CIVIL DEFENSE: A DETERRENT TO NUCLEAR WAR. (U)

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Civil Defense: A Deterrent to Nuclear War

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A Survey of Historical Efforts in Support of Civil Defense in U.S.
CIVIL DEFENSE: A DETERRENT TO NUCLEAR WAR

BY

GEORGE C. ATKINS
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19 APRIL 1982

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ABSTRACT

CIVIL DEFENSE: A DETERRENT TO NUCLEAR WAR

Nuclear war has been feared by the entire world since the end of World War II. Since the early 1960's the Soviet Union has been continually improving both their capability to wage nuclear war and, more importantly, to protect their population. Population protection or civil defense is the principle issue to be discussed with emphasis on Soviet accomplishments and fluctuation of US policy. This principle issue will be discussed from the viewpoint of many noted authors. The conclusion reached will indicate that there can be deterrence to nuclear war through civil protection. This conclusion is reinforced with the efforts of the Soviets and the gains made by the US over the past three years.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The course of this paper is directed at the conclusion that civil defense is one arm of nuclear deterrence. Along this route, civil defense will be discussed from the aspect of change, positive-negative-positive, within the United States, to show the "ups and downs" of the American public as external stimuli change. The Soviet civil defense strengths will be discussed, in detail, to indicate their appreciation for population survival. The civil defense program of the United States will highlight the change in leadership and the new direction of programs designed to protect a far greater number of United States citizens.

The conclusion will briefly sum up the paper and make the final statement of proof based on presented background material.
CHAPTER 2

CIVIL DEFENSE IS BACK

Ed Zuckerman writes in his article "Hiding From The Bomb—Again," published by Harper's, that "civil defense is back." Mr. Zuckerman's statement gives birth to several questions — where has civil defense gone? Why is civil defense returning? Why did civil defense depart in the first place? Who is bringing civil defense back? The answers to these questions are to be found interwoven and reported in history as the nuclear strategy for both the United States and Soviet Union developed after World War II. The nuclear strategy of the United States in the late 1950's and into the 1960's was clearly one of superiority, a powerful deterrent. The Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces being significantly inferior to forces of the United States greatly assisted President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Chairman Khrushchev had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba that had ranges capable of striking many strategic targets within the United States. These missiles, however, were not capable of being launched from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union needed the Cuban launch area because of their technological shortcoming in range. President Kennedy's so-called "blackmail" worked in 1962 and prompted the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov's remark to John J. McCloy, one of the US representatives to the United Nations, "You Americans will never be able
to do this to us (USSR) again!"³

The United States was shocked into the realization that the Soviet Union could attack with nuclear weapons. This realization was emphasized after the Cuban Missile Crisis but had its beginning in 1957 with the Sputnik I launching. The nuclear strategy of the United States from 1957 to 1963 was in the process of change as indicated by Colonel Staudenmaier:

During the period of American nuclear monopoly, the United States pursued a counterforce strategy that was designed to destroy the Russian strategic force on the ground. Later, after Russia had acquired the 'bomb,' and missiles had by and large replaced aircraft as the primary delivery vehicles, this strategy lost its attractiveness. By then both nations had entered the era of Albert Wohlstetter's 'Delicate Balance of Terror,' wherein each had the retaliatory nuclear capacity to devastate the other, but neither had achieved a disarming first strike capability. The American public became aware of its vulnerability to nuclear attack in 1957 when the Russian launched Sputnik I. At about the same time, the United States began seriously experimenting with ways to achieve an effective ballistic missile defense. In the early 1960's, confrontations with the Soviet Union over Berlin and Cuba reminded the American public of its susceptibility to atomic attack. These crises also aroused public concern over the role of civil defense in the nuclear era. However, after a brief flurry of activity, civil defense was allowed to languish to the extent that until recently, virtually the only reminder of its existence was the weekly testing of air raid sirens that allowed city dwellers to set their watches.

Without the capability to launch a disarming first strike, without an adequate active defense which could intercept missiles in flight and without an effective civil defense for protection of its population and economy, the United States, since 1960, has deterred the launching of Russia's nuclear force by threat of retaliation.⁴

Fundamentally, the goal of the United States has been, and still is, survival of a strategic nuclear attack through deterrence.⁵ Along with deterrence, however, a strong retaliatory nuclear force and a strong civil defense protection and recovery force were continually emphasized into the late 1960's.⁶ During the period 1962 through 1969 many construction companies built countless private and commercial fall-
out shelters across the United States. One such contractor, as reported by his son, built fallout shelters throughout the midwest. 7

As the 1960's closed into the 1970's, the rush for self-protection and the shock of the Soviet threat subsided, funds were diverted to other capital expenditures, and civil defense became a passive attention item. 8 9 During the next few years government appropriation levels actually decreased to the lowest level since 1960. 10 Lack of support for civil defense from either President Johnson or Secretary of Defense McNamara coupled with the high level of expenditures for the Vietnam War and anticipated funding of the Sentinel Antiballistic Missile System (ABM) contributed to a reduction in civil defense appropriation. 11

Due to the election of President Nixon and his selection of Melvin R. Laird as Secretary of Defense in 1969, civil defense received strong renewed backing. Mr. Laird indicated in his 1970 annual report that:

My responsibilities as Secretary of Defense requires me to evaluate problems related to the possibility of nuclear war and its probable effects upon the nation. As Secretary of Defense, I am convinced that the Civil Defense system is a vital part of our overall strategic posture and essential to the protection of the people . . . 12

Mr. Laird felt very strongly about civil defense as a deterrent. He indicated the root of his condition before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 22 March 1969, when he contended that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about it." 13

Even with good support for civil defense from the top-of-the-administration, appropriation through FY 1972 continued to be significantly lower than the levels of the Kennedy Administration ten years before. 14 It was time to "open the first envelope." 15 The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) was reorganized into the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)
The new agency would provide preparedness assistance planning in all areas of civil defense and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{17} With the new Agency (DPCA) came renewed interest in population relocation as a dual-use solution along with shelter protection in case of nuclear attack. Both relocation and protection continued into the late 1970's.\textsuperscript{18}

During the period 1972-1974 the SALT I Treaty limited the development and deployment of ABM Systems for the United States and the Soviet Union. This agreement recognized that both nations had the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other with first-strike and therefore, that safety lay in vulnerability.\textsuperscript{19} Dr. Blanchard is quick to point out that civil defense could have the same impact:

Highly effective levels of civil defense could create the same instability that ABM's created. While 'highly effective' levels of civil defense were not being proposed by OCD (DCPA), even marginally or moderately effective civil defense programs must have seemed incongruous to the Administration in relation to the SALT environment of cooperation and the theory of hostage populations.\textsuperscript{20}

The end result was a FY 1973 budget of $5.3 million less than was requested, with that entire sum being cut from the shelter program.\textsuperscript{21} The following year (FY 1974) another $6.5 million was cut in appropriations. As further emphasis on the deteriorating position of civil defense within the Administration, President Nixon abolished the Office of Emergency Preparedness and transferred its functions to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the General Services Administration, and the Treasury Department\textsuperscript{22} (probably due to his faith in SALT I).

In 1974, then Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger introduced the strategy of flexible response and limited nuclear war which
emphasized smaller war heads more "surgically" placed on strategic
targets. The bottom line assumed less population destruction for both
sides. 23

During the period 1969-1977, civil defense had become one of the
lowest priorities in the Department of Defense budget and, as such, was
not recognized by Congress. However, there was a growing realization
that the Soviets were greatly increasing their civil defense efforts. 24
It was known, for example, that the Soviets were placing much more
effort on their civil defense system than the United States. A great
many Soviet civilians were being trained, fallout shelters and some
blast shelter protection were being constructed, and a great deal of
emphasis was apparently being given to the formulation of evacuation
policies. Suggestions were being made to the leadership of the United
States concerning these observations as early as 1974 but, for the most
part, were disregarded until much later in the 1970's as impacting
appropriations. 25

By 1978 prior to the final year under President Carter, it became
obvious that it was high time to "open the second envelope." 26
Throughout the 1960's the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) with few excep-
tions failed to make extensive progress. In 1973 the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency (DCPA) came into being but accomplished little more
national visibility than had OCD. It was time to open the third
envelope. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was created by
President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978. 27 Of significant
interest and under authority of Presidential Directive 41, 28 FEMA began
to consolidate the fragmented elements of national preparedness scat-
tered throughout the government into a cohesive organization with
centralized direction and decentralized execution with the state and
local governments. President Carter's PD 41 directed that a new civil defense policy should be implemented based on the following guidelines:

(1) That the United States civil defense program should enhance the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war, thereby improving the basis for eventual recovery, as well as reducing vulnerability to a major Soviet attack;

(2) That the United States civil defense program should enhance deterrence and stability, and contribute to perceptions of the overall US/Soviet strategic balance and to crisis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension;

(3) That the policy not suggest any change in the US policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence; and,

(4) That the program include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis as well as be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies.

FEMA's strong and broad mission statement reads:

Under the direction of the President, protect the civilian population and resources of the Nation and preserve the continuity of constitutional government in time of emergencies. Develop programs and activities for preparedness for, mitigation of, response to and recovery from natural, accidental, terrorist, and wartime civil emergencies.

With the election of President Reagan in 1980, emergency preparedness received new emphasis. President Reagan, operating under authority of Public Law (P.L.) 96-342, continued President Carter's initiative to insure the "home front" was as strong as the projected strategic operating power of the United States. President Reagan appointed Mr. Louis O. Giuffrida as the Director of FEMA and directed that he be a member of the National Security Council (NSC). Joining the NSC was an important step for FEMA in that it had, for the first time, been recognized as a creditable advisor on national defense matters.

President Reagan's selection of Mr. Giuffrida as the Director of
FEMA was an excellent choice. Mr. Giuffrida, a strong, articulate, well educated and politically astute administrator, manager, and leader rapidly established good relations with other governmental agencies with his ability to cut through "turf" problems and arbitrate disagreements that had previously caused problems in FEMA type agencies. He consolidated subareas of the agency where possible and expanded responsibilities at the level of separate fifty states while encouraging and reinforcing the separate states' development of stronger agencies. The Congress of the United States had previously made this possible with matching federal funds for supporting programs at the state level.

The questions asked at the beginning of this section have been uncovered in history. Civil defense had been suppressed by the lack of budgeted and appropriated funds (see Chart 1, page 9) primarily due to lack of interest in the threat. Bernard T. Feld noted in September 1977 that with the exception of the fallout shelter boom of the 1960's the subject of civil defense during the atomic age had "been confined to the fringes of the discussions on defense policy, arms control and national security in the United States." Additionally he noted that,

Recently, however, there has been a revival of discussion on the issue, based mainly on the assertion of the existence of a very vigorous civil defense program in the Soviet Union, involving massive underground relocation of industry, widespread shelter construction, underground food storage, and planning for almost instantaneous evacuation of major urban centers.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was clearly reversing this trend in his Annual Report FY 1982 by saying:

3. Civil Defense

During the past year, new evidence and analysis have shed more light on the Soviet civil defense program. Soviet civil defense is a large, on-going program focused primarily on: (1)
CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BY CONGRESS  (in millions of dollars)

1951-1982
1983-1987 (REQUESTED)

CHART 135
protecting from the effects of military attacks: the leadership, the work force at key economic facilities, and the general population, in that order; (2) facilitating the continuity of economic activity during war; and (3) enhancing the capability for recovery from the effects of war. Some aspects of Soviet civil defense activity have been marked by bureaucratic difficulties and public apathy, but on the whole there has been a general trend of improvement in almost all facets of the civil defense program over the past decade.

Shelters are available for around 10 percent of the residents in Soviet cities with populations of 25,000 or more. The vast majority of the Soviet urban population would, therefore, have to be evacuated to receive any protection. With adequate warning time, the Soviets plan to evacuate to areas outside large cities those people not required to support essential activities. At key economic facilities, the work force on duty would be protected by shelters, while the off-duty personnel would be dispersed to zones within commuting distance outside the city. There is little evidence to suggest a comprehensive program to harden or disperse economic production installations themselves. The effectiveness of this program as a whole is, in my view, highly questionable; its most dangerous aspect is that the Soviet leadership might believe it effective, and behave accordingly.

As noted last year, the Soviet civil leadership personnel would also relocate from their hardened urban command posts to alternate exurban facilities. There are blast shelters within and outside cities sufficient to accommodate the majority of Soviet leaders at all levels of government.

A strong projected strategic capability was being tied to a strong domestic civil defense strategy. Civil defense was indeed back and it had returned under strong national leadership, threat appreciation, and a strong national desire to rectify past shortcomings in strategic and domestic capabilities.
CHAPTER 3

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE STRENGTHS

As early as 1976 Leon Goure, a noted authority on Soviet civil defense, was pointing toward the strength of the Soviet Union in his book *War Survival in Soviet Strategy, USSR Civil Defense*. At the same time Paul Nitze, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and SALT negotiating team member, was drawing attention to Soviet civil defense in his article in the January 1976 edition of *Foreign Affairs*. Mr. Dusko Doder, *The Washington Post* Foreign Service reporter, writes that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, writes in his new book that he "... has proposed sweeping measures to modernize Soviet strategic forces..." including "... total military preparedness not only by the armed forces and military industries but also of all sectors of the economy, the party and civil defense." From as early as 1976 until the present, the United States has been reading about Soviet improvements to their civil defense, the United States has taken action to counter this Soviet deterrent.

The questions to be addressed in this chapter are — just how strong is the Soviet civil defense program? Does the Soviet civil defense program have shortcomings? And more importantly — is the
Soviet civil defense program a true deterrent to nuclear exchange?

Chairman Brezhnev is credited with saying in the early 1970's that:

The center of gravity in the competition is now to be found precisely in science and technology, making the further intensive development of science and technology not only the central economic but also the critical political task, and this gives the questions of science and technology progress decisive significance. 41

Additionally, Marshal Ogarkov continues in his new book, Always Ready to Defend [the] Fatherland 42 as quoted by Mr. Doder that:

The changes in military technology, or as he put it, 'the fast pace of the development of nuclear missile weaponry by the adversary and the possibility of their sudden use' against the Soviet Union, call for new steps 'to secure the vital interests of our people.' 43

The indication here, as it has been in the past, is that the Soviet Union intends to fully capitalize on the benefits of technology whether it is developed or stolen (legal or illegal transfer of technology). Marshal Ogarkov goes on to say, "... the armed forces have to improve the command-and-control system and acquire 'the necessary modern technology.' 44 Therefore, the Soviets have tied the strength of their armed forces to technology and have performed a rather good job of forces improvement. Now the Soviets have identified the requirement to better manage the entire defense system — "... it [defense system] requires 'an even greater concentration of management.' 45 Additionally, and more importantly, in regard to emergency preparedness or civil defense, the Soviets have recognized that a strong national defense is also directly tied to a coordinated effort on the home front. Marshal Ogarkov was directly addressing this issue as follows:

In order to increase the military preparedness of the country, today as never before, it is necessary to coordinate mobilization and deployment of the armed forces and the entire economy and particularly the use of human resources, transport, communications and energy to secure the stability and livability of the country. 46
Mr. Doder suggests that,

Publication of the book would appear to place military and strategic doctrine before the Kremlin questions that, in turn, raise basic issues of allocation of resources at a time when the Soviet economy is already strained.47

If any shortcomings in Soviet civil defense can be found, it is in the area of their economic situation today.

The strength of the Soviet civil defense program is more clearly defined and has been widely published by such noted authors and experts as Leon Goure, Daniel Goure, Gordon H. McCormick, Harriet Fast Scott, General George J. Keegan, Jr., Dr. William Chipman, and T. K. Jones. The following paragraphs will examine the strengths of the Soviet civil defense system and consider if it is indeed a deterrent.

Mr. T. K. Jones noted that,

During the 1960's, it was pretty clear that had the Soviet attacked US forces, we would have had an immense arsenal that would have survived the attack; the Soviets would have had very little. The situation now has changed. Today a Soviet attack on the United States would leave them [Soviets] with reserve forces equal in destruction power to our surviving forces.48

Mr. T. K. Jones goes on to write:

Contrary to assertions in this country that the Soviet civil defenses are only a paper program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a 28 January 1977 letter to Senator William Proxmire, acknowledged the existence of substantial preparations in the USSR. These included hardened command control communication centers for the first echelon of the Soviet government and armed forces, blast shelters in manufacturing plants, shelters for the general population, probable underground storage bunkers for grain, and hardening of defensive missile sites and radars. What is more important, the fact of the Soviet Union's civil defense program was acknowledged by Leonid I. Brezhnev in a 2 May 1978 interview with the German social democratic newspaper, Vorwaerts.49

It is essential to note at this point exactly where the Soviet priorities lie in their quest for a balanced civil defense. Mr. Jones noted the Soviet priorities in 1979 and no better clarification has been
written before or since that time. He writes:

It is important to understand the objectives and priorities of Soviet civil defense. The Soviet preparations are designed to ensure postwar continuation of the regime's power (domestically and internationally), and to reduce the time needed for postwar recovery, as well as to enable governmental control and industrial operations during the course of any war. The highest priority is the protection of the leadership; their high quality shelters (including some very deep bunkers) could accommodate approximately one hundred thousand people, and could include an extensive network of survivable communications. Second priority is for the protection of essential workers, and third priority is given to the remaining population. Protection of industry - the means of production - appears to be fourth in priority.

It is interesting, however, to note that Marshal Ogarkov has indicated closer coordination is required between civil defense and including the military, mobilization and the entire economy such as the "... use of human resources, transport, communications and energy to secure the stability and livability of the country." Marshal Ogarkov again made this point very clear and set Soviet policy by writing:

Ogarkov said the links between the economic and civil defense should be improved, describing this as 'one of the most important conditions to sustain the required levels of defense capacity for the entire country.'

Additionally, Marshal Ogarkov identified the need to direct more attention to the stockpiling of essential items required for survival and recovery such as "... establish reserves in machine tools and raw materials, secure autonomous supplies of water and energy in the eventuality of war." General George J. Keegan, Jr., (Retired, former Chief, US Air Force Intelligence) claimed among other things,

... 

(3) That the USSR has hardened on the order of 35,000 installations including 75 underground command posts for the civil military leadership within the Moscow Beltway alone. 

(4) That there are bunkers for civilians in all major cities including several at Moscow University the size of several
football fields ....

(5) That grain storage bunkers the size of several football fields have been identified on the perimeters of all major cities and are guarded by the military — the most elaborate of their kind in the world .... 54

The Soviet civil defense program was already strong, and, with the emphasis suggested by Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet civil defense posture is due to be even stronger.

It is clear from the above statements that the Soviet civil defense population protection is well under way. To draw a contrast at this point, Dr. William K. Chipman, director of population protection for FEMA, indicates the crisis relocation plan is underfunded and the first phase will not be completed until the early 1990's. 55

Daniel Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, in their article "Soviet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimension of US - Soviet balance," in the Spring 1980 issue of Orbis, indicate that the Soviets are indeed strong and have combined both projected and defensive strength. 56 Goure and McCormick go on to conclude that there is a deterrent nature in the Soviet civil defense program in that recovery would be affected more rapidly than currently estimated in the United States. 57 Goure and McCormick also indicate for the first time the magnitude of personnel committed to the civil defense program:

The most controversial element of the Soviet defense arsenal is civil defense. While, until recently, arguments about the Soviet civil defense effort centered on the scope of the Soviet program, today even the most vociferous critics of population defense are forced to debate only its potential effectiveness. Even the CIA, which at one time was helpless to find any evidence of a coherent Soviet civil defense program, has acknowledged that the Soviet Union currently spends billions of dollars annually for civil defense and that the active full-time civil defense force comprises at least 100,000 personnel. A more careful evaluation would show that substantially more is spent on civil defense if all shelter construction and the maintenance of dual-purpose facilities are included in the estimates. Supplementing the program for in-place sheltering
of civilians is an evacuation program of gigantic proportions and a program for the hardening and dispersal of Soviet industry. Together, these efforts threaten to degrade seriously the US ability to achieve assured destruction. In addition, civil defense and industrial-survival programs might permit the Soviet Union to recover with greater rapidity than could the US in the event of a full-scale nuclear conflict.58

Mrs. Harriet Fast Scott is perhaps the most widely read and noted authority on current Soviet civil defense programs and would rank either first or second with Leon Goure depending on the reference consulted. Mrs. Scott, like Goure, has spent many years researching and studying Soviet civil defense. She spent four years with her husband in Moscow and has traveled widely in the Soviet Union since that time.59

Mrs. Scott's bottom line is that "The Politburo takes civil defense seriously." And further states, "...Soviet citizens of all ages are told: 'Civil defense is everybody's business!'"60

Mrs. Scott notes that as many as thirty-six or more general officers work full-time in Soviet civil defense tasks with the Soviet Defense Troops organized at the top on a part with the other five Soviet services — Strategic Rocket Troops, Ground Troops, Troops of National Air Defense, Air Forces, and Navy.61 General Colonel A. T. Altunin became the first Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR and Deputy Minister of Defense in 1972 shortly after the signing of SALT I.62 The fact that civil defense had been elevated to the minister level after SALT I indicated the Soviet's recognition of its importance in two ways — deterrence and self-protection. Self-protection is a given, but deterrence is more difficult to grasp. In a 1972 book written under the aegis of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces, the Party's voice in the Soviet military stated:

Improving Soviet civil defense, raising its effectiveness, is just one more real barrier on the part of the imperialists' unleashing a new world war. Consequently, civil defense of the
The Soviet Minister of Defense and Politburo member, Marshal Andrey Grechko, stated this policy in another way in his 1975 book, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*. He asserted that civil defense is now (1975) a matter of strategic significance and, concerning self-protection, that "modern war demands the creation of a carefully thoughtout system of measures to ensure stability of operations of the whole national economy and reliable protection of the country's population."64

Leon Goure points out the importance to the Soviets of national training in civil defense in his 1978 article "Another Interpretation (of Soviet civil defense).*65 He states that in 1972 a civil defense program was taught in the 2nd, 5th, and 9th grades of all secondary schools (a total of 52 hours annually), and in vocational, technical schools and institutions of higher learning (a total of 50 hours annually).66 This school program is capped off annually with 16 to 20 million school children participating in a civil defense exercise as part of a national war games program.67 In 1973 a 20-hour compulsory course for the adult population including factory workers, farm workers, and entire towns and cities was added and currently repeated yearly ever since that time. This 20-hour adult course is also capped off with a comprehensive exercise lasting two or three days.68 It is reported that a network of special training facilities for the adult program costs about two billion rubles.69 Since 1973 the Soviet mass media and indoctrination apparatus have been engaged in a large-scale and continuous civil defense propaganda and instruction effort.70 Mrs. Scott backs-up Leon Goure's statement by reporting her observation in June and
July 1975 of approximately twenty-three million Soviet youths participating in a massive military sports exercise in which survival training under simulated nuclear war conditions was a major part.\textsuperscript{71} The enclosed organizational chart on page 20 "Civil Defense for the City" is repeated at all levels from the national level through the district and down to city and sub-district level.\textsuperscript{72} It is interesting to note that at each level all essential elements are coordinated. To name a few, Militia (dedicated home-front troops for civil defense), Communication (to include mass media and command and control), and Material-Technical Supply.\textsuperscript{73} The latter controls the issue of gas mask, respirators, special clothing, boots, first-aid kits, and civil defense booklets. The civil defense booklets are issued to every person — man, woman, and child — that is undergoing civil defense training.\textsuperscript{74}

In addition to training of the entire populace, the Soviet civil defense program is also concerned with the wartime survival of economy and post-atomic recovery. The Soviet planners anticipate entire cities along with their industry to be destroyed. To insure that vital segments of the economy continue to operate, a planned dispersal of industry and "new cities" to the east closer to existing abundant raw materials has been in effect for years. Mrs. Scott notes,

One has only to recall that in the Soviet Union 10,000,000 people and 2,600 industrial plants were evacuated in total from western regions to the Urals and Central Asia from July to November 1941. After the war, these plants remained where they were and duplicate new plants were built on the old sites.\textsuperscript{75}

Noting again the organizational chart on page 20, recovery from nuclear war is included. Dedicated civil defense troops are responsible for restoring communications, railroads, bridges, defusing bombs, and perhaps even countering airborne attacks and enemy diversionary groups with primary emphasis on putting essential plants back into operation as
soon as possible.76

There is no doubt about the fact as stated that the Soviet leadership is concerned about its survival. The Soviets are planning to survive and that civil defense is everybody's business. The Soviets believe a strong civil defense can be and is a deterrent to nuclear war.

CHART 277

ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE OF A TYPICAL SOVIET CITY

Chief of Civil Defense for the City
(Chairman of the City's Executive Committee)

Staff of City Civil Defense

City Evacuation Commission

City DOSAAF Committee

City Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee

CITY CIVIL DEFENSE SERVICES

Communications Engineering Transport Military Fire Medical

FORMATIONS OF SERVICES

Municipal-Technical Material-Technical Supply Power Goods and Food Other

Chief of Civil Defense of City District
(Chairman of the District Executive Committee)

Staff of District Civil Defense

District Evacuation Commission

District DOSAAF Committee

District Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee

DISTRICT CIVIL DEFENSE SERVICES

Formations of Civil Defense of the District

Chief of Civil Defense of Local Organizations

Chief of Civil Defense of Housing Area
CHAPTER 4

US CIVIL DEFENSE: IT COULD BE BETTER!

The entire second chapter of this paper, "Civil Defense is Back," was devoted to the idea that the United States civil defense had once been favored, that it then lost that favor, and that it has now returned to the attention of the leadership of the nation. The degree of concern was noted in the amount of funds allocated for civil defense; now it is time to turn to views of the public programs in progress and their projected goals.

In 1975, Harriet Fast Scott, the noted author on Soviet civil defense, indicated the problems that the leadership of the United States would inevitably face due to the views expressed in a free society. She stated:

The attention given to civil defense by the Soviet Union perhaps cannot be duplicated in a free society. This does not mean that the prudent planner should not attempt to do everything possible to prepare ahead of time for such a contingency. The Soviet leadership has physically and psychologically prepared its people for the possibility of nuclear war. Western leaders have not.78

Mrs. Scott was right at that time and, to a degree, now; however, there has been a shift in public opinion concerning the amount of government spending that should be devoted to civil defense. The Gallup Poll conducted a survey and publicized the results on 3 August 1981. The question concerned protection of US citizens in view of increased Soviet
spending for civil defense. The survey asked agreement for spending money in terms of: "more," "less," "about right," or "no opinion."
The results are indicated below:

CHART 3
MORE NUCLEAR PROTECTION FOR US IN PERCENT (%) 79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>More</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
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What could be causing this upward trend in the desire for more protection from a possible nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union? There seems to be at least two factors which are widely known. The first of these is the publicized nuclear threat of the Soviet Union by the US news media and the second is the publicized fact that citizens of the USSR are, presently, better protected than those of the United States in event of nuclear attack. FEMA indicates that 90% of the Soviet citizens would survive a large scale nuclear attack while only 40% of the citizens of the United States would survive such an assault. 80 It is predicted, however, in the same publication, that, with good planning for crisis relocation, the United States survival rate could increase to 80% by 1985. This figure, 80%, is based on a total expenditure of $2.64 billion, about $1.67 per person for one year. It is also shown that, with shelters, an additional 10% could survive; however, the cost for shelters would be in excess of $70 billion. These facts have caused the emergency planners to turn to crisis relocation rather than shelters for the citizens of the United States.

As a point of contrast, it is interesting to note the progress made
and predicted by the Swiss government as stated in George Gallup's article on civil defense:

According to a recent article in the *New York Times* the Swiss government recently reported that in a war, 90% of the 6.5 million Swiss would have opportunity for nuclear protection. By 1990, the goal of shelter space for all will be reached.

Modern Swiss shelters, it is pointed out, offer protection against nuclear radiation, chemical weapons, and near hits by conventional weapons. According to civil defense engineers, Swiss shelters can withstand the blast and heat waves of any nuclear explosion except a direct hit and offer complete protection from primary and secondary radiation. The occupants are able to remain in shelter for 14 days until the fallout danger has decreased.

Some have stated, "If only the United States could be that far-sighted but we have never experienced war on our homeland!" FEMA is continuing to build on the well-grounded plan to improve civil defense for the United States. All federal agencies with any views or missions directed toward survival are now receiving guidance from FEMA. Volunteer and humanitarian organizations are working together with FEMA coordination to solve problems and to plan for natural disasters or war. The entire effort has been greatly decentralized, through the states, and down to the local level.

At the state level, FEMA manages a small office which cooperates, extensively, with the state planners and operators. Mr. Dan Isom, Director of Emergency Plans, North Carolina Emergency Management Agency, demonstrated a well protected command center. It has radio and landline communications which tie in hundreds of locations within the state and are interconnected with federal communications systems. This type of command center is duplicated throughout the United States and has formed a multi-gridded network for alert and control during emergencies. There are many other programs on-going and planned at federal, state and
local levels that cannot be discussed in this paper but all of which are
directed at insuring survival of the citizens of the United States.

The question could be asked, could more be done in civil defense? The answer is, of course, yes. There are thousands of people here in the United States that are considered non-combatants waiting to be asked, directed and trained in civil defense. Millions of "ham radios" and Citizen Band (CB) operators could form an unending network for command and control during emergencies. Retired military personnel could be used in management and middle-management duties before, during and after any emergency.

Civil defense within the United States is strong and growing even stronger. With more information, training and assets it could even surpass that of the Soviet Union.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Over the past twenty years civil defense has had its good days and bad. During the Kennedy administration and directly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, civil defense was at an all time high. The American public realized that they could be subjected to a Soviet nuclear attack. Many dollars were spent by both the federal government and the private sector on bomb shelters and plans. The fear of a Soviet attack soon faded in the United States as the Vietnam War began to cost the public through taxes.

Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, their leadership realized that national defense included both a strategic strike force and protection for their people. The Soviet Union perfected the ability to produce through technology (legally and illegally procured) a great strategic strike force. They at the same time were working over a period of years to protect their masses. The Soviet Union recognized, at least made public, statements that their civil defense measures were considered a deterrent to a nuclear attack by the United States.

After 1970, American authors and visitors to the Soviet Union began writing and reporting the great strides being made by the Soviet Union.
in civil defense and the American public and the administrators began to take notice of these facts. Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Fog Kohler wrote:

Soviet civil defense measures . . . have consistently been treated [by the US] . . . as an essentially insignificant consideration. Now we are finding that they may well be decisive, and that the whole foundation of the US deterrence posture is crumbling.84

Not until the Reagan administration came into leadership were there any positive steps made toward funding of a larger program, even though the Carter administration did set the wheels in motion with Presidential Directive 41 in 1978. With the present leadership, civil defense has been elevated to a much higher priority.

This author concludes that if the Soviets see their civil defense program as a deterrent they will also have respect for the civil defense program being planned and implemented in the United States. There are but two effective deterrents to nuclear war — a strong strategic strike force coupled with a strong civil defense program or total disarmament by both nations. This author does not see the latter as an acceptable alternative to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the first alternative is the only answer.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., p. 3.


9. It is appropriate here to acknowledge the assistance provided to the author by Dr. B. Wayne Blanchard FEMA by permission of Dr. William K. Chipman FEMA. The advice and background material that was provided was invaluable in the preparation of this paper.


11. Ibid., p. 397.


13. US, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Disarmament Affairs,

15. The envelope joke was told by several speakers to the USAWC Class of 1982. It seems that there was a change in management of a major firm. The incoming manager noted problems in the firm and requested guidance. The outgoing manager indicated the new manager should not worry that he had prepared three envelopes and when the new manager ran into problems he should open the 1st envelope and etc. through all three envelopes. Time went by and trouble occurred. The new manager opened the 1st envelope. It read **reorganize**. He followed the instruction and things improved for a while and then got worse. The new manager then opened the 2nd envelope which read **reorganize**. He reorganized again and things improved again for a while then got much worse. Finally the new manager opened the last envelope and it read — make up three envelopes!

17. Ibid., p. 431.
18. Ibid., p. 436.
19. Ibid., p. 440.
20. Ibid., pp. 440, 441.
21. Ibid., p. 441.
22. Ibid., p. 445.
23. Ibid., p. 447.
24. Ibid., p. 449.
25. Ibid., p. 449.

33. FEMA briefing slides.

34. Public Law 96-384, p. 1089.


41. Unclassified briefing slide presented by Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations—Command, Control, Communications, and Automatic Data Processing to the USAWC, Class of 1982, February 1982. By permission of Major General Buckingham.

42. Doder, p. A22.


45. Ibid., p. A22.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.


49. Ibid., pp. 109, 110. Emphasis added.

50. Ibid., p. 110.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.


57. Ibid., p. 112.

58. Ibid.


60. Ibid., p. 29.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 30.


66. Ibid., p. 49.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Scott, p. 29.

72. Ibid., p. 31.

73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 29.

75. Ibid., p. 33.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 31.

78. Ibid., p. 32. Emphasis added.


81. Unknown author.


83. It is appropriate here to acknowledge the assistance provided to the author by Mr. Dan Isom. The advice, assistance and material provided was invaluable in the preparation of this paper.

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