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AN ASSESSMENT OF PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES ARMY  
PROVOST MARSHALS PERTAINING TO COUNTERTERRORISM  
POLICY AND PROGRAMS ON ARMY INSTALLATIONS

by

ROBERT GLENN JOHNSON

B.S., The Florida State University, 1965

M.S., The Florida State University, 1973

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
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ROBERT GLENN JOHNSON

Approved:

*Robert M. Julian*  
Major Professor

Date 11-9-81

*Frank J. Thompson*  
Chairman, Reading Committee

Date 11-9-81

Approved:

*John Powling*  
Dean, Graduate School

November 19, 1981  
Date

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An Assessment of Perceptions of United States Army  
Provost Marshals Pertaining to Counterterrorism Policy  
and Programs on Army Installations

Abstract

↓  
This study is based on a worldwide survey of United States Army provost marshals (senior military law enforcement officers) assessing their perceptions of: the numbers of past incidents of terrorism directed against Army installations; the availability and adequacy of intelligence concerning local terrorist activities; the degree of threat their local commands face from terrorists; the adequacy of measures of counterterrorism preparedness at their local commands; and the overall adequacy of protection currently provided likely terrorist targets within their areas of responsibility.

↖  
The study concludes that the problem of terrorist attacks against Army personnel/materiel is perceived by the respondents as being predominantly concentrated outside the United States. Formerly expressed fears that counterterrorism intelligence for Army commands is inadequate are discounted by the majority of respondents who indicate that current counterterrorism intelligence is available and adequate. A further conclusion is that many survey respondents expect acts of terrorism to continue to be a problem for the Army. The research revealed perceived gaps in the existence of certain measures of counterterrorism preparedness within responding Army commands. Finally, a majority of respondents indicate a belief that the most likely targets of terrorists within their areas of responsibility are not adequately protected.

INDEX WORDS: Terrorism, Military, Defense, Army, Counterterrorism.

2-1

DEDICATION

To Beverly, my wife and best friend, without whom  
this project could never have been completed.  
Her words of encouragement and gentle, loving  
support were what kept me going.

## PREFACE

I elected to write on the topic of terrorism and the United States Army because it gave me the opportunity to expand my own knowledge of this area. Additionally, I hope this dissertation will contribute to the Army's ability to understand and effectively deal with the threat it faces from terrorism today.

My civilian and military education and work experiences have generated many questions in my mind concerning the clarity, consistency, and overall adequacy of Army policy and doctrine in the area of counterterrorism. My work on this dissertation gave me the opportunity to address some of these questions.

I hope that I have made some contribution to the understanding of counterterrorism, generally, and United States Army counterterrorism, specifically.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Human relations on all levels have been characterized by decisions demonstrating the Lasswellian formula, "who gets what, when and how," often accompanied by the threat and use of force. Political and ideological violence, which sometimes arises from and contributes to such conflict, includes what is commonly known as "terrorism."<sup>1</sup>

One needs only to read today's newspaper or listen to radio or TV news to be reminded of the ubiquitous nature of terrorism in the world today. Advanced technology and desire for access to constantly improving media have combined in recent years to make terrorism an increasingly popular means of achieving political goals.<sup>2</sup>

Personnel and facilities of the United States government have been popular targets for terrorist attacks. United States military forces have not been immune. Although identifying terrorist incidents as such is often difficult, since November, 1979, there have been at least 23 instances of terrorist attacks against United States military personnel.<sup>3</sup> The largest, and perhaps most vulnerable, of the United States' military services is the United States Army (hereinafter referred to simply as the Army). Army personnel and facilities have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks. Listed below are some typical examples:

The first attack [of the Baader-Meinhof gang] was against the Fifth Corps Officers' Club, adjacent to the I. G. Farben Building in Frankfurt on May 11, 1972. Three pipe bombs destroyed the entrance way, injuring 13 and killing Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Bloomquist, a 39-year-old Vietnam veteran.

On May 24, the Red Army Faction struck a U.S. facility again, this time in Heidelberg at the headquarters for the U.S. Army Europe. Two automobiles loaded with explosives blew up ripping through the front entrance of the Casino, a combination cafeteria and officers' club, and missed damaging a nearby computer building, the intended target. This attack caused three deaths and injured eight others.<sup>4</sup>

And more recently:

Terrorists fire-bombed an Army civilian personnel office [in Frankfurt] Monday [March 30, 1981] in the second of two attacks on U.S. military installations in Germany in 24 hours.

Damage was estimated at \$10,000. . . . About \$100,000 in damage was reported in Sunday's bombing of a military intelligence building in Giessen. . . .<sup>5</sup>

It is a safe assumption that the frequency of these attacks will at least remain at the same level.<sup>6</sup> An important question is whether Army policy and doctrine are adequate to protect soldiers, citizens, sensitive weapons and other vital property from the excesses of terrorists.

Senior military and civilian police officials have often stated that terrorist acts are nothing more than the same kinds of criminal acts that they deal with every day: arson, murder, kidnapping, robbery, etc. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that separate policy and doctrine addressing counterterrorism are not necessary. Extensive security and crime prevention programs are in

place on Army installations throughout the world. Is there a need for specific counterterrorism policy and doctrine? While terrorist acts inevitably involve some criminal act or acts, there are fundamental differences between conventional criminal acts and acts of terrorism.

First, the target of the terrorist act is often not the immediate victim. The target is often a large segment of the population to whom the terrorists wish to deliver some strong message. Although a well-known institution or individual may be the immediate victim of the terrorists by being bombed, kidnapped, or murdered, it is often the larger public which is the target. In a conventional crime, the victim and the target are normally the same.

Second, the motives of the perpetrators are quite often much different. Conventional criminals are often motivated by "selfish" goals: greed, lust, revenge, etc. Terrorists, on the other hand, may be motivated by relatively altruistic goals such as "making this a better world."

Third, the potential harm to the organization that is directly or indirectly victimized by terrorists is significantly greater. Not only is the immediate harm potentially greater (nuclear, biological, mass hostages, etc.) but the ultimate harm resulting from adverse publicity/public opinion may be immense. The very survival of the organization/institution may be threatened. There is a quantum

difference in potential harm between a conventional criminal act and a terrorist act.

A fourth reason that terrorism cannot be considered as just another criminal act is that acts of terrorism are almost always preceded by acts of conspiracy. Traditionally, there is a strong legal condemnation of any conspiracy among potential perpetrators of criminal acts. In many jurisdictions, including the military, this conspiracy itself is a crime, even without the criminal act which was conspired. In fact, the maximum punishment for the conspiracy, with or without the subsequent criminal act, is often the same as for the act which was the subject of the conspiracy. Since acts of terrorism virtually always involve some conspiracy, and most conventional criminal acts do not, the legal response to terrorism may be expected to be more severe.

Terrorism, it can be seen, is a much different and greater threat to the Army than conventional criminal acts.

Military and civilian writers alike are far from agreement on a definition of terrorism. Two broad areas of terrorism are generally recognized: terrorism against the state to bring it down or force reforms, and terrorism by the state as a means of enforcement.<sup>7</sup> This dissertation will necessarily concentrate on the former.

In order to put terrorism in the proper place within the spectrum of all political violence against the state, a short discussion of the various strategies used will be

presented. Table I-1 illustrates four traditionally successful strategies that use violence to change governments.

TABLE I-1  
VIOLENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING GOVERNMENTS

	Time Taken	Relationship with Existing Armed Forces	Status of Old Regime	Examples
COUP	Very Short	Won over	Ousted	Egypt-1952 Vietnam-1963 Chile-1973
INSURRECTION	Short	Defeated	Ousted	France-1830 -1848
GUERRILLA	Long	Defeated	Ousted	China-1939 Vietnam-1954 -1975
TERRORISM	Very Long	Evaded	Coerced	Northern Ireland Quebec

These strategies are not mutually exclusive. For long periods in Vietnam prior to the eventual triumph of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, elements of the guerrilla and terrorism strategies were used at the same time. Not all violent political struggles to change governments fit nicely into one or the other of these strategies. The strategies are useful, however, in illustrating some of the things terrorism is not.

In the past, terrorism has been successful when used over an extended period of time. Coups, insurrections, and guerrilla wars normally require less time for success. The terrorism strategy does not necessarily seek to win over or defeat the existing armed forces; the short-term goal is to merely evade these forces in order to be able to fight another day. Finally, it is not particularly the immediate ouster of the government that is sought by the terrorists, but rather a yielding of the government to the demands of the terrorists. The terrorists seek to have the government meet their demands for reform through coercion.<sup>8</sup>

The Army uses a somewhat different taxonomy of strategies which use violence for political purposes. With the exception of a coup, all extra-legal attempts to oust a legitimate government through violence of any sort are termed insurgencies. The Army's definition of an insurgency is: ". . . an attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population into forcibly overthrowing its existing government."<sup>9</sup> No distinction is made regarding the use of violence for the political purpose of bringing about reforms in an existing government without replacing the government.

Within this broad definition of insurgency are three strategies: "left," "right," and "mass." The "left" strategy ". . . envisions a spontaneous uprising, sparked by a suitable catalyst, of the masses against the government, and struggle of short duration."<sup>10</sup> This strategy

relies heavily on armed insurgents engaging government troops and the occupation of territory by the insurgents. Examples given of this strategy are the philosophy and activities of Che Guevara and the Tupamaro movement in Uruguay.<sup>11</sup>

The "right" strategy ". . . is characterized by infiltration of members of an insurgent organization into the society's political and social organizations."<sup>12</sup> Once the infiltration has been accomplished, the insurgents seek to manipulate the organizations to promote social unrest and propaganda favorable to their cause. What separates this strategy from legitimate political activity is the fact that this infiltration is accompanied by sabotage and terrorism, ". . . to discredit the government and influence the populace. . . . [However,] little emphasis is placed on development of armed elements."<sup>13</sup>

The final insurgent strategy, and the one upon which the rest of the manual concentrates, is the "mass" strategy. Obviously the Army writers of this manual were using Vietnam as their model.

This strategy envisions a protracted conflict against the incumbent government. Organizationally the mass strategy utilizes mass civil organizations and armed elements. The insurgent party operates from a secure base and establishes a parallel governmental structure that competes for legitimacy with the existing administrative structure of the incumbent government. Through a cellular organizational structure, and a system of interlocking directories, attempts are made to control all aspects of the movement.<sup>14</sup>

The mass strategy involves three phases: Phase I - Latent and Incipient Insurgency; Phase II - Guerrilla Warfare; and Phase III - War of Movement. The use of terrorism begins in Phase I, and is continued and expanded throughout the other two phases.<sup>15</sup>

Field Manual 100-20, "Internal Defense and Development," continues in great detail about how insurgencies are organized and about the most effective means of rendering Army assistance to foreign governments combating insurgencies. It is interesting to note that in this entire Army manual devoted to insurgency, there is no definition of terrorism. We must look elsewhere, then, to find the Army's official definition of terrorism.

Army policy on counterterrorism programs to protect Army resources is formulated by the Law Enforcement Division (LED) of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) in the Pentagon. Within the Army, "policy" is generally recognized as being directives from superior commands (higher headquarters) establishing what must be done and what is prohibited. Army policy usually takes the form of Army Regulations (AR's), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's), and Letters of Instruction (LOI's).

Formal Army doctrine and training on counterterrorism are the responsibility of the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS or MP School) at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Doctrine is generally accepted within the Army as being published and unpublished "how-to" techniques for

best implementing policy. Doctrine usually takes the form of Field Manuals (FM's), Training Circulars (TC's), Soldier's Manuals (SM's), Training Films (TF's), Training Extension Courses (TEC's), Programs of Instruction (POI's), and articles in Military Police, the official journal of the MP School.

The Army's primary policy dealing with terrorism directed against the United States Army is found in Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations." This regulation was published on 15 June 1978. The regulation defines terrorism as:

. . . calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act, sometimes symbolic in nature, intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.<sup>16</sup>

The Military Police School's Training Circular 19-16 (Draft), "Counterterrorism," published in May 1980, contains the same definition except that the phrase, "It usually involves a criminal act," is changed to read, "It is a criminal act."<sup>17</sup> This is an improvement since it is difficult to imagine a terrorist act that does not at least involve a conspiracy.

Neither definition takes into account the seriousness of the threat. These definitions could both be applied to some simple, politically motivated barroom brawl.

Somewhat confusing to provost marshals (chief law enforcement officers for major Army elements) is the definition of a "terrorist incident" also found in the Army regulation:

. . . a distinct criminal act committed or threatened to be committed by a group or single individual to advance a political objective, which greatly endangers safety or property. This definition does not include aircraft piracy emergencies which are governed by the provisions of Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 29 June 1972, subject: Support of Civil Authorities in Airplane Hijacking Emergencies, and AR 500-1.<sup>18</sup>

Although this definition does address the issue of the seriousness of the incident, it confuses the reader by taking out "aircraft piracy emergencies." This is a poorly constructed definition, since by many standards "aircraft piracy emergencies" could well amount to acts of terrorism. The definition is not the place for policy clarification. A single definition for terrorism should be used in the regulation. The problem of a separate policy dealing with "aircraft piracy emergencies" should be resolved by renegotiating the 1972 memorandum to make it consistent with other policy. If that is impossible, the peculiar portions of that policy should be spelled out in the Basic Army Regulation.

"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," is an oft heard saying that serves to cloud the issue of just what terrorism is.

What constitutes "terrorism" is highly controversial. Some feel that the validity of their cause, such as the right of self-determination

and the resistance to an oppressive totalitarian regime, justifies the resort to terrorism, viewing it as an acceptable alternative to the exercise of legitimate power. To others, the use of this type of violence, regardless of motivation, is considered a negative and even criminal act, outside the realm of what is tolerable, which therefore necessarily must be punished in accordance with the relevant law applicable.<sup>19</sup>

It is this concept that prevents more international cooperation in combatting terrorism. For the purposes of this dissertation, the following conceptual definition of terrorism will be used:

1. Conspiracy to commit or commission of planned threats or acts of violence of a serious nature, employed for
2. explicitly political purposes, ultimately directed against
3. an established state or organizational power, and involving
4. a relatively small number of conspirators.<sup>20</sup>

This definition requires no value judgments for application. Commission of certain acts for stated reasons against specified ultimate targets by a limited number of conspirators constitutes terrorism. Period. It is recognized that gray areas between terrorism and conventional crimes will continue to exist. The terrorist gang that robs a bank so it can continue to exist is a prime example. However, uniform adoption of a relatively simple definition of terrorism, such as the one offered above, would aid the Army by enabling provost marshals to better categorize instances of violence. This would allow them to create and

maintain better empirical data so that scarce security and intelligence resources could be more efficiently used.

In addition, the Army needs to recognize that there are at least two general types of terrorist incidents that could affect Army resources. The first type involves terrorist incidents that pose a grave threat to the national interests of the United States. Examples of this type would include the seizure of a United States Embassy, the kidnapping of a high-ranking United States official, or capture of a particularly sensitive item (nuclear, chemical, or other highly lethal and/or classified weapon or device). This type incident should be designated a "national terrorist incident."

The second general type of terrorist incident should be called a "local terrorist incident." It should be defined simply as, "all other terrorist incidents."

Policy guidance for the two types of incidents would necessarily be different. In the national terrorist incident, initial reaction by local forces would be the same as initial reaction for local terrorist incidents. For national terrorist incidents, however, subsequent command decisions would necessarily be made by national command authorities (President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, etc.). Response forces would consist of specially trained national elite forces.

There are those who have studied the problem of Army counterterrorism who think that the Army is ill-prepared

to meet the challenges posed by terrorism:

Considering the current lack of understanding of terrorist strategies and tactics within the United States Army, the likelihood that terrorists could easily provoke the Army into an over-reaction is extremely high. A noticeable training deficit exists in this area. Army emphasis on terrorism currently stresses the handling of hostage situations -- clearly the one terrorist related incident which is least likely to occur. It is the other 98.9 percent of terrorist related incidents with which the military must become concerned, since these are the tactics and incidents which have the highest probability for occurrence, and are the most likely to involve United States citizens and property.<sup>21</sup>

This dissertation will analyze Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine by comparing it with selected items of counterterrorism literature from outside official Army sources. Further analysis will be based on the perceptions of key Army law enforcement personnel concerning the terrorism threat and adequacy of Army counterterrorism measures. Specific research questions to be addressed will include, "What are the perceptions of Army provost marshals concerning:

1. past incidents of terrorism directed against their areas of responsibility?
2. availability and adequacy of intelligence concerning local terrorist activities?
3. The degree of threat their local commands face from terrorists?
4. measures of counterterrorism preparedness at their local commands? and,
5. the overall adequacy of protection currently provided likely terrorist targets within their areas of responsibility?"

A limitation of this dissertation is that it does not deal with Army counterterror missions involving national elite forces trained to perform rescue missions (such as the aborted mission in Iran). As previously discussed, however, initial reaction to all terrorist incidents to which Army personnel would respond is virtually the same, regardless of whether it is a "national terrorist incident" or a "local terrorist incident." Initial response decisions and forces would come from local Army commanders and not national elite forces. Since the initial responses to terrorist incidents are so crucial, the focus of the review and analysis will be on the unclassified policy and doctrine which govern all initial reactions to terrorist incidents.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Yonah Alexander, International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. ix.

<sup>2</sup>Howard K. Smith, ABC-TV News Commentary, 22 July, 1976.

<sup>3</sup>"Terrorism in the 1980's," Military Police, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1981, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup>Russell E. Paramenter, "Beginnings of Terror," Military Police Law Enforcement Journal, Vol. VI, No. 2, Summer 1979, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>"Army CPO in Frankfurt fire-bombed by terrorists," Stars and Stripes, 31 March 1981, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Rowland B. Shriver, Jr., John C. Evans, and Marvin Leibstone, "Countering Terrorism on Military Installations," Science Applications, Inc., McLean, Virginia, 29 July 1977, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas R. Davies, "Feedback Processes and International Terrorism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1977), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>Ernest H. Evans, "American Policy Response to International Terrorism: Problems of Deterrence" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977), pp. 7-13.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, "Field Manual 100-20: Internal Defense and Development," November 1974, p. 3/1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 3/2.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 3/3.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 3/3-3/5.

<sup>16</sup>Department of the Army, "Army Regulation 190-52, Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations," 15 June 1978, p. 1/1.

<sup>17</sup>United States Army Military Police School, "Training Circular 19-16 (Draft): Counterterrorism," May 1980, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>AR 190-52, p. B/1.

<sup>19</sup>Alexander, International Terrorism, p. ix.

<sup>20</sup>Adopted with slight modification from Lawrence C. Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism: A Historical and Statistical Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1978), p. 23.

<sup>21</sup>John B. Reisz, "A Theory on Terrorist Activity in America and Its Effect on the United States Army" (unpublished master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), p. 101.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ARMY SYSTEM OF POLICY AND DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Public policymaking is a very complex, dynamic process whose various components make different contributions to it. It decides major guidelines for action directed at the future, mainly by governmental organs. These guidelines (policies) formally aim at achieving what is in the public interest by the best possible means.<sup>1</sup>

In order to understand and critique the Army's policy and doctrine dealing with counterterrorism, it is necessary to examine how Army policy and doctrine are developed. The systems involved are complex. Only a general description will be provided here.

The Army is subject to policy developed outside its own institutional systems. Primary external policy that may impact on Army counterterrorism programs may be found in: the United States Constitution; various treaties to which the United States is a party;<sup>2</sup> the Posse Comitatis Act;<sup>3</sup> Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts;<sup>4</sup> Federal laws granting Army commanders certain authority;<sup>5</sup> other federal laws; and, various Department of Defense directives.

Department of the Army and local Army Staff Judge Advocates (Army lawyers) have spent considerable resources addressing the problems associated with the impact of these

external policy statements on Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine. Discussion of policy in this dissertation will be limited to policy over which the Army has developmental control.

Many different kinds of counterterrorism policy decisions could be made internally by the Army in the face of potential terrorism. The Department of the Army could assign counterterrorism missions to significant numbers of Army commands throughout the world. For example, one-third or one-half (or more!) of all combat commands could be directed to cease their normal training for conventional combat missions and begin training exclusively for counterterrorism missions. The Department of the Army could direct that all Army installations which are relatively open to the public (and the vast majority are, today) be sealed with barbed wire and be extensively patrolled with heavily armed units. There are, of course, problems with such decisions:

The heaviest part of the price to be paid for living in a "state of siege" may be the isolation . . . from the local community.<sup>6</sup>

The allocation of any resources to counterterrorism roles would come at the expense of other missions. At some point, the Army would no longer be able to perform some other missions it is now performing if it made such drastic policy decisions as those discussed above.

It is clear that an Army cannot continue to act as an anti-terrorist force over a long period of time without there being repercussions on training,

efficiency and political outlook. The characteristics which soldiers need to develop for conventional warfare are not necessarily appropriate for anti-terrorist operations.<sup>7</sup>

Also, there is no doubt that authorities in the Department of Defense and the Congress would require the Department of the Army to justify such significant reallocations of resources.

The other extreme of internal Army policymaking possibilities is that the Army could make no policy decisions concerning actions to be taken to protect its assets from terrorists. Local Army commanders could be left the freedom to react in whatever manner they chose if confronted with a terrorist threat or attack.

Who are the people and what are the institutions within the Army responsible for policy formulation? How are policy decisions made? How has Army counterterrorism policy emerged? Once policy is established, who are the people and what are the institutions responsible for developing the doctrine to assist the officers and soldiers throughout the Army in implementing the policy? How has Army counterterrorism doctrine emerged? These questions will be addressed in the remainder of this chapter. Succeeding chapters will define exactly what counterterrorism policy guidance and doctrine currently exist within the Army and the perceptions of key Army law enforcement officers concerning the adequacy of that policy and the degree of the current potential threat from terrorism.

The Army generates a great deal of policy in order to provide coordinated direction for its sizeable population. Policy is also required for coordinated utilization and the protection of installations, weapons/munitions (nuclear, chemical and conventional), and other material spread throughout the world. The total amount of policy directing the Army changes daily as regulations and other directives are generated, rescinded, and changed. But the amount in effect on any given day is considerable; the typical bookshelves used to house these regulations may contain as many as 15 meters of loose-leaf regulations, pamphlets, and other policy directives. This is only the policy generated at the Department of the Army level.<sup>8</sup>

Each subordinate command in the Army may add to the Army directives to clarify how that policy is implemented locally. The subordinate commands also often generate entirely new policies to govern their esoteric activities.

There are a great many policy-producing subordinate commands. Directly under the Department of the Army are the Major Commands (MACOMS). The largest and most important of these are: Forces Command (FORSCOM); Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); and, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). Under each of these are many major subordinate commands, such as corps, divisions, major United States Installations (forts), and many other types of organizations.

Between these headquarters and the officer or soldier who must implement some policy there are typically four or

five more levels of command which may also supplement or add policy. Needless to say, no single individual in the Army is completely versed on all Army policy. The majority may not even be completely versed on the policy governing their particular job. A key element to survival in this environment is much the same as the key success in many occupations: knowing where to find the pertinent information. There is a 140-page Department of the Army Pamphlet designed to assist people in just finding the appropriate Department of the Army Regulation.<sup>9</sup>

The keystone of most Army policy is the basic Army Regulation. Most subordinate command policies support and amplify these regulations. Army Regulations are primarily developed by the Department of the Army staff in the Pentagon. Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations," is the Army's primary policy statement on counterterrorism. The first digits of the two-part number indicate the subject area: in the example, "190" indicates that this is a military police regulation. Thus, all regulations specifically pertaining to military police subjects bear this number. The second number is an arbitrary number assigned by the particular Department of the Army organization that maintains this regulation. The agency that develops the cited regulation is the Law Enforcement Division of the Directorate for Human Resources Development of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

The fact that the Army's primary counterterrorism regulation is the responsibility of the Law Enforcement Division represents one major policy decision that has been made. This responsibility could have been given to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence or a special staff agency within the Department of the Army created specifically for counterterrorism policy development. The fact that it has become the responsibility of the Law Enforcement Division may indicate that key decision-makers within the Department of the Army view terrorism as more of a law enforcement problem than a threat which seriously endangers the Army as an institution.

Prior to 1977 there was virtually no formal Army policy addressing counterterrorism. In that year, the Law Enforcement Division contracted with Science Applications, Inc., a private research company, to study the problem of protecting Army resources from the threat of terrorists. Following research which included visits to various installations, interviews, and administration of surveys, Science Applications, Inc., published their findings in "Countering Terrorism on Military Installations." This 1977 document was the foundation for the subsequent regulation and most other Army policy and doctrine. It was, then, the Law Enforcement Division which was responsible for the start of Army counterterrorism policy production.

Army regulations are usually written and amended by project officers in the grades of major or lieutenant colonel, assigned to the various organizations of Headquarters, Department of the Army. For the most part, relatively few entirely new regulations are drafted. Most of the policy development process is devoted to changing existing regulations to account for new technology, equipment, tactics, federal laws, Department of Defense directives and other factors that constantly erode the currency of existing policies. The Army's counterterrorism regulation, AR 190-52, is an exception. It was a totally new regulation that was published on 15 June 1978.

Prior to approval of a regulation, it must be "staffed." This entails obtaining approval from all other Department of the Army offices upon which the regulation may have an impact. If any agency disagrees with the draft of the regulation, compromises must be found. This process begins at the lowest level (the previously mentioned major/lieutenant colonel project officers) and escalates up the chain-of-command only if differences cannot be resolved. Thus, every approved regulation represents a position that has been coordinated with the appropriate members of the Department of the Army staff.

Given the vast quantity of regulations, no single individual could possibly approve each change or new regulation. This authority is normally delegated down several levels from the Chief of Staff of the Army (the

Army's chief military executive officer). The officers granted the authority to approve new or amended Army policy are normally officers in the grades of colonel or brigadier general.

Army doctrine is developed in a more decentralized manner than Army policy. There is no formal doctrinal development authority in the Pentagon. Authority for managing Army doctrine development has been granted by Department of the Army to a major subordinate command, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia. This headquarters, in turn, has further delegated authority for doctrine development to subordinate commands such as the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

These centers have further delegated much of the authority for doctrine development to subordinate Army schools and training centers. The Army's decision to posit counterterrorism programs with its law enforcement institutions is again in evidence as the Combined Arms Center has delegated authority for counterterrorism doctrine and training development to the United States Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

At the Military Police School, as with other Army service schools, responsibility for producing and reviewing doctrine is normally done by staff officers in the grades

of captain and major. Coordination of drafts is effected within the school with appropriate departments and with other service schools and other Army agencies as deemed appropriate by the managers of the doctrinal products. Approval authority for these products is usually delegated to officer supervisors in the grade of colonel. The key counterterrorism doctrinal publication for the Army at this time is "Training Circular 19-16 (Draft), Counterterrorism," dated May 1980. (The "draft" designation indicates that the publication has not yet been approved for mass publication and Armywide distribution.) The emergence of this training circular from the Military Police School followed the publication of the basic counterterrorism policy document, AR 190-52. A detailed review of the regulation and the draft training circular will be made in the following chapter.

In addition to producing the Army's counterterrorism doctrine, the MP school is charged with coordinating and producing training plans and materials for counterterrorism courses used by the Army. The centerpiece of this effort is currently the "Counterterrorism Course." Design, approval, and institution of classes of the course came, again, only after publication of AR 190-52. The course will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

The systems within the Army responsible for production of policy and doctrine have responded to produce basic

products designed to cope with the challenge posed by terrorism to the Army. A detailed review of these products and an analysis of their adequacy follow.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Of particular importance are the so-called Status of Forces treaties. These establish authority and jurisdiction over United States military forces stationed in foreign countries. They specify which nation (the United States or the "host" nation) has authority to enforce which laws and which nation has jurisdiction to try offenders of which laws.

<sup>3</sup>Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385. This federal law generally prohibits the use of United States military personnel for the purpose of enforcing civilian laws.

<sup>4</sup>Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 and 552a. These laws have received considerable criticism from Army law enforcement officers. They open up files, in certain circumstances, to private individuals, and prohibit the maintenance of certain other types of files.

<sup>5</sup>Federal laws and implementing Department of Defense and Department of the Army directives and regulations spell out the authority and jurisdiction of Army commanders on Army installations on United States territory.

<sup>6</sup>Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism (London: Faber & Faber, 1975), p. 60.

<sup>7</sup>Anthony Burton, Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice and Response (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), p. 218.

<sup>8</sup>Approximately 1600 Army Regulations are in effect at any given time. These regulations range in length from one page to hundreds of pages. In addition, as many as 1850 Department of the Army Circulars and Department of the Army Pamphlets are also in effect. These may contain Army policy as well as other administrative material. (Source: DA Pam 310-1.)

<sup>9</sup>Department of the Army, "Department of the Army Pamphlet 310-1, Index to Administrative Publications," 1 May 1979. The individual looking for counterterrorism policy in this index would have difficulty. Under "terrorism,"

there is only one listing, and it is to a somewhat obscure document dealing only with personnel security. Although AR 190-52 is listed numerically, there is no reference to it in the general alphabetical index.

## CHAPTER III

### REVIEW OF PERTINENT ARMY LITERATURE

As a direct result of the Science Applications, Inc., 1977 report,<sup>1</sup> the Army published Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations." Since this is the cornerstone of Army policy on Army counterterrorism, a detailed review of the regulation is necessary. The regulation is divided into two chapters and four appendices. The total regulation contains only 15 pages.

Chapter I, "Introduction," is divided into seven fairly typical military sections: "General," "Purpose," "Applicability," "Explanation of Terms," "Policies," "Responsibilities," and "Reports." This chapter is only three pages in length.

The three-paragraph "General" section states that increasing terrorist attacks indicate a need for increased emphasis on "security consciousness" by commanders.<sup>2</sup>

The essence of the "Purpose" section holds that this regulation:

. . . establishes DA [Department of the Army] policy on counterterrorism and personal protective measures against terrorist acts and provides planning guidance for handling major disruptions on military installations.<sup>3</sup>

The "Applicability" section makes it clear that the entire Active Army, federalized Army Reserve and National Guard components are subject to the provisions of the regulation.<sup>4</sup>

In the "Explanation of Terms" section, various words and phrases related to terrorism are defined.<sup>5</sup> The key definition is the one for "terrorism," which was discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation.

The heart of the regulation is the "Policies" section. The first two paragraphs describe primary responsibilities in the area of counterterrorism that the Army does not have:

- a. The Department of State has the primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism involving Americans abroad and for handling foreign relations aspects of domestic terrorism incidents.
- b. The Department of Justice is the primary agency for coping with domestic terrorism. Investigative and operational responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. . . .<sup>6</sup>

In what is probably the key sentence of the regulation as far as subordinate Army commanders are concerned, the regulation specifically lays the responsibility for planning, coordinating and implementing preventive and initial response measures to terrorist acts on local commanders:

Although the FBI has overall responsibility for combating and investigating domestic terrorism and host countries have the responsibility overseas, the planning, coordination, and implementation of precautionary measures to prevent terrorist acts and to provide proper initial response on US Army installations worldwide, remain a local command responsibility.<sup>7</sup>

Some confusion is created by this section regarding counterterrorism responsibility outside the United States since the regulation clearly states that the Department of State has primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism abroad. Obviously, both the United States Department of State and the host countries bear certain counterterrorism responsibilities for terrorist incidents outside the United States involving United States personnel and property. Although apportionment of the responsibilities is a policy matter outside the Army's policy-making jurisdiction, the fact that this Army regulation is not clearer on this point is an Army matter and subsequent revision of the regulation should resolve this.

The "Policies" section further requires all Army installations and activities to establish and maintain "Procedures, guidance and policies for the protection of all US personnel and property. . . ." <sup>8</sup> Although not stated, the implication is that these policies will be for protection from terrorists.

The "Responsibilities" section of this chapter establishes specific responsibilities for the Army staff and local commanders. Of particular note is the latitude given local commanders in establishing negotiations with hostage takers and the fact that this latitude virtually ends at that point:

Commanders at all levels will . . . be authorized maximum flexibility in establishing negotiations with hostage takers. However, major demands

placed on the commander that are related to the safety and welfare of hostages will be referred through channels for resolution/guidance from Headquarters, Department of the Army (see App C). Neither additional weapons nor munitions will be given a terrorist.<sup>9</sup>

Appendix C describes the organization and functions of the Army Operations Center. Although the regulation clearly states elsewhere that the FBI and State Department have primary responsibility within the United States and overseas respectively, neither in this paragraph of the body of the regulation nor in the Appendix is this overall responsibility considered. The reader is left with the distinct impression that the Army will be in operational control of the situation, and not the Department of Justice (the Attorney General) or the Department of State (the Secretary of State). Paragraph C-2e(4) gives the only indication that the Army is not the prime decision-maker on terrorist incidents involving Army personnel/material. A function of Crisis Management Team of the Army Operations Center is to "operate in close coordination with and exchange appropriate operational information with higher, lateral, and subordinate operations centers concerning the crisis."<sup>10</sup>

Exception cannot be taken with the provisions of Appendix C insofar as there is a pressing need to inform the highest level of Army command and coordinate the Army's response to any serious terrorist threat. A short paragraph at the beginning of the Appendix is clearly needed, however, to remind the reader that any incident that has gone on

long enough to prompt the activation of a Crisis Response Cell or a Crisis Management Team (escalatory steps within the Army Operations Center) has become a "national terrorist incident" and operational decisions will certainly be made by State, Justice, or the President. It should be made clear in this statement of Army policy that requirements for reporting up through Army channels remain, but that mission decisions may be sent through State or Justice channels, depending on the location of the incident.

A sometimes heated debate is conducted between the Military Police School and the Law Enforcement Division at the Pentagon on whether one of these institutions may be infringing on the other's mission. Although the initial paragraph of Chapter 2, "Planning Guidance," of the LED-produced AR 190-52 refers the reader to various MP School doctrinal publications, the remainder of the chapter fits better into the category of doctrine than into the category of policy. The information in this chapter should have been written, staffed, approved, and published by the MP School as doctrine.

The chapter contains some good, basic guidelines for establishing local counterterrorism plans. The majority of the chapter deals with the difficult problem of hostage situations. A small portion addresses guidance for Public Affairs Officers.<sup>11</sup>

Appendix A of the regulation is a listing of references. It is interesting to note that only two Department

of Defense publications are listed: the other 26 publications cited are all Army-produced. There are no references to civilian publications.<sup>12</sup>

Appendix B contains Army policy concerning "Assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Combatting Terrorism." While Chapter 2 could serve as a good example of what Army policy is not, this Appendix is an excellent example of well-written, concise, detailed policy. It clearly spells out exactly what Army personnel can and cannot do in the way of assisting the FBI. The guidance even deals with such difficult problems as cost-sharing after the incident.<sup>13</sup>

Appendix D is entitled simply, "Checklist." It contains 43 short paragraphs suggesting logical, chronological steps to be followed in a hostage situation. As with Chapter 2, the guidance is not directive. The Appendix is really doctrine, and not policy. Although it is a useful guide, it is out of place in this policy document.<sup>14</sup>

Given the broad spectrum of choices that Army policymakers could have made regarding the establishment of counterterrorism policy, how can the policy stated in this regulation best be summarized? First, it is a very low-keyed response to the threat. The policy recognizes the growing nature of terrorism, but no specific resources are allocated to combat it from the Department of the Army level. No new commands or staff positions are created at the Department of the Army level to cope with terrorism.

The policy specifically directs "the planning, coordination and implementation of precautionary measures to prevent terrorist acts," and the provision of proper initial response to such acts, but the responsibility for these actions is given to "local commands."

The second major feature of the Army's counterterrorism policy established by this regulation is that it recognizes the supremacy of political leaders in the role of decision-makers during terrorist-instigated crises. Although it is initially made clear that the "Department of Justice is the primary agency for coping with domestic terrorism," and the "Department of State has the primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism involving Americans abroad," the policy fails to articulate from whom local Army commanders (responsible for initial response) will receive orders during the course of a local terrorist incident. Will the military chain-of-command be used, or will the FBI agent or State Department official on the scene be in charge through the authority of his or her chain-of-command? Given the complexity of laws, both international and domestic, it may be impossible to resolve this issue with a central policy statement. The regulation should at least recognize this problem, however, and require its resolution at lower levels of command.

The third and final major feature of this policy statement is that it does require local Army commanders throughout the world to develop counterterrorism plans.

From an Armywide basis, this is a no-cost or low-cost measure. The Army does not have to go to the Department of Defense (and ultimately the Congress) for additional funds to implement this policy. It can be accomplished, to one degree or another, with existing resources. The danger with such actions is that without some inspection or review actions, the degree of compliance is difficult to determine. Also, it is difficult to predict what other normally performed duties at the local level will go undone in order to accomplish this new mission.

An assessment of this regulation based on the results of a survey will be made later in this dissertation.

As Army Regulation 190-52 is the cornerstone of Army Counterterrorism policy, so Training Circular 19-16 (Draft), "Counterterrorism," dated May 1980, is the cornerstone of Army Counterterrorism doctrine.<sup>15</sup>

The 179-page draft circular is more detailed in its approach than the previously reviewed regulation. The seven chapters are titled: "Introduction"; "Who Are the Terrorists?"; "Intelligence"; "Threat Analysis"; "Security Countermeasures"; "Authority and Jurisdiction"; and, "Crisis Management." The four Annexes are: "References and Reading Sources"; "Counterterrorism Crisis Management Plan Format"; "Sample Standing Operating Procedures for Hostage Situations"; and, "The Special Reaction Team Assault Tactics in a Counterterrorist Role."

Chapter I, "Introduction," begins with a definition of terrorism (previously discussed in this dissertation), followed by a general discussion of terrorism. The rationale presented in this section for why terrorists will continue their activities seems slanted toward only one type of terrorist act.


Terrorists . . . know there is:

- Virtual certainty of gaining major publicity
- . . . ;
- Likelihood that all members of the terrorist team will escape punishment or death whether or not they successfully seize hostages;
- A chance that all or some demands will be met;
- The possibility of full compliance with such demands;
- Great likelihood of success where safe passage or exit is the sole demand;
- Great likelihood that if concessions to the principal demands are rejected, all or virtually all members of the terrorist team can still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of their original demands, or surrendering to a sympathetic government.<sup>16</sup>

It appears that the author of this portion was concentrating on hostage-seizure situations. This is a tendency which will be noted throughout the Army's counterterrorism doctrine.

The next substantive portion of this chapter introduces "The Counterterrorism Model." The graphic presentation of this model is reproduced in Table III-1. This system-type model is interesting and useful to the individuals responsible for counterterrorism planning. The remainder of the first chapter is used to explain the terms introduced in the graphic model.

TABLE III-1<sup>17</sup>  
 THE COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL



The "Intelligence" explanation is typical of definitions of all military intelligence: "The collection, examination, interpretation, and dissemination of information . . ." concerning who the terrorists are, when and where they will strike, and how they expect to terrorize.<sup>18</sup>

"Threat analysis" is explained as being a "fluid" process to determine the "level of terrorist threat." Upon completion of the threat analysis, efforts can be directed to "countering . . . discovered weaknesses."<sup>19</sup>

"Physical security" is a standard Army phrase that simply refers to the measures taken to protect property. Examples listed here are:

. . . intrusion detection systems, proper use of lighting and fences, ability to close or restrict access to installation, hardening of sensitive storage locations, and better educated security personnel . . .<sup>20</sup>

"Personnel security" is defined as those measures required to identify, educate, and otherwise protect individuals who may be targets of terrorist attacks.<sup>21</sup>

"Opsec" stands for operational security. This is another common Army phrase meaning protection of information which could aid the enemy (in this case terrorists) by limiting sensitive communications and other activities which could be intercepted or observed disclosing such information.<sup>22</sup>

"Authority and jurisdiction" are the legal boundaries defining what Army personnel may do in preparing for,

reacting to, and ultimately prosecuting those responsible for terrorist acts.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, "Crisis management" is explained as the requirement for any counterterrorism plan to ". . . describe the organization and functions of the crisis management team." Items singled out for more specific consideration are: chain-of-command; team members; missions of key installation units (military police, fire department, public affairs, etc.); training required; and, contingency plans.<sup>24</sup>

Chapter 2, "Who Are the Terrorists?" is an excellent, compact description of terrorist groups in general. The chapter provides a simple taxonomy of groups based on two dimensions: (1) beliefs (political, ethnic and nationalist, religious, environmental, mercenary, and pathological need); and (2) areas of operation (transnational, international, and national).<sup>25</sup>

Other topics briefly discussed in this chapter include terrorist: inter-group cooperation; goals (immediate and long-range); internal group organization; weapons; training; and finally, a detailed description of typical terrorist operations. The subsection dealing with terrorist operations is divided into: methodology, planning, movement, and sequence of actions. The author's bias towards dealing with terrorist acts involving hostage situations is again apparent in this section. The "planning" and "movement" paragraphs are general enough to cover practically any type

of terrorist incident. The "methodology" and "sequence of action" paragraphs, however, describe only terrorist hostage situations.<sup>26</sup>

A number of interesting, educational charts in this chapter help introduce the reader to some less well known aspects of terrorism. "Actions and behaviors matrix" describes terrorist activities through various stages of an incident.<sup>27</sup> "Terrorist Targets" list types of facilities terrorists might target under these categories: Engineering and Energy Systems; Communications and Supply; Transportation; Human; and Military.<sup>28</sup>

Of little use is a chart entitled simply, "Seven Most Common Acts of Terrorism."<sup>29</sup> These seven were obviously taken directly from the Science Applications report where they appear in exactly the same order: bombings, hijacking/skyjacking, kidnapping, armed assault/ambushes, arson, assassination, and hostage-taking/barricading.<sup>30</sup> The Science Applications report at least listed total numbers for these acts. The training circular gives none; it simply lists the type of acts. The Science Applications report does not cite a source. At least one other source has slightly different figures for a similar period. That information is listed in Table III-2.

TABLE III-2<sup>31</sup>INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS  
OR PROPERTY 1968-78, BY CATEGORY OF ATTACK

Type Incident	Number	Percent
Kidnapping	95	7.5
Barricade-hostage	13	1.0
Letter bombing	12	1.0
Incendiary bombing	266	20.9
Explosive bombing	655	51.5
Armed attack	54	4.2
Hijacking	34	2.8
Assassination	54	4.2
Theft, break-in	41	3.2
Sniping	28	2.2
Other actions	19	1.5
	<u>1,271</u>	<u>100.0</u>

A great deal of the counterterrorism policy and doctrine developed by the Army concentrates on the hostage-taking/barricading type incident, yet apparently only one percent of all terrorist acts during this recent period were of this type. An analysis will be made later in this dissertation of the perceptions of Army provost marshals concerning the likelihood of various types of terrorist acts against Army personnel/material.

"Adversary Characteristics Matrix" is the only chart in the training circular attributed to another source.<sup>32</sup> It is an excellent, detailed chart. It shows 17 characteristics of six types of potentially harmful groups and individuals. The characteristics include such things as organization, recruitment, motivation, size, etc. The six types of groups and individuals are: terrorist groups; organized criminal groups; extremist protest groups; disoriented persons; disgruntled employees; and miscellaneous criminals. Although the groups consider types of individuals other than terrorists, this matrix is still a useful tool for the planner who must also be aware of these other threats.

Chapter 3 deals with "Intelligence."<sup>33</sup> The Science Applications report devoted twelve pages of biting criticism to what it termed "the intelligence problem." The report concluded that Army policy so restricted provost marshals in the collection and storage of intelligence that the result was the destruction of the Army's entire counter-terrorism intelligence capability.<sup>34</sup> Others have made strong cases for the importance of intelligence in counter-terrorism programs:

Successful action against urban terror groups remains primarily a matter of prior intelligence; if that intelligence is to be effective it must be gleaned from a population aware of the problem and willing, not merely to stand aside, but actively to co-operate with the police and Army right from the start. . . . Once surveillance breaks down the terrorism is almost certain to

reach military proportions and, in that case, the authorities and the population are in for a long, bitter haul.<sup>35</sup>

The training circular was written for different purposes than the Science Applications report, of course, but none of the criticisms of restrictions on Army intelligence practices are found here. The restrictions are clearly stated. Brief summaries of the pertinent portions of the Freedom of Information Act<sup>36</sup> and the Privacy Act<sup>37</sup> are provided. Implementing Army policy is also summarized.<sup>38</sup> Agencies which can assist in intelligence assessments, such as the FBI and host-nation counterparts, are listed. This chapter provides an excellent guide for Army officials on counterterrorism intelligence. An assessment of the perceptions of Army provost marshals on the availability and adequacy of counterterrorism intelligence will be made later in this dissertation.

Chapter 4, "Threat Analysis," contains a guide for the local provost marshal to assess the potential terrorist threat to his or her installation or installations. The heart of the chapter is a section entitled, "The Installation Vulnerability Determination System." This section, including the title, was patterned almost exactly on an Appendix in the Science Applications report.<sup>39</sup> The system provides for certain "scores" to be assigned on the basis of particular facts about the individual installation within ten broad factors:

1. Installation's characteristics and its attractiveness as a target for terrorist acts.
2. Law enforcement resources.
3. Distance from urban areas.
4. Size of installation.
5. Routes to and from installation.
6. Attitude of area population.
7. Proximity to foreign borders.
8. Distance from other US military installations.
9. Terrain.
10. Availability of communications with the higher command.<sup>40</sup>

Very little rationale is given in either the training circular or the Science Applications report for the criteria used for the assignment of points for particular attributes that contribute to the total score for an installation. For example, under factor #7, "Proximity to foreign borders," the point system depicted in Table III-3 is established in both sources, yet neither source provides specific rationale for the assigned points.

The training circular gives no basis for assessing points for installations outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). The Science Applications report simply states that installations outside the United States be given the maximum of nine points. In justifying the point system, the Science Applications report states that this factor considers

TABLE III-3<sup>41</sup>  
PROXIMITY TO FOREIGN BORDERS

Location of Installation	Possible Points	Total Possible	Your Score
OCONUS* (Anywhere)	9	9	
MEXICAN BORDER			
0-100 miles	9		
101-500 miles	6		
Over 500 miles**	2		
CANADIAN BORDER			
0-100 miles	6		
101-500 miles	3		
Over 500 miles**	1		

\*The training circular states "CONUS," but this is clearly a typographical error and should be "OCONUS."

\*\*No explanation is given as to how to resolve the built-in problem of how many points to assign to an installation lying between a line 500 miles north of the Mexican border and a line 500 miles south of the Canadian border.

. . . the desirability of preparing for a terrorist attack in a foreign country and also escape after the act. The jurisdictional problems are readily apparent. The southern border of the U.S. is considered to pose a greater problem, in this respect, although this could change with time. . . .<sup>42</sup>

Assignment of points for the other factors appears to be similarly arbitrary. The concept of attempting to quantify the threat based on various factors is commendable,

however, and this guide for assessing the threat to Army installations is at least a beginning. The factors obviously need refinement. As more empirical data are gathered on the incidence of terrorist acts involving Army personnel/material, these vulnerability factors should be improved.

In addition to the point system, the training circular urges the reader to consider certain "subjective and objective information" that may impact on an installation's vulnerability:

- Economy.
- Standard of living.
- Effectiveness of law enforcement.
- Stability of the people's government and their own social and economic situation.
- People's morale and their support for the government and the government's support of the people.<sup>43</sup>

Upon conclusion of the installation threat analysis, the reader of the training circular is urged to "categorize . . . weaknesses into specific countermeasure areas." In addition, the reader is encouraged to examine ". . . countermeasure systems and possibly discover vulnerabilities not seen before."<sup>44</sup>

Although it has its weaknesses, Chapter 4 is a helpful guide to the individual beginning planning for the installation or installations for which he or she may be responsible. Subsequent versions of this chapter of the training

circular need some amplification, but the current guidance assists the reader in analyzing the local terrorist threat.

Chapter 5, "Security Measures," focuses on the prevention aspect of the training circular's overall counterterrorism model. Individual sections discuss and expand upon the concepts of physical security, operational security, and personal security. This subdivision is logical and useful to the local planner. The chapter is straightforward and the emphasis on prevention is fully justified. The theoretical argument for environmental preventive measures could be better presented. This aspect of Army counterterrorism will be addressed in the next chapter of this dissertation.<sup>45</sup>

Among the most confusing aspects of the Army's role in counterterrorism are the questions of authority and jurisdiction. When can military force be used against terrorists? Where can this force be used? Who is in command during different phases of an incident and at what locations? The clear writing of Chapter 6, "Authority and Jurisdiction,"<sup>46</sup> contains considerable evidence of some clear thinking and analysis on the part of this chapter's author, in spite of the previously mentioned problem of lack of clarity of Army policy in this area.

Separate paragraphs are developed for terrorist incidents occurring on-post CONUS (Continental United States), off-post CONUS, on-post OCONUS (Outside Continental United States), and off-post OCONUS. An oft-repeated phrase in

these sections urges the reader to seek specific advice concerning the local situation from the local Staff Judge Advocate (the local commander's military legal advisor).

The chapter concludes with an excellent matrix entitled "Determining Authority and Jurisdiction." Along the "y" axis of the matrix are listed the four territorial possibilities of a terrorist incident mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Along the "x" axis are descriptions of circumstances requiring authority or jurisdiction decisions: initial response; primary authority/jurisdiction; primary law enforcement responsibility; exercising control of military assets; and, primary investigative responsibility. For each intersection of the "x" and "y" axes, there is one or more agency listed. For example, for primary authority/jurisdiction off-post in CONUS, the listed agency is the FBI. There are many instances where two agencies are listed. A note at the bottom of the chart repeats the warning, "Coordinate with the local Staff Judge Advocate for clarification of authority and jurisdiction questions in your area."<sup>47</sup>

The first six chapters of the training circular emphasized the planning aspects of counterterrorism. Chapter 7, "Crisis Management," begins what the model describes as the "action" phase. Most of the chapter deals with the development of a crisis management team. Although not specifically stated, the reader is left with the impression that this team should be developed as a separate entity, in addition

to the commander's normal staff. Clarification is needed early in this chapter to explain precisely how this crisis management team relates with the existing staff.<sup>48</sup>

An organizational diagram of a proposed crisis management team is provided early in the chapter.<sup>49</sup> The various teams that comprise this proposed team appear to be designed primarily for a hostage type terrorist situation: external perimeter security team, interior perimeter security team, negotiation team, special reaction team, and others. This is consistent with the previously mentioned bias of the training circular toward preparations for this type of incident.

The remainder of this chapter describes, in considerable detail, the composition of the various segments of the crisis management team. Details down to suggested uniforms and other equipment are provided. It is a useful reference for the counterterrorism planner. Once the team is organized, the training circular suggests that practice alerts be held at least quarterly.<sup>50</sup>

The remainder of the training circular is devoted to annexes. Annex A is "References."<sup>51</sup> Again, references are exclusively to military publications, films, and training courses. Many excellent sources exist outside the military including: the FBI; the CIA; the State Department; various state and local police departments and academies; and others.

Annex B, "Counterterrorism Crisis Management Plan Format,"<sup>52</sup> is a traditional Army Operations Order with suggestions and examples for local counterterrorism planners for development of a local counterterrorism Operations Order. This is a practical addition to the training circular that will significantly benefit the local counterterrorism planner.

Annex C contains "Standing Operating Procedures for Hostage Situations."<sup>53</sup> As with the preceding annex, this is a practical help to the local planner. It contains many suggestions for consideration for the individual responsible for drafting such a plan at a local installation.

The final Annex of the training circular, "The Special Reaction Team: Assault Tactics in a Counterterrorist Role,"<sup>54</sup> contains a series of checklists for the planners and leaders of assault teams trained to be used against terrorists. It is a very detailed guide for individuals assigned duties that may utilize Special Reaction Teams.

Although the last Annex and most of the rest of the training circular concentrates on hostage-type situations, there is some justification for this in spite of the low percentage of occurrence of this type terrorist incident. A bombing or assassination are "single-stage" terrorist incidents. Once accomplished, the effectiveness of the immediate response of local law enforcement agencies is of relatively little consequence. Hostage-seizing, kidnapping, and some types of extortion, on the other hand, are often

"multi-stage" terrorist incidents, and the response of local law enforcement agencies can be extremely crucial. These "multi-stage" incidents are potentially of great danger not only to all individuals immediately involved but also to the institution against which they are targeted. Their nature demands the most sophisticated, coordinated types of responses. So, although these types of incidents may be numerically few, their potential for harm to the Army is great and the proportional emphasis given them may be justified.

Review of Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine has so far covered the primary policy document (AR 190-52) and the primary doctrinal guide (TC 19-16[Draft]). The next element to be critiqued is the Army's counterterrorism training program. The single most important training course in this program currently in existence is the Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course. The first iteration of this course was presented in June of 1980. The one-week course has been offered approximately once per month since that time. Prerequisites for attending the course are:

Be an installation commander or key staff officer with a planning or operational role in countering terrorism, grade O4 (major) or above (or civilian equivalent) and possess a SECRET clearance.<sup>55</sup>

The Military Police School expects to train over 300 officers each year in this course.<sup>56</sup>

It is apparent that the course designers were either the same individuals who wrote TC 19-16 (Draft), or were at least in very close contact with them. This observation is based, in part, on the stated purpose of the course:

To provide installation commanders and their staffs a systematic approach to countering terrorism on military installations. The course emphasizes planning and includes intelligence gathering, threat analysis, the prevention techniques of physical security, personnel security and OPSEC, authority and jurisdiction, and crisis management planning and action.<sup>57</sup>

This is almost an exact description of the counterterrorism model described in TC 19-16 (Draft) and reproduced in Table III-1 earlier in this chapter. The similarity with the training circular can also be seen by comparing its overall organization, as previously described, with the course design, summarized in Table III-4.

The course culminates in a practical exercise in which the student,

. . . performing as a member of a crisis management team, will accurately recognize and identify the nature of an incident; reliably determine the extent of an incident; and when to activate the crisis management team; successfully identify crisis management actions; supervise the maintenance of logs and records; utilize command actions; determine force to be used; supervise the use of force briefing of the special reaction team; supervise command and control, and review the after-action report.<sup>59</sup>

In order to produce the practical exercise, the school utilized local civilian and military police, as well as actors playing the roles of three masked "terrorists." The "terrorists" seized a military school bus and the local

TABLE III-4<sup>58</sup>

## COUNTERTERRORISM COURSE DESIGN

Subject	Classroom (hours)	Practical Exercise (hours)
<b>Counterterrorism Training</b>		
Introduction to Terrorism	1	
Information and Intelligence		
- Sources	1	
- Restrictions	1	
<b>Terrorism and the Threat Analysis</b>		
The Terrorist Threat	3	
Terrorist Activities	2	
Threat Analysis	1.5	1.5
<b>Security Planning</b>		
Physical Security Evaluations	1.5	
Legal Aspects of Installation		
Physical Security	1.5	
Operations Security and the Terrorist Threat	2	
Personnel Security and the Terrorist Threat	1.5	
<b>Crisis Management Program</b>		
Crisis Management Planning	3	2
Authority and Jurisdiction	2	
Hostage Negotiation Policies	1	
Selection of Crisis Management Team and Hostage Negotiators	1.5	.5
Crisis Management Team Training	3	
Crisis Management Actions	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>9.5</b>

police forces responded. Portions of this were video taped. The edited video tape is now used during the conduct of each session of the course. Using this and other limited information in the time available, students in each course are ". . . required to work out a safe and quick solution to free the hostages. . . ."60

The course is normally limited to 30 students. It is conducted in a sophisticated, electronic classroom which contains an elaborate, small-scale mock Army base. This highly realistic model is used in instruction and during the practical exercise.<sup>61</sup>

A senior military police officer who attended one of the first sessions of the course said it was excellent. This same officer did state, however, that he felt that the course concentrated too much on physical security and not enough on other aspects of prevention. In addition, this officer stated that the instructors seemed to favor the establishment of a separate crisis management team to deal with terrorist incidents at local installations, instead of using the existing installation staff.<sup>62</sup>

This position, also taken by TC 19-16 (Draft), was considered by this senior officer, and others the author has discussed this with, as being redundant and confusing. An assessment of whether special crisis management teams are being formulated or whether the normal staff is being used for counterterrorism will be made later in this dissertation.

The final document to be reviewed in this chapter is Department of the Army Pamphlet 190-52, "Personnel Security Precautions against Acts of Terrorism."<sup>63</sup> It is interesting to note that the Law Enforcement Division is the proponent for this pamphlet, as well as the basic counterterrorism regulation (AR 190-52). Both the pamphlet and the regulation have the same number, and both were published on the same date, 15 June 1978.

Although the regulation was primarily self-generated, this pamphlet was written as a direct result of the publication of Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, "Protection of Department of Defense Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts," dated May 1976. This directive tasked the heads of all Defense Department components (Army, Navy, Air Force) "to take necessary action to ensure that personnel under their cognizance are warned of the terrorist threat. . . ." <sup>64</sup>

The 10-page pamphlet is divided into four chapters: Chapter 1, "Introduction"; Chapter 2, "Nature of Terrorism"; Chapter 3, "Protective Measures"; and, Chapter 4, "Guidance to Hostages and Kidnapped Individuals." In addition to these chapters, the pamphlet has an appendix devoted to references.

The "Introduction" chapter states that terrorism is an increasing problem and that actions must be taken to counter this trend. The stated applicability of the

pamphlet is broad: All major Army commands and the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, when federalized.<sup>65</sup>

The two-and-a-half page chapter on the nature of terrorism contains a broad introduction to the threat posed by terrorists. Points stressed include the detailed planning done by terrorists, the difficulty of detecting them, the extreme violence of their attacks, and their desire to gain access to the media by their actions.<sup>66</sup>

Chapter 3, "Protective Measures," contains several lists of specific suggestions for diminishing the chances of individuals being successfully targeted by terrorists. There is a list of suggestions for all individuals, for military personnel, for school authorities, and for children. The suggestions range from common sense/common knowledge suggestions ("Lock your car when it is unattended") to more specific, special situation suggestions ("Watch for unexplained absences of local citizens as early warning of possible terrorist action").<sup>67</sup>

The final chapter, "Guidance to Hostages and Kidnapped Individuals," is a one-page list of 15 suggestions for individuals who find themselves the victims of a kidnapping or hostage situation. The suggestions center on keeping calm, not divulging information unnecessarily, not unnecessarily alienating the terrorists, and observing as much as possible for later investigation.<sup>68</sup>

The appendix in the pamphlet devoted to references is almost an exact copy of the references listed in the

counterterrorism regulation (AR 190-52). As with the regulation, no civilian references are listed, and of 25 total references, only three are non-Army publications. All three of these are Department of Defense publications. No effort has been made to provide the reader with civilian sources.<sup>69</sup>

The three publications and one training course reviewed constitute the core of the Army's counterterrorism policy and doctrine. Oblique and direct references are made in other Army sources to programs that can contribute to counterterrorism programs. For example: Field Manual 19-10, "Military Police Operations," contains a section on Special Reaction Teams; Field Manual 19-30, "Physical Security," is generally applicable to protecting Army materiel from all who would harm it, including terrorists; Army Regulation 500-50, "Civil Disturbances," establishes policy for coping with disturbances which may (or may not) be led or instigated by terrorists; and, Army Regulation 190-31, "Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program," establishes programs that are designed to prevent crimes against Army personnel and materiel, including those which may be committed by terrorists. The list of other policy statements and doctrinal publications which have some bearing on counterterrorism is quite extensive.<sup>70</sup> In addition, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the many layers of Army commands may, and usually do supplement regulations with ones providing greater specificity for

their regional and local situations. The various levels of Army commands may also establish regional and local training programs. The detailed review and improvement of these many other publications and training programs must be left to the hundreds of individuals responsible for their specific production and maintenance.

## FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism."
- <sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, "AR 190-52," p. 1/1.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>4</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 1/1-1/2.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 1/2.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 1/2-1/3.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. C/1.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 2/1-2/3.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. A/1-A/2
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. B/1-B/2.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. D/1=D/2.
- <sup>15</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)."
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 4.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 5.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 8-11.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 19 & 21-22.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>30</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," pp. A/27-A/28. The report states that these figures are for the period 1968-1976 and that they exclude CONUS (Continental United States) domestic/political acts. The full figures plus percentages calculated by the author are as follows:

<u>Type Incident</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Bombings	501	43.5
Hijackings/skyjackings	146	12.7
Kidnappings	137	11.9
Armed assaults/ambushes	119	10.3
Incendiary/arson	103	8.9
Assassination	63	5.5
Hostage-taking/barricading	35	3.0
Other	48	4.2
Total	1,152	100.0

<sup>31</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, International Terrorism in 1978 (Washington: 1979), p. 9.

<sup>32</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," pp. 25a-25b. "Courtesy of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from NUREG-0459." It is usual practice in doctrine-production at the Military Police School to write publications such as this without citations.

<sup>33</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," pp. 26-33.

<sup>34</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," pp. 9-10 & F/1-F/10, especially p. F/2.

<sup>35</sup>Burton, Urban Terrorism, pp. 216-217.

<sup>36</sup>5 United States Code, Section 552.

<sup>37</sup>5 United States Code, Section 552a.

<sup>38</sup>Army Regulations 190-52, 190-53, 340-17, 340-21, 340-21-5, and 380-13.

<sup>39</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," pp. E/1-E/13.

<sup>40</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," pp. 35-36, and with only minor differences in wording, Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," p. E/3.

<sup>41</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," p. 40, and with only minor differences, Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," p. E/9.

<sup>42</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," pp. E/7-E/9.

<sup>43</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," p. 43.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-58.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-64.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 65-95.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 96-98.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 99-106.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., pp. 107-137.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-179.

<sup>55</sup>United States Army Military Police School, undated flyer describing Counterterrorism Course.

<sup>56</sup>"New Counterterrorism Course," Military Police, Vol. 7, NO. 3, Fall 1980, p. 28.

<sup>57</sup>United States Army Military Police School, "Program of Instruction Number 7HF13" (Fort McClellan, Alabama, 1979), p. 1.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>59</sup>"New Course," Military Police, p. 29.

<sup>60</sup>MP School, "Program of Instruction," p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>"Off-the-record" interview conducted by the author in July 1980.

<sup>63</sup>Department of the Army, "Pamphlet 190-52, "Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism," 15 June 1978.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 1/1.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 2/1-2/3.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., pp. 3/1-3/3.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 4/1.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. A/1.

<sup>70</sup>A partial list of such publications includes:

AR 1-4, Employment of Department of Army Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service.

AR 10-23, United States Army Criminal Investigation Command.

AR 27-50, Status of Forces Policies, Procedures, and Information.

AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety.

AR 50-6, Chemical Surety Program.

AR 190-10, Security of Government Officials.

AR 190-11, Physical Security of Army, Ammunition, and Explosives.

AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program.

AR 190-28, Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties.

AR 190-49, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives in-Transit.

AR 190-50, Physical Security for Storage of Controlled Medical Substances and Other Medically Sensitive Items.

AR 190-51, Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level.

AR 190-53, Interception of Wire and Oral Communications for Law Enforcement Purposes.

AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations.

AR 380-20, Restricted Areas.

AR 380-55, Safeguarding Classified Defense Information in the Movement of Persons and Things.

AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army and Deliberate Security Violations (SEADA).

AR 415-22, Protection of Petroleum Installations and Related Facilities.

AR 500-1, Aircraft Piracy Emergencies.

AR 600-40, Apprehension, Restraint, and  
Release to Civil Authorities.

FM 19-5, The Military Police Handbook.

FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances.

TC 19-5, Bomb Threats.

TC 23-14, Sniper Training and Employment.

TC 100-1, Operations Security (OPSEC).

(Source: TC 19-16 [Draft])

## CHAPTER IV

### OTHER LITERATURE AND ARMY COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND DOCTRINE

There have been tomes of literature produced in recent years on the subject of terrorism. The Military Police School has compiled a terrorism bibliography with approximately 3,400 entries comprised of what is termed "current material."<sup>1</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency has published a 225-page, 1,277 entry annotated bibliography on transnational and international terrorism.<sup>2</sup> A computer search conducted for the author on the specific subject of "prevention of terrorism" by the National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the United States Department of Justice resulted in abstracts of 111 documents.<sup>3</sup> The problem faced by researchers in this area is not so much one of finding material as it is of sifting through the vast amounts of published material available in order to find something of specific relevance.

This chapter will compare existing Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine with selected samples of related literature produced outside the official Army system. Areas that will be examined include theories of terrorism, threat and consequences of Army over-reaction to terrorism,

deterrence theory as it relates to Army response to terrorism, and Army cognizance of environmental and other aspects of counterterrorism.

Official Army policy on counterterrorism falls short of developing a full theory of terrorism. Given the Army's limited policy-development role in national counterterrorism plans, detailed theory development may be unnecessary. The Army has developed a counterterrorism model (Table III-1) but little theoretical foundation for this model is in evidence in the Army literature.

In his dissertation, "Ecology of Terrorism: A Historical and Statistical Study," Lawrence C. Hamilton presents four theories of terrorism that in his view are reasonable constructs from the existing literature. Hamilton also reaches conclusions which may be of use to the Army.<sup>4</sup>

Hamilton's "A" theory of terrorism draws heavily on the writings of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara. The central theme of this theory is found in this particular quote from Guevara:

(Terrorism), by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or less legal or semiclandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment.<sup>5</sup>

This self-defeating aspect of terrorism is built into the five propositions Hamilton uses to support "A" theory:

1. Misery leads to terrorism.
2. Oppression leads to terrorism.
3. Terrorism leads to police oppression.
4. Police oppression decreases opportunities for contact with the masses.

5. Contact with the masses is crucial for revolution.<sup>6</sup>

This theory is more useful, perhaps, to terrorists as advice than to those responsible for counterterrorism programs. The proposition that terrorism leads to police oppression is a theme that runs through much of the terrorism literature, and will be examined later in this dissertation.

Hamilton's "B" theory of terrorism draws primarily on the concepts expressed by Carlos Marighela. Although the basis of the causes of terrorism are the same, the forecast results are different. The key rationale is provided in these Marighela quotes:

The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. . . . The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecutions. Political assassinations and political terror become routine . . . the problems in the lives of the people become truly catastrophic.

In their vain attempt to prevent revolutionary activity through violent laws, the enemy has become more cruel than ever, using police terror indistinguishable from that used by the Nazis. . . . In such a climate our revolution is gaining ground.<sup>7</sup>

The "B" theory propositions are:

1. Misery leads to terrorism.
2. Oppression leads to terrorism.
3. Terrorism leads to greater oppression.
4. Greater oppression leads to even greater revolutionary activities, hence, ultimately to revolution.<sup>8</sup>

The warning to the counterterror planner in this theory is that oppression (over-reaction) may fan the flames of the revolution. The terrorist tactics which

ultimately led to the successful revolt against the French in Algeria could be cited as an example of this theory.

Hamilton's "C" theory of terrorism is similar to the preceding theory with a pacific twist. The propositions are:

1. Misery leads to terrorism.
2. Oppression leads to terrorism.
3. Terrorism leads to moderate reform, i.e., less oppression.<sup>9</sup>

The similarities in the first three theories of terrorism are evident. They all assume that misery and oppression lead to terrorism. The counterterrorism planner can use these conditions, to some degree, to predict terror. This was done in the Science Applications report and TC 19-16 (Draft), "Counterterrorism," with the threat analysis design. Hamilton's "D" theory departs from these propositions in order to explain terrorism in affluent, liberal societies:

1. Lack of misery leads to terrorism.
2. Lack of oppression leads to terrorism.
3. Terrorism leads to oppression.
4. Terrorism increases the probability of a military coup.
5. Oppression decreases the probability of a successful revolution.<sup>10</sup>

Warnings to Army counterterrorism planners in this theory are that terrorism can surface in affluent, liberal societies, and pressures to conduct a coup may result.

Hamilton also discusses Ted Gurr's theory of relative deprivation and terrorism presented in Gurr's Why Men Rebel: the crucial point is not the level of deprivation,

but the difference between expectations and actual fulfillment. Also discussed is Gurr's concept of "utilitarian justifications" for violence, e.g., relative strength of regime and rebel forces, degrees of external support for each, and the historical success of past insurgencies. The final Gurr concept examined is "normative justifications" for violence: these include violence which is a learned, cultural response.<sup>11</sup>


Although Gurr used his concepts to explain much broader categories of violence, Hamilton uses them in an admittedly simplified framework to create an "E" theory of terrorism. This theory is best illustrated with Hamilton's "causal graph" presented at Table IV-1. The value of this theory to the counterterrorism planner is in the various concepts presented which may contribute to a better understanding of the causes of terrorism.

Hamilton ultimately arrives at these conclusions:

- (1) Is terrorism most likely under the most oppressive governments, or under the least oppressive? Other things being equal, it is most likely under the least oppressive.
- (2) Once terrorism arises, is government oppression more likely to increase or decrease? It is almost certain to increase, either temporarily or permanently.
- (3) If oppression is increased, will that stimulate terrorism to increase as well? It will further stimulate terrorism if the terrorists survive the government countermeasures.
- (4) Does terrorism increase the probability of revolution? It increases the probability of wider violence, but apparently does not affect the likelihood of a successful revolution.<sup>12</sup>

TABLE IV-1<sup>13</sup>

HAMILTON'S "E" THEORY OF TERRORISM



Implications for Army counterterrorism programs arising from these conclusions will be discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation.

One of the concepts that occurs repeatedly in the literature is the danger of government over-reaction to terrorism:

The dimensions of the classic liberal dilemma in urban terrorist situations are by now well enough known; the terrorist is attempting to provoke an over-reaction and thus to make the Government appear repressive.<sup>14</sup>

One of the most urgent reasons for keeping down terrorism is to ensure that we are not faced with the introduction of Draconian measures as the only alternative to death, destruction and chaos; the kind of "repression" which Carlos Marighela exhorts his disciples to provoke.

Over-reaction would not only poison our way of life, it would also play into the terrorists' hands, by building more public sympathy for them, and by increasing what is now only a tiny trickle of recruits to their ranks.<sup>15</sup>

Specific warnings have been sounded to alert the Army to the danger of oppressive over-reaction to terrorist incidents. In his thesis, "A Theory on Terrorist Activity in America and Its Effect on the United States Army," John B. Reisz states:

Terrorist successes . . . are largely dependent on military ignorance of the psychologies involved. The natural military reaction to a physical threat is, by virtue of training and experience, to reciprocate with immediate overwhelming force. Indeed, [Army] reaction to past civil disturbances of a decade ago evidences this tendency. Terrorists would rely on these factors to assist in bringing forth the desired over-reaction and repressive measures

against a segment of the population which may already feel victimized by its government.<sup>16</sup>

This fear of Army over-reaction and repression in the face of terrorism is not founded on the facts. The published Army policy previously reviewed in this dissertation leaves no doubt that the Attorney General and Secretary of State are the primary decision-makers for Army response to terrorism incidents within the United States and in foreign lands respectively. There is no reason to doubt that the Army would strictly abide by the orders of its civilian chiefs. The continuing tradition of American military obedience to its civilian political leaders, from the time of the revolution to the present, is the envy of the other nations of the world.

This is not to say that the Army is politically impotent. The Army has significant political efficacy. Its access to the President, the Congress, and to the people through its uniformed leaders is matched by few institutions in the nation. The same traditional restraint that has kept the Army loyal to its civilian chiefs, though, has worked to keep the Army's political potential in close check. Rigid Army policy prohibits soldiers of any rank from participating in political demonstrations in uniform. Soldiers are also prohibited from such activities during duty hours, in or out of uniform. Army regulations also severely restrict the possibility of soldiers on active duty being elected to public offices.

In addition to the policy controls giving virtually all decision-making authority, following initial reaction, to the Departments of Justice and State, the Army's internal reporting procedures established by existing policy make it quite clear that no significant military action or reaction in relation to a terrorist incident would or could be taken without the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the President. This is true even in the jurisdictions where Army authority to act is the greatest: on Army installations within the United States.

Contrary to Reisz's allegation about the Army's civil disturbance control role in the 1970's, considering the vast firepower at the disposal of the troops committed, tremendous restraint was exhibited. Additionally, the complete civilian control of Army troops was never in doubt.

The potential for over-reaction to terrorism surely diminishes as the number of terrorist incidents decreases. A great deal of existing Army literature dealing with terrorism concentrates on coping with terrorist incidents after they occur. Effectively and efficiently responding to terrorist incidents is clearly a commendable goal, but preventing these terrorist incidents with comparable or smaller resource expenditures would obviously be an even better goal.

The Military Police School's Counterterrorism Model (Table III-1) recognizes the importance of prevention by devoting a significant portion of the model to physical

security, personal security, and operational security. In addition, one chapter of the draft training circular and over 20% of the Counterterrorism Course are devoted to the subject of prevention.<sup>17</sup> Even though these efforts are significant, there still may not be enough emphasis in Army policy and doctrine on the deterrence of terrorism directed against the Army.

Although the differences between terrorism and conventional criminal behavior are significant, terrorism does inevitably involve some criminal acts. Therefore, it is useful to examine some crime prevention theories.

Among the primary theories of crime prevention within the criminal justice literature have been those of general deterrence and specific deterrence. Specific deterrence, in theory, occurs when an individual offender has received punishment which exceeded the rewards of his or her crime. The specific offender is thus deterred (in theory) from again committing a crime and again being punished in excess of the rewards of the crime. Current recidivism rates tend to weaken the validity of this theory.

General deterrence flows from specific deterrence. Members of the general public, seeing the effective punishment of criminals, are deterred from committing crimes so that they too will avoid punishment. There is general agreement that in order for general deterrence to be effective, punishment must be swift and certain.<sup>18</sup> The inability of many liberal governments to meet this standard is

well-known. One of the classic examples of the weakness of general deterrence is the case of "pickpockets engaged in picking pockets at public executions when other pickpockets were being executed. . . ."19

Given the questionable effectiveness of specific and general deterrence to prevent crime generally and terrorism specifically, other deterrence models will be briefly examined. Prevention of terrorism might be enhanced by application of other deterrence theories.

Conventional wisdom in the military holds that your military opponent will be deterred from attacking when he perceives that you have the capability and the will to inflict unacceptable losses on him if he attacks. This is the concept that drives the current strategic nuclear "balance of terror." Large standing armies in Europe, the Republic of Korea, and other places on the globe give further support to this dictum of deterrence. Although the cost of maintaining such deterrents may be high, many agree that this cost is less than the costs of defending against an actual attack, or yielding to political demands of a much more militarily powerful adversary.

Ernest H. Evans puts the theory in a slightly different way: ". . . deterrence is the art of convincing an opponent that the costs and risks of a particular course of action outweigh the benefits: that  $C$  (costs) +  $R$  (risks) >  $B$  (benefits).<sup>20</sup> If one accepts this formula, there are two ways to increase deterrence: raise the potential enemy's

costs and risks, or lower his perception of possible benefits.<sup>21</sup> It is the former that drives most current United States national defense policies.

Putting terrorists in the role of potential enemies (as indeed they have proven themselves to be), Evans' deterrence model can be most useful. The first assumption that must be made, however, is that terrorists possess a sufficient degree of rationality to weigh the cost-benefit risks of their actions. It is recognized that perceptions of what is rational vary from culture to culture and even from person to person. Some general conclusions are necessary on this topic, however, even though exceptions will certainly be found. Evans makes the same observation that others have made on the question of terrorist rationality:

. . . a frequent misapprehension about terrorist groups is that their violence is mindless and purposeless; . . . such violence is in the main quite purposive: it seeks to attain a valued objective, whether the liberation of one's homeland . . . or the smashing of international imperialism. . . .<sup>22</sup>

Granting the requisite rationality for application of deterrence theory, examination will first be made of ways to convince the potential terrorists that the costs and risks are high. As previously discussed, Chapter 5, "Security Measures," of TC 19-16 (Draft) is a useful presentation of general, logical steps aimed at the prevention of terrorism. A key portion of the theory of deterrence is ignored in this chapter, however. No mention is

made as to how the recommended steps will change the terrorists' perception of costs and risks associated with attacking a particular installation. Although major terrorist attacks are known to be preceded by extensive surveillance of the potential targets, if security measures of the targets are well hidden, disguised, or otherwise kept secret, the security measures serve no deterrent role. Deterrence theory suggests that scarce security resources should be proportionally allocated so that cost/risk-raising protective systems are readily apparent to potential attackers.

This concept goes directly against much traditional military thinking. Intelligence conscious military officers are likely to reason that security measures must be kept secret so that the potential enemy is denied the opportunity of planning for their compromise: "If the terrorists are aware of all our security measures, they can develop sufficiently sophisticated plans to compromise them," might be the argument of a local Army commander. Another argument that could be made against a more visible security system is that it would not deter terrorists, it would simply divert their attack to an installation with less visible security measures. Of course, security systems can be made more visible without revealing their complete width and depth. And, if one takes the defeatist attitude that the terrorists are coming in spite of what is done, there is little need to do anything in the way of prevention.

The fact remains that the security planner should be given some guidance in deterrence theory in order to make more rational decisions with scarce resources. It is not the mere existence of security systems that may deter terrorists, it is the terrorists' awareness of them that may serve as a deterrent. Current policy and doctrine offer virtually no information on this crucial area of terrorism prevention.

A somewhat different approach from Evans' for prevention is taken by C. Ray Jeffery in his seminal work on the environmental factor in criminal behavior, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Jeffery states that criminal behavior involves four elements:

1. The reinforcement available from the criminal act;
2. The risk involved in the commission of the crime;
3. The past conditioning history of the individual involved; and,
4. The opportunity structure to commit the act.<sup>23</sup>

Jeffery links these elements in a formula that bears some similarities to the Evans' deterrence formula:

Criminal behavior can be represented as gain (G) minus risk (R) plus interaction with the conditioning history (CH) plus interaction with environmental opportunity (EO). In order to change criminal behavior, we must change the environment . . . by (1) decreasing the reinforcement available from criminal acts, and (2) increasing the risk involved in criminal acts.<sup>24</sup>

Because there is little that can be done in a free society to alter the conditioning history of its citizens, the focus must be on alteration of the environment.

Jeffery states that the most important of the two environmental factors to be changed is the "reinforcement available."<sup>25</sup> The reduction of "gain" or "benefits" has been attempted by a United States policy of "no negotiations, no concessions." Evans argues that this in effect serves to increase terrorist gains by providing much more publicity than if certain quiet "cosmetic concessions" were made.<sup>26</sup> Another means of attempting to reduce gains would be imposition of news blackouts or strict censorship of news concerning terrorist incidents. Since access to the media is a well known terrorist goal, this policy might serve to deter terrorism. Communist countries with state controlled media have few attempts to gain access to the media through terrorism. Any action to control the media, of course, raises serious Constitutional questions which are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Since actions such as those discussed in the preceding paragraph are policy decisions beyond the authority of the Army, the focus of Army attention in the matter of deterrence of terrorists should be on convincing potential terrorists that the costs and risks of assaulting Army installations, materiel, and personnel are too great. The emphasis must be on environmental design factors that will raise costs and risks and will be apparent to potential terrorists.

Although not nearly so big and widespread as the Army, another large American institution has recently

achieved significant success by incorporating a number of environmental design factors aimed at decreasing the violence directed at it. Southland Corporation, parent company of 6,805 "7-Eleven" convenience stores around the United States and Canada, hired a former armed robber as a security consultant.

On the convict's advice, hidden cameras were discarded, silent alarms disconnected and secret mirrors removed. All security devices were brought into plain view. . . . His theory was based on visibility -- demonstrate to the potential robber his risks before the crime was committed in hopes of showing the crime would not work.

The "7-Eleven" stores began to acquire a new look . . . posters and display advertising that cluttered storefronts gave way to a neat, open appearance.<sup>27</sup>

This deterrence theory campaign was highly successful. During the five-year period following its initiation and ending in July 1980, there had been a 30% drop in armed robberies of "7-Eleven" stores. Those hold-ups that did occur during this period "resulted in 50% less related violence against cashiers and store employees."<sup>28</sup>

This is but one example of many campaigns to successfully reduce violence targeted at specific establishments. Conclusions that can be drawn from this and other civilian efforts will be discussed in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Joseph P. Sammartane and David J. Turner, "Terrorism: A Selected Bibliography," U.S. Army Military Police School, 1979.

<sup>2</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, "Annotated Bibliography on Transnational and International Terrorism," December 1976.

<sup>3</sup>National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Individual Computer Search Log Number 069458, August 8, 1980.

<sup>4</sup>Lawrence C. Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism: A Historical and Statistical Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1978), pp. 65-95.

<sup>5</sup>Che Guevara quoted in Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism," p. 69.

<sup>6</sup>Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism," pp. 66-69.

<sup>7</sup>Carlos Marghela quoted in Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism," pp. 74-75.

<sup>8</sup>Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism," pp. 75-76.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 81-82.

<sup>11</sup>Ted Gurr quoted in Hamilton, "Ecology of Terrorism," p. 86. Hamilton also discusses the findings of H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg which bring conservative pro-regime violence into Gurr's theoretical framework as well as anti-regim violence. Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 180-181.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>14</sup>Burton, Urban Terrorism, p. 213.

<sup>15</sup>Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism, p. 149.

- <sup>16</sup>Reisz, "Theory on Terrorist Activity," p. 101.
- <sup>17</sup>MP School, "TC 19-16 (Draft)," Chapter 5, "Security Countermeasures," pp. 45-58; MP School, "Program of Instruction"; and Table III-4 of this dissertation.
- <sup>18</sup>C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 44.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 43.
- <sup>20</sup>Evans, "American Policy Response," p. 81.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 91.
- <sup>23</sup>Jeffery, Crime Prevention, p. 177.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 178.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup>Evans, "American Policy Response," pp. 146-147.
- <sup>27</sup>"7-Eleven Book 'Expert' Advice on Stopping Crime," Washington Post, July 7, 1980, p. 13.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER V

### ASSESSMENT OF PERCEPTIONS OF ARMY PROVOST MARSHALS ON TERRORISM THREATS AND COUNTERTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS

Policy and doctrine are not free. Resources must be allocated to research, write, coordinate, publish, and disseminate policy and doctrine. Resources must also be allocated to provide for timely feedback in order to monitor the viability of existing policy and doctrine. Without sufficient, accurate feedback, it is difficult for policy-makers and doctrine-producers to make the proper decisions concerning the allocation of resources available to them. One relatively inexpensive way to obtain desired feedback is with surveys.

A survey questionnaire was prepared in conjunction with the research conducted by Science Applications, Inc. The questionnaire pertained to the perceptions of senior Army law enforcement officers concerning the threat posed to their installations by terrorism and their preparedness to counter such threats. The original plan was to mail the questionnaires to "certain installations." The report does not specify which installations were to receive questionnaires. As with much research, problems were encountered:

. . . unforeseen staffing difficulties precluded sending the survey to the selected installations. As a result, it was decided to prepare the survey for presentation to the attendees at the Law Enforcement Conference held at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama 1-3 March 1977.

While only 12 responses (approximately 17%) were returned for analysis it is believed that it represents a valid sample.<sup>1</sup>

The report does not further identify the recipients of the surveys or those who responded. The only rationale presented to justify why the researchers felt the 12 responses represented a valid sample is that, "This view is based on the wide variance of current law enforcement responsibilities of the respondents."<sup>2</sup> However, there is no evidence on the responses presented by the Science Applications report to indicate that the "variance of current law enforcement responsibilities" was measured or reported in any way on the survey instrument. Even if a variance of responsibility had been established and presented, there is no explanation of how that fact would make the small sample valid. A copy of the survey questions used by Science Applications is at Table V-1. A complete report of the responses is at Appendix I.

Science Applications, Inc. summarized the findings of their survey as follows:

- There is a wide variance in the perception of the terrorist threat to Army installations.
- There is a divided opinion on the role of Military Police versus CID (Army plainclothes criminal investigators) in responding to acts of terrorism.
- There is general agreement on lack of policy guidance in countering terrorism.

TABLE VI-1

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS QUESTIONS TO SENIOR  
ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

- 
1. What do you perceive to be the terrorist threat within your area of responsibility?
  2. What sources of local intelligence concerning terrorism are available to you?
  3. What do you consider to be the prime targets for terrorist acts on installations within your area of responsibility?
  4. If there have been terrorist threats, or acts, within your area of responsibility who conducted them, when, with what means, and where? What were the lessons learned?
  5. What policy guidance has been provided to counter terrorism?
  6. What changes or additions to policy guidance would facilitate planning to counter terrorism?
  7. Within your area of responsibility, how are "crisis management" teams organized? What disciplines are represented?
  8. Regarding jurisdiction, who is "in charge" during a terrorist crisis? (At the scene of the incident)
  9. During an act of terror what type of command, control, and communications procedures would be used?
  10. During an act of terror what would be the response elements and tactics?
  11. During an act of terror what type of procedures would be used during negotiations with terrorists (who would negotiate; with what type technique)?
  12. During an act of terror how would the public affairs aspect be handled?
  13. During an act of terror what special applications would be employed?
  14. What additional equipment and technology would you like to have to cope with terrorism?
-


- There are varying degrees of emergency plans developed at installation level.
- There appears to be a lack of understanding, or appreciation of jurisdictional problems associated with acts of terrorism.
- There is little or no appreciation that an actual terrorist act on a military installation can be escalated quickly to the national level rather than being contained at the installation.<sup>4</sup>

Although this may represent a fair summary of the 12 responses received, use of this summary to describe the perceptions of most or even many Army law enforcement officers would be an error. If Army policy-makers are interested in Armywide perceptions of Army law enforcement officers, the Science Applications survey results are clearly out of date and otherwise inadequate.

The Science Applications survey represented the first formal attempt to measure perceptions of Army law enforcement officers on the subject of terrorism. No evidence has been found of any official attempts to measure such perceptions subsequent to the Science Applications survey and prior to the research conducted for this dissertation.

Shortly after the submission of the Science Applications report in 1977, several major efforts were made by the Army to fill the then existing counterterrorism policy and doctrine voids. Among these efforts were: the preparation, staffing, approval, publication, and distribution of Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations"; the drafting and initial staffing of Training Circular 19-16 (Draft),





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

"Counterterrorism"; and, the development and initiation of classes of the Military Police School's "Counterterrorism Course."

How effective have these steps been? What are the perceptions of the Army's key law enforcement officers (provost marshals) concerning the adequacy of existing Army policy and doctrine? Is additional guidance needed? Should existing guidance be changed? These and other questions concerning Army counterterrorism require answers if the Army is to effectively plan for protection of its assets from terrorist threats.

Surveys of Army personnel by agencies of the Army or agencies sponsored by the Army must be approved by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).<sup>5</sup> Each survey request must be sponsored by an Army agency. The most logical sponsor for a survey on Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine is the Army's chief policy-making agency for law enforcement and crime prevention matters, the Law Enforcement Division (LED) of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) in the Pentagon. In September of 1980, the chief of the Law Enforcement Division agreed to sponsor a survey of Army provost marshals on, "Opinions of the Adequacy of Current Counterterrorism Preparedness at Army Installations," proposed by the author. In October of 1980 the LED division chief sent a formal "Request for Approval" to the appropriate

Army Agency.<sup>6</sup> An initial draft of the proposed survey was attached to this request.

After review of the letter and draft survey, the agency within TRADOC responsible for such matters, the Soldier Support Center, corresponded directly with the author to refine the instrument. Suggested revisions were communicated in two letters and several telephone calls. Approval to distribute the survey was granted in February of 1981.<sup>7</sup> A copy of the final approved survey is at Appendix II.

The individuals selected to respond to this survey were the officers on Army commanders' staffs (at all levels of command) responsible for law enforcement and crime prevention: the Army provost marshals. Since the number of provost marshals is relatively small, it was decided to send surveys to all of them in lieu of utilizing a sampling technique. A copy of the mailing list used is at Appendix III.<sup>8</sup>

A total of 191 surveys was mailed on 9 March 1981. Five surveys were destroyed by recipients or returned incompleated due to duplication or other reasons.<sup>3</sup> Completed surveys were received from 134 of the recipients for a response rate of 72%. A compilation of all responses is at Appendix IV.

A large majority of the respondents reported that their title was provost marshal or acting provost marshal (86.6%). The remainder reported that they were security

officers (performing basically the same type duties as provost marshals), deputy provost marshals, or other staff officers with law enforcement responsibilities. All respondents will be referred to as "provost marshals" throughout the remainder of the dissertation.

The respondents were spread through all the expected Army ranks: 29.1% were junior officers (second lieutenants, first lieutenants, or captains); 23.9% were majors; 27.6% were lieutenant colonels; 13.4% were colonels; and 6% were from the enlisted ranks or civilians.

The remainder of this chapter will be used to examine the results of the survey on the basis of: reported history of terrorism within the areas of responsibility of the provost marshals; perceptions of accessibility and adequacy of local counterterrorism intelligence; perceptions of the degree of conventional and unconventional terrorist threats; measures of counterterrorism preparedness; and, the perceptions as to the overall adequacy of protection currently provided to likely terrorist targets.

Asked how many "criminal acts attributable to terrorists" had occurred during the last three years within their areas of responsibility, 32.8% of the respondents reported one or more. Although provost marshals based outside the United States constituted only 40.3% of the respondents, 75% of the total reporting past incidents of this nature were foreign-based. Table V-2 depicts responses to this item controlling for location. Respondents from the

TABLE V-2  
 NUMBER OF PAST TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY LOCATION

Responses to the question: Approximately how many criminal acts attributable to terrorists have there been within your area of responsibility during the last three years?

LOCATION	# of Responses (%)	None (%)	One (%)	Two (%)	Three (%)	Four (%)	More than four (%)
U.S.	80 (59.7)	69 (76.7)	4 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	1 (25.0)	0 ( 0.0)	5 (41.7)
Foreign	54 (40.3)	21 (23.3)	14 (77.8)	7 (87.5)	3 (75.0)	2 (100.0)	7 (58.3)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>134(100.0)</b>	<b>90(100.0)</b>	<b>18(100.0)</b>	<b>8(100.0)</b>	<b>4(100.0)</b>	<b>2 (100.0)</b>	<b>12(100.0)</b>

United States are over-represented in the column showing respondents reporting no incidents in the last three years. In all other columns, the foreign-based provost marshals are over-represented. This result supports, in principle, the point system used for threat analysis for foreign installations found in TC 19-16 (Draft) and discussed earlier in this dissertation.

As previously discussed, one of the strongest positions taken by the Science Applications report was on what it considered the dysfunctional restrictions placed on Army intelligence gathering by the federal government:

It has been the general consensus among military law enforcement officials interviewed . . . that as a result of the restrictions placed on Federal (to include military) intelligence gathering agencies, their only source of information would be state and local officials. What is emerging is that in many of our major cities and states law enforcement intelligence files dealing with subversive and extremist organizations have been destroyed or otherwise made inaccessible, and that law enforcement officers now find themselves almost paralyzed by the pyramiding restrictions on intelligence operations.<sup>10</sup>

The respondents overwhelmingly (98.5%) reported that they had "access to sources of intelligence and police information concerning local terrorist threats." On the more critical question of adequacy of that intelligence and information, 80.6% of those responding agreed or strongly agreed that it was adequate. Table V-3 controls responses by location. Location of respondents appears to have little bearing on their perceptions of adequacy of

TABLE V-3

PERCEIVED ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE BY LOCATION

Responses to statement: "Local sources of intelligence and police information concerning terrorist threats are adequate."

	# of Responses (%)	Strongly Agree (F)	Agree (F)	Disagree (F)	Strongly Disagree (%)
U.S.	80 ( 59.7)	12 ( 48.0)	52 ( 62.7)	12 ( 60.0)	4 ( 66.7)
Foreign	54 ( 40.3)	13 ( 52.0)	31 ( 37.3)	8 ( 40.0)	2 ( 33.3)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>134 (100.0)</b>	<b>25 (100.0)</b>	<b>83 (100.0)</b>	<b>20 (100.0)</b>	<b>6 (100.0)</b>

intelligence. Attempts to determine factors contributing to differences in perceptions of adequacy of intelligence by controlling for grade (rank) and length of assignment also failed to indicate significant trends.

Survey results clearly refute the fears expressed by the Science Applications report in 1977. The responses to the current survey indicate that counterterrorism intelligence and police information are almost universally available to the respondents and that a sizable majority of respondents considers this intelligence and information to be adequate.

The survey instrument was designed to measure the perceptions of the respondents concerning the likelihood of two general types of terrorist attacks involving Army personnel/materiel. Both types involve "criminal acts with political overtones" by "some group." The first will be referred to as "conventional terrorist activities" and includes attempted: hostage taking, bombing, assassination, aircraft hijacking, arson, and theft of conventional arms. The second type of terrorist attack will be referred to as "unconventional terrorist activities" and includes attempted: theft of a nuclear device, threat or detonation of a nuclear device, theft of a chemical device, or threat or detonation of a chemical device.

Of the six conventional terrorist threats, the respondents perceived the most likely threat in the next year within their areas of responsibility to be attempted

theft of conventional arms, with 48.1% of those responding to this item stating that such an event was likely or very likely. The next most likely perceived conventional threat was attempted bombing (47.0% stating very likely or likely), followed by attempted arson (46.3%), attempted hostage taking (30.8%), attempted assassination (20.5%) and attempted hijacking (20.3%).

Table V-4 controls perception of conventional terrorism threat by location. The foreign-based provost marshals are uniformly over-represented in each column. Among provost marshals reporting that a terrorist-attempted assassination is likely or very likely in the next 12 months, 85.2% are based outside the United States. It is interesting to note that of 54 respondents from foreign locations, 19 (35.2%) considered bombing attempts by terrorists to be very likely in the next 12 months, and 17 (31.5%) considered such an attack to be likely. Fully 66.7% of the reporting foreign-based provost marshals considered such attacks likely or very likely within their area of responsibility.

Table V-5 controls perception of conventional terrorist threat by dispersion of area of responsibility. Provost marshals responsible for more than one installation have distinctly higher perceptions of conventional terrorist attempts.

Table V-6 controls perception of conventional terrorist threat by military population in areas of responsibility.

TABLE V-4  
PERCEPTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL TERRORIST THREAT BY LOCATION

	Attempted Hostage Taking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Bombing Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Assassin- ation Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Aircraft Hijacking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Arson Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Theft of Conven- tional Arms Very Likely or Likely (%)
U.S.	80 (59.7)	16 (39.0)	27 (42.9)	4 (14.8)	13 (48.1)	27 (43.5)
Foreign	54 (40.3)	25 (61.0)	36 (57.1)	23 (85.2)	14 (51.9)	35 (54.7)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>134 (100.0)</b>	<b>41 (100.0)</b>	<b>63 (100.0)</b>	<b>27 (100.0)</b>	<b>27 (100.0)</b>	<b>62 (100.0)</b>
						<b>64 (100.0)</b>

\*Grouping of data in this table requires that this column reflect total respondents, not responses, for comparison purposes.

TABLE V-5  
 PERCEPTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL TERRORIST THREAT BY  
 DISPERSION OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

	Attempted Hostage Taking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Bombing Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Assassin- ation Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Aircraft Hijacking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Arson Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Theft of Conven- tional Arms Very Likely or Likely (%)
*Total # of Respondents (#)	9 (22.0)	19 (30.2)	3 (11.1)	5 (18.5)	19 (30.6)	19 (29.7)
One In- stalla- tion	57 (42.5)	19 (30.2)	3 (11.1)	5 (18.5)	19 (30.6)	19 (29.7)
More than One In- stalla- tion	77 (57.5)	44 (69.8)	24 (88.9)	22 (81.5)	43 (69.4)	45 (70.3)
TOTAL	134 (100.0)	63 (100.0)	27 (100.0)	27 (100.0)	62 (100.0)	64 (100.0)

\*Grouping of data in this table requires that this column reflect total respondents, not responses, for comparison purposes.

TABLE V-6  
 PERCEPTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL TERRORIST THREAT BY  
 MILITARY POPULATION IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

	Attempted Hostage Taking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Bombing Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Assassin- ation Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Aircraft Hijacking Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Arson Very Likely or Likely (%)	Attempted Theft of Conven- tional Arms Very Likely or Likely (%)
Less than 10,000	19 ( 46.3)	33 ( 52.4)	13 ( 48.1)	10 ( 37.0)	30 ( 48.4)	31 ( 48.4)
More than 10,000	22 ( 53.7)	30 ( 47.6)	14 ( 51.9)	17 ( 63.0)	32 ( 51.6)	33 ( 51.6)
TOTAL	41 (100.0)	63 (100.0)	27 (100.0)	27 (100.0)	62 (100.0)	64 (100.0)

\*Grouping of data in this table requires that this column reflect total respondents, not responses, for comparison purposes.

Provost marshals with military populations exceeding 10,000 are consistently over-represented in all columns.

Controlling for length of assignment in current area of responsibility revealed a weak trend of higher perceptions among provost marshals assigned for less than a year. Controlling for grade met with mixed, inconclusive results. Given the relatively small numbers of respondents reporting various numbers of past terrorist incidents, no comparison was made between respondents reporting these incidents and perceptions of conventional terrorist threat. The dramatic results depicted in Table V-2, controlling past terrorist incidents by location, indicate that location is the primary determinate for perception of conventional terrorist threat.

The perceptions of greater threat from conventional terrorist attacks among foreign-based provost marshals is consistent with the reports of past incidents (Table V-2). The higher perceptions among provost marshals with more diverse commands (Table V-5) and larger populations (Table V-6) follow logically. Their area of responsibility would naturally offer more targets and given greater areas and populations, controlling access to Army personnel/materiel would be more difficult.

Responses to the open-ended question asking what other types of terrorist incidents were believed to be very likely within the next 12 months in the respondents' areas of responsibility included: 11 - demonstrations, four - sabotage, and various others ranging from bank robbery to

harassing phone calls. A complete listing of these responses is at Appendix V.

Responses to the following question, "What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider likely within the next 12 months within your area of responsibility?" are listed at Appendix VI. The responses are similar to those at Appendix V, with 10 of the 30 respondents mentioning demonstrations.

On the question of unconventional terrorist attacks, the respondents were asked about the likelihood of such events Army-wide, as opposed to within their respective areas of responsibility. The unconventional attack thought most likely by the respondents was the attempted theft of a chemical device (37.4% stating this was very likely or likely), followed by attempted or threatened detonation of a chemical device (29.0%), attempted theft of a nuclear device (28.2%), and attempted or threatened detonation of a nuclear device (21.4%). Although the clear majority of respondents indicated that they believed each of these incidents is unlikely or very unlikely, the fact that such substantial minorities of the Army's principal law enforcement officers think such incidents likely or very likely in the next 12 months is cause for grave concern. One military writer has noted that:

Although remote, the possibility of the theft or attempted theft of a nuclear warhead from a storage facility by a small terrorist force cannot be discounted . . . even an unsuccessful attack against a western nuclear storage area

would create a considerable international incident. An attack upon a U.S. nuclear storage site in Europe, for example, could have the following impact:

- (1) Create major U.S. embarrassment in the host nation where the weapon site was located.
- (2) Degrade the credibility of the U.S. Government and its Armed Forces to protect nuclear warheads abroad.
- (3) Cause Congressional reduction of stockpiled weapons in vulnerable areas thereby reducing number of weapons immediately available to the unified commanders.
- (4) Pin down U.S. Armed Forces in time of crisis or divert their attention toward another area.<sup>11</sup>

There are reasons, however, why terrorists may never choose to attempt to steal or detonate weapons of mass destruction:

Incidents in which terrorists have deliberately tried to kill large numbers of people or cause widespread damage are relatively rare. Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead--which may explain why, apart from the technical difficulties involved, they have not already used chemical or bacteriological weapons, or conventional explosives in ways that would produce mass casualties. Mass casualties simply may not serve the terrorists' goals and could alienate the population. You don't poison the city's water supply in the name of the popular front.<sup>12</sup>

The fact that terrorists have not chosen this path in the past is no guarantee that they will not in the future, but it does indicate that it may not be perceived by terrorists as an effective or efficient tactic.

Mixed results were obtained when controlling perceptions of unconventional terrorist threat by location and dispersion of area of responsibility.

Table V-7 controls perceptions of unconventional terrorist threat by grade. Civilian, enlisted, and company grade provost marshals are consistently over-represented in all columns. One explanation for this could be that the more senior officer provost marshals have had greater opportunity to learn about the intricacies of the Army's classified nuclear and chemical protection programs and are thus less likely to perceive a threat in this area.

The classification of matters concerning Army programs to protect its nuclear and chemical stocks precludes detailed discussion in this unclassified dissertation. The survey results indicating a surprisingly high perception of threat in this area will be furnished to the appropriate Army authorities, however.

Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations," previously reviewed in this dissertation, clearly requires the establishment of plans by "commanders at all levels" to respond to "any major disruption on installations to include threats and acts."<sup>13</sup> When asked if they had written counterterrorism plans for their areas of responsibility, 100 provost marshals (74.6%) responded that they did. An additional 27 (20.1%) responded that they had some incomplete plans, and only seven (5.2%) responded that they had no plans. No distinct patterns emerge when controlling these responses by location, command, military population, length of assignment, or grade.

TABLE V-7  
PERCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORIST THREAT BY GRADE

	*Total # of Respondents (%)	Attempted Theft of Nuclear Device Likely or Very Likely (%)	Attempted Theft of a Nuclear Device Likely or Very Likely (%)	Attempted Theft of a Chemical Device Likely or Very Likely (%)	Attempted or Threatened Detonation of a Chemical Device Likely or Very Likely (%)
Civilian, Enlisted, or Company Grade Officer	47 ( 35.1)	16 ( 43.2)	15 ( 53.6)	20 ( 40.8)	17 ( 44.7)
Field Grade Officer	87 ( 64.9)	21 ( 56.8)	13 ( 46.4)	29 ( 59.2)	21 ( 55.3)
TOTAL	134 (100.0)	37 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	49 (100.0)	38 (100.0)

\*Grouping of data in this table requires that this column reflect total respondents, not responses, for comparison purposes.

In addition to the existence of written plans, another measure of counterterrorism preparedness is the formal (written) identification of likely and vulnerable targets. Clear focus on the local factors contributing to the likelihood that terrorist groups would attack certain targets and the vulnerability of certain targets is crucial to rational security resource allocation. Overall security of Army personnel/materiel requires that members of the Army community other than military police and security personnel be aware of the possible threat. Communication of this awareness can be accomplished with the least confusion in written plans distributed to the key staff members who can assist in prevention of and reaction to terrorist incidents. Table V-8 presents the responses to questions on identification of likely and vulnerable targets. The results indicate that a clear majority of respondents have addressed these factors in their written plans, but nearly a third of the written target identification has not been disseminated outside the local military police/security community. There is no specific Department of the Army policy that requires such dissemination, but the results of these items indicate that greater specificity of the requirements for content and distribution of counterterrorism plans is needed.

Other factors that can be clarified in written counterterrorism plans are listed in Table V-9 along with the respective perceptions of the responding provost

TABLE V-8  
 IDENTIFICATION OF MOST LIKELY AND MOST VULNERABLE  
 TERRORIST TARGETS IN WRITING

	QUESTION: Have the most likely targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing? (%)	QUESTION: Have the most vulnerable targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing? (%)
Yes, and formally published in a plan or other document in such a way that the commander's primary staff should be aware of them.	81 ( 60.4)	77 ( 58.6)
Yes, but in such a way that only the key military police and security personnel are aware of them.	38 ( 28.4)	40 ( 30.5)
No, not yet.	15 ( 11.2)	14 ( 10.7)
TOTAL	134 (100.0)	131 (100.0)

TABLE V-9  
MEASURES OF COUNTERTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS IN POSITIVE ORDER

Measure	Strongly agree or agree (%)	Strongly disagree or disagree (%)	Total
It is clear who is "in charge" during a terrorist crisis (at the scene).	95 ( 72.0)	37 ( 28.0)	132 (100.0)
Command, control, and communication procedures for dealing with a terrorist incident are clearly articulated.	83 ( 63.4)	48 ( 36.6)	131 (100.0)
These command and control procedures are understood by those who must implement them.	80 ( 62.0)	49 ( 38.0)	129 (100.0)
Non-MP/Security Guard elements to be employed in the event of terrorist acts are clearly designated.	72 ( 54.5)	60 ( 45.5)	132 (100.0)
Establishment of Crisis Management Teams has been carefully planned.	63 ( 48.1)	68 ( 51.9)	131 (100.0)
Tactics and techniques to be employed by non-MP/Security Guard elements are understood by members of those elements.	54 ( 42.9)	72 ( 57.1)	126 (100.0)

marshals. The problem of who is "in charge" has evidently been adequately addressed in the minds of a majority of the respondents. The fact that some confusion on this crucial matter still persists with 28% of the respondents is cause for concern. The respondents' perceptions of difficulties increase with the items listed further down the table. The care with which crisis management teams have been planned and the understanding of counterterror tactics and techniques by non-MP/Security Guard elements are matters that policy-makers and doctrine-producers should consider for priority targeting.

Conventional wisdom holds that when asked, all bureaucrats will state that they don't have enough people to do the job. If this is true, the provost marshals responding to the survey fit the conventional mold. Of those responding to the statement, "Additional MP/Security Guard personnel are needed in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within my area of responsibility," 36.1% strongly agreed, and 32.3% agreed, for a total affirmation of the statement by 68.4% of the respondents. This clear reported perception of the need for more personnel should not be ignored. Army personnel managers at the highest levels of command should be made aware of this response.

Another indicator of counterterrorism preparedness is the availability of a Special Reaction Team (SRT). This is the Army's version of civilian police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. The SRT is typically highly mobile,

specially trained, and specially equipped to deal with a variety of situations, including response to terrorist incidents. In addition to its response role, the SRT can enhance an installation's terrorism deterrence program. The following responses were received to the question, "Is a Special Reaction Team (SRT) available for your use in the event you may need one in your area of responsibility?": Yes, an SRT is assigned within my area of responsibility - 61 (46.2%); An SRT is not assigned within my area of responsibility, but one is available to me - 35 (26.5%); and, No, an SRT is not available to me (27.3%). Controlling for this question by location and military population met with mixed, inconclusive results. Of those reporting SRT's assigned or available, 73.2% reported their teams could respond within two hours (rough estimate) and 78.3% reported their teams operating at 90% or greater strength.

Of those reporting SRT's assigned or available, 62.6% considered them adequately trained, 62.0% considered them adequately equipped, and 73.6% reported that they perform counterterrorist drills at least quarterly. Although majorities of respondents with SRT's available reported their teams could respond relatively quickly and were reasonably manned and equipped, significant minorities reported negatively on all these accounts. It must be remembered, also, that the majority percentages are for those reporting SRT's assigned or available. When those reporting no SRT assigned or available are included, all

the reported majority percentages diminish significantly. If all Army installations are to have viable counterterrorism programs, both deterrence and reaction requirements dictate that SRT development be improved at those locations with little or no SRT capability.

Hostage negotiators are only one portion of a provost marshal's counterterrorism reaction team and a portion needed in only a limited number of terrorist incidents. However, the availability of qualified hostage negotiators can become very crucial to the successful resolution of situations involving hostages. The following responses were received to the question, "Are trained hostage negotiators available to you within your area of responsibility?": Yes, FBI-trained CID agents (plainclothes military criminal investigators) - 60 (47.2%); Yes, CID agents trained elsewhere - 22 (17.3%); Yes, other - 25 (19.7%); and, No - 20 (15.7%). These responses indicate a high degree of preparedness to cope with hostage-type terrorist incidents. However, the fact that 20 provost marshals indicated that no trained hostage negotiators were available should cause some concern.

Although the provost marshal is normally the principal staff officer responsible for counterterrorism planning and coordination, other members of the commander's primary staff may be expected to perform some aspect of their speciality in order to adequately respond to the wide spectrum of possible terrorist threats. Table V-10 reports

TABLE V-10  
 PERCEPTIONS OF PREPAREDNESS OF PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS  
 IN ORDER OF PERCEIVED PREPAREDNESS

Staff Officer	Total respondents reporting officer very prepared or prepared (%)	Total respondents reporting officer unprepared or very unprepared (%)	Total respondents (%)
Intelligence Officer	100 ( 78.7)	27 ( 21.3)	127 (100.0)
Operations Officer	93 ( 77.5)	27 ( 22.5)	120 (100.0)
Public Affairs Officer	91 ( 74.0)	32 ( 26.0)	123 (100.0)
Medical Officer	80 ( 64.5)	44 ( 35.5)	124 (100.0)
Aviation Officer	74 ( 71.8)	29 ( 28.2)	103 (100.0)
Communications and Electronics Officer	77 ( 63.1)	45 ( 36.9)	122 (100.0)
Engineer	70 ( 58.3)	50 ( 41.7)	120 (100.0)

the perceptions of responding provost marshals concerning the preparedness of their fellow staff officers. The responses reflect a healthy respect by the provost marshals for preparedness of these other officers. A clear majority of the respondents reported that all primary staff officers were very prepared or prepared for counterterrorism operations. The spread between the officer most selected as prepared or very prepared (intelligence officer) and the officer least selected (engineer) is relatively narrow. The perceptions of provost marshals concerning the preparedness of their intelligence officers also further refutes the Science Applications report that the "pyramiding restrictions on intelligence operations" had paralyzed law enforcement officers.<sup>14</sup>

Responses to the open-ended questions asking the provost marshals what other staff officers they felt were very unprepared or unprepared are at Appendices VII and VIII, respectively.

Discussions on the subject of counterterrorism by Army provost marshals frequently include their perceived need for more or better hardware. Of the provost marshals responding, 87% strongly agreed or agreed that additional special equipment is needed to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within their area of responsibility. On the more sobering question of cost-effectiveness, 63.8% strongly agreed or agreed that it would be cost-effective to procure additional special equipment for counterterrorism

purposes. Of the provost marshals responding, 66.4% strongly agreed or agreed that additional counterterror technological developments are needed in order for them to adequately respond to terrorism within their areas of responsibility. Whether costs justify such development and procurement or not, it is clear that the majority of Army provost marshals responding think that such actions are necessary for their counterterrorism programs.

Table V-11 reports on the perceptions of the respondents concerning the need for technological development of counterterrorism-related items. The items are listed in the order in which the highest percentage of the respondents recorded the perception that there was a critical need for improvements for the respective item.

Training planners and materiel developers at the Military Police School should take note of the very strong perceived need for reaction team training facilities. The FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, maintains a staff responsible for developing all the listed items and monitoring their developments in other agencies. Resource managers at the Military Police School should closely examine the feasibility and effectiveness of frequent visits to the FBI Academy by researchers, writers, and instructors from the Military Police School.

Responses to the open-ended question, "What other areas have a critical need for technological development for counterterrorism use?" are listed at Appendix IX.

TABLE V-11

PERCEPTIONS OF NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT  
OF COUNTERTERRORISM ITEMS

Responses to the question: How would you rate the need for technological development for counterterrorism use for the following items?

Item	Critical need for improvements (%)	Improvement needed (%)	Current development sufficient (%)	Total (%)
Reaction team training facilities	66 ( 52.8)	46 ( 36.8)	13 ( 10.4)	125 (100.0)
Terrorist "profiles"	48 ( 38.4)	60 ( 48.0)	17 ( 13.6)	125 (100.0)
"Stun" weapons (non-lethal, incapacitating weapons)	45 ( 38.1)	59 ( 50.0)	14 ( 11.9)	118 (100.0)
Human stress instruments	38 ( 33.9)	67 ( 59.8)	7 ( 6.3)	112 (100.0)
Communications devices ("bugs," etc.)	33 ( 28.0)	54 ( 45.8)	31 ( 26.3)	118 (100.0)
Sniping weapons	29 ( 23.4)	52 ( 41.9)	43 ( 34.7)	124 (100.0)

Table V-12 reports the perceptions of provost marshals on the adequacy of current Army counterterrorism policy. A clear majority of the respondents reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that adequate Department of the Army policy guidance had been provided: 77 (57.1%). It is interesting to note, however, that the direction of the responses shifts on the next question. On the statement, "There is currently a need to change Department of the Army policy concerning counterterrorism," 68 (54.8%) strongly agreed or agreed. This reversed direction of responses continues and grows stronger with the statement, "There is a need for more specific policy concerning counterterrorism," 102 (79.1%) strongly agreed or agreed. Controlling these three items by location, grade, and military population produced no meaningful, conclusive trends.

These results indicate that while there is a broad base of general satisfaction with current Army counterterrorism policy, there is also a majority which perceives the need for change, and an even larger majority which agrees that greater specificity is needed in Army counterterrorism policy.

Although also a function of the perceived threat, one measure of the adequacy of Army counterterrorism policy, doctrine, and general preparedness is the perception of adequacy of protection of likely terrorist targets by the local provost marshal. Some of the more dramatic results of this survey surfaced as a result of compiling the

TABLE V-12  
 PERCEPTIONS ON ADEQUACY OF CURRENT ARMY COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

	Strongly agree or agree (%)	Strongly disagree or disagree (%)	Total (%)
Adequate Department of the Army policy guidance has been provided regarding how to counter terrorism within my area of responsibility.	76 ( 57.1)	57 ( 42.9)	133 (100.0)
There is currently a need to change Department of the Army policy concerning counterterrorism.	68 ( 54.8)	56 ( 45.2)	124 (100.0)
There is a need for more specific policy concerning counterterrorism.	102 ( 79.1)	27 ( 20.9)	129 (100.0)

responses to the statement: "The most likely targets of terrorists within my area of responsibility are adequately protected." A clear majority of the respondents, 76 (57.1%), disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Table V-13 controls the responses to this item by location and military population. Table V-14 controls the responses by dispersion of area of responsibility and grade. Disagreement with the statement was strongest among foreign-based provost marshals (71.7%), followed by provost marshals with military populations of 10,000 or more (64.8%), provost marshals responsible for more than one installation (65.8%), and finally field grade (senior) officer provost marshals (58.6%). This last category is so close to the overall rate of disagreement by respondents (57.1%), that it is of little consequence. The pattern of disagreement on this item may serve as a guide for allocation of resources for Army law enforcement policy makers and doctrine producers.

The response to the request for comments at the end of the survey was gratifying: 43 respondents (32.1%) listed some remarks. These comments covered a wide-ranging area of subjects and were quite varied in content. They are listed in Appendix X.

TABLE V-13  
 PERCEPTION OF ADEQUACY OF PROTECTION OF MOST LIKELY TARGETS FROM TERRORISTS  
 BY LOCATION AND MILITARY POPULATION

Responses to statement: The most likely targets of terrorists within my area of responsibility are adequately protected.

	BY LOCATION		BY MILITARY POPULATION	
	U.S. (%)	Foreign (%)	Less than 10,000 (%)	More than 10,000 (%)
Strongly agree or agree	42 ( 52.5)	15 ( 28.3)	38 ( 48.1)	19 ( 35.2)
Disagree or strongly disagree	38 ( 47.5)	38 ( 71.7)	41 ( 51.9)	35 ( 64.8)
TOTAL	80 (100.0)	53 (100.0)	79 (100.0)	54 (100.0)

TABLE V-14

PERCEPTION OF ADEQUACY OF PROTECTION OF MOST LIKELY TARGETS  
FROM TERRORISTS BY DISPERSION OF AREA OF  
RESPONSIBILITY AND GRADE

Responses to statement: The most likely targets of terrorists within my area of responsibility are adequately protected.

	BY DISPERSION OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY		BY GRADE	
	One installation (%)	More than one installation (%)	Civilian, enlisted, company grade officers (%)	Field grade officers (%)
Strongly agree or agree	31 ( 54.4)	26 ( 34.2)	21 ( 45.7)	36 ( 41.4)
Disagree or strongly disagree	26 ( 45.6)	50 ( 65.8)	25 ( 54.3)	51 ( 58.6)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57 (100.0)</b>	<b>76 (100.0)</b>	<b>46 (100.0)</b>	<b>87 (100.0)</b>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>The Science Applications report cautions the reader that, "It should be noted that not all respondents addressed every question which accounts for the variance in the number of responses to each question shown. . . ." Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Department of the Army, "Army Regulation 600-46, Surveys," 8 August 1974. It may have been that a belated discovery of the requirement to secure approval through the stipulations of this regulation contributed to the "staffing difficulties" that precluded a better distribution of the Science Applications' survey.

<sup>6</sup>Letter from Law Enforcement Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, to USA Soldier Support Center, subject: Request for Survey Approval, dated 15 October 1980.

<sup>7</sup>Letter from USA Soldier Support Center to the author, subject: Survey entitled "Opinions on the Adequacy of Current Counterterrorism Preparedness of Army Installations," undated, delivered personally by the Support Center to the author at the Pentagon on 23 January 1981, and letter from USA Support Center to the author, same subject, dated 20 February 1981. In addition to making some minor recommendations for changes, the 20 February 1981 letter granted approval for distribution of the survey and provided the Army Survey Control Number: ATZI-NCR-MA-81-7. This approval entitled the author to utilize Army reproduction and mailing facilities. It also probably increased the percentage of responses to the survey.

<sup>8</sup>A complete mailing list of provost marshals for the various levels of command Army-wide was not available from the Law Enforcement Division. The only list that could be found at the Military Police School was the mailing list of Military Police, the MP School's official journal. Editing of this list yielded 114 addresses for provost marshals. A review of this list revealed some obvious omissions, such as the provost marshals for Forts Riley, Knox, Leonard Wood, Monmouth, Indiantown Gap, Jackson, Sam Houston, and others. The list was expanded by using unit addresses from the

Army's "Worldwide Public Affairs Officers Directory--1980," published by the Army's office of the Chief of Public Affairs in the Pentagon. The rationale for using this publication was that installations and other units having public affairs officers would normally have provost marshals also, since the grade structure of public affairs and provost marshals for various command levels is very similar. The list was further expanded by using the United States Army, Europe, "Law Enforcement Telephone Roster," dated 15 September 1980.

Although not perfect, the final mailing list is probably the best list of Army provost marshals available at this time. The difficulty in compiling this list may well indicate that feedback processes concerning policy and doctrine for other military police related subjects are not working as efficiently as they should.

<u>9</u> <u>Survey Addressee</u>	<u>Reason for noninclusion</u>
Provost Marshal HQ 6th Battalion HAWK 65th Arty Key West, FL 33040	Returned by Postal Service marked "Addressee Unknown."
Provost Marshal HQ DISCO Columbus, OH 43215	Survey returned by the "Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office" with a note that he could not complete the survey because the questions were not all applicable to his present assignment.
Provost Marshal 4th Infantry Division Mech Fort Carson, CO 80913	Note sent back from provost marshal of Fort Carson stated that he had received two copies and one was being returned. Surveys were sent to both the provost marshal of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson and the provost marshal of Fort Carson. At many Army forts with a division based on the fort, the division will have a lieutenant colonel provost marshal who will serve as the deputy provost marshal under the installa- tion provost marshal, a colonel.

Provost Marshal  
Fort Richardson  
AK 99505

Note sent from provost  
marshal, US Army Alaska,  
stated he had received two  
surveys. This is probably  
a similar situation to the  
situation described above.  
The provost marshals for  
Fort Richardson and for all  
of Alaska may be the same  
individual.

Provost Marshal  
US Army Field Station  
Homestead AFB  
FL 33033

Letter from the Field  
Station commander stated  
that the questions on the  
survey did not pertain to  
his present responsibilities.

<sup>10</sup> Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," p. F/4.

<sup>11</sup> Major Roy Cadorette, "Nuclear Terrorism," "Publication A733, Course 7 - Low Intensity Conflict Syllabus, Terrorism," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Academic Year 1978-79, 31 May 1978, p. 187.

<sup>12</sup> Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>13</sup> Department of the Army, "AR 190-52," pp. 1-3.

<sup>14</sup> Shriver, et al., "Countering Terrorism," p. F/4.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

The weapons in the possession of the United States Army will hopefully always be used to protect and insure the freedom of the people of this country from foreign domination. They have the capacity, however, to inflict tremendous harm on the innocent if they are captured by those seeking political change through violence or threat of violence. Likewise, used by the Army itself in an over-reaction to a terrorist incident, these instruments of great destruction, both conventional and unconventional, could contribute to pathological social upheavals. Prevention of such catastrophes is among the Army's gravest responsibilities.

Certain conclusions can be made concerning Army counterterrorism doctrine, policy, and programs based on review of current counterterrorism literature and the reported perceptions of Army provost marshals. These conclusions may be useful in helping Army policy makers focus resources in the most efficient and effective manner to minimize the threat of terrorism to the Army.

Terrorism has been a problem within many local Army commands. Nearly one-third of respondents reported criminal

acts attributable to terrorists had occurred during the last three years within their areas of responsibility. Those reporting such acts were predominantly stationed outside the United States.

There is a perception that, to varying degrees, terrorism will continue to be a problem. Significant percentages of responding provost marshals reported they believed that various types of conventional terrorist acts are likely or very likely within their areas of responsibility within the next year: attempted theft of conventional arms (48.1%); attempted bombing (47.0%); attempted arson (46.3%); attempted hostage taking (30.8%); attempted assassination (20.5%); and, attempted hijacking (20.3%). Those reporting such incidents likely or very likely were primarily foreign-based. Significant percentages of responding provost marshals reported they believed that unconventional terrorist attacks are likely or very likely throughout the Army during the next year: attempted theft of a chemical device (37.4%); attempted or threatened detonation of a chemical device (29.0%); attempted theft of a nuclear device (28.2%); and, attempted or threatened detonation of a nuclear device (21.4%). Perception of the likelihood of such attacks was not related to location of the reporting provost marshal, but more senior provost marshals were less prone to report such attacks as likely or very likely.

Civilian research can be useful to the Army. If Lawrence C. Hamilton's findings<sup>1</sup> are considered, Army counterterrorism planners would be well advised to:

- (1) Be more alert to the threat of terrorism on and around Army installations in countries with less oppressive governments.

The threat in Western Europe and the United States must not be ignored.

- (2) Be sensitive to the possible requirement to participate in counterterrorism missions.

Policy and doctrine must be kept current and available to Army personnel responsible for counterterrorism operations.

- (3) Be alert to the dangers of oppressive over-reaction.

This point will be examined in greater detail later.

- (4) Be sensitive to the probability of wider violence in those theaters where terrorism is present.

Army distribution of counterterrorism resources should probably not be even throughout the Army but should be concentrated in those areas in which terrorism is most prevalent.

Given the fact that there are significant perceptions of a continuing threat from terrorists, what can be concluded about the Army's counterterrorism preparedness?

There are gaps in the counterterrorism plans at the local commands. While most respondents reported that they had written plans, 25.3% reported that their plans were incomplete or that they had no plans. In addition, approximately 40% of the respondents either had not identified

likely or vulnerable targets or had not distributed such information outside security channels.

Regarding other measures of counterterrorism preparedness, significant percentages of the respondents indicated that there were problems within their commands. For instance, 28% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that it was clear who was "in charge" at a terrorist incident. A larger percentage, 36.6%, disagreed or strongly disagreed that command, control, and communication procedures for dealing with a terrorist incident were clearly articulated. A total of 38.0% did not think these procedures were well understood. Responding to the statement that non-MP/Security Guard elements to be employed in the event of terrorist acts had been clearly designated, 45.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed. A slight majority, 51.9% of the respondents, disagreed or strongly disagreed to the statement that the establishment of crisis management teams had been carefully planned within their areas of responsibility. And finally, 57.1% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed to the statement that tactics and techniques to be used by non-MP/Security Guard elements were understood by members of those elements. These figures indicate changes are needed in order to improve the counterterrorism preparedness of local commands.

There is a perception by most respondents that more personnel resources are needed to be prepared for counterterrorism missions. Most respondents agreed or strongly

agreed that they needed more MP/Security Guard personnel in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism (68.4%). This indicates that many local commanders need to assess the personnel assignment situation within their commands and perhaps allocate more individuals to MP/Security Guard duties.

There are other counterterrorism resource problems. A significant percentage of respondents reported that they had no Special Reaction Team available to them in the event of a terrorist incident (27.3%). Lack of such teams could prove very costly to local commanders in the event of a terrorist incident.

A much smaller percentage of respondents (15.7%) reported that they had no hostage negotiators available. This appears to be an area that the Army has devoted nearly adequate resources to and only a small number of local commands need to be concerned with their situation.

A majority of respondents reported they believed all principal staff officers in their command were prepared or very prepared for terrorist incidents. This finding indicates that the respondents are generally confident that the support they will receive from their fellow staff officers will be adequate in the event of a terrorist incident.

Majorities of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that additional special equipment is necessary to adequately respond to acts of terrorism (87%), but a smaller percentage agreed or strongly agreed that procurement of such equipment

would be cost-effective (63.8%). Budget planners at local commands need to be informed of the specific needs of provost marshals regarding counterterrorism hardware they may need. Commanders must, of course, make final decisions concerning scarce resources, but counterterrorism planners must make their needs known to the commanders.

And finally, most respondents (57.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the most likely targets of terrorists within their areas of responsibility were adequately protected. Foreign-based respondents were much more likely to disagree or strongly disagree than U.S.-based respondents.

There are other implications of this research for improving Army counterterrorism policy.

A great deal of progress has been made by the Army since 1977 in production of counterterrorism policy. Army Regulation 190-52, "Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations," has gone far to establish policy for Army commanders and provost marshals. Although a majority of responding Army provost marshals (57.1%) agree or strongly agree that the Department of the Army counterterrorism policy is adequate. 54.8% also agree or strongly agree that the policy needs changing, and 79.1% agree or strongly agree that more specific policy guidance is needed. These findings indicate that there is a perception of a need to revise the regulation.

As previously mentioned, there were significant gaps concerning identification of likely and vulnerable targets and distribution of this information outside security channels. A revision of the regulation should contain specific guidance concerning contents, staffing, and distribution of counterterrorism plans.

Although the threat of Army over-reaction to a terrorist incident has been cited as a critical danger, fears of such a threat appear to be unwarranted. The Army's record of loyalty to its civilian leaders and its rigidly enforced apolitical nature combine to make internally directed military over-reaction unlikely. If military over-reaction to a terrorist incident occurs, it will probably not be because of the ignorance of military officers. It is conceivable that oppressive military over-reaction to terrorism could occur, however, at the direction of elected or appointed civilian leaders for political or other reasons. Others have come to similar conclusions:

Whether Armed Forces become politicized in a stronger sense, i.e. of interfering in politics, will depend on the coincidence of a number of factors. The traditions of the country and the Army concerned, the degree of ineptness displayed by the politicians and the intensity of the terrorism will all be variables affecting the outcome.

[In most Western countries] [only in the event of extreme public disillusion with politics, coupled with a breakdown of the economy and of law and order, would any intervention by the Armed Forces be even remotely likely.<sup>2</sup>

What may be a greater danger than over-reaction is the possible failure of Army commanders to act swiftly and with

certainty in close concert with the primary decision makers from the Departments of Justice and State. Instead of laying additional restrictions on Army commanders in this regard, new policy is needed which will help crystallize the command relationships at local levels to deal with the broad spectrum of potential terrorist acts. This may be impossible to do with an Army-wide policy directive. What may be needed is an Army-wide requirement for local commands to enter into local formal agreements with the appropriate FBI or embassy officials. Such agreements should be required to clarify command responsibility for initial response and throughout the course of terrorist incidents. Such documents are of some use in the event of actual incidents, but perhaps more importantly, the coordination required for their publication and approval forces the key players to think through the possible problems prior to their occurrence. Because of this important ancillary benefit, Army policy should require that these plans be reviewed and approved, annually, by all parties to them.

Greater specificity is also needed in the regulation on the matter of frequency of counterterrorism drills by local command staffs. Although the regulation clearly states the initial response to acts of terrorism is a responsibility of local commanders, only 31.8% of the respondents reported that their local staffs had had at least one exercise or practice drill on counterterrorism

within the last 12 months. This is a strong indicator that many local staffs would not be as well prepared as possible to provide the best initial response to actual acts of terrorism.

This low rate of exercises may also be indicative of a general lack of attention being given to counterterrorism activities at the crucial local command level. The best Army-wide policy possible is of little use if it is not being conscientiously implemented by commanders at all levels. One way to monitor implementation is through visits and inspections. Implementation of Army counterterrorism policy should be a matter of particular concern to the staff of the Army Inspector General. Since this staff is responsible for inspections Army-wide, local commanders would soon make counterterrorism a matter of higher priority for their staffs if they knew this would be an item specifically evaluated and reported on to higher headquarters by the Army Inspector General.

Any revision of AR 190-52 should also delete entire portions of the existing regulation. Much of it is doctrine which should be incorporated into Training Circular 19-16 (Draft), "Counterterrorism."

Previously stated fears that adequate counterterrorism intelligence and police information are not available to Army provost marshals are not based on the current perceptions of the responding provost marshals. Over 80% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their

counterterrorism intelligence and police information were adequate. Efforts to loosen the current restraints on the collection and maintenance of such information by Army agencies are probably not necessary at this time.

Regarding the need for technological development of counterterrorism items, respondents cited critical need for development of the following items by the stated percentages: reaction team training facilities (52.8%); terrorist "profiles" (38.4%); "stun" weapons (38.1%); human stress instruments (33.9%); communications devices (28.0%); and, sniping weapons (23.4%). These findings should serve as a guide to policy-makers allocating scarce resources for Army research and development programs.

Conduct of this research has led the author to reach other conclusions. Training Circular 19-16 (Draft) contains a wealth of useful information for provost marshals, but until it is published and disseminated, it is contributing very little to the Army's counterterrorism program. It is difficult to justify why this manual has remained in a draft status for so long. If the Military Police School is waiting to refine it into the perfect counterterrorism manual, it will never be published. Though flawed in its present form, it is rich in thought-provoking ideas for local provost marshals who are struggling with writing and implementing their own counterterrorism plans. One of the least expensive steps the Army could take at this time to

improve its counterterrorism program is to immediately publish and distribute this manual.

The Army counterterrorism literature, on the whole, uses few resources from outside military channels. The references provided in the Army publications are almost exclusively to other Army publications. There is an incestuous quality to the policy and doctrine beginning with the Science Applications report and running throughout all the subsequent Army counterterrorism literature.

The Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course is a large step forward in preparing key staff officers from throughout the Army for more effective prevention of and reaction to terrorist incidents. This effort is, however, entirely too limited. The same, or a similar course, needs to be offered to virtually all military police officers and senior noncommissioned officers, perhaps as a part of their normal resident military training at the Military Police School. In addition, the survey results indicate a desire on the part of many provost marshals to improve/increase counterterrorism training for basic military police. The Military Police School should formally examine the feasibility of establishing such training.

The Military Police School has obviously done an excellent job of publicizing its "Counterterrorism Course." Of the provost marshals responding to the survey, 78.4% reported that they knew about the course. The Military

Police School should be concerned, however, that 17.2% of the respondents reported that they needed more details about the course, and 4.5% reported that they did not know the course existed.

Although much of the draft training circular and the Counterterrorism Course focus on prevention of terrorism, there are aspects of prevention that have been ignored. Army policy and doctrine need a new emphasis on prevention. Much could be learned from the civilian studies of deterrence theory and crime prevention through environmental design. Any revision of AR 190-52 should include such an emphasis, including changing the title of the regulation.

More specifically, security planners should be given some guidance in deterrence theory in order to make more rational decisions with scarce resources. It is not the mere existence of security systems that may deter terrorists, it is the terrorists' awareness of them that may serve as a deterrent. Current policy and doctrine offer virtually no information on this crucial area of terrorism prevention.

Means of learning more about how to convince the terrorists that the risks are not worth taking include the careful interrogation of captured terrorists and the detailed debriefing of government agents who have successfully infiltrated terrorist cells. Current policy restricts the Army's ability to conduct such research, but the Army

should urge the pursuit of this research by those agencies with these capabilities such as the FBI and CIA.

Extensive research and resource expenditure are not required, however, to immediately incorporate some environmental deterrence factors into terrorism prevention programs. There are no-cost and low-cost measures that can increase visibility of security, and thus deterrence, with minimum risk of disclosing valuable information to potential terrorists. Examples are: releasing stories to the media citing the high state of readiness of security forces; assembling heavily armed reaction teams in different visible locations; arming guards on an irregular, rotating basis with different crew-served weapons<sup>3</sup>; practicing assault tactics in relatively visible areas; and, using explosive detection devices on public gates and at other visible locations.

In all attempts to improve Army policy and doctrine, it must be recognized that the threat and the perception of the threat are not equal throughout the Army. Concentration of efforts should be made on foreign areas, installations with larger populations, and commands with greater dispersion of installations. The expense of actually sending project officers charged with developing or refining counterterrorism policy or doctrine to visit representative installations from these "higher risk" categories should be seriously considered. Similar results could be obtained by

bringing together key officers from these types of commands to assist in policy and doctrine formulation.

In this regard, given the results of this research which indicate a perception by the responding provost marshals that the threat from terrorists is significant, the time is right for an Army-wide conference on the subject of counterterrorism. Such a conference could be used to quickly expand on the results of this research and to set the direction of future Army counterterrorism initiatives.

Decisions on direction of policy or revision or institution of new regulations or manuals are of little use if there are no resources allocated to accomplish these functions. Given the high perception of threat among the Army officers most intimate with and responsible for counterterrorism, it is crucial that the Army devote more policy-making resources to this problem. The fact that much of the Army-wide research on this subject has been conducted by a private research firm under Army contract and by the author on private time may indicate that the Army has not allocated sufficient policy-making resources to this area. One logical method of correcting this situation would be to create a new branch within the Law Enforcement Division with the sole purpose of refining Army counterterrorism policy. It must be borne in mind, however, that if this significant new mission is given the LED, the resources to perform it must also be provided. To expect the LED to perform an extensive new mission with no

additional resources must be with the realization that some missions currently being performed will suffer.

Terrorism can be suppressed. The recent military takeover in Turkey resulted in sharp reductions in terrorist incidents.<sup>4</sup> The cost, of course, was the right of the people to democratic processes. What is to be done, then, to protect critical Army personnel/materiel from the excesses of terrorists? This broad guidance has been offered:

Individuals must take whatever precautions they can, remain well informed, and work to insure the high quality and morale of the security forces which defend them. Beyond these measures, there must be a conscious effort not to over-react. In effect, the inconvenience and insecurity of the seige state must be tolerated because the alternatives to tolerance would doom liberal society. [Emphasis added.]<sup>5</sup>

Although much progress has been made, this research has clearly shown that it is imperative that improvements be made to the United States Army counterterrorism policy and doctrine if "the high quality and morale of the security forces" of the Army are to be achieved and maintained.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Hamilton, Ecology of Terrorism, pp. 180-181.

<sup>2</sup>Burton, Urban Terrorism, p. 220.

<sup>3</sup>Crew-served weapons available could include machine guns, recoiler rifles, anti-tank missiles, and mortars.

<sup>4</sup>"Give the Turks Time," The Economics (May 23, 1981), p. 16.

<sup>5</sup>Hamilton, Ecology of Terrorism, p. 182.

APPENDIX I

RESPONSES BY SENIOR ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS  
TO 1977 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS, INC.  
SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

What do you perceive to be the terrorist threat within your area of responsibility?

- The potential is there and probably so are they-- but who they are--where they are and what their plans are-- is a great unknown to me.

- Dissidents intending to disrupt and disgrace the military operations. This goal is limited to a specific area or operation.

- The threat could be from any group of malcontents with real or fancied complaints against personnel or facilities. The imminence of the threat is difficult to predict. Today I estimate the threat as relatively low.

- In the Panama Canal Zone there could be three threats. One could be "Zonians," a 2d or 3d generation born in the CZ. Second, the Panamanians. Third, a foreign power wishing to embarrass the U.S.

- I take exception to consistent over use of "buzz word--terrorism." From law enforcement point of view, it is the criminal acts (against persons or property) which

are important--not the underlying motive. In a loose sense of the word the threat is from disgruntled groups claiming credit for bombings of federal facilities.

- The threat is high with government buildings and/or dignitaries as targets.

- Minimal--but distinctly possible since my installation is extremely large, it is an open thoroughfare, and far from homogeneous.

- The literature today tends to define the terrorists as those who commit crimes with political motivations. Your (SAI) definition includes psychos and criminals. According to your (SAI) definition, the seizure of a hostage (plain old kidnapping) is always possible. I don't like your (SAI) definition.

What sources of local intelligence concerning terrorism are available to you?

- Pretty scarce.

- Gossip, rumor, political and social organizations as well as MI operatives.

- Unit personnel and internal unit reports, MI reports and assessments, newspapers and other news media, reports from higher headquarters, rumors, anonymous tips, and overt acts by any terrorist type groups.

- Perhaps one of our better sources is our own liaison team who daily have contacts with the local authorities.

- MI, local offices of Federal Agencies especially FBI, local police. Although there are restrictions on

collection and storage there is nothing to preclude obtaining verbal information by face-to-face liaison.

- All kinds, FBI, etc.--but how good their intelligence is, in this new controlled environment, I don't know!

- Military Intelligence, local CID, DIS, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, local police.

- I don't know--I'm in USAMPS.

- Local law enforcement agencies and field offices of Federal Agencies.

What do you consider to be the prime targets for terrorist acts on installations within your area of responsibility?

- Arms rooms perhaps to obtain capability to go on to bigger and better things. Computer systems also very vulnerable.

- Storage sites containing sensitive munitions and activities with sensitive missions. Students in training, arms rooms, water supply, communications facility.

- There was, several months ago, one incident in which an Army airfield was the target of a bombing. Other potential targets include arms rooms and ammo storage areas.

- Those facilities which could be put out of business without a substantial loss involving time or money to repair the facility for later use.

- Prime targets (based on actual incidents) which could have been perpetrated by "terrorists" -

- o Central arms/ammo storage facilities (but not unit arms rooms)

- o Central power and telecommunications facilities
  - o Major Army medical center
  - o Arson or bombing against troop billets
  - o Money handling activities
  - o Major outport for sealift of cargo
  - o Presence of "controversial groups," e.g.,  
Vietnamese relocation
  - o Anytime VIP are present.
- Classified documents, various Headquarters of key activities (symbolic targets)
  - VIP, arms and munitions, aircraft
  - VIP visitors, public utilities, clubs
  - Sensitive munitions and materiel, sources of money
  - Arms rooms, finance offices, bank

If there have been terrorist threats, or acts, within your area of responsibility who conducted them, when, with what means, and where? What were the lessons learned?

- The bombing incident referred to (airfield) was carried out at night with no personnel injuries and very little property damage. The FBI investigated.
- None
- Not to my knowledge
- Explosives detonated in parking lots and other deserted areas which would impact on civilian/dependent fears. They occurred during evening hours and periods of limited visibility. Security personnel are not the answer-- personal awareness would be the best deterrent.

- No actual acts specifically by "terrorists," but bomb threats and similar incidents found to have been perpetrated by youths and mentally disturbed individuals. These pointed out the need for:

- o Joint PM/CID Task Force with one "command and control center."

- o Task force to include medical/fire fighting/EOC plus emergency reaction force.

- Not against our military installations. We only have bomb threats--so far all idle.

- To my knowledge there have been none.

- Don't know of any.

- None.

What policy guidance has been provided to counter terrorism?

- FBI speakers.

- DOD Directive that addresses responsibility and proponency for terrorism--belongs to FBI but the Army should be prepared to support.

- None.

- Without referring to my PM SOP it is impossible to quote regulation numbers here at the conference.

- There is now an ever increasing amount of material flowing down from Dept. of Army and various professional organizations.

- Command correspondence, TM's, FBI presentations.

- So far as I know, other than the study being prepared under DA auspices, which will ultimately lead to guidance, there is none at present.

- Rely mostly on AR 380-series, CIA, and FBI material.

- Primarily warning documents; i.e., better look at your nuclear sites, etc.

- Very little.

- None.

What changes or additions to policy guidance would facilitate planning to counter terrorism?

- Define parameters of terrorism in order to assign responsibility for neutralizing terrorist activities.

- Make someone responsible for program.

- Have a checklist, directive in nature, whereby personnel would not live in a vulnerable area, provide domicile to duty transportation, have films which would be part of mandatory welcome briefings. (Note: this response was overseas oriented.)

- As revealed by the SAI team, to date, there is an immediate, urgent need to direct that all PM develop (update) their emergency plans/SOP. These SOP need not be entitled "Anti-Terrorist" but should cover reactions to threats against key facilities/personnel. These plans must be tested periodically. Ultimately there is a need for DA Directives and training material on the subject.

- Clearer lines of authority to respond, clearer guidance on responsibility and jurisdiction, provision of resources.

- I'm not sure.
- The identification of responsibilities. Who does what? Who is in charge? Who runs the scene? Policy on these subjects should be issued.
- This should be a DOD task force project of the highest priority. Planning and equipping of an interbureau strike force, highly trained in counter-terrorism.
- None.

Within your area of responsibility, how are "crisis management" teams organized? What disciplines are represented?

- No such teams have been organized.
- I am not aware of local program. There is a plan which provides guidance but it is not widely publicized.  
(Note: The respondent did not have operational responsibilities.)
- What teams!?
- MAAG Security Team consisting of full time PMO, Embassy representative, signal, EOD, security officer from each service and major activity, intel agencies, and also the most important--the PAO.
- No teams now; however, they should include MP and CID, PAO, SJA, medical, firefighting, EOD, and Chaplain.
- We do not have as yet crisis management teams formed. However, we do have active alert plans which would marshal all available resources in a short period of time. There is also excellent tie-in with civil police resources.

- Organized to meet the known or perceived threat with composition as needed depending on hostage(s) or bargaining position. Tied together through EDC operations.
- At present time: law enforcement, legal, and command.
- I don't know--I'm in USAMPS.
- None.

Regarding jurisdiction, who is "in charge" during a terrorist crisis? (At the scene of the incident)

- Unknown, probably Commander/Provost Marshal.
- Terrorist incidents are primarily felonies, CID should have major responsibility. PM is a manager, not an operator--should not control scene.
- We have not had any terrorist problems; however, if we did it will probably be the CID. They are the most experienced in this area.
- On a Federal installation, the Senior Commander.
- Post Commander.
- Commander, unless he has delegated authority to the PM.
- Considering that, in essence, so called "terrorist crises" are, in fact, the perpetration of crimes the only logical individual who can be "in charge" is the Provost Marshal or his designated representative. The PM is the senior law enforcement official at the installation.
- The MP's.
- Good question!

- Should be designated by a plan.
- Any number of people depending upon the location and situation. It could be the unit or installation commander, Provost Marshal, or commander of the counter terrorist force.

During an act of terror what type of command, control, and communications procedures would be used?

- A Command Group should be at the scene with the most direct radio, wire, and visual communication.
- Depends on post--but MP's normally have good commo and would probably be used.
- Military Police and MP Emergency Operations Center.
- Suggest a mobile operations center in the vicinity of the incident using MP radio net initially under "command" of the PM. There should be provision for wire commo, if situation permits.
- Command Directives, guidance, delegation of authority. Operational control exercised by appropriate representatives. Commo is critical to control!
- Post Commander will have centralized control with advice from PM. MP commo will be used extensively.
- Most expeditious and most available.
- We would use the same system we use during any other crisis type incident.
- CID agent at scene should be in charge. PM should back him up with outer perimeter security, traffic control, ambulance support. Use CID and PM commo. PM makes his "SWAT" team available to respond to agent in charge.

During an act of terror what would be the response elements and tactics?

- Every PM should have a platoon with 3 or 4 squads trained similar to a "SWAT" team.

- The same as reacting to a bank robbery. SOP governing this area would be used.

- We have special MP sniper teams formed and trained by the FBI. Riot control agents are available and the control of them and their use is incorporated in alert plans. Reaction is contingent on development of alert plan.

- There must be developed a syllabus for the training of an "Emergency Reaction Force," which would include various disciplines. "Tactics" envisioned are neither new nor unique. Included would be commo, reaction to emergency plans, first aid, crowd control, riot control formations. These are tasks already performed--or supposed to be performed by MP.

- Military Police and EOD.

- Unknown.

- Reaction force must have the capability to completely and thoroughly overwhelm the terrorists if the need arises. The reaction force must deal from a position of strength, real and apparent.

During an act of terror what type of procedures would be used during negotiations with terrorists (who would negotiate with what type technique)?

- A messenger type individual or a person who has little or no authority to approve or comply with the

terrorist demands. This will give the Commander an edge so that he can delay or drag out the negotiations and wear down the terrorist. Also, it will give the Commander increased reaction and planning time.

- Depends on locale but probably would be referred to FBI unless total military personnel involvement.

- The negotiator could be PM or his representative, Chaplain, SJA, medical personnel (possibly a psychologist)-- but not CID or installation CDR/CG.

- Difficult question. It depends on the situation. Probably the best trained ones (MI or CID).

- It is envisioned that Military Police Investigators will be used. They are slated to receive training in this art.

- Only the Commander or his designated representative would negotiate.

- A senior CID special agent would probably negotiate. The technique would depend on who the terrorists are, what they want, etc. However, we would make it clear that the negotiator will not have any authority at all. He can not promise anything and he must have time to get any answer, giving us time to react to the situation.

- Train both selected CID and MPI personnel in negotiations.

- The Commander.

During an act of terror how would the public affairs aspect be handled?

- Have PM support by coordinating press point inside outer perimeter.

- Would be handled as any other incident.

- Releases would be cleared through the Commander via the EOC.

- Our PAO is tied in closely with DA Public Affairs.

In significant incidents releases would come from that level.

- Credibility is vital to prevent and/or neutralize the terrorism threat and to maintain excellent rapport with the public to assist in maintaining public support against hostile actions.

- No comment. PAO possesses necessary expertise to determine.

- A most important member of the security team.

- Biggest problem is to find seating space for all the news media that would show up.

- Incidents should be played down so as to deter imitators, prevent the forming of large crowds of onlookers, but yet released information must be the truth and factual.

During an act of terror what special applications would be employed?

- Depending upon the situation and location any type of reaction force or combination could be employed.

- A makeshift organization would result from whoever is available.
- Riot control agents.
- Snipers included as part of a special reaction team.
- Organizations, special equipment, and special training should be available to counter "hard-core" terrorists as a contingency capability for protection of people, property, and maintenance of law and order.
- Use of and escalation of force would be used as needed but only after determination of what kind of negotiation would be conducted and what the counter offers are.
- MP "SWAT" teams should have marksmen, gas, armored vehicles, and other special equipment available.

What additional equipment and technology would you like to have to cope with terrorism?

- That normally used by emergency teams--helicopters, armored cars, weaponry, communications.
- Edgewood Arsenal has a new foam that could be excellent anti-intrusion material for sensitive areas. Should be examined and tested widely.
- I would like to see a centralized type unit that could support several Army facilities, that has been trained for this type of operation with a short notice reaction time.
- We only need to expand our training. Added resources can be gotten from the civil police who are well equipped. We could use an armored vehicle (V-100 type).

- No special equipment is needed. The key is ready availability of standard equipment/ammunition. These factors must be considered in emergency plans.

- Communications and personal protection devices other than rifles and pistols. Weapons are more dangerous than the terrorists if in the hands of the wrong people.

- A non-lethal immediate incapacitating capability.

- A quick acting, non-lethal, temporary incapacitant which is odorless, colorless, and tasteless which can be delivered discretely.

- The answer to this question should be based upon the study and after action analysis of terrorist incidents.

Additional Comments Provided:

- The anti-terrorist reaction could be structured in the following manner:

o CG, General Staff and Special Staff would handle command decisions of magnitude, such as meeting money demands, etc. Special Staff could, upon request, furnish advice to the scene commander on technical areas.

o CID to control the scene itself and conduct negotiations. Special Agents have much experience in dealing with people. They are also exposed to crisis situations on a daily basis making them ideal for functioning in a terrorist situation. They work closely with the Command, and control the scene and anyone on it. When uniformed

Military Police are used they should operate under the control of the scene commander.

o Military Police would be ready to provide support in different areas, such as traffic control, SWAT operations, etc.

- Definition of terrorism is vital to development of sound doctrine; approved and accepted by responsible activities. Give it a "continued" sense of urgency to develop current solutions to respond to and neutralize the threat. Update contingency plans and training of law enforcement resources and interested supportive activities. We need to support now the effort to react to the most serious current threat to the U.S.--terrorism that could escalate to guerrilla warfare within the U.S. We commend the efforts so far, particularly that of DAPE-HRE with Science Applications, Inc. Well done--keep up the good work in a serious problem area.

- The most important idea is to stop efforts to identify "terrorist activity" as unique. From police point of view "counterterrorism" is part of crime prevention (measures taken to preclude incidents based on development of police information and threat assessment) and reaction to criminal incidents. By stressing "newness" or "uniqueness" of "terrorism" DA is, in my view, de-emphasizing obvious immediate needs for intelligence, threat assessments and emergency plans. It is possible that too many PM are "waiting for doctrine."

- I think this survey is much less meaningful than it would be if you would have allowed conferees to take it back to home station and research some of the material-- which would provide more accurate responses. None of us came prepared for such a questionnaire; therefore, many responses are general in nature and less accurate than they would be otherwise.

APPENDIX II

"OPINIONS OF THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM  
PREPAREDNESS AT ARMY INSTALLATIONS"

MARCH 1981

PID, SHAPE  
APO New York 09055

Dear Provost Marshal:

This is a survey of the opinions of Army Provost Marshals about counterterrorism preparedness.

Every Provost Marshal in the Army has been sent a copy of this survey. The Law Enforcement Division, ODCSPER, is officially sponsoring this survey and the Department of the Army has approved it for Army-wide distribution (Survey Control Number ATZI-NCR-MA-81-7).

Results of this survey will be compiled and published in, "A Critical Assessment of United States Army Counterterrorism Policy and Doctrine," a doctoral dissertation I am currently working on for the University of Georgia.

The Law Enforcement Division plans to use the collective opinions gathered through this survey to assist in evaluating Army Regulation 190-52 (Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations) and as an aid in planning an Army-wide counterterrorism conference.

Moreover, results will be provided to the US Army Military Police School for its use in developing counterterrorism doctrine and instruction.

You will be informed of the results through an article in Military Police, the official journal of the MP school.

This is not a sample survey. It is a census of every Provost Marshal in the Army. To insure results that will contribute to improved counterterrorism policy and doctrine, it is important that every survey be completed and returned.

However, your participation in this research is voluntary. You are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information.

The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. If you have any questions, please write me or call me at: SHAPE extension 4309 or 4159. My commercial number is Belgium (065) 44.43.09.

In order to meet deadlines, I would appreciate your response within the next 21 days. Thank you for your help and cooperation!

Sincerely yours,

/Signed/ Robert G. Johnson

ROBERT G. JOHNSON  
MAJ, GS

INSTRUCTIONS

The focus of this questionnaire is not on counterterror missions involving national elite forces trained to perform rescue missions (such as the rescue attempt in Iran). Rather, the focus is on policy, doctrine, training, and preparedness to deal with local terrorist acts and threats against Army personnel/materiel within your area of responsibility. (The phrase, "your area of responsibility," includes the geographical area in which you would reasonably be expected to respond to terrorist acts or threats against Army personnel/materiel.)

Your comments on any item or related subjects are encouraged. They need not be typed ... handwritten comments are welcome. Feel free to enter comments anywhere on the survey. In addition, space for your comments has been provided at the end of the survey.

Your responses will be held in confidence unless you indicate a desire to be identified.

For each of the questions within this questionnaire, circle the letter associated with the best response and/or write in the requested information.

I fully appreciate how critical your time is. If you come to an item that is not clearly written or would take some time to complete, please simply move on to the next item.

Department of the Army Survey Control Number ATZI-NCR-MA-81-7

1. What is your current position?
  - A. Provost Marshal
  - B. Acting Provost Marshal
  - C. Security Officer
  - D. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  
2. What is your rank?
  - A. 0-1, 0-2, or 0-3
  - B. 0-4
  - C. 0-5
  - D. 0-6
  - E. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  
3. What is your first specialty?
  - A. 31, Law Enforcement
  - B. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  
4. What is your second specialty?
  - A. 31, Law Enforcement
  - B. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  
5. Do you know about the existence of the US Army Military Police School Counterterrorism Course?
  - A. Yes
  - B. Yes, but I need more details
  - C. No
  
6. Have you attended the US Army Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course?
  - A. Yes.
  - B. No, but I plan to attend the course
  - C. No, I did not know of this course
  - D. No, and I will most likely never attend
  
7. Have you attended any counterterrorism courses other than that offered by the US Army Military Police School?
  - A. Yes. I have attended (please state course name, location, and sponsor of course, if known): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - B. No

8. Do you have access to sources of intelligence and police information concerning local terrorist threats?

- A. Yes
- B. No

9. How geographically dispersed is your area of responsibility?

- A. I am responsible for one installation
- B. I am responsible for two installations (separate posts or detachments)
- C. I am responsible for three or more installations

10. How long have you been assigned to your current area of responsibility?

- A. One year or less
- B. Between one and two years
- C. Between two and three years
- D. Between three and four years
- E. Between four and five years
- F. More than five years

11. What is the approximate total number of military personnel within your area of responsibility?

- A. Fewer than 2,500 military personnel
- B. Between 2,500 and 5,000
- C. Between 5,000 and 10,000
- D. Between 10,000 and 15,000
- E. More than 15,000

12. Approximately how many civilians work on the military post(s) within your area of responsibility?

- A. Fewer than 500 civilian personnel
- B. Between 500 and 1,000
- C. Between 1,000 and 2,500
- D. Between 2,500 and 5,000
- E. More than 5,000

13. Approximately how many family members (dependents) live on the military post(s) within your area of responsibility?

- A. Fewer than 500 family members
- B. Between 500 and 1,000

- C. Between 1,000 and 2,500
- D. Between 2,500 and 5,000
- E. More than 5,000

14. Where is your area of responsibility?

- A. Within the contiguous 48 states
- B. Within Alaska or Hawaii
- C. Within a US possession, trust, or commonwealth
- D. In foreign territory with a Status of Forces Treaty in effect
- E. In foreign territory with no Status of Forces Treaty in effect

15. For the most part, your area of responsibility is included within which command?

- A. FORSCOM
- B. TRADOC
- C. USAREUR
- D. Eighth US Army
- E. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

16. For the most part, to which component does the command in which you are assigned belong?

- A. Active Army
- B. Army Reserve
- C. National Guard
- D. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

The possibility may always exist, but based upon your knowledge of local civil-military relations and the social and political environment, how likely is it that some group may attempt one of the following criminal acts with political overtones? (Within the next 12 months, within your area of responsibility.)

17. Attempted hostage taking

- A. Very likely
- B. Likely
- C. Unlikely
- D. Very unlikely

18. Attempted bombing

- A. Very likely
- B. Likely
- C. Unlikely
- D. Very unlikely

19. Attempted assassination

- A. Very likely
- B. Likely
- C. Unlikely
- D. Very unlikely

20. Attempted aircraft hijacking  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
21. Attempted arson  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
22. Attempted theft of conventional arms  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
23. What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider very likely in the next 12 months within your area of responsibility? (please specify, if any)  
\_\_\_\_\_
24. What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider likely within the next 12 months within your area of responsibility? (please specify, if any)  
\_\_\_\_\_

Department of Defense policy is to neither confirm nor deny the locations of certain weapons or devices. Therefore, as a senior Army law enforcement official, how likely do you think any of the following terrorist incidents are, Army-wide, within the next 12 months?

25. Attempted theft of a nuclear device  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
26. Attempted or threatened detonation of a nuclear device  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
27. Attempted theft of a chemical device  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
28. Attempted or threatened detonation of a chemical device  
A. Very likely B. Likely C. Unlikely D. Very unlikely
29. Approximately how many criminal acts attributable to terrorists have there been within your area of responsibility during the last three years?
- A. None  
B. One

- C. Two
  - D. Three
  - E. Four
  - F. More than four (please specify approximate number)
- 

30. Do you have a written counterterrorism plan for your area of responsibility?

- A. Yes
- B. I have some written plans, but they are incomplete
- C. No

31. Have the most likely targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing?

- A. Yes, and formally published in a plan or other document in such a way that the commander's primary staff should be aware of them
- B. Yes, but in such a way that only the key military police and security personnel are aware of them
- C. No, not yet

32. Have the most vulnerable targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing?

- A. Yes, and formally published in a plan or other document in such a way that the commander's primary staff should be aware of them
- B. Yes, but in such a way that only the key military police and security personnel are aware of them
- C. No, not yet

33. Has the primary staff of the commander in your area of responsibility had at least one exercise or practice drill on counterterrorism within the last 12 months?

- A. Yes
- B. No

34. Within your area of responsibility, what type of crisis management team exists to handle terrorist incidents?

- A. A team specifically developed for that purpose
  - B. The commander's normal staff
  - C. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
-

35. Is a Special Reaction Team (SRT) available for your use in the event you may need one in your area of responsibility?

- A. Yes, an SRT is assigned within my area of responsibility
- B. An SRT is not assigned within my area of responsibility, but one is available to me
- C. No, an SRT is not available

36. If you have an SRT available for your use, how long would it take for the SRT to be equipped, organized, and at the scene of the problem? (Time will vary, of course, depending on where within your area of responsibility the disturbance has occurred, but make a rough estimate.)

- A. Less than one hour
- B. Between one and two hours
- C. Between two and four hours
- D. Between four and eight hours
- E. More than eight hours
- F. I do not have an SRT available

37. If you have an SRT available, is it operating at full strength in terms of personnel?

- A. 100%
- B. More than 90% strength
- C. Between 75% and 90% strength
- D. Less than 75% strength
- E. I do not have an SRT available

38. If you have an SRT available, do you feel it is adequately trained?

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. I do not have an SRT available

39. If you have an SRT available, is it adequately equipped?

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. I do not have an SRT available

40. If you have an SRT available, how often, on the average, does it perform counterterrorist drills?

- A. At least once a week
- B. One to three times monthly
- C. At least once quarterly
- D. At least once annually
- E. Less than annually
- F. I do not have an SRT available

41. Are trained hostage negotiators available to you within your area of responsibility?

- A. No
  - B. Yes, FBI-trained CID agents
  - C. Yes, CID agents trained at (please specify)
  - D. Other (please specify)
- 

How would you rate the primary staff officers within your area of responsibility on their preparedness for counter-terrorism operations?

42. Engineer

- A. Very prepared
- B. Prepared
- C. Unprepared
- D. Very unprepared

43. Communications and electronics officer

- A. Very prepared
- B. Prepared
- C. Unprepared
- D. Very unprepared

44. Medical Officer

- A. Very prepared
- B. Prepared
- C. Unprepared
- D. Very unprepared

45. Intelligence officer

- A. Very prepared
- B. Prepared
- C. Unprepared
- D. Very unprepared

46. Operations officer

- A. Very prepared
- B. Prepared
- C. Unprepared
- D. Very unprepared

47. Public affairs officer

- A. Very prepared B. Prepared C. Unprepared  
D. Very unprepared

48. Aviation officer

- A. Very prepared B. Prepared C. Unprepared  
D. Very unprepared

49. What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility do you consider to be very unprepared for counterterrorism operations? (please specify, if any)

---

50. What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility, do you consider to be unprepared for counterterrorism operations? (please specify, if any)

---

How would you rate the need for technological development for counterterrorism use for the following items?

51. Sniping weapons

- A. Critical need for improvements  
B. Improvement needed  
C. Current development sufficient

52. "Stun" weapons (non-lethal, incapacitating weapons)

- A. Critical need for improvements  
B. Improvement needed  
C. Current development sufficient

53. Communications devices ("bugs," etc.)

- A. Critical need for improvements  
B. Improvement needed  
C. Current development sufficient

54. Terrorist "profiles"

- A. Critical need for improvements  
B. Improvement needed  
C. Current development sufficient

55. Human stress instruments

- A. Critical need for improvements
- B. Improvement needed
- C. Current development sufficient

56. Reaction team training facilities

- A. Critical need for improvements
- B. Improvement needed
- C. Current development sufficient

57. What other areas have a critical need for technological development for counterterrorism use? (please specify, if any) \_\_\_\_\_

To what extent do you agree with each of the statements listed below? (Circle the appropriate response)

58. Local sources of intelligence and police information concerning terrorist threats are adequate.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

59. Adequate Department of the Army policy guidance has been provided regarding how to counter terrorism within my area of responsibility.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

60. There is currently a need to change Department of the Army policy concerning counterterrorism.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

61. There is a need for more specific policy concerning counterterrorism.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree

- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

62. Within my area of responsibility, the establishment of Crisis Management Teams (to manage the response to acts of terrorism) has been carefully planned.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

63. Within my area of responsibility, it is clear who is "in charge" during a terrorist crisis (at the scene of the incident).

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

64. Within my area of responsibility, command, control, and communication procedures for dealing with a terrorist incident are clearly articulated.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

65. These command and control procedures are understood by those who must implement them.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

66. Within my area of responsibility, non-MP/Security Guard elements to be employed in the event of terrorist acts are clearly designated.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

67. Tactics and techniques to be employed by non-MP/ Security Guard elements are understood by members of those elements.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

68. The Public Affairs Office within my area of responsibility is adequately prepared to handle the information aspects of a counterterrorism operation.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

69. Additional MP/Security Guard personnel are needed in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within my area of responsibility.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

70. Additional special equipment is needed in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within my area of responsibility.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

71. It would be cost-effective to procure additional special equipment for counterterror purposes within my area of responsibility.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

72. Additional counterterror technological developments are needed in order to adequately respond to terrorism within my area of responsibility.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

73. The most likely targets of terrorists within my area of responsibility are adequately protected.

- A. Strongly agree
- B. Agree
- C. Disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

You have reached the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your time. If you have any comments, please write them below and on the back of this page, if necessary.

Please place the questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope and mail it at your earliest convenience.

COMMENTS:

APPENDIX III

SURVEY MAILING LIST

Provost Marshal  
Fort Devens, MA 01433

Provost Marshal  
Senior National Advisor  
Army National Guard  
Providence, RI 02904

Provost Marshal  
Fort Dix, NJ 08640

Provost Marshal  
3d Infantry Division  
APO New York 09036

Provost Marshal  
US Army Engineer Division, MED  
APO New York 09038

Provost Marshal 3d Armored Division  
APO New York 09039  
9B2

Provost Marshal  
USA Element  
SHAPE Belgium  
APO New York 09055

Provost Marshal  
HQ V-Corps  
APO New York 09079

Provost Marshal  
HQ USAREUR and Seventh Army  
APO NEW YORK 09086

Provost Marshal  
VII Corps  
APO New York 09107

Provost Marshal  
8th Infantry Division  
APO New York 09111

Provost Marshal  
Seventh Army Training Command  
APO New York 09114

Provost Marshal  
Southern European Task Force  
APO New York 09168

Provost Marshal  
32d Army Air Defense Command  
APO New York 09175

Provost Marshal  
21st Support Command  
APO New York 09325

Provost Marshal  
1st Armored Division  
APO New York 09326

Provost Marshal  
Bad Kreuznach Community  
APO New York 09252

Provost Marshal  
US Army Berlin  
APO New York 09742

Provost Marshal  
Substation, Bremerhaven  
APO New York 093-5

Provost Marshal  
Seneca Army Depot  
Romulus, NY 14541

Provost Marshal  
9th Inf. Div.  
Ft. Lewis, WA 98433

Provost Marshal  
Fort Wadsworth  
Staten Island, NY 10305

Provost Marshal  
US Military Academy  
West Point, NY 10996

Provost Marshal  
Fort Hamilton, NY 11252

Provost Marshal  
ATTN AFZS-PM  
Fort Drum  
Watertown, NY 13601

Provost Marshal  
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

Provost Marshal  
Defense Depot  
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

Provost Marshal  
Letterkenny Army Depot  
Chambersburg, PA 17201

Provost Marshal  
Walter Reed Army Medical Center  
Washington, DC 20012

Provost Marshal  
USA Engineer Division, Europe  
APO New York 09757

Provost Marshal/Commanding Officer  
709th MP Bn  
APO New York 09757

Provost Marshal  
Frankfurt Community  
APO New York 09710

Provost Marshal  
Fort Leslie J. McNair  
Washington, DC 20319

Provost Marshal  
First US Army  
Fort Meade, MD 20755

Provost Marshal  
Fort Meade, MD 20755

Provost Marshal  
Fort Detrick, MD 21701

Provost Marshal  
Fort Ritchie, MD 21719

Provost Marshal  
Nuernberg Community  
APO New York 09696

Provost Marshal  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Provost Marshal  
Vint Hill Farms  
Warrenton, VA 22186

Provost Marshal  
Fort Myer, VA 22211

Provost Marshal/Commanding Officer  
793d MP Battalion  
APO New York 09696

Provost Marshal  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria VA 22314

Provost Marshal  
Weisbaden Community  
APO New York 09457

Provost Marshal  
Fort Monroe, VA 23651

Provost Marshal  
Fort Story, VA 23459

Provost Marshal  
Fort Eustis, VA 23604

Provost Marshal  
HQ, TRADOC  
Fort Monroe, VA 23651

Provost Marshal  
Fort Lee, VA 23801

Provost Marshal  
Reserve Training Center  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307

Provost Marshal  
82d Airborne Division  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307

Provost Marshal  
Bayreuth Subcommunity  
APO New York 09411

Provost Marshal  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307

Provost Marshal  
Fort McPherson, GA 30330

Provost Marshal  
HQ FORCOM  
Fort McPherson, GA 30330

Provost Marshal  
Fort Gordon, GA 30905

Provost Marshal  
Fort Stewart, GA 31313

Provost Marshal  
Fort Benning, GA 31905

Provost Marshal  
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35809

Provost Marshal  
Fort McClellan, AL 36205

Provost Marshal  
Fort Rucker, AL 36362

Provost Marshal  
3d Armored Brigade  
PO Box 2347  
Jackson, TN 38301

Provost Marshal  
Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot  
Lexington, KY 40507

Provost Marshal  
Fort Campbell, KY 42223

Provost Marshal  
101st Airborne Division Airmobile  
Fort Campbell, KY 42223

Provost Marshal  
Defense Construction Supply Center  
Columbus, OH 43215

Provost Marshal  
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216

Provost Marshal  
Jefferson Proving Ground  
Madison, IN 47250

Provost Marshal  
Defense Logistics Support Center  
Federal Center  
Battle Creek, MI 49017

Provost Marshal  
Fort McCoy, WI 54656

Provost Marshal  
Fort Sheridan, IL 60037

Provost Marshal  
Joliet Army Ammo Plant  
Joliet, IL 60436

Provost Marshal  
Granite City Army Depot  
Granite City, IL 62040

Provost Marshal  
Gateway Army Ammo Plant  
St. Louis, MO 63139

Provost Marshal  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Provost Marshal  
Fort Polk, LA 71459

Provost Marshal  
Fort Sill, OK 73503

Provost Marshal  
2d Armored Division  
Fort Hood, TX 76544

Provost Marshal  
Fort Hood, TX 76544

Provost Marshal  
1st Cav Div  
Fort Hood, TX 76544

Provost Marshal  
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234  
9B13

Provost Marshal  
HQ Fifth US Army  
Fort San Houston, TX 78234

Provost Marshal  
Fort Bliss, TX 79906

Provost Marshal  
Wm Beaumont Army Medical Center  
El Paso, TX 79910

Provost Marshal  
Rocky Mountain Arsenal  
Denver, CO 80240

Provost Marshal  
Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center  
Denver, CO 80240

Provost Marshal  
Fort Carson, CO 80913

Provost Marshal  
Defense Depot Ogden  
Ogden, UT 84407

Provost Marshal  
Yuma Proving Ground  
Yuma, AZ 85364

Provost Marshal  
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613

Provost Marshal  
White Sands Missile  
Range, NM 88002

Provost Marshal  
93d ARCOM  
1350 San Pablo  
Los Angeles, CA 90033

Provost Marshal  
Fort MacArthur, CA 90731

Provost Marshal  
Fort Ord, CA 93941

Provost Marshal HQ Sixth US Army  
Presidio of  
San Francisco, CA 94129

Provost Marshal  
Presidio of  
San Francisco, CA 94129

Provost Marshal  
Defence Depot Tracy  
Tracy, CA 95376

Provost Marshal  
Sacramento Army Depot  
Sacramento, CA 95813

Provost Marshal  
Munich Community  
APO New York 09407

Provost Marshal  
Eighth US Army/UNC/USK  
APO San Francisco 96301

Provost Marshal  
US Army Japan  
APO San Francisco 96331

Provost Marshal  
Western Command  
Fort Shafter, HI 96858

Provost Marshal  
25th Infantry Division  
Schofield Barracks, HI 96857

Provost Marshal  
Fort Shafter, HI 96858

Provost Marshal  
Fort Lawton  
Seattle, WA 98199

Provost Marshal  
Madigan General Hospital  
Tacoma, WA 98431

Provost Marshal  
9th Infantry Division  
Fort Lewis, WA 98433

Provost Marshal  
Fort Greely, AK 99733

Provost Marshal  
US Army Alaska  
Fort Richardson, AK 99505

Provost Marshal  
Fort Wainwright, AK 99703

Provost Marshal  
Anniston Army Depot  
Bynam, Alabama 36201

Provost Marshal  
Pine Bluff Arsenal  
Pine Bluff, AR 71611

Provost Marshal  
Sierra Army Depot  
Herlong, CA 96113

Provost Marshal  
Sharpe Army Depot  
Lathrop, CA 95331

Provost Marshal  
Oakland Army Depot  
Oakland, CA 94626

Provost Marshal  
Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center  
Aurora, CO 80045

Provost Marshal  
HQ USA Military District of Washington  
Fort McNair, DC 20319

Provost Marshal  
Dwight David Eisenhower Army Medical Center  
Fort Gordon, GA 30905

Provost Marshal  
USA Armament Materiel Readiness Command  
Rock Island, IL 61299

Provost Marshal  
Fort Riley, KS 66442

Provost Marshal  
Fort Knox, KY 40121

Provost Marshal  
Aberdeen Proving Ground  
Aberdeen, MD 21010

Provost Marshal  
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Provost Marshal  
Fort Monmouth, NJ 07730

Provost Marshal  
Fort Toten  
Flushing, NY 11359

Provost Marshal  
Fort Tilden, NY 11695

Provost Marshal  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 17003

Provost Marshal  
Fort Jackson, SC 29207

Provost Marshal  
Corpus Christi Army Depot  
Corpus Christi, TX 78411

Provost Marshal  
US Army Health Services Command  
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234

Provost Marshal  
Red River Army Depot  
Texarkana, TX 75501

Provost Marshal  
Dugway Proving Ground  
Dugway, UT 84022

Provost Marshal  
Tooele Army Depot  
Tooele, UT 84074

Provost Marshal  
Fort A.P. Hill  
Bowling Green, VA 22427

Provost Marshal  
US Army Field Station Augsburg  
APO New York 09458

Provost Marshal  
US Army Support Group  
Bremerhaven  
APO New York 09069

Provost Marshal  
1st Infantry Division (Fwd)  
Cooke Barracks (Goepingen)  
APO New York 09137

Provost Marshal  
3d Support Command  
APO New York 09757

Provost Marshal  
2d Support Command  
APO New York 09160

Provost Marshal  
Tripler Army Medical Center  
Tripler AMC, HI 96859

Provost Marshal  
2d Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco, CA 96224

Provost Marshal  
19th Support Command  
APO San Francisco, CA 96212

Provost Marshal  
US Southern Command  
APO Miami, FL 34003

Provost Marshal  
Fort Lewis, WA 98433

Provost Marshal  
1st Infantry Division  
Fort Riley, KS 66442

Provost Marshal  
AFCENT Subpact (US)  
APO New York 09011

Provost Marshal  
8th Support Group  
APO New York 09019

Provost Marshal  
Schwaetisch Hill Subcommunity  
APO New York 09025

Provost Marshal  
Wildflecken Subcommunity  
APO New York 09026

Provost Marshal  
Schweinfurt Community  
APO New York 09033

Provost Marshal  
Baumholder Community  
APO New York 09034

Provost Marshal  
Wuerzburg Community  
APO New York 09036

Provost Marshal  
3d Armored Division  
APO New York 09039

Provost Marshal  
Bad Toelz Community  
APO New York 09050

Provost Marshal  
Zwibruecken Community  
APO New York 09052

Provost Marshal  
60th Ordnance Group  
APO New York 09052

Provost Marshal  
Garmisch Community  
APO New York 090-3

Provost Marshal  
29th Area Support Group  
APO New York 09054

Provost Marshal  
5th Signal Command  
APO New York 09056

Provost Marshal  
Worms Community  
APO New York 09058

Provost Marshal  
Butzbach Subcommunity  
APO New York 09077

Provost Marshal/Commanding Officer  
95th MP Battalion  
APO New York 09086

Provost Marshal  
Mannheim Community  
APO New York 09086

Provost Marshal  
NATO/SHAPE Support Group  
APO New York 09088

Provost Marshal  
26th Support Group  
APO New York 09102

Provost Marshal  
Grafenwoehr Subcommunity  
APO New York 09114

Provost Marshal  
Goeppingen Community  
APO New York 09137

Provost Marshal  
Bamberg Community  
APO New York 09139

Provost Marshal  
Fulda Community  
APO New York 09146

Provost Marshal  
Stuttgart Community  
APO New York 09154

Provost Marshal/Commanding Officer  
385th MP Battalion  
APO New York 09154

Provost Marshal  
Ascheffenburg Community  
APO New York 09162

Provost Marshal  
Karlsruhe Community  
APO New York 09164

Provost Marshal  
Hanau Community  
APO New York 09165

Provost Marshal  
Giessen Community  
APO New York 09169

Provost Marshal  
Hohenfels Subcommunity  
APO New York 09173

Provost Marshal  
Darmstadt Community  
APO New York 09175

Provost Marshal  
Heilbroun Community  
APO New York 09176

Provost Marshal  
Ansbach Community  
APO New York 09177

Provost Marshal  
Augsburg Community  
APO New York 09178

Provost Marshal  
Mainz Community  
APO New York 09185

Provost Marshal  
Pirmasena Community  
APO New York 09189

Provost Marshal  
Vicenza  
APO New York 09221

Provost Marshal  
Fort Clayton  
APO Miami, FL 34004

Provost Marshal  
Fort Amador  
APO Miami, FL 34007

Provost Marshal  
Fort Buchanan, PR 00934


APPENDIX IV

SURVEY RESULTS

Responses to Survey: "Opinions of the Adequacy of Current Counterterrorism Preparedness at Army Installations"

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u># of responses</u>	<u>(%)</u>
1. What is your current position?		
A. Provost Marshal	108	(88.6)
B. Acting Provost Marshal	8	(6.0)
C. Security Officer	4	(3.0)
D. Other	<u>14</u>	<u>(10.4)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)
2. What is your rank?		
A. 0-1, 0-2, or 0-3	39	(29.1)
B. 0-4	32	(23.9)
C. 0-5	37	(27.6)
D. 0-6	18	(13.4)
E. Other	<u>8</u>	<u>(6.0)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)
3. What is your first specialty?		
A. 31, Law Enforcement	119	(88.8)
B. Other	<u>15</u>	<u>(11.2)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)
4. What is your second specialty?		
A. 31, Law Enforcement	7	(5.4)
B. Other	<u>122</u>	<u>(94.6)</u>
Total	129	(100.0)





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963-A

5. Do you know about the existence of the US Army Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course?

A. Yes	105	(78.4)
B. Yes, but I need more details	23	(17.2)
C. No	<u>6</u>	<u>(4.5)</u>
Total	134	(100.1)

6. Have you attended the US Army Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course?

A. Yes	35	(26.5)
B. No, but I plan to attend the course	52	(39.4)
C. No, I did not know of this course	8	(6.1)
D. No, and I will most likely never attend	<u>37</u>	<u>(28.0)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

7. Have you attended any counterterrorism courses other than that offered by the US Army Military Police School?

A. Yes	34	(25.6)
B. No	<u>99</u>	<u>(74.4)</u>
Total	133	(100.0)

8. Do you have access to sources of intelligence and police information concerning local terrorist threats?

A. Yes	130	(98.5)
B. No	<u>2</u>	<u>(1.5)</u>

9. How geographically dispersed is your area of responsibility?

A. I am responsible for one installation	57	(42.5)
B. I am responsible for two installations	13	(9.7)
C. I am responsible for three or more installations	<u>64</u>	<u>(47.8)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

10. How long have you been assigned to your current area of responsibility?

A. One year or less	60	(44.8)
B. Between one and two years	37	(27.6)
C. Between two and three years	26	(19.4)
D. Between three and four years	8	(6.0)
E. Between four and five years	1	(0.7)
F. More than five years	<u>2</u>	<u>(1.5)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

11. What is the approximate total number of military personnel within your area of responsibility?

A. Fewer than 2,500	39	(29.1)
B. Between 2,500 and 5,000	16	(11.9)
C. Between 5,000 and 10,000	25	(18.7)
D. Between 10,000 and 15,000	19	(14.2)
E. More than 15,000	<u>35</u>	<u>(26.1)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

12. Approximately how many civilians work on the military post(s) within your area of responsibility?

A. Fewer than 500	17	(12.9)
B. Between 500 and 1,000	19	(14.4)
C. Between 1,000 and 2,500	34	(25.8)
D. Between 2,500 and 5,000	26	(19.7)
E. More than 5,000	<u>36</u>	<u>(27.3)</u>
Total	132	(100.1)

13. Approximately how many family members (dependents) live on the military post(s) within your area of responsibility?

A. Fewer than 500 family members	29	(22.5)
B. Between 500 and 1,000	19	(14.7)
C. Between 1,000 and 2,500	15	(11.6)
D. Between 2,500 and 5,000	20	(15.5)
E. More than 5,000	<u>46</u>	<u>(35.7)</u>
Total	129	(100.0)

## 14. Where is your area of responsibility?

A. Within the contiguous 48 states	75	(56.0)
B. Within Alaska or Hawaii	5	(3.7)
C. Within a US possession, trust, or commonwealth	1	(0.7)
D. In a foreign territory with a Status of Forces Treaty in effect	52	(38.8)
E. In a foreign territory with no Status of Forces Treaty in effect	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.7)</u>
Total	134	(99.9)

## 15. For the most part, your area of responsibility is included within which command?

A. FORSCOM	34	(25.6)
B. TRADOC	20	(15.0)
C. USAREUR	42	(31.6)
D. Eighth US Army	1	(0.8)
E. Other	<u>36</u>	<u>(27.1)</u>
Total	133	(100.1)

## 16. For the most part, to which component does the command in which you are assigned belong?

A. Active Army	131	(97.8)
B. Army Reserve	2	(1.5)
C. National Guard	0	(0.0)
D. Other	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.7)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

The possibility may always exist, but based upon your knowledge of local civil-military relations and the social and political environment, how likely is it that some group may attempt one of the following criminal acts with political overtones? (Within the next 6 months, within your area of responsibility.)

17. Attempted hostage taking

A. Very likely	7	(5.3)
B. Likely	34	(25.6)
C. Unlikely	66	(49.6)
D. Very unlikely	<u>26</u>	<u>(19.5)</u>
Total	133	(100.0)

18.	<u>Attempted bombing</u>		
	A. Very likely	26	(19.4)
	B. Likely	37	(27.6)
	C. Unlikely	51	(38.1)
	D. Very unlikely	<u>20</u>	<u>(14.9)</u>
	Total	134	(100.0)
19.	<u>Attempted assassination</u>		
	A. Very likely	7	(5.3)
	B. Likely	20	(15.2)
	C. Unlikely	63	(47.7)
	D. Very unlikely	<u>42</u>	<u>(31.8)</u>
	Total	132	(100.0)
20.	<u>Attempted aircraft hijacking</u>		
	A. Very likely	6	(4.5)
	B. Likely	21	(15.8)
	C. Unlikely	46	(34.6)
	D. Very unlikely	<u>60</u>	<u>(45.1)</u>
	Total	133	(100.0)
21.	<u>Attempted arson</u>		
	A. Very likely	12	(9.0)
	B. Likely	50	(37.3)
	C. Unlikely	50	(37.3)
	D. Very unlikely	<u>22</u>	<u>(16.4)</u>
	Total	134	(100.0)
22.	<u>Attempted theft of conventional arms</u>		
	A. Very likely	20	(15.0)
	B. Likely	44	(33.1)
	C. Unlikely	51	(38.3)
	D. Very unlikely	<u>18</u>	<u>(13.5)</u>
	Total	133	(99.9)
23.	What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider <u>very likely</u> in the next 12 months within your area of responsibility?		
	A. Provided no response	107	(79.9)
	B. Provided response (see Appendix V for results)	<u>27</u>	<u>(20.1)</u>
	Total	134	(100.0)

24. What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider likely within the next 12 months within your area of responsibility?

A. Provided no response	108	(77.6)
B. Provided response (see Appendix VI for results)	<u>30</u>	<u>(22.4)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

Department of Defense policy is to neither confirm nor deny the locations of certain weapons or devices. Therefore, as a senior Army law enforcement official, how likely do you think any of the following terrorist incidents are, Army-wide, within the next 12 months?

25. Attempted theft of a nuclear device

A. Very likely	3	(2.3)
B. Likely	34	(26.0)
C. Unlikely	71	(54.2)
D. Very unlikely	<u>23</u>	<u>(17.6)</u>
Total	131	(100.1)

26. Attempted or threatened detonation of a nuclear device

A. Very likely	2	(1.5)
B. Likely	26	(19.8)
C. Unlikely	61	(46.6)
D. Very unlikely	<u>42</u>	<u>(32.1)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

27. Attempted theft of a chemical device

A. Very likely	3	(2.3)
B. Likely	46	(35.1)
C. Unlikely	60	(45.8)
D. Very unlikely	<u>22</u>	<u>(16.8)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

28. Attempted or threatened detonation of a chemical device

A. Very likely	3	(2.3)
B. Likely	35	(26.7)
C. Unlikely	60	(45.8)
D. Very unlikely	<u>33</u>	<u>(25.2)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

29. Approximately how many criminal acts attributable to terrorists have there been within your area of responsibility during the last three years?

A. None	90	(67.2)
B. One	18	(13.4)
C. Two	8	(6.0)
D. Three	4	(3.0)
E. Four	2	(1.5)
F. More than four	<u>12</u>	<u>(9.0)</u>
Total	134	(100.1)

30. Do you have a written counterterrorism plan for your area of responsibility?

A. Yes	100	(74.6)
B. I have some written plans, but they are incomplete	27	(20.1)
C. No	<u>7</u>	<u>(5.2)</u>
Total	134	(99.9)

31. Have the most likely targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing?

A. Yes, and formally published in a plan or other document in such a way that the commander's primary staff should be aware of them	81	(60.4)
B. Yes, but in such a way that only the key military police and security personnel are aware of them	38	(28.4)
C. No, not yet	<u>15</u>	<u>(11.2)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

32. Have the most vulnerable targets for terrorists within your area of responsibility been identified as such in writing?

A. Yes, and formally published in a plan or other document in such a way that the commander's primary staff should be aware of them	77	(58.5)
B. Yes, but in such a way that only the key military police and security personnel are aware of them	40	(30.5)
C. No, not yet	<u>14</u>	<u>(10.7)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

33. Has the primary staff of the commander in your area of responsibility had at least one exercise or practice drill on counterterrorism within the last 12 months?

A. Yes	42	(31.8)
B. No	<u>90</u>	<u>(68.2)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

34. Within your area of responsibility, what type of crisis management team exists to handle terrorist incidents?

A. A team specifically developed for that purpose	56	(42.1)
B. The commander's normal staff	65	(48.9)
C. Other	<u>12</u>	<u>(9.0)</u>
Total	133	(100.0)

35. Is a Special Reaction Team (SRT) available for your use in the event you may need one in your area of responsibility?

A. Yes, an SRT is assigned within my area of responsibility	61	(46.2)
B. An SRT is not assigned within my area of responsibility, but one is available to me	35	(26.5)
C. No, an SRT is not available	<u>36</u>	<u>(27.3)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

36. If you have an SRT available for your use, how long would it take for the SRT to be equipped, organized, and at the scene of the problem? (Time will vary, of course, depending on where within your area of responsibility the disturbance has occurred, but make a rough estimate.)

A. Less than one hour	40	(30.3)
B. Between one and two hours	31	(23.5)
C. Between two and four hours	19	(14.4)
D. Between four and eight hours	6	(4.5)
E. More than eight hours	1	(0.8)
F. I do not have an SRT available	<u>35</u>	<u>(26.5)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

37. If you have an SRT available, is it operating at full strength in terms of personnel?

A. 100%	44	(36.1)
B. More than 90% strength	21	(17.2)
C. Between 75% and 90% strength	12	(9.8)
D. Less than 75% strength	6	(4.9)
E. I do not have an SRT available	<u>39</u>	<u>(32.0)</u>
Total	122	(100.0)

38. If you have an SRT available, do you feel it is adequately trained?

A. Yes	57	(43.5)
B. No	34	(26.0)
C. I do not have an SRT available	<u>40</u>	<u>(30.5)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

39. If you have an SRT available, is it adequately equipped?

A. Yes	57	(43.2)
B. No	35	(26.5)
C. I do not have an SRT available	<u>40</u>	<u>(30.3)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

40. If you have an SRT available, how often, on the average, does it perform counterterrorist drills?

A. At least once a week	12	(10.7)
B. One to three times monthly	13	(11.6)
C. At least once quarterly	28	(25.0)
D. At least once annually	10	(8.9)
E. Less than annually	9	(8.0)
F. I do not have an SRT available	<u>40</u>	<u>(35.7)</u>
Total	112	(99.9)

41. Are trained hostage negotiators available to you within your area of responsibility?

A. No	20	(15.7)
B. Yes, FBI-trained CID agents	60	(47.2)
C. Yes, CID agents trained (elsewhere)	22	(17.3)
D. Other	<u>22</u>	<u>(19.7)</u>
Total	127	(99.9)

How would you rate the primary staff officers within your area of responsibility on their preparedness for counter-terrorism operations?

42. Engineer

A. Very prepared	2	(1.7)
B. Prepared	68	(56.7)
C. Unprepared	43	(35.8)
D. Very unprepared	<u>7</u>	<u>(5.8)</u>
Total	120	(100.0)

43. Communications and electronics officer

A. Very prepared	5	(4.1)
B. Prepared	72	(59.0)
C. Unprepared	44	(36.1)
D. Very unprepared	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.8)</u>
Total	122	(100.0)

44. Medical officer

A. Very prepared	10	(8.1)
B. Prepared	70	(56.5)
C. Unprepared	39	(31.5)
D. Very unprepared	<u>5</u>	<u>(4.0)</u>
Total	124	(100.1)

45. Intelligence officer

A. Very prepared	24	(18.9)
B. Prepared	76	(59.8)
C. Unprepared	26	(20.5)
D. Very unprepared	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.8)</u>
Total	127	(100.0)

46. Operations officer

A. Very prepared	14	(11.7)
B. Prepared	79	(65.8)
C. Unprepared	26	(21.7)
D. Very unprepared	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.8)</u>
Total	120	(100.0)

47. Public Affairs Officer

A. Very prepared	15	(12.2)
B. Prepared	76	(61.8)
C. Unprepared	30	(24.4)
D. Very unprepared	<u>2</u>	<u>(1.6)</u>
Total	123	(100.0)

48. Aviation officer

A. Very prepared	17	(16.5)
B. Prepared	57	(55.3)
C. Unprepared	25	(24.3)
D. Very unprepared	<u>4</u>	<u>(3.9)</u>
Total	103	(100.0)

49. What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility, do you consider to be very unprepared for counterterrorism operations?

A. Provided no response	120	(89.6)
B. Provided response (see Appendix VII)	<u>14</u>	<u>(10.4)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

50. What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility, do you consider to be unprepared for counterterrorism operations?

A. Provided no response	124	(92.5)
B. Provided response (see Appendix VIII)	<u>10</u>	<u>(7.5)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

How would you rate the need for technological development for counterterrorism use for the following items?

51. Sniping weapons

A. Critical need for improvements	29	(23.4)
B. Improvement needed	52	(41.9)
C. Current development sufficient	<u>43</u>	<u>(34.7)</u>
Total	124	(100.0)

52.	<u>"Stun" weapons (non-lethal, incapacitating weapons)</u>		
	A. Critical need for improvements	45	(38.1)
	B. Improvement needed	59	(50.0)
	C. Current development sufficient	<u>14</u>	<u>(11.9)</u>
	Total	118	(100.0)
53.	<u>Communications devices ("bugs," etc.)</u>		
	A. Critical need for improvements	33	(28.0)
	B. Improvement needed	54	(45.8)
	C. Current development sufficient	<u>31</u>	<u>(26.3)</u>
	Total	118	(100.1)
54.	<u>Terrorist "profiles"</u>		
	A. Critical need for improvements	48	(38.4)
	B. Improvement needed	60	(48.0)
	C. Current development sufficient	<u>17</u>	<u>(13.6)</u>
	Total	125	(100.0)
55.	<u>Human stress instruments</u>		
	A. Critical need for improvements	38	(33.9)
	B. Improvement needed	67	(59.8)
	C. Current development sufficient	<u>7</u>	<u>(6.3)</u>
	Total	112	(100.0)
56.	<u>Reaction team training facilities</u>		
	A. Critical need for improvements	66	(52.8)
	B. Improvement needed	46	(36.8)
	C. Current development sufficient	<u>13</u>	<u>(10.4)</u>
	Total	125	(100.0)
57.	<u>What other areas have a critical need for technological development for counterterrorism use?</u>		
	A. Provided no response	105	(78.4)
	B. Provided response (see Appendix IX)	<u>29</u>	<u>(21.6)</u>
	Total	134	100.0)

To what extent do you agree with each of the statements listed below.

58. Local sources of intelligence and police information concerning terrorist threats are adequate.

A. Strongly agree	25	(18.7)
B. Agree	83	(61.9)
C. Disagree	20	(14.9)
D. Strongly disagree	6	(4.5)
Total	134	(100.0)

59. Adequate Department of the Army policy guidance has been provided regarding how to counter terrorism within my area of responsibility.

A. Strongly agree	2	(1.5)
B. Agree	74	(55.6)
C. Disagree	48	(36.1)
D. Strongly disagree	9	(6.8)
Total	133	(100.0)

60. There is currently a need to change Department of the Army policy concerning counterterrorism.

A. Strongly agree	11	(8.9)
B. Agree	57	(46.0)
C. Disagree	55	(44.4)
D. Strongly disagree	1	(0.8)
Total	124	(100.0)

61. There is a need for more specific policy concerning counterterrorism.

A. Strongly agree	38	(29.5)
B. Agree	64	(49.6)
C. Disagree	27	(20.9)
D. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)
Total	129	(100.0)

62. Within my area of responsibility, the establishment of Crisis Management Teams (to manage the response to acts of terrorism) has been carefully planned.

A. Strongly agree	4	(3.1)
B. Agree	59	(45.0)
C. Disagree	57	(43.5)
D. Strongly disagree	11	(8.4)
Total	131	(100.0)

63. Within my area of responsibility, it is clear who is "in charge" during a terrorist crisis (at the scene of the incident).

A. Strongly agree	25	(18.9)
B. Agree	70	(53.0)
C. Disagree	26	(19.7)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>11</u>	<u>(8.3)</u>
Total	132	(99.9)

64. Within my area of responsibility, command, control, and communication procedures for dealing with a terrorist incident are clearly articulated.

A. Strongly agree	11	(8.4)
B. Agree	72	(55.0)
C. Disagree	36	(27.5)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>12</u>	<u>(9.2)</u>
Total	131	(100.1)

65. These command and control procedures are understood by those who must implement them.

A. Strongly agree	9	(7.0)
B. Agree	71	(55.0)
C. Disagree	37	(28.7)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>12</u>	<u>(9.3)</u>
Total	129	(100.0)

66. Within my area of responsibility, non-MP/Security Guard elements to be employed in the event of terrorist acts are clearly designated.

A. Strongly agree	12	(9.1)
B. Agree	60	(45.5)
C. Disagree	49	(37.1)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>11</u>	<u>(8.3)</u>
Total	132	(100.0)

67. Tactics and techniques to be employed by non-MP/Security Guard elements are understood by members of those elements.

A. Strongly agree	7	(5.6)
B. Agree	47	(37.3)
C. Disagree	52	(41.3)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>20</u>	<u>(15.9)</u>
Total	126	(100.1)

68. The Public Affairs Office within my area of responsibility is adequately prepared to handle the information aspects of a counterterrorism operation.

A. Strongly agree	16	(12.5)
B. Agree	80	(62.5)
C. Disagree	24	(18.8)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>8</u>	<u>(6.3)</u>
Total	128	(100.1)

69. Additional MP/Security Guard personnel are needed in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within my area of responsibility.

A. Strongly agree	48	(36.1)
B. Agree	43	(32.3)
C. Disagree	39	(29.3)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>3</u>	<u>(2.3)</u>
Total	133	(100.0)

70. Additional special equipment is needed in order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism within my area of responsibility.

A. Strongly agree	61	(46.6)
B. Agree	53	(40.5)
C. Disagree	16	(12.2)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>1</u>	<u>(0.8)</u>
Total	131	(100.1)

71. It would be cost-effective to procure additional special equipment for counterterror purposes within my area of responsibility.

A. Strongly agree	29	(22.8)
B. Agree	52	(40.9)
C. Disagree	39	(30.7)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>7</u>	<u>(5.5)</u>
Total	127	(99.9)

72. Additional counterterror technological developments are needed in order to adequately respond to terrorism within my area of responsibility.

A. Strongly agree	20	(15.3)
B. Agree	67	(51.1)
C. Disagree	40	(30.5)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>4</u>	<u>(3.1)</u>
Total	131	(100.0)

73. The most likely targets of terrorists within my area of responsibility are adequately protected.

A. Strongly agree	8	(6.0)
B. Agree	49	(36.8)
C. Disagree	60	(45.1)
D. Strongly disagree	<u>16</u>	<u>(12.0)</u>
Total	133	(99.9)

Comments

A. Provided no comments	91	(67.9)
B. Provided comments (see Appendix X)	<u>43</u>	<u>(32.1)</u>
Total	134	(100.0)

APPENDIX V

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 23

"What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider very likely in the next 12 months within your area of responsibility?"

1. Sabotage - Damage to vehicles/property/prestige.
2. Attempted bombing.
3. Demonstrations.
4. Bomb threat.
5. Hostage situation, demonstration, infiltration of federal property from Mexico, subversiveness without US Army.
6. Attempts on the Space Shuttle.
7. Possible dissident inspired demonstrations.
8. Protests, demonstrations.
9. Disruptive demonstration insighting.
10. Harassing phone calls by terrorists or "screw balls."
11. Training, targets against U.S.
12. Seizure of nuclear weapon.
13. Operational disruptions may be likely.
14. Demonstrations.
15. Armed robbery at AMEXCO w/subsequent hostage taking. Solved successfully and abandoned subject shot dead Jul 80.
16. Attempts to steal conventional arms/ammunition/explosives.
17. Bank robbery.

18. Possibly sponsor local demonstrations.
19. Entrance & theft of an ammunition storage area.
20. Disruption of planned military field exercises within my area of responsibility.
21. Theft of nuclear weapons, bank robbery.
22. Demonstrations - damage of facilities during same.
23. Scare letter to newspapers.
24. Thefts, sabotage.
25. Unfavorable press releases concerning the ineffectiveness of local police to combat crime or acts of terrorism.
26. Sabotage and destruction of U.S. govt. property.
27. Demonstrations & distribution of literature.

APPENDIX VI

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 24

"What other type(s) of terrorist incidents do you consider likely within the next 12 months within your area of responsibility?"

1. Attempted arson.
2. Bomb threat.
3. Theft of government property.
4. Army thefts to include ammo.
5. Armed aggression.
6. Use of peace, anti-nuclear demonstrations to inflict violence to nuclear sites.
7. Theft of small arms and/or ammunition.
8. Confrontations with US Army MP's.
9. Possible assassinations of mil. VIP's.
10. Demonstrations resulting in violent acts.
11. Same as 23, possibly sponsor demonstrations.
12. Kidnapping, demonstrations.
13. Sabotage of aircraft and combat vehicles.
14. Theft of ammunition.
15. Any action that could generate political unrest. This area is extremely volatile with economic and political problems, along with the government trying to establish and demonstrate its sovereignty.
16. Infiltration of demonstrations/strikes with possible violence resulting.

17. Demonstrations.
18. Sabotage of military equipment.
19. The possible sabotage of US gov't property, i.e. trucks, jeeps, tanks, etc.
20. Attempted arson, threats to mil members/installation.
21. Theft of military equipment such as uniforms, field equipment.
22. Destruction of facilities or material, i.e. POL, AMMO, etc.
23. Attempt to obtain a hand portable special weapon.
24. I am responsible for securing toxic chemicals and an APRF both of which are used in R & D environment. If any incidents occur, they would be in this area.
25. Harassment, minor destruction.
26. Student riots and demonstrations.
27. Violent demonstrations are possible but I wouldn't go so far as to say very likely.
28. Kidnapping of gov't officials - host country.
30. Disruptive demonstrations.

APPENDIX VII

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 49

"What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility, do you consider to be very unprepared for counter-terrorism operations?"

1. Deputy chief of staff.
2. Supporting BASEOPS PM.
3. G-5.
4. DPTSEC (post-level).
5. Executive Officer (Dep installation Cdr.)
6. DIO - does not have generators - very critical item.
7. HQ CMDT.
8. C/S.
9. Legal.
10. DIO.
11. DT, DM, Chaplain, RMO, CPO, DPCA (Div of Per & Comm Aff).
12. Installation Coordinator.
13. DPCA, HHC CDR.
14. DSS (Supply) Adjutant.

APPENDIX VIII

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 50

"What other staff officers, within your area of responsibility, do you consider to be unprepared for computerterrorism operations?"

1. Logistics office.
2. Logistics, Transportation.
3. DIO - S-4.
4. Me--there is no one to train me!
5. DIO.
6. PM, Personnel Officer, Logistics Officer.
7. DIO.
8. Chief of Staff.
9. DIO, DPCA.
10. Chaplain.

APPENDIX IX

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 57

"What other areas have a critical need for technological development for counterterrorism use?"

1. Other assorted equipment availability (standardization).
2. "Quantify the threat" - What to do if taken hostage.
3. Special equipment-doctrine.
4. Large crowd-demonstration control items.
5. All senior MP NCO's and all commissioned officers should be trained in hostage negotiations.
6. If used at all, 95B's at the school.
7. Security Systems Improvements.
8. We have limited resources unlike BORDER GP 9 or SF GP.
9. MP training. The school is poor!
10. Training and assigning reaction teams, properly equipped - none available.
11. Bomb detection.
12. How-to tactics for SRT's and doctrine.
13. In depth counter-intell. w/distribution to installations.
14. Basic instruction on how to handle the situation should be given to MP's in AIT. They have no idea what to do and will usually be the first ones on the scene.
15. Monitoring equipment, CCTV's.
16. More trained personnel in this area is USAREUR. At least one person per community and sub-community.

17. Individual training of MP's.
18. DA sponsored school for training SRT's.
19. Visual surveillance devices, i.e., able to see around corners, thru smoke, etc.
20. Body protection, protective masks better suited for the situations.
21. Use of starlight scopes and infrared equipment.
22. Riot control equipment--critical need.
23. The law needs to be better defined on how to deal with them.
24. Protective clothing and equipment for SRF members. (State of the art ballistic vest, etc.)
25. Training of personnel.
26. Technology is not the problem--qualified personnel is the problem, both in terms of quantity and quality--preparedness is an expense we cannot meet.
27. Surveillance equipment.
28. Ref. 51-57. Due to the high turnover of US personnel and lack of qualified instructors, it is unfeasible to consider use of US personnel in counterterrorism operations.
29. Army Regulation to allow for equipping of SRT's instead of having things scattered all over.

APPENDIX X

COMMENTS BY RESPONDENTS ON 1981 SURVEY

1. The terrorist threat appears to be much greater in Europe than CONUS, however the best counterterrorism training, preparedness, and financing appears to be in CONUS. This is something I do not understand. The info isn't getting to community PM's in USAREUR!

2. Difficulties are encountered with being assigned to a military community PMO and serving a separate combat unit. Unit guard and duty personnel are designated as the reaction force in the event of terrorist activities. However, control of the unit has not been clearly explained. No exercises are conducted and overall kaserne security has been downgraded, over my strongest objections. The task is difficult to maintain as high a security level as possible, and still conform to command wishes. I hope the information is useful.

3. [Installation omitted], because of its R & D and testing mission is a unique installation. AR's, 50-5, 50-6, and 190-54 are applicable, at least in part. This requires me to implement as a matter of routine the requirements for

reaction forces similar in nature to an SRT. Both military police and DOD security guards perform this function.

4. ... Neither the MP Brigade nor the State Headquarters have a Provost Marshal Section/Cell. The Brigade is organized as a Corps type MP Brigade and is, therefore, not authorized a PM section. Additionally, I should point out that the Brigade and State Headquarters are currently sending officers to the resident course at USAMPS. The CG and his S-3 have already attended along with two staff officers from State Headquarters. As a result of the Brigade CG's attendance plans are underway to "export" this course to [state omitted] in the form of a two-day seminar with local law enforcement participation anticipated. The end result should be a better plan or SOP within the Brigade to deal with terrorist activity. Most of our MP units have SRT's based on their Civil Disturbance contingency missions.... Counterterrorism is certainly a valid mission for the MP Corps, especially in its combat support role.

5. Anti-terrorist plans should be the responsibility of the DPT/G-3 not the PM. Most command group personnel (CG, DCG, or C/S) look to the proponent for a letter, regulation or message when tasking action officers. AR 190-52 proponenty is with the law enforcement element, ergo the OPM has action. Counterterrorism is a military operation, with

large helpings of police, but it should be a G-3 type action.

6. The increased interest by all levels of command is very encouraging. Some examples, of plans, SOP's, training programs, etc. we in the field could use would be very helpful. Lessons learned also would be great. This is a new field to most of us and we can use all the help available.

7. We need a training & equipment package.

8. All the planning for ATHORP (Anti-terrorist, hostage rescue plan) is at PMO level and will be presented to the CMD in the near future.

9. Initial MP response to a terrorist incident is weak. Most MP's carry only 5 rounds of ammo. No shoulder weapons, gas or masks are routinely carried on patrol. The vehicles have no spot lights or adequate radio equipment. The first MP on the scene probably would not have a fighting chance as he has nothing to fight with. This is the area where the real weakness among MP's lies.

10. Item 39. Too often counterterrorism is given lip service and not taken seriously. Although the regulation directs that an SRT be formed, there are no provisions/ means of funding for specialized equipment nor are personnel authorized. We need to have immediate assistance in

this area. Second area of immediate concern to me is obtaining some relief/exception to regulations relating to AR 380-13. We are faced with a "catch 22" situation. We are tasked to continually assess the threat yet we have the hindrance of AR 380-13.

11. Terrorist activities are here to stay and there is definite need to have trained MP's that can react in a crisis situation until reinforced, trained SWAT personnel can arrive and take over negotiations/responsibilities. Army will probably react after our National Security is threatened to establish effective guidelines, training and equipment on counterterrorism.

12. a. If some of my answers conflict it's more than likely due to my interpretation of your question.

b. My area of responsibility is special weapons and based on the current trend and sophistication of terrorist groups I see that the army is still taking short cuts to save money. I am preparing to occupy a new facility and based on what the different agencies cut here and there and even considering the current state of the art we're still at a disadvantage with the systems we will be employing. Were I a terrorist, the hours of darkness is when I would attempt to strike a target like mine. However, we have no night vision devices. In addition the security personnel do not receive proper training at the MP school prior to assignment to P.S. units with special weapons security

missions. I think my point is that security of special and conventional weapons in the US has not received the overall attention it needs. If the threat is current and real then we must treat it as such and devote more money and training in that area.

13. If they want us they will get us.

14. If MP's are going to become involved, we will need TDA/TOE POSITIONS, NOW. We must take out of other resources.

15. Counterterrorism plans in USAREUR should be under the direction of a single law enforcement entity. Presently, in my community, for instance, law enforcement is all but shut-out from planning, executing and formulating plans. Probably this is due to the lack of trust the "commander" has in senior NCO's, even those of us with years of LE experience. Probably in most cases, elsewhere, unless the community PM is O5 or above, not much reliance is placed upon LE assets in any situations to include counterterrorism planning. I personally believe terrorism is too real of a threat today to leave it in the hands of non-experts. Terrorism is a police problem not the problem of the "town doctor" or the "mayor," if you will. If counterterrorism is not given to the hands of a single LE officer of each command, I see many problems in the future in dealing with threats. These problems as seen are, confusion in the

execution of counterterrorist plans, poor resource availability and the needless injury of personnel due to improper and invalid training of personnel. A "commander" today is too involved with the long range combat preparedness of his assets and treats subjects, as counterterrorism, as a thorn in his side. Plans are drawn to meet minimum requirements not optimal results. Counterterrorism should not be associated with combat support but, counterterrorism must become a realized support to daily living.

16. Under the difficult but workable NATO SOFA environment, special [national identification omitted] police units are the only qualified resource, coupled w/MP outer perimeter guards and CID negotiators. It works!

17. Answers to questions 39-40 pertain to the [foreign sub-state identification omitted] State Police Squad. I don't have a US Forces SRT. Ref. questions 51-57, the problem isn't improvement needed, the problem is access/availability. It's not to be had!

18. Formation of designated Special Reaction Teams, assigned to communities (mainly in USAREUR) by required and authorized TDA slots is essential for a serious counterterrorist operation to take place. Current weapons - 5.56, .45, M-203 are not accurate enough for special ops. M-79 was a better choice, a more accurate handgun and longrange sniping rifle are needed.

19. We feel [country omitted] is a highly volatile area, with explosive political issues, and civil unrest producing constant demonstrations. The political, economic and military status of [country omitted] make it very vulnerable for terrorist targets for accomplishment of certain goals and objectives. Counterterrorism and SRT are of increasing concern to both the command and the law enforcement agencies.

20. My response to #62 indicates that careful planning has not taken place where personnel involved are aware of procedures to follow. Our plan addresses specific actions for specific situations for which we are well informed. The overall versatility may be lacking, however. Training has developed from within once the problem was recognized and has been based upon the most recent information we can gather. S-2 information is sometimes slow but always available.

21. Counterterrorism reaction forces in Europe are provided thru the [national identification omitted] police; however US forces are not adequately trained nor equipped. Infantry/combat troops do not have the sensitivity, nor emotional training to handle these situations. More training of MP's is sorely needed.

22. I have read 17 different installation plans. All are adequate but need some revision. All installations have

not yet rehearsed plans--the majority have SRT--equipped with whatever is currently available in the inventory. Intelligence is good. Coordination is thorough and outside DA agencies familiar with plans. There is a need now for formal SRT training at MP School--perhaps also an ASI awarded upon completion of school. Some installations consider counterterrorism as MP function solely, and not as installation requirement. This perception is being changed.

23. At this time, in my area of responsibility located in S.E. of CONUS, my biggest problem is convincing that a problem exists.

24. The biggest problem that I see with the protection of US Army Depots and nuclear storage areas by civilian DOD or contract guard personnel is the lack of any kind of standards as far as age, weight, ability to perform certain tasks required for that job. There is no physical fitness test required of any kind and as a result the guards are overweight, out of condition, and in poor health. A perfect example of this occurred on 9 March. I had a 62 year old guard die of a heart attack at his home on that date. He had 22 years on the guard force and he was at least 100 lbs overweight. I could do nothing to remove the man from the guard force or put him on weight control or even get him to take a fitness for duty physical. As a result of the lack of standards and no physical training requirements I have to replace a deceased guard.

It seems to me that if the standards for securing a nuclear depot are basically the same as that of a chemical depot then the requirements and standards should be the same for the personnel assigned to protect these installations. Presently they are not even close to being the same, yet the SOI teams expect to see the same results.

My feelings are very strong concerning more stringent standards for DOD civilian guards for chemical depots. I also contend that all the equipment in the world is not worth a nickel unless you have properly trained personnel to operate it.

Department of the Army is spending a tremendous amount of money on physical barriers and equipment, which is greatly needed I might add, but I feel that a real hard look should be taken at the people we have to operate all that expensive equipment. I think we need to make some changes.

25. Definite legal guidelines are needed, however we train with what we have.

It is stupid to have elaborate protective systems and then train security forces not to fire at individuals that have penetrated 2 barbed wire fences unless fired upon, in dealing with special storage areas--the 8 uses of force should be changed.

26. If the counterterrorism course was open to anyone in

a position that has the need for it. They should attend regardless of rank.

27. The problem with reacting to or protecting against terrorism is there are simply not enough manpower resources to even come close to guarding everything that is a potential target. There is also the problem of crying wolf once too often.

28. After having viewed the extent of training undergone by [national identification omitted] personnel as well as considering the possible political ramifications surrounding a hostage situation or any terrorist incident, there should be no doubt that [national identification omitted] authorities should be counted upon to handle any and all incidents of this nature. The plan for our community establishes a command and control element to be established and use Military Police to assist the [national identification omitted] police in control of the situation. However any planned use of force against terrorists is left to the [national identification omitted] authorities. This community as I believe all USAREUR communities, is unprepared to utilize force in terminating a terrorist incident.

29. My installation is a small sub-post of a larger installation approximately 40 miles away. The basic mission of the post is to provide a site for amphibious training, and the major tenant activity is a single

transportation battalion. The PMO of our parent installation has had a formally organized SRT for approximately 9 months, and would respond to incidents at this location also. Law enforcement personnel at this post consists of a 33-man MP platoon, of which 9 have been identified to receive SRT training commencing in May. Due to a high concentration of military activity in this area, it is more probable that major Naval and Air Force bases in this vicinity would be the primary targets for terrorist activity rather than this installation. My rather negative responses to questions dealing with the preparedness of staff officers and command and control procedures is based on the fact that our small post population has dictated minimal staffing in many areas and/or staffing by civilian personnel. (Medical facilities consist of a 4-man staffed dispensary headed by a civilian contracted general practitioner; major engineer projects are done by the Naval Public Works Center; there is no aviation officer; etc.)

30. You have chosen a very interesting subject....

31. ... I have 1 operations Sgt. and 2 MPI's and there is something going on all the time.

32. Some of the questions could not be answered in that the plan for counterterrorism is not available but underway.

33. The only terrorists' activities that this office is aware of in CONUS is that which has recently occurred in

the state of Ill. No real threats are known for the state of [state omitted].

34. At the MACOM HQ's level our involvement is general in nature. Primary responsibility to develop and test plans is at the installation level.

We enjoy good support with concerned staff elements (intel, PAO, etc.) at the HQ level.

35. Consider impact of terrorist activity against ADP systems critical to all aspects military activity, particularly in R & D area.

36. Our plan is used as a stalling device until professionally trained personnel arrive. It basically, protects personnel not directly involved with terrorist actions. We will not meet terrorist demands until these trained personnel arrive.

37. Four senior MP officers at this installation have just completed the counterterrorism course at USAMPS. As a result planning in this respect is proceeding on a priority basis. In the near future the deficiencies indicated above will be corrected and a strong, viable counterterrorism program will be implemented.

38. This installation is a sub-post of [installation omitted] and is being vastly reduced in size and importance but being within the greater [city omitted] area has a

great potential for problems of terrorist nature. When media effect is desired by realization that weapons vital to National Security will be rescued at all costs then small nonvital targets of structure or hostage holding become of a very probable nature. Generally, the Army is not prepared for fast reaction situations and duty MP's or contract civilian groups (which covers most all posts) would be overwhelmed.

39. To cope with counterterrorism in the Army, we need more training for the doers. The MP school offers a one week course for staff officers, but does not offer anything for the MP who responds to the scene. Some type of special course should be offered by the MP School. (i.e. SWAT type)

40. Question 58: Current restrictions on gathering information on non affiliated personnel inhibits timely receipt of intelligence.

Questions 59, 64, & 65: The relationship and jurisdictional determination over terrorist incidents in the US is vague and not clearly understood. FBI does not have same understanding of jurisdiction as is prescribed in AR 190-52, this is considered a major weakness in the DA policy.

41. ... I personally feel that if we are proficient in our basic infantry tactics and use a common sense approach during a crisis situation we should do well. I don't think

we can afford all the specialized equipment or training since we are constantly rotated....

42. In my opinion in [country omitted] we have to rely on their specially trained tactical teams for aid in taking on terrorists by force. The apparatus is present in the community to meet and deal with a terrorist act to a certain extent and it can be activated. However, without special weapons and arms we would be in a precarious position. To adequately meet our needs as far as a US response is concerned we have to come to the realization that we need to train and equip specialists full time and make them capable of response to any threat. We should borrow procedures from those existing and successful organizations who have encountered these problems.

43. ... I don't know how the situation is in the States but I think that in [country omitted] we are placed in the position of being "too young to cuss and too old to cry."

The primary problem is that a provost marshal doesn't have the necessary assigned personnel or equipment to do the basics promptly and professionally. He has no planners--he's lucky if he has four desk sergeants--and "his people" that are available to respond to an incident are on loan from the supporting tactical MP unit.

A problem that will apparently need to be resolved here in Europe is that while a large majority of the time and personnel expenditures by tactical MP units is for

Provost Marshal Support almost the entire emphasis of training is for combat.!

We do a terrible job of providing consistent non selective law enforcement throughout [country omitted] and this is solely a result of absolute lack of interest. Community PM's are under-staffed and under-financed although they get some isolated attention at USAREUR level where "Drug Abuse is the number one problem" to Corps where "Law enforcement is our number one omission--it's a community problem," and total positive emphasis is placed on forming MP groups and tactical expertise.

The worst aspects of counterterrorism ... Who is in charge of intelligence gathering? MI is either at a loss of data or depends on the same sources as we do--they are staffed for intelligence gathering--we are not--yet all are expected to be the experts--planners, intelligence gathering etc. with no additional personnel for yet another mission....

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