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ABSTRACT

U.S. Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Professional Identity and Commitment

Frank R. Wood

Evidence presented in this research suggests civilianization of junior officers in the Air Force has progressed beyond heterogeneity in the convergence with society—that all segments including the combat components are converging with civilian counterparts. This represents a fundamental change in the orientation of military officers.

The qualitative data reported in this study comes from an in-depth analysis of over 250 hours of interviews with 83 Air Force junior officers and 43 of their spouses. The quantitative data includes questionnaire items accomplished by each interviewee.

Evidence reported in this study suggests the social world of the Air Force junior officer has lost the articulation characteristic of earlier times. Strong macro level social forces have caused the adoption of corporate rather than professional modes of operation. Prestige structures within the Air Force reflect this change as management skills replace combat flying as the characteristic function. The result is a civilianization of junior officer identities and extensive use of civilian counterparts as reference groups. Additionally, pressure for change comes from military families who, reacting to the uncertainty of officer work schedules, are becoming independent from the Air Force, anchoring themselves in the more stable civilian community, and civilianizing the
military member in the process.

Despite these changes, many officers remain committed. Generally, commitment is explained by major identities used by each officer. Those who view themselves as "specialists" in the Air Force tend to place greatest importance on their specialized skill and the outside opportunities it provides. Those who view themselves as "officers" tend to place importance on normative differences and despite the costs, tend to focus their personal investments within the military world. As civilianization continues, attrition is expected to remain high and the officer corps will become more like "professionals in the military" than "military professionals."
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CHANGING PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
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for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Field of Sociology

By
FRANK RAY WOOD

Evanston, Illinois
June 1982
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have always been interested in professional identity and commitment, especially in regard to military careers. My father was a professional military officer and a powerful role model. My mother was an Air Force wife and through her support of my father's career, taught me that military work was something special, something worth the sacrifice. Although they never consciously steered me toward a military career, I have always thought of myself as an Air Force officer and being an officer has been my life's work. To my parents, then, I am grateful because they not only gave me a strong foundation upon which to build my own career, but provided an intimate understanding of what a military career was like in earlier times.

Beginning a military career is one thing, but sustaining and nurturing it is another. In this regard, I owe much to my wife, Barbara. She has sacrificed much because she believed in me and the importance of what I do. Willingly, she has followed me all over the world and kept "the home fires burning" when I was gone. She has "been there" for the good times and the bad. She can tell "war stories" with the best of them and she has rekindled a sense of purpose in many, like myself, who might have otherwise resigned. She has truly shared my career, but more importantly, she has shared my life. For that, I am grateful.

Next, I would like to thank the junior officers and the spouses who allowed me to interview them and pry into their lives. They "told it like it was" and this is their story. Their enthusiasm motivated me...
and challenged me to do the best analysis I could. Through their service they have done much for their country, sometimes at great personal cost. Their comments are not always flattering, but they are truthful and offered out of concern for the military institution.

This research has benefited from the active participation and guidance of my dissertation committee. They have provided just the right mixture of autonomy, guidance and support. Through them I have learned to be a sociologist. Charles C. Moskos, the Chairman, was an outstanding role model and advisor. Moreover, he was a mentor and sponsor who took a personal interest in all phases of my professional development. Howard S. Becker taught me how to "do sociology"—how to explore a situation, ask the right questions and how to find out what is "really" going on. Morris Janowitz convinced me my work was important and set the example for scholarship. Kent Smith, who spent hours listening to my early analyses, showed me what teaching and dedication to students was all about. These individuals represent the cornerstones of my sociology experience. Working with them has been personally and professionally rewarding.

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This research could not have been done without the support of these people. However, the opinions expressed herein are my own and those of the respondents.
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CHAPTER

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CHAPTER ONE

LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM

The excessive loss rates of highly trained Air Force officers have become an important issue in recent years. During the 1978-1980 period, pilots with six to eleven years of experience were leaving the service at rates of up to 80% in some weapon systems. The cost of these losses to the Air Force exceeds $500,000 per pilot in training and the overall impact is a loss of expertise essential to the Air Force function.

In response to this situation, Headquarters Air Force established an Officer Retention Working Group at the Military Personnel Center located at Randolph AFB, Texas. While exploring pilot losses, this group noticed similar problems (although not as critical) among other groups which were used for comparison. In short, the retention problem was found to be widespread and involved fundamental issues which were affecting the entire officer corps.

From the beginning, the Air Force has approached the retention problem from a management orientation. The problem, itself, has been defined in terms of "attrition" and little consideration has been given to the other side of the coin, "retention" or why people stay. The methodology used to study the problem has almost exclusively been quantitative and the data gathered consequently limited by the foresight of the researchers who designed the survey questionnaires. The solutions, from the outset have been conceptualized in management terms, that is, as a problem of economics which requires more bonuses and
higher salaries or the problem has been seen in terms of job satisfaction which requires redesigning work situations. While each is a valid part of the problem, an understanding of the entire situation is lost because researchers have tended to work on either the macro or the micro level and few have attempted to explore the interaction between levels. The result has been "bandaid fixes" for fundamental problems.\\n
This research proposes to avoid these shortcomings by taking a larger view of the problem which suggests consideration of other issues such as: the changing nature of the military profession; the changing orientations of officers and their families to the profession; and the effect these changes have on commitments of the officers. The outcome of such an analysis is a better understanding of the whole problem and determination of the key factors which drive the situation. The hazard in taking such an approach is that the solution which arises may demand more than "bandaid fixes." Instead, the solution may require fundamental changes.

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM: THE METHOD

The data reported in this study come from an in-depth analysis of over 250 hours of structured and unstructured interviews with 83 Air Force junior officers and 43 of their wives. Junior officers in their first ten years of service were chosen because among these officers, the issue of commitment is especially salient. After ten years, other factors such as possible retirement at twenty years of service are presumed to be more important. Also, since junior officers constitute the
future of the Air Force, changing patterns of commitments found in this group point the way to later changes in the nature of the profession, itself.

The in-depth interview was selected as the primary source of data because this research is exploratory. While the Air Force has conducted many surveys of their officers, few deal with the hard to quantify issues of commitment, identity, cohesion, fragmentation, prestige structures, institutional values, family conflicts, civilian comparisons, and choice constraints. Further, those which do ask about commitment rarely ask, "commitment to what?" Those which do ask about identity rarely ask "identity as what?" Few ask what the Air Force means to the individual. Few ask why some persons stay when others faced with the same problem are leaving. Toward these issues the depth interview is especially suited.

The focus of the interviews became progressively structured as the theory evolved. Most of the first forty were completely unstructured and lasted about two and one-half hours for each respondent. As the salient issues became clear, more structured questions were asked to explore earlier conclusions and interview time in the last forty-three cases was reduced to about one and one-half hours per respondent. Even in the most structured form, the interview left much room for free expression and did not force answers into specific categories or limit them in any intentional manner. All interviews were tape recorded and comments analyzed after transcription.

In addition to the interview data, information was gathered in
informal conversations as a participant observer. As a junior officer myself at the time of this study, I qualify as a participant observer and my experience with officers like those in the sample is extensive. In a way, any conversation I had with the respondents--before, during, or after the interview--was a part of my data collection effort.

Being an "insider" was generally a benefit in that the respondents were very open and willing to answer my questions. To maximize this kind of response, I began each interview by disclosing information about myself, what assignments I have had in the past, and why I was interested in this study. I found that my disclosure set the tone for openness in their responses. In addition to providing positive motivation to give honest answers, my "insider" status also deterred erroneous answers which they knew I could detect.

For many respondents, the interview was a form of serious self-evaluation. In listening to their own answers to my questions, they reported re-evaluation of themselves and their relationships with their families and the Air Force. For instance, six officers reported (in later correspondence) that the interview had caused them to rethink their decision to leave the Air Force. Four couples reported a healthier relationship after discussing issues brought up in their separate interviews. These are all indications that the responses were open and honest.

To counteract any bias which may result from my "insider" status and reliance on qualitative data, quantitative data were also collected. To each respondent, a questionnaire was administered which gathered
background data and measured basic attitudes. Early questionnaires were designed only to assess the direction and the extent of patterns revealed in the qualitative comments. In this stage, key questionnaire responses were clarified in the interview. Later questionnaires refined the measurement of key concepts and will provide a means of exploring larger samples for the trends revealed in this sample.

Analysis of these data, then, involves a type of triangulation in which data from various sources are used to substantiate a finding. In general, qualitative data identify significant patterns and provide complex and sometimes unexpected interpretations which would not have otherwise been detected by conventional survey methods. The quantitative data proved to be a good measure of the direction and extent of the patterns noted. The value of this approach was proven on several occasions. For example, questionnaire responses often reflected traditional beliefs and socialization. Further discussion of responses in the interview often revealed (even to the respondent) the reverse of the original answer to be reality. In other words, the "buzz words" in the questionnaire often elicited "knee jerk" responses.

Another benefit involves the use of categories and labels. Checking the questionnaire responses in the interview identified several differences in the categories and terminology used by the researcher or the respondent to describe the same phenomenon. Undetected, these differences may have generated different findings.

Since this research is exploratory, the method of sample selection was theoretical rather than random. Theoretical sampling is especially
suited to the discovery of categories and their properties and to the identification of interrelationships necessary for the construction of theory. Using this method, theoretical categories are developed and elaborated by maximizing and minimizing differences in comparison groups until a point of saturation is reached. In short, data collection is guided by the evolving theory.\(^2\)

In general, an effort was made in this sample to select subjects which represented the widest possible variety of groups and social characteristics normally found in the Air Force. Female officers constitute 15.7 percent of the respondents. Minority race and ethnic groups are represented in 12.0 percent. Overall, the officers come from all three commissioning sources and represent 14 specialties. Almost all (92.8%) are married. They have various career aspirations ranging from immediate resignation to completing a full 30 year career and range from one to ten years of commissioned service. In respect to these characteristics, this sample is fairly representative of the Air Force. In all other respects, maximum variation is sought in the hope that any trends evident in such a widely varied, even though small sample, would be worthy of further study in a larger sample. More complete sample statistics are provided in Appendix A.

Time and location were additional points of differentiation. The first forty interviews were conducted in the Fall of 1978. Sixteen were at the Air Force's professional military school for junior officers--Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama.\(^3\) Six interviews were conducted with junior officers working
in the Pentagon at the Air Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Headquarters Air Force level. The remaining 1978 interviews were conducted at a single Air Force base which had an operational mission under one wing commander. The second set of interviews, forty-three, were conducted in the summer of 1980. Five were with staff officers at the Major Air Command or higher level. Eleven were with officers assigned to a Military Air Command base. Ten were with officers assigned to a Tactical Air Command base. The remaining seventeen interviews were with officers assigned to a Strategic Air Command base. At each location both flying and support officers were interviewed. All the officers in the 1980 group were married and separate interviews were conducted with their wives to assess marriage factors which were shown to be important by the 1978 interviews.

Throughout the analysis, two subsets of officers are examined and compared: 43 flying officers (pilots, navigators, and weapons controllers) and 40 support officers (administrative, personnel, supply, etc.). Although these two groups are generally presumed to be part of a cohesive professional officer corps, they are naturally differentiated by two significant factors. First, only the flying officers, who constitute approximately 47 percent of the junior officers, perform the traditional combat mission. Support officers presumably support the flyers in this task. The second factor is the working schedule. Support officers generally work a standard 'duty day,' e.g., 7:30 AM to 5:00 PM. Flyers, on the other hand, work a 'by activity' duty schedule which changes according to assigned flights, alert tours, and
deployments. These two factors generate qualitatively different lifestyles which require individual and comparative analysis. The extent of the difference is described by a young lieutenant in Civil Engineering:

There seems to be a large split between the support and the flying side. . . . We have two different chains of command and not a whole lot in common as far as work goes. We can't seem to relate and it seems to be fostered by the Air Force.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The military has been conceptualized by various researchers as: an institution, a profession, an occupation, an organization, a subculture, a community, and a way of life. To some degree, it is all of these, but none of them totally. Explanations of the military using these perspectives are limited because they tend to focus on factors related to the specific type of social organization presumed. As a result, they generally incur problems associated with the reification of abstract concepts like 'institutions,' 'professions,' 'occupations,' and 'subcultures.' Further, they tell us little about why and how a particular organizational form exists or what types will arise in the future. Compared over time, these structural "snapshots" can depict fundamental changes, but rarely include an analysis of how these changes came about and the inherent processes which force them.

This research will examine more than the formal organizational aspects of the military by using the perspective that the military is a "social world"--a social organization which persists over time despite changes in organizational form. Using this larger unit of analysis,
involving formal and informal structural elements operating at the center and the periphery of the world, will provide a better understanding of the changing nature of Air Force officership at the junior officer level because it includes linkages of the formal characteristic organization with other social units which exert pressure for change within. In other words, understanding the interactions between major structural and process elements of the junior officer's world is presumed to be the key to understanding the military as a complex, rapidly changing, large-scale social organization.

A Social World is a concept used by sociologists to describe a unit of social organization which is diffuse and amorphous in character, generally larger than groups or organizations, and not necessarily defined by formal boundaries or spatial territory. Social worlds are recognizable constellations of activities, actors, spheres of interest, and communication networks. This concept, conceived by the early sociology theorists of the Chicago School and recently developed more fully, not only provides the means for understanding the structural qualities of these large-scale groups, but places a special emphasis on the nature of interactions and the processes of social change characteristic to them. Since much of the recent social worlds conceptualization involves art worlds, comparative examples used here will generally come from the social world of art.

The structure of social worlds varies considerably in terms of size, types of central activities, complexity of organization, technological sophistication, ideological elaboration, and geographical
dispersion. Nevertheless, each social world has: core activities and values; a social organization which specifies characteristic groups, types and levels of participation; and a boundary of some sort which distinguishes members from non-members.

At the heart of every social world is some activity which is viewed as the "quintessential act." This act clearly defines those who do it as members of the social world, provides the basis for a claim of special worthiness, provides an organizational focus, and marks the distinctiveness of this social world from others. For example, in the art world, those who do art are: consensually defined as "artists," who have special talents, who are found at the center of a large network of cooperating people organized to support the art activity, and who by virtue of their special talents and experience are viewed as different from persons outside the art world. Similarly, in the social world of the military officer, combat has been the activity which has defined one as an "officer," provided a major source of legitimation for the allocation of national resources, served as the organizational focus, and distinguished members of the military from civilians.

Core activities, even though they define the social world, are not static and are subject to many forces for change. Change may come from outside the social world as it encounters changing environments or interacts with powerful interest groups. Change may also result from interactions between groups which are themselves part of the social world. While the basic function of the social world may not change (doing art or defending society), the manner in which it is done or
the core activities may change (as the military did with the introduction of airpower and space or as music did with the introduction of electronic instruments and electronic mixing) which fundamentally alters the very nature of the social world.

This research will present evidence that the core activities of the Air Force junior officer's social world have changed in recent years from activities associated with combat to those associated with management—that the trend toward civilianization reported by Janowitz continues.11 Further, the impact of this change will be shown to be the result of significant interaction with outside groups and segmentation of groups within the social world.

Social worlds are affected by their environments and the military is no exception. Changing technological, political, and economic concerns have operated to change the military task from the attainment of complete military victory to the attainment of limited political gain in the most efficient manner given the technology of the time. Military expertise is no longer the monopoly of the military professional. It must be shared with diplomats, politicians, technicians and justified in terms of good business practices. Fundamental changes in the nature of the military social world's core activities affect the interaction of significant groups within.

Social world activities are collective activities involving vast networks of cooperating people whose work is essential to the final outcome.12 Thus, the core activity becomes the basis for the social organization of persons with various levels of participation and
commitment. Often, these persons can be grouped into "social types" whose interactions create the conventional modes of cooperation and collective action characteristic of the social world. For example, art works are the product of the cooperative activity of some people defined as artists and others defined as support personnel, who interact according to recognized conventions. While these conventions facilitate the production of art by art world "integrated professionals" and "mavericks," they are challenged to some degree by "naive" and "folk" artists who do not rely on them to produce their particular forms of art.

Similarly, segmentation in the social world may challenge established conventions. In the computer world, for example, segmentation has generated subworlds associated with differences in problems solved, technology used, applications required, and relationships to giant corporations. These segments, as they attempt to capture resources necessary for their survival, organize into subworlds which cut across the lines of cleavage defined by traditional structural interests. Thus, social world conventions are redefined, core activities may be altered, and social organization may be changed.

In the social world of the Air Force officer, combat or deterrence is a collective activity accomplished by flying officers and support officers. In times of war, the conventions of this social world place the flying function squarely in the center because in the Air Force, only those who fly do the combat function—others provide support. In peacetime, these conventions supporting the primacy of combat are rejected and those who manage the military organization, support
officers, are placed in the center of the social world. Currently, military social world members find themselves in some middle ground, involving neither war nor peace, but deterrence. Thus, there is a constant struggle between the flying and support 'social types' to determine what conventions should be used to accomplish the military task and in the process, the military task itself has come to be redefined and the Air Force officer corps has fragmented into subworlds with "officer" and "specialist" identities. These subworlds have alliances which cut across organizational boundaries and include interests in worlds outside the military. Incorporating new reference groups, segmentation also exerts pressure for redefinition of conventions, core activities, and social organizations.

Part of the problem faced by Air Force officers, therefore, is caused by the inability to maintain the articulation of their social world. Articulation involves affirming similarities with other members of the social world and accentuating differences from non-members. Similarities unite the members, making them a cohesive, recognizable group with shared values and activities. Differences separate members clearly inside the social world from non-members through a process of "distancing."

Distancing can be done structurally and symbolically. Structural distancing involves certification, rites of passage and specific career lines that must be followed by a person wishing to move from the outside to the inside of the social world. This is not enough, however. Distancing must also be symbolic. Symbolic distancing involves
establishing the uniqueness of social world activities and the members. Without symbolic distancing, structural distancing has little meaning. In other words, if the social world is not seen as "really" different, then the structural requirements of the social world can come to be seen as another way to become "like everyone else."

Symbolic distancing is the major problem for Air Force junior officers in two ways. First, military expertise is challenged and often superseded by political, diplomatic, and technical expertise. Increasingly, military responsibilities are shared with civilians as military activities continue to be contracted out to civilian personnel. Second, the Air Force is organized and operates like a large corporation. It relies on "good business practices" to legitimize its activities. As a result, management is fast becoming the central activity and as junior officers find themselves forced into a management role, they see little difference between management in the Air Force and management in the civilian sector.

The problem with this inability to articulate the unique characteristics of the military social world and to establish distance from other worlds is that seeing little difference with the civilian sector, junior officers find it easy to move from military to civilian social worlds. Hence, attrition becomes a major problem in disarticulated social worlds.

This study will explain recent high rates of attrition among Air Force junior officers as the natural outcome of significant changes in the military social world. Fundamental changes in the Air Force will be identified and shown to have caused identities to civilianize and
commitments to decrease. Specifically, a problem of legitimation based
on professional expertise will be documented in the interactions with
other social worlds and historical factors which have forced the adoption
of a corporate model. Examining the characteristic core of the Air
Force, identities will be shown to be civilianizing in response to
changing professional prestige structures and the increased use of
civilian reference groups. At the periphery of the Air Force social
world, families of junior officers will be shown to be reacting to the
inherent uncertainty of Air Force work by becoming independent and
anchoring themselves in more stable civilian communities. Finally, the
commitment patterns of junior officers will be analyzed and the effect
of social world disarticulation, the result of changes in all these
areas, on Air Force junior officers will be demonstrated.
CHAPTER TWO

INTERACTIONS WITH OTHERS
EXTERNAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

We are inclined to think of our institutions as eternal but they are not. They constantly undergo the pressures of the society in which they are located. To survive as a going concern, they change. Hughes emphasizes this point and suggests that one of our chief sociological tasks is to "try to make some sort of social order out of the various contingencies to which going concerns are subject and the kinds of changes that occur in them as they try to survive."

This chapter will focus on the relationships between the military and significant elements of society—relationships that have generated tremendous forces for change. Essentially, this analysis is historical and based mainly on inference from previous macro studies. Of particular interest in this analysis is those factors associated with the professionalization and deprofessionalization of the military because these factors explain why civilianization has been the dominant process in the post World War II period and why the military has found legitimation based on professional expertise increasingly difficult.

EARLY PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MILITARY

War has been around a long time but professional officership is a product of the late 18th and early 19th century. Prior to that time, officers could be classified as mercenaries who viewed their activities
as a trade or speculative business, and later as aristocrats, who were relatively incompetent amateurs. Huntington marks the beginning of military professionalism with a Prussian government decree on August 6, 1808:

The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal rights.

Prussian army reforms of this period marked a clear break with the eighteenth century aristocratic military model. For the first time, specific military expertise and skills became the criterion for officer-ship. A military system was created which included: education requirements for entry; advancement by merit and examination; an efficient staff system; a recognized limit to professional competence embodied in civilian control; and a sense of corporate unity and responsibility. These ideals furnished the model used by almost all other officer corps in the world.

The U.S. military began with a different relationship to society. Rather than standing armies found in Europe at that time, the U.S. military began as a group of citizen militias augmented by mercenaries. In the post-Revolutionary period any ideas of a professional standing army were voted down because of a basic distrust of any system which might foster a military elite. This anti-elite sentiment continued into the Jacksonian period when legislation established tighter controls. For example, legislation required recruits for West Point to be
appointed by congressmen who were civilians, and cadets to be recruited from all the states, in equal proportion to avoid regional dominance of the military institution.\(^3\) The succeeding years, even through the Civil War, were characterized by continuing suspicion of the military and the officer corps responded to their isolation by turning inward.

Huntington suggests that this isolation from the larger society was critical to the development of professionalism in the American military. The outstanding finding of his research was that professionalism—characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness—flourished during peacetime only when conservatism was relatively strong or when isolation was forced upon the military in periods of extreme liberalism. For example he found:

During the post-Civil War decades the officers as a whole developed a uniquely military outlook, fundamentally at odds with business pacifism and the rest of civilian liberal thought . . . for the first time American officers began to view themselves as a learned profession in the same sense as law and medicine.\(^4\)

It was peacetime that allowed isolation and the isolation allowed the military to withdraw into its hard shell and shape the ideals of its institution. One almost envisions soldiers huddling around the campfires, socially and geographically isolated at their frontier forts and convincing themselves that they are professional. Society probably cared little what they did during these times. Perhaps, in an effort to gain acceptance in a hostile society, these periods were used to develop theories of military science and to inculcate a professional ethic of service and responsibility. Wartime periods, most would argue, are also important to professionalism because military expertise is
recognized to be important and allowed to be practiced. The isolated peacetime periods, however, may be more critical for professional development because they highlight the uniqueness of the military expertise, clearly separate those who practice it from the rest of society, and allow them autonomy to set different standards of behavior than that of the larger society.\(^5\)

The time between the World Wars was another period of reexamination and regeneration for military professionals. Initially, the officer corps tried to get closer to the civilian society but was shunned and isolated because of the difference in lifestyles and value structures. The military, with its emphasis on group loyalty, service to country, and pessimistic outlook toward world affairs (characterized as conservative realism), found itself at once a part of but also at odds with the liberal society which was concerned with individualism, business, and social reform.

The power of professional military leaders probably reached unprecedented heights in World War II. They ran the war, making key decisions in military matters, and shared control of the economic mobilization.\(^6\) This is the time in American history when the military profession had the greatest power and was held in the highest esteem.

These early stages of professionalism are instructive because they show the close relationship between the military and society. In fact, a case could be made that the changing organizational forms of the military are unintended outcomes of social change in a particular historical period; that is, they are as much accident as they are
purposeful action. If this is true, historical context is an important part of the analysis of change in the military social world and the current historical period may be forcing another change requiring de-professionalization of the officer corps.

CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF THE MODERN MILITARY

Most observers see the post World War II period as another period of instability for the military. No longer was the military able to reduce itself to a small, closely knit officer corps who in isolation, could be concerned with professionalism. Instead, large armed forces remained in being as a constabulary force and mass media forced continual comparisons between military and civil institutions. The political involvement of high ranking officers continued following the precedent set in World War II. The goal of many military actions changed from military victory to deterrence or some limited political gain--at best it became unclear. Further, the threat of a short notice total war demanded a concern with and expertise in a quickly expanding body of technology. These changes and others made it increasingly difficult to distinguish the military from others who were associated with it.

Researchers, trying to assess the relationship of the military to society in this period found it useful to place the military somewhere along a continuum between "convergence" and "divergence" with civilian structure and norms. Those studying the officer corps itself tended to follow the grand theorists and characterize the officers as "homogeneous" or "heterogeneous."
Research characteristic of the early 1950s emphasized homogeneity in the officer corps. For example, Mills popularized the term "military mind" which he described as:

the product of a specialized bureaucratic training . . . the results of a system of formal selection and common experience and friendships and activities--all enclosed within similar routines . . . the sharing of a common outlook, the basis of which is the metaphysical definition of reality as essentially military reality.

This description set the tone for subsequent investigations of officer corps cohesion even to the present. Huntington, writing later in the 1950s, described the military as functionally and ideologically divergent and modeled the officer corps as a homogeneous group, apolitical in orientation, and performing a unique function for society--the management of violence.

Janowitz, also writing during this period, was the first to recognize changes in civil-military relationships and to highlight emerging differences in the officer corps. In contrast to the Huntington model, Janowitz suggested a convergent model with narrowing differences between the military and civilian society. While still professional, the officer corps in this model is heterogeneous, pragmatically sensitive to political issues, understanding social norms, sharing its military function with civilian counterparts, and generally more like society. In his landmark study of the professional soldier after World War II, he identified several major trends including: the changing modes of authority from domination to persuasion; narrowing skill differentials between military and civilians; more representative officer recruitment; increasing importance of management skills,
technicism and political expertise; and an increasing need for indoctrination and unification along functional lines. The phenomenon of "civilianization" suggested by this research was well documented by many researchers in the 1960s. Even studies of foreign militaries were described in these terms.

During the Vietnam Conflict, the ascendency of ground combat forces halted the long trend toward increasing specialization. Post Vietnam theorizing recognized this trend and the argument for a "plural" military suggested by Moskos became popular. Pluralism is a model which suggests only a part of the officer corps converges while the rest diverges. In other words, those associated with the combat mission are presumed to be a divergent homogeneous professional military group while support officers are more heterogeneous and more like society.

Also during this period, the likelihood of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) sparked a resurgence of the divergent-homogeneous model. Janowitz in 1971 admitted there were "limits to civilianization" and later in 1976 warned that new dimensions of technology, social stratification and the normative content of social and political movements threaten to separate the military from the larger society and render it an internal but more isolated body with selective linkages to that society.

Other researchers presumed the AVF would engender a near monolithic "military mind." Abrahamsson in 1972 traced the professionalization process and described the individual officer as undergoing an extensive period of socialization which "homogenizes" the individual attitudes of the profession's members into a common outlook concerning
themselves and their function in society.  

Bachman and Blair, in 1975, examined a wide ranging sample of Army and Navy military men and comparable civilians for attitudinal indications of a "separate military ethos." Unsurprisingly, they found military men who were career oriented, both officer and enlisted, were consistently more favorable toward the military than their civilian counterparts. Surprisingly, they failed to notice how small the differences were. Even to the present, the homogeneous view of the officer corps is presumed.

A model proposed by Moskos in 1977 challenges this presumption and signals another radical shift. His research suggests: the military is moving away from being an "institution" toward being an "occupation"; the social composition is becoming unrepresentative of class and racial groups; and the attitudes of military members are changing from viewing their work as a "calling" to "just a job." Much of the research done recently supports these contentions.

Taking exception to the terminology used by Moskos, Janowitz charged Moskos was "changing the rules of the game of social analysis without clearly signalling the changes he introduced." Janowitz suggests what Moskos really meant was that the shift was from "professional" to "occupational."

While these models might indicate much confusion on the part of researchers as to how the military is best viewed, there is really a great deal of conceptual continuity from model to model. At the center of all these models is presumed to be a core of professional officers who exalt the unique military function of combat. What changes from
model to model is the size of this characteristic core which has an impact on the professionalism of the military—moving it from a profession to an occupation. Two major questions arise at this point:

(1) Why is the professional label so important to the military and those who study it?
(2) What social forces are operating, outside the military, to force the change from profession to occupation?

THE PROFESSIONAL LABEL

Becker suggests the term "professional" should be thought of as a symbol, something used by those inside and outside an organization to describe members of certain occupations and to evaluate the kind of work they do. It is an ideal type which consists of a set of ideas about: the kind of work done; the characteristic source of motivation to work; relationships with clients, the public, and other professionals; and what recruitment and training is necessary. Various characteristics are attributed to the professions. Generally, they are thought to possess a monopoly of some specific, esoteric expertise which is necessary to society. Since only members of the profession can know or understand the ramifications of the expertise, it follows that they should control its practice and acquisition. Licensed by the state, professional review boards and certifying agencies are controlled by members of the profession. Since their work has grave consequences for individuals and ultimately society, clients must trust the professional to do what is right and to follow a set of professional ethics.
which emphasizes service to the client rather than the self-interest of the professional. In other words, performance of the professional duty, rather than the market place transaction is the source of motivation. Also, since "they can be trusted" and "only they can really know," they should have autonomy. A true professional, then, is never hired, his services are retained. The shared body of knowledge and codes of behavior create a sense of community between professionals. This professional community is the only group to which they defer. Rewards are symbolic rather than renumerative and in return for a long period of training and certification they are awarded a high status position in society.

The term "professional" symbolizes an exchange: collective prestige and autonomy in return for high standards of behavior and commitment to do the task in which the profession has expertise. This exchange has important consequences. For example, claiming professional status can be a way of convincing others that they cannot know or understand what is involved in the professional's expertise so they should trust the professional to do what is right by granting autonomy of action. This is the problem of client control and is faced by all professions to some degree. To the extent that the client can be taught to adopt the stance of layman (to acknowledge professional status), the professional's judgment will be trusted. For the military profession, this may be crucial for gaining needed resources in tight economic times.

Perhaps more interesting is the desire of citizens and researchers
to affix the professional symbol to the military. If this can be done, then presumably all can rest assured that those doing this crucial task are totally committed to do the best job they can and that they are doing it for the "good of the country," not for their own self-interest. In other words, we want to trust them to do what is right, and don't really want to know if they aren't. If professionalism is a myth, therefore, we all may be supporting it.21

Professional status is also important to the relationship between the individual and the organization. Huntington cautions us that the military is "an organization as well as a profession."22 Proclaiming professional status is a way of attracting personnel to the organization by providing collective mobility.23 However, gaining mobility in this manner incurs a cost to the individual in that the organization may demand more than the individual anticipated. In this way, some personal autonomy is lost. From the military's viewpoint, asserting professional status may be a way of "doing more with less" when manpower resources are in short supply. This method of operation would be especially attractive to any organization because professional rewards are symbolic rather than economic. This is the problem of colleague control found in most professional associations. Commitment to the concerns of the group, then, is the cost of collective professional status.

At the heart of these social exchanges is the presumption that some critical expertise has been monopolized by those desiring the label "professional."24 Because of this monopoly, a clearly defined group of individuals will be allowed a certain autonomy to practice
their expertise, to regulate themselves, and to determine who is or who isn't part of the group. The expertise, then, becomes the basis for the profession's identity and the monopolization of the expertise becomes the primary determinant of relationships between the profession and society and between the profession and its members.

DEPROFESSIONALIZING FORCES

Prior to World War II, there were sharp differences between war and peace. War highlighted the importance of the military expertise. Peace brought demobilization which highlighted vast differences between being "military" and being "civilian." To this point, there was little doubt that military professionals possessed an expertise that was both unique and important. However, Hughes reminds us:

It is characteristic of human societies almost everywhere that they want education, religion, and patriotism quite honestly, but that in ordinary times they don't want to be plagued to death by them, and that they will invent devices to keep in check the very people they hire to give them the valued things.\textsuperscript{5}

Since World War II the unique expertise of the military has been routinized in the classic Weberian manner and the status of those who practice it has declined as they have come to be seen less as professionals and more as just members of an occupation.

The post World War II decade of the 1950s was a period continuing the pattern of wartime civil-military relations. Large armed forces, which were thought to be necessary to counter the threats of the cold war, remained mobilized. This constabulary force, in the process of integrating into the social and economic life of the society, came to
resemble large civilian bureaucracies.

During this period, two major social forces worked to erode the military's monopoly of expertise and ultimately its professional status. These factors were: political control over the management of military force and rapid changes in military technology. The result was that military professionals were forced to share their unique expertise—the management of the instruments of violence—with a host of others including politicians, diplomats, and technicians.

The post World War II period witnessed a change in the nature of the military task. Previously, there was a clear distinction between peace and war and each required a specific expertise. "Diplomacy had no role in war, military force had little or no role in peace." When Americans went to war, they went wholeheartedly and the goal was clear—total victory. After World War II, these premises changed. In the constabulary force described by Janowitz, use of military violence was carefully adjusted to the political objectives pursued. During this period, American policy makers actively used military force in the classic Clausewitzian manner—as an instrument of politics and with a force limited to that necessary to achieve the political goals of the government. The goal became limited political gain with the previously military function of strategy planning done by politicians and shared with diplomats. Indeed, doctrinal and strategic literature of the nuclear age as well as the existing strategies of deterrence and detente are almost exclusively the product of civilian theorists who see the employment of military force as an increasingly less favorable
option than most diplomatic options. Hence, the military's unique expertise is shared in the post World War II period with politicians and diplomats. Also, the protection of society against external threats, once the sole responsibility of the military, is now shared with these other groups.

Technological change in the military has generally followed that of industry. Margiotta argues that technology has become the organizational essence of the Air Force and that dependence on high-technology war machines has produced cooperative adventures with industry at the cutting edges of science. As a result, application of technology to military problems has been the task of a growing body of officers. However, the rate of technological change has been so great in recent years that the military has only been able to monitor advancements as they are developed and procure weapons systems as they appear to be possible or are offered by industry. In fact, 86% of the projects undertaken by the USAF Wright Aeronautical Laboratories in 1981 were contracted out to civilian researchers and the military scientific community has experienced great difficulty even monitoring these contracts.

Recent weapon systems have become so complicated that during early years of employment, technical representatives of the producing corporation have followed the weapon systems even into combat zones to insure they remain operational. Technicians, as well as diplomats and politicians, have come to share the once unique expertise and responsibility of the military.

Sharing expertise and social responsibility questions the legitimacy
of the military as a profession because it weakens the distinction between "who is" and "who is not" military. This is one of the emerging trends cited by Moskos in describing the occupational model:

Rather than assigning its own military personnel, the U.S. Government increasingly gives contracts directly to civilian firms—with salary levels much higher than comparable military rates—to perform difficult military tasks.29

One cannot overstake the difficulty of determining the boundaries of the military organization and the extent that the operational segment of the military has come to rely on these quasi-military organizations. "Tech reps" are permanently assigned aboard large U.S. Navy warships and to the home bases of modern Air Force aircraft. Without the skills of these civilians these systems would be combat ineffective. Civilians constitute the bulk of the logistic-supply systems in all services and provide most of the major aircraft repair and modification work in the USAF. In the Army, they perform necessary maintenance and assembly functions at major ordnance centers in or out of combat zones. Missile warning systems in Greenland and peace-keeping forces in the Sinai are civilian manned. During the last decade, there has been about one-half as many civilians working in the DOD as active duty personnel and reserve strength has been at least equal. Since 1969, full-time Air National Guard personnel actually have been part of the civil service system. Private companies such as Air America and Vinnel Corporation have been hired to perform covert or sensitive military operations in combat zones. Foreign pilots have been trained by "former" military personnel. Civilian airlines currently contract to provide airlift on a daily basis and are paid a bonus to be prepared to augment military
airlift during a national emergency. In fact, this capability was tested recently during the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 when civilian aircraft were used to rescue American nationals under near combat conditions.

Civilianization of military jobs has been a long-standing defense policy since the mid-sixties. In the period between 1964 and 1978, more than 100,000 jobs were converted and in 1978 the General Accounting Office recommended conversion of 86,000 more. Again, the problem with such a trend is the blurring of the distinction of what is military and what is not. At present, this distinction is so unclear that "civilian employment or contractual service rendered to the armed forces" is now considered active military service and constitutes the basis for benefits administered by the Veterans Administration under the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977.

Even worse than the inability of the military to clearly identify "who is" and "who is not" part of the profession, is the inherent loss of autonomy which results from dependence on other organizations. Aldrich reminds us:

Control of resources in an interorganizational network is implicitly linked to interorganizational power, as a powerful organization can force others to accept its terms in negotiations of disputes or in cooperative ventures. Dependence is the direct result of sharing expertise with other organizations. While this may be the result of two social forces, changing politics and technology, a third force, economics, amplifies dependence in a competitive environment of limited resources.

There can be no doubt shrinking national resources in the post World War II period has generated extensive competition between
organizations for limited resources. In this situation, we would expect organizational change. Pfeffer and Salancik describe such change as a form of survival:

The key to survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources. Organizations are embedded in an environment comprised of other organizations. Organizations must transact with other elements in their environment to acquire needed resources. Problems arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their environment but because this environment is not dependable. New organizations enter and exit, and the supply of resources becomes more or less scarce. When environments change, organizations face the prospect either of not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these environmental factors.

For the military profession, which finds itself dependent on others for its expertise, the forces for change are indeed great. Unfortunately many changes may be unintentional.

A useful place to start analyzing environmental impact is to examine the "organization set" which interacts with the military and consider relative power of the military in these interactions. There can be no doubt these external organizations exert pressure for change and that the military profession is unable to resist these demands.

For example, the military has been caught in the middle of power struggles between the legislative and the executive branches of the government. In the 1950s and 1960s the executive branch has usurped fiscal controls over the military budget and the "power to declare war" from the Congress. In the last decade, however, Congress has successfully regained control in these areas. "Watch dog" agencies recently established in each branch struggle to redirect military operations and policy. The General Accounting Office (GAO), for example,
has actively sought reform in pay and compensation, retirement, utilization of civilian personnel, deployment and capabilities of forces and weapons system acquisition. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has also investigated these issues and made their own recommendations. Both branches have increased their respective staffs. The executive branch has created the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and each legislator has their own individual staff, in order to effectively deal with the volume of data and time constraints required for defense decisions.

The sheer number of controlling agencies and the power they wield, even as incomplete as it has been presented here, raises the question: "who is running the military?" Military professionals generally recognize and accept the principle of civilian control, but they have always assumed political superiors were "dedicated men who were prepared to weigh his professional advice with great care." This does not appear to be happening. According to Admiral Moorer, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the influence of the Joint Chiefs on military policy has steadily declined:

It has been my observation, as well as experience, that the opinions and positions of professional military personnel are being progressively down-graded and, in many cases, ignored. The issue is not a question of civilian control... but concern that the judgement of military officers is being replaced by that of civilian analysts on key decisions.

Matters of control over professional expertise are critical to the self-esteem of any profession and no less so for the military. During the Vietnam conflict, President Johnson's alleged boast that the military "can't even bomb an outhouse without my approval" illustrates
the poor position the military profession has occupied when dealing with the organizational set in its environment.

A profession whose bargaining position is weak vis-à-vis other organizations is vulnerable to change in an environment of limited resources. Such an environment has been the case since World War II. The economic environment of the 1950s was quite favorable to the military. About 60% of the legislature had previous military experience. They were generally sympathetic and felt military matters were best left to those who had special professional skills in that area. The result is that the Defense Department received just about everything it requested. By the 1960s the situation had changed. Concerns about military spending were considered in the context of other national priorities and needs. Each new weapon system was weighed against various public social programs which were also being proclaimed to be national priority items.

By 1972, the situation had become worse. Six times as many Americans as a decade before suggested cuts be made in defense spending. To justify their programs, the civilian leadership of the military began to defend their decisions in terms of "good business practices" such as cost-benefit analysis, systems analysis, marginal analysis and the like. While these practices began when Chief of Staff George C. Marshall was tasked with pulling together the multiple and diverse centers of economic and social power needed to fight World War II, this trend reached its height when Robert S. McNamara was appointed Secretary of Defense in 1961. From then to the present, the selection and employment
of weapon systems and forces has been done according to systems analysis and financed through an elaborate Planning Programing Budgeting Systems (PPBS). 42

Time and time again, the professional advice of the military has been disregarded and cost-benefit analysis followed. The result is often devastating. For example, during the TFX controversy of the 1960s, military selection committees unanimously recommended the Boeing design over that submitted by General Dynamics. Three times McNamara sent the recommendation back to the military committee and when they refused to change their decision, he overruled and purchased the TFX which later, as the F-111, never lived up to expectations. 43

The same charge has been made in regard to the Vietnam War. Unlike Korea, which was fought with essentially the same leadership traditions as World War II, Vietnam was fought differently, by officers raised in the context of a large military bureaucracy. 44 The extent to which management techniques were being used by this time is best illustrated (almost caricaturized) by the Defense Department's reporting of the war in terms of "body counts" and the concern with the number of enemy killed per thousand dollars of ammunition and bombs expended. Woolsey, a past under-secretary of the Navy, describes the tactics used in this war as a particularly good example of a war fought according to the principles of marginal analysis:

The actual tactics used in Vietnam--a little more of this, slightly more bombing here, try and see, and so forth--are normally identified far more with the civilian marginal approach toward things than they are with the military man's instinct for the jugular. For better or for worse, Vietnam
was not exactly fought the way in which most military people who were involved in it were actually recommending that it be fought.\textsuperscript{45}

While many attribute the failure in Vietnam to "mismanagement," the question which should be asked is: "whose mismanagement?"

A September 1974 survey of the 173 individuals who held U.S. Army general officer command positions in Vietnam during 1965-1972 reveals that nearly 70 percent of the men who managed the war did not think the U.S. objectives were sufficiently clear and more than half of them did not feel in retrospect (1974) that it should have progressed beyond an advisory effort or that the results of the war were "worth the effort."\textsuperscript{46}

The success of the "management venture" in Vietnam is history, but the effect on the military professional's evaluation of his expertise is profound. General Jones, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the effect as a "great frustration . . . flowing from the lack of a clear, definable, obtainable objective and . . . frustration from stringent rules of engagement which tended to offset advantages in skill and technology."\textsuperscript{47}

By this point in time, it is clear that the military professional's expertise has somehow changed from combat--the management of violence (in the 1950s)--to simply management (in the late 1960s and 1970s). Even within the military organization, business techniques are used extensively. In a tight resource environment, these practices manifest themselves in the "do more with less" syndrome.\textsuperscript{48} In essence, it is the application of marginal analysis in a tight resource environment--a practice which continues even today. Over a given period of time, the
theory suggests, resources are reduced, and production goals are increased. If the unit reaches the new, higher goals, their resources are again reduced and the cycle starts over. Table 2.1 illustrates the extent to which this has been happening. The problem with doing more with less is that the difference must be made up somewhere—either by demanding more from the human resources or by reducing the quality of the product produced. The human resources can only be pushed so far before they leave the organization and then the problem becomes one of doing more with even less. The long term consequence of this practice, therefore, is ultimately a reduction in quality.

Table 2.1
Declining Resources

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1979</th>
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<td>DOD budget as % of total federal budget</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF budget as % of total federal budget</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total AF personnel (1000s)</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active AF aircraft</td>
<td>15,380</td>
<td>12,132</td>
<td>9,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF major force squadrons</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF budget (constant FY80 dollars) (millions)</td>
<td>53,491</td>
<td>34,726</td>
<td>33,451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Many observers describe this reduction in quality as a compromise of professional ethics, a change to values more acceptable in business than in a profession. A 1970 Army War College study designed to measure
how closely day to day operations of the Army were to the professional ideals of "duty, honor, country" describes this shift in values and found "survivability" to be a key word which describes the new ethical norms:

 Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the officer corps.

 Many senior officers were forced to abandon their scruples and . . . if necessary to lie and cheat in order to remain successful and competitive.

 Dishonesty is across-the-board. 49

 The results of this study show a clear change in values away from a service ideal and toward an emphasis on careerism.

 Gabrial and Savage suggest this degradation of professional values is widespread and indicative of a military which has become a modern business corporation. In their model, officers have become "middle-tier managers" whose primary concern is their own careers. In fact, they blame the military failure in Vietnam on the Army's attempt to "manage" the war and they attribute the relative success of the marines at the same time to their refusal to accept the management model. 50

 Other researchers, describing the difference between leadership and management, provide additional evidence of the emerging management model. Segal (1981) describes management as an impersonal, rationalistic process which attempts to quantify variables and allocate resources to maximize efficiency, tends to exclude factors which are difficult to measure, and views manpower as a commodity. In this schema, logistical costs come to outweigh morale gains. Leadership, on the other hand,
is rooted in a fundamentally different assumption about the nature of social organization, that individuals are not isolated commodities, they operate in groups, and the leader-follower relationship is crucial. Wakin uses the basis of cohesion as a point of comparison. In management, he says, group cohesion is contractual and utilitarian in nature, based on self-interest. Leadership, however, relies on a shared value which emphasizes the importance of the group over the individual. The general trend in the military described by most researchers in this area has been one of increasing emphasis on management, viewing persons as detached, interchangeable individuals who operate based on self-interest, and decreasing emphasis on leadership, which considers group cohesion and shared values.

The profession-occupation shift suggested by Moskos is understandable when environment factors are considered. In the post World War II period, political and technological change, have forced military professionals to share their once unique expertise. This has diminished the distinction between military professionals and others. Sharing expertise has also reduced the bargaining power of the professional leaders in their dealings with other organizations who claim to have the same or similar knowledge in these areas. In an environment characterized by a tight economy, "good business practices" have been used increasingly to justify the need for limited resources. While increasing reliance on good management practices has, perhaps, insured the survival of the organization in a tight resource environment, the cost has been an extensive change in the orientation of the officer corps.
Corporate practices, ideology and organization forms have become an attractive and widely accepted substitute for declining professional ideals and organizational forms. Hence, the shift from profession to occupation was inevitable.
CHAPTER THREE

CHANGES AT THE CORE: CIVILIANIZATION
OF PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE AND IDENTITIES

Every organization has a group which exhibits the characteristic norms and values of the entire organization. Location of this group and the determination of how others relate to them is essential to understanding the nature of the organization itself. Since the macro analysis of the military suggests an increasing occupational orientation and a decreasing professional orientation, a micro analysis should reflect these trends by demonstrating a fundamental change in the characteristic military group or a change in the relationship of others to those previously thought to be characteristic.

In the Air Force, those traditionally thought to be central to the profession are the flying officers who alone do the unique function of the Air Force "to fly and fight." All others are presumed to support this function. This traditional view of Air Force social organization depicts a 'functional primacy' characteristic of most professions; that is, all who practice a profession place primary importance on the unique expertise which only they share and a functional hierarchy is established whereby each specialty or group in the profession is ranked according to their distance from the primary function. In the U.S. Air Force, for example, the primary function is presumed to be combat flying and the characteristic professional core is presumed to be the flying officers who alone accomplish that mission. However, this
presumption may not be correct in light of the occupational model.

In the extreme case, the occupational model describes an organization without the central focus of a "calling" or a primary function. Instead, it suggests an officer corps which is fragmented into specialties, loosely held together by the direction of a management core and some vague understanding that they are protecting the nation. Among the services, the occupational model may be most appropriate for the Air Force which is highly technologically oriented and, therefore, very susceptible to specialization. Even so, some researchers argue that occupational orientation is only to be found away from the flight line.

This chapter will present evidence that the core of the Air Force social world has changed--that a new characteristic group, based on 'management,' is emerging and that this change has clear implications for the professional identities of junior officers. Essentially, I am proposing a new model for the officer corps (at least in the Air Force) which is qualitatively different from previous models which have presumed a military core. In this model, all segments including the combat components are civilianized. As such, this model goes beyond heterogeneity in its convergence with society. Instead, it represents fragmentation of the officer corps into specialties and each specialty converging with their civilian counterparts.

Evidence supporting this contention comes from two major findings reported in this chapter. First, professional prestige systems in the Air Force are changing: the importance of the flying function is declining while that of management activities is increasing. The leveling
of prestige between these two major functions is substantiated by comments of junior officers about essential job characteristics and relative amounts of recognition associated with each. The second finding is that professional identities of junior officers in all specialties, even the combat components, are civilianizing. For example, combat crew members, thought to be the characteristic military group, tend to view themselves as "professional pilots who happen to be working for the Air Force" and support officers have redefined "officership" as "management" which is not inherently military. Together, these two findings suggest junior officers in the Air Force, previously characterized as "military professionals," might be characterized better as "professionals in the military."

COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PRESTIGE AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION

A useful benchmark to assess changing prestige in the Air Force is provided by Mack's study of prestige ranking systems on an air base conducted in 1954. After functionally classifying organizational units as operations, command, support or services, he found flying personnel received the highest rating and all groups were ranked "according to their distance from the primary mission of the base, that is, how directly they were believed to contribute to the actual dropping of bombs."

By contrast, prestige ranking among specialties in today's Air Force is not as clearly delineated and seems to be changing. Flying, the unique function of the Air Force, is no longer of central importance.
According to an administrative officer in this sample:

The support people are not interested in providing support to operations. . . . They can't identify with the airplanes on the base. . . . Most people outside operations see the airplanes as just getting in the way. They are a nuisance!

To assess the degree of change in current prestige ranking systems, all respondents were asked the following question: "During your time in the Air Force, have you seen any changes in pilot prestige relative to the other specialties?" The response was overwhelming. A leveling trend was reported by 82 percent of the sample. Responses were typically explained in this manner:

There is some shifting going on. Both groups (flying and support) are moving together. The prestige of the pilots is declining. The support fields are increasing. The job of flying was romanticised but it doesn't have that much charisma anymore.

Another indication of this trend is the practice of aircrews to refer to themselves as "crew dogs" and "line swine."

While many observers expected the recent pilot shortage to reverse this trend, there were only slight differences in the responses of the 1978 and 1980 samples. In 1978, 85 percent reported prestige leveling and in 1980, this percentage dropped to 79 percent, indicating a slight ebb in a long term trend. Most respondents attributed the slight increase in pilot's relative prestige to the current pilot shortage rather than to a fundamental change in prestige structures:

Right now I think the flying people are at the bottom of a downhill trend . . . maybe now it will start to pick up.

We are going up in prestige now because of supply and demand . . . they need us, not respect us.

These comments reflect the guarded optimism with which flying officers
are responding to current retention efforts.³

Prestige leveling is a long term trend which reflects the routinization of the military task on the societal level. However, it is a trend which signals a fundamental change in the Air Force organization and the orientation of the junior officer corps. Several factors related to this change were identified and will be discussed: changing job characteristics; perceived promotion opportunity; and social recognition patterns.

Changing Job Characteristics

Among officers of similar pay and rank, the job held becomes the primary determinant of professional prestige. The value of a particular job is presumed to be a function of three essential characteristics—expertise, responsibility, and importance. On the basis of these characteristics prestige is differentially allocated.

Subjective allocation of these characteristics was quantitatively determined by measuring the absence of these characteristics. Using selected relative deprivation questions suggested by Runciman, information was gained not only about which specialties lacked these qualities, but also which specialties had the desired characteristics.⁴

The results of this analysis, shown in Table 3.1, indicate a reversal of the patterns described in the 1954 Mack study in which the "ability of the individual, the difficulty of the work and the importance of the work" were found to be greater in the flying group. Currently, flying officers report their jobs lacked these essential qualities at similar or higher rates than support officers. The
difference is especially great in respect to job responsibility and importance. Both groups attributed these qualities to those in support functions. Comments associated with these attributions provided further explanation of key differences.

Table 3.1
Subjective Allocation of Essential Job Characteristics
By Flying and Support Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>% Reporting Deprivation of Characteristic</th>
<th>Groups Reported to Have Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flyers</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N of Flyers = 43, N of Support = 40.

The expertise required in both flying and support functions is generally reported by the respondents to be about equal. Flying, long thought to be a mysterious activity, has been demystified by increasing technology while some support functions (such as those involving computer technology) are increasingly mystical. This trend was emphasized by a support officer:

There is really no trick to flying. They have proven the fact that all they need a pilot for is the take-off and landing. The rest can be done from the ground by technicians. What is really mystifying today is the computer, not flying.
The main difference reported by these groups was not the level of expertise required by the task, but the complexity of the environment in which the task is accomplished. Flying officers generally feel their peacetime task is not very demanding. With any level of experience, training missions become very routine. According to one pilot, they are "oriented about the lowest common denominator . . . requiring only 20% of the aircrew's capability." Also, the supervision and management of aircrews and aircraft is shared with others through an extremely centralized command and control system.

Support officers, on the other hand, see themselves in jobs of increasing scope and variation. They are more than just specialists, they must also develop managerial skills. Typically, they compare themselves with flyers as follows:

All they do is fly airplanes, I have a much better view of the Air Force . . . They only know their part. I must deal with the problems . . . They are sheltered.

While peacetime has simplified the flying environment, it complicates the environment of management and both groups attributed job expertise to support specialties because they 'do management.'

The respondents of both groups generally defined responsibility in terms of autonomy which allowed them to view the responsibility as theirs, personally. Autonomy, in turn, was a function of the cost of a mistake. Flying officers reported a relative lack of responsibility almost three times as often as support officers. Generally, flying officers described an erosion of responsibility which has evolved as ground commanders increasingly participate (through the extensive command and control
facilities) in what would otherwise be the aircraft commander's decision. This practice is so pervasive that even simple crew management decisions have been moved to higher levels.\(^5\) As a result, flying officers are frustrated by their lack of control. A bomber pilot made this observation:

> When I stand outside the cockpit of a loaded B-52 on Alert, I say, 'That guy has a tremendous amount of responsibility. The airplane is loaded with nukes and has specific targets to hit.' When I get inside as the aircraft commander, I realize I don't really have control over anything. Even on a training mission, I'm told when to start engines, when to shut down, when to take off, everything. Everybody believes I have responsibility, but I realize I'm not doing anything except what I am told.

Both flying and support officers agreed that at the junior officer levels, support officers have greater autonomy. This is largely because their mistakes are less likely to be disastrous. Typically, support officers describe their situation positively:

> My commander manages by exception, letting me run my own show to a great extent. I have a great opportunity for personal growth and development. I feel a great sense of accomplishment.

Responsibility, even described in terms of autonomy, is so important in the relative evaluation of jobs that those who have it, identified it as a favorable point of comparison with civilian jobs and a reason they stay in the Air Force.

Job importance was described by the respondents in two dimensions: the importance of the task; and the ability of the individual to gain importance while doing the task. Flying officers reported the absence of importance in their jobs almost twice as often as support officers.

The importance of the flying task, according to the respondents,
has diminished because its outcome, deterrence, is difficult to see or measure. In the absence of reliable feedback from their commanders or the public, flying officers honestly do not know how to rate their task along this dimension. Support officers, however, provide a clear assessment. Typically, they described the flyer's peacetime job, standing alert tours and flying training missions, as "not all that important or demanding" and many accused the flyers of "goofing-off" or "not earning their flying pay while on alert." These charges become especially salient in the absence of positive feedback from other sources. Many flying officers, who reported the absence of importance in their jobs, compared themselves with very junior support officers who manage large groups of people and whose task has clearly visible outcomes. A flying officer in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) assessed his job in this manner:

I wonder how effective my job (pulling strategic nuclear alert) will be. We don't get any feedback. The importance seems to be decreasing . . . A lot of my peers in the Air Force have more important jobs than I, for example, security police and radar site commanders.

Infrequent periods of political and military conflict around the world make more visible the importance of the flying officer's job. For this reason, the self-esteem of aircrews in the Military Airlift Command (MAC), who do their "real job" everyday, and the Tactical Air Command, who must be constantly ready to deploy as part of the Readiness Command concept, was qualitatively higher than Strategic Air Command aircrews, who pull alert in support of nuclear deterrence.

The second dimension of job importance, the ability of the
individual to gain personal importance while doing the task, is structurally determined. Flying officers work in large squadrons of 100-150 other flying officers doing the same or similar jobs. In this situation, they find it difficult to distinguish themselves as individuals. Support officers, by comparison, are easily visible in squadrons with large numbers of subordinate enlisted personnel. Additionally, support positions are often organizationally located to provide direct access to the unit commander; whereas flying officers usually start three echelons below the unit commander. To gain importance at the same level as most support officers, the flyer must first distinguish himself from the rest of the flyers and then gain access to the commander through three organizational levels. Not only is the outcome of the flying task not visible, but those who do it must fight the organizational structure to make themselves visible. A communications officer confirmed this difference:

> I have worked with the wing staff and other base level groups my whole career. This is a definite advantage for a support officer. I gained expertise someone flying couldn't get for eight years. It gave me a lot of visibility.

In sum, the manner in which these officers allocated these job characteristics, assumed to be the essence of professional prestige, suggests the emergence of a different value system than that described in the 1954 Mack study. Flying, once the primary basis of prestige in the Air Force, is now often described as relatively simple, requiring little responsibility and having little importance. Even though it still involves the delivery and handling of unthinkable destructive power, the flying function has been routinized and is being replaced
in the prestige hierarchy by management, a civilian function, which is inherent in all support tasks.

While this analysis of each group's job characteristics provides an indication of the social value assigned to each specialty, recognition differentially accorded each group provides a relative measure of each group's prestige. Recognition from two sources can provide a relative comparison: formal recognition from the Air Force in the form of promotion opportunities; and informal recognition received from supportive social relationships.

Formal Recognition: Promotion and School Selection

Formal recognition is provided by the Air Force through career advancement systems. At the junior officer level, this type of recognition is critical because under the current 'up or out' policy, any officer twice passed over for promotion cannot remain in the service.

The perception that flying officers (often referred to as 'rated') progress more rapidly than support officers ('non-rated') is probably one of the oldest generally accepted assumptions in the Air Force. It is an artifact of the prestige system described by Mack in 1954 and the embodiment of the idea that the "mission of the Air Force is to fly and fight" and that non-flying officers "assist or support the flyers."

Reliance on this traditional assumption, however, seems to be related to length of service. For example, a 1976 study of 537 junior officers, most of whom had less than five years of service, concluded:

this perception leads the flying officer to believe he has an edge over the non-rated officers while the non-rated
officer believes he is at a disadvantage when compared to the rated officer.8

By contrast, my research shows quite a different pattern. In a sample in which most officers have five or more years of service, 58.1 percent of the flyers felt deprived of the 'opportunity for steady career progression' while only 37.5 percent of the support officers felt such deprivation. Perceptions of career progression opportunity, then, are affected by seniority. Older and wiser junior officers do not agree that flying is the path of career opportunity. In fact, the career outlook of many of the flying officers interviewed is summarized by this pilot's assessment:

There are jobs where you cannot progress through a twenty year career; for example, being a pilot. It is doubtful that you can be a pilot and make it. You have to change specialties just to stay in.

Realizing that they must be promoted to stay in the Air Force, flying officers find themselves in a dilemma generated by two structural constraints. The first is the flyer's inability to stand out, by comparison, with support officers. This situation has already been discussed as the 'inability to gain personal importance' and is a function of a large number of officers doing the same job. In regard to promotion potential, this constraint affects the flyer's 'visibility' which is extremely important for advancement.9

Data reported in a 1976 study of Officer Effectiveness Reports supports this contention. Flyers, in general, were unable to achieve as high a percentage of the top block ratings as the support officers during the 1976 rating cycle.10 In an 'up or out' system, visibility
is more than just promotability, it is survival. Ironically, a support officer accurately described the flyer's dilemma with this comparison:

The non-rated officer . . . really has an advantage because there are so many rated people. To stand out in the rated field, you really have to be great . . . . There are generally three captains on a crew . . . . If you do well, you are recognized by your peers. If you do really well, you might get noticed by someone higher.

The flyers' inability to stand out in their specialty is compounded by the second structural constraint--their inability to get out of what they see as a bad situation for their professional development. Manpower shortages in the navigator career field have been a chronic problem. With pilot shortages also a problem, many senior pilots are concerned that there will be a decreased opportunity to hold staff and support positions which they see as necessary for promotion. Even without the shortage, personnel policies embodied in the Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974 require flying officers to perform flying duties steadily for the first nine years (until just before promotion to major). 11 The result is a growing feeling of helplessness--of being locked into a 'structural prison.' This frustration was characterized by a pilot as follows:

I have the feeling that the job I'm assigned to doesn't warrant being promoted to major. Even if I do my job as aircraft commander well and fill all the other 'squares,' I probably won't be promoted. I don't see that as my fault--being assigned to a job they don't see as important enough to promote.

Perceptions of this dilemma have not changed even after recent visits of high level personnel officers to the field. A flying officer offered this assessment of such visits:
They come here and tell us that staying in the cockpit won't hurt our chances for promotion to major . . . but they lie! Look around and see who was passed over last time--those who haven't done anything else but fly.

Because of these structural constraints and current shortages, many flyers, even though they had proven themselves in non-flying specialties, were being sent back to the same flying jobs they had when they were lieutenants. Flying officers at all levels who were completing staff tours reported their professional growth was being blocked, their experience wasted and no matter what they had accomplished, the system treated them as 'just pilots.' Their situation was summarized by a pilot returning to flying from a Pentagon assignment:

I've gone too far, too fast. I've held every position I can as a pilot. If I stay in the Air Force, I'll have to take a giant step backward--back to the same job I had five years ago. Most of the flying captains that I know here, at the Pentagon, are in the same boat. We've progressed too fast. The system is too inflexible to handle us and I see no way to get out of it.

Other officers, who had been flying constantly for most of their first ten years, described themselves as "doing the dirty work" and compared themselves to staff and support officers who have "exposure" and hold "glamour jobs." Hughes suggests prestige ranking has something to do with the relative cleanliness of the function performed. Also, the delegation of dirty work is part of the process by which people in some functions attain mobility. After two unpopular wars, the fighting function may be considered 'dirty' and management 'clean.' Hence, those who do the fighting have low prestige and those who 'do management' are abandoning their association with the fighting function in order to become mobile. When they learned this lesson late, pilots felt forsaken.
I realize now, if I had not been so concerned with learning the flying business, I would have probably been promoted below the zone. What I did was better for the Air Force, but worse for me. The system rewards those who look out for themselves.

The perceptions of these senior flyers are important because they are passed on to those more junior and carry great credibility. In essence, they are part of the professional socialization of the young pilot and the message is clear, "Get out of flying if you can... You can't make it in a flying specialty." Support officers tell a different story. An administration officer made this comparison:

I see the non-rated officer in a fantastically good position. He can do anything because of his exposure to higher levels and increased opportunities to do other things.

Support officers have few restrictions on mobility (except into flying). Further, support officers are being assigned to command positions in increasing numbers. Previously, these command positions were held predominantly by flyers; partly as holding places for the costly flying personnel during times when there was little demand for their combat skills and partly because the charisma of command was legally tied to the mysticism of flying. In fact, until 1975, congressional law required flying units to be commanded only by pilots. Change to these policies, however, is underway and the support officers are quite optimistic about their own career progression opportunities. Typically, they offered examples of the changing backgrounds of their commanders and emphasized the importance of management skills. For example:

For the first time we have a Deputy for Personnel who has not been rated. It has really made a difference. For me, it's a sign that I can be successful as a personnel officer.
Also, the Assistant Deputy Commander for Resources is non-rated. He survived in a rated world. It's a sign that things are changing.

In today's environment, the senior officers cannot just be aircraft oriented. They (Wing Commanders) must be chief executive officers. That requires management expertise.

The support officers are quite optimistic in their perception of their own career progression opportunities.

In sum, the perceptions held by these junior officers show clear patterns. Younger officers of both the flying and support groups feel flyers definitely have an advantage in the first six years. More senior officers of this sample realize support officers actually have the advantage thereafter because the selection to the rank of major is selection for a management position and that is what support officers have been doing all along. **15** Flyers realize they must change specialties or accept a reduced opportunity for promotion, but they are locked into their specialty by the system constraints. These perceptions of promotion opportunity describe a clear trend—the prestige of flying officers is declining while that of support officers is increasing.**16**

**Informal Recognition: Co-Workers, Other Specialties and Civilian Acquaintances**

Informal social recognition is another confirmation of prestige which is no less important than formal recognition. It generates the basic social attraction to the institution, provides motivation for the individual to stay in the system, and feedback necessary for self-assessment between infrequent occasions of formal recognition. Social
recognition from three sources, summarized in Table 3.2, will be examined.

Table 3.2
Perception and Expectation of Informal Recognition by Flying and Support Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition Source</th>
<th>Flyers % Have</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Support % Have</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-worker</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Specialty</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N of Flyers = 43, N of Support = 40.
Expectation based on 68% of sample.

Co-Worker Recognition is, perhaps, the most important because it is the recognition a person gets from those with whom he interacts most frequently. Since there is little interaction between flying and support groups, this type of recognition is an indication of the mutual appreciation, mutual respect, group cohesion, and social solidarity within the flying and support groups themselves. At first glance, the responses would appear to indicate similar high levels of co-worker recognition (see Table 3.2). To properly assess these responses, however, the expectations of each group must be considered. Expectations were offered as qualifying comments accompanying each response.

Social solidarity and mutual respect are generally expected to be high among flyers who work together in a life-and-death environment.
Less cohesion is expected among support officers, because they are somewhat isolated from their peers. These expectations were confirmed by responses asked of the last 68% of the sample. Of those asked about these expectations, most expected flyers to have a greater sense of teamwork and mutual respect than they actually experienced. Even among support officers, this expectation was strong. Traditional expectations are summarized by these support officer comments:

My peers and I are all in separate branches with projects of our own. I don't spend a lot of time with other military officers. I work with my NCO's and civilians. There is little overlap, but we coordinate when necessary.

I know there is a sense of loss when a crew is disbanded. I think that's great. I wish the support side was like that.

Self-reports of recognition did not confirm these expectations. In fact, the naturally fractured support group reported as high a percentage of co-worker recognition as the flying group. This reversal is partly explained by responses to questions asked of the entire sample (N=83) about changes they had seen in the emphasis on teamwork during their time in the Air Force. A decreasing emphasis on teamwork was described by 55 percent of the respondents. Of those who described a decrease in the 1978 sample, 76 percent attributed it directly to the Officer Effectiveness Report system in use from 1974 to 1978. This system, because it required a rigid distribution of ratings within a given work unit, caused fellow workers to be viewed as 'competition' for the limited top block ratings.

There can be little doubt this controlled rating system differentially affected the flying and support groups. As perhaps the largest
group of officers on most operational Air Force bases, flyers often work side by side with other junior officers with whom they are competing. Support officers, however, are generally isolated from other officers of the same grade and interact more with subordinates who are not in competition for the same ratings. The rating system, then, had a significant adverse effect on co-worker relations between flyers and less effect on the interaction between support officers. Confirming this assertion, a support officer in the 1978 sample made the following observation:

I think the flyer's situation is more 'dog eat dog' because of the large number they have who must compete for the limited number of 'glory slots' on the staff. It's different for a personnel officer who is the only one who can do some special project and works directly with the Chief of Personnel or the Deputy for Personnel. That's a real difference!

The effects of this system still persist. Many officers in the 1980 sample attributed low levels of teamwork to this controlled rating system even though it was discontinued in 1978. Others described a slight increase in teamwork "because the old controls were lifted." Still others suggested the controls were being informally enforced especially in respect to general officer endorsements.

Other specialty recognition is the recognition received from peers in other specialties. In a sense, it is a measure of general cohesiveness within the officer corps. Also, it indicates socially perceived functional priorities.

There has been a long standing assumption that flyers receive more recognition than any other specialty since flying has traditionally been viewed as the most important function and because flyers constitute the
largest specialty group (approximately 47%) among junior officers. While this expectation was also confirmed by questions asked in the interviews, the rates of recognition from other specialties reported by each group (see Table 3.2) favored support officers. Two forces seem to be generating these unexpected results: growing social isolation due to schedule differences and technical specialization; and the ascendance of management as a common standard of comparison between jobs.

Isolation has long been a problem for support officers because they are organizationally scattered among several support fields heavily populated by enlisted specialists. A longer history of isolation has caused them not to expect recognition from other specialties. Generally, support officers are quick to point this out. For example:

Peers in other specialties don't recognize me because they don't know what I do.... I don't see my peers in other specialties unless I have to work with them.

I expect recognition from other specialties to be low; it is and that doesn't bother me.

Flyers, on the other hand, are just entering a period of social and technical isolation. Because they work on event-related schedules of odd hours, late night flying missions, seven day alert tours and twenty to thirty day deployments, they rarely interact with their support contemporaries who work regular schedules. Also, these groups are generally organizationally and geographically separated from each other. Consequently, flyers as a group are typically viewed by support officers as isolationists.

Flyers have isolated themselves. They don't get involved in anything. They are hurting themselves.
Technical specialization is also forcing isolation. Even when their work overlaps such as operating and maintaining the same piece of equipment, flyers and support officers have trouble establishing a common ground because their individual tasks have become increasingly disparate. A flying officer described this trend:

They don't know what we do—even the maintenance officer who gets the airplane ready to go. We fly for eight hours and bring him back a broken airplane. All he knows is that we broke his airplane. It's the same when we pull alert. They know we are out there, but they don't really know what alert is. The complexity of jobs has gotten to the point we can't even understand what the other guy is doing.

In this environment of complex and more specialized jobs, 'management' emerges as a common standard for comparison between specialties because it is visible and to some degree a function shared by all officers. In this sample, flyers whose job has been traditionally more important to the unique Air Force mission, receive less recognition than expected because their job is highly specialized, not desirable, and little understood by non-flyers. Support officers received more other-specialty recognition than they expected and more than the flyers received themselves. This is due, at least in part, to the perception that they 'do management' which is easily understood by all Air Force officers. The widespread use of management as the new standard of comparison in both groups is illustrated by a support officer:

A lot of those in the flying force really recognize me for my job—as a commander...a manager. Because I am in a command position, they think of me differently than if I was a specialist. Many of them would like to have my job.

Civilian recognition which usually comes from the officer's civilian acquaintances (college friends, neighbors, church members, family
and civilian counterparts) is the third source of social recognition received by junior officers. In general, these people represent the larger society to the officer and constitute the most salient source of social feedback outside the military. As a group, however, junior officers find their role as a military officer is poorly understood by the civilian community.\(^{20}\) As one observed:

I understand the business world better than they understand mine. It's purely a lack of exposure.

To gain understanding in these relationships, many officers have resorted to their specialist identity which is better understood outside military circles. In so doing, support officers had little difficulty establishing an identity with their civilian acquaintances and 62.2 percent reported some sort of recognition (see Table 3.2). Flyers, however, reported that they were less fortunate because their specialty was uniquely military. As long as they classified themselves in general terms, e.g., as a 'pilot' or 'navigator' they were generally well received. If they were more specific about their flying duties, recognition suffered. This situation was described by a pilot:

If you tell somebody you are a pilot, you get quite a bit of respect. If you tell them you are a pilot in the Air Force, you are viewed as a 'dime a dozen.' If you tell them you are a B-52 pilot, instead of getting admiration and respect, you get sympathy.

Only 45.2 percent of the flying officers reported recognition from their civilian acquaintances.

Again, the expectations of each group must be considered. Flyers expected recognition to be greater than that which they actually gained. Support officers expected less and were again surprised. Interestingly,
support officers considered recognition from this source to be of little importance. Flyers, however, thought civilian recognition to be of considerable importance. Perhaps civilian recognition has become important to flyers because their prestige is declining within the military and the reverse may be true for support officers.

In sum, from all three sources of social recognition—co-workers, peers in other specialties and civilian acquaintances—the flying group has failed to have its expectations met. Support officers, on the other hand, have had their expectations exceeded. Because expectations are a product of traditional models, they may serve as a useful benchmark to highlight the increasing recognition of support specialties and the decreasing recognition of flying specialties. These changes of informal recognition parallel the emerging patterns of prestige noted in the analysis of job characteristics and formal recognition.

THE PROBLEM OF PRESTIGE LEVELING

The Air Force junior officers in this sample provide clear evidence that the basis of professional prestige is changing to reflect the deprofessionalization process described in the macro level analysis. All measures of relative prestige indicate the same trend—a leveling of prestige. Flying, once the charismatic and characteristic activity of Air Force officership, is now considered routine, requiring little responsibility, and just not very important. Management, on the other hand, is a function which has greater professional value and is emerging as the new basis for prestige allocation. Formal recognition patterns
indicate this trend is institutionally supported and informal recognition patterns indicate it has widespread social support.\textsuperscript{21}

Prestige leveling is problematic because the absence of a prestige hierarchy suggests the absence of a characteristic group which represents the unique organizational identity or the emergence of a new characteristic function or group. Either way, this trend represents a fundamental change in the social meaning of Air Force officership. A major consequence of professional prestige leveling is that the legitimation of the military officer identities becomes confused and will be shed in favor of more stable civilian identities.

CIVILIANIZATION OF JUNIOR OFFICER IDENTITIES

Military officers essentially have two identities: 'officer' and 'specialist.' The officer identity is the object of much socialization effort as each officer attends a formal course of instruction lasting from three months (for Officer Training School graduates) to four years (for all Academy and some ROTC graduates). Although 94 percent of the officers interviewed in this study identified themselves as "professional," many officers reported a change in orientation after a period of time: "Everyone is dedicated and gung-ho when they come in, but this drops off after a couple of years." In other words, something happens to young officers when they encounter the day to day reality of the Air Force.

Evidently, in the routine of Air Force life, 'officership' loses its meaning and specialty identities become more important. The need
to redefine officership was summarized by a support officer as follows:

I would like to be considered a damned good personnel man. To be called that is a higher compliment than to be called 'an officer.' The term 'officer' is nebulous. What is a good officer? The flyers call a pilot 'a good stick' and that's a higher compliment than to say he's a good officer, because nobody knows what that means. I want to be known as a good personnel man first and a good officer second.

This process of redefinition proved to be quite widespread.

To assess the extent of this identity confusion, all officers in this sample were asked, "Do you normally think of yourself as a military officer or as a specialist working for the Air Force?" Almost half (42%) of the officers answered 'specialist' and standard assumptions about who they would be did not prove to be true! Support officers were expected to answer as specialists and flying officers, presumed to be the most institutional because only they did the uniquely military task of flying combat, were expected to answer as officers. Over twice as many flying officers (55.8%) as support officers (25.6%) identified themselves as specialists. In clarifying these responses, the typical response for a pilot was that he thought of himself as a "professional pilot" who just happened to be "flying for the government." The support officer replies were just as significant. When asked why they normally thought of themselves as "officers," they usually replied, "because I do management."

These responses signal a significant change in the professional orientation of junior officers. Both groups have redefined themselves in civilian terms---flyers by making their specialty identity primary and support officers by redefining officership as management. While
each group has individuals with military identities, these identities are not necessarily linked to the combat function. This phenomenon is pronounced in both the 1978 and the 1980 samples.

Turning Outward: Civilianization of Values and Orientation

The fragmentation of officers into specialty groups with essentially civilian identities creates a working environment with a high probability that officers in these groups will turn outward and establish stronger alliances with civilian counterparts in the same specialty than with their counterparts in a professional officer corps fragmented into many specialties with little in common. The frequent utilization of a non-military term to define a uniquely military status, e.g., the use of 'management' by support officers to define 'officership' and the self-identification of Air Force pilots as 'just pilots,' is itself an outward turning act. However, another indication that junior officers are turning away from the military officer orientation is the increasing use of civilian reference groups for job and lifestyle comparisons.

Civilian comparisons are easy for many officers. In fact, over three quarters of the officers who reported relative deprivation in their evaluations of military pay, benefits, lifestyle and job importance identified civilian counterparts which they used as the basis of comparison (see Table 3.3). These comparisons represent a search for identities and values which better satisfy their personal needs.
Table 3.3
Selection of Comparison Reference Groups
By Officers Who Expressed Relative Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic Considered</th>
<th>Deprived Group</th>
<th>% Deprived</th>
<th>Flying</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>Flyers</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Benefits</td>
<td>Flyers</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Befitting Expertise</td>
<td>Flyers</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Importance</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N of Flyers = 43, N of Support = 40

Support officers have little trouble finding direct comparisons. Many belong to professional associations related to their specialty. Others work with civil servants who do the same job for the government or have neighbors who do the same or similar jobs for private corporations. As one support officer reported:

I see myself as a professional because I am an industrial engineer and a member of the American Institute of Industrial Engineers.

Flying officers find direct comparisons in airline and corporate flying. Their orientation to commercial flying is especially salient during periods when the airlines are hiring and when there are extensive shortages of pilots in both the civilian and military sectors. Navigators and many pilots also compare themselves with junior or
middle-level executives. This comparison was offered by a pilot:

The airline pilot is responsible for carrying people; so am I. In addition, I also do aerial refueling. It's maybe a slightly different mission, but the job is basically the same. I have the same responsibilities unless I’m flying special operational sorties. In terms of recognition, I have less than an airline pilot... I also think of myself as the president of a four-man corporation (my crew).

For both groups of officers, comparison to civilian groups such as relatives, neighbors, and school friends were common. In general, such comparisons were related to exposure. For example, officers who lived near their home-town often used relatives, those recently graduated from college used college buddies, and those who lived outside the air-base used their neighbors. In most cases, non-military exposure generated a sense of deprivation and the need to find new comparison reference groups.

Until recently, comparison between military and civilian jobs was not generally done because of the vast differences in systems of compensation and the associated lifestyles. The military employed a system of compensation based on an array of social benefits provided in return for the member's total commitment to service. Civilian society, by contrast, has relied on a marketplace cash-work nexus in which limited services are compensated by monetary reward. In their pure form, these systems are not clearly comparable. However, as military compensation policies become increasingly economically oriented, direct comparisons with the civil sector are not only easier but in many cases are forced by top level decision makers.

Increasing comparison of civil and military jobs along these lines
is instructive because in modern society, the money paid a person who occupies a particular position is a measure of prestige. Comparisons based on salary highlight the declining prestige of the military status and provide yet another justification for the adoption of a specialty status recognized in the civilian occupational structure. In response to relative deprivation questions about pay, benefits and lifestyles, most officers replied that their pay was sufficient as long as it did not erode further. What bothered them was that many civilians were "being paid too much for what they did" and that said a lot about the importance of the military job. For example:

If a toilet paper salesman makes $40,000 a year and a coffee cup salesman makes $50,000 a year and a guy who sits on alert with nuclear weapons makes $20,000 a year, something is wrong. I think I make enough to get by, but those clowns, out there, are just paid too much for what they do!

Why should we be martyrs and try to live on $20,000 a year. . . . I relate to my father and brother in terms of lifestyles and I see myself living like a slob in ten years by comparison. . . . I'm doing a service and being penalized for it.

Maybe a letter carrier is more important than a professional officer . . . I don't know.

Status can come in two forms: social recognition and monetary reward. Military officers do not seem to be able to gain either. Consequently, they are encouraged to adopt their specialty identity which provides higher levels of esteem in the civilian occupational structure.23
CONCLUSION

Among Air Force junior officers in this sample, the trends are clear. An analysis of essential job characteristics suggests the professional value of flying functions is decreasing while that of the support functions is increasing. Prestige, measured as recognition, shows the same trend. Formal recognition indicators lend credence to the contention that the leveling trend is institutionally supported and informal measures indicate it has widespread social support.

Prestige leveling signals a fundamental change in the meaning of Air Force officership. Military identities, because they are confused, must be shed or redefined. Support officers have been able to redefine officership in terms of management. Flyers, because of structural constraints, are not able to 'do management' and have adopted their specialist identity which has valid credentials outside the military. Junior officers of all specialties, having defined themselves in civilian terms, establish alliances with outside groups which, in turn, exert influence over value formulation and become primary sources of social reference. This process supports my contention that the officer corps, at least the junior officer corps in the Air Force, are better characterize as "professionals in the military" than as "military professionals."

Implicit in these trends is the operation of strong social forces directed toward the routinization of the characteristic military task. Technology is a double edged sword. On the macro level it served to eliminate the difference between 'military' and 'civilian' by forcing
the once unique expertise to be shared. On the micro level, it serves to eliminate the common bond of shared expertise thus fracturing the officer corps into specialists who have less in common with other specialists in the Air Force than with civilian counterparts. Lacking a common bond and a unique emphasis, the military identity becomes confused and the profession experiences an identity crisis which makes it very susceptible to outside pressures to adopt civilian prestige structures and identities. On the macro level, this was described as the increasing acceptance of corporate, business or occupational ideology.

In this sample, only a leveling of prestige has been detected. No one group dominates the prestige hierarchy; however, support officers who 'do management' seem to be emerging as the new characteristic group. This ascendancy suggests a new prestige system may be developing based on management. Even so, the findings in Mack's 1954 study will still be correct in an ironic fashion. Professional prestige will still be allocated according to the distance from the primary mission; however, the perception of the mission will have changed from combat to bureaucratic management.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHANGES AT THE PERIPHERY:
THE FAMILY CIVILIANIZES THE MILITARY MEMBER

Issues associated with military family life have been a growing concern for the Air Force during the last three decades. Early on, the Air Force recognized the impact family factors could have on the commitment of the military member and instituted several innovative support systems such as child care facilities, family medical care, housing and assignment considerations. These programs were established with the idea that the military member could better focus on his duties if he knew his family obligations were fully discharged. As part of this exchange, the military expected, like large corporate organizations of the 1950s and 1960s, that both the member and the spouse would be totally involved in the member's job.¹

Research on military families during this period suggests this was the case and depicts a lifestyle completely oriented around the military. During this time, there is little separation of work and leisure, both of which take place on a military installation. Family members were considered "dependents" who routinely adjusted to the transitions required by "the needs of the military." Military officer careers were "two person careers."² The wives were expected to "complement the high calling of her husband" by socializing with other service wives, entertaining her husband's military associates, volunteering her time to meet the needs of the military community, and generally "keeping the
home fires burning" by managing the household while her husband concerned himself with military duties. In short, the activities of the military officer's family during this earlier period were husband-centered and generally confined to the military community.

The decade of the 1970s was a time of significant change for both the military and the family. Women throughout society were seeking jobs with career potential and married women increasingly preferred employment and career to full-time family and parenting responsibilities. Air Force families were no different. In 1980, over half (52%) of the civilian wives of military members were employed, and two-thirds of these held full-time jobs. Three out of four families (74%) preferred to live off the base in the civilian community. Further, less than half (41%) of the families believed the Air Force provided a good environment for rearing children. The changing orientations of officer families, especially the spouse, was summarized by one wife in this sample:

The typical Air Force wife is changing. Ninety percent are college graduates. They have more options and want more say in where they go and what they do.

Air Force officials are concerned about these changing orientations because they have been linked to recent high attrition rates. Although the link has been established, the manner in which families affect attrition is not clearly understood.

The 1978 sample of officers in this study also suggested the family was an important factor. Therefore, the 1980 sample was limited to married officers and involved separate interviews with the spouses. Many interview questions posed to this later sample were specifically
designed to examine the reciprocal effect of the Air Force on the family and of the family on the Air Force. Doing so uncovered a process by which the family civilianizes the military member. While some analysts attribute current changes in Air Force families to economic concerns, this study suggests non-economic factors are also operating—there is a "push" generated by the nature of Air Force work as well as the "pull" provided by economic considerations.

This chapter will illustrate the civilianizing process by examining changes at the periphery of the junior officer's military social world; that is, how work-family interactions affect both the family and the Air Force. While several threats to the family posed by various aspects of military work will be described, the underlying threat will be shown to be uncertainty—an uncertainty generated by separations and unstable work schedules. The common reaction of families to this uncertainty is a withdrawal from the relatively unstable military community and an attempt by the families to make a "life of their own" anchored in the more stable civilian community. Hence, spouses are working and moving off-base. This new independence of the family is problematic because both the Air Force and the member's family are competing for the officer's commitment. Evidence will also show that these changes have rendered the officer less able and less willing to bargain on behalf of "Air Force needs" in family conflicts. The major consequence of increasing family independence, then, is that the families, anchored as they are in the civilian community, serve to pull military members away from the military community and integrate them into the civilian community;
thereby displacing the military as a central life interest of the member. In this manner, external and internal factors operate through the family to create pressure for change in the junior officer's military world.

WORK/FAMILY CONFLICTS AND THEIR RESOLUTION

The intersection of work and family worlds is especially salient in conflict situations. The way in which families deal with work-family conflicts reveals the relative importance of work and family worlds and the process of mutual influence between them. While the effects of key aspects of military work on the family have been investigated by previous researchers, few have studied Air Force families and most have emphasized individual "strains" and their specific impacts on the family. This research will also describe the impacts of various aspects of Air Force work; however, the focus will be on the similarities inherent in both the strains and the responses by the families to those strains. Doing so reveals the underlying characteristic of Air Force work that threatens the family—uncertainty. The basic response of the families to this threat is to move toward greater independence from the Air Force. Thus, the mutual influence that work and family have on each other is uncovered and the consequences for officer retention become clearer.

The family conflicts associated with military work are well known to researchers in this area. They include: relocations, long hours, frustrations, travel, alert, and unaccompanied remote assignments. While these "strains" may be differentially experienced by various
officer groups, they all constitute aspects of the Air Force "way of life" which are shared by all members of the military social world. The extent of this commonality was evident when they were almost universally referred to in answers to questions about what advice current spouses would give to prospective spouses who were going to marry a second lieutenant. A typical response is offered by this spouse:

... While military life has a lot of good aspects, those that are most negative are: not being close to the grandparents, being on alert or having to go TDY (travel), the possibility of a remote tour after the baby is born, and long hours during exercises. Moving will be detrimental to the children when they get older...

To understand how this shared experience impacts Air Force families as a whole, each "strain" will be assessed separately and their differential effects on the lifestyles of significant officer groups will be described. The importance of this approach was underscored by an interesting unobtrusive indicator. One officer's wife related a play acted out for a recent Officer Wives' Club dinner which featured (in melodrama form) the 'villain,' Alert, who was trying to snatch the marriage license from the 'damsel,' the wife, and gain control of the family.

Comparisons across officer groups will point to major similarities inherent in both the individual strains and in the responses to those strains by the families. In this manner, the overall impact of Air Force work on the family will be shown to be uncertainty generated periodically by relocation and, on a day to day basis, by various levels of separation and unstable work schedules. The major response of families to this uncertainty will be shown to be some type of independence-gaining behavior, that is, families withdrawing from the Air
Force community and anchoring themselves in the more stable civilian community.

Relocation: A Threat to All

Relocation, officially called "Permanent Change of Station" (PCS) affects all officer families to some degree. In a time when the private sector shows increasing resistance to family relocations (see Appendix D), the military continues to move its people every 1 to 4 years. Moreover, there is little personal choice in the matter. The respondents in this sample, for example, reported moving on average every 2.2 years (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1
Components of Uncertainty Associated with Officer Work by Significant Officer Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Years Between Relocations</th>
<th>Hours Worked Per Week</th>
<th>Frequency Schedule Changes</th>
<th>Days Absent Last Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crews N=17</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>&quot;often&quot;</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff &amp; Support N=19</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>&quot;rarely&quot;</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC Crews N=6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>&quot;rarely&quot;</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average N=42</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The difficulties associated with family relocations are well documented in research about both civilian and military families. They include: emotional problems, depression, and a sense of "rootlessness" for spouses and children, isolation from social support networks for the whole family, and problems of readjustment to a new environment. While these problems are shared with the civilian sector, there are economic differences that are not. For example, many corporations offer to pay carrier costs, house hunting costs, and to underwrite the economic loss of buying a new house or the cost of a spouse's employment agency. This is a sharp contrast to military moves about which there is little personal choice and which costs members on average between $1,300 and $2,400 in out-of-pocket, non-reimbursable expenses for each move. In addition, claims for damaged household goods average $450 per move and the maximum liability for a total loss is limited to $12,500. When these costs are added to real estate losses experienced because houses must be sold in a hurry, mortgages negotiated at higher rates, and closing costs which must be paid, the relocation picture includes economic as well as mental and physical hardship. Even comparison with civilian service counterparts is grim; GAO auditors estimate that civilians receive $3,700 to $4,300 more in reimbursement than their military counterparts.

Other costs of relocation are hidden—not easily measured. Nevertheless, they are part of the military lifestyle. For example, many respondents in this sample cited "not being home" as a cost of relocation to strange areas. When asked how they liked where they were
living, nostalgic comparisons were made with somewhat mystical places where they felt they belonged and that they called "home."

This place is a foreign country.

I'm from a smaller town with less crime and less smog.

I like green... not the desert. We have planted trees, but it does little good.

I have to drive 17 miles to church or change to being a Protestant.

I would just like to be where my family and friends are.

Military families, however, learn to adjust. Many commented that a benefit of moving is that they had come to rely on their own family rather than parents for support and their marriages were better for having moved away from their hometowns and parents. Others, who had small children, missed having grandparents for their children. Many solved the problem by frequent visits and telephone calls. While constantly leaving old friends was also cited as a problem, only a few resolved not to make new friends at the next place; most viewed moving as an opportunity to make new friends.

Proper preparation for the move seemed to be the key to coping with relocation. One wife reported:

Moving puts a strain on the family. It's hard on the kids. I don't like not having my things when I get there and paying money out of my pocket for things I already own.... The last time we moved we were in a motel for two months waiting for a house.... It was expensive.... I try to make the moves easier by psyching myself up.... to find out all I can about the place we are going. I try to take a couple of things along to make it seem like home until the rest of our things get there. I take my own sheets, a couple of sets of dishes, some cookbooks, and since I can't take my plants, I take shoots to start new ones.
For all families, periodic relocation is a source of uncertainty. Some families, through preparation, adapt like gypsies and treat the uncertainty as an adventure. The critical factors affecting families facing relocation seem to be associated with economics, friends, and children.

**Separation: A Threat of Varying Degree**

Like relocations, separation is a strain which affects all officer groups; however, the specific form in which it is manifested is different for various officer groups. Support officers, for example, experience separation as the result of long hours and frustrating work. Flying officers experience separation as the result of crew duty which requires long absences associated with extensive travel, pulling alert, and overseas assignments to forward areas. These strains represent various levels of separation and each requires some response from the family, only the highest levels exceed the coping capabilities of most families.

*Long hours and frustrating work* affect most officer groups but these qualities are most characteristic of work done by support and staff officers. When talking about the absorption of leisure time by the job, it is important to distinguish between qualitative absorption, in which the overload is mental or emotional, and quantitative absorption, in which the overload limits the number of hours available for leisure. Both are factors in staff and support jobs. Also, both represent a type of separation.

*Long hours* is the quantitative side of the absorption issue.
Officers in this study reported working 50-55 hours per week. More senior staff officers tended to work more. Jobs which involve long hours simply reduce the amount of time the member can share with the family. The long hours reported by these officers suggest they regularly work during the evenings or on weekends (see Table 4.1). The specific effect of long hours on the family is described by this staff officer:

I really get involved in my work ... It needs to be done. I get so wrapped up, I don't realize how little time I am spending with my family. Eventually, we quit talking. My wife gets my attention by saying 'I don't think you realize how little time you are spending with the kids.' Then I have to decide if the job is so important that I should try to make her understand that I need just another week with these hours or if I decide it is not all that important, then I change my schedule.

Also described in this comment is the generally held ability of staff officers to alter their schedules to accommodate family needs.

Frustration is the qualitative side of the absorption problem and results from several causes: excessive demands, lack of recognition, guilt about spending long hours away from the family, and other job pressures. Much of it stems from doing bureaucratic work with high demands and limited resources. This situation was commonly related by support officers:

There are some undue pressures put on us to get things done without the resources to do it. You are up to your eyeballs in paper work and the problems keep coming ... They always expect you to get the work done by the required suspense.

The effect of this kind of separation on the family was described by the spouses who sensed an emotional separation manifested in two ways: sometimes the member is visibly upset, but more likely he is "there,
but not really there." Visible anger is relatively easy to deal with, but the moodiness caused by frustration at work dismayed the spouses, as this typical comment suggests:

He comes home frustrated and just sits there. At first I thought he was mad at me. Sometimes I ask him about it . . . or nag him or start a fight . . . then we talk.

Long hours and frustration are forms of separation from the family. Either the member is not home many hours of the day or when he is, he is "there, but not really there." When children are involved the impact of these factors is magnified and the problem cited by most spouses is the difficulty of "keeping the father at home when the work is pulling him away." While the separation experienced by staff and support officers has an impact on their families, the impact is of low intensity compared to the separation characteristic of crewmembers.

Extensive travel, pulling alert tours, remote tours, and overseas assignments to forward areas are the strains imposed on families of officers assigned to operational crews--either aircrews or missile launch crews. Crew duty in this respect is a common characteristic of officers assigned to flying duty with the Military Airlift Command (MAC), The Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and missile launch officers also assigned to SAC. While their specific jobs differ in many respects, these crew members all share the difficulties associated with periodic physical separation from their families. In contrast to the support officers just discussed, crew members in this sample (see Table 4.1) reported over two and one-half the number of nights away from home (approximately 138 per year). Interestingly,
the number of hours worked per week by crewmembers was nearly equal that of staff and support officers.

Family researchers agree that the amount of time and the timing of occupational events are important factors which affect family rhythms because family events and routines are usually built around work rhythms. However, recurring long term absences may preclude the possibility of an organized family life because the family never really has the chance to settle into an adaptive routine. This appears to be the situation faced by families of Air Force crew members.

The officers who experience the greatest impact of extensive travel in the Air Force are those assigned to Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircrews. Typically, these officers are gone 15-20 days a month flying cargo and personnel around the world on 7-20 day trips. On the surface, these trips appear to be planned ahead and to follow a stable schedule. Prior to each trip, the local unit specifies a departure and return time. The difficulty, however, arises when the crews depart the Continental United States and enter what is called "the MAC System." Once in "the system," a collection of travel routes and requirements controlled centrally, trips originally scheduled for 10 days can be extended to 15 days and 15 day trips sometimes are extended to 20 days. This generates a great deal of uncertainty for the families of these aircrews, because the duration of the absence is indeterminant. While describing the difficulties of family planning under such circumstances, many wives related their own version of the "ruined dinner party" story in which they describe planning a dinner party for the husband's
scheduled return only to have him miss it by a few days!

The length of a trip seems to be a critical factor in that extensions and long trips, in general, exceed the family's ability to compensate. One spouse relates:

The week long trips . . . I don't notice. It gives me a chance to get caught up on house work and other things. But when he is gone two and one half weeks, that is too long . . . things fall apart.

Another problem faced by MAC aircrew families is that missions are not always scheduled in advance. The MAC mission requires responsiveness to military contingencies, political crises, and natural disasters. MAC wives were especially attuned to the world situation because they knew their families might be affected. Typically, they emphasized their concern with world affairs:

It's hard on the women because they sit there and listen to the world news and can't do a thing about it . . . There's an unsettledness with not knowing what's going to happen from day to day. The world situation may have my husband going to war anytime . . .

Alert requirements mostly affect officers who serve on the aircrews and missile launch crews assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Just as MAC crews fly scheduled "trips," these crew members are regularly scheduled to "pull alert tours," during which they maintain a constant state of readiness to launch their aircraft or missiles within minutes. The short response time during alert periods requires aircrews to be quartered in an alert facility near their aircraft for a period of 7 days and missile crews to remain in the missile launch facility (located within 100 miles of the base) for a thirty hour period. Alert tours for aircrews occur approximately every third week. For missile
crew members, tours are usually spaced so that three to five occur every month. Thus, alert tours for officers assigned to support SAC's strategic alert requirements may require members to be absent from their families up to one third of each month.

Unaccompanied remote overseas tours and accompanied overseas assignments are a possibility for all officers. Generally, one remote tour or overseas assignment is served in a twenty year career. However, aircrew members assigned to TAC may face two or more such assignments in their careers because the fighter weapon systems which they operate are stationed in "forward" areas around the world.

Remote tours are 12 to 24 month assignments to military installations located in places like Turkey, Greenland, the Aleutian Islands, Korea and other locations considered undesirable for dependents. In some locations, dependents are allowed, but the tour is extended to 24 months. Most military members with families opt for the short remote tour (1 year) over the longer tour with dependents. Generally, remote tours involve an extended absence of approximately one year which is viewed as a very real threat to the family. Typically, members and spouses in TAC cited remote tours as the worst threat to their family life. For example, a TAC aircrew wife stated:

"The most detrimental aspect of Air Force life is the remotes. It hasn't happened to us yet, but we know it will and we will not like it. We have heard of a lot of marriages breaking up because of ... women and children left at home while the husband is gone. ... It's not something I want to see happen to me. If you don't have children, it wouldn't be so bad, but if you did, when he came back the child would be a year older ... a year missed by both the parent and the child. I have said to him that if he was ever sent remote, that I would want to get out. ... I'm not sure I was joking."
These concerns were echoed by a very successful and otherwise highly motivated woman officer who saw a remote tour as an impossible hardship on her family:

At this point, if I am sent on a remote tour I will have to get out because I just can't leave my daughter for a year at this age... maybe when she is older.

In addition to remote tours, TAC aircrew members also face a high probability of Accompanied Overseas Assignment, especially to Europe. While this kind of assignment may sound exciting, for TAC aircrews it brings all the problems associated with extensive travel and alert tours. Those who had been to Europe emphasized the many drawbacks:

In Germany, we were gone five or six weeks in a six month period and sat alert for six to eight days while we were home.

We didn't travel in Europe because of the exercises and the job requirements. Some wives just took their kids and went traveling by themselves.

Long hours, frustrating work, extensive travel, alert tours, remote tours, and overseas assignments all represent some degree of family separation. The plausibility and importance of viewing each of these strains as separation is underscored by similarities in the cycle of family events which surround them. Essentially, each poses the same threat, involves the same response, and follows a similar cycle of events. In each case, three distinct stages involving similar critical events is encountered. What varies is the length of the cycle.

The first stage involves preparations and some departure ritual. Usually, in the process of trying to anticipate problems which must be solved in advance, arguments reflect the resentment of the spouse who
is being left behind to "face the world alone." The departure ritual is typically described by a MAC wife in this manner:

When he is going to leave, we argue and then we must make up quickly—even if the problem isn't solved—because I don't want him flying with that on his mind. We sometimes cover up the problem rather than solving it... but it always comes back...

In either case, the problem is not solved and will never be since the real issue is resentment, on the part of the remaining spouse, about having to carry all the family responsibilities and guilt on the part of the departing spouse, who really has no choice. Some couples, after years of fighting before trips, come to realize that it is part of the separating process and may even make leaving easier.

During the absence, the second stage, a major problem is communication between the member and the family. Communication is most difficult for the MAC crew families because the world-wide movement of aircrew members makes them the least accessible during their absence. Keeping in touch is easier for SAC alert aircrews because they are more accessible; although, the requirement for rapid response only allows these couples to "catch time" together in "short unplanned rendezvous" in situations which will not degrade aircrew response (usually a few minutes or an hour at a time, at or near the alert facility). Missile crews, who are several miles away from the base and underground, must communicate via telephone with their families. Although this is their only option, the limitations are acceptable because the tour of duty is relatively short.

For families of officers assigned to remote overseas tours and
staff officers who worked long hours in frustrating jobs, communication has added importance. In addition to linking the member to the family for problem solving, communication "becomes" the member. Some spouses reported that while the member was on a remote tour, their major problem was maintaining "a father's presence in the family." They did this by having the children write daily letters or keep a diary. Spouses of hard working staff officers used the same techniques to solve the same problem. They reported "linking" the children with the fathers through mid-day telephone calls, telling the children what daddy was doing, and having them report to daddy what they had done each day, if he got home before their bedtime.

In addition to the problem of communication during the separation, many spouses reported feeling resentment about being left with all the responsibilities of running the household. This resentment was especially acute among MAC wives who at first view the absent member's activities as "running around the world," eating in exotic restaurants, and "lying around on the beach." While this was surely not the case, it is difficult for the remaining spouse to believe otherwise because communication is so difficult. Among SAC and TAC spouses there is less resentment. Most are able to visit on alert and understood "it was no picnic." Nevertheless, they resent the extra burden placed on them because of the member's absence. Typically, spouses of often absent members resent "having more influence over the children," having to do "all the household duties," and "having to be the flexibility in the family."
When the member returns after a period of extended absence, the difficulties associated with the separation are not over. Instead, the family goes through a period of readjustment—the third stage of the separation cycle. Roles have to be changed, family power redistributed, and resentment generated during the separation must be brought out into the open. MAC wives typically described the process as follows:

When he is gone, a wife has to be pretty independent. She has to learn to do a lot of things for herself. Then when he comes back, to step back down. You almost have to have a split personality. You become independent and you don't have to answer to anybody, then he comes back. Well, you have to be versatile.

This change in roles is not taken so lightly by some wives:

When he is away for a long time, I get resentful. I resent having more influence over the children. When he gets back, I shut him out of the family.

Typically, some manner of "fighting" was described by each group as part of the rejoining process. Some couples, especially those who experienced frequent separations of long duration, avoided the hassles associated with transitioning by having the spouse continue to do most of the household and child care duties.

Readjustment is complicated by other factors such as the differential experience each spouse had during the absence. For the crew member, the separation is a time of little privacy and of high performance liability. Home again, most wanted some peace and quiet or to spend time by themselves or with their wives. The wives, on the other hand, who have been home most of the week, wanted to go out with the husband or leave the children with the husband and get away by herself.
Most families, especially those with children, established a pattern of spending time "as a family" in the first few hours after the separation; then the parents would make arrangements to be alone, either together or separately, shortly thereafter.

The problem of family separation and reunion has been widely researched but mostly in situations where the separation is of a long-term nature, i.e., returning prisoners of war, remote tours, sea duty, etc. Few researchers have studied the effect of successive absences of shorter duration. Interestingly, the cycle of family events associated with each recurring separation is similar to absences of longer duration. One could speculate, however, that these shorter, recurring separations are a greater problem for families because the shorter duration and the repetitiveness never allow the family time to adjust to either the absence or the presence of the military member.

**Spouses Go to Work: A Major Response to Separation**

When asked to describe how they coped with the overall problem of separations, wives who were not actively raising children overwhelmingly answered "by going to work." This response calls to question some previous assumptions about why military wives work. The increasing incidence of wives working, for example, has been explained by economists as the result of the military member's declining buying power (the result of single digit pay raises during times of double digit inflation) or by feminists who argue that it is the result of the women's liberation movement (a manifestation of the push for equality
in the marketplace and in the family). While these may be valid reasons for many women, the majority of officer wives surveyed in a recent Air Force family study stated they worked for "their own enjoyment" rather than to "earn money" or for "self-improvement." \(^{22}\)

In my own sample, wives also gave other non-economic reasons for their employment and comparisons between significant officer groups explain why. The majority of those who were married to crew members and experienced separation in their family life stated they went to work "to have something to do" during the separation. For only a few crew wives did work later come to be viewed as "fulfilling" or an "economic necessity." By contrast, none of the staff and support officer wives cited "something to do" as a reason they worked and generally reported that they worked for the expected economic and fulfillment reasons. These comments were typical of crew wives who experienced much separation:

- "I got this job so I wouldn't notice the time he spends away from home. It has helped. It gave me another avenue of things to do when he is gone.

- You have to get involved with something else so you won't come down with the 'SAC wife syndrome'--where you get nervous sitting around waiting for him to come home.

- I resolved the separation problem by getting a job with flexible hours. I work more when he is gone and I take 'comp' time when he is home. Now I don't mind his being gone so much.

The military members see the importance of the spouse's independence too:

- Since my wife works, I don't feel so bad about being gone a lot. She can get along without me. . . . We have been able to lead independent lives.

Children have an effect on this process in that they temporarily limit
the availability of the spouse. The options are summed up by this officer:

This kind of job takes a lot of time. Sometimes you live, eat and sleep with it. It tends to erode the family life. Without children, we can just live independent lives, but I will resent it when we have kids.

As a general rule, the spouses that were best able to deal with the separation were those that were working or involved with their children; non-employed, childless wives coped least well. Separation provides strong motivation for wives to involve themselves outside the home when they may not otherwise. Among aircrew families in this sample, where separation is extensive, more than one-half the wives were working. More important, one-half of these cited "something to do" as the main reason for working. By contrast, none of the spouses in the non-crew groups reported working for this reason. Instead, they worked to make money or to develop occupational skills.

The contention that increased rates of working among wives is related to separation is further supported by the low rates of wives working in the TAC aircrew group. None of the wives in this group worked because most had experienced a remote tour or an overseas assignment and, for the first time in their marriage, were not experiencing separation.

TAC aircrews in this sample seemed to be unusually involved with their families and home life. This phenomenon is explained by the special nature of their aircrew work. In this assignment, they were tasked with training other aircrews in a particular fighter aircraft. In other words, this group of crew members had a job which required
little separation from their families and few requirements to travel. Since most officers in this group had just come from remote or European assignments, most viewed this new-found stability as an opportunity to get caught up on family affairs and contribute to the household in a more traditional manner. The uniqueness of this situation and the emphasis placed on family matters by this group are illustrated by these spouse comments:

- Being here has put more stability in our lives.
- This is the first time we have had a home life with the kids, where he has been on a stable schedule. . . . At this base I haven't made as many friends as I have at others. . . . I am more concerned with the family.

Given this new found interest in the family, and vivid memories of previous remote and European tours, most officers of this group expressed apprehension that their next assignment would thrust them back in the turmoil and family hardship experienced previously. Considering the likelihood, their fears were well founded. Weighing family and career considerations, the unanimous choice among members and spouses in the TAC aircrew group favored the family:

- If I got a remote assignment or was thrown into a situation like Germany, where I was gone TDY (traveling) or on alert a lot, I would just get out.

Wives going to work for "something to do" is clearly a major response of the family to extreme separation involved in the military work of crew members. Usually, going to work involved getting a "job" rather than starting a "career" which would complicate the inflexibility already found in the military member's work. Child rearing alters this pattern somewhat albeit only temporarily since 37 percent of Air Force
wives with pre-school children are now working and the percentage increases with the age of the children. Also, crew families in this sample, following the trend in society to delay child rearing, tend to have fewer children on average than staff and support families. However, this may not be generalizable to larger samples. Clearly, working is a popular way for wives to cope with separation. While it solves the problem of separation, it creates other problems which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Erratic Schedules: Differentially Compounding the Effects of Separation

While separation is the major problem Air Force work presents to families, erratic schedules between absences is another which compounds the hardship imposed on the family by separation. Between separations, constant upheavals in the family routine never allow time for reconstitution. Having no definite beginning or end, the separation just continues. Crew members, the extreme case, unanimously reported this problem.

The lowest level of schedule instability is found in staff and support jobs. This is not to imply that these jobs are routine. Indeed, requirements in these jobs change hourly. Generally, staff officers describe their job as "stamping out brush fires" and full of projects with "short suspenses." The critical difference, in regard to schedule instability, is that changes at this level, which occur on an hourly or daily basis, affect only the routines of each day or, at most, a week.
By contrast, aircrew schedule changes routinely affects weeks and months of their personal lives.

After returning from a trip, for example, MAC crew members are given a few days of post-mission crew rest and then put on call. During this period, they are required to call in each afternoon around 3 PM to find out what their requirements are the next day. They may be asked, at this time, to report the next day for ground training, to fly a local training sortie, or to accomplish an unscheduled operational mission. When asked to describe periods between scheduled trips, these comments were heard most often:

The schedules are too erratic. I've bought tickets to lots of concerts and have never made one of them. You can't plan anything unless you are in post-mission crew rest and they can't touch you. I missed a family reunion even though I applied four months ahead of time.

It's feast or famine around here. You can't plan anything.

SAC aircrews and missile crews echoed these comments. Typically, aircrew members are scheduled for 7 day alert tours approximately every third week. Between tours, they accomplish flying requirements by mission planning and flying roughly every other day until the next alert tour. Since some flights will be daytime flights and others at night, the family of the aircrew member may have him home one day, gone the next, or have to keep the house quiet while he is resting to fly all night. Sometimes, even short notice trips are thrown into the schedule between planned alert tours. Therefore, the family's schedule is never really stable. Missile crews face similar upheavals between alert tours in that they may be scheduled for ground training requirements,
alert substitutions, even "back to back" tours (possible because of the shorter tour length). The effect on the family in both groups is constant turmoil. The instability between scheduled alert tours is so severe some wives of these SAC crew members assert alert tours are "the only stability in their lives" and that they look forward to them because only then do they know "where their husbands will be and what they will be doing."

Typical schedules were readily provided by the respondents. An aircrew member reports:

If we could depend on a schedule it wouldn't be so bad. You mission plan, you fly, you have time off, and it seems you are always on alert or waiting to go on alert. I just got off, I pulled a week of alert, off for six days, flying some of that time, back on for this week, and now I am getting ready to go TDY on a Global Shield exercise. That's almost a month that I've been gone . . . What's the compensation? . . . More of the same . . . It's just time out of my life.

A similar account was offered by a missile crew member's wife:

When my husband was on a missile crew, there was no regularity in our life. His hours changed week by week. We grabbed time together when we could. A good week would be: out on Monday, back on Tuesday, training on Wednesday and Thursday, Friday and Saturday off. A bad week is: alert Tuesday, home Wednesday at noon, training on Thursday, out again on Friday.

Non-Availability: A Major Response to Erratic Schedules

Crews have added stability to their schedules in ingenious and very pragmatic ways. In one way or another, most make themselves unavailable to the squadron for short notice activities. For example, some would leave town on scheduled days-off so that they could not be recalled for whatever duties that came up:
Sometimes, we go off base to spend time together... Going away for the weekend solves the problem of unscheduled requirements... So we go camping.

Some try not answering the phone, but they quickly add, "It only gets us in trouble."

Many moved off the base and justified it by saying not only did it separate their family life from the military, but it helped stabilize their schedule because "the squadron was more reluctant to call in someone who had to drive 13 miles than someone who lives right on base."

The importance of this behavior as a statement of independence is highlighted by the realization that the aircrew group, which experiences the greatest separation and schedule upheaval, is leaving the security and convenience of the base; that is, they are leaving their wives "alone" in the civilian community and making it more difficult to go to work when their irregular hours preclude less expensive shared transportation arrangements.

A few officers reported just moving off base was not enough and they elected to move to areas which require a long distance call from the squadron because "that makes them really think about how badly they need you before they call--especially if you refuse to accept the charges." Others reported using telephone answering services and selectively responding when the squadron called them to report. Still others reported installing two telephone lines, one for their "friends" and one for the squadron (which was seldom answered). Almost every respondent knew of telephone ring systems used to identify calls from "friends."

One MAC officer even described putting in for several two-day
leave periods. Approved one at a time, these leave requests seemed harmless, but together "they chopped up the month in such a way that the scheduler couldn't send me on any extra trips."

Other officers sought administrative duties and staff jobs which made them too valuable to the unit to allow long or unscheduled absences. The success of this tactic is described by a missile crew member:

My being able to change jobs from 'line swine' to a wing staff job not only gave me more challenge, it has been good for my family. Now I'm home to play with the kids.

Also, some officers requested transfers to Major Air Commands with less demanding missions.

These ways of solving the problem of erratic schedules are all very pragmatic and work quite well for the individual. Unfortunately, these solutions are not in the best interest of the Air Force. Essentially, the needed stability is provided by withdrawing from the organization.

The importance of schedule stability and the impact of unstable schedules on crew member families are reinforced by the comparison of staff and support officers with crew members. Work schedules of both groups are erratic, but on different scales--hourly and daily as compared with weekly and monthly. However, the key difference between staff/support officers and crew members is not the inherent instability of work schedules but the ability to prioritize work requirements and to adjust work schedules to meet family needs.

Generally, staff and support officers in this sample reported few
insurmountable problems with their families. Problems of frustration, once recognized, were effectively dealt with by the families. Problems of long hours were solved by "catching time when you can," rescheduling events or blocking out special times for the family. Many staff/support officers reported keeping in touch with their families by making phone calls periodically throughout the day or by meeting their spouses in the middle of the day for lunch or shopping. Most spouses in this group reported special times set aside in the evening or on the weekend "just for the family." Comments by members of this group provide clear evidence that the individual's ability to control the work schedule not only reduces family separation, but allows some problems to be pre-empted or defused by changing the work situation. Hence, officers in this group reported fewer work/family conflicts. The manner in which the conflict was pre-empted is illustrated by these support officer comments:

Occasionally, if I get caught up at work, I will take-off early to be with my daughter. ... I just work later on the weeknights. ...

Now that the kids are older, they need more of my time in the evenings. So, I take my work home and do it after they have gone to bed.

The degree of control exercised by staff/support officers is a sharp contrast to the schedule of crew members whose scheduled separations are "the only stability in their lives." The toll taken on their respective families is also clearly different.
UNCERTAINTY AND INDEPENDENCE: 
THE PRIMARY WORK/FAMILY INTERACTION

While manifested in many forms as specific hardships experienced by specific types of military families, uncertainty is the basic problem faced by Air Force officer families. As such, uncertainty should be the focus of researchers seeking to determine how military work affects the families of Air Force officers. Uncertainty in the family lives of officers in this sample is generated by the unique combination of two aspects of the officer's work: frequently recurrent separation and constantly changing work schedules. Both of these factors have various levels of intensity (summarized for each group in Table 4.1).

Separation is characteristic of most Air Force jobs. Its least intense form is represented by the situation of staff and support officers who work long hours daily. The extreme case of separation is found among MAC aircrews who are physically gone from their families for long periods of time on a recurrent basis. Somewhere, between these extremes, are the separations associated with SAC alert and remote tours.

Changing work schedules is also found in most Air Force jobs. Again, the lowest level of change is found in staff and support jobs where bureaucratic requirements are complicated by short suspenses and changing priorities imposed by both the situation and higher levels of authority. Schedule changes at this lowest level occur hourly and change the routines of each day. The highest level of change is found among SAC alert crews whose schedule changes daily and the result is a significant change in the work routine of entire weeks or months.
Somewhere between these extremes, the unstable schedules of MAC aircrews and the unpredictability of remote tours for TAC aircrews is situated.

The critical factor affecting the impact intensity of both separation and schedule uncertainty is control by the individual over the prioritization of work tasks and over when or where those tasks must be accomplished. In this regard, staff and support officers have the advantage of greater control over their work and the impact of Air Force work on their families is noticeably reduced.

The major response of Air Force families to the uncertainty caused by both separation and unstable schedules is to establish greater independence from the military community. This independence is the underlying result of several specific behaviors (summarized in Table 4.2) such as: wives working, moving off-base, and making oneself unavailable for recall to accomplish unplanned or short notice duties. 27

Policy research, examining each of these behaviors separately, has tended to attribute them to solely economic concerns. While economic considerations certainly support these actions by military families, taken as a whole they represent a reaction of the family unit to non-economic aspects of Air Force work. These non-economic aspects may be the real "push" driving the family's withdrawal from the military community and economic considerations may only be one of many "pulls" which support the "push."

Several indications in this study support this contention. These indications are summarized in Table 4.1 and 4.2. Only in the crew member group, where there is a high uncertainty associated with much
Table 4.2

Indications of Family Independence by Significant Officer Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Spouse Works</th>
<th>Hrs/Wk Spouse Works</th>
<th>Major Reason</th>
<th>Live Off Base</th>
<th>Major Reason</th>
<th>Makes Self Not Available</th>
<th>Best Friends Are Military</th>
<th>Spouse Recommends Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crews N=47</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Something to do</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>Get away</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff &amp; Support N=19</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Fulfillment</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC Crews N=6</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>First chance</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=42
separation (represented as "days absent in the last year") and work
schedules which change "often" (as opposed to "rarely"), do we find wives
that work "to have something to do," families who move off-base "to get
away," and fewer "best friends who are military." Also in this group,
were many who reported making themselves "unavailable" for short notice
duties. It is as if the crew members are reacting to forced family
separation by separating themselves from the Air Force whenever possible.
In this manner, presumably, they are able to maintain some sort of order
in their family life.28

Independence was a key word that emerged often in interviews with
crew members' wives. When asked what advice they would give to a pros-
spective spouse of a new Air Force officer, 79 percent of the crew member
spouses specifically recommended "learning to be independent" (see Table
4.2). Among staff and support spouses, less than half that percentage
(32%) even mentioned "independence" in any comment.29 The uncertainty
associated with the member's job is clearly related to the family's de-
sire for independence from the Air Force.

This relationship was explained, in part, by other comments made
by crew member spouses during the interviews. For example, "learning
to be independent" was recommended by many because, in their experi-
ence, "you can't depend on your husband to be there when you need him"
and "you can't rely on your husband personally to provide your happi-
ness." Some wives reported trying a traditional marriage in the be-

ning:

For the first two years of our marriage I was very dependent
on him; then I realized that I had to grow up and do things
on my own.
"Learning to be independent" becomes a way of surviving periodic separations.

I have had to do things I never thought I would have to do . . . because my husband was not around to do them.

What starts as a way of surviving, extends into other areas of family life.

The separations have made me a stronger person.

When he is gone, he is not here to bargain with so I do what I want . . . When he comes back and he doesn't want to do what I want, I just do it anyway--without him.

Finally, the family develops a life apart from the Air Force and sometimes the member.

His being gone doesn't bother me all that much. We have developed different lives--we don't have any common interests.

What I do has nothing to do with my husband's job . . . To handle the separations, I have become independent. Now I try to keep the Air Force out of my life.

When the process of independence-gaining has proceeded to the final stages, two long term choices face the member. The first alternative is to continue with independent lifestyles and separate interests. This choice is reflected in oft heard comment: "You have to grow apart to survive." The other choice is to seek a job with more stability. This choice requires the Air Force to be more flexible in their assignment of persons already serving in jobs involving separation and erratic schedules. This option is reflected in the following hopeful comment: "You have to know that it (a lifestyle characterized by uncertainty) will not be that way the rest of your life . . . If so, you have to get out." In other words, extensive separation and constantly changing
work schedules cannot be tolerated for an entire career. If no relief is formally provided by the Air Force, the member and his family will generate it by becoming independent or by leaving the service.

THE DECLINING ROLE OF THE MILITARY MEMBER AS THE AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE IN FAMILY NEGOTIATIONS

Greater independence makes the families of military members a competing institution bargaining for the limited resources of the military member. In this situation the orientation of the military member becomes critical. Is he aligned with the profession or the family or caught in the middle? If he is aligned with one or the other, what power does he have to affect a change in either? While the traditional assumption that the military member exercises control over a family unit which is "dependent" upon him might currently be recognized as incorrect, there is still a presumption that the member at least represents the "needs of the Air Force" in work-family conflicts. In this study, the latter situation was assumed, but answers to questions about work-family negotiations provided evidence that the military member has neither the ability nor the desire to represent the Air Force in work-family conflicts. In other words, the evidence suggests the member does not act as a broker for the Air Force in work-family conflicts. Instead, he or she aligns with the family which as a unit, deals with problems presented by Air Force work.
Declining Family Power

Inflexibility is a widely known and clearly present aspect of military work. The "needs of the Air Force" dictate working hours, travel requirements, and relocation. The legitimacy of these needs is rarely questioned seriously because they are always (although not clearly) related to national defense.

Over three quarters of the spouses in this sample cited inflexibility as a reason why the family adapted in particular ways to work demands of the Air Force. The inflexibility of military work, they contend, "requires us to take up the slack . . . to make all the adjustments." Sometimes the realization of this constraint is precipitated by a crisis in the manner described by this spouse:

One night when we were fighting about his job, he made me realize that he couldn't do anything about it because he couldn't just get out of the service. Then it struck me--I was causing the problem . . . by complaining about something he couldn't change.

No matter how it is learned or phrased, the lesson is clear: "the Air Force comes first in all things."

The inflexibility inherent in military work directly affects family negotiations. Spouses readily admit this is the constraint under which they must work:

I am more flexible because he is less able to bend as much as I can.

This constraint is reflected not only in reports about actual work/family negotiations, but in basic advice that would be offered to prospective spouses of junior officers. Interestingly, a civilian husband
offered these comments about the inflexibility of his wife's military job:

The most important thing for a prospective husband to understand is what he is getting into . . . I am the one who has to find a new job everytime she moves . . . Also, her schedule is less flexible than mine. I have to negotiate my schedule, she can't. When it comes to one of the kids having to be somewhere and my wife has to work, I am the one that gets off and takes them.

Some researchers, undoubtedly, have confused this inflexibility with a greater power attributed to the military member during family negotiations. Indeed, the ability to declare some point of contention as "not negotiable" is a sign of power in negotiations. However, the attribution of greater marital power to the military member on this basis may be incorrect because it presumes the member wants what the Air Force is requiring in each situation. Such a presumption is unrealistic--especially when family hardship is involved. At least three findings in this study provide evidence that the family power of some military members is diminished and that they are not able to effectively bargain on behalf of the Air Force in work-family conflicts.

First, officers who experienced a great deal of family separation, generally described themselves as "outsiders looking in" on their families. In other words, they did not feel that they were really part of anything the family was doing. While separated, the member lost touch with the family processes. There was little choice but to accept the fact that the spouse was independent and the actual head of the household. Between periods of separation many reported a strong hesitancy to interfere with normal family processes, such as discipline and
financial management, because they knew they would be leaving again shortly. These flying officers were among many who described such a dilemma:

On long TDYs [trips] I lose contact with what is going on in the family. When I return, I am on the outside looking in. A lot has happened that I wasn't part of . . . and I know I'll be leaving again.

She is raising the child differently than I would, but I am not at home enough to have a say in it, so I just let her do what she wants.

The second indication that the family negotiating power of the military member may be diminishing is that several officers or their spouses reported incidences of the spouse openly questioning why they are married. Again, this occurs in families where there is much separation. Generally, the spouse has gone to work "to have something to do," then realizes her potential for economic self-sufficiency and that she is doing all the household chores anyway. The question that arises, usually during a fight, is "who needs you anyway?" Officers who reported incidents like this did so with a feeling of helplessness:

Sometimes she says to me, 'Why am I even married? I have to do everything anyway. So why be married?' . . . I have to agree with her at times.

Even though they could do little to change the situation, many crew members blamed themselves and quietly hoped the spouse would not leave.

The third indication that the negotiating power of the military member has decreased is greater sharing of household duties. While this is explained, in part, by changing norms which reflect greater sharing of these duties between marriage partners throughout society, openly complaining about some of the duties suggests the change is not
totally willful. For example, spouses demand:

This is his house too. I don't stop working when he comes home so he should help me when he gets home. Recently, we have started sharing the chores. If I do the dishes, then my husband will get the kid to bed. He used to sit and read the newspaper.

And the husbands complain:

When I come home after a week of alert, I end up watching the kid while my wife goes out and does what she wants.

Thus, families are demanding more time from the military member and getting it. When separation is a characteristic of the work, guilt may be a motivating force which compels the member to do things he may not otherwise. The tendency of Air Force supervisors to measure dedication in terms of working during off-duty time may no longer be valid in light of other demands placed on the individuals by their families.

In the family negotiating arena, then, these indications suggest the member's power is declining: opting out of the decision process, facing complete independence rather than dependency, and personal guilt about being absent. These forces are clearly more pronounced among crew member families; however, I speculate they also operate in non-flying groups, but to a lesser degree. They all question the traditional assumption that members are able to negotiate on behalf of the Air Force with their families. In fact, they are not! Family compliance is more a function of perceived benefit to the family or the absence of any choice in the matter. The latter, unfortunately, generates greater guilt and further erodes the member's bargaining position.

While the member's ability to negotiate in the family has declined, the assumption so far in this discussion has been that the member is
willing to represent "Air Force needs" to the family. Additional evidence suggests this assumption, that the member views work demands as more important, also should be questioned.

Siding With the Family

The military has always been considered an occupation which demands a high dedication to work. However, comments of the respondents in this study suggest work considerations more often than not take second place to family needs. This questions the assumption that the member is willing to counter the growing independence of the family and keep the family responsive to Air Force needs.

Evidence of the relative importance placed on family concerns is found in the resolution of work-family conflicts and the part played by the member in that resolution. At the onset, this study assumed members could be viewed as the "agent" of the Air Force in family negotiations; however, only one young support officer described this traditional orientation:

I don't feel torn between the demands of my family and my job. My wife knows that I have to identify with the military and she has to identify with me.

If the officer was not aligned with the Air Force, it was assumed he might be caught in the middle of a struggle between the Air Force and the family. Again, only one officer reported this orientation:

I may have to choose between my family and my career when my legal commitment is up. I love both. My job is important and gives me a sense of importance. My family gives me love and support but the needs of the two seem irreconcilable. If I stay in, I can see I will have to give up some in both areas and my wife will have to make concessions in both areas.
Unexpectedly, the work and family orientation most often described
was one of the military member aligned with the family and both trying
to cope with the demands of the profession. The norm, described by this
officer, clearly represents the greater relative importance most officers
placed on their families:

The most detrimental aspect of the Air Force is that it demands
your full devotion . . . The reason people are getting out is
to be with their family . . . I will not be devoted enough to
lose my family. The family comes first . . . I will take a bad
OER [Officer Evaluation Report] before I will put my family
second. If they make me decide between my family and my job,
I will get out.

Most officers are realistic about the demands of military work but
are quick to point out that their critical limit is "long term family
hardships." This comment illustrates the position typically taken on
this matter:

If I decided to get out now, it would be because of family
conflicts that are irreconcilable. I place the mission of
the Air Force above short term effects on the family. Long
term effects would be too much of a detriment.

Other indications underscore the greater relative importance being
placed on family rather than work concerns. For example, when asked to
rank order 'officer,' 'specialist,' 'family,' and 'other' activities as
to the degree that they require the most involvement, are more impor-
tant, or are the major source of satisfaction in the lives of the
officer, family activities were ranked ahead of all other interests for
72% of the respondents.37 Also spouse satisfaction with the member's
military service, support of their careers, and satisfaction with Air
Force life were all positively related to stated career intent.38
Further, those who were asked, "If you were to leave the Air Force
tomorrow, what would be the cause? What would drive you out?" replied in terms of family hardships more often than any other reason.

The relative importance of the family to the military member questions any presumption that the member will curb the trend toward growing independence of the family. Values are changing. Recent studies of Air Force families suggest work is declining as a central life interest of many officers. The same trend is reported by many officers in this sample in regard to the values of younger officers:

The junior officers coming in seem to have a different set of priorities . . . They are no longer just 'me first.' . . . They try to balance their job, personal, and family needs.

When asked why values were changing in this way, most respondents replied, "the family offers a greater return on your commitment" which supports current research findings concerning the decline of institutionalism in the military. Also, it could be the result of declining cohesion and social support in the military as the comments above seem to indicate. Either way, the result is the same: family concerns are more important than those of the job.

In sum, the military member is neither willing nor able to effectively counter the family's growing independence; subsequently, he becomes a part of it. The short-term result is diluted commitment to the Air Force. The long-term result is attrition because when faced with extended conflict, these Air Force junior officers are much more likely to "divorce" the Air Force than their spouse (as they did in the past).
CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AND POWER

The difficulty with the increasing independence of military families is that they are becoming rooted in the civilian rather than military community. Since the military member has little power to negotiate change in the family and places more importance on the family's needs in work-family conflicts, the family effectively operates to ground the member in the civilian community. A situation which serves to highlight this process is the problem of relocation, faced so frequently by military families.

Relocation has always been a hardship borne by military families. In earlier times, however, transfers were easier because they usually involved moving out of one set of quarters and into another located in a different part of the same military community. This was true for several reasons. Wives in the 1950s and 1960s, not unlike their civilian counterparts in civilian communities, involved themselves primarily in the military community. Standard activities, reported by research of that period, consisted of attending social activities, volunteering service (hospital and military community service activities), and raising children—all of which can be continued in other military communities. Also, financial investments in a particular geographic area were diminished because living in quarters on the base was preferred to civilian housing. During this time, on-base quarters not only provided the convenience of being close to work, military facilities, and other military families, but also provided an economic advantage of lower cost housing relative to that available in the civilian
Further, personal investments of friendships in the civilian community were reduced because of the somewhat isolated nature of the military community. Wives have been reluctant to make friends outside the military community because they must be left behind; whereas, military friends may be seen again in future assignments. Children also faced this dilemma. In military communities, the other children are also "uprooted" and the higher percentage of new kids in the system makes integration easier. Lifestyles kept within the military community, as they were in earlier times, makes relocation to another military community easier.

Today, however, the greater independence of families from the Air Force creates greater dependence on the resources of a specific geographic locale. This situation was vividly illustrated by the cases of three out of seven families of crew members interviewed at a less desirable, somewhat isolated base located along the northern tier of the United States. These crew members and their families were emphatic about their desire not to be moved from that area--even at the cost of future promotion. In short, family stability was more important than job opportunity. Each of these cases illustrates why a seemingly undesirable assignment may appear desirable to some families. Considered together, they illustrate how families are operating to integrate the military member into civilian communities.

One family was reluctant to leave the area because the wife was well established in a job with good potential for career progression. Unfortunately, the job was tied specifically to that location and could
not be duplicated elsewhere. Moving meant the loss of substantial income to the family. This family is not unlike many of those interviewed in this sample, since 44% of officer wives are currently employed. The constraint imposed by the spouse's employment is illustrated by these typical spouse comments:

I never thought about the moving until I got a job. Then I began to regret moving and starting over.

The biggest detriment is the effect on the wife's career. Because of it, you see more and more people separate and split up in the military. It could be that the wives might not move anymore.

Although most spouses are quick to point out that they are working in "jobs" rather than "careers" so that they can make concessions to the inflexibility of the military member's career, a few spouses have started careers which are approaching or have exceeded the earning capacity of the member; consequently, these families are hard pressed to relocate when asked by the Air Force. For all families in which both spouses work, the civilian job constrains the career decisions of the military member.

The second family that was reluctant to leave the northern-tier base had purchased a house with a 7% loan and lived in a neighborhood situation that they felt could not be duplicated elsewhere. In this situation, there is no doubt that relocation would be an economic hardship. Current high interest rates would require more money for less house. Thus, the move may result in a decreased standard of living even if the potential for progression increases.

The decision to live on or off the base is actually a decision
between a military and the civilian lifestyle. The relative merits of living in military and civilian communities are illustrated by these comments:

Living on base is a good way to start out in the Air Force. It's like a complete immersion in the Air Force way of life.

If we lived off base, I don't think I would feel like we were in the military.

Those who had made a decision to move off-base had this to say:

I am looking forward to the day when we get our own house and have non-military friends. When we can be more 'normal' persons on an everyday basis.

I don't feel like I am in the Air Force because we don't live there or have much to do with it.

Buying a house off base represents a considerable investment in the local community and the civilian lifestyle. At the very least, potential economic losses associated with forced sales or refinancing constrain career decisions.

The third family in this group was unwilling to relocate because they had just become established in the civilian community and had children who had just entered school. This family had made considerable personal investments in the civilian community which would be lost by relocating.

The importance of children in the relocation decision varies with their ages. Most parents felt moving around was a healthy experience for young children because "they get varied experiences, learn to adjust and to accept different kinds of people." Relocation during the high school years was seen as a problem by most parents because "they
will have to leave their friends when friends mean the most." Much of
the childhood development research supports these contentions.47 No
matter what the age, children link the family to the civilian community,
to schools, to recreational programs, and to other families with similar
aged children.

Parents, too, make personal investments in the community. Again,
this investment represents a choice between military or the civilian
lifestyles. In this sample, family life which involved a great deal of
separation, often resulted in heavy friendship investments in the
civilian community "because you can count on them being there when the
military people are coming and going all the time." In fact, crew mem-
bers, who experienced greater work-induced uncertainty and whose families
sought more independence from the Air Force, reported their "best friends
tended to be military," almost 20 percent fewer times than did staff
and support families who experienced less separation (see Table 4.2).
Friendship investments, then, are related to living off-base and repre-
sent an investment in the civilian community.

The divisive character of the family, which is increasingly
anchored in the civilian community, is highlighted by the problem of
relocation. Moving in the military no longer involves simply moving
out of the quarters on one base and into the quarters of another.
Instead, many ties with the civilian community must be severed. Some-
times these civilian ties are more important than military ones and
rather than relocate, the military member may terminate his association
with the military. In this manner, the family civilianizes the member.
CONCLUSION

At the periphery of the military social world, junior officer families are changing their orientations and generating tremendous pressure for change within. Once a part of the military organization, they are now well established in the civilian sector. This change is often attributed to social and economic forces which "create the need for additional incomes and sound investments to counter inflation" or "the need for self-actualization reflecting the women's liberation movement." These external forces explain only part of the situation. They are the "pull" which provides alternative opportunities and legitimate the new civilian orientation. The other part of the explanation involves internal, non-economic factors, a "push" generated by the unique characteristics of Air Force officer work.

Two aspects of Air Force work are the source of most work-family conflicts: recurring separations and erratic work schedules. These qualities are found to some degree in all jobs held by officers. The lowest levels of conflict occur in staff and support jobs because long working hours and changing bureaucratic priorities can be kept under control by the individual's ability to reschedule and reprioritize work requirements. The highest levels of conflict are found among crew members who experience extensive, recurring physical separations and extensive schedule changes between separations. Officers in this latter group are unable to counter the effects of work conflicts because they rarely exercise any control over their work requirements.
The major reaction of the family to these work conflicts is to establish independence from the Air Force and this reaction profoundly affects the military member. Independence behavior is most acute in situations with the greatest separation and when schedules are especially erratic. In this sample, the major response to separation is that spouses go to work "to have something to do." The major response to erratic schedules involves making oneself unavailable for short notice duty by moving off-base, impeding telephone contact, or leaving town. Both types of family response represent a withdrawal from the Air Force—a withdrawal in which the military member plays an active part because he or she is unable (due to reduced family power) or unwilling (due to a greater importance placed on family concerns) to counter the move toward independence.

Reacting in this manner to the uncertainty generated by the separation and erratic schedules characteristic of Air Force work, the family anchors itself in the more stable civilian community and draws the military member away from the military community. It is through the family that the "pull" of social and economic change operates to civilianize the member. Moreover, it is through the family that the "push" provided by the unique qualities of Air Force work operates to civilianize the member. The latter process may be the more important process because this is where the Air Force can exercise some control to retard the civilianization process.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONSEQUENCES FOR COMMITMENT

Previous studies of officer attrition have tended to focus on single factors such as job satisfaction, job irritants, rewards, and alternative employment possibilities. While these studies have correctly identified the relevant factors in the attrition equation, they have failed to explain how these factors operate to affect commitment and why commitment is problematic in today's Air Force. Separately, these factors are poor indicators because they explain only part of the problem. Solutions based on these partial explanations are only partial solutions, never getting to the heart of the problem.

What previous chapters in this report have described is a military social world which is not well articulated; that is, activities and values found at the center are poorly defined, boundaries are diffuse, and there is significant interaction with outsiders and involvement in outside interests. These characteristics make commitment problematic because it cannot be focused and may be easily misplaced. Consequently, an understanding of how social world articulation affects commitment is necessary to explain current attrition problems among Air Force junior officers.

This chapter will examine the problems of commitment in social worlds that are not well articulated. Specifically, social organizational characteristics of articulated and disarticulated social worlds will be related to normative and behavioral dimensions of commitment.
Then, normative factors will be used to describe groups of junior officers in the sample who identify themselves primarily as "officers" or as "specialists." Finally, the personal investment patterns of these two groups will be used to demonstrate two different patterns of commitment: commitment by constraint and commitment by choice.

SOCIAL WORLD ARTICULATION

Any social world can be placed on a social organizational continuum between two ideal types: articulated and disarticulated social worlds. Articulation, in this sense, refers to the degree to which a social world can be clearly defined by its members and others, that is, everyone knows what it is about and how it is different from other social worlds. Articulation, then, is a function of two major characteristics: internal integration and external differentiation. These characteristics are summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1
Major Characteristics of Social World Articulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social World Type</th>
<th>Articulated</th>
<th>Disarticulated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Integration</td>
<td>Functional Primacy</td>
<td>Multi-functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Differentiation</td>
<td>Functional Monopoly</td>
<td>Functions Shared With Other Worlds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Internal integration is achieved through a principle of "functional primacy." Functional primacy focuses a social world on a specific set of core activities or a "quintessential act." These activities are the basis for collective action, are elaborated throughout the social organization, and are shared, to some degree, by all members. The integration generated by functional primacy is more than functional integration, which interlocks specific roles, it also involves a normative integration based on shared values. In this sense, a community is developed around the core activities—a community articulated by career paths, prestige structures, and common values, all of which are associated with the primary function of the social world.

External differentiation is best achieved through "functional monopoly" which renders certain activities unique to a particular social world. Monopolization of these activities sets a particular social world apart from others and clearly places those who do these activities "inside" and all others "outside." Further, to the extent that social worlds maintain hegemony over certain activities, they operate as closed opportunity systems which preclude doing these activities in other social worlds. To the extent that the internal integration of a social world ties together and gives meaning to all aspects of life within its borders, functional monopoly precludes meaningful interaction outside the social world altogether. In this manner, social worlds and their members are unique and differentiated from others.

Articulated social worlds, then, focus on special activities or values, the monopoly of which set their communities apart from others.
Typical examples of articulated social worlds are: the professions, communes, deviant subcultures, and total institutions (prisons, mental institutions, nursing homes, etc.). Professions are organized around a unique expertise which they are able to monopolize (practicing medicine and law, saving souls, defending society, etc.). Entry into the professional world is strictly controlled (attending medical school, law school, seminary, and commissioning programs) and shared values emphasizing professional knowledge provide the basis for general career lines which lead to positions of highest esteem (chief surgeon, partner, bishop, and general officer). To the extent that the professional can practice his skill only within the confines of the professional social world (only if he is properly licensed), participation in other social worlds is precluded. This is the essence of collegial control notably found in this and other well articulated social worlds. Professional social worlds are examples of social worlds articulated by and organized around a unique skill.

Communes, deviant subcultures, and total institutions, on the other hand, are examples of social worlds articulated by shared values and activities rather than a particular skill. Communes are unities with both physical and social boundaries, defined by a set of values and ideals involving harmony, brotherhood, mutual support, and value expression. These ideals give rise to the key communal arrangement—equal status and the sharing of resources. Deviant subcultures also have clear boundaries, albeit some more visible than others (e.g., motorcycle gangs as opposed to homosexual communities). Members of deviant
worlds have one thing in common: their deviance. This activity is required for membership and marks the difference between "insiders" and "outsiders." The community formed around this activity supports the members by helping them rationalize their position and teaching them how to carry on the deviant activity with a minimum of trouble. Total institutions are social worlds bounded by admission to the institution, sometimes against the individual's own will, and constitute communities of persons "in the same boat." The activities characteristic of these groups are highly routinized and supervised to some degree by "outsiders." Each of these worlds--communes, deviant subcultures, and total institutions--have clearly focused groups, communities organized around core values and activities, and clear boundaries which separate members from outsiders.

Not all social worlds are articulated. In fact, most social worlds are described as diffuse and amorphous (e.g., those of art, baseball, stamp collecting, etc.). These worlds generally lack the characteristics of "functional primacy" and "functional monopoly." For example, the computing world is segmented into subworlds associated with differences in the problems solved, technology used, applications required, and relationships to giant corporations. There is no functional primacy here. No one set of activities articulates a particular social organization throughout this world. Also, there is no functional monopoly. These activities are practiced in many organizational settings (precisely the problem with "relationships to giant corporations" cited above). Further, rapid changes in technology, problems to be
solved, and applications preclude long-lasting monopoly by any particular group. Disarticulated social worlds are characterized by a multifunctional orientation and functional expertise shared with other worlds.

Social world articulation is a matter of degree. Even those worlds generally thought to be well articulated exhibit some disarticulation. For example, Bucher and Strauss have described the medical profession as "loose amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in different manners and more or less delicately held together under a common name at a particular period in history." In the case of medicine, specialization has fractured the unique expertise which lies at the heart of their professional world. Law has experienced a similar phenomenon. Rueschmeyer suggests the social world of lawyers is fragmented because specialist lawyers are more responsive to the interests of their clients than they are to the professional concerns of other lawyers. Similarly, most communes have disbanded because the ideals for which they were formed conflicted with the personal freedom desired by most individuals. In each case, fragmentation of the core values and activities is correlated with fragmentation in the community and weakened monopoly. Fragmentation at the core and competitive alternatives make commitment to a social world problematic.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIAL WORLD ARTICULATION TO COMMITMENT

Unhappy with the results of single factor approaches to attrition studies, researchers have recently turned to the study of "the other side of the coin"—commitment. Commitment, however, is a difficult
factor to conceptualize or to measure. It has both normative and behavioral components which may be directed toward one or several goals. The normative basis of commitment involves attitudes and values which motivate an individual to act. Action, however, may not follow normative directions because previously extraneous and irrelevant lines of action may operate to constrain behavior in current situations. Further, the action may be directed toward one or several alternatives involving, for example, various activities or various organizations.

On the surface, commitment seems to be a useful concept to explain attrition behavior; however, it is a very "slippery" concept which involves many factors operating interactively. Hence, single factor approaches to commitment have not been successful because the conditions under which they operate are rarely specified.

To sort out the operation of these various factors, commitment researchers should ask an important question: "commitment to what?" In this regard the issue of social world articulation becomes very important. The focused nature of articulated social worlds allows the normative and behavioral dimensions of commitment to be focused within the social world while at the same time increasing the likelihood that behavior will reflect the normative base. In disarticulated social worlds, there is much more variation in commitment goals and a greater likelihood that past investments will constrain or conflict with current lines of action to create discrepancies between behavioral and normative dimensions of commitment. Since articulation makes a difference, it is useful to specify which normative and behavioral factors will be
important in articulated and disarticulated social worlds. This can be
done in the manner summarized in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2
Normative and Behavioral Components
of Commitment by Articulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Type</th>
<th>Articulated</th>
<th>Disarticulated</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>Master Identity</td>
<td>Multiple Identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Career Satisfaction</td>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Loyalty</td>
<td>Limited Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>Continued Investment</td>
<td>Multiple Investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within the Social World</td>
<td>Generating Outside Alternatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps the most important normative component of commitment is
identity. Identities provide an organizing and a "motivating" frame
of reference--a perspective consisting of assumptions, definitions,
attitudes, and values which organize and inform thoughts and actions.\textsuperscript{14}
Identities, then, serve as the major normative base for committed ac-
tion. The use of identities to predict behavior, however, is compli-
cated--especially in disarticulated social worlds--because individuals
have more than one identity important to the commitment equation and
each identity carries the potential for personal investment.

Considerable research attention has been paid to examining the
situations under which one identity rather than another becomes pre-
dominant and is acted out in behavior.\textsuperscript{15} Most researchers agree that
identities are situational; therefore, multiple identities have the potential for much conflict in disarticulated social worlds. However, multiple identities can be articulated or "nested" under a master identity in articulated social worlds. Broadhead describes this process as "inundation" which involves:

an absorption and encapsulation of a person's general range of identities, interests and activities into a far more substantively delimited and radically focused order of events and concerns that usually pivot around a single, all informing identity.16

The possibility of nesting under a master status or inundation is greatest in articulated social worlds because functional primacy integrates all aspects of life internal to the social world and functional monopoly externally differentiates those who do the characteristic activities from "outsiders."

Master identities, possible in articulated social worlds, and multiple identities, probable in disarticulated worlds, specify satisfaction measures important to the normative basis of committed action. Many attrition studies have focused on job satisfaction as a major basis of committed action because it serves as a good summary measure of how a person weighs the costs and rewards associated with a job. Unfortunately, the results of most job satisfaction studies show only moderate relationships between job satisfaction and attrition. In fact, a recent review of the literature in this area found "the satisfaction-turnover relationship, although consistent, usually accounts for less than 16 percent of the variance in turnover."17

The problem with job satisfaction is that it measures the short
term satisfaction associated with a current job in a particular specialty and not the longer term satisfaction associated with a master status, composed of many different jobs held while pursuing a career in an articulated social world. In other words, job satisfaction is a valid measure of satisfaction only in a disarticulated social world where the job represents the major tie the individual has with that social world. If the social world is articulated, the current job may be only one of many jobs subsumed under the master status, the satisfaction of which must be measured over a career of work in the social world.

As part of the normative basis for commitment to a social world, then, satisfaction must be measured differently in articulated and disarticulated social worlds. When the world is disarticulated, job satisfaction is important. When the world is articulated, career satisfaction (a measure of satisfaction with the master status) is the correct unit of analysis.

Similarly, the normative orientation to the social world community is different in articulated and disarticulated social worlds. Since multiple identities suggest the social world in question is only one of many valued by the individual, social integration will be limited, probably to the segment associated with work in a particular specialty. As a normative component of committed behavior, loyalty to the social world is limited and may conflict with loyalties to other worlds. Social integration in articulated worlds is more complete, encompassing a wider range of interaction in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Loyalty in articulated worlds is directed toward the entire community.
and involves few conflicts. As a normative component of committed behavior, loyalty is limited in disarticulated worlds and more complete in articulated social worlds.

The relationship of committed behavior to its normative components is also a function of articulation. In articulated social worlds, behavior is more likely to correspond with normative attitudes because identities, satisfactions, and social interactions are all focused within the social world. The lack of conflict allows continued investment in social world activities even at the cost of foreclosed outside opportunities. The situation in disarticulated worlds is more complicated because each identity has the potential for personal investment, satisfactions are fragmented, and loyalties may conflict. Further, previous investments outside the social world are more likely to operate to constrain continued investment within the social world—even if the normative orientation favors such investment. Considering these effects of social world articulation, two different patterns of committed investment are suggested. In disarticulated worlds, multiple investments will be the norm and the major strategy will be to generate alternatives for flexible investment. In articulated worlds, the norm will be continued investment even at the cost of foreclosing outside opportunities.

The relationships between the key variables just discussed (summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2) suggest a useful way to analyze commitment patterns in social worlds. Articulation clearly defines what a social world is and how it is different from others; thereby locating it in the host society. Articulation is generated by two characteristics:
internal integration and external differentiation. Internal integration is largely achieved by functional primacy which elaborates the characteristic activities of the social world throughout the social organization. External differentiation is achieved by monopolizing the social world's characteristic activities, thereby making them unique. Commitment has two dimensions: normative and behavioral. Identity, satisfaction, and loyalties are major components of the normative dimension. Personal investment patterns, whether they be inside or outside the social world, constitute the behavioral dimension. Articulation affects commitment in two ways. First, it defines the nature of the normative components. Second, it determines the relationships between the behavioral dimension and the normative dimension.

This schema will be used in the next sections to analyze patterns of commitment among the Air Force junior officers in this sample. Since their social world is neither fully articulated nor fully disarticulated, identities will be used to determine how they perceive their world. In-world identities will be presumed to reflect a perceived articulation and corresponding relationships between variables will be expected. Likewise, out-world identities will suggest disarticulation is perceived and relationships associated with disarticulation are expected. In other words, articulation which can be measured objectively is really in the "eye of the beholder" and the relationships expected from the theoretical model will depend upon the articulation perceived by the individual.
As late as the 1950s the military was a highly articulated social world with a unique function of combat and a clear organization around that function. Mack's study of prestige systems on an Air Force base in the early 1950s found "the ability of the individuals, the difficulty of the work, and importance of the work generally run on a continuum of distance of the subsystem from the primary mission." In other words, persons and specialty groups were ranked "according to their distance from the primary mission of the base, that is, how directly they were believed to contribute to the actual dropping of bombs." This finding suggests a strong internal integration based on functional primacy.

Even family life was oriented around the functional core of this social world. Finlayson, reviewing the family literature of this period, describes the officer's wife as one who "complements the high calling of her husband," who serves as "a diplomat without portfolio," who "never complains when she has to move," and who found the "only tragedy that upsets her is separation from her husband." In short, the military family was, at this time, totally involved in the military social world.

In these earlier times, military life involved a total liability for both the officer and family. The officer was "on call" 24 hours per day for seven days a week, often worked overtime without compensation and periodically was asked to jeopardize his life for the "mission." The family liability was just as pervasive in that they were asked to
absorb the impact of the officer's total involvement—to "keep the home fires burning" no matter how little of the time he was there. In return for total liability of officer and family, the military offered benefits upon which families came to rely and which could not be found generally outside the military community. These included dependent allowances, household transfer costs, housing allowances, retirement benefits, medical services, and discounts on food and household goods. Further, frequent relocations, characteristic of the time, created a reluctance on the part of military members and their families to socialize with outsiders and this social isolation was reinforced by the physical isolation of most military bases. Thus, personal and professional lives were well integrated and focused in a military community which was clearly organized around combat, a unique military function not found in the civilian sector. Further, these characteristics sharply defined the military social world and separated it from all others.

Findings reported in previous chapters of this study suggest the social world of the Air Force junior officer has lost the articulation characteristic of these earlier times. The military's once unique expertise is now shared by politicians, diplomats, and technicians. The distinction of "who is" and "who is not" part of the military has become blurred. This disarticulation became problematic in hard economic times and when justification for resources based on professional military concerns was questioned, the military began to take on characteristics of the corporate world. By the 1970s, imitation of the corporate model—especially by the Air Force—included adoption of similar
activities, organization, and ideology. Reacting to this new articulation, identities of Air Force junior officers have civilianized as prestige structures within the Air Force have begun to emphasize management rather than the unique flying function. Clear functional counterparts in the civilian sector provide further support for changing officer identities. At the periphery, families are becoming more independent from the Air Force and the member. Unable and unwilling to counter this trend, the members invest heavily in the civilian rather than the military community. Thus, disarticulation of the military social world precipitates disarticulation of the identities and fragments the commitments of its members.

Disarticulation of the Air Force is not complete. While it fits neither of the ideal types posed earlier, it has characteristics of both. As a result, junior officers have developed different perspectives of their social world that roughly parallel the ideal types presented. In other words, in spite of the apparent trend toward disarticulation, some junior officers see more articulation than others.

During the analysis of changing professional identities among junior officers in this sample, two major orientations emerged—-that of "professional military officer" and that of "professional in the military." These major identities serve as master identities through which other potentially conflicting identities are organized and shape the way the military social world is perceived. In this manner, they explain much of the variation in committed behavior.

The measurement of identities is no easy task, either for the
researcher or the subject. From the earliest interviews in this study, it became clear that some officers identified themselves as "military officers" and other identified themselves as "specialists who worked in the Air Force." Those who identified themselves as "officers" expressed a special interest in the concerns of the military profession. On the other hand, those who identified themselves as "specialists" were often concerned with what was happening to counterparts outside the Air Force and were usually dismayed by their own positions relative to these outsiders. Generally, the best measure of this pluralistic orientation is the subjective judgment by respondents as to how they normally viewed themselves in these terms.23 Surprisingly, few respondents had difficulty making a determination and most felt comfortable with these categories. The reliability of this early measure was checked with more elaborate measures used on the 1980 sample (N=43). (See Appendix E for specific measures and correlations.) Since no major discrepancies with these later, more elaborate measures were noted, the earlier measure involving the entire sample (N=83) will be used exclusively in this analysis.

Commitment to the military social world is measured in this study as "stated career intention." While actual behaviors would provide better indications of commitment, such data are impossible to collect in a cross-sectional study such as this. Stated career intention is a reasonable measure to use in this case because previous longitudinal research has shown it to be related to actual retention and attrition behavior.24 Nevertheless, commitment to the military social world will
be analyzed in this study as a matrix of collateral attitudes, behaviors, and stated career intentions.

In general, the utility of this approach is confirmed by significant differences in the commitment matrices of junior officers who report "officer" or "specialist" identities in this sample. While similar in terms of years of service, they are clearly different in regard to career intentions (see Table 5.3). Those who identified themselves as "officers" had significantly higher career intentions (averaging "20 years or more") than those who identified themselves as "specialists" (whose average response was "thinking about getting out"). These significant differences in stated career intentions were correlated with differences in the manner in which each identity group views their military job and the military community as well as the personal investments they are willing to make in order to be a part of both.

In general, those who viewed themselves as "officers" also viewed their officer jobs and the military community as something special. This was clear in responses to the question: "What would you miss about the Air Force if you were to leave tomorrow?" Typically, these replies identified some aspect of the officer job or the lifestyle which, in the respondent's opinion, could not be duplicated outside the Air Force. These perspectives, which constitute the normative basis for commitment, will be specified in detail and compared between identity groups.
Table 5.3
Factors Associated with Officer or Specialist Identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Specialist</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of service</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>N=81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying status</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>N=82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Career Intended</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>N=82 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOB PERSPECTIVES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional values</td>
<td>+.639</td>
<td>-.524</td>
<td>N=42 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job satisfaction</td>
<td>+.075</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>N=82 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career satisfaction</td>
<td>+.462</td>
<td>-.390</td>
<td>N=42 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat experience</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>N=82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of teamwork among peers</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>N=78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friends in same specialty</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>N=82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families satisfied with military</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>N=41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with supervisors</td>
<td>+.123</td>
<td>-.199</td>
<td>N=81 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor influence</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>N=82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N=48</td>
<td>N=34</td>
<td>N=82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Factor score with mean=0, SD=1
(2) Significance p < .005
JOB PERSPECTIVES AS A
NORMATIVE COMPONENT OF COMMITTED BEHAVIOR

One of the critical characteristics of the officer job to those who identified themselves as "officers" is its importance both to society and to the individual. Several officers in this group argued that national service was important in any form, that is, "everyone should serve in the military or for the government at one time or the other."

Institutional values provide the basis for identity choice and formulation by placing greater value on some identities over others. Typically, this process was described as follows:

I normally think of myself as an Air Force officer because I have wanted to be part of the military... an Air Force officer... during high school and college.

Being a military officer carries a lot of responsibility.

I could make big bucks on the outside as an architect, but somehow I am happier working in the Air Force, getting something done for them and the United States than I would be working for one or two guys as an architect.

To check these declarations of strong values associated with the officer identity, an institutional values factor was devised (see Appendix F) to measure the importance placed on the military as an institution in society and the importance of the combat function within the Air Force. The strong differences between identity groups, shown in Table 5.3, suggest different institutional orientations operating in each group. Those who identify themselves as "officers" have much stronger institutional values than those who see themselves as "specialists" working for the Air Force. One young lieutenant illustrates the difference in
values by describing the difficulty he has interacting with subordinates who hold "specialist" values:

I tell my guys that I am here because I am an American and I want to protect the country so their grandma and grandpa can sit on the porch and rock--she can knit and he can chew tobacco. That's what in hell I am here for . . . . They just look at me like I'm crazy.

Another major characteristic of the officer job which is associated with the officer identity is diversity. Job diversification confounds the salience of the specialist identity. As a person makes various geographical and specialty changes, "officership" is the one constant factor in their lives. In other words, as new specialties are entered, the one identity, among many, that is retained is that of "officer."

All others must be shed or repressed. Comments by individuals who were allowed some diversity in their jobs emphasize this point:

When I was a pilot, I thought of myself as just that--a pilot. When I was in a school preparing for a non-flying job, I really started identifying with the end goal--the Air Force mission--rather than the means to that end--flying.

I am an officer, not a specialist because I can be moved anywhere and put in any type of position. . . . Over a twenty year career you may have many jobs. The Air Force regards its officers as a management resource.

While this may be true for some officers, it is not for others who find themselves locked into their specialty and the consequences for identity are predictable.

Flying officers, who have been forced to specialize in recent years because of personnel policies and shortages caused by high attrition, provide a good example of how specialization affects identity. Without job diversification, they have experienced social isolation and taken on
a predominantly specialist identity. (More than half the specialists in this sample are flying officers.) In the absence of interaction with officers of other specialties, flyers have come to think in terms of their own specialty to the exclusion of all others. Isolation is an inherent quality of the flyer's job because work schedules are erratic, their professional knowledge is esoteric, and they are organizationally removed from their peers in other specialties. Not only have they come to identify themselves as specialists twice as often as the support group (see Chapter Three), but their specialist identity is supported by support officers who typically react to the flyer's isolationism as follows:

Pilots are like the medical corps—in a world of their own.

They just don't get involved in anything. They have isolated themselves. I see them as pilots and navigators, but not as officers.

The importance of job diversity was also illustrated by many comments which suggested it was a job quality which could not be duplicated outside the Air Force. Unique to the military, job diversity was a quality they would miss if they left the Air Force. Several officers expressed this sentiment:

In the Air Force, I have gotten the opportunity to do a number of different jobs and that intrigues me. In industry, I would probably advance in only one track.

This perception that diversity is characteristic of the Air Force officer job and the realization that "corporations can't allow employees as much variety ... they generally restrict a person to working in one specialty" not only ties the "officer" identity to jobs that have
diversity, but also emphasizes the difference between officer work and
civilian work. Some officers even suggested the job variety associated
with the officer's job compensated for the higher pay they would re-
ceive on the outside.

Along with these differences in the subjective definition of the
officer's job and its importance, predictable differences in satisfac-
tion with job and career also emerged. (For specific questions used to
measure these factors, see Appendix F.) As expected, job satisfaction
is not a strong differentiating factor in the determination of the
officer or specialist identity. While some difference is noted, this
difference is small (see Table 5.3).

Career satisfaction differences, on the other hand, are much lar-
ger (almost one-half standard deviation either side of the mean). In
light of the subjective definition of the officer identity as the
diversification of jobs over a career, the relative importance of career,
rather than job satisfaction, makes sense, that is, the career perspec-
tive is the necessary unit of analysis for officer identity determina-
tion. In general, individuals who identified themselves as "officers"
had significantly more satisfaction with their careers than those who
viewed themselves as "specialists." This is not to say that job satis-
faction is not important. On the contrary, previous satisfying jobs
are probably necessary to the evaluation of a career as satisfying.
Temporarily dissatisfying jobs can be endured if past jobs have gener-
ally been satisfying and future jobs are likely to be so. Also, insti-
tutional values may help the individual through a dissatisfying job if
they see it as "something important" or as a "temporary inconvenience on the way to doing something more important." In short, the analysis of a career involves past experience and future opportunities. Present jobs change and present job satisfaction does not provide enough information to predict career decisions for all officers. For those who view themselves as "officers," career satisfaction is a better predictor because the officer job is measured over a career. Career decisions of those who see themselves as "specialists," on the other hand, are probably predictable from job satisfaction measures because the current job is the important element. Relative satisfaction with that job may well determine the individual's intention to remain in the organization or to do the same work elsewhere. 27

Another determinant of officer identity is combat experience. Those who identified themselves as "officers" were more than three times as likely to have had combat experience (see Table 5.3). Personal experience in combat may serve to accentuate the difference between 'military' officers and 'civilian' specialists. Notably, few junior officers in today's Air Force have any combat experience and little institutional emphasis is placed on it. 28 Nevertheless, the experience of combat may emphasize to the individual the military nature of officer work and personalize his relationship to that unique function which places him squarely within the military social world.

In respect to the work they do, then, individuals who view themselves as "officers" or "specialists" have two very different perspectives. Those with the primary identity of "officer," see their work
as a career (even before it is begun) involving jobs in several specialties which, over a period of time, contribute to a function--associated with combat--which they see as important to themselves and to society. Further, this kind of work is viewed as very different from that done in the civilian sector; therefore, it can only be done inside the military social world. "Specialists," on the other hand, place primary emphasis on the work they are currently doing. For them, the Air Force and the military in general is one of many organizations in which they can practice their particular specialty. As long as the Air Force provides a satisfying opportunity to practice their specialty, they will remain; otherwise, they will leave and seek similar work in the civilian sector. For the "officer," the Air Force is viewed as a closed opportunity structure. For the "specialist," the Air Force is one of several opportunities available. Attitudes and perceptions of these individuals about the Air Force community are also differentiated along these lines.

COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES AS A NORMATIVE COMPONENT OF COMMITTED BEHAVIOR

Another characteristic that sets the military social world apart from the civilian sector is the strong sense of community with others who are "insiders." Almost 80% of the respondents who were asked the question: "What would you miss about the Air Force if you left tomorrow?" replied, "the people." For most respondents, "the people" meant similar others and the comments which accompanied these responses demonstrated a widespread horizontal integration among junior officers.
The source of this integration is illustrated by this composite comment:

If I got out of the Air Force now, I would miss the people. We have a lot in common . . . similar age . . . similar education . . . similar values . . . and similar interests. Military people are generally more interesting and more informed about the world situation . . . They have a wide range of experiences . . . Everyone is concerned with getting the job done—even if it takes long hours . . . Because we are all under the same pressure and have the same goals, we have a common bond. We like to get together even after work and this helps us do our jobs better . . .

In short, junior officers experience a sense of solidarity with others who share their concerns and are "in the same boat."

While "people" in the Air Force are important to most junior officers, those who identified themselves as "officers" demonstrate a more holistic involvement in the Air Force community. Major differences in frequencies and types of interaction, summarized in Table 5.3, support this contention. The "officer" group, compared with "specialists," reported a much wider range of social integration. Along with a greater sense of teamwork among their peers, they also reported a greater frequency of best friends outside their specialty and family satisfied with military life. In addition to wide-spread horizontal integration, "officers" also report vertical integration in the form of greater satisfaction with their supervisors and a greater frequency of being mentored by senior officers. In short, those who identified themselves as "officers" report a more complete social integration than those who identified themselves as "specialists."

The close, primary group relationship perceived by "officers" was thought by them to be characteristic only of military communities. The Air Force was described as "a big family which takes care of one
another" in contrast with civilian communities where "people have different interests and different priorities." Many officers suggested this enhanced sense of community was a reason they stayed in the Air Force. Others, who had left the Air Force earlier and returned, suggested the lack of community on the "outside" was a reason they returned.

This process was illustrated by one of the returnees:

When I first came into the Air Force, my objective was like many new guys . . . to fly for the airlines. After pilot training and Vietnam, I had a civilian job waiting for me so I got out . . . but I didn't work for the airlines. . . . Life on the outside was OK . . . we liked the people, but we felt like we were on a different wave length. . . . Later, I thought about getting into the Guard [Air National Guard] or the Reserves . . . One day, strictly on impulse, my wife and I drove onto an Air Base . . . we felt like we had come home. . . . So we talked it over and decided rather than going into the Guard, we might as well go back into the Air Force. We did. And since we have been here, we have felt 'normal.' Looking back, I don't think I ever 'really' left . . .

The sense of community found by some in the Air Force is an important part of the "officer" identity. It cannot be duplicated in the civilian sector so it sets the military social world apart from others.

In sum, individuals who identify themselves as "officers" view both their job and the military community differently than "specialists." In their perception, the military job involves "officership," that is, several diverse activities which taken as a whole serve an important function for society. In the military community, they find strong, supportive bonds with others who have common interests and find themselves in the same situation. These perceptions, characteristic of "officers," articulate the special nature of the military social world--making it different from others and setting it up as the only place
where these special characteristics can be had. Those who identify themselves as "specialists" do not perceive this articulation. They place importance on their specialties which can be accomplished just as well in other organizations. Likewise, their involvement in the military community is limited, usually related to a shared interest in the specialty, and can be easily replaced with a similar involvement in the civilian sector. Individuals with an "officer" identity are completely integrated into the military social world--both functionally and socially.

As one "specialist" nicely put it:

When you think of yourself as a military officer, you have to start talking about the military as a 'way of life.' That means the whole nine yards--the challenge and diversity of the job, the friendships, and taking care of each other . . . To me, it's a bunch of BS . . .

But to those identifying themselves as "officers," it is not "BS." It is a way of articulating the military social world and their personal commitments follow that articulation.

PATTERNS OF COMMITMENT ASSOCIATED WITH IDENTITY

The major career decision made by any junior officer is whether to continue in the Air Force or to leave after the initial tour of duty. Becker suggests past investments in one or another alternative serves to constrain future investment decisions and those investments constitute commitment to lines of action. Following Becker, commitment to the military social world must be analyzed in terms of perceived alternatives in the civilian sector and perceived costs of investment in the military.
Identity is the normative basis of committed action. In this sample, career intention and patterns of personal investment are clearly differentiated by major identity. Those who identify themselves as "officers" generally plan to stay at least until the first opportunity for retirement, at twenty years of service. "Specialists," on the other hand, are generally unsure or are thinking about getting out. To understand these stated career intentions as committed behavior, however, the costs of these actions and alternatives must also be considered.

Table 5.4
Percent Who Perceive Civilian Job Opportunities
By Identity and Career Intention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Identity</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Specialist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Getting Out</td>
<td>85.7 (N=7)</td>
<td>93.8 (N=16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying In</td>
<td>91.7 (N=12)</td>
<td>57.0 (N=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=19</td>
<td>N=23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentage in each cell is percentage of cell N.

Air Force junior officers are quick to point out the costs they pay for not pursuing the alternatives available to them. Answers to relative deprivation questions used to identify reference groups (Chapter Three) are loaded with comparisons and stories of lost opportunity. Comparing
themselves with civilian counterparts, these respondents typically referred to salary, a comparison made easier by the current market-place emphasis on military compensation:

My specialty is wide open on the outside now. I could start at $37,000 a year. One of my friends got a job on the outside and he doesn't do half the things I do in the Air Force and he's making $37,000. It's disappointing. I have had many offers out there [a behavioral scientist in 1980].

I would have no problem finding a job at equal or greater pay. I have made contact with several people and they tell me I would start at $30,000 per year [a transportation officer in 1980].

On the outside, I could get twice the pay and half the headaches [a pilot in 1980].

If I was on the outside, I have no doubt that I would be in a management position for a top corporation, starting at $25,000 [a personnel officer in 1978].

Clearly, junior officers have considered their alternatives in the civilian sector and comparisons of salaries illustrate the economic losses they incur by staying in the Air Force.

Non-economic losses are also incurred by the choice of military rather than civilian social worlds. Several officers suggested civilian employment provides: greater opportunity for advancement without the restrictions of rank; more freedom to change jobs or companies; greater prestige; and schedule stability. While these are relatively minor costs differentially perceived by individual officers, nevertheless, they represent costs which are weighed when career decisions are made.

While some costs are universally shared by all junior officers, some costs are differentially borne by specific groups. In this regard, individuals from both flying and non-flying groups who identify themselves
as "officers" report a higher cost in terms of their families. On average, they estimate "some" degree of conflict between their Air Force work and their families. By comparison, "little" conflict was reported among "specialists." This difference, added to the shared costs discussed above, might suggest the potential for lower commitment on the part of those identifying themselves as "officer." On the contrary, stated career intention is higher for the "officer" group which indicates costs, by themselves, do not cause attrition--especially if no other alternatives are perceived. Alternative perception, then, is another factor in the commitment equation.

Alternatives are differentially perceived by "officers" and "specialists" but their influence on the career decisions of these two groups is completely different. These differences are summarized in Table 5.4. In the "specialist" group career intention is directly related to perceived opportunities in the civilian sector. "Specialists" who intend to leave the Air Force perceive other opportunities at a greater frequency than those who intend to stay. In short, the "specialist" who remains tends to be "unsure" of alternatives in the civilian sector. The importance of alternatives to the career decisions of "specialists" is illustrated by this comment:

My career intentions have changed recently because the airlines have stopped hiring . . . so I'm less positive about getting out. I ask myself: 'If I've got $50,000 to $100,000 staring me in the face in an airline job, what the hell am I doing in the Air Force in a job that tops out at $32,000 or $34,000?' Since they aren't hiring, I have no choice . . . no options. So I guess I'll stay . . .

For the "specialist" group, career intention is best understood as an
analysis of perceived alternatives, that is, "specialist" commitment is a "commitment imposed by constraints."

Among the "officer" group, however, this relationship does not hold. The frequency of persons who perceive civilian job opportunities is high at all levels of career intention. In short, perceived alternatives are not as important to this group. Given a similar cost paid by this group, the difference in career intent appears to be the willingness to bear the cost, that is, "officer" commitment is a "commitment by choice." Since much of the previous retention research has examined the "constraint" pattern (primarily an economic model), the rest of this chapter will be devoted to the analysis of commitment by choice associated with the "officer" group.

If the characteristic nature of the commitment process in the "officer" group is purposeful investment within the military social world, then this commitment should be reflected by a focused matrix of personal investments. The pattern of investment, summarized in Table 5.5, supports this hypothesis. Investment differentials shown in the table indicate the relative commitment of each group to military and civilian social worlds. This analysis will consider investments in three major areas as indicative of commitment: place of residence, spouse working, and friendship networks.
Table 5.5

Personal Investments By Officer and Specialist Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Identity</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Specialist</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career intention</td>
<td>20 years or more</td>
<td>Thinking about getting out</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian job opportunities</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>N=42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live on-base</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse not working</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>N=76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends are military</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>N=40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share friends w/spouse</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>N=39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=48</td>
<td>N=34</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision to live on the military base is a major investment decision made by members of each group. Living on-base represents a "complete immersion in the Air Force way of life" and costs the member the investment equity which might be gained by home ownership. Residing off the base represents a separation of home and work lives and provides an alternative community. Individuals who identify themselves as "officers" are almost twice as likely (52%) to live on-base as "specialists" (32%). Career intention is also related to residence choice. Within the "officer" group, those who have a positive career intention live on-base four times as often (80%) as those who identify themselves as an "officer" but have decided not to stay in the Air Force (20%).
For the "officer" group, the greater frequency of on-base residence represents a commitment, made at some cost, to the military social world.

Another major investment decision to be made is whether the spouse should work. Like residing off-base, the spouse's work is a divisive investment because it tends to divert family resources to areas of concern outside the military social world. In this regard, those identifying themselves as "officers" have spouses who choose not to work more than twice (44%) as often as those in the "specialist" group (21%). Again, there is a relationship to career intention. Among "officers" who plan to stay in the Air Force, the percentage of wives not working increases to 95%. Choosing not to work makes spouses available to support the member's career and the Air Force community. Spouses not working also represents an investment in the military social world which is made at the cost of the additional income to the family.

Residing off-base and the spouse working are two factors that are clearly related to each other and to stated career intention. Choice of residence affects spouse work by making full participation in the work force easier in two ways. First, when the member's family lives off-base, the Air Force community is less likely to make demands on the spouse. Second, since most spouse employment is in the civilian sector, travel to work is more convenient. As a result, members who live on-base in this sample were more likely to have spouses who did not work or who worked only part-time, and members who lived off-base were over twice as likely to have spouses who worked full-time (see Table 5.6). The interaction of these two factors produced predictable differences
in career intention (see Table 5.7). The lowest career intentions, that is, persons who were "unsure whether they would stay in the Air Force," are generally persons who both live off-base and whose spouses are employed. The highest career intention, "more than twenty years of service," is found among persons who have chosen to live on base and whose spouses have chosen not to work. Other combinations produce an intention to stay, but only until the earliest retirement at twenty years.

These two factors also interact to affect a third major area of investment—friendships. Individuals with an "officer" identity are one-third as likely as "specialists" to have best friends who are "military" and twice as likely to "share" these friends with their spouse (see Table 5.5). This represents another investment in the military social world because through such friends, formally established aspects of the military are reproduced informally.

The frequency of individuals reporting "best friends who are military" is affected by place of residence. All (100%) of the individuals living on-base reported best friends who were military. However, this frequency drops to 60% for those living off-base because there is a greater opportunity to interact on a continual basis with persons not connected to the military. The effect of military friendship networks is amplified if these friends are shared with the spouse. Otherwise, normative pressure from civilian friends may act through either spouse to strain the integration of work and family.30

Separate or shared friendship networks are somewhat affected by the spouse's work. For example, 70% of the families in which the spouse
Table 5.6
Extent of Spouse Work by Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Not at All %</th>
<th>Part Time %</th>
<th>Full Time %</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off-Base</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Base</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7
Average Career Intention by Spouse Employment and Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spouse Employed</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-Base</td>
<td>20 Years (N=14)</td>
<td>Less than 20 Years (N=20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Base</td>
<td>More than 20 Years (N=12)</td>
<td>20 Years (N=12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=26</td>
<td>N=32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
does not work have shared friends who tend to be associated with the military. In families which have separate friendship networks, 88% of the spouses work. In these cases, the spouse's separate friends tend to be associated with the spouse's work.

What really matters here is the degree to which friends and co-workers of both spouses are associated with the military and are "connected" to family leisure activities. If friendship networks are anchored in the military community and shared by both spouses, continued investment in the military social world is likely. If not, there will be pressure for investment in other concerns.

Thus, individuals who identify themselves as "officers" tend to pool their investments in the military social world. The costly nature of such investments accentuates the difference between being "military" and being "civilian." In other words, "officers" may be articulating the military social world by making costly investments which foreclose opportunities outside the military social world.

CONCLUSION

Commitment involves a choice among alternatives which results in an awareness of declining options in other areas. In this regard, commitment is problematic in disarticulated social worlds because competing alternative investments may constrain future investments within the social world. Articulation of the military social world has declined markedly in past years. Unique differences have disappeared and junior officers find themselves with many employment alternatives in the civilian
sector. In short, junior officers find themselves in a position which requires them to ask: "If I am not doing anything inherently military, why am I working for this company for lower pay and lower status?" Disarticulation provides the "push" of the attrition problem. Increased alternatives are the "pull."

Junior officers in this sample tend to identify themselves as "officers" and as "specialists" and this identity explains much of the variation in career intention because it reveals different patterns of commitment for members of each group. For "specialists," alternatives are the key factor which determines career intention. Theirs is a "commitment imposed by constraints" or the lack of alternatives. When the cost of staying in the military is perceived to be high, the existence of alternatives in the civilian sector determines the attrition rate. Therefore, when alternatives are perceived to be plentiful, as in the 1978 to 1980 period, attrition will be high for this group. When alternatives are perceived to be slim, as they are during the current recession, attrition will be low. This is the economist's model which suggests the military option should be made more attractive by increasing pay.

Another pattern of commitment seems to be operating in the "officer" group—a "commitment by choice." This group purposefully invests in the military social world at great personal cost. Such investment is justified to them by perceptions of the military job and community which stresses their uniqueness. The costs associated with lost civilian opportunities accentuate the difference between military social worlds
and others. Not taking advantage of civilian alternatives constrains future outside investments so commitment will be maintained. Whereas "specialists," who are currently committed by the constraint of fewer civilian alternatives in a recession, will continue their high rates of attrition when the economy improves, "officers" will remain committed to the military social world as long as they perceive a difference worth the cost. An "officer's" spouse illustrated the perspective of the "officer" group nicely:

The Air Force is a great life . . . you do something important and you make good friends . . . There are good times and there are bad times, just like anywhere else . . . The difference is that in the Air Force, our commitment is tested more often . . .
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Civilianization of the military continues beyond all expectation. Previous researchers, trying to assess the relationship of the military to society have found it useful to place the military somewhere on a continuum between "convergence" and "divergence" with the civilian structure and norms. Those studying the officer corps itself tend to follow the grand theorists and characterize the officers as "homogeneous" or "heterogeneous." While many models have been proposed, all of them presume a core of professional officers who exalt the unique military function of combat. What changes from model to model is the size of the characteristic core. Evidence presented in this research suggests civilianization among junior officers in the Air Force has progressed beyond heterogeneity in the convergence with society--that all segments including the combat components are converging with civilian counterparts. This represents a fundamental change in the relationship of military officers with society.

The post World War II period is a unique period which has generated strong social forces for change within the military. Political and technological changes have forced the military to share their once unique expertise with politicians, diplomats, and technicians. As a result, the distinction between military professionals and others who have the same or similar skills is diminished and bargaining for necessary resources on the basis of professional expertise becomes problematic.
Responding to the tight economy characteristic of the last two decades, the military has increasingly come to rely on "good business practices" to legitimate their actions and to justify their need for limited resources. While increasing reliance on corporate practices perhaps insured the survival of the organization during these times, the cost has been extensive changes in the nature of the military and the military officer. These changes are vividly described by the Air Force junior officers interviewed in this research. Since these changes reflect strong social forces operating outside the military, there may be little that can be done to change the course of events; however, an understanding of what is happening is essential.

Junior officers in this sample report significant changes at the core of their military world. The attribution of essential job characteristics such as expertise, responsibility, and importance suggests management functions are gaining importance while the flying function is declining in importance. Two other indications support this contention: formal recognition, in the form of early promotion and school selection; and informal recognition from co-workers, peers in other specialties, and civilians. These findings signal a fundamental change in the meaning of Air Force officerhood.

Prestige leveling is an important finding because it documents the changing nature of the Air Force organization in the perception of the junior officers: that there is no longer a characteristic group or that management is emerging as the new characteristic function. The major consequence is that military officer identities become confused
and must be shed in favor of more stable civilian identities.

The acceptance of civilian identities by junior officers is a sign of their changing orientation to the profession. For example, flying officers, who do the unique function of the Air Force, give greatest importance to their specialty identity, viewing themselves as "professional pilots who just happen to be flying for the government." Support officers claim a military officer identity, but have redefined officership as "management." Both groups find ready comparisons in civilian counterparts who are used as reference groups. Since the greatest rates of civilianization are found among flying officers, their association with the combat function is not sufficient to place them at "the core" of the profession.

At the periphery of the military world there have been additional extensive changes. Once a supportive element of the military organization, families of many junior officers react to the uncertainty of Air Force officer work by establishing their independence from the Air Force and by anchoring themselves in the more stable civilian community. Uncertainty is characteristic of all officer jobs and is generated by some degree of recurring separation and erratic schedules. Independence-gaining behavior takes two major forms: when there is extensive recurring separation, spouses tend to go to work "to have something to do"; and when work schedules are especially erratic, stability is induced by moving off-base, selectively responding to telephone communication, and generally making oneself unavailable for short notice requirements. In either case, the military member has neither the power nor the desire to
counter the family's move toward greater independence. In fact, they are generally part of it and through the family, the member is drawn away from the military community and integrated into the civilian community. In this manner, strong local geographical ties are established, relocation becomes problematic, and commitment becomes constrained by family concerns.

At both the core and the periphery of the military officer's world, strong social forces are operating to strain the commitment of junior officers. Political, technical, and economic changes have challenged professional legitimation and promoted corporate practices, ideology, and organization. Finding very little difference between work in the peacetime Air Force and work in civilian corporations, the "pull" of greater civilian salaries and status has attracted many junior officers. Similarly, the "pull" of a second income, home-owner's equity, and the spouse's self-actualization is made stronger by the "push" of extensive family separation and work schedules that never allow a family routine. The result has been increased investment in the civilian community by many junior officers and their families. In these ways the Air Force has become more like "an occupation" and individuals within it have come to see it "as just another organization." Even so, there are many officers who do not hold civilian identities and who are still willing to accept the family hardships as part of the job.

Junior officers in this sample can be divided into two groups according to how they identify themselves in "officer" or "specialist" terms. This identity explains how they orient themselves to the Air
Those who view themselves as "officers" place their emphasis on institutional concerns. They see their job as important to society and involving several diverse activities over an entire career. They also view the Air Force community as an important element of the institution which provides social support, from both horizontal and vertical sources, not to be found in the civilian sector. Those who view themselves as "specialists" place importance on individual concerns. They see their job as a specialized skill which can be accomplished just as well in other, non-military organizations. Likewise, their involvement in the military community is limited, usually related to shared interests in the specialty work.

These identities also explain much of the variation in career intention because it reveals different patterns of commitment followed by each group. For "specialists," alternatives are a key factor. Personal investments are generally directed toward generating alternatives. When the cost of staying in the military is too high, perceived alternatives in the civilian sector determine career intention. This pattern of commitment constitutes "commitment imposed by constraints" and tends to follow the economist's model of maximum pay-off among alternatives.

Those who identify themselves as "officers" follow a different investment pattern. This group purposefully invests in the military at some personal cost. Such investment is justified by a perceived difference in the nature and importance of military versus civilian work. Foreclosing civilian alternatives, this group also constrains the possibility of future outside opportunities so commitment to the military will
be continued. This pattern of commitment constitutes a "commitment by choice" which requires an articulated difference making personal investment in the military worthwhile.

These important differences explain recent attrition rates. "Specialists" respond to economic incentives and alternative opportunities. Their attrition will be low—they will appear to be committed—when the military pays more than civilian alternatives or there are few alternatives in the civilian sector (e.g., during a recession). When pay and bonuses are not competitive or the economy improves, "specialists'" attrition will increase. "Officers," on the other hand, respond to perceived normative differences. Above a minimum standard of living, personal cost and hardship are acceptable and even expected, as long as they perceive themselves to be working for the collective good of society. When that goal is lost or they are thrust into a situation in which the normative goal is self-interest or individual economic reward, their commitment decreases or they adopt the orientation of the "specialist."

Thus, the long term trend toward civilianization will continue to take its toll. Junior officers with an "officer" orientation will either become "specialists" or will leave the service. Those with "specialist" orientations will require increasing economic incentives or they will leave the service when alternatives in the civilian sector improve. In both cases, the Air Force will become more occupational, attrition will be high, and the officer corps will become more like "professionals in the military" than "military professionals."
By isolating macro and micro levels part of the picture is lost. While contributing factors can be identified, the manner in which they affect changing commitment is not discovered. The result can be contradictory findings. For example, in April of 1980, I was informed by an Air Staff officer that a Headquarters Air Force briefing given at that time listed the same seven reasons for why officers were staying in the service and why they were leaving. In this case, the factors were identified, but the completely different manner in which they operate was not revealed.


Squadron Officer School brings together the top 85% of the Air Force lieutenants and captains--officers with two to eight years experience--for a ten week course of training which emphasizes leadership, resource management, political science, force employment, and communicative skills. The student body, approximately 750 persons, is scrambled by 19 variables into equally heterogeneous sections of 12-15 officers. Almost all of the interviewees in this location were assigned to the same section and came from various career fields, backgrounds, sexes and races.

This sample considers only line officers. Medical service, legal, and scientific officers are excluded because they are expected to have stronger professional ties outside the Air Force.


These characteristics are taken from Anselm Strauss, "Social worlds and legitimation processes," unpublished paper.


Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, op. cit.


Levels of participation and commitments are suggested by David R. Unruh, "Characteristics and types of participation in social worlds," op. cit.


Becker, "Art worlds and social types," op. cit.

Kling and Gerson, "Patterns of segmentation and intersection in the computing world," op. cit.

18 Essentially, this is the basis for social interaction. See Georg Simmel, "How is society possible?" in D.N. Levine (ed.), Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

19 For the early socialization of doctors, see Howard S. Becker, Boys in White (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1977). Career requirements are even found in unstructured worlds such as fine art photography described by Barbara Rosenblum, Photographers At Work (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 91.

NOTES: CHAPTER TWO


5 Isolation is important to the development of any unique identity—even that associated with a deviant sub-culture. For an interesting comparison, see Howard S. Becker, Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 9-18.


9 See Kurt Lang, "Technology and career management in the military,"


17 See Charles A. Cotton, The Divided Army: Role Orientations Among Canada's Peacetime Soldiers (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 1980);


21The Huntington and Janowitz studies had an interesting effect on the officer corps. By labeling them "professional" they were confirming what the officers had been claiming for almost a century. The effect is that the officers themselves began believing they were correct in their previous assumption. The Armed Forces Officer (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington) written by the Dept. of Defense in 1950 emphasizes that the officer is a "gentleman" and stresses "fidelity." Only in one paragraph is reference to professionalism dared. By contrast, an AFROTC instructional manual published by the Air University in 1962 is titled The Air Force as a Profession. In it, almost every chapter relies on the Huntington and Janowitz studies and even goes so far as to describe the changing nature of officerhood toward the convergent model.

22Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 256.


30 Ibid. and *Selected Manpower Statistics FY 1979*, DOD Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports.


32 Howard E. Aldrich, *Organizations and Environments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 120.

33 Jeffery Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 2-3. Note: Part of the limited resource situation in recent decades has been the declining number of eligible males (18-26 years old) which will reach a low point in the 1980s. Competition with industry for personnel resources will reach a high level at a time when economic incentives necessary to attract American youth are not available. For a discussion of this problem, see "Who will fight for America?" *Time Magazine*, 9 June 1980. Also see Thomas H. Etzold, "Where have all the young boys gone? And other questions for American strategy," paper.
presented at the SE Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Maxwell AFB, AL, 3-5 Jun 1979. This analysis will assume this specific problem is part of the overall resource situation.


39 Guenter Lewy, quoted in John Schlight, "Civilian control of the military in Southeast Asia," Air University Review, Nov-Dec 80, p. 58.

40 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, op. cit., p. 357.


43 Dale O. Smith, "We'll lose the next war, too, unless," The Retired Officer, Vol. 36, No. 10 (1980), p. 18.


52 Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of leadership," ibid., pp. 95-111.

53 Margiotta, Evolving Strategic Realities, op. cit., p. 115.

NOTES: CHAPTER THREE


3 This was confirmed by informal talks with local commanders. Whenever I mentioned the increasing self-esteem of the flying officers,
they would describe recent local efforts to highlight the importance of the pilot's job.

4 For each characteristic, the following questions were asked: "Does your job have or require a high level of [characteristic]?" If the reply was "no" and they would like to have this characteristic, the respondent was asked: "Who has the [characteristic] you would like in your job?" See W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966) for the concept of relative deprivation and the use of these questions in other substantive areas.

5 Command and control systems were developed as part of the fail-safe system to prevent execution of a nuclear weapon without Presidential authorization. Essentially, these facilities electronically put the unit commander into the cockpit of every airplane. In peacetime, airborne decisions are increasingly shared with those on the ground and this mindset has carried over to ground training activities which are increasingly coming under centralized control. For parallels in the corporate world, see: Richard H. Hall, Organizations: Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 10, 16, 126, 166-169, 190, 267-269; Jeffery Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 14; and for a description of "computerocracy," see Frank R. Hunsicker, "Organization challenge and response by 1985," in F.D. Margiotta (ed.), The Changing World of the American Military (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 283. Also, since 1978, the Air Force has tried to reverse this centralization trend by instituting a program called "Buck Stop" which is designed to decentralize control whenever possible. Current indications suggest this program is "dying a natural death" and the system is returning to "business as usual."

6 Many respondents associated managing or leading people with "officership." This association may come from formal professional socialization programs which teach officer candidates that when they are commissioned, they will be 'leaders' or 'managers' or men.

7 These characteristics are similar to those identified by Hackman and Odham as characteristic of jobs with high motivating potential. For a discussion of how such characteristics lead to job enrichment, see J.R. Hackman and G.R. Odham, "Development of the job diagnostic survey," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 60 (1975), pp. 159-170. For a comparative analysis of Air Force and Airline pilots based on these and similar characteristics, see William E. Rosenbach and Robert A. Gregory, "Job attitudes of commercial and U.S. Air Force pilots," Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1981.

8 Steven Keyserling, Junior Officer Perceptions of the OER System,
Data provided by Steven Keyserling, *Junior Officer Perceptions of the OER System*, M.A. Thesis, Report No. GSM/SM/760-32 (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1976). During the 1974-1978 period, top block ratings were controlled, that is, forced into a specified distribution within major organizations. At this time, up to 22% of the officers could be rated in the top block, 28% could be allocated to the next block, and the third block was uncontrolled. Therefore, only the top two blocks were considered "competitive." Further analysis of the Keyserling data (see Appendix C) shows pilots fare about as well as support officers and navigators not as well, indicating a functional priority within the flying group itself. Another problem reported by many flyers is that the OER format is really designed for non-flying officers because it requires flyers to be evaluated in areas not applicable to their primary job.


The Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974 establishes financial inducements which make it extremely desirable for flyers to serve in operational flying positions for nine to eleven years out of their first eighteen years of service.

Rosabeth M. Kanter discusses a similar problem which she calls "blocked mobility." See Kantor, "The impact of hierarchical structures on the work behavior of women and men," *Social Problems*, Vol. 23 (1976), No. 4, pp. 415-430.


However, some support officers in the 1980 sample expressed concern that the current attention being paid to the pilots during the current pilot shortage may temporarily retard this trend.


See Appendix B for 1976 and 1978 promotion and school selection statistics which substantiate these perceptions.
Co-worker recognition was measured as the response to the question: "Is there a sense of 'teamwork' in your work relations with your peers?" Teamwork is assumed to be indicative of mutual respect.

Expectations were measured by asking the following questions:

1. Compared to what you expected, how much recognition do you get from your co-workers?
2. How much recognition do you get from your co-workers?
3. How much recognition from co-workers do you expect junior officers in other specialties to have?

Separating and centralizing operations and flying functions at high levels was a management effort designed to promote greater efficiency, but the cost became mutual understanding and cohesion. For a historical account of the centralization of maintenance functions in the Air Force, see James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 61-64.


One of the findings of Margiotta's study of the Air Force 'elite' of the 1980's (ibid.) is instructive in this regard. Even though five of every six Air Force general officers in 1974 had combat experience, sixty-three percent of this projected 'elite' felt that combat experience should not be a criterion for promotion to the rank of general officer.

Similar identity divisions have been documented in the police force, as "street cops" or "management cops," and among lawyers, as "individual practitioners" and "organization lawyers." See: Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, *Street Cops Vs. Management Cops: The Two Cultures of Policing*, Forthcoming; and Jerome E. Carlin, *Lawyers On Their Own* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1962).

Recent pay increases in 1980 and 1981 have done much to increase the self-esteem of military members by making pay closer to being comparable with civilian counterparts.
NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR


2 "Two-person careers" are those which involve certain expectations for the wives of employees. Typical examples are: college and university professors, corporate executives, public officials, military officers, and foreign service officials. See H. Papanek, "Men, women, and work: reflections on the two-person career," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 852-872.


4 For descriptions of typical military family activities at the time, see: M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960) especially chapters 9 and 10; R. Little, Handbook of Military Institutions (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971), pp. 257-270; and various "guide book" supplements such as M. Murphy and C. Parker, Fitting in as a New Service Wife (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1966).


7 To investigate and correct adverse interaction between the Air Force and the families, a special Assistant for the Air Force Family
Matters was established in 1980 within the Directorate of Personnel Plans, Headquarters USAF.

8The effects of uncertainty described in this chapter are not unlike those found in working-class families except in this case, uncertainty is the result of work schedules rather than economic instability. For a description of working-class family life, see L. Rubin, Worlds of Pain (New York: Basic, 1976).

9Alvin Toffler has called the family the "giant shock absorber of society . . . the place where the bruised and battered individual returns after doing battle with the world, the one stable point in an increasingly flux-filled environment." See his book, Future Shock (New York: Bantam, 1970), p. 238.


13R. Kanter, ibid., p. 38.

14Cecile Landrum, a staff member for the Under-secretary of the Air Force, reported at the Seventh Psychology in DOD Symposium at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980 that "90% of Air Force personnel moves are mandatory; 10% are voluntary." Cost statistics are reported in Nida, op. cit. and an Air Force Times article, "Test of full property coverage begins June 1," May 18, 1981, p. 2.


17 The hours reported by these officers are higher than those of professionals and lower than persons self-employed as reported by R. Kanter, *Work and Family in the United States*, op. cit., p. 32.

18 Ibid., p. 31.

19 One week seemed to be the breaking point reported by most families. Beyond this time, their ability to cope was degraded.


21 The multiple effect of the "clustering" or "pile up" of non-normative life events saps the regenerative power of the family making it more vulnerable to each additional stressor event. In other words, the family who is already struggling with the significant life changes associated with planned separation, may lack the resources to cope with additional changes imposed by unplanned schedule changes. Research in this area is illustrated by: H. McCubbin and D. Olsen, "Beyond family crisis: Family adaption," Paper presented at the 1980 Families in Disaster Conference, Uppsala, Sweden (June 1980) and L. Geismer, B. La Gay, I. Wolock, U. Gerhart and H. Fink, *Early Supports of Family Life: A Social Work Experiment* (New Jersey: Scarecrow, 1972).


23 The evidence is quite clear that married women with no children are more likely to be employed than are women with children and the

While this statistic may be a function of the small sample, the interview comments suggest rates of working wives in a larger sample at the same location would also be low by comparison.

D. Orthner, Families in Blue, op. cit., p. 55. Also see Caroline Bird, Two-Paycheck Marriages, op. cit., p. 121.

One wife illustrated the importance of advance notice saying, "an unplanned trip of five days is as bad as a planned trip that is thirty days long."

Kantor found a similar independence reaction among families of corporate executives. The more the husbands were gone, the more they operated without him. See Kantor, Men and Women of the Corporation, op. cit., p. 114. On the other hand, C. Derr, studying Navy officer families, draws a different conclusion. In his study, the officer groups which experienced the most separation had more compliant and supportive wives. The difference in findings may be the result of Derr's more senior sample; measuring attitudes and not behaviors; and considering only separation rather than the combined effect of separation and unstable schedules. See C.D. Derr, Marriage/Family Issues and Wife Styles Across Naval Officer Career Stages: Their Implications for Career Success, NPS54-79-003 TR2 (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1979).

By changing certain social circumstances, families are able to reduce the stress induced by hostile environments. For a discussion of such coping mechanisms, see: H. McCubbin, et al., "Coping repertoires of families adapting to prolonged war-induced separations," op. cit.; and L. Pearl and C. Schooler, "The structure of coping," Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 19 (Mar 78), pp. 2-21.

Some indication of increasing family independence was reported by D. Orthner, Families in Blue, op. cit., pp. 15, 18, 19.

Among aircrew families, separation tends to create female headed households similar to those found among black families, commuter families, corporate families, or families in which the fathers are institutionalized. This phenomenon has been studied with respect to military families by J. Rienert, "Separation and female centeredness in the military family," in E. Hunter and D. Nice (eds.), Military Families, op. cit.

This situation is similar to those reported by Scanzoni in which husbands who fail in the provider role lose family power. See John Scanzoni, Opportunity and the Family: A Study of the Conjugal Family in Relation to the Economic-Opportunity Structure (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 19-20.


This is in contrast to recent surveys of civilian husbands which show while many men talk about sharing household duties, only about 28% actually do any chores.

Similar problems may be found in other occupations which require frequent absences of the male such as professional sports, truck-driving, and sales representatives.
Asking similar questions, Kanter found 62% of the 205 respondents rated "family" more important than "career." See R. Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, op. cit., p. 105.


Some studies have shown when occupations have a strong sense of community, the family may lose importance as a focus of primary ties. For the case of craft printers, see S. Lipset, M. Trow and J. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956). For other examples, see J. Aldous, "Occupational characteristics and male's role performance in the family," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 31, p. 712.

Part of the attrition problem may be that the somewhat more traditional people that enter military careers and their more traditional wives are extremely disappointed when they find themselves in female headed households rather than the traditional ones they expected. Even though they cope with this situation, their value system requires some end to the coping, a time when they can be "normal" again. Aircrew members suggested a "burn out" point occurs at approximately two years in jobs with extensive separation. After the "burn out" point, if no change is seen within the Air Force, the member begins to consider leaving the service.


These examples are important because in each case, the officer faces relocation in the near future. All stated they would separate rather than move. Personnel officers charged with replacing these officers estimate they will lose at least two more officers (who will
themselves separate rather than move to this undesirable location) before they are able to replace each officer already in place.

\[46\] Blockberger suggests there are two "types" of military families related to their choice of residence. Those who live off-base were found to prefer privacy, freedom and few constraints on lifestyle. On-base families preferred close bonds and shared experiences with other military families. See C. Blockberger, Jr., Military Families: Differential Life-styles, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work.


NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

\[1\] For examples of such studies, see: Rogert M. Vrooman, "An analysis of factors associated with the job satisfaction and career intent of Air Force personnel with less than six years of service" (M.S. Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1976); Glenn A. Grotz and John J. McCall, "Estimating military personnel retention rates: Theory and statistical method" (Rand report # R-2541-AF, June 1980); T.E. Harrell and R.L. Rhame, "Instructor pilot retention in Air Training Command: A survey analysis" (USA: Air Command and Staff College report # 0900-79, 1979); Ronald L. Blackburn and Randall L. Johnson, "Turnover of junior officers" (M.S. The.'s, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1978); Thomas N. Thompson, "A study of job satisfaction in the Air Force" (Air Force Institute of Technology report # GSM/SM/75D-22, 1975); and James W. Patterson, "An analysis of career intent and job satisfaction of first term Air Force personnel" (Air Force Institute of Technology report # GSM/SM/77D-25, 1977).


15. See: Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*


Ibid., p. 282.


Basic identities were measured with the question: "How do you normally think of yourself--as a military officer or as a [specialist] working for the Air Force?"


See: J.R. Galbraith and A. Edstrom, "Creating decentralization

26 Considering these factors and their relationship to officer or specialist identities, the high rate of self-identification as a 'specialist' among certain officer groups such as flying officers is understandable. As long as the flying task is not seen as professionally important, flyers are unable to diversify in their jobs, and as a group are socially and professionally isolated, self-identification as a 'specialist' will continue. High rates of 'officer' identity will only be found among groups whose work is important to the profession (currently management) and who are allowed to diversify. In these groups, cross-training to other specialties allows the integration of various specialty identities under the master identity of "military officer."

27 In this regard, those who are working in their chosen specialty will stay if they are satisfied and leave if they are not. If they are not working in their chosen specialty, the likelihood that they may be able to do so will determine their choice.

28 For a discussion of the unimportance of combat experience to the future elite of the Air Force, see: Franklin D. Margiotta, "A military elite in transition," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1976), pp. 155-184. Also note that support officers as well as flying officers serve combat tours; however, many flyers with combat experience left the Air Force during the post-Vietnam drawdown.

29 Becker, "Notes on the concept of commitment," op. cit.


31 Shared and separate friendship networks in this sample are related to spouse work only, not to place of residence.
## APPENDIX A

### SAMPLE STATISTICS

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<td>Cauc</td>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>OTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>OTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Social Actions</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>At least 20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Missiles*</td>
<td>At least 20</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Food Service</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
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<td>Black</td>
<td>OTS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Missile*</td>
<td>At least 20</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEW NUMBER</td>
<td>PRESENT CAREER INTENT</td>
<td>SEX</td>
<td>RACE</td>
<td>PRIMARY SPECIALTY</td>
<td>YEARS OF SERVICE</td>
<td>LOCATION OF INTERVIEW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>20 only</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>20 only</td>
<td>AFB #4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>20 only</td>
<td>AFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cauc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJCOM (Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Prior enlisted; † Oust; ‡ Requires resignation as soon as possible; § Indicates resignation; Waiting indicates waiting until conditions change in favor of resignation; *0, †0, and ‡0 indicate years of service intended.
APPENDIX B

PROMOTION AND SCHOOL SELECTION STATISTICS

The validity of the perceptions junior officers hold about their relative chances for promotion is demonstrated by statistics associated with early promotion to major and selection to attend professional schools. Differential rates of early promotion to the grade of major are clear indications of the professional prestige of each specialty because these promotions are highly selective, limited to no more than five percent of those eligible for promotion in all year groups including those who are 'on-time.' 'On-time' promotion rates are not valid indicators of professional prestige because they are more of a manning decision which selects out a number of officers not allowed by congressional grade limitations. Professional school selection rates are good indications of prestige because those who attend constitute the future 'elite' of the Air Force (see note 1 below).

Force distribution statistics for the officer ranks in 1978 show support officers in the 8 to 11 year groups are twice as likely as pilots performing pilot duties to receive early promotion to major (see note 2 below). The selection rates for navigators performing navigator duties is only one-fourth that of support officers. The results of the calendar year (CY) 1976 and 1978 Central Temporary Major Board show similar findings in their selection of officers to be promoted ahead of their contemporaries. Of the officers considered in CY 1976, pilots in flying jobs ranked seventh among other specialties in rates of
selection. In CY 1978, the next selection board, pilots faired better, ranking only fourth. In both years, cap. 'ns who were commander/directors, scientific and development engineers or intelligence officers were selected at a higher rate while navigator selection rates trailed behind at least ten other specialties.

Intermediate service school selections show the same trend. Of those eligible for school selection in Fiscal Year (FY) 1976, flyers in flying duties had a selection rate lower than six other specialties. In FY 1978, however, they moved up to second place. Navigators, as usual, experienced very low rates of selection in both years. Unfortunately, similar statistics for 1979 and 1980 were not available.

These selection rates, because they determine the 'elite' of the future Air Force, are important signs of where the Air Force is placing its organizational emphasis. On average, flyers did poorly in 1976 for both early promotion to major and school selection. In spite of higher rates of selection in 1978, the rates experienced by flyers were still only barely comparable with those of support officers (see note 3 below).

Note 1: Selection of reserve officers for regular commissioning is another indicator which is not examined in this study.

Note 2: Force distribution and selection statistics in this section are based on data provided by Headquarters Air Force. See tables in this Appendix for detailed statistics.

Note 3: Statistics also show that selection rates for those with advanced degrees are two and three times the rates of those with only a
baccalaureate degree. This is problematic because flyers, with their erratic schedule, have little opportunity to complete graduate education. Also, the flying commands had low selection rates by comparison with non-flying commands.
APPENDIX B
SELECTION RATES FOR BELOW-THE-ZONE PROMOTION
TO MAJOR AND INTERMEDIATE SERVICE SCHOOL (LINE OFFICERS ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Director</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific &amp; Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Resources MGT</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other OPS (Missiles)</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineers</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not reported for both years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flyers Average</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=237)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=244)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=939)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=1187)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Average</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=474)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=352)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=2070)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(n=2547)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
APPENDIX B (cont.)

NUMBER OF MAJORS WITH 9-11 YEARS OF SERVICE BY SPECIALTY

A/O 09/30/78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Specialty</th>
<th>Total in Specialty</th>
<th>Number Selected to Major/</th>
<th>(Percent of Total in Specialty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot--Core duties</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(.86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot--Total</td>
<td>4664</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>(1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nav--Core duties</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(.46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nav--Total</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot &amp; Nav In Supplement</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(2.23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rated</td>
<td>5900</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Rated</td>
<td>5754</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>(1.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX C

**1976 OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS**

**BY RANK AND FLYING OR SUPPORT SPECIALTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block 1 (22% allowed)</th>
<th>Block 1 &amp; 2 (50% allowed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flyers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E

IDENTITY MEASURES

RELATIONSHIP OF SELF-RATING TO OTHER MEASURES OF IDENTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER MEASURES</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity factor</td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>-.423</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Officer Identity</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Specialist Identity</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifies with Civilian Counterparts</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks of Self As Specialist</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=19
N=23
Total N=43

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE IDENTITY:

Identity Factor

1. When I hear someone criticizing the Air Force, I take it personally.
2. I feel a sense of pride in working for this organization.
3. I really feel as if this organization's problems are my problems.
4. More than anything else, I have always wanted to be an Air Force officer.
5. I would be extremely disappointed if I had to leave the Air Force before retirement.
6. I have never seriously considered any other kind of work than being an Air Force officer.
7. Doing well in the Air Force is extremely important to me.
8. On my job, I can always act just the way I picture myself--I don't have to act like somebody else.

Identity Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Loading</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EIGENVALUE = 3.12

Importance of Officer and Specialist Identities

1. Please rank the following activities as to the degree which they are a major source of satisfaction in your life. (Using a scale from 1 to 4 with 1 being the least important and 4 being the most)
   --- Working as an Air Force officer
   --- Working in your specialty area
   --- Your family activities
   --- Other activities outside work and family

2. Please comparatively rank the following activities as to the extent to which they tend to involve the most important things that happen to you. (1 lowest and 4 highest)
   --- Your work as an Air Force officer
   --- Your work in your specialty
   --- Your family activities
   --- Other activities outside work and family

3. Please comparatively rank your degree of involvement in the following activities. (1 lowest and 4 highest)
   --- Your work as an Air Force officer
   --- Your work in your specialty
   --- Your family life
   --- Other activities outside work and family

NOTE: Identity ranks are averaged across the questions.
Identity with Civilian Counterparts

1. I tend to identify more with civilian counterparts who work in jobs similar to mine than I identify with the officer corps in general. (Agree ----- Disagree)

Think of Self as Specialist

1. I normally think of myself as a specialist [personnel manager, pilot, administrator, etc.] working for the Air Force rather than as a military officer. (Agree ----- Disagree)
APPENDIX F

FACTOR ITEMS

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE INSTITUTIONAL VALUES:

1. I view my Air Force experience as "just a job" and not a "way of life." (reversed)

2. I feel I play an important part in the accomplishment of the Air Force mission.

3. I normally think of myself as a specialist [personnel manager, pilot, administrator, etc.] working for the Air Force rather than as a military officer. (reversed)

4. The military serves an important function for the American people.

5. Military service is a way of life and can never be just a "job."

6. What a member does in his or her private life should be of no concern to the supervisor or the commander. (reversed)

7. Differences in rank should not be important after working hours. (reversed)

8. The Air Force requires me to participate in too many activities that are not related to my job. (reversed)

9. Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for military personnel.

10. Military personnel should perform their operational duties regardless of the personal or family consequences.

11. How much commitment do you feel the Air Force should expect of its officers?
   a. To willingly do their assigned job and that is all.
   b. To willingly do their assigned job and other additional duties as necessary during normal duty hours.
   c. To willingly do all of the above and work off-duty hours in the event of a crisis.
   d. To willingly do all of the above and routinely work during off-duty hours as necessary to accomplish the unit/Air Force mission.

NOTE: Responses for each item are standardized.
Institutional Values Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Loading</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.19</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EIGENVALUE = 3.91

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE JOB SATISFACTION:

1. I have control over my activities.

2. There is little opportunity for personal growth and development. (reversed)

3. I feel a sense of accomplishment.

(Note: the scale for the following is "none-- to ---great.")

4. How would you rate the job satisfaction you feel in your present job?

5. How would you rate the frustration you feel in your present job? (reversed)

6. To what extent does your present job give you an opportunity to use your previous training?

7. To what extent does your present job give you an opportunity to use your personal talents?

8. To what extent do you feel you are being used to your fullest potential?
Job Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Loading</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.95</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.60</td>
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<td>.56</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EIGENVALUE = 4.22

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE CAREER SATISFACTION:

1. In general, I have had the opportunity to hold Air Force jobs which I find personally rewarding. (Disagree --- Agree)

2. Would you recommend being an Air Force officer to a young man?
   a. Would recommend for a career.
   b. Would recommend, but for less than a career.
   c. Would not recommend.
   d. Unsure.

3. Would you recommend being an Air Force officer to a young woman?
   a. Would recommend for a career.
   b. Would recommend, but for less than a career.
   c. Would not recommend.
   d. Unsure.

4. If you could begin working over again in the same specialty as you are in now, how likely would you be to choose the Air Force again?
   a. Definitely would not join the Air Force.
   b. Probably would not join the Air Force.
   c. Would not care much whether it was the Air Force or some other organization.
   d. Probably would choose the Air Force over other organizations.
   e. Definitely would choose the Air Force over other organizations.

5. This item is an average of career satisfaction reported for each year of service.

NOTE: Responses for each item must be standardized.
Career Satisfaction Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Number</th>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.82</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EIGENVALUE = 2.70

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUPERVISORS:

1. I enjoy working with my immediate supervisor.
2. I enjoy socializing with my immediate supervisors.
3. Some of my supervisors are incompetent.
4. I can't talk to them.
5. They don't listen.
6. They give little guidance.
7. They keep me informed.
8. They rarely interfere with my work.
9. They don't understand my situation.
10. They trust me to do my job.
11. They recognize how well I do my job.
12. My supervisors are so concerned with their own careers that they have little interest in mind.
13. My immediate supervisor is very receptive to my ideas and suggestions.
### Supervisor Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients

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Eigenvalue = 5.46
Abrahamsson, Bengt

Abrams, P.

Aldous, J.

Aldrich, Howard E.

Allison, Graham T.

Bachman, Jerald G. and John D. Blair

Bailyn, L. and E. Schein

Barber, Bernard

Becker, Howard S.


Benson, Robert S.

Biderman, A.D. and L.M. Sharp

Bird, Caroline

Blackburn and Randall L. Johnson

Blalock, H. and P. Wilken

Blockberger, C., Jr.

Bradford, Z.B. and F.J. Brown

Broadhead, Robert S.

Bucher, Rue and Anselm Strauss

Burr, W.R., R. Hill, F.I. Nye, I.L. Reiss (eds.)

Busquets, J.

Carlin, Jerome E.
Centers, R., B. Raven and A. Rodrigues

Cotton, Charles A.

Cressey, Paul G.

Deagle, Edwin A., Jr.

Derr, C.D.

Evans, William M.

Faris, John H.

Feldman, Saul D.

Farrell, Daniel and Caryl E. Rusbult

Finlayson, Elizabeth


Goldman, Nancy L. and David R. Segal (eds.)

Goode, William J.

Grotz, Glenn A. and John J. McCall

Gulbraith, J.R. and A. Edstrom

Hackman, J.R. and G.R. Odham

Hall, Richard H.


Harries-Jenkins, Gwen

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Little, Roger

Mack, Raymond W.

Margiotta, Franklin D.


Margolis, Diane R.

McCall, George J. and J.L. Simmons

McCubbin, H. and B. Dahl

McCubbin, Hamilton I., Barbara B. Dahl and Edna J. Hunter (eds.)

McCubbin, H., E. Hunter, and B. Dahl

McCubbin, H., B. Dahl, G. Lester, D. Benson and M. Robertson

McCubbin, H. and M. Marsden
McCubbin, H. and D. Olsen

McDonald, G.

Mills, C. Wright


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Reuss-Ianni, Elizabeth
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Rice, D.

Rienerth, J.

Rosenbach, William E. and Robert A. Gregory

Rosenblum, Barbara

Rossi, Alice S.

Rubin, Lillian
Rueschmeyer, Dietrich  

Runciman, W.G.  

Russett, Bruce and Miroslav Nincic  

Safilios-Rothschild, C.  

Sarfatti, Magali Larson  

Scanzoni, John  

Scanzoni, J. and K. Polonko  

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Stanton, M.

Stoddard, Ellwyn and Claude E. Cabanillas

Stoehrmann, Kenneth C.

Stone, Gregory P.

Strauss, Anselm


Stumpt, S.

Sweet, J.

Thompson, James D.

Thompson, Thomas N.

Tietler, G.

Toffler, Alvin

Trice, Robert H.

Unruh, David R.


U.S. Army War College
Veevers, J.E.

Vrooman, Roger M.

Wakin, Malham M.

Weber, Max

White, William H., Jr.

Wiener, Yoash and Yoav Vardi

Wilensky, Harold

Winter, D.

Woolsey, James R.
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