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**US INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES,
AND POLICY OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA**



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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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**US INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES,
AND POLICY OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA**

by

Richard P. Cronin

15 January 1982

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
FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "US Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia: A Long Term Commitment?" which was sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute in October 1981. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy.

This memorandum provides a framework for considering US interests and objectives in Southwest Asia, and policy options for the future. It traces the evolution of US policy toward the region and changing assumptions regarding the nature of US interests and the threats posed to them, especially the dichotomy between intraregional and extraregional threats. The author notes the long-standing conflict between the goal of protecting US interests against the worst case external military threat to the region, and the objective of maintaining regional stability and a favorable political climate for the continued flow of oil. Finally, he discusses three options for protecting US interests in the region and indicates the extent to which each enhances or inhibits the achievement of various recognized objectives.

The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the author's professional work.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. RICHARD P. CRONIN is a Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Head, Asia/Latin America Section of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service. He received his Ph.D. in history (Modern South Asia) from Syracuse University in 1974. Prior to joining the Congressional Research Service as a defense analyst in 1975, he worked briefly at the Budget Directorate of the Air Force. He served as a reserve officer in the US Army during 1964-66, including service in Vietnam. Dr. Cronin has written widely for congressional publications on problems concerning South and Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean, and related Defense issues. He also has written or contributed to three books on the nationalist period of British Indian history.

US INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, AND POLICY OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

For over three decades the Persian Gulf and adjacent parts of South and West Asia have occupied a key place in American strategy, although the nature and relative importance of US interests in the area have varied. Over time the significance of the region has tended to increase as the industrial democracies—not to mention the non-oil-producing areas of the Third World—have become increasingly dependent on its petroleum resources. Likewise, the perceived threats to the region have grown due to accelerating and destabilizing social change and the increased capabilities and demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to exploit instability and project military power outside its borders.

This study is intended to provide a framework for thinking about US interests and objectives in Southwest Asia, and policy options for the future. It traces the evolution of US policy toward the region and the changing assumptions regarding the nature of US interests and the threats posed to them, especially the dichotomy between intraregional and extraregional threats. It notes the long standing conflict between the goal of protecting US interests

against the worst case external military threat to the region, and the objective of maintaining regional stability and a favorable political climate for the continued flow of oil. Finally, it discusses three options for protecting US interests in the region and indicates the extent to which each enhances or inhibits the achievement of various recognized objectives.

American interest in the region that has come to be called Southwest Asia was brought home most vividly by the 1973 OPEC embargo and the supply disruptions and further redoubling of oil prices that followed the 1979 Iranian Revolution. World oil prices as of late 1981 were about 18 times the 1970 price of \$1.80 per barrel. Oil supply uncertainties and runaway price increases may be seen to lay behind the worldwide economic malaise of the industrial countries during the period since 1973. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan added a new element of uncertainty about the security of oil resources of the region. The demonstrated willingness of the USSR to project military power beyond its borders caused concern about future Soviet intentions regarding areas now seen as vital to US security, and raised the specter of a local or general war involving the superpowers, with the resultant danger of a nuclear conflagration.

The US response to the new threats to its interests in the Persian Gulf region has been reactive and largely predictable. This is an understandable consequence of the rapidity with which the American position was undercut by the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by the complications induced by the hostage crisis, and by the absence of truly close political ties with any of the Islamic countries of the region directly in the path of future Soviet expansionism.

As the Soviet Union enters the third year of its military involvement in Afghanistan without any marked change in the situation, and as the forces of Islamic revivalism in other forms of social and political change seem to be marking time, the United States is in a position to consider its longer-term strategy for protecting its interests. Some basic factors that must influence the success of any American response include the following:

- For at least the next decade the Western world and Japan will remain highly dependent on the oil of the Persian Gulf.
- After 1985 the Soviet Union, currently the world's largest oil producer, may become somewhat dependent on external sources of petroleum, but it also has massive gas and coal reserves and large

potential for energy substitution. (Eastern Europe is already a modest importer of Persian Gulf oil.)

Due to poor export performance, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be hard-pressed to pay for what oil they do import.

Radical social change will continue to affect the Persian Gulf countries, most of which are now traditional monarchies.

The Arab-Israeli dispute is fundamentally insoluble in the medium term, and will pose a continuing danger to American interests in the region.

The American ability to project ground forces into the region will grow slowly at best, and will remain dependent on access to outside logistical support facilities for any deployment beyond the commitment of a Marine or Army airborne brigade for a few weeks.

Despite Islamic fundamentalist opposition to change, western, the interests of the oil-producing countries will remain more compatible with those of the United States than with those of the Soviet Union.

INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

Interests, objectives and policies are distinct but related terms whose meanings are, unfortunately, often confused. Interests, so quite but clear thinkers, are highly generalized abstractions that reflect each state's wants and needs. Objectives, on the other hand, are more specific goals calculated to serve these interests, while policies are the organized means under which the pursuit of those goals is carried out. Different policies can be adopted to serve the same goals, and different goals are possible within the same perception of national interests.

SOUTHWEST ASIA:

Official testimony of the Congressional Committee on the Middle East, Department of Defense, 1978. The same committee published a report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 1978. The same committee published a report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 1978. The same committee published a report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 1978.

Islamic faith and its perceived vulnerability to Soviet expansionism. Depending on how broadly the region is defined, it includes as many as four major cultures—Arabic, Judaic, Iranian and Indo-Pakistani. Its geographical continuity is broken at several points by mountain ranges, deserts and water bodies. The political history and structure of the region is quite diverse, though the primary oil-producing states at the region's "strategic center of gravity" are, with the notable exceptions of Iran and Iraq, traditional monarchies.

For the purposes of this study Southwest Asia is defined as extending from Eastern Turkey (which abuts the Azerbaijan region of Iran) down through the traditional Middle East into the Arabian Peninsula and extending eastward through Iran into Pakistan. While the term Southwest Asia may be convenient shorthand, it is important to remember that if all of the relevant political dynamics and geostrategic factors are to be considered, then the geography involved includes Egypt and Sudan, the Horn of Africa, Kenya and India. Moreover, the area embraces conflicts and rivalries that do not relate directly to either the region's oil resources or the Soviet Union. These include the Arab-Israeli dispute and the related issue of the Palestinians, the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Pakistan-India rivalry, and various ethnic based autonomy movements such as those of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and the Baluch in Iran and Pakistan.

In this context, the US relationship with Israel deserves comment. US support for Israel's security and survival is long standing and relates to a number of general and particular interests and objectives that are discussed below. Support for Israel is one of the few foreign commitments having a wide political constituency in the United States.

The existence of hostility between Israel and its neighbors is a given that must be factored into US policy. To Israelis, Arab hostility presents a continuing and deadly danger. To the Arabs, the Israeli state represents the last act of European colonialism and its economic and military success is a continuing reminder of the weaknesses of their own social and political organization.

The United States has a vital role to play in managing the dispute and reducing the scope or severity of any armed conflict. The critical requirement is that American policymakers correctly anticipate the effect of actions taken in pursuit of one set of goals

(supporting Israel and promoting a Middle East settlement) on the other major US goals (maintaining access to the region's oil and deterring Soviet expansionism), and vice versa. Miscalculations on this score have the potential for grave danger to US interests and for the peace of the region.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN US INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

US involvement in the security of Southwest Asia has been continuous since World War II and the onset of the Cold War. The nature and degree of US involvement in the region has varied in response to changing perceptions of US interests and differing evaluations of the threats posed by intraregional and extraregional forces.

Continuity. Throughout the postwar period certain constants are evident regarding US involvement in Southwest Asia. First, the region has been perceived as highly important to the United States. Second, American policymakers usually have identified the Soviet Union as the main long-term threat to US interests. The Soviet threat has formed the basis for every collective security arrangement since the period of the Truman Doctrine.

Change. At the same time, US perceptions concerning the nature of its interests and the threats posed to them have shown considerable volatility. Over time the relative importance of the region to US interests has tended to increase, and the nature of the perceived interest has shifted from political-strategic to economic-strategic. Likewise, US policymakers have not always agreed on the most immediate or most dangerous threat to US interests. *A basic source of tension in US policy over the past three decades has been whether to give primary attention to the Soviet threat or to emphasize other, primary non-Soviet threats, such as regional instability, adverse economic developments and the danger of nuclear proliferation.* This tension remains today and is reflected in various competing policy options for protecting what are by nearly unanimous agreement vastly increased American interests in Southwest Asia.

EVOLUTION OF US INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND POLICY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

Interests. Since the end of the Second World War the American interest in Southwest Asia has derived from the region's oil and its strategic location, especially its character as a bridge between three continents and its proximity to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. In varying degrees, these factors affect concerns about the physical survival and economic well-being of the United States, and the congeniality of the international environment to its political values and institutions.

From these basic concerns flow certain more narrow interests such as regional stability, self-determination of the local states, the absence of outside intervention on the part of hostile powers, and the maintenance of peace.

Objectives. In order to protect and promote these interests a succession of American administrations have defined complementary objectives. These objectives have varied over time, depending on the ranking of US interests at any given moment and perceptions regarding the main threats to those interests.

•*Core Objectives.* Certain objectives can be identified that have been basic throughout the period 1945 to the present. These include:

- Containing Soviet expansionism through collective security;
- Maintaining uninterrupted access to the region's oil resources;
- Preserving the independence and self-determination of regional states, especially Israel;
- Preventing the spread of communism and other radical social-economic doctrines;
- Deterring intraregional conflict, especially a new Arab-Israeli conflict;
- Enhancing US economic and commercial interests; and,
- Avoiding war with the Soviet Union.

•*Other Objectives.* In addition to these basic objectives, the United States has from time to time pursued additional objectives. These include:

- Enhancing human rights conditions within regional states;
 - Preventing or delaying the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- and,
- Limiting destabilizing transfers of conventional arms.

Contradictions. While many of these objectives are complementary, some tend to be contradictory. This is especially true of recent years, as the overall importance of the region has grown and the number of threats to US interests has multiplied. For instance, the containment of Soviet expansionism may conflict with the objective of avoiding war with the Soviet Union. Maintaining uninterrupted access to the region's oil supplies may, under certain conditions conflict with the self-determination of regional states. This applies both to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which US support of Israel's self-determination has led with a cutoff in oil supplies, and in respect to potential US moves to counter an oil embargo. The goal of limiting destabilizing arms transfers may conflict with the objective of promoting US economic and commercial interests. Seeking to prevent or delay nuclear proliferation may conflict with other goals of preserving the independence of states or containing Soviet expansionism through collective security arrangements.

US POLICY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA PRIOR TO 1979

Postwar Containment Period. In the immediate post World War II era, when the United States was still a net oil exporter, US policy in the region focused primarily on the containment of Soviet expansionism and the management of the process of decolonialism, especially the withdrawal of British power and the emergence of newly independent states in the Near East and South Asia.

The major hallmarks of US policy during the period of the Cold War included the Truman Doctrine and the containment policy, and broad pursuit of a policy of collective security. Central to the containment policy as applied to Southwest Asia were Turkey's incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, Pakistan's accession to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (which became the Central Treaty Organization following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and the establishment of a Ba'thist regime in 1958), and the conclusion of identical bilateral security treaties with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in 1959.⁵ In addition to the pacts and related bilateral security agreements, the United States entered into a variety of mutual assistance agreements with governments in the region, and provided large sums of military and economic aid.⁶

In the 1960's and early 1970's, as the petroleum of the region became a more important factor to the Western economies, and as the spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union appeared stabilized, the nature and relative importance of US objectives changed. The main US goals during this period related to supporting local collective security efforts, fostering orderly development, resolving regional disputes, maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil "at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our growing needs and those of our European and Asian friends and allies," and insuring to the maximum extent possible that the swelling oil revenues of the gulf were recycled through the US economy.⁷

One major difference between the Cold War era and the late 1960's and early 1970's was the lower degree of direct US involvement in regional security that marked the latter period. Even at the peak of US involvement in the middle 1950's, US interests were primarily secured through political means rather than by a military presence. In the whole of the period from the end of World War II the United States had never deployed anything but token military forces into the region, notably the small four ship flotilla (MIDEASTFOR) home ported at Bahrain since 1949. However, US military assistance made the biggest states—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—into credible local military powers, and US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) missions played a major role behind the scenes. Moreover, the system of pacts made clear that the United States would play a direct role in the region's defense against Communist aggression, regardless of the size of its forces on the scene during peacetime, and that an attack on the region could well lead to a general war.

By the mid 1960's, however, the United States had become preoccupied with the conflict in Southeast Asia and began to cut back its direct involvement in regional security. This trend was hastened by the emergence of basic differences in the objectives of the United States and those of some of its regional clients. Thus the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict led to a cessation of US military assistance and arms sales to the subcontinent that lasted, with minor exceptions, until this year.⁸ Likewise Iran, another CENTO member with whom the United States had a bilateral security agreement, began to acquire the financial resources through swelling oil revenues that permitted it to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy.

The contraction of the direct US role probably would not have occurred had it not been for a major reevaluation of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The revised estimate of the Soviet Threat was strikingly illustrated in mid-1973 by a senior official of the Department of Defense's International Security Agency during testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he outlined US military goals in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula area, (which, unfortunately, he stated as "security interests" rather than objectives). First among these was "to contain Soviet military power within its present borders," followed by "access to Persian Gulf oil" and "free movement of US ships and aircraft into and out of the area, and continued access to logistic support facilities on Bahrain for our small Middle East force."

With regard to the first objective of containing the Soviet Union, the DOD official noted that it "was paramount during the height of the cold war but

with the gradual improvement in relations between the USSR and Iran and between the USSR and ourselves, the threat of Soviet overt military action against the sovereignty and independence of states in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula has lessened and is no longer a cause of immediate concern.¹⁰

The October war and the 1973 OPEC embargo and price increases continued to give a non-Soviet orientation to US policy in the region. In November 1973, Roger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told the Congress that the Persian Gulf had "the potential in economic terms to be the fastest growing area in the world." The region was, he noted, "a primary source of energy for the Western World...[and] an area which will provide almost unlimited opportunities for the sale of every kind of good and service." Accordingly, his prepared statement noted that "the restoration of a political atmosphere conducive to the pursuit of our economic and other interests is obviously our first task."¹¹

Reliance on "Regional Influentials." In keeping with the low estimate placed on the Soviet threat, American policy during the 1970's by and large was to avoid a direct US military presence except when absolutely necessary, and to seek to secure US interests through the agency of "regional influentials," diplomacy and economic involvement. This policy coincided with a general public

aversion to overseas military involvements and with the formalization of detente with the Soviet Union.

The US relationship with the Shah of Iran formed the centerpiece of the regional security system that evolved during the early 1970's, a system whose most significant feature was that the United States was no longer the principal factor. The US-Iran relationship grew in importance in the 1960's and early 1970's as Iran moved from being a recipient of US military assistance to a major cash purchaser of first line equipment. The dream of the Shah to become the dominant power in the Gulf, and the growth of the resources needed to realize that goal, coincided with the US preoccupation disengaging from the conflict in Southeast Asia. The United States encouraged the Shah's ambitions in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and the presumed "lessons" of Vietnam.¹²

Tentative Steps Towards an Interventionist Capability. While it emphasized the "twin pillars" policy based on Iran and Saudi Arabia, several events caused US policymakers to begin to rethink the basis of US security policy in the region. The 1973 Mideast War and the OPEC embargo led the United States to deploy a carrier task force into the Western Indian Ocean from regular duty with the Pacific Fleet and this presence was maintained well into 1974. Later, the Soviet acquisition of a logistical facility at Berbera, Somalia, its military involvement in Ethiopia and a steady increase in Soviet "ship days" in the Indian Ocean caused the United States to begin to build up the facility at Diego Garcia that had been leased from Britain in 1965.¹³

Public and congressional skepticism regarding military involvements in Southwest Asia and the attitudes of local states toward a US military presence imposed important limitations on US policy. American friends in the region such as Iran and Saudi Arabia opposed a permanent shore based military presence for US forces and since 1971 regularly supported UN Resolutions declaring the Indian Ocean to be a "Zone of Peace." As a consequence of US support of Israel during the 1973 war and the deployment of carrier strike forces into the western Indian Ocean during the oil embargo (which implied a willingness to use force against the oil-producing countries), Bahrain threatened to evict the US Navy's Middle East Force.¹⁴ A compromise agreement reached in June 1977 allowed the Navy access for just six months of the year and with a reduced administrative and logistical establishment.¹⁵

New Foreign Policy Objectives. During the mid and late 1970's, the Ford and Carter Administrations added new objectives for US policy. These included the steps to check nuclear proliferation, to promote human rights and to minimize the risk of local conflicts fueled by conventional arms transfers. These new goals tended to conflict with existing objectives such as support for self-determination through collective security and the promotion of US commercial interests, but were intended to serve the US interest in regional stability and orderly development.

For instance, in the period from 1976 down to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States leaned hard on Pakistan to stop it from acquiring a nuclear reprocessing facility from France and pursuing other avenues to match India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." The United States suspended and then terminated economic assistance, and denied Pakistan's request to purchase 110 A-7 attack aircraft for its aging air force.

The Carter Administration also initiated a policy of active support for human rights. This included some tentative efforts to persuade the Shah to conciliate emerging interest groups, especially the urban middle classes. The United States strongly deplored the trial and execution of Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan, following his overthrow by a military coup, and distanced itself from the martial law government headed by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq.

Likewise the Carter Administration initiated a "global" policy of foresaking arms transfers as normal instruments of US policy. This policy made no notable dent in the soaring US arms exports to Southwest Asia due to the effective exclusion of Iran and Saudi Arabia from its limitations. The policy did, however, play a role in the decision not to supply arms to Somalia subsequent to the eviction of the Soviets from Berbera, and in denying Pakistan the opportunity to modernize its forces.

By the eve of the Iranian revolution the United States remained primarily concerned with its economic and political interests in Southwest Asia, and saw the most immediate threats to these interests as arising from local circumstances rather than extraregional forces. In its global strategy, Europe remained the highest priority and the area of greatest perceived threat. The United States was pursuing a variety of often conflicting regional objectives, and its position had become increasingly dependent on

local surrogates, especially the Shah of Iran. Occasionally the United States exhibited discomfort over its dependency on Iran as well as concern about the steady buildup of Soviet military power in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa, but it moved ineffectually to deal with these concerns.

US INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND POLICY SINCE 1979

In the wake of the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan the definition of US interests and objectives in South and West Asia once again took on the formulation of the 1950's. What was different from the 1950's, however, was the higher perceived importance of the Persian Gulf compared to other areas of US interest. After December 1979 the Persian Gulf came to be seen as a critical area whose defense was essential to the very viability of the US position in Europe and Northeast Asia. President Carter made this view official policy in his State of the Union address of January 1980, when he declared that "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States," and that such action "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹⁶

Carter Administration Response. The Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis shattered US complacency about its ability to deal with threats to its interests, but, partly out of preoccupation with the hostage crisis and uncertainty about the longer-term implications of that event, the Carter Administration did not immediately articulate any new set of regional objectives. Events such as the seizure of the Great Mosque at Mecca by Shia militants and the related burning of the US Embassy and cultural Centers in Pakistan in November 1979 raised the specter of the complete collapse of the American presence in the region.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later in the year, however, restored the image of the United States somewhat and provided a basis for a new political and military strategy. By late 1980 the Carter Administration had begun to develop a set of policy responses that had an underlying coherence. These included a variety of political moves—some successful, some not—to enhance Western solidarity regarding Afghanistan and the continuing hostage crisis, and a number of policy decisions aimed directly at Southwest Asia.

The primary objectives of the Carter Administration in support of US interests in Southwest Asia included the following:

- Enhance US capabilities to deploy forces into the region via the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the negotiation of access to logistical facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Oman.

- Rebuild some kind of US-led collective security system in Southwest Asia based on helping local states "to perceive the nature and source of the real external threat to the region."

- Prevent, if possible, the consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan.

- Discourage recognition of the Soviet installed government in Afghanistan.

- Continue progress towards defusing the Arab-Israeli dispute through fulfilling US commitments made in support of the 1978 Camp David agreement.

- Stabilize the Subcontinent through a balanced effort to rebuild ties with both Pakistan and its traditional adversary, India.

- Reduce US dependence on oil from the region through conservation and a strategic petroleum reserve.

In order to carry out these objectives the Carter Administration made a number of changes in its foreign and defense policies. It shifted emphasis in its defense policy from Europe to the Persian Gulf region and reluctantly withdrew the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) from the Senate (where it had no prospect of success). Within limits, it subordinated its human rights, arms transfer and nuclear proliferation policies to the desire to rebuild a US-led collective security system in the region. For example, it offered to restore US economic and military assistance to Pakistan, despite that country's continued pursuit of a nuclear explosive capability. In addition, the Carter Administration expended considerable political capital to obtain congressional acquiescence to continued shipments of uranium fuel for India's US-built Tarapur Atomic Power Station, despite the Indian government's unwillingness to agree to new legislatively mandated terms for nuclear exports and India's opposition to a confrontationalist posture toward the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan."

The Carter Doctrine implied a policy of fighting, if necessary, to prevent further Soviet expansionism in the region. The reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral security agreement with

Pakistan reduced doubts about US intentions in the event of a full scale Soviet attack on that country, as did new assurances to Saudi Arabia. Less certain was the policy in the case of the more likely Soviet move into Iran, where the United States had no leverage or influence, and was less equipped to intervene militarily. Until the end, the Carter Administration's sole preoccupation regarding Iran was the release of the hostages.

Reagan Administration Policy. The underlying premise of the Reagan Administration's strategy toward Southwest Asia appears to have been aptly summed up in an article by Paul H. Nitze in the Fall 1980 issue of *Foreign Affairs*:

The principal task of the early 1980's must be to check, blunt and so far as possible, frustrate the integrated Soviet strategies while the energies of many nations similarly threatened have an opportunity to become mobilized and linked so as to reverse the currently adverse trends in the correlation of forces."

This global concept was echoed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when in the context of the Afghanistan situation he spoke of the need to "forge a consensus of like minded peoples."²⁰ Later the concept became identified with the Middle East and Southwest region as a "strategic consensus." Its goal is to persuade the diverse countries of the region to put aside local parochial security concerns and unite with the United States in an alliance-like relationship against the Soviet Union and its client states.

Richard Burt, Director of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, emphasized the administration's unequivocal strategic perspective when he noted in congressional testimony "we view the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, as part of a larger politico-strategic theater, the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa, and we view it as a strategic entity requiring comprehensive treatment to ensure a favorable balance of power."²¹

The Reagan Administration took several key steps to pursue its strategic consensus. In March 1981 it decided to go ahead with the proposal, first raised by the Carter Administration, to sell the AWACS and F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia. In mid-June, following a visit to Islamabad by Under Secretary of State James C. Buckley, the United States and Pakistan reached

agreement on a \$3.2 billion multi-year package of economic assistance and arms credits for Pakistan, including the advanced F-16 fighter bomber. In November 1981, presumably as part of its effort to keep the Camp David process on track and to alleviate Israeli concerns regarding Saudi Arabia's acquisition of AWACS, the Reagan Administration initialed a strategic cooperation agreement with Israel that included the unusual provision of specifically naming the threat from the Soviet Union and its surrogates as the basis for the accord.

The decisions to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia and the F-16 to Pakistan aroused great controversy in Congress and were perceived as representing a major policy shift. Aside from concern about Israel's security, opponents of the AWACS sale and the provision of the F-15 range enhancements warned that Saudi Arabia's possession of these systems would heighten its risk of involvement in any new Arab-Israeli conflict. The administration, however, argued that the sale of these systems to Saudi Arabia was essential to the defense of the oil fields against threats such as arose during the Iran-Iraq conflict, and in the event of a worst case Soviet attack.²² The administration also argued that approval of the AWACS had become a test of American credibility.

The Pakistan aid package represented a second important element in the administration's goal of achieving a strategic consensus, as Pakistan represented the only channel for influencing the Afghanistan situation. As had its predecessor, the Reagan Administration was anxious to make sure that Pakistan held firm against recognition of the regime in Kabul.

The Pakistan aid package also aroused considerable controversy on grounds that the provision of the F-16's to Pakistan would create a destabilizing reaction on the part of India and because the United States had not received satisfactory assurances from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program. Ultimately, however, it became evident that the F-16's were to the Pakistanis the *sine qua non* of any agreement with the United States. Congress accepted the necessity of US aid to Pakistan, despite objections to the F-16's, and reluctantly also seemed to conclude that truly satisfactory nuclear guarantees were not achievable. However, the Congress attached conditions to the enabling legislation that would have the effect of requiring a cutoff of US aid should Pakistan explode a nuclear device.

Despite these achievements the Reagan Administration's overall policy toward Southwest Asia remains unclear. The administration's hopes of achieving a strategic consensus against the Soviet threat have foundered on Arab-Israeli hostility, uncertainties resulting from the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and continuing Saudi diffidence.²³ Despite generally higher defense spending, critical decisions regarding ways and means remain to be made. The administration is reported to be divided among itself as to how far to go towards seeking onshore logistical facilities—either US controlled or through surrogates—in order to acquire the military capability to mount a credible defense against a Soviet attack in the region.²⁴ A number of unpredictable variables are almost certain to cause a further reevaluation of the administration's policies in the months and years ahead.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The three broad policy options considered below address alternative ways of protecting US interests in Southwest Asia in what is presumed to be a fundamentally changed security environment since the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each is biased toward a particular view of the primary threat of US interests, although each would seek to deal in some way with every foreseeable threat and every important interest and objective.

Option 1—Military Strategy (Strategic Consensus Plus). This option represents a combination of the present "strategic consensus" and the logical extension of that policy and the Carter Doctrine. It is basically a forward military strategy in which the US presence is the main vehicle for establishing a favorable balance of power. An extreme variant of this strategy has been postulated by Robert W. Tucker, a long-time proponent of an interventionist policy in the region. Tucker has questioned whether local states, either as a part of a strategic consensus or any similar collective security arrangement, could defend the Gulf without a direct US military presence. In fact, Tucker suggests that the weak and unstable local states themselves represent threats to US interests, and that since some outside power will inevitably dominate the region, the United States should be that power. Tucker has strongly criticized the logistical shortcomings of the RDJTF concept and the

political limitations of an "over the horizon" presence—which prevents a physical demonstration of the US presence. In the first instance, Tucker recommends that the United States acquire the Israeli bases in the Sinai—Eitam and Etzion—that are to be dismantled and turned over to Egypt as part of the Camp David agreement. His rationale, however, would support a military presence in other countries as well."

A recent article in *The Washington Post* alleged that within the military services strong advocacy exists for a plan of building "surrogate bases" in Saudi Arabia to be used in an emergency and for a regionwide air defense network—of which the AWACS aircraft and F-15 fighters being sold to the Saudis would be an essential component. The November 1, 1981, article by Scott Armstrong alleged that informally the American military services already had achieved an understanding with Saudi Arabia that would involve the "prepositioning," primarily at Saudi expense, of a 90-day supply of war stocks in facilities built to US specifications by American engineers.²⁶ Department of Defense spokesmen have denied the existence of any formal agreement with Saudi Arabia of this nature, and others have suggested that the reported understanding "may reflect only the advanced planning of two military establishments and fails to take into account the divergent views of the Saudi political leadership."²⁷

Practically speaking, while such an agreement would not necessarily involve a US military presence it would require a substantial civilian maintenance force and it implies the possibility of an expanded military presence at some unspecified future point. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has likewise advocated an expanded military presence, arguing that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force could have no credibility as long as the logistical facilities "negotiated by the Carter Administration" lacked "concrete content." Kissinger and others have advocated the stationing of US air and naval forces in Pakistan.²⁸

Advantages of the Military Option. The military option has a number of potential advantages. These include the following:

- It addresses important US objectives in the region, containing Soviet expansionism and maintaining access to the region's oil, in a direct and concrete way.
- It makes clear to regional states the determination of the United States to protect its interests in the region, and thereby conveys a stronger impression of "reliability" and "resolve."

- It matches ends with means.

Disadvantages of the Military Option. At the same time, the military option has some important weaknesses:

- It only nominally addresses, and may in fact compound, other threats to US interests and other objectives such as regional stability.

- Under the best of circumstances, US access to logistical facilities would depend on local acquiescence. This would tend to constrain US policy in regard to regional issues in which US interests are not best served by support of the host country, and could result in the denial of US access in the obverse case.

- Even assuming assured access, the resources to mount a credible military defense of the Gulf would likely reduce US capabilities elsewhere.

Discussion. In varying degrees the military option is grounded in a world view that does not shrink from the exercise of force and places a low value on ideas that are not backed by tangible power. This option finds favor among would-be practitioners of Realpolitik and among military planners who seek the necessary logistical basis for carrying out the implications of stated US policy. It implies a lower value on self-determination as a policy objective in cases where this conflicts with US interests.

Some adherents to this school of thought tend to deprecate the significance of the Palestinian issue, on the grounds of the demonstrated lack of cohesiveness of the Arab countries, and place a high value on US military ties with Israel on grounds of that country's close identification with the United States and the potential afforded for projecting US power into the region.

There are also some supporters of a military option who see Saudi Arabia as the main potential locus of US military power in the region. This school tends to view Saudi protestations regarding its nonalignment and its opposition to an onshore US military presence as a consequence of equivocal US support of the Kingdom and still insufficient evidence of US "reliability" and commitment. Advocates of this alternative approach to achieving a military foothold in the region tend to favor Saudi rather than Israeli perspectives on the Palestinian and related issues.

The biggest difficulty with the military option is that it seems to be out of phase with the politics of the region. None of the pro-Western countries of the Gulf has agreed to a permanent US

military presence, and US officials have denied thus far any intention of seeking such a presence. Without some kind of relatively permanent onshore access, however, including airfields capable of taking heavy transports such as the C-5, port facilities, communications, and facilities for stockpiling significant quantities of military equipment and stores, the United States cannot support more than expeditionary forces. Military analysts are well aware of the need for permanent facilities in the region, and the armed services can be expected to urge them on US policymakers. Without such facilities, the RDJTF can never be more than a "tripwire" force in the context of a Soviet drive towards the Gulf. No advocate of the military option has offered thus far a plausible scenario for obtaining facilities that are free of control by the host country. Nor have they addressed the problem of how to respond in the event that a US presence becomes the catalyst for the overthrow, by domestic opposition forces, of the local government. Under such circumstances an effort by the United States to intervene in support of a local government or to remain by military means could well lead to an American "Afghanistan."

It may be that a dramatic development such as a Soviet attack on Iran might impel local governments to enter into a defense relationship with the United States sufficiently close to make US bases a feasible option. Under present circumstances, however, the pursuit of a military strategy seems to offer more risks than gains. Moreover, the feasibility of such a strategy also awaits the development of an adequate force structure or the reordering of present deployment patterns, such that would make bases in the region a usable asset.

Option 2—US-Soviet Condominium. Another option for securing American interests in the oil of the Gulf and perhaps, for dealing with regional instability, is an attempt to come to terms with the Soviet Union on delineating superpower interests. This is the most unlikely option at present, yet it is one that many regional states see as entirely possible at some future time. This view is based on the perception that both superpowers rate their avoidance of conflict higher than their interests in the region. Thus, it is reasoned, if the superpowers can come to terms over limiting strategic arms and in formalizing their respective spheres of interest in Europe, there is no reason why at some point they could not find it mutually advantageous to come to terms with each other in Southwest Asia.

Some variant of this option is not without advocates in the United States. In congressional testimony subsequent to the invasion of Afghanistan, former US Ambassador to Moscow George Kennan maintained that the paramount US interest in Southwest Asia was not access to the region's oil or deterring Soviet expansionism, but rather avoiding a conflict that could lead to a nuclear conflagration.²⁹ Some concrete precedents also exist such as the abortive effort of the Carter Administration to reach a naval arms limitation with the USSR in the Indian Ocean.

As a first step the United States could agree to consider Soviet President Brezhnev's proposal, made during a visit to New Delhi in December 1980, to settle the "external aspects" of the Afghanistan question and the "crisis" in the Persian Gulf on the basis of a five-part plan involving agreement not to establish bases in the region (Afghanistan excluded, of course); not to threaten force or interference in the internal affairs of local states; to respect nonalignment; to respect the "sovereign right" of local states to their natural resources; and not to raise obstacles to normal trade or threaten sea lanes.³⁰

Advantages of the US-Soviet Condominium Option. In terms of traditional great power behavior such a settlement could have several advantages:

- It could reduce the risk of a superpower conflict that would, at a minimum, probably result in the destruction of the very oil facilities that are the object of US interest.
- It could reduce regional instability by eliminating the need for competition for military bases and Soviet backed subversion of pro-Western governments.
- It could reduce tensions between the United States and its NATO allies over US efforts to involve them in undesired security commitments in Southwest Asia.

Disadvantages of the US-Soviet Condominium Option. Seeking negotiations with the Soviet Union or demarcating areas of interest in the Gulf would represent a "leap into the dark" that could have disastrous consequences. Some disadvantages include:

- The lack of credible guarantees that the Soviets would not continue to exploit regional instability to the disadvantage of the United States.
- A severe weakening of US credibility among friends and allies.
- Possibly harsh local reaction at the superpowers carving out spheres of influence.

Discussion. A major shortcoming of this option is that politically, the West is still perceived to be in a stronger position in the Gulf than the Soviet Union, despite that country's advantages of geography. Thus the Soviet proposal is viewed as an attempt to use Afghanistan as a lever for being able to play a larger role in Gulf affairs.

Through a further expansion of its influence, or by becoming a major consumer of Gulf oil, the USSR may some day force the United States to come to terms with it. The evidence to date, however, suggests that the Soviet Union remains an unwelcome presence in the region, and that even the states with whom it is most closely tied, such as Iraq and South Yemen, regard the Soviet Union primarily as the source of external support against their enemies.

If and when the Soviet Union becomes a net oil importer, it is not clear what goods it will be able to provide in free exchange. Except in the area of primary raw materials, the export performance of the Soviet Union has been dismal and shows no sign of any fundamental change. This fact is one of the more troubling aspects of the situation—that is, the possibility that the USSR may seek to obtain the oil of Iran or other Gulf countries in the way that it now obtains the natural gas of Afghanistan.

Probably the most likely inspiration for US-Soviet condominium would be a repeat of the post World War II scenario. The Soviets might invade Iran under the right circumstances and present the West with the reality of the Red Army on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The West would have recourse only to war or to reaching an agreement on recognizing spheres of influence. Such an event would likely also result in a US presence on the western shore of the Gulf.

Option 3—Political Strategy (Strategic Consensus Minus). This option, like that of the military option, has a variety of potential meanings. Essentially, however, it represents a view that while military force is important to deterring Soviet expansionism, political factors are the prime determinant of Soviet action and of US capabilities. In other words, this option is based on the perspective that the Soviet Union does not desire to provoke a war with the United States, but that in the pursuit of its goals—which include traditional aspirations toward the Indian Ocean—political maneuvering is the key step to creating opportunities that will not

provoke a military response by the United States. Thus Paul Jabber, in a Fall 1980 article in *Daedalus*, noted the significance of the fact that "of all the so-called Northern Tier countries bordering on the Soviet Union from Turkey to Pakistan, Afghanistan alone has never been part of any Western-sponsored regional security system." Jabber asserts, therefore, that "the Soviets formulated their decision regarding Afghanistan with a different calculus than would be used in any decision to invade Pakistan or Iran or to threaten with military force any of the Arab oil-producing states."¹¹

The political option follows the general approach advocated in a Summer 1981 article in *Foreign Policy* by Christopher Van Hollen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. In this article "Don't Engulf the Gulf," Van Hollen argued that the search for a strategic consensus "evokes memories of the containment policies of the 1950's, but it lacks political coherence or a structural underpinning." He views the goal of military footholds in the region as politically unfeasible and argues for "a more sophisticated multilateral approach...that is better tuned to the most likely threats and to regional sensitivities, and that defines 'security' in other than simply military terms."¹²

Van Hollen and others argue for an increase in US naval capabilities in the region but oppose an onshore presence on grounds that it could destabilize any government that accepted US forces. Advocates of a political strategy favor more subtle steps such as behind-the-scenes support for the new Gulf Cooperative Council, the encouragement of Saudi-Pakistani ties, greater economic and military support of Turkey, the reengagement of the Arab-Israeli peace process, including confronting the problem of the West Bank and the Palestinian issue, and greater efforts to involve Europe and Japan more extensively in regional affairs.

Advocates of the political approach see the main sphere for American military power lying in the overall strategic balance. Some, including Van Hollen, suggest that the United States might acknowledge that the Soviet Union is already a factor in the Gulf and cautiously attempt to engage the Soviets in proposals for internationalizing the oil-producing regions and the sea lines of communication.

Advantages of the Political Strategy. The political strategy has several advantages flowing from its modest goals and general conformity with regional realities:

- It meets what local states say they want from the United States.

- It avoids bruising domestic political fights to achieve controversial objectives.

- It is more satisfactory to US allies in Europe and Japan.

- It allows the US military to concentrate on its overall strategic posture and to avoid tying up scarce resources for one or two regional contingencies of doubtful likelihood.

Disadvantages of the Political Strategy. The main disadvantages flow from its secondary attention to worst case scenarios and its subtlety, which might be subject to misinterpretation as a lack of will or commitment. Thus:

- It would not adequately provide for the situation of a direct Soviet attack toward the Gulf.

- An over-the-horizon naval presence might not convey an adequate impression of US military power and willingness to defend Gulf states.

- It might be difficult to sustain domestically if the importance of individual steps toward the overall strategy were not appreciated or could not be made clear for political and security reasons.

Discussion. The political strategy does not command the attention of a "Grand Design" or a strategic consensus, but it has the virtue of being more in tune with local realities and US capabilities. While the United States has not yet achieved an agreement with any country providing for the kind of access or logistical support that could give confidence about the ability to carry out a major military commitment, it does have forces in being that can be employed in the region and these already provide some level of deterrence. The ability to actually use local facilities in the event of a major contingency, however, is years away and it is not even certain at this point that the resources will be committed to this effort, at least in the sense of forces or supply stocks that have utility only in the Gulf. Under these circumstances the political option allows the United States to maintain security ties with the Gulf while keeping its options open should conditions arise that would substantially change the climate in favor of a US military presence. By pressing the issue of a military presence in the absence of the requisite force structure, on the other hand, the United States risks much for gains that are largely symbolic and subject to rapid reversal.

The political strategy also provides the flexibility to seek to improve relations with countries that are currently pro-Soviet or nonaligned away from the United States, whereas the strategic consensus or forward military approach tends to be polarizing. With a lower key approach, for instance, the United States would be better situated to continue slow progress toward better relations with Iraq, and an opportunity to attempt a rapprochement with India. The political approach would not require the revocation of any existing commitment, but would seek to modify adverse perceptions of the current policy and provide for new initiatives aimed at conveying an impression of greater balance in US policy toward all countries with which the United States has an opportunity for favorable relations.

CONCLUSIONS

The enhancement of US strategic mobility and deployable military power certainly has been mandated by the events of the past two and one-half years. Likewise, has been the need to shore up, where feasible, the security of regional countries that are likely targets of Soviet expansion or victims of aggression from other quarters. But no event of the past two and one-half years has clarified the specific utility of military power in the situations that are most immediately threatening to US interests. Moreover, the effort to deploy power in the region and strengthen the military forces of US friends can sometimes exacerbate the non-Soviet-related threats to US interests.

The risk of current US policy and some prescriptions for the future are that they will result in an impressive-seeming crypto-alliance, basing, and logistical support system that could crumble overnight due to adverse local political developments. Such a facade of power may be worse than clear limitations, either because it induces complacency or because it stimulates greater efforts on the part of adversaries. The United States has limited means to guarantee the stability of its friends in the region. No one would argue that protection from external attack is not an important source of stability. But too heavy a hand can cause unintended adverse results.

Above all, it would be well to bear in mind the recent admonition of the previous Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,

David Newsome, that no strategy for deploying American ground forces in the Persian Gulf region be undertaken "without a thorough national and congressional debate." As Newsome noted, "That debate has yet to begin."

ENDNOTES

1. The prospect of Soviet oil production and other energy output continues to be a matter of controversy. The USSR has large opportunities for energy substitution due to the presence of massive gas and coal reserves. Past Western estimates, even in the relatively short run, have not been very reliable. See US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Energy in Soviet Policy: A Study Prepared for Use of the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Security Economics*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981.

2. John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973, pp. 1-4.

3. Department of Defense, *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request, and FY 1980-84 Defense Programs*, January 25, 1979, p. 54.

4. Collins, *Grand Strategy*, p. 278.

5. Technically the United States never joined CENTO, but based its involvement on "observer" status and bilateral commitments to member nations. Membership in CENTO would have committed the United States to support members against attacks from any source, while the bilateral relations limited the applicability of the US commitment to Communist aggression in the context of the 1958 Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East. Two factors that especially affected US policy were Iraq's technical state of belligerency with Israel (applicable during the Baghdad Pact era) and Pakistan's rivalry with India, a country with which the United States wished to maintain good relations. For background on the US relationship with CENTO and the operative limitations on the US commitment to its member countries see testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Roger Davies, in US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Comments Abroad; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part 7, Greece and Turkey*, June 9 and 10, 1970, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 1855-1859.

6. US loans and grants for economic and military assistance to the Near East and South Asia region totaled \$32.2 billion from the end of World War II through fiscal year 1980. US Agency for International Development, *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945—September 30, 1980*, p. 7.

7. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 7.

8. US arms transfer policy toward the subcontinent is described in Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 49-69. See also US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, Committee Print, 97th Cong., 1st sess.*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, September 25, 1981, pp. 67-87 (Pakistan).

9. Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) James H. Noyes, June 6, 1973. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*, p. 39.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Roger P. Davies, November 28, 1973, *ibid.*, p. 151-152.

12. Sisco testimony, pp. 5-6.

13. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Disapprove Construction on the Island of Diego Garcia; Hearings on Senate Resolution 160, June 10, 1975*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975.

14. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, Committee Print prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, 96th Cong., 1st sess., Washington: US Government Printing Office, April 1979, p. 112.

15. *Ibid.*

16. President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980 (text in *The New York Times*, January 24, 1980, p. A12).

17. Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs*, January 19, 1981, p. 32.

18. For a discussion of the foreign policy and political background to the Carter Administration's authorization of two shipments of uranium fuel to India see Richard P. Cronin, "Congress and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: Uranium Exports to India: A Case Study," in US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Congress and Foreign Policy—1980*, Committee Print, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 90-104.

19. Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, p. 92.

20. US Congress, Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to be Secretary of State*, January 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15, 1981, Part 1, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 16.

21. Henry Trehwitt, "Administration Says Region from Turkey to Pakistan is a Single 'Theater'," *Baltimore Sun*, March 24, 1981, p. 4.

22. Reportedly the possibility of selling both the AWACS to Saudi Arabia and the F-16 to Pakistan had been raised first by the Carter Administration. Neither indication of willingness to consider selling these systems would have been binding on the new administration, however, and in fact both decisions became very much a part of the Reagan Administration's pursuit of a strategic consensus.

23. Robert E. Hunter, "After 'Strategic Consensus'—What?," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 29, 1981, p. 22.

24. George C. Wilson, "In Policy Shift, Pentagon Seeks Naval Superiority," *The Washington Post*, December 14, 1981, p. 1.

25. Robert W. Tucker, "American Power & the Persian Gulf," *Commentary*, Vol. 70, No. 5, November 1980, pp. 25-41.

26. Scott Armstrong, "Saudi's AWACS Just a Beginning of New Strategy," *The Washington Post*, November 1, 1981, p. 1.

27. UPI, "Pentagon Denies AWACS Sale Tied to Bases in Saudi Arabia," *The Washington Post*, November 2, 1981, p. 3; David B. Ottaway, "Saudis Wary of U.S. Military Role," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1981, p. 1.

28. David K. Shipler, "Kissinger Urges U.S. to Enhance its Forces in Mideast," *The New York Times*, January 7, 1981, p. 8; position attributed to Kissinger in Christopher Van Hollen, "Leaning on Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, No. 38, Spring 1980, p. 45. See also Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 8, Spring 1980, pp. 30-38 (esp. pp. 36-38).

29. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Security Interests and Policies in Southwest Asia*, Hearings, February 6, 7, 20, 27; March 4, 18, 1980, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 88.

30. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Tass Carries Text of Brezhnev Indian Parliament Speech," FBIS 62, December 10, 1980.

31. Paul Jabber, "U.S. Interests and Regional Security in the Middle East," *Daedalus*, Fall 1980, p. 71.

32. Christopher Val Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981, p. 1065.

33. David D. Newsome, "America Engulfed," *Foreign Policy*, No. 43, Summer 1981, p. 32.

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