Strategic Access

A Different Perspective On Traditional Security Problems

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History
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Exchange

The initiatives for the annual exchange of lecturers by senior Army officers originated with Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, whose husband died while serving on active duty with the US Army in 1943. Her ideas were set forth in correspondence to General George C. Marshall, dated 17 June 1944.

"My husband, Kermit Roosevelt, . . . attempted to carry out in his own life his conviction that the development of a closer relationship between individual English and Americans, and a better understanding between the military forces of the United States and the United Kingdom would contribute in large measure to the preservation of world peace. In view of this conviction of his, it seems appropriate . . . to set up this Memorial."

The US Congress, in 1945, enacted legislation which authorized the Kermit Roosevelt Fund and established in the "War Department" a Board of Trustees to implement and administer the exchange program "for the purpose of fostering a better understanding and a closer relationship between the military forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom by sponsoring lectures or courses of instruction . . . ."

The initial exchange of British and American lecturers under the auspices of the Kermit Roosevelt Fund took place in 1947, with six colleges participating, three each in England and the United States. Since that date the lecturer exchange has taken place essentially in the original format with changes necessary only to accommodate the increase in the number of military colleges in the respective military establishments. Eleven colleges participated in the 1978 program.

The Kermit Roosevelt Fund was sustained through 1957 by Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, and through 1969 by grants from the Rockefeller and McCormick Foundations. In 1970, it was mutually agreed that the Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Series would be officially supported by the United Kingdom and United States as a continuation of the program formerly sponsored by the Kermit Roosevelt Fund.
The British Army exchange officer, General Sir Edwin Bramall, lectured on "Military Leadership in Peace" at the US Military Academy, West Point; The Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk; the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks; and the National Defense University, to include The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair.

The following text of the 32nd Annual Kermit Roosevelt Lecture was adapted for presentation at the following military educational institutions in the United Kingdom: Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham; Army Staff College, Camberley; National Defence College, Latimer; and Royal College of Defense Studies, London.
It was your Harold McMillan, I believe, who observed that "The difficulty with speeches is that you are perpetually poised between the cliche and the indiscretion." Since I endorse that view, I propose simply to share some thoughts with you, informally, as a basis for your considering their implications for our mutual security and the military forces of the Alliance, in the spirit of Kermit Roosevelt, who served in both of our armies in the two World Wars.

My purpose in addressing "Strategic Access" is not so presumptuous as the title of my lecture implies. All I want to suggest is that it is an orientation that seems to provide a useful perspective on security issues in view of current and projected international trends. What I want to avoid is a semantic exercise, or any claim of developing either a revolutionary "general theory" or some grand "conceptual framework" designed to lead those appropriately initiated to infallible solutions to the complex security problems facing our Alliance and the individual nations within it.

In addressing students required to produce written work which undergoes critique, I am reminded of the note a professor placed on a student research paper: "This essay is both original and brilliant; unfortunately, the parts that are original are not brilliant, and the parts that are brilliant are not original." My remarks fit neither category. At my University, we just finished a series of six monthly seminars, during which a number of knowledgeable participants explored the utility of addressing security issues from the perspective of strategic access; but the brilliance of some of the insights I am borrowing are tarnished in summarizing them in favor of the breadth of coverage necessary in a presentation of this kind.

Moreover, after selecting the title of the talk some time ago, I discovered that "Access" is a credit card here in the UK—used to purchase a wide range of goods and services. Coupled with the fact that 62 years ago, almost to the day, the entertainment tax was imposed in England, this offers an obvious opportunity for
various analogies in trying to define this rather elusive topic; but I shall spare you that. Instead, permit me to back into the subject, as it were, by using an historical example, which also will reflect a personal concern about my selection as the Kermit Roosevelt lecturer.

Two hundred, twenty-two years ago (18 May 1756), a battle was fought between the British Mediterranean Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Byng, and the French Fleet, commanded by the Marquis de la Galissoniere. In response to conflicting intelligence reports, Byng had been dispatched by the Admiralty to the Mediterranean with instructions that if the French had attacked Minorca, he was to use "all possible means for its relief."

In engaging the French Fleet, Byng violated what were called "Permanent Fighting Instructions" in delaying his signal to come about to join the action. Although his tactics were not faulty, as I understand it, an inadequate signal system in effect delayed Byng's access to his lead ship in communicating instructions. The result of the confusion was Byng's inability to bring his entire line to bear in time, thereby causing him, in Army parlance, to "piece-meal" his forces. Galissoniere, after inflicting damage on a major portion of Byng's fleet when it was particularly vulnerable, immediately disengaged to a position outside of British gun range. Facing a superior French force that commanded the initiative, Byng withdrew. Upon his return to England, he was court-martialed, convicted, and subsequently shot for failing "to do his utmost."

I cite this example because it underscores directly points highly relevant to some of the themes I want to present today. First, force has been and will continue to be used to gain access or to prevent it. Clearly, gaining access was Byng's mission in attempting to raise the siege of Minorca. Galissoniere's task was to prevent access by the British, and he did not risk his ships by fighting when it was unnecessary to accomplish that mission.

In discussing the second point, I cannot resist observing that it is rather disconcerting to follow so distinguished a group of predecessors in this Kermit Roosevelt series, especially in view of the fact that flag officers have been executed in this country for failing "to do their utmost." Voltaire may have been correct that shooting an admiral from time to time encourages the others; but with all deference to the civilian officials present, it seems to me that the occasional threat of shooting a politician, rather than a flag officer, might—as Samuel Johnson observed—"concentrate the
mind wonderfully" in attempting to ensure that the particular application of force is appropriate for the political objectives that are sought. After all, the British garrison of 3,000 on Minorca was besieged in the stronghold of Fort St. Philip by 15,000 French. Byng learned this enroute to the Mediterranean, at Gibraltar, causing him, some two weeks before the naval engagement, to despair of relieving the garrison with the one regiment of fusiliers that accompanied him. Also, it should be noted, the lack of intelligence, or access to accurate information, was a critical factor in the entire episode.

Third, to employ a current metaphor, oftentimes the traditional "Rules of the Game" do not fit the requirements of the situation. Byng's trial refocused interest on tactical doctrine, and pointed up the limitations of the inflexible directives contained in the Permanent Fighting Instructions. This highlights for us the necessity of questioning some of the conventional wisdom and the rigidity in thinking that frequently limits us in addressing security issues. In this regard, it may be useful to recall that no less an authority than Liddell-Hart cautioned us, in his Thoughts on War, that "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."

Although the relationships may appear somewhat strained, this historical example from the Seven Year's War includes the principal categories of access that I want to emphasize, with the notable exception of the economic. There is no question that economic access has been a key security consideration throughout history. The importance to the strategy of imperial Rome of access to grain supplies, as well as to effective land and sea logistical routes, could be cited. More pertinent to this audience is to recall that during the "high noon" of the British Empire, one of your most important strategic advantages over European rivals was control of access to the special type of smokeless steam-coal, found in abundance in South Wales, that propelled your Navy ships. It was, however, access to secure coaling stations in key oversea locations that enabled Britain to achieve a high degree of logistical autarky, with all that meant to its security and ability to project power.

Even though I intend to continue with an essentially inductive approach, I certainly do not want to rely exclusively on historical examples in an effort to illustrate my points. Indeed, it is precisely the relatively recent, but apparently fundamental,
changes in international politics that, in my view, underlie the utility of placing increased emphasis on strategic access as a perspective in analyzing security issues.

Permit me to employ the unoriginal notion of the "global diffusion of power"—political, economic and technological, as well as military—as a convenient shorthand expression to describe the international environment within which nations must seek security now and in the foreseeable future.

The diffusion of political power is obvious in the veritable explosion of new states in what has been termed a period of decolonization following World War II. Numbering about 50 at the time the United Nations was founded, there are more than 150 today. Despite enormous disparities in size and wealth, each sovereign state wields some measure of political power. Indeed, at the very time political, as well as economic and technical, problems are becoming less susceptible to solution by single states, nationalism in some ways is becoming a stronger force than ever. I might add, parenthetically, that these trends also are reflected in intra-state relations as well: in addition to Ireland, forces of Scottish and Welsh nationalism here in the UK come to mind, along with the French in Canada. By no means, however, is the US immune from regionalism; for many in the South, there is only an unsatisfactory truce in the Civil War, and our problems with the state of mind in Texas continue interminably.

But to return to the point, the impact of increased national assertiveness may be seen in issues involving basing facilities, rights of passage and overflight, and trade and commodity arrangements. In international political fora, the less industrialized countries are pressing advanced Western states to share their prosperity. The "Group of 77," now numbering well over 100, would have been inconceivable only a few years ago; but it now generates demands concerning the economic exploitation of such "common areas" as Antarctica, the deep ocean, and outer space.

Although difficult to differentiate from its political twin, the distribution of global economic power also has changed dramatically. In fact, for my own country, and perhaps for others in our Alliance, economic issues appear to present the most complex and intractable security problems.

Following World War II, and until quite recently, the United States was in a position to subordinate short run economic considerations to longer term political advantage related to the
cold war and national security. The Marshall Plan, the Point IV Program, and even support of the European economic community, all were justified to a significant degree on security grounds. In fact, there has been a kind of moralistic aversion in the United States toward rationalizing foreign policies on an economic basis.

Since the end of War War II, the decrease in the proportion of the world's goods and services produced by the US, from about half to one-fifth, indicates the trend in the decentralization of economic power. It was, however, the embargo of 1973 and the quadrupling of the price of imported oil that exposed the economic vulnerability of the United States—both in terms of access to resources and the importance of trade. According to our Department of Commerce, some 69 resources considered critical to our economy move in significant proportion by sea. We now find ourselves in an unaccustomed deficit position, not only in the exchange of goods but also in our overall balance of payments, with the inevitable impact on the value of the dollar in relation to other currencies. I am sure that those of you who have coped with such problems for some time view the uncertainty, and even confusion, in the US with amused toleration, if not satisfaction.

But the point is not that the United States faces unique problems; quite the contrary. The substantial increases in international trade and capital flows underscore the interdependence—or perhaps more accurately, national vulnerabilities and dependence—between and among a very disparate group of suppliers and consumers. There can be no security for the West, to include Japan, isolated from the less industrialized world. Dependence upon the importation of essential raw materials has increased, especially in the field of energy, coincident with the loss of Western control over these resources and increasing awareness on the part of supplier countries of their actual or potential bargaining power. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in discussing what he called "new dimensions of security" in a recent lecture, placed in first rank the task "to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials . . . ."2

At the same time, however, uneven rates of economic development and growth indicate that gaps will continue to grow between industrialized states and those which are resource-poor and non-industrialized; and also between less industrialized, but resource-rich states, and those which are resource-poor and non-industrialized. Vulnerable to interruptions in supplies of goods, capital and technology, many of the less industrialized states are
characterized by concentrations of domestic political power that not only permit precipitous shifts in foreign policies and alignments, but also foster a potential for domestic violence and other forms of disruption. All of this suggests that access to resources, trading partners and other markets is likely to become more complex and difficult, and potentially more subject to conflict, in the future.

Of the resource issues vital to the security of the US, Western Europe and Japan, access to oil at reasonable prices is the most obvious; and this has occurred at the very time political developments have increased the risk of that dependence. Studies of the adequacy of supplies indicate no alternative to heavy reliance on Middle East sources for at least the next 10 to 15 years, until new techniques of producing energy become operative. Since worldwide shortages could lead to anarchy in international energy markets, perhaps of greatest concern, in an already rather alarming situation, is the potentially damaging impact on relationships between and among Alliance partners of uncoordinated national solutions to questions of access to oil.

The USSR currently is exporting oil to Western Europe at market prices, to earn hard currency, and to Eastern Europe and Cuba at subsidized prices, for political reasons. There are indications, however, that Soviet wells may be running low on reserves. Should shortages develop to the point that domestic needs cannot be met, and the USSR is forced to go to foreign sources for its oil, how will it pay? Its only significant comparative advantage seems to lie in military hardware; and one could anticipate the offer of substantial quantities of modern armaments at bargain prices in exchange for oil, with the resultant security implications. Even if arms transfers are not involved, Soviet competition for limited oil resources raises prospective political and other security implications for the West; for example, it has been reported that the USSR is negotiating for future delivery of oil from Mexico.

While the less industrialized countries may not have large demands for oil as such, vital increases in food production are dependent upon access to petroleum-based products in the form of fertilizers; and most of these countries are in a poor position to bargain for scarce resources. In addition, the production of fertilizers requires nitrates and phosphates; and major deposits of phosphates are found in few countries: the United States, the Soviet Union, and Morocco. Some projections indicate that before
long the US and USSR will not produce enough phosphates to meet domestic needs, but will join in the competition for Moroccan supplies. In fact, there have been reports that the Soviet Union not only is assisting in the extraction of Moroccan phosphates but also is arranging for the delivery of these phosphates to the USSR beginning in the mid 1980's.

In general, mineral supplies do not appear to present serious problems; although, in the absence of stockpiling, access to them could. Cartels and embargoes seem unlikely, but the extraction and distribution of minerals frequently requires a relatively elaborate infrastructure, to include skilled technicians, a responsible labor force, and bulk transportation such as railroads. Such a complex is vulnerable to various forms of disruption, which could affect both the availability of, and access to, the commodity, as recent events in Zaire illustrate.

A corollary of economic power is innovative technology, which frequently is prompted by an increase in demand for, or constraints on the supply of, resources. For example, the increasing shortages of wood in Great Britain between 1550 and 1700 led to the progressive substitution of coal, thereby promoting expansion of industry, new methods of manufacturing and the exploration of previously untapped resources. I mention this not because I would presume to lecture this audience on British history, but because the case illustrates so well the parametric relationship: at the same time that technology creates new capabilities, it generates new requirements. Although the process is circular, technological developments, over time, have provided the means to overcome shortages and restrictions on access.

Examples of the offsetting effects of recent and projected technological developments abound:

• Not only has space technology markedly increased access to information concerning other countries, as well as the ability to communicate internationally, but it also holds out the promise of an entire new frontier for the eventual exploitation of resources. The US space shuttles programmed for operation in the 1980's will provide the equivalent of one large railroad boxcar being launched into space and recovered each week!

• Stable floating platforms provide the basis for systematic exploitation of vast resources in our oceans, and deep sea mining technology already is available to recover from the ocean floor manganese nodules which also contain cobalt, copper, and zinc.
• In light of current projections of population growth, access to fresh water for food production becomes a critical issue. As an alternative to desalinization plants, there is the possibility of towing icebergs to areas deficient in fresh water. The feasibility of this was examined as early as 1962, as a potential solution to the water problems of Los Angeles, California; and there are indications of renewed interest in this technique to relieve shortages in a number of areas of the world.

• Computers and developments in data processing and information technology enable us to process rapidly, and render into accessible format, masses of information. The implications of introducing this technology are profound, both for industrialized countries and for less developed states.

• Developments of air transportation have had a dramatic effect on access to other portions of the globe. During the Berlin Airlift, only about 30 years ago, we relied on the Skymaster C-54, which could carry 15 tons; our C-5 Galaxy can transport 107 tons 3,000 miles without refueling, at twice the speed of the C-54.

• Even more apparent is the radical impact of rockets and missiles on concepts of distance and strategic access in the military sense. In his recent book The British Revolution, Robert Rhodes James concludes that the one “gleaming lesson” of twentieth century warfare is that strategy follows, and does not precede, the scientist and technician.

• Nuclear energy provides an obvious example of a potential substitute for access to oil, although various forms of opposition and bureaucratic impediments inhibit its exploitation in a number of countries. However, I want to take special note of it because of its potentially divisive impact on relations among allies and other friends. There are persuasive arguments against the use of breeder reactors; but especially since there are relatively few major uranium producers, states undoubtedly will pay a price for greater autarky. If breeder reactors prove economically viable, technical and institutional arrangements will have to be devised to meet the perceived needs of Europe, Japan, and Brazil while containing the proliferation problems inherent in the generation of large amounts of plutonium.

• In the case of the Soviets, there probably is more oil and gas in the ground and off-shore than they would need in this century; but it is located in inhospitable regions of the Arctic and Siberia and remote areas of the Soviet Far East. Access to it will
require massive infusions of capital and technology; but most, if not all, of the technology required to exploit these sources already is in hand. This raises interesting policy questions since the problem for the USSR is access to that technology, if it chooses to exploit these domestic sources.

I do not want to belabor further the rather obvious relationship between technology and access; but I would like to draw two conclusions. The application of technology does hold out promise—in the long run—of solutions to many of the issues of strategic access, either through developing substitutes or circumventing the problems; but, as John Maynard Keynes cautioned us: "In the long run, we are all dead." At the same time, it does seem clear that there are important mutual advantages in Alliance cooperation in the application of technology to the solution of problems of strategic access. The West and Japan enjoy a comparative advantage in the vital field of technology; and coordination in policies and programs involving technology transfer, especially to the Soviet Union and its allies, appears far more advantageous than the essentially competitive approach that obtains currently.

For those of us here today, I believe, the proliferation of military power, coupled with the political, is a matter of special concern. Obviously, the potential impact of the spread of nuclear weapons is especially worrisome; but so too is growing conventional military capability, both of regional powers, to project their influence over adjacent states, and of smaller powers as well.

Developed nations have lost the ability to exercise relatively easy control over less industrialized political entities through selective, but potentially unlimited, application of power. This is due in part to public attitudes in Western democracies; for although we know little more than Hobbes or Machiavelli about the functions of power, we do think differently about its use. Related to these attitudes, but in a more objective sense, a relatively primitive military force, armed with light but modern weapons, often supplied by a third power, can inflict on modern formations a level of casualties unacceptable for sustained military involvement, given contemporary Western cultural values. Also, the diffusion of military power extends to the ability of the less industrialized littoral states to challenge major naval powers. Such weapons systems as mines, patrol boats, relatively simple submarines, cruise missiles, and maritime strike aircraft can provide an effective local sea denial capability.
Now I must confess that as a soldier, I usually have found oceans on the edges of maps—disguising the fact that they are waterways, making up some 70% of the surface of our globe, and connecting the earth's land masses into a more or less integrated geographical whole. This restricted outlook is conditioned by the fact that during most of the post World War II era, and until relatively recently, the US, Britain, and France effectively controlled the major oceans and waterways; historical legacies had provided a variety of bases in areas adjacent to critical sea lanes. But unchallenged use of them by Western powers is eroding at the very time we are becoming increasingly dependent on maritime access; illustrative of this dependence is the fact that some one hundred ships arrive in northern European ports every 24 hours.

There is an increasing reluctance to accept traditional concepts of freedom of the seas, and it now is commonplace for many of the burgeoning number of sovereign states to claim territorial waters out to 12 miles, and exclusive economic zones to 200 miles. As has been reflected in the Law of the Sea Conference, states are eager to exercise stringent management over adjacent waters, to include sea traffic, pollution control, fishing and off-shore drilling. This undoubtedly will revive longstanding, but recently dormant, disputes on off-shore boundaries and islands, as well as generate some new ones.

As possible oil producing areas assume greater significance, the effect is to increase substantially the potential for dispute, and even conflict, in the Baltic, North, Aegean, Yellow, East, and South China Seas; the Gulf of Suez; the Southwest Coast of Africa; areas offshore of Mexico, Columbia, and Venezuela; and border areas between Peru and Equador, Australia and New Guinea, and Argentina and the Falkland Islands.

Contrary to popular belief, major fishing beds are relatively few in number and small in size. The most prolific areas are those with major upwellings, which supply nutrients for the food chain; and most of these are found within 200 miles of shorelines, the very areas over which countries are claiming exclusive economic jurisdiction. Insofar as access to fish is concerned, these claims appear to have the greatest potential impact on the Soviet Union and Japan. Encounters over fish already have involved these two countries, as well as North and South Korea; the United States and various Latin American countries; and, as you well know, the UK and Iceland.
The vicinity of Spitzbergen (Svalbard), claimed by Norway, is rich in fish and believed to contain extensive oil deposits. But it is located astride the passageway for Soviet submarines leaving Murmansk; and therefore, from the Soviet perspective, there would be military implications in the presence of Western oil rigs and oceanographic research facilities.

Increases in off-shore activity and the potential for international disputes is highlighted by the establishment of a variety of "constabulary forces" in a number of countries, to include the U.K. To police the North Sea, I understand that you have instituted what are designated as "Tapistry" missions, called "FISH OPS," I am told, by somewhat irreverent Royal Air Force flight crews. Nor has the international military-industrial complex ignored this market; brochures from weapons industries now offer for sale a wide selection of especially configured aircraft and naval vessels to perform international policing functions.

The point, however, is that these and other developments indicate that there may well be military, as well as political and economic, costs in challenging what states have come to regard increasingly as de jure, as well as de facto, sovereignty. For example, one can foresee situations in which the ability to conduct a show of force, such as the deployment of the USS Enterprise Task Force through the Straits of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971, will be far more problematical.

The trends I have described are essentially independent of direct East-West rivalries, although they can be affected by them and exacerbated through arms transfers to powers of either side. In the process of modernizing, the USSR has generated a large residue of relatively sophisticated military equipment it can make available to other nations. Often omitted from press reports on comparison of arms sales is the fact that between 1971 and 1975, the Soviet Union outsold the United States in tanks and self-propelled guns 5 to 3, artillery pieces 3 to 1 and aircraft 2.5 to 1. Within the last year, it provided more weapons to Ethiopia than did the United States during its entire post-World War II military relationship with that country. According to reports, the USSR is employing some 4,000 military advisers and somewhat more than 40,000 Cuban troops in providing military assistance to a large number of African states. Although there are indications that the Soviets may not prove highly effective in a long-term imperial role,
their assistance not only creates at least short-term obligations on the part of the recipients, but also could affect Western access to these countries.

It is apparent that "detente" raised unrealistic expectations in the United States, and undoubtedly elsewhere as well. This was based in part on commitments in the 1972 Declaration of Principles between the US and the USSR that "Both sides will do their utmost to avoid military confrontation and to prevent the outbreak of war," and "... both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with that objective." Also included in the Declaration is the mutual pledge to "Promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security, and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs." Such statements generated hopes that the Soviet Union would abstain from the use of force to promote change, despite clear enunciations on the limitations of detente such as Mr. Brezhnev's warning that "Detente does not in the slightest abolish, cannot abolish all the laws of class struggle ... ." The Soviet leadership clearly persists in a dynamic view of what it terms the "correlation of forces," and by no means is detente viewed as a commitment to stabilize East-West relations.

The USSR traditionally has been considered a land power; but it continues to expand its Navy. At the same time, paradoxically, it does not appear to be developing a significant long-range force projection capability. It has no attack aircraft carriers, and its naval infantry, numbering some 12,000, is a relatively small portion of its armed force. But applying customary Western naval mission categories in analyzing Soviet naval capability may be misleading.

The USSR has emphasized attack and cruise missile submarines, which outnumber those in the US Navy by some 3.5 to 1, and an extensive buildup of the land-based naval air arm, equipped with anti-ship missiles. Worldwide Soviet naval exercises at sea have demonstrated a capability to coordinate operations in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Carribean, the Sea of Japan, and the Indian Ocean; and have included flights of land-based naval aircraft from advanced base areas in East and West Africa, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Cuba. The Soviet commercial fleet, numbering thousands of vessels, serves as ubiquitous eyes and ears for intelligence gathering. What all this seems to suggest
is an interdictory capability for the disruption of Western maritime operations—or put another way, a “counter-access” naval force—in addition to the obvious capability to accomplish the traditional mission of “showing the flag.”

One of the principal points I have been trying to advance is that we must not restrict our analysis of security issues to a direct comparison of the military capabilities of major adversaries. At the same time, however, such considerations cannot be ignored since they not only are central to the avoidance of nuclear war, but they also are relevant to questions of strategic access and the maintenance of some semblance of world stability. Access to Eurasia from the United States is essential in the event of conflict involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and should there be a prolonged conventional engagement—an admittedly unlikely contingency, but one that cannot be ignored, especially in view of the conventional wisdom that obtained prior to both World Wars regarding their inevitable brevity—it would be especially important to blunt Soviet naval access in order to deny its interdiction capability, and in turn to permit essential resupply of NATO from the U.S.

Since the sustained and continuing Soviet military buildup has been catalogued so fully in recent press accounts, I will not repeat it here—but I will restate the proposition that maintaining an adequate deterrent is a dynamic problem, and repeat the rather obvious proposition that prudence requires that the West possess an adequate military capability both to ensure that our interests are respected and to preclude a major hostile power from obtaining exclusive domination by force over areas vital to the security of the Alliance.

In my view, however, the utility of the perspective of strategic access is that it prompts examination of a broader range of considerations in the ability to project power, to include a more careful calculus of what often are considered unglamorous questions of logistical capability. The relative ease with which the logistical function has been accomplished since World War II has disguised its importance. In Vietnam, for example, however one may evaluate our involvement there, the US was able to deploy half a million men to a theater thousands of miles from its shores, and conduct combat operations with high logistical expenditures to include massive air strikes; but without access to secure forward
bases—Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—and the use of Australia and Hong Kong, the constraints would have been enormous.

Inadequate consideration of logistical factors during the crucial peacetime planning process has led some anonymous, but inspired, wag in the US military forces to compose what has been called the “Logistician’s Lament.” Since it illustrates the problem so well, I’d like to share a portion of it with you:

Logisticians are a sad, embittered race of men, very much in demand in war, who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace.

They deal only with facts, but must work for men who traffic in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much fact.

They disappear in peace, because in peace, war is mostly theory.

The people who trade in theories, and who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are generals.

Logisticians hate generals.

Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power.

In peace they stride along confidently, and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands.

In war they must stride more slowly, because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: “No, you can’t do that.”

Generals fear logisticians in war; and, in peace, generals try to forget logisticians.

Romping along beside generals are strategists and tacticians.

Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians.
Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow up to be generals, although sometimes generals will discipline errant strategists and tacticians by telling them about logisticians.

This sometimes gives strategists and tacticians nightmares, but deep down in their heart they do not really believe the stories.

Sometimes a logistician gets to be a general.

In such a case he must associate with generals whom he hates. He has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises, and on his back is a logistician whom he fears.

There’s enough truth in this to remind us that we cannot relegate logistical considerations to low priority if these general propositions concerning strategic access have any validity. For oversea areas are increasingly difficult to reach in view of problems of transit and overflight; and with potential attrition rates and weapons expenditures, operations could be exceedingly difficult to support and sustain. This places a high premium on forward bases and other facilities at the very time their maintenance is proving increasingly costly, both economically and politically. A comprehensive view of security considerations, to include a careful cost-benefit analysis, is essential in resolving the inevitable dilemma. There is a risk in isolating issues; for example, in considering our ability to project military power, the pertinence of negotiations on the limitation of naval arms in the Indian Ocean—begun some time ago—is apparent.

In 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War and the oil crisis, the Soviet Union obtained approval to over-fly some allies while similar permission was denied to the United States. This brought into sharp focus difficulties in obtaining access to a close ally caused by limitations on access to logistical facilities. It also highlighted the potential for serious discord, even among strong allies, when access to vital resources is at stake. The lesson of this experience appears obvious; there must be a high degree of cooperation within the Alliance on issues we have considered external to it. In reporting on the recent visit to China by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron, your Chief of Defense Staff, one
of our major newspapers noted that he is on record favoring NATO military involvement outside Europe, "if necessary to maintain the political balance or to preserve the West's share of the world's resources."

This underscores the main point: the utility of an orientation on strategic access as a kind of integrating mechanism in analyzing security requirements, to ensure that they are viewed from a broad perspective. This perspective also should assist in suggesting potential vulnerabilities, surfacing other problem areas, and providing the impetus for appropriate preparation in peacetime for wartime contingencies or, perhaps even more difficult, for ambiguous periods of crisis. The analysis must be based on a realistic view of trends in the international environment, to include the constraints imposed by them. It requires a careful examination of the political-economic, as well as the political-military, intersections of security issues. The range of contingencies that could interrupt strategic access must be considered in the larger context of their inter-relationships. Desired outcomes must be determined as a basis for deriving requirements to ensure access.

All of this is a necessary foundation for planning the composition, structuring and procurement of forces, as well as their disposition, to include the necessary infrastructure and logistical support. Changes to existing forces can be only incremental; but it is increasingly important, I believe, to strengthen the link between a careful analysis of the requirements of strategic access, supporting strategy and decisions on force structuring, which often tend to be made in relative isolation.

Admittedly, viewing our mutual security concerns from the standpoint of strategic access will not guarantee solutions to them; but such an approach at least should encourage us to focus more directly, and hopefully with more precision, on some of the more important security problems facing the Alliance.

This brings me, in a rather circuitous route, back to my point of departure, and to the reason for my being here today—Kermit Roosevelt. His foresight, along with his dedication in two wars, is a reminder, and indeed an inspiration, to us all. I feel certain that he, as well as anyone, would have understood the requirements of strategic access, appreciated their implications for our mutual security, and assisted in developing the capabilities to provide the foundation for the mutual confidence that is essential, in the final analysis to the peaceful achievement of the larger goals of Western democracies.
ENDNOTES

1. I also draw on articles by two of our participants who prepared papers for our seminar: Professor Geoffrey Kemp of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Commander Harlan Ullman of our own National War College faculty.


3. US, Canada, Sweden, South Africa, and Australia.

4. Algeria 35-50; Angola 23,000-25,000; Benin 20; Congo 400-500, half military; Equatorial Guinea 100-400, half military; Ethiopia 16,000-17,000, almost all military; Guinea 400, mostly military; Guinea-Bissau 200-250, mostly military; Libya 100-125; Mozambique 800, half military; Sierra Leone, a few security advisers. Also: Tanzania 100-300 civilians; Sao Tome and Principe 75-100 medical personnel; Cape Verde 10-15 doctors. Source: "Turmoil in Africa," US News and World Report, 29 May 1978, p. 18.
The National Defense University, established formally in January 1976, consists of the two joint senior service colleges and four functional directorates, all located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in southwest Washington, D.C.

Ten month residence courses are conducted at the colleges for selected military officers of all services, in the grades of Colonel/Captain and Lieutenant Colonel/Commander, and career civil servants in comparable grades from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other government departments and agencies. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces offers a program for 218 students focused on the management of resources in the interest of national security, while The National War College course for 160 students emphasizes national security policy formulation and strategy.

The four directorates include:

- Administrative and Budget, which provides a full range of academic support services and operates a printing plant and the University library.

- Decision Systems, which offers instruction for resident students in the use of decision analysis, quantitative techniques, and management information systems technology in decisionmaking. The Directorate also provides automatic data processing support to all University components.

- External Programs, which offers a correspondence course in National Security Management, with an average enrollment of 5,000 students, and conducts four two-week courses, three at locations other than Fort McNair, for an annual total of about 1,000 senior Reserve Component officers of all the military services.

- Research, which provides a sustained opportunity for uniformed and civilian University Research Fellows to study intensively subjects related to national security. The research results, normally published in monographs, case studies, or books, are made available to competent government officials and selected specialists in the private sector. The University also administers the National Security Affairs Institute, which offers a forum in which government, industry, and other interested national security and other defense-oriented elements can explore national security issues.