 20 man cell to perform Provost Marshal duties for Fort Chaffee. The cell was replaced by Fort Sill military police on 12 February, who are to remain for restoration (ANNEX A).

Effective 19 February 1982, the task force was officially terminated and disestablished (ANNEX B).

Annex A (FORT CHAFFEE SECURITY OPERATIONS) to PART I to VOLUME VI to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

271511Z JAN 82

FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-OCO//

TO CDR USAFAC & FT SILL OK//ATZR-DPTPOM//

INFO CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA//ATCS-P//

CDR FT MEADE MD

CDR FT CHAFFEE AR

CDR TF FT CHAFFEE AR

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: FT CHAFFEE SECURITY OPERATIONS

A. AFOP-OO MSG 041435Z NOV 80, SUBJ: COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS - SUSTAINED SUPPORT OF CUBAN RESETTLEMENT CAMP, FT CHAFFEE, AR (U)(NOTAL).

B. ATZR-DPTPOM MSG 252046Z JAN 82, SAB (U)(NOTAL).

1. AS OUTLINED IN REF A, TF MP UNITS WERE TO PROVIDE RESETTLEMENT CENTER EXTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT OF REFUGEE DISTURBANCES. REF B REQUESTED RETENTION OF A FORSCOM MP CELL AT FT CHAFFEE TO PERFORM DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER (DLO) DURING RESTORATION AFTER ALL REFUGEES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM FT CHAFFEE. CURRENT PLANS CALL FOR ALL REFUGEES TO BE TRANSFERRED BY 29 JAN 82.

2. USE OF FORSCOM MP ASSETS TO PERFORM DLO FOR A RESIDUAL CIVILIAN POPULATION DURING RESTORATION IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN REF A. HOWEVER, A 20-MAN MP DETACHMENT WILL REMAIN AT FT CHAFFEE UNTIL 12 FEB 82 TO ALLOW CDR, FT SILL TIME TO ARRANGE FOR A SECURITY FORCE AS REQUIRED.

Annex B (TERMINATION MESSAGE) to PART I TO VOLUME VI to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

241537Z FEB 82
FM HQDA WASHDC//DAMO-DDS//
TO CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA
CDRUSAFACFS FT SILL OK
CDRMTMC WASHDC
INFO HQDA WASHDC//DACA-BU/DAEN/DAMO-TR/DAAR//
RUEAUSA/CNGB WASH DC
UNCLAS

SUBJECT: FORT CHAFFEE DETENTION CENTER

1. ON 4 FEB 82, THE LAST CUBAN REFUGEES OF THE APPROXIMATE 19,000 WHO FORMERLY WERE ACCOMMODATED AT FT CHAFFEE, AR WERE RELOCATED TO OTHER FEDERAL AND PRIVATE FACILITIES. WITH THE CLOSURE OF FT CHAFFEE, THE MISSION OF THE TASK FORCE IS TERMINATED AND THE TASK FORCE WAS DISESTABLISHED EFFECTIVE 192400Z FEB 82.

2. ADDRESSEES ARE COMMENDED FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND DEDICATION IN ACCOMPLISHING A MOST DIFFICULT TASK. YOUR EFFORTS ARE TRULY APPRECIATED.

3. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) HAS DECLARED THE CHAIN LINK FENCING USED IN SUPPORT OF REFUGEE OPERATIONS AT FT CHAFFEE, AR AS EXCESS PROPERTY. IN THIS REGARD, THE FOLLOWING FENCING WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE FT CHAFFEE GARRISON TO BE UTILIZED AT COMMANDERS DISCRETION.

FENCE CHAIN LINK: 1900' X 6' (STORED)
1200' X 6' (IN PLACE)
24000' X 10' (IN PLACE)

4. REIMBURSEMENT. BILLING ACTIONS FOR THAT PORTION OF THE RESTORATION COSTS PROPERLY CHARGEABLE TO FEMA SHOULD BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. RESTORATION COSTS DETERMINED TO BE AN HHS IS COMPLETED. FINAL BILL SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITHIN 90 DAYS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ALL RESTORATION WORK.

VI-1-B-2

PART II (RESTORATION) to VOLUME VI to After Action Report Task Force
Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

The attached annexes present background information on the reimbursement of restoration costs and estimates of those costs.

- Annex A - Restoration Funding
- Annex B - Revision of Restoration Estimate, May 81
- Annex C - FEMA Reimbursement (Inclosures deleted)
- Annex D - HHS Reimbursement
- Annex E - Revision of Restoration Estimate, July 81

Annex A (RESTORATION FUNDING) to PART II to VOLUME VI to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

(COL. MEYER)

*Telecopied to DIA & Fort Sill
7 May 81*

[Signature]
1 May 1981

ATZR-B-CDR

SUBJECT: Restoration Funding for Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Commander
US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
ATTN: ATZR-DRM (Colonel Kraus)
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503

1. This letter is provided to inform you of my increasing concern for an area of major significance which may ultimately require your direct involvement to effect resolution.
2. I am somewhat apprehensive that the allocation and formal commitment of necessary funds to provide for the rapid and total restoration of this installation are not receiving the attention necessary. On 30 January 1981, utilizing in-house capabilities of logistics, facilities engineering and communications expertise, we forwarded our base line cost estimate of approximately 5.8M for complete restoration to the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM), Fort Sill. This estimate includes hospital buildings but does not include restoration costs for medical supplies which is a separate package being prepared in MEDDAC channels.
3. To date thru DRM, we have received approval and fund cite designation from Federal Emergency Management Agency in the amount of \$1,088,354 which only marginally addresses those facilities vacated by Cubans prior to 1 January 1981. Additionally, we have Health and Human Services approved dollars to order items which require long lead time for requisition and receipt. The shortfall of approximately 3.5M from our base line estimate is my principle concern. We here at Fort Chaffee are unaware of any action at higher levels, either military or civilian, to specifically address this deficit and no agency has been specifically identified as responsible to confirm additional required funding.
4. Our present projection is that if the Cuban Resettlement Operation terminates in the July-August time frame as currently programmed, funds

ATZR-B-CDR

1 May 1981

SUBJECT: Restoration Funding for Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

and resources must be readily available if total restoration is to be completed to support Reserve Component Units scheduled for annual training in May of 1982.

5. Request your personal support in rectifying this problem area.

RAY L. SPENCE
Colonel, FA
Commanding

CF:
Cdr, USAFACFS, ATTN: ATZR-FE
Cdr, USAFACFS, ATTN: ATZR-DI
Cdr, MEDDAC, Fort Sill
Chief, USACC, Fort Sill
Task Force Cdr, Fort Chaffee

Annex B (REVISION OF RESTORATION ESTIMATE, MAY 81) to PART II to VOLUME VI to
After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY GARRISON, FORT CHAFFEE (SEMI-ACTIVE)
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72905

ATZR-B-CDR

28 May 1981

SUBJECT: Revision of Restoration Estimate, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Commander
US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
ATTN: ATZR-DRM (Colonel Kraus)
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503

1. References:

a. DA Form 2496, dated 30 January 1981, from Financial Management, Fort Chaffee to ATZR-DRM (ATTN: Mrs. Gilbert) Subject: Estimate of Restoration Costs.

b. Letter, Headquarters, USAG, Fort Chaffee (Semi-Active) dated 1 May 1981, Subject: Restoration Funding for Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

2. The original 30 January 1981 restoration estimate of \$5,796,294 (Inclosure 2) submitted by this Headquarters was based on two assumptions:

a. That the resettlement operation would be terminated by 1 April 1981.

b. Damage and loss would decrease as refugees became settled and HHS gained control.

Both assumptions proved false. Refugees are still at Fort Chaffee and the extent of damages/losses are directly proportional to the length of their occupancy of any given area/facility. Pictures depicting damages/losses within the Cuban enclave are at Inclosure 3.

3. To date this Headquarters has received FEMA approval of \$1,088,354 for restoration of facilities vacated by Cubans prior to 1 January 1981. This amount was included in the 30 January 1981 total restoration estimate. In addition, we later received authorization for \$1M reimbursement from HHS which left a shortfall of \$3.5M on the original estimate. It should be noted that the approved FEMA restoration estimate increased from \$1,088,354 to \$1,102,720 upon completion of restoration projects.

ATZR-8-CDR

28 May 1981

SUBJECT: Revision of Restoration Estimate, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

4. Based on information contained above, a revised estimate of \$6,410,060 (increase of \$1,702,120 above the 30 January 1981 estimate) has been completed from current input provided from installation engineers, logistics and USACC. Mr. Gene Abston, Comptroller, HHS, monitored and agrees with the revised estimate. The revised estimate includes funding requirements for damages/losses to facilities, installed equipment, communications equipment, furniture, dining facilities and replacement items. Increase is attributed primarily to IJO estimates based on current costs and additional identified losses in the logistics area. The \$1,102,720 funded against FEMA for restoration is not included in the revised estimate, but the 1M which HHS has already made available is included. This estimate includes hospital buildings but does not include restoration costs for medical supplies and existing furniture and inventory which is a separate package being prepared in MEDDAC channels. A detailed breakout of the revised estimate is contained at Inclosure 1.

5. Request that the revised estimate be considered in your efforts to obtain funding authority to allow completion of restoration requirements at Fort Chaffee for facilities vacated after 31 December 1980. This installation plans to complete restoration in-house as this approach appears more economically feasible. At present Fort Chaffee has necessary trained personnel in hire. If funds are not made available in a timely manner, a personnel lay off will become necessary. This will result in time loss with no guarantee of rehiring personnel with required expertise. Based on current commitment rate, it is anticipated that the approved funding of \$1,000,000 by HHS will be fully committed by 16 July 1981. It is imperative that funding approval for a shortfall of \$5,410,060, or a major portion thereof, be made available prior to that date to insure continuance of effort for restoration of facilities by 1 May 1982 in order for this installation to meet its required support missions.

3 Inclosures
as


RAY L. SPENCE
Colonel, FA
Commanding

REVISED RESTORATION COST ESTIMATE

	<u>HHS Initial Estimate of Costs After 1 Jan 81</u>	<u>Increase to Initial Cost Estimate</u>	<u>Revised Cost Estimate</u>	<u>Approved Funding Committed Thru 22 May 81</u>	<u>Balance</u>
Facilities					
Engineers Bldgs	3,392,062.	1,514,541.	4,906,603.	552,203.	4,354,400.
Labor Costs					
Admin Support	115,300.		115,300.		115,300.
Logistics	887,700.	174,939.	1,062,639.	7,300.	1,055,339.
Logistics Labor	301,700.		301,700.		301,700.
Communications	11,178.	640.	11,818.	2,500.	9,318.
Hospital Restoration-Supplies		12,000.	12,000.	8,400.	3,600.
Total	<u>\$4,707,940.</u>	<u>\$1,702,120.</u>	<u>\$6,410,060.</u>	<u>\$570,403.</u>	<u>\$5,839,657.</u>

The uncommitted balance of \$429,597 will be applied to those areas which are determined to be of highest priority.

INCREASE TO INITIAL COST ESTIMATE

Facilities Engineer Bldgs.	\$1,511,541	Increase in cost estimates for IJOs (see Incl 1)
Logistics	174,939	Additional identified Restoration costs (see Incl 1)
Communications	640	Additional 32 telephones @ \$20.00 ea.
Hospital - Supplies	12,000	No requirements were identified on initial estimate for the hospital. Requirements are now identified for materials such as: plastic sheeting, hammer, saw, stapler, tacks, teflon cover and cardboard.
	<hr/>	
	\$1,702,120	

22 May 1981

ENGINEERING RESTORATION ESTIMATE

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>COSTS</u>
Theater	\$ 25.0
Gym	45.0 (23.5)
Motor Pools	15.0
Hospital Areas	247.5 (55 Bldgs @ 4.5 ea)
Main Enclave Barracks	2,030.5 (131 Bldgs @ 15.5 ea)
Main Enclave Admin/Support	884.4 (134 Bldgs @ 6.6 ea)
Main Enclave Mess Halls	117.5 (3 Bldg. @ 7.5 ea)
Screens	45.0
Stockade	4.0
Fire Extinguishers	17.6
Removal Light Poles & Fixtures	45.0
Repair of FESA equipment and return	3.0
Real Property REcords	25.0
Roads, Shoulders, Culverts	130.0
Removal, Grade & Repairs Grounds Maintenance	125.0
Removal of temporary construction items	43.0
Removal of Loudspeakers	3.0
Repair of Utility Systems	67.0
Heating System	50.0
Lagoon Aeration System	5.0
Interior cleaning of Bldgs	107.0
Exterior Police	20.0

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>COSTS</u>
Removal of Concertina fence	25.0
Removal of Observation Tower	2.0
Repair of Equipment-In-Place (Mess Halls)	125.6
Repair of Local Alarms	65.0
Exterior Painting	574.5
Signs (Bldgs, Street & Traffic)	20.0
Repair of Athletic Fields	20.0
Subtotal	4,906.6
Minus Obligations	552.2
Total	\$4,354.4

4354.4
~~574.5~~
3,759.9

NOTE: It is anticipated that the main enclave fence and security lighting will be removed without cost to HHS for the salvage value of the fence and lighting systems.

ENGINEERS - ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GS</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>1 Yr HOURS 2080</u>	<u>180 Days HOURS 1440</u>
1	Real Property Clerk	5/7	7.08	1 Yr	14,726.40	
1	Budget Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days		8,596.80
2	Work Order Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days		17,193.60
1	Engr Tech	5/5	6.68	180 days		9,619.20
1	Estimator	5/5	6.68	180 days		9,619.20
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	180 days		7,660.80
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	1 Yr	<u>11,065.60</u>	
					25,792.00	52,689.60
				TOTAL BASE		78,481.60
				Benefits (7.60%)		<u>5,964.60</u>
				TOTAL		84,446.20
2	Maint Worker	WG 10/5	9.73	180 days		28,598.40
				TOTAL BASE		107,080.00
				Benefits (7.60%)		<u>8,138.08</u>
				TOTAL		115,218.08

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-13, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

ATZR-B-L

Estimate of Restoration Costs

TO C,FM

FROM C,LOG

DATE 22 May 81

CMT 1

MAJ Roberts/gw/2238

1. A revision of restoration cost estimate is detailed below:

a. Identified losses prior to 31 Dec 80:

\$ 4,123.00	Furniture
<u>27,434.72</u>	Dining Facility Equipment
\$31,557.72	Total

b. Property found unserviceable and turned in to Property Disposal Office:

\$117,908.87

c. Identified losses subsequent to 1 Jan 81:

Report of Survey and GPLD - None

d. Identified item replacement requirements:

(1) Glides	\$27,600.00	14,720.00
(2) Face Shields	30,940.00	
(3) Batons	9,370.00	
(4) Loaned communications equipment restoration	2,000.00	
	Total	\$69,910.00 57,030.00

e. Estimated costs for furniture and dining facility equipment which cannot be classified until turned in:

\$2,610,864.90	Issued Furniture
<u>939,906.99</u>	Issued Dining Facility Equipment
\$3,550,771.89	Total Issued
X.25	Estimate of Damage/Loss
\$ 887,692.98	Cost Estimate

f. Total estimate of loss:


\$ 31,557.72	para a
117,908.87	para b
00	para c
57,030.00	para d
69,910.00	para e
887,692.98	para e
\$1,107,069.57	Grand Total
\$1,094,189.57	

ATZR-B-L

22 May 81

SUBJECT: Estimate of Restoration Costs

2. The 25% factor used to compute loss has been derived from the observed abuse of equipment, the lack of user accountability, and the failure to comply with approved supply procedures on the part of the user.
3. This estimate does not consider restoration costs for items procured solely for the Cuban Resettlement Task Force since replacement of such losses is not anticipated.
4. Personnel cost estimates for restoration must consider the retention of 29 personnel for 180 days subsequent to the termination of the resettlement mission. These personnel requirements were identified by DF dated 28 Jan 81, subject: Estimate of Restoration Costs.



FRANCIS H. ROBERTS, JR.
MAJ, FA
Chief of Logistics

LOGISTICS - PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GS</u>	<u>WG</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>1140 HOURS</u>
1	Act Maint Clerk	5/5		6.68	9,619.20
5	Supply Clerks	3/5		5.32	38,304.00
1	Clerk Typist	3/5		5.32	7,660.80
1	Purchasing Clerk	4/5		5.97	8,596.80
3	Hvy Mtr Veh Oper		7/5	8.36	36,115.20
2	Whse Idrs		WL 5/5	8.05	23,184.00
6	Warehouseman		4/5	6.81	156,902.40
	TOTAL BASE				280,382.40
	Benefits (7.60%)				21,309.06
	TOTAL				301,691.46

ESTIMATED RESTORATION COST

Period 8 May thru 31 Dec 1980

Rewire buildings North of Ft Smith Blvd (complete)				Cost
(1)	Telephone House Wire	25,000ft	@ .08ft	\$2,000.00
(2)	Terminal Blocks	110	@ .42ea	46.00
(3)	Protectors	50	@ 5.00	250.00
(4)	Ground Rods	60	@ 7.65	459.00
(5)	Clamps, misc Hdwe Staples Insulators			100.00
(6)	Ground Wire	500ft	@ .05ft	25.00
			Material	<u>\$2,880.00</u>

Labor to re-install above and Restore Communications to buildings

450 M/H @ \$10.00 p/h	\$4,500.00
Total Cost	<u>\$7,380.00</u>

Rewire buildings South of Ft Smith Blvd (Incomplete)

(1)	Telephone HouseWire	40,000ft	@ .08ft	\$3,200.00
(2)	Terminal Blocks	140	@ .42	58.80
(3)	Protectors	60	@ 5.00ea	300.00
(4)	Ground Rods	75	@ 7.65ea	593.75
(5)	Clamp, misc Hdwe, Staples, Insulators			125.00
(6)	Ground wire	600ft	@ .05ft	30.00
				<u>\$4,297.55</u>

Labor to re-install above and Restore Communications to buildings

520 M/H @ \$10.00 p/h	\$5,200.00
Total Cost	<u>\$9,497.55</u>

Total Cost to Restore Communication to all buildings

Buildings North	\$7,380.00
Buildings South	9,497.55
TOTAL	<u>\$16,877.55</u>

Restoration:

Replacement of TA-236/PT Telephones stolen or destroyed by Cuban exercise.

Prior to Dec 31, 1980	73 telephones at \$20.00 ea	\$ 1,460.00
After Dec 31, 1980	43 telephones at \$20.00 ea	860.00
		<u>\$ 2,320.00</u>

TOTAL RESTORATION COST

Material	\$7,177.55
Labor	9,700.00
Phone Replacement	2,320.00
	<u>\$19,197.55</u>

INITIAL COST ESTIMATE 30 JAN 1981

	FEMA Identified Costs Prior to 31 Dec 80	HHS Estimate of Costs After 1 Jan 81	TOTAL
Facilities Engineers Bldgs	480,438.	3,392,062.	3,872,500.
Labor Costs - Admin Support		115,300.	115,300.
Logistics	31,558.	887,700.	919,258.
Logistics - Labor costs		301,700.	301,700.
Mattress contract	525,000.		525,000.
Cleaning Contract	43,978.		43,978.
Communications	7,380.	11,178.	18,558.
Total	<u>\$1,088,354.</u>	<u>\$4,707,940.</u>	<u>\$5,796,294.</u>
Increase Cleaning Contract	<u>1,486.</u>		
Furniture Glides	\$1,089,840.		
	<u>12,880.</u>		
	<u>\$1,102,720.</u>		

ATZR-B-FM

Estimate of Restoration Costs

DRM
ATTN: Mrs. Gilbert

Financial Management

30 Jan 81
Mrs. O'Dell/wb/2710

1. As requested in telecon of 27 Jan 81, the following estimate of Restoration cost is provided.

	<u>IDENTIFIED COSTS PRIOR TO 31 DEC 80 (APPROVED)</u>	<u>COST OF VACANT BLDGS PRIOR TO 31 DEC 80 (NOT APPROVED)</u>	<u>ESTIMATE OF COSTS AFTER 1 JAN 81</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Facilities				
Engineers Bldgs	\$245,438	\$235,000	\$3,392,062	\$3,872,500
Labor Costs			115,300	115,300
Logistics	31,558		887,700	919,258
Labor Costs			301,700	301,700
Communications	7,380		11,178	18,558
Totals	<u>\$284,376</u>	<u>\$235,000</u>	<u>\$4,707,940</u>	<u>\$5,227,316</u>

2. Detail computation of estimate is provided in Incl 1 thru 3.

3. Actual restoration costs that have been billed through 20 Jan 81 are as follows:

BILLED 1-20 JAN 81

HRA7 \$1,139.96
HRA8 514.31
\$1,654.27

MEMO: Cost of Bldgs vacant after 1 Jan 81 on which IJO's have been prepared is \$5,827. which is included in Estimate of Costs after 1 Jan 81.

CF
CFE
CLOG
USACC-CHA

C.M. O'DELL
Supv Budget Analyst

3 Incl
as

Cost of Bldgs vacant prior to 31 Dec 80 - Work started and projects approved

<u>JOB NO.</u>	<u>BLDG NO.</u>	<u>DATE ISSUED</u>	<u>EST. CO</u>
2489-80	1332	16 Sep 80	20,985
2514-80	1346	24 Sep 80	21,779
3244-81	1200-211	24 Nov 80	12,401
3247-81	1050-1060	24 Nov 80	13,267
3249-81	1244-1250	25 Nov 80	6,816
3250-81	1042/1047/1076/1081/1086	28 Nov 80	1,292
3251-81	1037/1049/1080/1053-1073	28 Nov 80	13,788
3252-81	1040/1041/1043/1079/1082		
	1046/1085	26 Nov 80	5,214
3254-81	1038-39/1044-45/1062/1073		
	1077-78/1083-84	26 Nov 80	6,492
3273-81	1272-1283	3 Dec 80	11,231
3274-81	1105-06/1109-10/1140/1144		
	1147/1148/1157/1161-62/1158	4 Dec 80	5,071
3278-81	1100/1103-04/1107-08/1113-19	4 Dec 80	10,201
3279-81	1120-1124/1127-1132	3 Dec 80	11,546
3280-81	1133-37/1139/1143/1145/1152		
	1153/1155/1156	5 Dec 80	12,608
3281-81	1160/1163/1166-76	5 Dec 80	12,772
3286-81	1165/1213/1226	6 Dec 80	586
3287-81	1126/1260/1269/1270	9 Dec 80	6,240
3288-81	1046/1085/1142/1159		
	1216/1302/1303	9 Dec 80	2,507
3290-81	1215/1217/1221-1223/1232/		
	1235/1236/1301/1305-06/		
	1309/1310	9 Dec 80	6,442
3291-81	1111/1141/1146/1149-50/1214		
	1218/1220/1224/1233/1237/		
	1300/1304/1307/1308/1311	9 Dec 80	6,886
3297-81	1464	10 Dec 80	8,217
3312-81	1410	22 Dec 80	6,109
3313-81	1409	22 Dec 80	5,991
3316-81	1406	23 Dec 80	6,796
3317-81	1407	23 Dec 80	7,956
3318-81	1408	23 Dec 80	7,578
3319-81	1411	23 Dec 80	7,438
3320-81	1412	23 Dec 80	7,229

\$245,438.

Incl 1

Cost of Bldgs. vacant prior to 31 Dec 80 - No work started & projects not approved.

<u>JOB NO.</u>	<u>BLDG NO.</u>	<u>DATE ISSUED</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>
3337-81	1094/1189	2 Jan 81	336.00
3338-81	1184	"	588.63
3339-81	1714	"	12,344.00
3341-81	1745	"	10,988.00
3242-81	1419	5 Jan 81	10,887.00
3343-81	1742	"	11,517.00
3344-81	1743	"	10,021.00
3345-81	1414	"	11,467.00
3346-81	1415	"	11,402.00
3355-81	1417	7 Jan 81	10,130.00
3356-81	1418	"	11,669.57
3357-81	1416	"	11,126.00
3358-81	1565	9 Jan 81	6,680.00
3359-81	1420	"	11,191.00
3360-81	1421	"	10,373.00
3361-81	1422	"	11,724.00
3362-81	1423	"	11,968.00
3363-81	1424	"	11,711.00
3364-81	1425	"	11,938.00
3367-81	1638	"	6,660.00
3368-81	1639	"	4,291.00
3375-81	1627	14 Jan 81	3,794.00
3376-81	1634	"	5,431.00
3377-81	1635	"	5,610.00
3378-81	1636	"	7,185.00
3379-81	1637	"	2,528.00
			<hr/>
			\$223,560.20
3381-81	1632	15 Jan 81	3,804.00
3382-81	1633	"	3,656.00
3383-81	2553-2554	"	3,944.00
			<hr/>
		Grand Total	\$234,964.20

Vacant Bldgs after 1 Jan 1981 on which IJO's have been prepared (not approved).

<u>JOB NO.</u>	<u>BLDG NO.</u>	<u>DATE ISSUED</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>
3386-81	2022/2033	21 Jan 81	\$ 1,957.24
3387-81	2021, 2024-2025	"	<u>3,869.64</u>
			\$ 5,826.88

29 Grad - Eng - Admin - Tech - Support

No.	TITLE	G.S.	RATE	Time	1 YR Hours	180 Days Hours
1	Rec. Prop. Clerk	5/7	7.08	1 YR	2080	1740
1	Budget Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days	14726.10	8596.80
2	Work Order Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days		17193.60
1	Eng. Desk	5/5	6.48	180 days		9619.20
1	Continental	5/5	6.48	180 days		9619.20
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	180 days		7660.80
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	1 YR	11065.60	
					25792.00	58689.60
					TOTAL BASIC	78481.60
					Benefits (7.60%)	5761.60
					TOTAL	84243.20
2	mint warden	10/5	9.93	180 days		28598.40
					TOTAL	107080.00
					Benefits (7.60%)	8139.98
					TOTAL	115219.98

DFE/28Jan81

<u>ITENS</u>	<u>COST</u>	
Theatre	\$ 25.0	
Gym	45.0	
Ft. Smith → North	145.0	
Motor Pool	6.0	
INS Area Bldgs	15.0	
Hospital Area	247.5	(55 Bldgs @ 4.5 ea)
Main Enclave Barracks	1,452.0	(121 Bldgs @ 12.0 ea)
Main Enclave Admin/Mess	1,102.8	(167 Bldgs @ 6.6 ea)
Screens	98.9	
Stockade	4.0	
Fire Extinguishers	11.2	
1000 Area	57.5	(23 Bldgs @ 2.5 ea)
Removal of light poles/fixtures	45.0	
Repair of FESA Equipment and return shipment - also ECS	15.0	
Real Property Records	15.6	
Roads, Shoulders, Culverts, removal grate repairs	75.0	
Grounds Maintenance	65.0	
Removal of temporary construction items	30.0	
Removal of Loudspeakers	3.0	
Repair of Utility System	25.0	
Heating Central System	50.0	
Lagoon Aeration System	20.0	

Removal of Concertina Fence	\$ 40.0
Removal of Observation Tower	- 2.0
Removal of partitions and underpinning	20.0
Repair of Equipment-in-place (Mess Halls)	50.0
Repair of Local Alarms	31.0
Exterior painting/Main Enclave Area only	176.0
	<hr/>
	\$3,872.5

NOTE: It is anticipated that the main enclave fence and security lighting will be removed without cost to HHS for the salvage value of the fence and lighting system.

✓ CF: Connie O'Dell/Budget

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

ATZR-B-L

SUBJECT

Estimate of Restoration Costs

TO CFM

FROM CLOG

DATE 28 Jan 81

CMT 1

MAJ Roberts/gw/2238

1. An estimation of restoration costs is detailed below:

a. Identified losses prior to 31 Dec 80:

\$ 4,123.00	Furniture
<u>27,434.72</u>	Dining Facility Equipment
\$31,557.72	Total

b. Estimated costs for furniture and dining facility equipment which cannot be classified until turned in:

\$2,610,864.90	Issued Furniture
<u>939,906.99</u>	Issued Dining Facility Equipment
\$3,550,771.89	Total Issued
<u>X.25</u>	Estimate of Damage
\$ 887,692.98	Estimate of Loss

c. Total loss estimate:


\$887,692.98	Estimate
<u>31,557.72</u>	Identified
\$919,250.70	Grand Total

2. The 25% factor used to compute loss has been derived from the observed abuse of equipment, the lack of user accountability, and the failure to comply with approved supply procedures on the part of the user.

3. This estimate does not consider restoration costs for items procured solely for the Cuban Resettlement Task Force since replacement of such losses is not anticipated.

4. Personnel cost estimates for restoration must consider the retention of 29 personnel for 180 days subsequent to the termination of the resettlement mission. These personnel requirements are at Inclosure 1.

1 Incl
as


FRANCIS H. ROBERTS, JR.
MAJ, FA
Chief of Logistics

28 January 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Retention of Temporary Personnel

1. Restoration of this installation after termination of the Cuban Refugee Resettlement Operation includes recovery, inventory, accounting, classification, reporting, shipping, warehousing and replacing all equipment and supplies located on the installation, and re-establishing all buildings utilized for troop support to their original configuration. In addition, it continues to support all logistic functions, i.e., requisitions, receives, warehouses and issues all equipment and supplies, to include POL, building issues, linen and transportation support for Engineer materiel, repair parts, weekend troop training and scheduled Annual Training CY 82, to include planning and pre-camp conferences.

2. In view of the above work load, request authority and approval to retain 29 temporary employees for a period of 180 days to be utilized in the following areas:

a. Accounts Maintenance Clerk	GS-5	1 ea
b. Supply Clerks	GS-3	5 ea
c. Clerk Typist	GS-3	1 ea
d. Purchasing Clerk	GS-4	1 ea
e. Heavy Motor Vehicle Operator	WG-7	3 ea
f. Warehouseman Leader	WL-5	2 ea
g. Warehouseman	WG-4	<u>16</u> ea

Total 29

3. Planned schedule for restoration process is as follows:

a. Present to closing date; Retrieve all equipment not utilized or required as soon as possible through coordination with hand receipt holders.

b. Closing date + 30 days: Locating, retrieving and warehousing all equipment and supplies found on post.

c. 30 to 90 days after closing; Inventory, classifying, disposing and/or reporting all equipment.

Quil

m

ATZR-B-L


28 January 1981

SUBJECT: Retention of Temporary Personnel

d. 90 to 120 days: Restoration to include cleaning of all buildings and shipping of excess equipment,

e. 120 to 180 days: Relocating property and restoration of buildings for mission support and shipping of excess equipment,

4. The above mission can be accomplished by this activity without requesting support from Supply Division, Fort Sill, OK, which disrupts their assigned mission.



FRANCIS H. ROBERTS, JR.

MAJ, FA

Chief of Logistics

29 June 81
 Personal Cost - 180 days
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Utilities	G-S	W-C	Rate	1410 (sum)
Electric Clerk	5/5		6.168	7619.50
Busby Clerk	3/5		5.321	3830.25
Clark August	5/5		5.321	766.50
Purchasing Clerk	4/5		5.97	2591.80
Supervisor		7/5	2.56	3611.25
Walter		5/5	2.05	2318.10
Wichmann		4/5	4.81	15690.25
			Station Super	28038.15
			Bank Note (1260%)	21304.50
			total	30169.40

ESTIMATED RESTORATION COST

Period 8 May thru 31 Dec 1980

Rewire buildings North of Ft Smith Blvd (complete)

Cost

(1) Telephone House Wire	25,000ft	@ .08ft	\$2,000.00
(2) Terminal Blocks	110	@ .42ea	46.00
(3) Protectors	50	@5.00	250.00
(4) Ground Rods	60	@7.65	459.00
(5) Clamps, misc Hdwe Staples Insulators			100.00
(6) Ground Wire	500ft	@ .05ft	25.00
		Material	<u>\$2,880.00</u>

Labor to re-install above and Restore Communication s to buildings

450 M/H @ \$10.00 p/h	\$4,500.00
Total Cost	<u>\$7,380.00</u>

Rewire buildings South of Ft Smith Blvd (Incomplete)

(1) Telephone HouseWire	40,000ft	@ .08ft	\$3,200.00
(2) Terminal Blocks	140	@ .42	58.80
(3) Protectors	60	@ 5.00ea	300.00
(4) Ground Rods	75	@ 7.65ea	593.75
(5) Clamp, misc Hdwe, Staples, Insulators			125.00
(6) Ground wire	600ft	@ .05ft	30.00
			<u>\$4,297.55</u>

Labor to re-install above and Restore Communications to buildings

520 M/H @ \$10.00 p/h	\$5,200.00
Total Cost	<u>\$9,497.55</u>

Total Cost to Restore Communication to all buildings

Buildings North	\$7,380.00
Buildings South	9,497.55
TOTAL	<u>\$16,877.55</u>

Restoration:

Replacement of TA-236/PT Telephones stolen or destroyed by Cuban exercise.

Prior to Dec 31, 1980	73 telephones at \$20.00 ea	\$ 1,460.00
After Dec 31, 1980	11 telephones at \$20.00 ea	220.00
		<u>\$ 1,680.00</u>

TOTAL RESTORATION COST

Material	\$7,177.55
Labor	9,700.00
Phone Replacement	1,680.00
	<u>\$18,557.55</u>

Annex C (FEMA REIMBURSEMENT) to PART II to VOLUME VI to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

The following are attached:

Appendix 1 - Letter, 24 Jun 81

Appendix 2 - Letter, 30 Jun 81

Appendix 1 (LETTER, 24 JUN 81) to ANNEX C to PART II to VOLUME VI to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is The Adjutant General Center.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
DAEN-ZCP-U	Replacement of Destroyed Buildings at Fort Chaffee, AR

TO DACA-BUE FROM DAEN DATE 24 JUN 1981 CMT 1
Mr. Peters/gew/43936

1. Reference letter, DACA-BUE to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2 April 81, SAB (Incl 1).
2. In their 17 April 81 answer (Incl 2) to reference letter, FEMA balked at your request for reimbursement of \$582,500 for replacement of the four buildings destroyed during early June 1980 by Cuban refugees during a riot action. In their letter, FEMA admitted liability for reimbursement of the costs of fair market value of the destroyed property at the time of the loss.
3. In order to establish an equitable basis for determining fair market value a professional appraisal was requested through Corps of Engineers channels. The appraisal has been received, totals \$202,400 as of 5 June 1981, and is attached at Incl 3, for your use in requesting reimbursement from FEMA.
4. It is proposed to soon notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Army's intention to replace the four destroyed buildings, required for mobilization purposes, using FY 81 MCA authority under 10 USC 2673 with appropriation being provided from a \$202,400 FEMA reimbursement and other FY 81 funds available to the Corps of Engineers for the remainder. Your early action is sought to obtain concurrences of FEMA to reimburse the Army with the amount of \$202,400 for the destroyed buildings.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS:


N. G. DELBRIDGE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Engineers

- 3 Incl
1. Ltr, 2 Apr 81
2. Ltr, 17 Apr 81
3. Appraisal, 5 Jun 81

CF:

DAEN-ZCI
DAEN-REM-C
DAMA-OSD
ATEN-C
AFEN-CDC-P
ATZR-FEEP
ATZR-B-FE ←

VI-11-C-3

Appendix 2 (LETTER, 30 JUN 81) to ANNEX C to PART II to VOLUME VI to After
Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF DACA-BUE

30 June 1981

Federal Emergency Management Agency
1725 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20472

ATTN: Mr. James I. Makris

Dear Jim:

Reference our telephone conversation 30 June 81 and Tom Casey's letter of 17 April 81.

Attached is a complete set of documents that outlines procedures used to determine "fair market value" of building and equipment destroyed by fire during a riot of Cuban refugees in June 1980.

In line with our conversation of 30 June 81, I am assuming that FEMA will reimburse Department of Army \$202,400 for the destroyed buildings and equipment at an early date. Your check should be made payable to:

Commander, US. Army Forces Command
ATTN: AFCO-FAO
Ft. McPherson, GA 30330

I hope this closes a chapter in an overly drawn-out affair. Your cooperation in this matter is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely,

W. LOWE
Chief, Budget Execution
and Systems Division

CF: DAEN (Mr. Peters)
FORSCOM (CPT Decker)
DAMO-ODS

Annex D (HHS REIMBURSEMENT) to PART II to VOLUME VI to After Action Report
Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

081300Z JUL 81

FM CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFCO-FAO
TO CDR FT SILL OK//ATZR-RMFA//
INFO CDR USAFIVE FT SAM HOUSTON TX//AFKB-RM-PM//
UNCLAS

SUBJECT: BILLING HUMAN HEALTH SERVICES (HHS) FOR CUBAN REFUGEE SUPPORT

A. HQDA MSG, DACA-BUE, 011330Z JUL 81, SUBJ: BILLING HHS FOR CUBAN REFUGEE SUPPORT (U).

1. DURING A MEETING BETWEEN HQDA AND HHS REPRESENTATIVES ON 29 JUN 81, NO CONCLUSIVE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE ISSUE OF REIMBURSING THE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY FOR TOTAL RESTORATION OF FT CHAFFEE. THE MAJORITY OF RESTORATION AT FT CHAFFEE IS BEING DELAYED PENDING PLACEMENT OF THE REMAINING REFUGEES. SEP 81 HAS BEEN TARGETED FOR CLEARING FT CHAFFEE. HHS INDICATED THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO COVER TOTAL RESTORATION.

2. UNTIL THE RESTORATION ISSUE IS SETTLED, LOCAL PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACCUMULATE NECESSARY RESTORATION COSTS AND SHOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY UNWARRANTED DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENTS DUE TO THE HHS FUNDING SHORTAGE. HQDA AND FORSCOM WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES FOR TOTAL REIMBURSEMENT OF RESTORATION COSTS.

3. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, HHS HAS AUTHORIZED OBLIGATION OF AN ADDITIONAL \$1.0 MILLION TO RESTORE FACILITIES AT FT CHAFFEE. THIS ADDITIONAL \$1.0 MILLION REPRESENTS A CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF \$2.0 MILLION FOR RESTORATION.

4. ADDITIONAL BILLING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. APPROPRIATION TO BE BILLED IS 75X0174.

B. ACCOUNTING SYMBOL 1-1994765.

C. BILLS WILL CONTINUE TO FLOW THROUGH 5th ARMY TO FORSCOM.

D. SEPARATE SCHEDULES WILL BE PREPARED FOR OPERATIONS AND RESTORATION.

E. RECAP OF COSTS ON THE SF 1080 WILL INCLUDE SEPARATE LINES FOR OPERATIONS, COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PROVIDING SECURITY, AND RESTORATION. SUPPORTING SCHEDULES ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SECURITY COSTS. EXAMPLE OF SF 1080 BREAKOUT:

OPERATIONS:		\$XXXXX
SECURITY	\$XXXXX	
OTHER	XXXXX	
RESTORATION		XXXXX
	TOTAL	\$XXXXX

5. POC IS MR TERRY COOK, AV 588-3814/3745.

Annex E (REVISION OF RESTORATION ESTIMATE, JULY 81) to PART II to VOLUME VI
to After Action Report Task Force Resettlement Operation-Fort Chaffee

RESTORATION COSTS
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

	\$000		
	FEMA	HHS	TOTAL
28 May 81 - Cost Estimate:	\$1,099.7	\$6,403.6	\$7,503.3
CHANGES TO ESTIMATE - 21 July 81:			
Maint & Repair of Facilities		(450.6)	(450.6)
Replacement of Equipment	12.4	(77.4)	(65.0)
Addtl. Labor Requirements:			
Admin. (O&A,CPO,Budget)		80.4	80.4
Logistics		117.0	117.0
REVISED ESTIMATE FOR RESTORATION:	\$1,112.1	\$6,073.0	\$7,185.1
Billed to FEMA	(1,085.3)		(1,085.3)
Authority Received to Bill HHS		(2,000.0)	(2,000.0)
BALANCE:	\$ 26.8	\$4,073.0	\$4,099.8

RESTORATION COSTS - FORT CHAFFEE

	28 May 1981 Estimate		Increase/Decrease to Est.		Revised Estimate		
	FEMA	HHS TOTAL	FEMA	HHS	FEMA	HHS TOTAL	
1. Maint & Repair of Facilities	480,500	5,022,000	5,502,500	-450,600	480,500	6,571,400	5,051,900
2. Contracts							
a. Custodial to clean bldgs.	45,500		45,500		45,500		45,500
b. Mattress Renovation	525,000		525,000		525,000		525,000
3. Other Personnel Costs							
a. Administrative Support (O&A, CPO, Budget)		301,700	301,700	+ 80,400		80,400	80,400
b. Recovery, inventory, accounting, classification, reporting, shipping, warehousing and replacement of supplies and equipment				+117,000		418,700	418,700
4. Replacement of Equipment							
a. Furniture	4,100	652,700	656,800	-169,700	5,300	483,000	488,300
b. Dining Facility Equipment	27,400	235,000	262,400	- 43,000	38,600	192,000	230,600
c. Furniture Glides	12,900	14,700	27,600		12,900	14,700	27,600
d. Face Shields (Loaned)		31,000	31,000			31,000	31,000
e. Batons (Loaned)		9,400	9,400			9,400	9,400
f. Communications Equip (Loaned)		2,000	2,000			2,000	2,000
g. Lock Sets				+ 10,000		10,000	10,000
h. Armored Vests				+ 36,100		36,100	36,100
i. Miscellaneous		117,900	117,900	+ 89,200		207,100	207,100
USACC							
1. Replacement of Telephones	1,400	900	2,300		1,400	900	2,300
2. Repair and/or replace communications to bldgs.	2,900	4,300	7,200		2,900	4,300	7,200
HSC							
Supplies for packing for storing supplies/equip		12,000	12,000			12,000	12,000
TOTALS	1,099,700	6,403,600	7,503,300	-330,600	1,112,100	6,073,000	7,185,100

EA

CFE

21 July 1981
wd/2840

1. The current estimated cost to complete restoration of installed equipment and Facilities is \$2,662.900 as of 20 July 81. The estimate is my best considering the present situation. Additional damages could occur to both the installed equipment and Facilities resulting in higher restoration costs.
2. The disposition of the security fence and security lighting must be resolved. If HHS is to retain possession of these items, they must be informed that GSA must let a contract for removal and transportation. This division does not have the resources to divert from it's Restoration Mission for the removal.
3. Also HHS could save money on the exterior police and interior cleaning by organizing a Cuban work force to accomplish all of the exterior police and a large majority of the interior cleaning.
4. The 20th of September 81 is my revised estimate of the date I start releasing some of my work force. By that date I must have all or a large portion of the Restoration funds to insure that long lead time supply items are on hand. However if the Facilities are still occupied, I will still not be able to proceed due to lack of Facilities to work in. We must insist that the Cuban Resettlement Operation consolidate. 753 Cubans and the HHS support elements are occupying over 200 buildings. Consolidation should reduce the number of occupied buildings to 100 or less.

1 Incl
asRICHARD L. BROWN
LTC, CE
Chief, Facilities and Engineering

20 July 1981

ENGINEERING RESTORATION ESTIMATE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>COST</u>
Hospital Area	247.5 (55 Bldgs @ 4.5 ea)
Main Enclave Barracks	1,085.0 (70 Bldgs @ 15.5)
Main Enclave Admin/Support	679.8 (103 Bldgs @ 6.6 ea)
Main Enclave Mess Halls	78.8 (2 Bldgs @ 21.9 & 7 Bldgs @ 5.0)
Theater	25.0
Repair of FESA equipment and return	3.0
Real Property Records	25.0
Roads, shoulders & culverts	130.0
Removal, grade & repairs - Grounds maintenance	125.0
Removal of loudspeakers	3.0
Repair of Utility systems	67.0
Heating system	32.8
Interior cleaning of buildings	107.0
Exterior police	20.0
Removal of Observation Tower	2.0
Repair of Equipment-in-place (Mess Hall)	75.0
Repair of local alarms	<u>65.0</u>
SUBTOTAL	2,770.9
MINUS UNCOMMITTED	<u>108.0</u>
FROM 2nd MILLION	2,662.9
TOTAL	2,662.9

NOTE: It is anticipated that the main Enclave 10' fence and security lighting will be removed without cost to HHS for the salvage value of the fence and lighting systems.

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

ATZR-B-L

Estimate of Restoration Costs

TO C,FM

FROM C,LOG

DATE 21 Jul 81

CMT 1

Mr. Ross/gw/2238

1. A revision of restoration cost estimate is detailed below:

a. Identified losses prior to 31 Dec 80:

\$ 4,123.00	Furniture
<u>27,434.72</u>	Dining Facility Equipment
\$31,557.72	Total

b. Property found unserviceable and turned in to Property Disposal Office:

\$207,050.33

c. Identified item replacement requirements:

(1) Glides	\$ 27,600.00 14,700.00
(2) Face Shields	30,940.00
(3) Batons	9,370.00
(4) Loaned communications equipment restoration	2,000.00
(5) Lock Sets (warehouse, barracks, hospital, S&A bldg)	10,000.00
(6) Armored Vests	<u>36,090.00</u>
Total	\$126,000.00 103,100.00

d. Estimated costs for furniture equipment and dining facility equipment which cannot be classified until turned in:

\$2,610.864.90	Issued Furniture and Equipment
<u>939,906.99</u>	Issued Dining Facility Equipment
\$3,550.771.89	Total Issued

\$675,000.00 Estimate Damage/Loss

e. Total estimate of loss:


\$ 31,557.72	para a
207,050.33	para b
<u>103,100.00</u> 126,000.00	para c
<u>675,000.00</u>	para d
\$1,108,050.33	Grand Total
\$1,016,708.05	

ATZR-B-L

21 July 1981

SUBJECT: Estimate of Restoration Costs

2. Estimated loss in para d has been derived from the observed abuse of equipment, the lack of user accountability, and the failure to comply with approved supply procedures on the part of the user.
3. This estimate does not consider restoration costs for items procured solely for the Cuban Resettlement Task Force since replacement of such losses is not anticipated. It further does not consider losses/damage suffered by leased equipment; such loss is an operational cost and requires immediate reconciliation with the vendor and will be billed as a contractual settlement upon return of such equipment.
4. Personnel cost estimates for restoration must consider the retention of 39 personnel for 180 days subsequent to the termination of the resettlement mission. These personnel requirements are at Inclosure 1.


FRANCIS H. ROBERTS, JR.
MAJ, FA
Chief of Logistics

21 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Retention of Temporary Personnel

1. Restoration of this installation after termination of the Cuban Refugee Resettlement Operation includes recovery, inventory, accounting, classification, reporting, shipping, warehousing and replacing all equipment and supplies located on the installation, and re-establishing all buildings utilized for troop support to their original configuration. In addition, it continues to support all logistic functions, i.e., requisitions, receives, warehouses and issues all equipment and supplies, to include POL, building issues, linen and transportation support for Engineer materiel, repair parts, weekend troop training and scheduled Annual Training CY 82, to include planning and pre-camp conferences.

2. In view of the above work load, request authority and approval to retain 39 temporary employees for a period of 180 days to be utilized in the following areas:

a. Accounts Maintenance Clerk	GS-5	1 ea
b. Supply Clerk	GS-3	6 ea
c. Clerk Typist	GS-3	2 ea
d. Purchasing Clerk	GS-4	1 ea
e. Heavy Motor Vehicle Operator	WG-7	3 ea
f. Warehouseman Leader	WL-5	2 ea
g. Warehouseman	WG-4	14 ea
h. Mechanic	WG-8	5 ea
i. Lube Specialist	WG-4	1 ea
j. Parts Specialist	GS-3	1 ea
k. Dispatcher	GS-3	1 ea
l. Electronic Repairman	WG-10	1 ea
m. Supervisory Supply Clerk	GS-5	1 ea
	Total	<u>39</u>

ATZR-B-L

21 July 1981

SUBJECT: Retention of Temporary Personnel

3. Planned schedule for restoration process is as follows:

a. Present to closing date: Retrieve all equipment not utilized or required as soon as possible through coordination with hand receipt holders.


b. Closing date + 30 days: Locating, retrieving and warehousing all equipment and supplies found on post.

c. 30 to 90 days after closing: Inventory, classifying, disposing and/or reporting all equipment.

d. 90 to 120 days: Restoration to include cleaning of all buildings for mission support and shipping of excess equipment.

4. The above personnel include labor requirements for vehicle and electronic maintenance resulting from fleet support of restoration work force.

5. The above mission can be accomplished by this activity without requesting support from Supply Division, Fort Sill, OK, which disrupts their assigned mission.


FRANCIS H. ROBERTS, JR.
MAJ, FA
Chief of Logistics

ENGINEERS - ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>1 Yr HOURS 2080</u>	<u>180 Days HOURS 1440</u>
1	Real Property Clerk	5/7	7.08	1 Yr	14,726.40	
1	Budget Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days		8,596.80
2	Work Order Clerk	4/5	5.97	180 days		17,193.60
1	Engr Tech	5/5	6.68	180 days		9,619.20
1	Estimator	5/5	6.68	180 days		9,619.20
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	180 days		7,660.80
1	Clerk	3/5	5.32	1 Yr	<u>11,065.60</u>	
					25,792.00	52,689.60

	TOTAL BASE	78,481.60
	Benefits (7.60%)	<u>5,964.60</u>
	TOTAL	84,446.20
2	Maint Worker	WG 10/5
	180 days	9.73
	TOTAL BASE	107,080.00
	Benefits (7.60%)	<u>8,138.08</u>
	TOTAL	115,218.08
		28,598.40

Personnel Cost

Restrictions

180 days

21 Jul 81

	GS	W/C	RATE	1440 hrs.
DT A Jerry Ricket Charles Glass Bob Samml	7/10	5/11 7/11	6.85 6.28 7.46	956400 704320 1074240 2764960 225337 3190277
			Total Benefit 26%	
			Total	
CPO Dean Busch Robert Kinick Marilyn Robison Linda Shumate	4/5 4/11 3/1 3/1		5.97 5.87 4.70 4.70	859680 758880 676500 676500 2972160 225884 3178044
			Total Benefit 7.60%	
			Total	
Budget William Black Pat Baldwin	3/1 3/9		4.70 5.95	676800 856800 1533600 116554 1652154
			Total Benefit 7.60%	
			Total	
GRAND TOTAL				8038475

Personnel Cost

180 days

(Supply)

20 Jul 81

No.	TITLE	G.S.	WC	RATE	BASE
1	Accounts Mgmt Clerk	5/5		4.68	961920
6	Supply Clerk	3/5		5.32	4596480
1	Clk Special	3/5		5.32	766080
1	Purchasing Clerk	4/5		5.97	859680
3	Trng mtr. rsk. ager		7/5	8.36	3611520
2	Warehouse Leader		Wk 5/5	8.05	2318400
14	Warehousemen		4/5	6.81	1372560
<u>28</u>			TOTAL BASE		26573600
			Benefits (7.60%)		2040000
			TOTAL		28853100

Personnel Cost

180 days

(TISA)

20 Jul 81

No.	TITLE	GS	WG	RATE	1440	1440
1	clerk	5/5		6.68 Benefit 16% Dental	961920 73166 1035026	

TOTAL

SUPPLY
MOTOR Acc.
TISA

28883111
11946182
1035026
41864319

Personnel Cost

180 days

(Motor Pool)

20 Jul 81

No.	TITLE	OS	W/G	RATE	1970
5	Mechanics		8/5	8.88	6393600
1	Auto Specialist		4/5	6.81	980640
1	Auto Clerk	3/5		5.32	766080
1	Electrician (Repairman)		10/5	9.93	1429920
1	Dispatched	3/5		5.32	766080
1	Clerk (Appoint)	3/5		5.32	766080
			Detail	8.00	11162400
			Benefit	7.607	843762
			Detail		11946182

Wick Gas Station - Fuel Reservoir

Account	Description	Qty	Rate	Ext. L.P.	Remaind. L.P.	Remaind. Ext. L.P.	Date	Dept. No.
110-270-9137	57 1/2 gal	28.00	1.46	40.78	18950.00	18950.00	8/11/61	10 Station
110-270-9137	60 x 34 steel drum	2/6*	273.00	87.00	1628.00	1628.00	-	-
110-270-9176	60 x 34 steel drum	4*	15.00	60.00	15.00	1500.00	5-9-61	-
110-270-9176	60 x 34 steel drum	100	73.00	73.00	73.00	1825.00	5-9-61	-
110-270-9176	60 x 34 steel drum	2	137.00	27.40	137.00	262.00	5-9-61	-
110-270-9176	60 x 34 steel drum	2	4193.00	4193.00	18105.00	18105.00	-	-

VOLUME VII
ALBUM OF PHOTOGRAPHS





