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
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JUNE 1982

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS - CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

by

THOMAS E. BURNS, JR.

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Contemporary US terrorism is viewed in the context of a recurring social phenomenon the most recent incarnation dating approximately from the mid-sixties. Statistical accounting of claimed US terrorists incidents from January 1980 to December 1981, is set forth revealing a total of 71 incidents by various groups including Armenian, Jewish, Cuban Croatian, Puerto Rican and others. Actions concerned with Puerto Rican terrorism are shown to account for more than 40% of all incidents during the two year period as well as the most significant damages and injuries. Western European terrorism overview presented with specific details relating views of government officials on aspects of foreign direction, revealing general consensus of no direct evidence of Soviet or foreign control of plans and/or operations. Connection between various national terrorist groups acknowledged but no unified orchestration perceived on the part of many. Terrorism is compared with other social phenomena to place terrorism in its proper context for threat assessment. Material is set forth which indicates relatively stable incidence of terrorism over period viewed.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN TERRORIST
GROUPS - CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

BY

THOMAS E BURNS, JR.

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ABSTRACT

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This study reviews selected recent and historical terrorist activity in the US and Western Europe. It discusses the current status of terrorist groups in the US, Ireland, Germany and Italy. Definitions of terrorism from authorities in the academic, political and intelligence arena are set forth. Philosophical difficulties with the concept of terrorism are discussed, including the moral dilemma terrorism episodes present to the world community. Terrorism's weaknesses are illustrated both philosophically and practically. Contemporary US terrorism is viewed in the context of a recurring social phenomenon the most recent incarnation dating approximately from the mid-sixties. Statistical accounting of claimed US terrorists incidents from January 1980 to December 1981, is set forth revealing a total of 71 incidents by various groups including Armenian, Jewish, Cuban Croatian, Puerto Rican and others. Actions concerned with Puerto Rican terrorism are shown to account for more than 40% of all incidents during the two year period as well as the most significant damages and injuries. Western European terrorism overview presented with specific details relating views of government officials on aspects of foreign direction, revealing general consensus of no direct evidence of Soviet or foreign control of plans and/or operations. Connections between various national terrorist groups acknowledged but no unified orchestration perceived on the part of many. Terrorism is compared with other social phenomena to place terrorism in its proper context for threat assessment. Material is set forth which indicates relatively stable incidence of terrorism over period viewed.

PREFACE

This Individual Military Study Project was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Military Studies Program. The scope and methodology were approved by the War College and necessary funding and other support provided through such institution. The assistance of elements of the FBI, CIA and US Department of State is acknowledged. Any judgements made, deficiencies found or weaknesses evident in the material that follows are the responsibility of the author and not of the above or others who assisted in this effort.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

This study was undertaken to examine the mass of public source and unclassified government material to determine the nature of terrorism, its current status and the foreseeable threat posed to the US government and others by terrorism.

Methodology

A review of assorted publications on terrorism, in both the academic and government communities was made. A search of the Index to the New York Times for the period from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1981 (the most recent date available) was conducted for descriptions of various incidents during the period. Reports by Congressional committees responsible for oversight of terrorism and investigation thereof were reviewed for a similar period. Background interviews were conducted with FBI, CIA and Department of State personnel at their respective headquarters in the Washington, DC, area and with investigative and supervisory personnel in the New York FBI office. Computerized references to terrorism as found in the DIALOG Magazine Index from January 1, 1977 through October 1981, and a terrorist abstract computer printout from "The Information Bank" for the period from January 1979 to March 1981 were also reviewed. Finally a variety of other media sources was consulted.

In keeping with the encouragement contained in the Military Studies Program Directive, material utilized in this study was purposely limited to unclassified information.

Statement of the Problem

Recent terrorist incidents at home and abroad have often been subject to disparate interpretations as to their meaning and significance. Trends appear unclear despite a surfeit of commentary on terrorism by journalists, authors, academicians, consultants, politicians and others. Terrorism, as a commodity, is marketable economically, politically and academically. Its marketability ensures a "data dump" which confuses more than enlightens.

A paranoia of terrorism seems to pervade our national psyche at times. Each significant incident aggravates the symptoms causing more persistent and intense calls to action. The more remote the incident, seemingly the more the risk is perceived. A perverse reasoning appears to prevail which posits, if it can happen there, how much greater must the risk be here?

Simply stated the problem addressed within, stripped of emotion and rhetoric, is "What threat does terrorism present today to US persons and property at home and abroad?" Can we place the risk of terrorism in some context which affords a realistic assessment of the threat without reference to the hyperbole of the past.

These and other issues then form the substance of this effort.

CHAPTER II

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF TERRORISM

Terrorism Defined

Definitions of terrorism abound. Definitions are as numerous and diffuse as commentators. To provide a better insight into the nature of terrorism, the following definitions are set forth for consideration:

Terrorism, a form of insurgent warfare conducted either by individuals or very small groups, involves the use of systematic, arbitrary and amoral violence - for example murder, torture, mutilation, bombing, arson, kidnapping and hijacking - in order to achieve both long and short-term political aims.

Westview Special Study,
Insurgency in the Modern World,
Edited by Bard E. O'Neill, et. al., p. 4

Terrorism is the use of violence to achieve political goals . . . it is extreme violence and coercive intimidation for political ends . . . it is contemporary barbarism . . . (it) is the weapon of the weak pretending to be strong.

Paul Wilkinson
Terrorism and the Liberal State,
pp. xii, 49, 64, 234

Terrorism is theater . . . it's affordable war which seems to work.

Dennis W. Stiles,
Sovereignty and the New Violence,
Air University Review, Volume XXVII
Number 5, July-August, 1976

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political symbolic effect that is aimed at achieving a psychological impact on a target group wider than its immediate victims, and

Senator Jeremiah A. Denton,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism, Senate
Judiciary Committee, quoted by
Charles Mohr, "Hearings on Terror Opens
With Warning on Soviet" New York Times,
April 25, 1981 p. 10

Terrorism is . . . violence or threat of violence (perpetrated for political effect) calculated to gain widespread attention by its inherent drama and to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, which in turn causes people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the importance of their cause.

John B. Stuart, Jr., et. al.,
Generic Adversary Characteristics Report,
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
March, 1979 p. 60

Terrorism is . . . the use of violence . . . against an instrumental target . . . to communicate to a primary target a threat of violence so as to coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety in connection with a demanded . . . (political) outcome.

Jordan J. Paust,
Terrorism and the International
Law of War, Military Law Review,
Spring, 1974 pp. 3,4

Terrorism . . . (is) the use of covert violence by a group for political ends . . . usually directed against a government less frequently against another group, class or party.

Walter Laqueur,
Terrorism, p. 79

Terrorism . . . (is) the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims.

Central Intelligence Agency,
Patterns of International Terrorism,
1980 Edition, p. ii

These definitions are essentially more similar than dissimilar; each illuminating the nature of terrorism from a somewhat different perspective. Furthermore, terrorism is often referred to in the context of its geographic or wider political implications. Thus, when terrorism is prefaced with the adjectives, international or transnational it refers to terrorist behavior with additional distinctive characteristics. International and transnational terrorism also fall victim to multiple definitions, to wit,

International terrorism . . . is terrorism carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state. Transnational terrorism is terrorism carried out where perpetrators are essentially non-state actors.

David L. Milbank,
"International and Transnational
Terrorism, Diagnosis and Prognosis," in
Contemporary Terrorism Selected Readings
Edited by John D. Elliot & Leslie K. Gibson
p. 51

International Terrorist activities means any activity or activities which:

- (a) Involves killing, causing serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or violent destruction of property, or an attempt or credible threat to commit such acts; and
- (b) Appears intended to endanger a protectee of the Secret Service or the Department of State or to further political social or economic goals by intimidating or coercing a civilian population or any segment thereof, influencing the policy of a government or international organization by intimidation or coercion, or obtaining widespread publicity for a group or its causes; and
- (c) Transcends national boundaries in terms of the means by which it is accomplished, the civilian population, government, or international organization it appears intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which its perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

"Executive Order 12036"
in, Intelligence Requirements for
the 1980's Edited by Roy Godson,
Appendix III, p. 30

International Terrorism . . . (is) terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions or governments. (It) has involved groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes (for example Yugoslavia and El Salvador), to rectify national or group grievances (for example the Palestinians) or to undermine international order as an end in itself (for example the Japanese Red Army).

Central Intelligence Agency
Patterns of International Terrorism,
1980 Edition, p. ii

International Terrorism is terrorism which is,

1. Directed against foreigners or foreign targets.
2. Concerted by the governments or fractions of more than one state.
3. Aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government.

Transnational terrorism has often been confused and used interchangeably with international terrorism; however, it has been distinguished by some writers to apply to those terrorists who operate internationally with the express long-term purpose of global revolution or of establishing a revolutionary supranational world order. These terrorists are an exotic minority of international terrorists and are exemplified by the Japanese Red Army.

Paul Wilkinson
Terrorism and the Liberal State,
p. 173, 174

A respected commentator on terrorism, Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC, has observed that any definition of political terrorism "venturing beyond noting the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or the threat of such acts toward achieving political ends is bound to lead to endless controversies." Furthermore, although the quest for a complete definitive statement of the essential nature of terrorism will continue for sometime, it "will not result in a consensus and (indeed) will make no notable contribution toward the understanding of terrorism."¹ The message here is not to get

caught up in a fruitless search for an absolute definition lest such effort obscure the more important task of understanding the nature of terrorism today and the risk it poses for society.

One important distinction which must be made is that terrorism differs from guerrilla warfare. If we fail to distinguish between the two, we will understand neither. Terrorism is primarily directed against unarmed civilians. It is a form of insurgent warfare just as guerrilla warfare, but it doesn't seek to engage the regular military forces of its enemy or destroy the enemy's means of production. Terrorism does not so much seek to defeat the enemy physically as to erode his psychological support by inducing fear in his supporters both domestically and internationally. Guerrilla warfare differs from terrorism in that its targets are most often the military or police forces of its enemy.² Guerrilla warfare attempts to have a more direct impact on the adversary by attacking both uniformed military and economic targets of importance to the enemy. Guerrilla warfare usually involves units larger than the traditional terrorist groupings. The nature of its targets often requires greater logistic support than terrorists require. These logistic needs frequently result in base camps of some appreciable size and complexity.

Some observers have suggested size as the major distinction between terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare. Under such rationale an arbitrary number is selected as the point where terrorism ends and guerrilla warfare begins. This pragmatic approach may satisfy some administrative needs, but it is essentially counterproductive. It omits from consideration those factors which are true indicators of terrorism and guerrilla warfare and hence contributes to the already imprecise thinking in the area.

One final caveat. In defining terrorism we must resist the impulse to so broadly construe it that it includes all forms of political violence. Doing so adds nothing to understanding terrorism. It only obscures its nature and dilutes the concept to a point where terrorism is indistinguishable from other violent activity. Under a broad definition, the shooting of President Reagan might be considered terrorism as well as the military confrontation in El Salvador.

Historical Perspective

Terrorism is often thought of as a contemporary phenomenon born of the failure of modern societies to adequately satisfy the needs of all its members. In truth, political violence, akin to what we might call terrorism today, is found throughout history. Walter Laqueur in his book "Terrorism" traced terrorist behavior back at least to the Sicarii, a highly organized religious sect active in the Zealots struggle in Palestine, circa, AD65-75. They are mentioned by Tacitus and in rabbinical writings as having burned granaries. At one time they were reported to have sabotaged Jerusalem's water supply. They were the extreme, nationalist, anti-Roman party and their victims were the moderates. Indeed some others have traced terrorism back to the dawn of civilization.³

The more or less modern terrorist period in the US could be dated from the 1860s with the founding of the Ku Klux Klan. In Europe during the latter part of the 19th century there also were groups operating which employed terrorist tactics, notably in Ireland, Russia, Germany, France and the Balkans. Some of them were nationalistically motivated, others were anarchists with little plan other than destruction. During the first part of the twentieth century episodes of terrorism continued

from both right and left wing terrorists in the US and Europe.

Thus, the advent of US and European terrorist groups in the late 1960s can be viewed as the contemporary incarnation of recurring terrorist episodes. It was only little more than a decade ago that urban terrorism began to attract general attention and,

Seen in historical perspective it was no more than a revival of certain forms of political violence that had been used previously in many parts of the world. But given the frailty of human memory it was perhaps not surprising that the re-emergence of terrorism should have been regarded . . . as an altogether novel phenomenon and that its causes and the way to cope with it should have been discussed as if nothing of the kind had ever happened before.⁴

Philosophical Difficulties

The oft repeated and trite adage, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," succinctly expresses the dilemma confronting nations today in their efforts to resolve incidents of international terrorism. It clearly expresses the differing moral perspective from which nations and individuals view the problem. It states, quite rightly, that terrorism is viewed by some as a pejorative appellation for what others see as heroic acts of liberation and herein lies the rub. Brian M. Jenkins, Director of the Security and Subnational Conflict Program, the Rand Corporation, has observed that the dilemma's solution lies in the realization that "One man's terrorist is every man's terrorist."⁵ While Jenkins' prescription is true enough, he would be the first to acknowledge it as an impossible dream in the contemporary political setting.

The response to terrorism is further complicated in that terrorism qua terrorism is not a crime under the US legal system nor under the legal system of other states. Indeed the Fifth UN Congress on Preven-

tion of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva, Switzerland in September, 1975, noted,

The attention of the participants was focused on the phenomenon of 'terrorism' which has no accepted definition in any legal code resulting in real difficulties in considering it in the context of the criminal justice process.⁶

The UN has traditionally reflected the difficulty of its member states in its efforts to deal with terrorism. Contradiction in the UN's approach to terrorism is seen in the policy set forth in the "General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN." This document states, inter alia,

Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts.⁷

This would appear to state a strong UN position against terrorism. The document, however, raises questions when it goes on to state that member states have an obligation to help people struggling for their freedom and independence.⁸ [Emphasis added]

In fact a 35 member ad hoc Committee on Terrorism in the UN has further complicated the issue by producing a definition of terrorism which appears to be pejorative in the extreme. Terrorism, it declares, consists of "Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes against people struggling for their liberation."⁹ Other commentators believe terrorists should be equated with war criminals and pirates and declared outlaws before all the world and labeled according to international law, hostis generis humani, (enemies of humanity).¹⁰ It is difficult to gain even a semblance of unanimity in a world organization where such widely divergent attitudes prevail.

During the last twenty years there have been at least five international conventions signed by participating nations aimed largely against international terrorism. (Tokyo Convention, Hague Convention, Montreal Convention, OAS Convention, and UN Convention Concerning Crime Against Internationally Protected Persons). These conventions, however, only deal piecemeal with particular aspects of terrorism, specifically skyjacking and attacks on diplomats and in no way represent a comprehensive response by the international community to terrorism.

Thus when dealing with terrorism we must constantly keep in mind that we are involved in an area which is supercharged emotionally and where no acceptable definition is agreeable to all the parties involved. While it is often possible to gain agreement between and among those who view the situation in question as "terrorism" in the final analysis, such agreement is usually contingent on the more parochial issue of whose bull is being gored.

Inherent Weaknesses

Terrorism as a theory is based on certain assumptions about human nature and behavior. These assumptions are either false or at the least unproven and of dubious validity. They are:

1. Persons confronted with threats to life and limb will ultimately surrender their allegiances, principles or beliefs to save themselves.
2. Terrorism inevitably leads to terrorization of the target and victim and that,
3. Consequently when the target/victim has been exposed to a given quotient of coercive intimidation, a collapse of will occurs and submission to persecutors results.¹¹

These assumptions, it is submitted, are not absolute and therefore are not always operative. The assumptions fail to adequately account for the whim and caprice of both target and victim which have considerable consequence for the outcome of any terrorist confrontation.

Che Guevara, the expatriate Argentinian-Cuban revolutionary identified another liability of terrorism when he wrote that terrorism was,

A measure that is generally indiscriminate and ineffective in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys . . . lives that would be valuable to the revolution.

He also believed that terrorism can turn people against a revolutionary movement and its rapport with the masses.¹²

Another weakness is that terrorist groupings, by their very nature, contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. The inevitable effect of the criminal and conspiratorial nature of the terrorist enterprise, it is submitted, has a corrupting impact over time on the personality of those involved. The terrorists, as it were, become what they are and cannibalize themselves. This phenomenon has been observed first hand by the writer and others and may indeed explain the often episodic nature of terrorism. Factionalization occurs, energy is spent on internecine conflict and new groups rise, Phoenix like from the ashes of the former group. Over time this process tends to enfeeble and ultimately the successor groups become weakened and impotent.

The Russian terrorist Bakunin observed this same phenomenon many years ago when he described the duplicity of Nechayev's terrorist secret society.

Truth, mutual trust, serious and strict solidarity exists only amongst a dozen or so individuals who form the sanctum sanctorum

of the society. All others must serve as blind tools, exploitable material in the hands of the dozen men with real solidarity. It is allowed and ordered to trick them, compromise them, rob them and even destroy them if need be; they are fodder for conspiracy.¹³

Walter Laqueur has noted that terrorists' campaigns, with some exceptions, seldom last longer than three or four years. Once security forces have mastered counter-terrorist techniques, terrorist losses usually become unacceptably high and enthusiasm wanes. Those instances where terrorist campaigns last longer, are the result of the terrorism being launched from some sanctuary or the terrorists having strong support of a nationalist, separatist or religious kind.¹⁴ Although Laqueur is correct in what he says he doesn't go far enough. The internal dissension (supra) which inevitably builds over time contributed substantially to the groups' demise internally just as sure as the counter-terrorist authorities are working to the same effect externally.

CHAPTER III

CONTEMPORARY US TERRORISM

Overview

For purposes of this paper, the primary focus on US terrorism will of necessity, be confined to the recent past. Emphasis will be placed on terrorist groups which have been involved in incidents of terrorism since January 1, 1980.

The current episode of terrorism in the US dates in the main from the late 1960s and has continued sporadically to the present time. The groups have been both of the left and the right although those espousing a leftist philosophy have been more numerous, vocal and active. Leftist groups have had a significantly greater impact on how terrorism is viewed today by many observers. Indigenous US terrorist groups appear to be primarily ethnically centered with overtones of either a Fascist, Marxist-Leninist, nationalist or separatist philosophy. Many indigenous groups such as the National Socialist White Peoples Party (American Nazi Party), the Black Panther Party, (BPP) and the American Indian Movement (AIM) were primarily involved in terrorist efforts in the late 60s and early 70s. They have for the most part faded from the scene and are not significant terrorist actors today. One grouping in this indigenous ethnic category however, the various Puerto Rican pro-independence organizations remains the most significant factor in current US terrorism.

On the right the Ku Klux Klan sporadically continues to be involved in terrorist episodes. It does not, however, function as a nationally organized cohesive entity but rather as a locally inspired, locally organized, and often locally ineffective group.

Other indigenous but non ethnic terrorist groups grew out of the new - left student protest groups of the 60s. They have similarly passed from the scene and are no longer viable terrorist organizations in the US. This category would include groups such as the Weather Underground.

The contemporary US terrorist scene is in large measure identified with issues and concerns which are external to the United States. These terrorist groupings are not so much concerned with events and situations prevailing in the United States as they are with some extra - US problem and in that sense they are non-indigenous. These groups are also ethnic in nature and frequently seek to redress some real or perceived illegitimacy. Groups in this category include expatriate Cuban, Croatian and Armenian organizations as well as a few Jewish organizations. The truly ethnic terrorists are almost exclusively interested in representatives of the "alien" regimes they oppose and their targeting in the US is primarily directed at them. US interests when occasionally targeted by these groups tend to be instrumentalities or proxy targets selected to achieve some ulterior purpose.

Statistics¹⁵

Terrorist incidents inside the US increased during 1981 reversing the trend of the previous four years which showed a pattern of decline. In 1981, there were 42 claimed incidents of terrorism within the United States. This was an increase of 13 incidents over the 29 incidents

recorded for 1980. By comparison there were 111 terrorist incidents in 1977; 69 acts of terrorism in 1978 and 52 in 1979. The 1980 terrorist incidents were largely concentrated in the New York City area, and in Puerto Rico. In 1981, terrorist incidents were again concentrated in these same locations with an additional concentration noted in California as a result of the activities of two Armenian and two Jewish terrorist groups there.

Fourteen groups were identified as responsible for the 29 incidents of terrorism reported in 1980. Six of the fourteen groups were Puerto Rican with the majority of their activities occurring in Puerto Rico (two arsons, six bombings, two attempted bombings and one shooting). Three other Puerto Rican terrorist incidents occurred in New York (two bombings, one hostage situation) and one hostage situation occurred in Chicago, Illinois. Thus, terrorist incidents connected in some fashion with Puerto Rico accounted for more than half the terrorist incidents in the US during 1980 (15 of 29). Of the remaining eight terrorist groups, six were essentially ethnic groups concerned with causes which do not directly involve the US. (Jewish, Cuban, Armenian, Libyan, Croatian and Iranian). Only two groups were indigenous in the sense that their concerns were directly related to the US political system; they were a small communist group and a splinter Klan group.

During 1981, as noted above, there were 42 claimed terrorist incidents in the US. As in 1980, Puerto Rican groups were responsible for the largest portion (16) which equates to 38% of the total incidents. Similarly ethnic groups whose causes do not directly concern the US (Armenian, Croatian, Sierra Leone Liberian, Cuban, Iranian, Jewish and Libyan) accounted for 24 other terrorist incidents more than half (57%)

of the total for the year. As in 1980 only two terrorist incidents were directly linked to two indigenous groups, both small communist groups.

The casualty total related to the 71 terrorist incidents in the US during the period January 1, 1980, to December 31, 1981 were 23 injured and 2 killed. Nineteen injuries and one death occurred in 1980 and four injuries and one death occurred in 1981. Bombings of all types, totaling 39 over the two year period, were the largest single component of the statistics. When attempted bombings, numbering 14, are added we see that such incidents (53) account for 75% of all terrorists incidents during the two year period. Furthermore, during 1981, bombings and attempted bombings accounted for approximately 80% of all terrorist incidents.

In 1981, Jewish terrorist groups accounted for the second highest number of terrorist incidents (8), in the US, followed by Armenian (6), Cuban (4), Iranian (2), Croatian (1), Libyan (1), Liberian (1), and Sierra Leonean (1) groups. Indigenous communist groups were responsible for two incidents.

Additional details, including short descriptive narratives of some of the (71) incidents occurring in 1980 and 1981 follow.

Groups and Incidents

Puerto Rican. Incidents of terrorism in both the US and Puerto Rico related to the efforts of Puerto Rican terrorist groups to secure independence from the US were the single most numerous category during the period from 1977 through 1981. Such incidents accounted for 128 of 303 terrorist incidents during the five year period fully 42% of all domestic incidents. Indeed one group, the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) has claimed responsibility for more than 100

bombings and attempted bombings since October, 1974, in Chicago, New York, Washington, DC, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. These FALN bombings alone are known to have caused five deaths, 80 injuries and more than \$3.5 million in estimated damages.

Aside from being the single largest component in the US terrorist incident profile, Puerto Rican terrorism is one of the oldest terrorist phenomena facing the US. It is arguably the most complex in terms of organizations, personnel and targets involved. Historically the first act of terrorism in Puerto Rico goes back at least as far as 1931, when a member of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party (PRNP) attacked a Judge of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico at a Fourth of July US independence celebration. The PRNP organized in September 1922, is probably the earliest known organization with the main objective of destroying the existing government of Puerto Rico by any means, in order to terminate US dominion and secure Puerto Rican independence.

Numerous acts of violence have occurred since that date by a variety of Puerto Rican terrorist organizations resulting in considerable death, injury and destruction both in the US and Puerto Rico. Two of the more spectacular incidents were the attack on "Blair House," then the temporary residence of President Harry S. Truman, by Puerto Rican terrorists in October 1950, and the March 1954, attack on the US House of Representatives by four Puerto Rican nationalist terrorists. Over the years, police agencies have identified no fewer than 15 terrorist groups which have operated for varying periods of time both in Puerto Rico and the continental US. Various Puerto Rican political groups which endorse the activities of the violent terrorist organizations have also been identified over the years. Examples of both types of groups are functioning today in both the US and Puerto Rico. In fact a recent

study by the Rand Corporation on Puerto Rican terrorism concludes, as we have here, that such terrorism is the greatest internal terrorist threat to the US today.¹⁶

During 1980 and 1981, 31 incidents of terrorism by various groups connected with the Puerto Rican independence movement are known to have occurred. Available data regarding each of the groups follows:

FALN. This group is a clandestine Puerto Rican terrorist organization operating in the United States. It has claimed and been identified by various police agencies as responsible for over 100 bombing incidents since 1974. The FALN claimed responsibility for two terrorist incidents in 1980, none in 1981 and four in 1982 through March 31st.

The downturn in FALN activity is due, at least in part, to successful police work. The FALN was severely disabled by the arrest of 11 members by Evanston, Illinois, police on April 4, 1980, while apparently preparing a political kidnapping. The defendants were prosecuted in Federal court on charges which included seditious conspiracy, plotting against the government illegally, automobile theft and illegal use and possession of weapons. The indicted defendants were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of from 55 to 90 years.

The arrests and convictions severely crippled the FALN. From a high level of terroristic activity in the years prior to the 1980 arrests the FALN was unheard from for almost two years. Then on February 28 and March 1, 1982, four bombs claimed by the FALN exploded in quick succession in the financial district of New York City. Targeted were the offices of Merrill, Lynch and Co., the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and the Chase Manhattan Bank. No injuries and minor damages were reported. The bombings may indicate a resurgence

of the FALN although many remain convinced that the organization was badly hurt by the arrests and convictions. It is believed that the arrests accounted for a good percentage of the membership of the FALN and the organization was forced to curtail its activities for almost two years. The FALN in the past has used bombings as a tactic, almost exclusively and in its weakened condition can be expected to do little more. The FALN has primarily operated in the US as opposed to other Puerto Rican groups which have primarily operated in Puerto Rico.

Revolutionary Commandos of the People (CRP). The CRP is a clandestine terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for eleven bombing incidents on Puerto Rico since October 1977, directed at US government installations and oil companies. During 1980 and 1981 the seven incidents claimed by the CRP were all bombing incidents directed against US Postal facilities on Puerto Rico. The group is not known to operate in the continental US. In terms of impact, its efforts to date have been relatively ineffective causing minimal damage.

Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros. This group, also known as the Popular Puerto Rican Army (EPB), is a pro-independence terrorist group operating both in Puerto Rico and in the continental US. It claimed credit for 10 terrorist incidents from August 1978 to early 1982 resulting in extensive damages and one death. EPB has jointly claimed responsibility for at least 16 other terrorist incidents which resulted in two additional deaths and other damage during this same period.

During 1981, the Macheteros claimed credit for five terrorist incidents (four bombings and one armed robbery) including two bombings which caused more than 40 million dollars in damages. On January 12, 1981, the group set bombs that destroyed nine military jet fighters and damaged two others at the Muniz Air National Guard base adjacent to the

International Airport at Isla Verde Puerto Rico. There were 13 explosions and 3 unexploded pipe bombs were recovered from other planes. Of the planes destroyed eight were A-7 jet fighters costing over four million dollars each. Subsequently in November, 1981, the Macheteros took responsibility for bomb blasts which knocked out electricity for 20,000 customers in the San Juan metropolitan area. Two substations were damaged by the bombing and damage was estimated at over ten million dollars.

During 1980 the Macheteros claimed responsibility for an attack on three US Army officers in San Juan, Puerto Rico, injuring one. The attempt to assassinate the officers occurred as they were driving to work. A subsequent communique from the Macheteros claimed the attack as a military operation carried out to rid the island of "occupation forces." Earlier in December 1979, the Macheteros along with two other Puerto Rican terrorist groups took responsibility for an attack on a bus carrying United States Navy personnel at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico in which two sailors were killed and ten others injured. (As this report goes to press the group has claimed another attack on U.S. military personnel in Puerto Rico resulting in the murder of one sailor and the wounding of others in May 1982).

The Macheteros activities which have been largely confined to Puerto Rico are in direct contrast to the pattern of bombing in the US by the FALN. The Macheteros have emphasized attacks on the military or high value economic targets whereas the FALN has largely targeted low value commercial or civilian US government offices. The Macheteros in their attacks would appear to more closely resemble urban guerrillas than terrorists based on their choice of targets.

The Macheteros have received the public praise of some of the Puerto Rican advocates of independence. Juan Antonio Corretjer, the socialist doyen of the non-clandestine political movement for independence has noted the Macheteros have not so much terrified the people as they have struck blows against the armed forces of the US. Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, praised the Macheteros attack on the Isla Verde Base saying the group had overcome the mediocrity and sloppiness which had been the subject of criticism in the past.

Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVPRR). This Puerto Rican terrorist group jointly claimed responsibility with the Macheteros and the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance for the attack in December 1979, on US Navy personnel at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico. In July 1980, they claimed responsibility for four bombings in four separate cities in Puerto Rico. The bombings were all aimed at radio towers, one of which was operated by the US Coast Guard. They caused interruptions in each instance. Earlier during 1979, OVPR claimed responsibility for two bombings of US Coast Guard facilities on Puerto Rico. OVPR has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist incidents since July 1980.

Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP). Since January 1978, this terrorist group has been responsible for an armed attack on a police station and the theft of weapons from a sporting goods store during an armed robbery. FARP participated with the Macheteros and OVPRR in the Sabana Seca attack in December 1979, supra. FARP has claimed numerous terrorist incidents on the Island of Puerto Rico. In December 1980, the group exploded two bombs in Pennsylvania Station in New York City. A communique subsequently issued claimed the bombs were

to protest the arrival of Cuban and Haitian refugees in Puerto Rico. The last known FARP terrorist incident occurred in March 1980, when a bomb ignited in a vehicle in the basement of the Condado Convention Center in Puerto Rico one hour before Henry Kissinger was due to deliver a speech in the Convention Center. A communique issued after the incident claimed responsibility for it and for "all the revolutionary organizations operating in Puerto Rico." The group has not claimed responsibility for any other incidents in over a year.

Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR), This terrorist group claimed responsibility for one bombing and four attempted bombings in New York City, during the period May 16-18, 1981. One bomb exploded at John F. Kennedy International Airport killing one man and two other unexploded bombs were also found there. Subsequently on May 18, 1981, bombs were delivered by mail to the US Mission to the UN in New York and to the General Consul of the Honduras Consulate in New York City. No injuries occurred in these latter four attempted bombings and all were claimed by PRAR. The group had not been heard of before these incidents and has not been heard from since.

Star Group (SG), National Liberation Movement (NLM), Anti-Communist Alliance (ACA), Each of the above groups were responsible for one incident of terrorism during the period January 1, 1980, December 31, 1981, on the island of Puerto Rico. Two were bombings, one by the ACA in San Juan, Puerto Rico in January 1980, and one by the SG in Carolina, Puerto Rico in August 1981. The NLM claimed responsibility for shots fired at the guard house at the entrance to Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico on November 27, 1981. A military policeman on duty at the gate was wounded in the attack.

Armenian

Since 1973, a number of Armenian terrorist groups have been involved in at least 130 attacks worldwide, including 21 assassinations primarily directed against Turkish diplomatic personnel and installations. The attacks have been claimed by various groups as retribution for the purported massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey during World War I. The actual historical record of Turkish/Armenian conflict during World War I is subject to debate with the Armenians claiming genocide by the Turks and the Turks claiming that while 200,000 Armenians died during World War I, their death was not the result of a planned massacre, but rather due to the fortunes of war.

Significant Armenian attacks against Turks in the US did not occur until the late 1970s. Since that time ten bombing incidents and two assassinations, in January and May 1982, have been carried out in the US by such groups. Groups active in the recent past are described as follows:

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). This terrorist group has been responsible for two incidents in the US since January 1, 1980. On February 22, 1981, two bombs were detonated at a store in Hollywood, California, causing minimal damage. The store had previously received an extortion letter from the ASALA demanding a \$150,000 contribution. A second bomb was detonated in October, 1981, at the Hollywood Palladium during an affair sponsored by an Armenian aid association. ASALA later claimed the bombing.

ASALA ostensibly seeks reunification of historic Armenian land now under Turkish control with the existing Soviet-Socialist Armenian Republic. The group has as its enemies "imperialism," the Turkish State and so-called Armenian reactionaries, especially the traditional Armenian

political parties.

ASALA activities have been centered in California where there is a substantial Armenian population estimated at approximately 500,000. ASALA also has strong ties to Lebanon where a substantial Armenian Community of 200,000 exists and where ASALA may have originated.

October 3. October 3 is connected with ASALA and derives its name from the date two Armenian terrorists were arrested by Swiss authorities after a bomb they were building exploded. In February 1981, the group claimed responsibility for a bomb discovered attached to the wall adjacent to the front door of the Swiss Consulate in Los Angeles.

June 9 Organization. This terrorist group is an offshoot of ASALA and derives its name from the killing of a Turkish diplomat in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 9, 1981. During 1981, it claimed two bombings in Los Angeles directed against Swiss companies (June 26, 1981, and August 20, 1981), to protest the imprisonment of Armenian nationalists by Swiss authorities.

Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). JCAG is considered the second major Armenian terrorist organization in the US; the other being ASALA. JCAG communications have been devoid of Marxist cant. The group has similar ends to ASALA; however, seeks "justice" rather than a unified socialist Armenia as does ASALA. The group has been active worldwide since 1973. Since January 1, 1980, the group has been involved in four bombings and two assassinations in the US with four of the six incidents occurring in California.

Claimed incidents include:

- o October 6, 1980, fire bombing of Consul General of Turkey in Los Angeles.

- o October 12, 1980, bombing of Turkish owned travel agency in Hollywood, California.
- o October 12, 1980, bombing of Turkish Mission to the UN in New York City.
- o November 20, 1981, bombing of Turkish Consulate at Los Angeles, California.
- o January 1982, assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles, California.
- o May 1982, assassination of Honorary Turkish Consul General, Somerville, Massachusetts.

The Armenian terrorist groups have not targeted US citizens qua US citizens for their attacks to date.

Jewish

During the two year period 1980-1981, Jewish terrorist groups claimed responsibility for nine terrorist incidents in the US. This total placed the Jewish terrorist groups third during this period in number of incidents of all domestic terrorist groups after the Puerto Ricans (31) and the Cubans (10). The incidents included four actual bombings, three attempted bombings, one shooting and the short-lived takeover of the Austrian Consulate in NYC. The various Jewish terrorist groups recently active are:

Jewish Executioners with Silence (JES), International Committee Against Nazism (ICN). These groups jointly claimed responsibility for an attempted bombing of an ethnic restaurant in New York City, in October 1980.

Jewish Defenders. This group claimed credit for fire bombing the Center for Historical Review in Torrance, California, in June 1981. The

targeted center has published research, inter alia, which questions the accuracy of statistics regarding the number of Jews exterminated during World War II.

Jewish Defense League/American Revenge Committee (JDL). This was the single most active terrorist group in the US in terms of attacks claimed during 1981, although other groups caused more property damage and personal injuries. The group was originally organized in 1968 by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane who proclaimed that violence was necessary to accomplish the objectives of the JDL. The group is headquartered in NYC and is composed of Jewish-American extremists who consider themselves to be protectors of Jewish rights.

Chapters have been operational in several of the larger metropolitan areas.

Claimed terrorist incidents by the JDL include:

- o January 26, 1981, bombing of Iranian Bank in San Francisco, California.
- o August 31, 1981, seizure of Austrian Consulate in NYC.
- o September 3, 1981, two attempted fire bombings of Soviet and Romanian vehicles and one actual fire bombing of a Nigerian vehicle in NYC.
- o October 25, 1981, fire bombing of Egyptian Tourist Office in NYC.
- o November 14, 1981, shooting at Soviet Mission to UN residence in Glen Cove, New York.
- o December 24, 1981, attempted bombing of Soviet Vehicle in NYC.

Not all of the incidents claimed by the JDL are as benign in effect as those above. On April 5, 1982, the fire bombing of a Lebanese

Restaurant in an Arab neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, killed an elderly woman and injured eight others. Minutes after the first alarm was turned in at 1:56 a.m., a caller claiming to represent the JDL telephoned news organizations and said that the militant group was responsible for the fire. Subsequently leaders of the JDL stated they had nothing to do with the fire. NY Mayor Koch denounced the incident as a "terroristic attack" and a "barbaric act," saying that if the JDL was responsible they were no different from the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Black Liberation Army, the Provisional Wing of the IRA or the FALN.

Cuban

Omega 7. Omega 7 has claimed responsibility for 30 bombings and at least one assassination over the last six years in New York, New Jersey, Florida and Puerto Rico. Omega 7 is a pseudonym for the Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM) an anti-Castro Cuban exile group which was founded in 1960 to keep alive the spirit of the continuing fight against the communist government of Cuba.

Most of Omega 7 efforts have involved bombings. Targets have included dissident Cuban exiles, diplomatic and commercial personnel and installations of the Soviet, Cuban, Mexican and Venezuelan governments and other targets which have, in some fashion, been involved in facilitating intercourse between Cuba and other nations. Omega 7 is the only Cuban group to have claimed responsibility for terrorist acts within the US during 1980 and 1981. During this period they claimed responsibility for nine bombing incidents as well as the assassination of Cuban UN attache Felix Garcia in September 1980, in New York City. The group responsible for actions claimed by Omega 7 is deeply committed to the

liberation of Cuba.

Croatian

Croatian National Resistance (CNR), also known as Croatian Freedom Fighters (CFF). The CNR is an international anti-Yugoslav organization committed to establishment of an independent state of Croatia. Members of the organization have been convicted of numerous crimes in the US and other countries. Investigation has revealed CNR involvement in bombings, murders, hijackings, extortions and other terrorist motivated activities. During 1980 and 1981, the CNR claimed responsibility for four bombings the last of which occurred over a year ago in January 1981. Two were targeted against Yugoslav establishments; one in New York City March 17, 1980, against the Yugoslav Commercial Trade Bank and the second against the private residence of a Yugoslav diplomatic official in Washington, DC June 3, 1980. The other two bombings, both in New York City, were directed against the Statue of Liberty June 3, 1980, and the New York Supreme Court building January 23, 1981, to draw attention to CNR grievances.

The group is believed to have been seriously hurt by arrests in December 1980, and subsequent conviction in March 1981, of five of its members on charges involving an aborted plot to promote their cause. The men were convicted in Federal Court of violating Federal racketeering, explosives and civil rights laws. Subsequently in June 1981, ten other CNR members were arrested on similar charges and will be prosecuted for, inter alia, bombing, transportation of explosives and extortion. These arrests have diminished CNR's capacity for violence. The lack of any Croatian claimed incident since January 1981, is some indication of the diminished level of activity credible at least in part

to the arrests and the disruption thereby caused CNR. CNR has members in some of the larger US cities.

Other US Groups

In addition to the above groups, ten others have claimed responsibility for ten (one each) terrorist incidents in the United States during the 1980-1981 time frame.

The groups are:

- o Libyan Revolutionary Committee (pro-Libyan government group)
- o Libyan Students in the US (Anti-Libyan government group)
- o Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Racist group)
- o Revolutionary Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist group)
- o Iranian Patriotic Army (Anti-Khomeini group)
- o People's Mujaheddin Organizations of Iran (anti-Khomeini group)
- o Communist Workers Party (Marxist-Leninist group)
- o Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade (Marxist-Leninist group)
- o Black Brigade (Anti-Liberian government group)
- o Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals (Anti-Sierra Leone Government group)

The above groups were involved variously in bombings, assaults, trespass and two shootings injuring five people. The groups are marginal in terms of the paucity of incidents and their impact as compared with the more active terrorist groups. Six of the groups are concerned with issues existing outside the US and of the remaining four groups, three are small domestic communist groups of limited consequence and one

as an independent element of the NKK. None of the groups are principal players on the terrorist scene today and based on their limited claimed activity over the past two years should probably be regarded with rare exception as marginal terrorist groups which may or may not be heard from in the future.

Suspected Terrorist Incidents in the US

During 1980 and 1981 there were a small number of incidents suspected of being terrorist related, but which for one or another reasons cannot be identified with certainty as such. The most interesting and complex situation in this category was the failed robbery of a Brink's Armored Truck in Nanuet, New York (a New York City suburb) on October 20, 1981. During the course of the robbery and its aftermath one Brink's guard and two police officers were killed. Police arrested suspects fleeing the scene and others were subsequently arrested. To date ten individuals have been indicted; three on federal charges and seven on state charges relating to the robbery and murders. Arrested were Katherine Boudin, Samuel Brown, Nathaniel Burns, Judith A. Clark, David J. Gilbert, Anthony LaBorde, Donald Weems, Cecil Ferguson and Edward L. Joseph. Mutulu Shakur was also indicted but remains a fugitive as of this writing. Those arrested included black and white political extremists from the late 60s and 70s. Among the known previous organizational affiliations were the Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the May 19th Communist Movement. These groups to various degrees have advocated violent political change. Their recent level of public activity, however, was only a fraction of their earlier public profile. To discover that members of each of the groups which have been

largely dormant were involved in the robbery conspiracy, was a revelation of considerable interest.

Investigation following the arrests located a number of "safe houses" wherein were found weapons, ammunition, literature on radical causes and floor plans for police stations, as well as, names of specific police officers marked for possible targeting. Furthermore, there were indications that the principals in the Nanuet attempted robbery were involved in other armored car robberies earlier in the year (1981). Thus, the banding together for criminal purposes of former members of various extremist and radical organizations had terrorist overtones. Questions unanswered at this time are whether the group was involved in the embryonic formation of a new terrorist organization or whether it was straightforward criminal activity for individual profit with the justification of "liberations struggle" readily available if apprehended; whether the banding together was an indication of strength or impotency; was it the death rattle or renewal of the violent militant action seen in this country during the 60s and 70s, etc.? The upcoming trials in New York should resolve some of these questions.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN EUROPEAN TERRORISM

Overview

The more prominent Western European terrorist groups which have targeted Americans in Europe are the German Red Army Fraction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Italian Red Brigades (RB). Other terrorist groups operate in Western Europe, but they pose a lesser threat to Americans and other Europeans tending to focus primarily on their principal national adversaries. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the various Armenian and Palestinian groups and the Basque Fatherland (ETA) are examples of these latter groups. None of these groups are known to have significantly targeted US interests. PIRA, the RB and the RAF have by their actions shown themselves to be the more threatening and persistent Western European terrorist groups in operation today. Accordingly, this paper will address only these three groups to the exclusion of others.

Statistics¹⁷

Western Europe recorded a total of 450 terrorist incidents during the two year period from January 1, 1980, to December 31, 1981. This total represents approximately 30% of all terrorists incidents (1,469) occurring during such period worldwide. Historically for the 14 year period from January 1, 1968, thru December 31, 1981, a worldwide total

of 7,425 terrorist incidents have been recorded; 2,452 occurred in Western Europe and represent one third of all terrorist incidents during the period.

During 1981 there was an increase in terrorist incidents in Western Europe as compared with 1980 (246 vs 204). Attacks on US citizens or property in Western Europe numbered 76 during 1981, an increase over the 58 incidents recorded in 1980.

During 1981 terrorists in Western Europe appear to have selected American military personnel and installations for attack. Bombings occurred at US military installations in Western Germany and General Frederick Kroesen's armored vehicle was attacked with an anti-tank missile in West Germany. General James Dozier was kidnapped in Italy by the RB in December 1981, and in France Assistant Military Attache Lieutenant Colonel Ray was assassinated by a terrorist during early 1982. Terrorists would appear to have recently emphasized US military personnel as attractive targets in Western Europe. CIA Director, William Casey has stated that he sees the international terrorist threat growing not receding. He believes that because of the RBs failure in the Dozier kidnapping they can be expected to attempt to balance that failure with a success. They will execute another terrorist attack in the future "to make an impression or to get attention."¹⁸ Indeed the attack predicted by Mr. Casey may have occurred April 27, 1982, when the RB assassinated a Christian Democratic politician and his driver in their bullet-proof car.¹⁹

Over the 14 year period from January 1, 1968, to December 31, 1981, there were 767 attacks on US citizens or property in Western Europe which is approximately 31% of the total number of attacks (2452) in such

area during the period. Historically, Western Europe has been the locale for more terrorist incidents (2452) than any other geographic area. Latin America which is second in number of terrorist incidents is far behind Europe with 1597 recorded incidents during the period January 1, 1968, to December 31, 1981. It has been noted, however, that Latin American incidents are growing faster than in any other region.

With respect to the nature of the incidents in Western Europe they cover the spectrum of possible terrorist actions and have included kidnapping, bombings, armed attacks, hijackings, assassinations, sabotage and others. By far the most common incidents are bombings, accounting for fully 65 percent (1588) of all incidents (2452) during the fourteen year period from 1968 through 1981. Last year, bombings in Europe accounted for approximately 60% (140) of the 246 incidents reported. The next single highest terrorist incident assassination accounted for approximately 12% (30) of the total incidents recorded during 1981 (246) in Western Europe.

The overall number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe has been relatively stable during the last ten years. They have ranged from a low of 170 in 1975 to a high of 263 in 1977 and have averaged 225 incidents a year.

Similarly worldwide the number of terrorist incidents have remained rather stable over the past ten years (1972-1981), fluctuating from a low of 474 incidents in 1975 to a high of 850 incidents in 1978 and have averaged out at 635 incidents each year. The real consideration with respect to terrorism, however, goes deeper than the number of incidents. The more important consideration is the number of casualties which have increased worldwide almost every year since 1968. However, casualties actually dropped dramatically in 1981 from 1720 killed or wounded in

1980 to 1098 in 1981, the lowest tally since 1977. Terrorists seem to be changing the focus of their attacks, however, from businessmen and travellers to diplomats and military personnel.

Between 1968 and 1981, a total of 189 Americans were killed in international terrorist attacks. Ten Americans were killed worldwide in 1980 and six in 1981, due to terrorism outside the United States. Within the United States, during this two year period, two persons were known killed by terrorists.

Countries and Groups

Ireland. Irish terrorism is included here because it bears a unique relationship to the US compared with other Western European terrorism. As credible a source as Sean O'Bradaigh, the spokesman for Sinn Fein the political party in Dublin which is the legal arm of the IRA, has said "Irish-Americans are our backbone."²⁰ Others confirm that the US is the single largest supplier of funds and weapons to Irish terrorists (up to 50% by some estimates) and that this relationship has existed for many years. The principal terrorist groups in Ireland are the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The PIRA has three immediate aims, to wit:

- a. A declaration of intent by the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland.
- b. An amnesty for all political prisoners including the release of all PIRA prisoners in jail in Britain.
- c. The recognition of the right of the Irish people to decide their own destiny, free from British interference.²¹

The INLA has similar aims. The UVF is opposed to any change in the

status of Northern Ireland vis-a-vis Britain and targets PIRA and INLA for attack. None of the groups have targeted US interests either persons or property and they are not expected to do so in the foreseeable future. Any such targeting is perceived by many within the Irish nationalist movement as counterproductive in that it could jeopardize assistance currently being received from the US. Evidence of this assistance is seen in the New York area arrest last year of a number of Irish immigrant activists who actively supported the IRA philosophy of armed confrontation with British security forces. Arms and ammunition destined for Northern Ireland were seized in connection with the arrests. The suspects will be tried shortly in New York on federal charges relating to their efforts in connection with such material.

The Irish extremists differ from most other European terrorist groups in that their membership is largely working class, based in ghetto areas of the cities and in the poorer rural areas. These "blue collar" patriots differ from the continental groups in that such groups are better educated and by and large are from a higher socio-economic strata in their society. The Basque separatist movement ETA, however, is rather similar to the Irish in terms of its working class membership. Both the Basques and the Irish are also essentially ethnic groups fighting constituted authority with the purpose of establishing broader political self-determination for their ethnic constituency. British intelligence, in a compromised analysis of the PIRA in Northern Ireland, judged it to be a primarily inward directed Celtic nationalist effort as opposed to one directed by external or foreign authorities.²²

The PIRA and INLA are both difficult groups to gauge in terms of future potential for terrorist activity. The actual membership strength

is not believed to be as good an indicator as with other groups since the PIRA at least is known to act on an ad hoc basis on occasion. Individuals who have not been operationally active may be called into action for a specific task and then return to a relative inactive posture within the organization. The cited British intelligence report judges that PIRA is deeply committed to a long campaign of attrition. The group furthermore has the technical expertise to manufacture sophisticated bombs and does train its members with some care. Often the operational elements are manned with terrorists having years of experience.

The British projection for the future is that the Irish terrorists will concentrate their attacks on members of the British security forces and at the infrastructure of government including high value economic targets such as public utilities. In this regard the Irish nationalists, by some definitions, are more similar to urban guerillas than terrorists. It is also anticipated there will be a trend toward more precise targeting to avoid alienation of public opinion which is politically damaging. The various Irish terrorists groups are not seen as posing any threat to US interests as noted above and would accordingly appear to be of less interest to US authorities overseas than German or Italian terrorists.

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).²⁴ Modern terrorism in Germany dates from approximately early 1972, with the advent of a series of bombings directed at US military personnel and installations and at the German police and judicial system. Four US servicemen and one German were killed in these attacks and numerous individuals injured. The RAF claimed responsibility for the attacks, demanding cessation of US bombing attacks on Vietnam and calling for major changes within Germany

society. This series of bombings followed by four years the first major politically motivated acts of violence committed by terrorists in the FRG, the destruction by arson of department stores in Frankfurt. Subsequently journalist Andreas Baader and others were implicated and charged with arson. Ulrike Meinhof, another journalist writing in the German political magazine "Konkret" defended the arson as justified. It was by this means that Baader and Meinhof met and became principal actors in the gang referred to as the Baader-Meinhof Group whose official name is the RAF. Arrests were made one month after the 1972 bombings and this terminated what the German authorities have referred to as the actions of the "first generation terrorists."

The second phase in the terrorist campaign against the FRG was marked mainly by kidnapping and hostage takings with the aim of securing the release from FRG prisons of the first generation terrorists. This campaign was partially successful, however, resulted in the deaths of both terrorists and targets during both aborted and successful kidnappings. During this period Second of June Movement terrorists murdered the president of the Superior Court of Justice for Berlin, Gunter Van Drenkmann. An unsuccessful terrorist attack on the German Embassy in Stockholm occurred in 1975, as well as, the attack on the OPEC conference in Vienna. The latter event consisted of both German and other terrorists as did the subsequent hijacking of an Air France airbus to Entebbe, Uganda, in conjunction with the Palestinians.

The third and final phase of German terrorism to date became more violent with street murders and the move away from political objectives and toward individual actions. During this period German industrial representative Hans Martin Schleyer was kidnapped and murdered and the

unsuccessful hijacking of a Lufthansa jet to Mogadishu, Somali, was carried out with Palestinians. The demands in the hijacking included, inter alia, release of imprisoned German terrorists.

The most recent episodes of German terrorism were the bombing of the combined US and NATO air command headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, August 31, 1981 and the attempted assassination of US General Frederick Kroesen commander of US Army forces in Europe employing rocket propelled grenades and other weapons in ambushing his armored Mercedes, September 15, 1981. This resumption of activity by the RAF is not considered by some knowledgeable authorities to pose a proximate threat to US persons and installations since the RAF is not considered likely to carry out a terrorist campaign for some time.²⁵

Estimates of recent strength of the RAF operational membership are less than 50. German authorities have identified 15 terrorists who they believe are the hard core of the RAF and were searching for approximately 30 known violent terrorists at last count. Forty others were imprisoned at the beginning of 1981 and fifty others were in preventative investigative custody.²⁶

German terrorism has been largely curtailed since 1977, due to excellent German police work culminating in numerous arrests of terrorists and in driving others abroad as a result. The successful German effort is undoubtedly due at least in part to optimal exploitation of current computer technology by the West German Federal Criminal Office BKA.

The attacks in 1981 targeted against Americans confirms information recovered by German police during arrests that the RAF has recently adopted some new targets including NATO and the Germany Army. This same targeting of NATO was observed interestingly enough, during the kidnap-

ping of Brigadier General James Dozier in December 1981, by the RB in Italy.

Terrorism is not over in Germany. The hard core show no signs of giving up. There is, however, an "ostensible calm" in the views of knowledgeable German officials,²⁷ and it appears the authorities are on the offensive and the terrorists on the defensive.

Other groups including the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) and the Military Sports Group Hoffman (MSGH) have also been active in FRG terrorism. The RZ is a leftist anarchist group which has carried out over fifty bombings aimed at property rather than people. The MSGH is a right wing group thought to be connected with the Oktoberfest bombing in Munich, Germany, in 1980, resulting in 13 deaths (including the terrorist who planted the bomb) and many injuries. Neither group is perceived as presenting the threat posed by the RAF. The Second of June Movement, referred to above, is considered defunct at the present time having split into two factions in June of 1980 with one faction joining the RAF.

Italy. The most salient difference between German and Italian terrorism is that in Italy there is a much greater potential for future acts of terrorism. Terrorist groups are more numerous in Italy (up to 100 by some estimates) and there is also believed to be a larger pool of potential recruits available.²⁸ Indeed confirmation may be found in a recent poll conducted for the Italian magazine "L'Espresso." Of those contacted in the 20-24 age bracket, 56 percent responded that they understood or approved of the most widely publicized Italian terrorist group the Red Brigades (RB). Furthermore, of all age groups polled only 20 percent replied with an unqualified yes when asked, "Would you

denounce a suspected terrorist to the police"? Almost 66 percent believed that police methods cannot put an end to violence and that social reforms are the sole conditions for success. While 54 percent of respondents considered the Red Brigades as "dangerous assassins" or "mad people" fully 40 percent felt they pursue a "noble end through wrong means" or that they "struggle for a better society."²⁹ With such mixed emotions prevailing it would appear that the Italian government must do better in the psychological war for the allegiance of its citizens than it has done heretofore.

Although there is a veritable plethora of Italian groupings with a potential for terrorism, the RB remains the major threat in Italy. The RB are anarchistic in that they have no specific plan or program to replace the Italian government should their efforts be successful. They have espoused a strong anti-NATO, anti-imperialist line epitomized by the General Dozier kidnapping of December 1981. This incidentally was the first significant terrorist targeting of an American by the RB.

Considering levels of sophistication and the threat posed, the RB is an extremely dangerous group. Other Western European groups have not been able to mount multiple squad size units acting successfully as a coordinated entity as the RB did in the kidnapping of former Italian leader Aldo Moro. The RB has long since graduated from the rather elementary tactic of bombings, to the more mature tactics of assassinations and kidnappings.

The RB were seriously hurt by police successes during the investigation of General Dozier's kidnapping. The group admitted failure and can be expected to carry out "at least one spectacular terrorist attack during the first portion of 1982."³⁰ US News and World Report, March 8, 1982, issue quotes CIA Director William J. Casey saying that the RB -

since they suffered a setback in the Dozier matter - will "want to come back and regain their reputation and status . . . if they want to stay in business, they've got to do something again."

The problem is that the expected nature of the anticipated attacks by the RB cannot be predicted. The risk is that they may resort to less complex incidents than the Dozier kidnapping and employ the simple expedient of assassination against US targets.

Any discussion of the number of individuals involved in RB activities is difficult because of the varieties of levels of association with the RB by different people. Estimates of numbers involved have proved inaccurate in the past. Like the Puerto Rican model, association with the RB can probably be viewed on various levels from clandestine operational units to overt political affiliates. The outermost circle of supporters (overt) are also of some concern to the Italian government since they are substantial in number and are often made up "of wealthy people and members of the intelligentsia (and) enable the terrorists to continue operating and are not necessarily violating the law themselves."³¹

Organizationally, the RB is composed of columns in some of the major cities in Italy. The columns function with a degree of coordination but not with anything approaching integration. As an entity they are politically astute. We can expect them to capitalize on and act in coordinated fashion with respect to issues of current European concern including nuclear deployment and other peace issues of the day.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

Government Views

Recent information and evidence in the public record does not permit a judgement of direct foreign (Soviet) responsibility for terrorist incidents in many countries including Ireland, FRG, Italy and the United States. There is ample direct evidence to prove training of various foreign terrorists in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Libya, Cuba, Lebanon and elsewhere. The question however, is not training which all acknowledge has been afforded to some Western Europeans and Americans, but whether foreign governments, particularly the Soviets, orchestrate terrorist incidents around the world. We find considerable agreement albeit with some exceptions that centralized direction as such doesn't exist when we look at the recent public record of some government officials.

United States

In April 1981, FBI Director William H. Webster stated on the NBC news program "Meet the Press,"

I cannot speak about activities abroad but I can say that there is no real evidence of Soviet-sponsored terrorism within the United States . . . within the United States we seem at this point to be free of direct deliberate Soviet domination or control or instigation of terrorist activity.³²

Early in 1981, Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, accused the Soviet Union of "training, funding, and equipping" international terrorists.³³ Haig verbalized the administration's position with respect to international terrorism. Haig did not define terrorism, probably purposely, and thus could be presumed to include within the definition a wide spectrum of political violence including wars of "rational liberation." Given such presumption the statement is sufficiently broad to be defensible. The difficulty arises when such statement is applied to bonafide terrorist groups, such as the RB and RAF, to mean that a direct manipulative relationship exists. Some observers have attempted to do so and the fault then clearly lies with such interpreters rather than with Secretary Haig's statement.

To clarify the issues of foreign involvement raised by Mr. Haig and others, CIA Director William Casey directed his agency early in 1981 to conduct a review of the intelligence on terrorism. Casey also asked the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to prepare a report on terrorism. The CIA draft was reportedly rejected by Mr. Casey, according to analysts, because it did not support Mr. Haig's assertions. Sources close to Mr. Casey said it was rejected because he felt it lacked substance and was poorly written. The DIA report was also found by Mr. Casey and others to be wanting. A third report was then produced incorporating aspects of the first two reports in addition to new material. According to officials familiar with its details, it concludes that the "Soviet Union has not played a direct role in training or equipping traditional terrorist groups such as the RB or the RAF and has no master plan to create terrorism around the world."³⁴ [Emphasis added]

A subsequent article in the New York Times by reporter Leslie H.

Gelb is most revealing as to the possible etymology of the administration's initial position on terrorism. It noted that the State Department's own Bureau of Intelligence and Research had no hard evidence to back up Mr. Haig's assertions, supra, and that he was "basically repeating the stories of a Czechoslovak defector" of 1968, Major General Jan Sejna. The article further noted that it appeared information provided by General Sejna to Western European intelligence during his trip to Europe in 1972 under CIA auspices had essentially been recycled by those agencies and provided back to the US. General Sejna reportedly told Western intelligence that the Russians had "trained terrorist groups like the . . . RAF and RB. . . ." The article noted there was little evidence to support assertions of direct Soviet involvement in international terrorism although there is evidence of indirect links.³⁵

Great Britain

British security officials are reported to have spoken of training that IRA members received in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East in the 1970s, but said this relationship did not appear to have been long-standing.³⁶ Furthermore, a compromised secret British intelligence report on Northern Ireland provided to the press by the PIRA noted Irish terrorism is essentially an inward looking Celtic nationalist motivated effort and discounted external direction of such movement. This report also judged that the US was the main source of weapons for PIRA and that there were no indications of any substantial link between the Soviet Union and either wing of the IRA.³⁷

Indeed, as an aside on the issue of terrorist weapons supply the New York Times carried a report on its June 23, 1981 issue captioned, "Thefts of US Weapons Said to Benefit Terrorists." The article quoted a

report by the London Center for Contemporary Studies, an independent group which reviews social and political trends, which said the United States is the world's largest supplier of arms to terrorists through thefts from its armories. The US Army it said has acknowledged that enough arms to equip 8,000 men were stolen from United States depots between 1971 and 1974. Thefts from the US military bases have now largely been overcome by increased physical security. Department of Defense statistics for 1980 reveal that the net loss for the year was only 181 conventional arms out of an inventory of over six million.³⁸ The problem of US supply of weapons worldwide nevertheless remains a consideration as evidenced by an arms firm advertisement in June 1981, offering for sale, among other things, 60,000 new M16A1 rifles, 50 T.48 tanks, 50 new Huey helicopters and an unspecified number of machine guns and anti-tank missiles.³⁹ The point here is that while all sales are subject to US State Department approval it would appear that large pools of US weapons commercially available provides adequate supplies for terrorists without the need of relying on Soviet or other sources.

Italy

Knowledgeable Italian officials are convinced that terrorism in Italy has its roots in the historical and political conditions prevailing in Italy. There is,

No proof of outside influence or direction of the Italian terrorist movement. There are indications of links and contacts with other terrorist groups. Italian terrorists have gone abroad for training, have hidden in foreign countries . . . have obtained weapons and explosives abroad, etc. But the idea that there are foreign countries 'pulling the strings' has no basis in fact.⁴⁰ [Emphasis added]

General Umberto Capuzzo, the Commander of the Carabinieri, Italy's paramilitary police corps, said in February 1981, that "Italian terror-

ism is sui generis; there is no great brain abroad."⁴¹ Most recently Antonio Savasta, Red Brigade leader convicted in the kidnapping of General Dozier and implicated in 17 Red Brigade murders including the killing of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, testified that the only major foreign contact of the Red Brigade was with the Palestine Liberation Organization.⁴²

Federal Republic of Germany

These appraisals are quite similar to the estimates of German officials on German terrorism. Noting intercourse between German and foreign terrorist groups, officials say,

There is, however, no information about common operations with indigenous terrorists of other nations except Palestinians. Furthermore, there is no verified information about Soviet or other East bloc support of the German terrorists except to the extent the Soviets have provided material to the Palestinians who in turn passed this along to Libyan and German terrorists. There are unverified reports of Czech training of German terrorists, but the East German and Soviet governments have taken public positions against the terrorists and in general the East bloc has been supportive of FRG efforts to extradite German terrorists.⁴³

The real problem seems to be how to interpret the "evidence" of foreign involvement in indigenous terrorism anywhere. In general, West German officials tend to give less weight to statements by terrorists about "safe" houses in East Germany than do American analysts "committed to the hypothesis of indirect Soviet responsibility."⁴⁴

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Overview

Terrorism is and will remain a problem in Western Europe and the US for the foreseeable future. Incidents will continue and in some instances be as aggravated as any in the past. The threat posed will primarily be to individuals whether they be businessmen, military, diplomats, government officials or private citizens. The risk, so far as can be perceived, will not seriously threaten governments in an institutional sense. Professor Paul Wilkinson expresses essentially these same thoughts historically when he states ". . . terrorists have had extremely limited success in realizing strategic aims . . . (but) have enjoyed spectacular successes in attaining short-term tactical objectives"45

A Sense of Proportion

One caveat to be constantly remembered in examining terrorism is never to lose a sense of proportion. Terrorism's consequences have often been exaggerated when compared with the adverse impact of other social phenomena, particularly in the US. The annual homicide rate in the US is now approaching 22,000 killings annually.⁴⁶ Compare this with the two persons known killed in terrorist incidents in the US from January 1980 through December 1981. Compare it also with the 16 Ameri-

cans killed in terrorist incidents outside the US during the same period.⁴⁷ Terrorism is thus taken out of its emotional and rhetorical context and juxtaposed with everyday violence in America. The comparison gives a realistic context to terrorism in terms of its relative impact on the populace.

Comparisons may also be made which similarly place international terrorism in a contemporary context. CIA statistics reveal a total of 189 Americans were killed worldwide in international terrorist attacks between 1968 and 1981.⁴⁸ Add the estimated 80 or so deaths in the US during the last ten years as a result of political violence⁴⁹ and the figure of 269 approximates the annual homicide rate for Cleveland, Ohio.⁵⁰

Other CIA statistics from 1968 through 1981 reveal a worldwide total of 12,240 persons (all nationalities) killed or injured in terrorist attacks.⁵¹ This is less than one-half the number of deaths in the US which will be caused this year as a result of drunken driving.⁵²

Other Observations

Statistical comparisons, of course, are only some indication of the relative impact of terrorism and other factors must be considered. The substantial percentage of non-indigenous terrorism in the US as described within is also revealing. If we exclude Puerto Rico, which is a special problem, the overwhelming proportion of terrorism in the US, limited as it is, is identified with causes and issues external to the US.

Furthermore an examination of US terrorist tactics is interesting. Seventy five percent of all terrorist incidents in the US during the period 1 January 1980 to 31 December 1981 were attempted or actual

bombings. Bombings are considered by some observers to be among the least sophisticated of terrorist tactics. Bombings require limited risks, knowledge, infrastructure and logistic support on the part of the terrorists. Bombings tend to be more typical of the unsophisticated terrorist groupings just as expropriations, kidnappings and assassinations of high officials are typical of the more mature terrorist groups. Complex Western European terrorist groups such as the RAF and the RB evidenced a move away from bombings as they became more expert and capable in other terrorist tactics. Terrorism, as noted within, is the weapon of the weak pretending to be strong; the use of the bomb as an exclusive or largely exclusive tactic of US groups would seem to place such terrorist groups at the low end of the capability scale. This is all the more true when we consider that of the 33 identified terrorist bombing incidents in the US in 1981, nine were failed attempts and seven of the thirty three were fire bombs.

The only political kidnapping, if it can be so called, was that of Patty Hearst in the early 70s by the Symbionese Liberation Army, a now long defunct group. Excluding the Puerto Ricans, nothing in the US compares to date with the spectacular terrorist efforts mounted by Western European groupings, notably the RB and the RAF. Yet we see the German authorities themselves are somewhat confident and hopeful for the future. The post - Dozier successes of Italian authorities over the RB are notable and the police there, as in Germany, appear on the offensive and the terrorists on the defensive. The recent targeting of Americans by the RB and RAF bears watching but to date has proved more spectacular than effective. In Ireland the PIRA has not targeted US citizens or interests and is not expected to do so.

Puerto Rican terrorism in the US has to be considered as having the most potential for future incidents. If we look at any of the objective indicators, number of incidents, damages and injuries and the like and link such capacity with intent as expressed in their rhetoric, the potential for similar or increased levels of action are realistic projections. The FALN arrests in April of 1980 may have hurt the overall Puerto Rican terrorist capacity. It is noted that Puerto Rican terrorists incidents dropped during 1980 and 1981 (15 and 16 respectively) to approximately half the number for the preceding three years (1977-41 1978-28 and 1979-31), although the recent years may have caused more property damage just as the earlier years caused more deaths.

Based on some recent incidents one could reasonably project an upswing in Puerto Rican terrorist activity in 1982. We should view this upswing, however, in its historical context and not permit a snapshot of the present to be given more impact than it deserves. Indeed any upswing confirms above all else the cyclical nature of terrorist episodes.

At least one Armenian group also appears to be developing into a more formidable actor on the US terrorist scene based on the recent murders of a Turkish representative in Los Angeles, California (January 1982) and Sommerville, Mass. (May 1982) and the wounding of another Turkish representative in Ottawa, Canada (April 1982). Armenian terrorist actions in 1982 (to May 5) have equaled the number of deaths resulting from terrorism in the US during the previous two years (2).

Foreign Involvement

The question of direct foreign (Soviet) involvement in indigenous terrorist activities both in the US and Western Europe has been answered

in the negative by respective police and intelligence officials. While evidence does exist showing some mutual support and contact between traditional terrorist groups, this cannot be traced with any confidence back to a centralized "directorate of terrorism." Third world nations and groupings have provided assistance but whether such assistance was provided as proxy for another is more the subject of conjecture than hard fact.

Possible Declining Incidence of Terrorism

Finally, terrorism as an unfolding drama is extremely attractive of and susceptible to full and undivided media coverage. As a result, there is a tendency for those spectacular but occasional episodes of terrorism to color the public and official perception of the likelihood and significance of terrorist incidents. Accurate appraisal of the terrorist threat will never result from judgements based on such perceptions, yet these perceptions tend to be the recollections so many rely on.

We see from statistics available incidents of terrorism are not increasing exponentially as a cursory review of the subject might indicate. Domestically incidents could be said to have undergone an overall decrease during the last five years (1977-1981). International terrorist incidents reveal increases in six of the last 14 years and decreases in seven years including last year, 1981.⁵³ Deaths and injuries have increased internationally in nine of the last 14 years and decreased in four including a rather dramatic drop from 1,720 in 1980 to 1,098 in 1981.⁵⁴ Representative Donald Edwards, Chairman of the House subcommittee that oversees the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has said, "terrorism is actually decreasing." Mr. Edwards made such remarks in connection with his disagreement over a change made by the US govern-

ment in 1981 in the criteria used to tally terrorist incidents.⁵⁵ The change resulted in an increase in the number of international terrorist incidents previously tallied by CIA for the 12 year period 1968-1979 from 3,336 to 5,954. One commentator remarked, ". . . the CIA annual report now includes relatively trivial or vaguely related incidents it used to ignore."⁵⁶

In closing two quotes from Walter Laqueur seem appropriate,

The frequent invocation of the 'steady growth of terrorism' to be found in the popular literature is not borne out by facts and figures.⁵⁷

(Terrorism) . . . will always attract much publicity but politically it tends to be ineffective. Compared with other dangers threatening mankind, it is almost irrelevant.⁵⁸

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