The last two decades revealed a trend toward unionization by public sector employees including civilian employees on military installations. In this paper, LTC Daniel examines public sector employee unions and specifically their propensity to strike. Since US Army civilian employees have not, as yet, gone on strike, he examined a similar public sector group—the police. The paper begins with a review of the Boston Police Strike of 1919 and its impact on public sector unions from 1920-1950. Next, the paper
Item 20. continued.

examines the right of police to join unions, and the right of police unions to affiliate with big labor. That section of the paper continues with a discussion of how police unions achieve their objectives. LTC Daniel uses a system model to display the differences between police wants and public perceptions. Based on his study of police unions, LTC Daniel then attempts to predict what those unions will do in the remainder of the 1980s. LTC Daniel next uses the knowledge of police union strikes to study Army Installations. The result is a set of options Army installation commanders have if ever faced with union strikes.
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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS AND THE POST COMMANDER

BY

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

During the decades of the 1960's and 1970's there was a new trend among public sector employees - their unionization and demonstrated willingness to strike for increased benefits and higher pay. Civilian employees on military installations along with policemen, firemen and teachers, have shown this same propensity. To date US Army civilians have not gone on strike. But, what if they should, what options are open to the installation commander, and what problems will he face? This paper will attempt to address these questions. The basic thesis, however, is that he should be able to cope very well - and much better than his civilian counterpart, a mayor, because of the numerous and varied resources available to him.

Since US Army civilian employees have not gone on strike before, it will be necessary to examine a group that has, to determine the effects. Therefore, an examination of the police union movement is appropriate because law enforcement officers provide a crucial service in our society. We will examine their rights vis-a-vis: joining unions; affiliating with national labor organizations and federations such as the AFL-CIO or the Teamsters; their First Amendment Rights to join; what they hope to gain from their efforts; and how they achieve many of their objectives.

Finally, this paper will attempt to extrapolate lessons learned from police unionization and responses from governmental agencies to U.S. Army civilian employees and the installation manager.

ORGANIZATION

Chapter 1 will be a historical summary leading up to the infamous
Boston Police Strike of 1919 with its chilling effect on public employee unionization during the period 1920-1950. This Chapter will conclude with an examination of the associations and unions found in existence today.

In the following chapter, the era of 1960 to the present will be examined to determine those factors involved that led to ever increasing police and governmental employee militancy. Included will be a brief examination of the pro and con arguments used when discussing the "rights" of police to form a union, collectively bargain and strike. Finally, the chapter will examine some of the methods used by policemen to get what they want.

Chapter three will look at where police are today and attempt to predict what may be in store for this current decade.

Chapter four will examine the Army Installation, those jobs normally associated with civilian employees, and options open to the installation commander.

**AUTHOR BIAS**

This question of public sector employees joining unions was addressed in June, 1981 while the author was a student in a graduate degree program. Then, as now, my bias was anti-union. Additionally, the rights of public employees to strike was more in doubt - the Professional Air Traffic Controllers (PATCO) had not yet struck. As we are all aware, the President refused to be bullied and exercised his right, or obligation, to fire striking PATCO members. Nonetheless, my first paper on this subject showed that should public sector employees, such as police, go on strike a hopeless situation was not created.
CHAPTER 2

POLICE UNIONISM - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

I want to say this - that a strike of the policemen of a great city, leaving that city at the mercy of an army of thugs, is a crime against civilization.

In my judgement the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and direct as the obligation of a soldier. He is a public servant, not a private employee. He has no right to prefer any private advantage to public safety.

Woodrow Wilson
following the 1919 Boston Police Strike

POLICE ASSOCIATIONS PRE 1919

While there are some early references to police employee organizations as early as the Civil War period, the organizations that have endured to the present were not founded until the very late 1800's and first decade of this century. Most of those formed prior to 1900 were usually benevolent associations - that is, they were founded to protect the policeman and improve his working conditions. As a general rule police associations were not opposed by their public employers - in fact some were controlled by high ranking police officials. Moreover, the paramilitary organization found in an early police department made it relatively easy for the department to control the association.

Juris and Feulle point out that many of the early unions were formed to aid policemen in obtaining what are now termed fringe benefits for most early twentieth century policemen, i.e. more pay, shorter working hours and better overall working conditions.
Many associations actually provided for some fraternal and social needs because life was tough in this era for a policeman. Although not generally known, most police officers in this period served as appointees of the dominant political organization and thus had no tenure beyond a politician's good will and continued tenure in office. As stated earlier, some of these early organizations have endured to the present. Examples include: the New York City Patrolmen's Benefit Association (1892); the Erie Club in Buffalo, New York (1894, but now the Police Benevolent Association); the Rochester Police Locust (named for the wood in their nightsticks) Club (1907); and the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #1 in Pittsburgh (1915).

No historical perspective would be complete unless it was pointed out that early 1900 public sector employees also had no right to organize, much less strike. The literature of the time is rich in this thought. As an example, an editorial in Independent in 1907, responding to the question "may public employees strike?"...

...to this principle we can offer apparently only a negative answer... civil servants are a privileged class... they have a certain tenure of office which gives them, in the eye of the law, that "right to the job" which wage earners in general are prone to assert as a cardinal moral principle governing industrial relations.

The above is a far cry from where federal, state and local government employees find themselves today, eighty years later. But, the facts were, around the turn of the century, that public employees did not enjoy the right to organize. As noted in the Independent editorial, and
as reinforced by Juris, public employees enjoyed a degree of job security, generally had better working conditions, public employers resisted all organization efforts, and until the latter part of the 1950's employees had no protected right to organize and conduct collective bargaining.5

Contrary to the above, there were police strikes prior to the large one in Boston in 1919 according to John Burpo, Legal Advisor to the Tucson, Arizona Police Department. He mentions an 1889 police strike in Ithaca, New York, where five officers walked off the job for seven days when the mayor reduced salaries from $12 per week to $5. The Ithaca City Council finally restored their salary to $12 and the police returned.6

A larger, potentially more dangerous, strike occurred in 1918 in Cincinatti, Ohio when four officers were discharged by the Chief of Police for participating in a meeting where a raise of $300 was discussed. 50 officers eventually struck in protest. The Cincinatti public safety director, who had previously concurred in the firing, reinstated the officers after they were assessed and had served a 30 day suspension.7

By 1919, police associations were showing up in ever increasing numbers in American Cities. Some eventually sought affiliation with organized labor, specifically the American Federation of Labor, which was led at this time by Samuel Gompers. Juris and Feulle have noted that during the period 1917-1919 as many as thirty-seven police organizations had applied for AFL Charters. The larger cities, New York and Chicago, remained on the sidelines and watched the various organizing efforts. Cities such as Los Angeles, California, Portland, Oregon, Jackson, Mississippi, and Jersey City, New Jersey applied for affiliation. By September of 1919, these charters had been issued. Included in the thirty-seven was a charter for the Boston Police force.
THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE

With the exception of the Montreal, Canada police strike in 1969 the one in Boston had the distinction of throwing a city of 670,000 inhabitants into total anarchy. What occurred is detailed below.

1919 was not a particularly good year. The year saw prohibition ratified, the Klu Klux Klan reborn, there was the debate over joining the League of Nations, and the "Red Scare" was alive and well. This fear was compounded by a series of strikes that had stunned American businessmen, and the more cynical among them got the inspired idea that all labor militancy was an attempt to "Sovietize" the United States. Moreover, this was a period of rapidly rising prices, rising wages in the private sector and stagnant police salaries.

The Boston Police were under the control of a Republican Commissioner, Edwin U. Curtis, who reported directly to the governor, Calvin Coolidge, another Republican. The mayor, Andrew J. Peters, was a Democrat who had little or no authority in police matters. "His status was less than that of a distiller at a Methodist prayer meeting," according to one periodical of the time. The police were worked from 75-90 hours per week, received one day off in every fifteen, had to purchase their own uniform, belt, gun, stick and helmet, were required to receive permission to leave the city, and after six years on the force were eligible to receive the full $1,100 authorized as a salary.

The strike was precipitated when the Boston Social Club applied to the AFL for recognition, which was contrary to an earlier directive of the Police Commissioner, Mr. Curtis. The AFL subsequently agreed to grant the charter in the absence of Samuel Gompers, who was out of the country.
Additionally, the Central Labor Council of Boston "welcomed the baby union to its arms" and "pledged every atom of support that organized labor can bring in their behalf." Initially eight policemen and subsequently eleven more were discharged from the force for being the leaders who had the audacity to ask the AFL for a charter and violate the orders of the commissioner. On September 9, 1919, 75% (over 1,000 men) of the police went on strike to protest the firing of the nineteen policemen. The gory details of the strike are not in the purview of this paper; suffice it to say that looting and pillaging prevailed while the police were on strike. There were massive riots and at least three people were killed. Moreover, the AFL and the Boston Labor Council provided no assistance; the strike was broken in three days after the National Guard was mobilized and sent to Boston. To the surprise of most it is significant that the mayor rose to the occasion and had restored law and order by the time the governor finally acted. However, Governor Coolidge got the credit and many historians claim that his "handling" of the strike is what gave him the requisite push to national prominence.

Most commentators are in agreement that there were several significant outcomes that are germane to police unionism from the strike.

- The police affiliation with the AFL was destroyed. Not just the Boston charter, but charters from all 36 other police locals were revoked.

- Additionally, the Federation of Police (FOP), which had been contemplating spreading their organization from Pittsburgh, dropped all plans.

- More than eleven hundred Boston policemen lost their jobs. All strikers were fired and new policemen hired.
The benefits that the strikers had been fighting for were granted so as to preclude a recurrence.

1920 - 1950

The Boston Strike had a chilling effect on police unions for the next two decades. It wasn't until the newly merged AFL-CIO turned its attention in the 1950's to public employees that the movement was revived, and, it was the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) that chartered the first police local in Portsmouth, Virginia in 1937. By 1958 AFSCME claimed sixty-six police locals. There was resistance, however, in Chicago, Los Angeles, Jackson, Mississippi and St. Louis. It should be noted that all AFSCME Charters included a no strike charter provision which wasn't lifted until the 1970 AFSCME Convention. By this time AFSCME claimed to represent about 11,000 policemen and sheriff department employees in 90 locals in 20 states.17

In these same intervening years the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) were also busily organizing. The FOP was organized in 1915 and currently purports to maintain some 900 locals with a membership of 90,000 policemen. The national and state FOP Associations contend they are opposed to strikes (although three locals have engaged in job actions). The FOP is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO and considers itself not to be a labor union.18

Yet another police organization is the international Conference of Police Associations (ICPA) which is found primarily in the South. It was organized in 1953 and "serves as a coordinating agency for 275,000 police belonging to various autonomous labor organizations."19
A more recent development in the police labor movement is the appearance of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in 1958, under the leadership of James Hoffa. By 1976 Norman Weintraub, the union's research director, stated that he was aware of about 15,000 police officers holding membership in the Teamsters.²⁰

The most recent newcomer to the field is the AFL-CIO which has been directly enlisting local police unions since 1968 when the New York City Patrolmans Benevolent Association applied for and received a charter. Subsequently, the AFL-CIO executive committee decided to form a new organization called the International Brotherhood of Policemen.²¹

Finally, the black policeman is forming into associations. These organizations are more concerned about the problems facing the black as a policeman than with job conditions. Issues these associations have dealt with include: white police beating black prisoners, use of black officers to break up riots among black construction workers, and alleged prejudicial recruiting practices by police departments.²²

**SUMMARY**

During this brief historical overview it was pointed out that the late 19th century police associations generally could be construed as social organizations and that some would lobby for increased benefits for their membership. By 1915 the police appear to have believed that their associations should affiliate with a national labor organization. And why not, the AFL was in being and was willing to accept them. It also was noted that during this period, public employees in general were discouraged from organizing. The Boston Police Strike of 1919 had a decidedly "chilling effect" on police unionization for the following two decades and it wasn't
until the 1940's that the AFL and AFSCME were able to break the ice.

Finally, this section of the paper provided an overview of current day police unions and associations with a view toward their sizes and aims.
CHAPTER 3

POLICE MILITANCY

In the historical overview section of this paper we saw that since the mid to late 1800's the police had formed associations, although those that exist today didn't form until the turn of the century. Further, we saw that the policemen of the country are about 600,000 strong and that AFSCME and the FOP are the two largest and strongest police organizations, but that the teamsters are busy organizing police, as are the AFL-CIO. To be discussed in this chapter of the paper are the reasons why police found it necessary to speed their organizing efforts in the 1960's and why they were so successful in their efforts.

WHAT THE POLICE WANTED - 1960

Policemen, like all other workers, want equitable economic benefits and optimum working conditions. They have traditionally sought increased salary, compensation for overtime work, improved pension provisions, quality health insurance, uniform allowances, guaranteed pay, and a voice in departmental policies. Concerning the last issue, that of a voice in departmental policies, many policemen of the sixties were concerned with issues such as:

- The number of patrol shifts; and the number of officers riding in a squad car.
- An equitable promotion system.
- Departmental recruiting practices.
- Paper work excesses
- Inter departmental transfers
Conversely, the public was concerned with a rising crime rate, a perceived notion (or frustration) that police were not coping with the crime rate, and they publicly vented their anger at the police.

Another way of examining this situation, or dichotomy of the police wants and public perceptions is to use the systems approach to model the issue. This model was developed by John Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor. Juris and Feulle, in 1973, also attempted to display such a model. My attempt which is based on these previous two models, is at figure 1.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO EXAMINE POLICE UNIONISM IN THE 1960's - 1980's

ENVIRONMENT

MARKET
- Public hostility towards police
- Demands for law and order
- Perceived low rewards ($)
- Poor managerial practices
- Influx of younger policemen
- Taxpayer resistance *
- Tight budgets *
- Inflation *
- Layoffs *

POLITICAL
- State, county, and local laws

* indicates more germane to the 1980 timeframe.

PLAYERS
- Police
- Mayor/City Manager
- Third Parties
- City Council
- National labor organs.
- Other gov't agencies in the jurisdiction fighting for the same dollars.

RULES
- POLICE PROPENSITY TO FORM UNIONS
  - JOB ACTIONS
    - WORK STOPPAGE
    - STRIKES

fig. 1
As shown in figure 1, we can graphically display the factors which contributed to the police militancy that was so prevalent in the 1960's. It was precisely this militancy that led to their massive organizing efforts and their job actions which received wide-spread attention. It can be argued (and will be later in this paper) that many of the conditions still prevail.

Two factors showing on the model need elaboration - poor managerial practices and state laws. First, poor managerial practices. What is meant here are those "irritants" used by many police departments which can lower police morale - things such as: internal departmental investigations where the policeman has no rights; the requirement to testify in court on a policeman's own time without pay; being re-shifted with little or no warning; interdepartmental transfers with no input from the affected officer, and the requirement to work without pay as a form of disciplinary punishment for a rules infraction. As shown on the chart, the laws of the state also affect the model. Let's turn our attention to this area next.

**ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES**

It may be best to examine the issue of the rights of a policeman vis-a-vis joining an employee organization and the laws governing police conducting collective bargaining and striking. First, a policeman's right to organize, bargain and strike.

As a prelude to this discussion it needs to be pointed out that there is a large body of literature that discusses this issue. On each side of the question there are logical arguments; however, those arguments reflect the biases, either pro or con, of the author. The case for either side
revolves around the following key issues: public services, i.e. fire and police protection are essential and if public employees don't provide the service it won't or can't be provided in a cost efficient manner; most municipalities don't have the requisite legal authority to negotiate; most governmental units are "sovereign"; and, that if public employees are allowed to organize, bargain and strike it would upset the political apple-cart. Juris and Feulle, in Police Unionism, seem to best perceive both sides of the many arguments and have concluded that:\textsuperscript{24}

Policemen should have the right to form, join and assist unions, if they so choose, in order to participate via bargaining and other political processes that affect their work lives .... (even though) in the short run such participation might increase the social, political and economical costs ... for thirty-eight years the bedrock principal in the private sector of our national labor policy has been that private-sector employees have the right to participate in an organized manner .... We have yet to encounter any compelling reasons why policemen should not also enjoy similar rights.

STATE LAWS

However, restrictions do exist against policemen organizing and joining employee organizations. These restrictions are found in state statues and departmental regulations and include the right, as an example, to join FOP, to join FOP above a certain rank, or more broadly, to join organizations associated with organized labor, or join a labor group that admits members other than policemen. Prior to 1968 state courts generally upheld restrictions of this nature. However, the Seventh and Eighth Federal Circuit Courts in 1968 and 1969 reversed state cases and statutes validating denials of the policeman's right to strike.\textsuperscript{25}
Insofar as the policeman's right to conduct collective bargaining and go on strike the following might be suggested. First, these rights vary from state to state and secondly, even though some state laws do not prohibit either, some localities do not allow such actions. The following data, extracted from a Gammage and Sachs book, Police Unions, is useful.26

- Only two states, Alabama and Missouri, offer prohibitions to a policeman from joining a union.
- Twenty (40%) of the states specifically grant all public employees the right to organize and join a employee organization of their choosing.
- Twenty-nine (57%) of the states are silent on the subject.

As relates to a policemans right to conduct collective bargaining the following applies:27

- Twenty-seven states, plus the District of Columbia (54%), have the right to bargain.
- Fifteen (29%) states do not have the right.
- Nine (17%) states have no law.

What about strikes? Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the law as of 1971 clearly denied all public employees the right to strike in 18 jurisdictions. In 32 states the law is silent.28

HOW POLICE GET WHAT THEY WANT

Now would appear to be appropriate to discuss how the police can get what they want as shown at figure 1. The first way would be through some method of negotiating. John Burpo lists four types: Informal discussions through police administration channels; lobbying, for example, before the city council; consultations with the police chief, who in turn lobbies;
and direct bargaining between the police labor group and the public employer representative.  

Should negotiations fail, however, the police have many forms of job actions available to them simply because of the vital services they are perceived by the citizenry to perform.

Assume that one, or even several of the phases of negotiations mentioned above are in progress and the police perceive little progress or, that negotiations have broken down. At this point the police have several forms of mild protests that they could employ. For example, they and/or their families could picket City Hall, they could threaten a lawsuit, or even take their case to the press. It might be appropriate to label these type of activities as job actions.

Should the above measures not produce the desired results, a broader category of job actions, but ones falling short of actually going on a strike, might be employed. Such actions could include activities such as policemen writing many more tickets than normally would be the case. This type of action includes ticketing citizens for those minor infractions that may normally be disregarded.

John Burpo has documented the opposite - that of a police slowdown in enforcing traffic laws. This situation is potentially more dangerous in that there is a threat to public safety with more flagrant violations going unchecked. Moreover, the municipality stands to lose revenues normally gained from traffic fines. Finally, there is a hybrid tactic noted by Burpo. In 1967 the Detroit Police Administrators feared that the police would use the Whiplash approach. This occurs when police slow down their ticketing efforts, lull the public into a perception that they won't be
cited, and then, commence a massive ticket writing campaign. 31

The genuine work stoppage, when accomplished by a truly aggrieved police force takes on more serious overtones. These tactics are usually not resorted to unless the above mentioned types of protest fail to convince the local government of the need of some type of improvement in wages or working conditions. By now we have all heard of these actions which are called the "Blue Flu" or "Asian Flu" or a "sick-in". These actions require that policemen, and especially those working where strikes are prohibited, call in sick with a "hard to document" illness - a headache or a backache. Such a generic malady precludes management from proving malingering. In 1969 the police in at least 11 municipalities used this tactic: 32

In discussing his departments 1967 "Blue Flu" epidemic, a Detroit police official described the difficulty of proving malingering by an officer: (participating officers were required to be examined by a city doctor). It looked like the battlefield of Antietam. Some fine performances were given... some of the officers should have been awarded Oscars.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter of the paper we have examined the growing militancy of the police in the 1960-1970 era. The tool used was a model developed by John Dunlop. Moreover, it became clear that many factors interplay in the equation. Subsequently, an overview of the laws governing the rights of police to organize, bargain and strike were examined. Finally, we saw that the police have numerous options available to them to obtain many of their demands once they are organized.
CHAPTER 4

Up to this portion of the paper we have examined the police and their unionization efforts. The police were chosen because they are perceived to provide such a vital service to their community, to wit: law and order. However, sanitation workers, teachers, firemen and US Army civilians have the same desires and have demonstrated the same militancy.

Let's turn now to the civilian employee on an Army installation to see how the installation commander might cope should his civilian work force threaten to strike or actually walk out.

THE INSTALLATION

An Army post is very similar to a civilian community. It is basically self sufficient and provides its members the same services as a city or town does for its citizenry. In reality, an installation commander provides fewer vital services than does a mayor. For example, although he has to provide for refuse collection he contracts to a private concern vice hiring his own sanitation department workers. The same applies to sewage treatment and provisioning for water, electricity and fuel.

An installation commander is required, however, to provide for police and fire protection/prevention. Additionally, he is charged with the maintenance of the post grounds, buildings, facilities and roads. Sometimes he provides for telephone services. In short, he has many responsibilities. However, he has the resources and capabilities his civilian counterpart does not have, specifically, a military organization for backup that can provide most if not all required services.
FUNCTIONS

Assume you are an installation commander and face the potential of a strike. Further, assume that the vast majority of your civilian workforce is unionized. The matrix below shows those functions necessary to be considered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>CIVILIAN</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>MILITARY BACKUP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Fire</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Clerical</td>
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<td>Medical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The matrix above is misleading in one aspect - in that shown for engineer skills and attendant military backup. In reality, all bases are not covered as the matrix would indicate. Specifically, there is a military backup in very few instances. Therefore, the installation will face the largest challenge in the facilities area vis-a-vis emergency repairs and operation of fixed plants (such as a steam plant in the winter).

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Based on the services required to be performed on a day-to-day basis and after considering that most of these functions can be provided by soldiers in times of true need, what then needs to be accomplished?

Despite the fact that a strike in today's environment would seem to be nearly impossible, not to mention illegal, it appears that a solid, well developed, contingency plan for such an eventuality should be developed. There are two reasons this is so.
First, such an exercise would force the installation staff to identify those functions truly needed. For example, the Post Library could be closed rather than manned. The same could apply to the Quartermaster Laundry for short periods of time. But, such is not the case with the Fire Department. There is a requirement to identify and to make arrangements for additional firefighters. For example, Carlisle Barracks may have to get military firefighting assistance from soldiers stationed at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia or Ft. Rucker, Alabama. The same would apply to those skills in the engineering area.

The second, and even more important, reason why a contingency plan should be developed is that the mere existence of a workable solution would tend to preclude a strike in the first place. Interestingly enough, Dr. Richard Ayres states (back to police strikes) that if a city purports the willingness to take a strike it (the city) actually reduces the possibility of one. Moreover, his analysis of police strikes in the past five years shows an actual reduction in the crime rate during the strikes in the cities being struck.\(^\text{33}\)

Assuming that, after developing a post contingency plan, the workers actually go on strike. What to do?

First, but beyond the purview of this paper, the striking workers should be handled like President Reagan did with the 1981 PATCO strikers.

Second, when it is known that a strike can be handled, or that workers will be dismissed, if they do strike, then the negotiating posture of the installation commander is enhanced greatly. And why not? We see workers in civilian industry having to give back benefits to save entire corporations and most of the attendant featherbedding has evaporated.
These same attitudes prevail on an Army post. It needs pointing out that Carlisle Barracks appears to be the exception because the provided services here are excellent. But, such is not normally the case, especially in the facility engineering area. Therefore, let the civilian employees know that they can be replaced or done without and use this attitude during the periods of time when negotiating contracts.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

First, it is necessary to apologize to the reader for "going the long way around" the subject of this paper before arriving at the installation.

However, I hope that this paper has demonstrated a remarkable phenomenon - that of the growth of public employee unionism with the police as the focus. It probably could have been equally well documented by using teachers, or firemen, or air traffic controllers. In any case, we, as Americans, have seen public sector unions develop and grow in just 30 years. Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that in another five to ten years it will be legal for all public employees to strike.

Therefore, it is necessary to learn how to adapt to this possibility now rather than wait. From the above I then conclude that:

- Installation commanders must learn how to bargain with their union employees because these employees are beginning, as did the police, to learn the "rules of the game."

- A contingency plan should be developed and tested if required to demonstrate that a strike could be withstood.

- A strike could have a devastating effect on an installation should soldiers be unionized and refuse to "Cross the picket line."
END NOTES

1 "Lessons From the Police Strikes," American City. 21:4, October, 1919, p.316.


4 "May Public Employees Strike?" Independent. 62:3047, April 15, 1907, pp.979-980.


7 Ibid.

8 Juris, op.cit., pp. 16-17.


10 Juris, op.cit., p. 15-16.


12 Dugan, op.cit., p. 30.


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27. Ibid.
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GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS


