ARE THE SOVIETS TALKING ABOUT TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THEIR OP-ETC(U)

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ARE THE SOVIET TALKING ABOUT TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THEIR OPEN-SOURCE PUBLICATIONS?

1981

MAJ THOMAS J. FIELDS, JR.

GARMISCH, GERMANY

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ARE THE SOVIETS TALKING ABOUT TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
IN THEIR OPEN-SOURCE PUBLICATIONS?

MAJOR THOMAS J. FIELDS, JR.
June 1981

UNITED STATES ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
Garmisch, Germany
FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgements and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, or the Russian Institute. The completed paper is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commander, US Army Russian Institute, APO New York 09053.

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GEORGE H. KLEB
LTC, MI
Commanding
SUMMARY

In this paper the author surveys current Soviet open-source periodicals in order to determine what is being said about tactical intelligence. The research is limited to calendar year 1980 which was the most recent information available at the time of writing. Eight titles are chosen and the information is categorized and discussed under the general headings of: ground reconnaissance; the regimental intelligence officer; personnel training; and intelligence sources. The author attempts to reproduce the character and content of the Soviet writing, stating that the Soviets are using doctrine, World War II experience, and training exercises as basic vehicles for describing procedure, demands, focus, and missions in this field. The author summarizes his findings, concludes that the Soviet approach is well suited to the modern battlefield, and states that there is a need for NATO tactical planners to examine the situation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE, THE FOCUS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE REGIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. RECONNAISSANCE/INTELLIGENCE TRAINING</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. ADDITIONAL TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The initial purpose of this paper was simply to determine what the Soviets were currently writing about tactical intelligence in their open-source publications. Eight titles were selected from calendar year 1980. Four basic themes seemed to emerge so discussion was categorized under the headings: "Ground Reconnaissance, The Focus of Tactical Intelligence," "The Regimental Intelligence Officer," "Reconnaissance/Intelligence Training," and "Additional Tactical Intelligence Sources." The author attempts to reproduce the character and the content of the Soviet writings, and states that the Soviets have chosen an approach that is ideally suited to conventional war in Europe. They utilize an all-source approach but center on reconnaissance in force with regiment as the lowest management level. Training is emphasized using time-tested doctrine and methods. This produces a picture of early battles between forward elements. The impact of the current Soviet approach must be considered by NATO tactical planners.
GROUND RECONNAISSANCE, THE FOCUS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

The Russian word "razvedka" is variously translated as "intelligence" or "reconnaissance". Perhaps it is merely coincidence, but ground reconnaissance also seems to be a focal point of articles on tactical intelligence.

The articles surveyed demonstrate that the Soviets have chosen ground reconnaissance as the basis for their tactical intelligence system. Although they discuss technical intelligence and analysis of information from many sources, the picture which emerges is one of rapidly moving maneuver elements developing, reporting, and exploiting information on enemy movement and disposition.

The Soviets discuss ground reconnaissance operations ranging from three- to five-man patrols (typically with prisoner capture missions) to ground reconnaissance conducted by elements of the regimental reconnaissance company, divisional reconnaissance battalion, and army level reconnaissance elements. Additionally, combat reconnaissance missions are assigned to maneuver elements of combat divisions. Several described are at the platoon, company, and battalion level. The missions are frequently "reconnaissance in force" or "covering force" style operations. They require the same basic preparation and combined-arms coordination as regular offensive and defensive operations. Basic tasks are to force the enemy to reveal the location of strong points and of weapons positions; to discover the location of enemy ambushes; to determine the location of enemy reserves; and, if appropriate, to engage and destroy the enemy.
A typical operation to be used as a learning vehicle is described as follows: Coordinated reconnaissance in force is being conducted by one reinforced infantry battalion per front unit. Each battalion is supported by an artillery regiment and a 120mm mortar battery. The mission of the units is basically to locate enemy dispositions. The information collected is to be used to improve existing data, make corrections to current plans, and determine priorities for artillery fires and ammunition resupply. The operation begins twenty-four hours before the main attack and starts with a fifteen-minute artillery preparation. After the preparation, supporting fires are shifted deep into enemy territory. One element encounters the strong point of the enemy's defense. It had been hidden well enough that division reconnaissance/intelligence was not able to discover it. Another element finds a weak-point, overruns the enemy, drives six to seven km./deeper and forces the enemy to deploy his reserves. This information is combined with the personal observation of the battlefield by general force commanders and the main attack proceeds successfully. This application of an old tactic shows that the experience of "The Great Fatherland War" has not lost its significance in modern conditions.

This example, like many in Soviet military writing, uses a rather dramatic and simplistic historical situation to make a point. The point, nevertheless, is valid. In a fast-moving, modern war environment, reconnaissance in force has a great deal of utility. It allows for the development of immediately useable information on enemy dispositions. This information can be used, with previously collected data, to make rapid decisions and adjustments to existing plans. Additionally, ground reconnaissance creates the capability to engage and destroy enemy units.
when the situation permits. Conducting ground reconnaissance and making the decision as to when, where and how to engage, if at all during a reconnaissance mission, are stressed in current Soviet field exercises.6

An additional combat operation with intelligence application is the basic ambush. The ambush is conducted when the situation favors it and the terrain provides cover and concealment. Units take up hidden positions along likely or anticipated enemy routes of movement. Surprise is achieved and the enemy is destroyed. For intelligence application, the missions of capturing prisoners, documents, weapons and materiel are added. This must be emphasized in training. The choice of terrain and the integration of tanks and supporting fires are important. This mission is described as valid for assignment to one platoon within a maneuvering battalion. A key element is to achieve surprise and utilize the ensuing panic to capture prisoners and equipment. These tactics have a modern-day application. Differences from past wars which must be considered include greater intervals and open flanks. These tactics (the ambush with intelligence application) apply in conjunction with attack, defense and the meeting engagement. They apply at platoon and company level and, less frequently, at battalion level.7

The foregoing statements are simple and straight forward. They describe very basic tactics with an intelligence application. Nothing new has been created. It may very well be, however, that the Soviet choice of focus is excellent, timely, and well suited to the modern battlefield. They do not emphasize reliance on technical intelligence, nor do they describe a slow process of tedious analysis. Instead, they describe ground force elements moving quickly and developing intelligence which can be exploited immediately and used to fine tune existing plans.
THE REGIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Much of what is written deals with the regimental level. This appears to be the lowest level at which a form of tactical intelligence collecting (management) is performed. The articles surveyed deal with the regimental intelligence officer. His functions are listed; the importance of his role is emphasized; and the battlefield is described through his eyes.

The lowest tactical level at which an intelligence staff officer is assigned is regimental level. His official duties are often listed in open-source publications. The following are the assigned duties of the regimental Chief of Intelligence according to field manual:

- preparing personnel in his area of specialization in fulfilling combat missions;
- providing the regimental commander with data on enemy and terrain;
- insuring the combat and mobilization readiness of the reconnaissance/intelligence subunits of the regiment;
- insuring the combat and political preparation, indoctrination, and political-morale of his personnel;
- assisting the regimental chief of staff and supervising the reconnaissance personnel of the regiment.

Additionally he is required to:

- take part in the preparation and fulfillment of plans for combat, political preparation and mobilization in his area of specialization;
- direct the combat and political preparation of reconnaissance personnel and of all personnel in his area of responsibility and collect, analyze and disseminate data on enemy and terrain and present these to the regimental commander on a timely basis;
- provide exercises and exams for officers, warrant officers, reconnaissance units and regimental units in his area of specialty;

- be completely aware of the morale level of reconnaissance personnel;

- be completely aware of the presence, specifications, maintenance and proper use of equipment in the reconnaissance unit and inspect equipment at least once every three months;

- direct the establishment of a training program for intelligence readiness.

The following quote is somewhat dramatic but it is included to demonstrate what is being read by the Soviet military. The role of the intelligence officer is definitely, although somewhat histrionically, described as key.

The Commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment looked over the officers as though wishing to convince himself that all who were required to be there are present. He must inform them of his decision. In fulfillment of the assigned mission the regiment is quickly moving forward, but now the battalions are stopped. The forward reconnaissance detachment had earlier discovered the prepared defenses of the 'enemy'. It is necessary to decide how to move in these new circumstances. The study process is two-sided. The 'enemy' is also striving for victory. What are his intentions? What are his capabilities? In order to clarify the current situation it is necessary to listen to the opinion of assistants and chiefs of services. Once more the commander looked over those present and fixed on a lean, not tall officer:

- Chief of Intelligence, your views ...

Guards Captain Plyusnin Boris Tikhonovich approached the map and started his briefing. He expected, more than that - knew: that the Regimental Commander would begin by turning to him. Based on analysis of the forces and equipment of the opposing side and its level of readiness, the intelligence officer always has the first word.

The officer described is professional and experienced. He has previously served as a reconnaissance unit commander and takes all of his assigned responsibilities very seriously. The commander decides to attack and the intelligence staff officer receives his basic orders.
from the Chief of Staff. The article emphasizes that in the current situation, where there is little information on the enemy and poor visibility due to bad weather, the role of the intelligence officer is critical. Although the term isn't used—E.E.I. (Essential Elements of Information) are developed:

- Where are the enemy reserves? (The criticality of this information comes from the experience of previous wars.)
- What is the general enemy activity? (night activity) (preparation of surprise)
- Is the enemy preparing ambushes? (especially antitank ambushes)
- Where are the enemy's platoon level strong points?
- Where is the enemy's artillery?

In further fulfillment of his responsibilities, the intelligence staff officer personally talks to the reconnaissance personnel. Their level of readiness and morale is high. The intelligence officer also inspects equipment although he has confidence in those who have staff responsibility in the technical fields.

His assets include the reconnaissance elements as well as a separate platoon with a reconnaissance mission. In other situations an entire battalion may be assigned a "reconnaissance in force" mission. Reports are received. Eighty percent of the platoon strong points and much of the enemy artillery are located and destroyed. A report of unidentified motor noise is disturbing. Orders are issued to collect more information and the noise turns out to be coming from the location of the enemy reserve. The intelligence officer is involved in the process of constant analysis—comparing data from organic sources with other data, investigating conflicting information, reporting, and briefing the commander. The mission is accomplished.
The intelligence staff officer is described as a man of self-control. He pays attention to detail and overlooks nothing. He utilizes the experience gained in previous wars but realizes that modern war involves sharp and rapid changes in situation and that intelligence/reconnaissance moves faster and sees further than in the past. Intelligence is the key to keeping the mechanized infantry informed. "The key to victory is intelligence. He who determines the intentions of his enemy earlier is the one who is victorious. But this key is not easily achieved." \(^{12}\)

In addition to directing an intelligence cycle, the intelligence staff officer conducts classes at regimental level and monitors intelligence/reconnaissance training at battalion and company level. He recognizes the need for specialists and special equipment and he analyzes training exercises to assess intelligence performance. There are many demands on his personnel. They must drive, shoot, cover long distances, discover ambushes, and follow enemy tracks while covering their own. The importance of and demands on intelligence assets are growing constantly. The intelligence staff officer must manage this dynamic environment and ensure that others in his unit do not forget its importance. The officer described may very well be a professional intelligence officer but, no matter what, he is called on to use experience, expertise, and leadership. He is managing intelligence at the lowest tactical level. He is assigning collection requirements, receiving reports, briefing, and affecting tactical plans in a very fluid and fast-moving environment. The articles emphasize the role of this officer and this level and say very little about similar activity above or below. This choice of emphasis in publications may also indicate a choice of emphasis in doctrine. The critical point of tactical intelligence and management is at regiment.
RECONNAISSANCE/INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

Personnel assigned to reconnaissance elements are required to be all around soldiers, well trained in basic skills, effective in their specialty, capable of operating in all types of terrain and conditions, mounted or dismounted. They are required to maintain the highest levels of physical and psychological readiness and must be thoroughly familiar with their equipment.

An article on training problems gives some insight into what is expected of reconnaissance personnel. A Soviet regiment is experiencing difficulty in that there are insufficient BMP's (Infantry fighting vehicles) to permit training in mounted reconnaissance. House-keeping duties and other demands have reduced the amount of time available for weapons firing. Training devices and mock-ups are available but not used. A discussion develops as to whether or not the basic mission of knowing and finding the enemy obviates the requirement to concentrate on basic skills such as weapons firing. The answer is a resounding - No! - The reconnaissance soldier, although prepared for specific missions, must receive all around preparation, especially in the use of basic weapons. Furthermore, there is a tendency to relegate this responsibility to "higher headquarters". This must be stopped. Commanders at all levels are required to provide adequate training of reconnaissance personnel to insure their combat readiness.

In a discussion specifically on the conditioning of scouts the following ideas are offered. Reconnaissance elements must be prepared to move deep into enemy territory, to find enemy locations and to
report immediately. They must be prepared to cover 50 kilometers of
difficult terrain such as swamp, thick forest, and shallow streams, in
conditions of darkness and bad weather, carrying heavy packs and avoiding
roads. Scouts must be constantly prepared for these missions and junior
officials are to serve as personal examples. Scouts are trained at special
posts where they are taught to study situations and to examine options.
They must master basic reconnaissance skills on land and on water. They
must be physically and psychologically prepared for battle at all times.
The scout must develop the qualities of bravery, strength, cold-bloodedness,
decisiveness, self control, high morale, speed and stealth. Training
must be developed resourcefully, both on the unit and individual level.
As an example stations for hand-to-hand combat, grenade throwing, and
complex problem solving can be run simultaneously rather than sequentially
so that one unit can be moved through more quickly. A high degree of
involvement in sports is also a beneficial means of conditioning.14

Indeed, many of the episodes recounted in Soviet writings demonstrate
the need for the skills and conditioning described above. The basic
tasks of capturing prisoners, documents, and materiel are repeated in
almost all the articles surveyed. The element of surprise is described
as critical when operations which involve making contact with the enemy
are envisioned such as in prisoner capture operations. The scout is
trained in the skills of observation and description, keying on enemy
positions, firing positions, systems of defense, movement, strength and
fortifications. The scout is trained to thoroughly prepare for his
mission, to achieve surprise, to conduct the mission, to report by radio
in a timely fashion, to take prisoners, and to keep his own losses to
a minimum. Two stories attempt to emphasize these points. In one case,
careful study leads to the selection of an enemy machine gun position as a likely target for a prisoner capture operation. The situation is studied; the operation is rehearsed; supporting fires are coordinated; surprise is achieved; two enemy are killed and one captured; there are no friendly losses.

These "stories" do seem to emphasize the cycle for which reconnaissance personnel are trained: preparation and study; coordination; conduct of mission (often emphasizing surprise); reporting; completion of mission with minimum losses. The stores describe, respectively a few days and one week of preparation. This seems like a lot of time but it may be valid if one envisions a long-range reconnaissance operation where a number of reconnaissance elements are involved, with different elements being in different parts of the cycle. That is—several in mission preparation; several conducting missions and reporting; several returning and providing data; several ready to receive new missions.

In addition to the skills, tasks, missions and qualities described above, the literature indicates that reconnaissance personnel are prepared to accomplish special missions. One article describes a situation in which a reconnaissance element encounters an enemy telephone line. They cut into the line and listen. Having gathered critical information they report immediately. They then proceed to destroy the telephone line which forces the enemy to use more vulnerable radio communications. With these tasks accomplished they continue the mission.

All in all, the discussion of reconnaissance personnel would seem to indicate that what the Soviets desire is a rather elite, highly-trained specialized and motivated group of people. In addition to mastering the basic skills of soldiering, they are required to be
constantly prepared to undertake a range of arduous and difficult missions. Their training and utilization are matters of command emphasis and are seen as key to achieving success in battle.

The fact that the Soviets are writing articles on training is certainly not unusual. The general style and content of the articles described above is rather common. Training must be innovative and continuous. Current situations and historical situations are used as examples. However, certain elements can be derived from these articles. Reconnaissance personnel receive special training at special schools. Other personnel receive additional training in this field. Mastering of basic and special reconnaissance/intelligence skills is critical to the accomplishment of the ground force mission.
ADDITIONAL TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Although, as described earlier, ground reconnaissance is the focal point, Soviet writings reference other sources of tactical intelligence. The description of the activities of the regimental intelligence officer cited earlier demonstrated an interaction of intelligence sources. The basic sources described are: ground reconnaissance elements, frontline units conducting their own reconnaissance, general force and artillery unit commanders conducting personal observation of the battlefield, and information from "higher headquarters". The intelligence officer is at the center of the process—receiving information, taking reports, informing units, and briefing the regimental commander.17

One article, however, gives an excellent description of the integration of additional sources of intelligence on the battlefield.18 The attack is about to begin. A reconnaissance in force mission is assigned to a motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks, artillery, engineers and antitank weapons. The commander briefs his subordinates on the operation and includes a description of existing data on the enemy. The battalion is assigned the mission of discovering the enemy's basic system of defense, as well as collecting data on his artillery and engineer activities. Special attention must be paid to enemy antitank defenses. To do this he is told to use "all means" of intelligence. He is additionally told to prepare a group to capture prisoners, weapons and materiel. This mission is delegated to a subunit commanded by a lieutenant. All units are required to set up observation points. They are to observe the enemy continuously and report all information acquired.
The lieutenant in charge of the reconnaissance patrol is ordered to move into enemy territory. His mission is to locate the enemy's weapons positions, his unit locations and his engineer defenses. As the patrol finds enemy locations or captures a prisoner, they are required to report immediately by radio.

The director of the exercise informs the participants that "to aid the battalion, the senior supervisor has organized intercept activities of the enemy's radioelectronic equipment by means of radio intelligence; has attached helicopters for observation in depth; in this way it is possible with ground observation points, and attached radio receivers, that the battalion headquarters may receive intelligence data immediately." This brief quote is one of the most interesting and informative sentences of all the data surveyed. It is the only reference to observation helicopters and intercept activities. The scenario continues. Commanders of elements not participating in the reconnaissance in force are to man their observation posts and command observation points in their areas of responsibility. Under the cover of an artillery preparation the reinforced battalion moves forward in attack formation. The enemy opens fire, revealing positions which were previously hidden. The enemy defense is penetrated. Surprise has been achieved. An enemy prisoner and several weapons are captured. The reconnaissance patrol has moved forward and discovered an enemy telephone line. The lieutenant in command orders that the line be tapped. Having tapped the line the scouts overhear that one of the enemy commanders is asking for immediate assistance. This is reported to headquarters. The scouts then destroy the telephone line, causing the enemy to use more vulnerable radio communications. The scouts continue their mission. Information is received that intercept
has located three radio stations. Air reconnaissance reports the movement of a tank column, assumed to be the enemy's reserve. Other enemy locations are discovered and reported. The elements involved in the reconnaissance operation switch to tactical missions as appropriate. One element conducts a small attack. The main force of the battalion switches to a defensive formation in anticipation of the enemy's counter-attack. Engineer elements which had been moving with the battalion report on enemy engineer defenses, terrain, strong points, trenches, and mine fields. All of this information is collected and analyzed by the chief of intelligence. The commander is briefed and plans are finalized. The description of this reconnaissance in force mission offers an extremely thorough compilation of intelligence sources: ground reconnaissance; commander's observation; prisoner-document-weapons-and-materiel capture; telephone tap; radio intercept; and aerial reconnaissance. "Attached" radios are used to enhance reporting. Reports seem to be forwarded to the battalion conducting the operation and to the intelligence staff officer. Information is collected, analyzed and used to adjust final plans. The description in this article is, in this author's opinion, the single most valuable description of the research. It expands the basic intelligence sources to include aerial observation and electronic intercept—an "all-source" approach. Additionally, the description above appears to have been designed to emphasize the rapid and multifaceted aspects of collection as well as the need for immediate reporting and instant utilization of information received.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

The Soviets are writing about tactical intelligence in open-source publications. They are using doctrine, World War II experience, and descriptions of field exercises as the basic vehicles to discuss personnel, procedure, missions and systems.

Reconnaissance in force and ground reconnaissance in general are the most frequent themes of the articles surveyed. The missions run from three to five men up through reinforced battalions. The basic tasks are discovering enemy dispositions, reserves, strong points and weak points. The data is used to facilitate offensive operations against defending enemy forces. Although, as one might expect, the Soviets always do very well in their own exercises, their choice of focus and the operations described would seem to be extremely well suited to the fast-moving, modern battlefield.

The regimental intelligence staff officer stands at the center of the tactical intelligence cycle. He is the immediate supervisor of reconnaissance personnel. He distributes tasks, collects and analyzes data, reports and briefs—much like a tactical unit S-2 in the U.S. concept. He is responsible for intelligence training throughout the unit. He is described as a first assistant to the commander in the complex conditions of modern warfare and he may very well be the focal point of staff activity during the battle.

Reconnaissance/Intelligence personnel (or scouts) are organic to tactical units from regiment up. They receive special training and are expected to master the skills of their specialty as well as basic
soldiering skills. They are trained in both mounted and dismounted operations and apparently concentrate on: capture of weapons, documents, materiel and prisoners; basic observation and reporting techniques; and engaging the enemy when appropriate.

Tactical Intelligence Sources include reconnaissance observation and capture operations as well as commanders' observation; systems of observation posts; field telephone taps; radio signal intercept; photography and aerial observation; and information from higher headquarters.

It appears as though the Soviets have chosen to keep their approach to tactical intelligence very simple. They focus on ground reconnaissance and emphasize management at the regimental level. They utilize an "all-source" approach but are certainly not relying on vulnerable, technical methods. In this writer's view, the system they describe is extremely well suited to the rapid pace of combat envisioned in a future European conflict. Reconnaissance in force has the inherent capabilities of collecting information, exploiting information by engaging the enemy, and confusing the enemy as to the location of main force elements.

All of this paints a picture which should be considered by those developing NATO ground force tactics. In a conventional war, the initial battles may take place between NATO covering force elements and enemy reconnaissance in force elements. It may be very difficult for NATO elements to determine main force locations and to identify the specific area of the main attack. Additionally, it will be very difficult to accomplish the mission of forcing the enemy to deploy attack forces early if NATO forward forces are engaging enemy reconnaissance in force. Certain basic options should be considered: early
location of enemy ground reconnaissance elements for artillery and air
exploitation; forward stationing of friendly reconnaissance elements
with a mission of differentiating between enemy reconnaissance and
enemy main force units; covering force bypass of the earliest enemy
units discovered; and finally, standard collection requirements to ascer-
tain specific locations of enemy reconnaissance in force elements.
FOOTNOTES


2 A. Borosov, "Zakhvat yazyka," (Literally translated this means Seizure of a "Tongue"). "Tongue" appears several times as the military slang for an "enemy prisoner". Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3, 1980, p. 27.

3 Retired Guards Major V. Eroshin, "Vnezapnest’ v razvedke" (Surprise in Reconnaissance), Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 5, 1980, pp. 29-33.


6 Ibid.

7 Guards Major N. Kotov, "Zasada" (Ambush), Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, 1980, pp. 43-45.

8 Ustav vnutrenney sluzhby voruzhennykh sil SSSR (Manual of Interior Service of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Chapter 96, pp. 400-401.


12 Ibid., quoting an unidentified general officer.

13 Lieutenant Colonel V. Parfenov, "Chego nedostayet v p’gotovke razvedchikov" (What is the Problem With the Training for Scouts), Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 227, October 1980, p. 2.

14 Senior Lieutenant V. Shugay, "Zakalka razvedchikov" (Conditioning of Scouts), Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 96, April 1980, p. 1.


19. Ibid., p. 29 (emphasis added).

20. Ibid.
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Panasenko, Colonel P. "Nachal'nik razvedki (Chief of Intelligence). No. 63, March 1980. P. 2. (This is a good source on the basic functioning of the regimental intelligence staff officer.)


Shugay, Senior Lieutenant V. "Zakalka razvedchikov" (Conditioning of Scouts). No. 96, April 1980. P. 1.

Voyennyy Vestnik. Published monthly by the Ministry of Defense. Moscow, USSR.


Nazarov, General Major A. "Razvedka boyem" (Reconnaissance in Force). No. 2, 1980. Pp. 26-30. This is an excellent article on the wide variety of tactical intelligence sources used by the Soviets.

SOVIET MANUAL

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