POLICY OBJECTIVE AND OPTIONS UNDER A LEVERAGE STRATEGY TOWARD C--ETC (U)

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Castro's Cuba continues to pose a three-way challenge to U.S. interests. First, Cuba directly endangers U.S. security interests in the Caribbean because of its military ties with the USSR. Second, Cuba undermines U.S. global interests in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World because of its role as a military-political paladin allied with Moscow. And third, Cuba threatens the stability of the Caribbean Basin, and facilitates Soviet penetration of the region, because of its continued "internationalist" activities in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere in the region.

Accordingly, U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 1980s ought to encompass a range of objectives that, at a minimum, strive to (1) neutralize the Cuban-Soviet security threat, (2) discourage Cuba's global paladinism, and (3) arrest Cuban efforts to revolutionize the Caribbean Basin. At a maximum, U.S. policy could attempt to use Cuba as a fulcrum to constrain Soviet expansionism elsewhere in the world, and it could additionally seek to alter fundamentally (1) the Cuban-Soviet relationship, and (2) the very nature of the Castro regime itself.

Recent U.S. policy succeeded in restoring a needed although limited U.S. presence in Havana. But it did not succeed in deterring the Castro regime from pursuing a new overseas military operation in Ethiopia in 1977-78, nor in achieving any of the other U.S. minimum or maximum objectives listed above. Alternative punitive and conciliatory policy options, however, are also likely to prove equally ineffective if not counterproductive for U.S. goals in the 1980s.

A punitive policy that involved the direct application of U.S. military force against Cuba appears to be beyond present U.S. force capabilities given U.S. military commitments elsewhere in the world. Also, whether direct or through Cuban exiles, U.S. military moves against Castro might be politically unsustainable within as well as outside the United States; they could precipitate a conflict with the USSR in other contested regions; and they might well work to Castro's domestic advantage because of Cuban nationalism and the mobilization character of his regime. On the other hand, a conciliatory U.S. posture is unlikely to move Cuba to abandon its
major foreign policy positions because of the even greater entrenchment
of Fidel and Raul Castro's guerrilla veterans in the highest organs of
the Party, State and Government starting in the 1979-80 period. More-
over, the United States would have little bargaining power under a con-
ciliatory policy because of its inability to match the high levels of
economic (and military) assistance that the Soviet Union extends to Cuba.

In contrast to the punitive and conciliatory options, a long-term
U.S. Leverage strategy towards Cuba would aim at advancing U.S. minimum
and maximum objectives through the employment of a spectrum of political,
economic and military policies well into the 1980s. Such a strategy
would combine both pressures and inducements, similar to those in the
punitive and conciliatory approaches, in order to create a situation
that would oblige the Castro regime to change its international behavior.
But unlike those approaches, a leverage strategy would avoid working
against the strengths of the Castro regime, while instead exploiting
the latter's many weaknesses, and its new vulnerabilities and interests,
so as to develop leverage and thereby advance U.S. objectives with respect to
both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Leverage entails the ability of the United States to influence Cuba's
behavior to the former's advantage through Cuba's own recognition that it
can minimize its vulnerabilities and maximize its interests only by
satisfying U.S. demands. To this end, the United States would first need
to apply pressures in order to exacerbate the Castro regime's growing
economic, political and foreign policy vulnerabilities, through such
measures as information programs beamed to Cuba, and concerted political
and military action with regional allies. In particular, U.S. pressures
would be aimed at intensifying the regime's concern over its own long-
term survival.

Leverage will not be attained, however, if the Castro regime is able
to offset U.S. pressures through countermeasures at home and abroad, such
as by organizing the new Territorial Troop Militia and by securing stepped-
up Soviet support. Thus, along with pressures, the United States would
also need to offer inducements that are addressed to the Cuban leadership's
primary interests in assuring regime security and survival, in regaining
Cuba's international autonomy, and in accelerating the island's economic
development. The United States could effectively advance these course in-
terests -- by relaxing U.S. pressures, by allowing Cuba greater international
room for maneuvering, and by extending needed trade and technology oppor-
tunities -- in return for the cessation of Cuba's maximalist and expansionist foreign policies by either a Castro or post-Castro regime. Whereas pressures would work to increase the costs of Castro's maximalist policies, inducements would thus be aimed at convincing Cuban leaders to forego those policies in favor of advancing their primary interests.

The Castro regime's new vulnerabilities and interests, together with the increased Soviet stake in Cuba, also suggest that Cuba could serve as fulcrum for exercising leverage on the Soviet Union. If the USSR becomes the direct target of U.S. leverage, then Cuba provides the means by which Soviet expansionism is to be constrained by virtue of the island's vulnerability as the most exposed salient of the Soviet bloc. If Cuba remains the direct target of the U.S. strategy, then the United States still possesses indirect leverage on Moscow. However, care is needed by the United States in not overplaying its "Cuba-card" in order not to provoke a Soviet retaliation against U.S. allies that are contiguous to the USSR. Hence, Cuba-derived leverage might best be used to obtain Soviet cooperation in resolving Cuban-related problems.

A long-term leverage strategy towards Cuba aims at creating a condition whereby a Castro or post-Castro Cuba would ultimately be obliged to secure its primary interests by altering its international behavior in conformity with basic U.S. security and foreign policy interests. Further research is thus needed with regards to the types of vulnerabilities and interests that potentially make the Castro regime susceptible to U.S. leverage, and with respect to the types of leverage instruments and policies that the U.S. Government can in fact employ towards Cuba.
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS
UNDER A LEVERAGE STRATEGY TOWARD CUBA
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This study begins by assessing the Cuban challenge to U.S. security and foreign policy interests, the range of objectives that U.S. policy toward Cuba should strive for in the 1980s, and the accomplishments as well as failures of recent U.S. policy toward Castro. The study then examines two conventional policy alternatives, the punitive and conciliatory approaches, with regard to their respective strengths and weaknesses in advancing U.S. objectives toward Cuba. Finally, the concluding part of the study explores the way in which the United States might devise and apply a long-term strategy for gaining increased leverage against Cuba and, directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union, with the aim of promoting a range of minimum-maximum objectives toward Cuba in the 1980s.

CUBA: U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

Beginning with President Eisenhower, every U.S. Administration has been confronted with the "Cuba-problem." After six months in office, the new Reagan Administration is similarly faced with devising a policy towards Castro's Cuba that will advance U.S. interests and objectives. As a starting point, therefore,

*An abbreviated version of this paper was presented by the author at the Department of State conference on "Cuba in the 1980s," in Washington, D.C. April 9, 1981. This paper is based on the author's larger study on Cuba under a major project on Caribbean Basin security issues directed by David Ronfeldt at The Rand Corporation. The opinions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author.
we must first ascertain what U.S. interests are affected by Cuba's presence and activities.

CUBA'S CHALLENGE TO U.S. INTERESTS

Cuba's challenge to the United States in the 1980s consist of three inter-related elements. First, U.S. security and foreign policy interests are directly endangered in the Caribbean and elsewhere by Cuba's close military and political ties with the Soviet Union. While Cuba's alliance with the USSR could be viewed as largely defensive in character during the 1960s, Cuban-Soviet military ties have assumed an increasingly offensive and coordinated dimension since the mid-1970s. Thus, Cuba's Angolan operation was facilitated by Soviet logistical support beginning in late 1975; two years later, the Soviets supplied not only logistical support but also the strategic command for Cuba's Expeditionary Forces in Ethiopia; and Soviet pilots flew Cuban Migs on the island to enable Cuban air force pilots to fly combat missions in Ethiopia.¹

Moreover, the Soviet Union has vastly increased its overseas military capabilities since the 1960s with its blue-water navy whose ships now pay port calls and conduct oceanic surveys in the Caribbean. In this regard, Soviet submarines have a repair and rest facility in Cienfuegos; a Soviet, 3,000-man brigade evidently remains in Cuba; and Soviet reconnaissance planes and electronic surveillance facilities now use the island for monitoring the U.S. and Caribbean area. The Soviet reach into the Caribbean is also significantly

augmented by Cuba's own military capabilities. Having already engaged in overseas combat operations supported by and coordinated with the USSR, Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) -- consisting of 142,000 active duty and 60,000 ready reservists -- continue to be advised by some 1,500 or more Soviet military advisors on the island. With their estimated combat radius of 250 nautical miles, Cuba's Mig 23s can command portions of the Caribbean and deliver air strikes against Florida, while the Cuban army could probably seize the Guantanamo Naval Base in the event of war. An impending military conflict with the Soviet Union would thus require that the United States divert air, sea and naval units to cope with both the Cuban and Soviet military presence in the Caribbean.

Second, and relatedly, U.S. global interests continue to be undermined by Cuba's role as a military-political paladin in Africa, where the Cuban military presence in particular has greatly advanced Soviet interests and objectives in the continent. To be sure, Cuba has had its own interests to promote in Africa by greatly expanding its military and political presence there.\(^2\) Still, the initial dispatch of 36,000 Cuban combat troops to Angola in 1975-76, followed by the dispatch of another 12,000 to Ethiopia in 1978,\(^3\) were both indispensable to the advancement of Soviet objectives in Africa in that the Cuban operations consolidated the power of the two pro-Soviet Marxist regimes in these countries, while securing the Soviet, East European as well as Cuban presence in southern Africa and the Horn. In this respect, an estimated 15,000-19,000 Cuban military

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\(^2\)See Gonzalez, loc. cit., and Leo Grande, loc. cit.

\(^3\)The Angolan and Ethiopian troop figures were mentioned by Fidel Castro in his "secret speech" of December 27, 1979, before the National Assembly of People's Power.
personnel remained stationed in Angola and another 11,000-13,000 in Ethiopia at the end of 1980. Cuban military personnel in these two African states and elsewhere alone accounted for two-thirds of the estimated 51,555 military advisors, instructors, technical personnel and troops that were stationed by the USSR and East European states in the Third World the previous year, excluding Soviet forces in Afghanistan.\footnote{National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79, A Research Paper (ER 80-10318U, October 1980), p. 15.}

Third, Cuba's intensified "internationalist" activities in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere threatened the stability of the Caribbean Basin, and directly or indirectly facilitate further Soviet penetration of a regime of vital strategic and geo-political importance to the United States. More so than other states, Cuba supplied the military and political support that proved essential to the victory of the Sandinista forces in the Nicaraguan civil war.\footnote{The first of several Cuban arms shipments began in September 1977, with the May 1979 shipments proving indispensable to the FSLN spring offensive. Havana also dispatched Julian Lopez, allegedly a DGI officer, and currently Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua, to Costa Rica in March 1978 to coordinate Cuban operations.} In the post-1979 period, Havana dispatched not only school teachers, public health and administrative personnel to Nicaragua, but also military and security advisors that enabled the new revolutionary government to consolidate its power. By early 1981, some estimates placed the number of Cubans stationed in Nicaragua at 8,000. Also, Cuba appears to have stepped-up its support for the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla forces in El Salvador beginning in late 1979. The Castro regime supplied political advice and direction to the Salvadoran guerrillas as it had done earlier with the Sandinistas. Additionally, the State Department charged that Havana organized and coordinated the transportation of upwards of 800 tons of weapons that various communist bloc countries reportedly had agreed to supply the...
guerrillas, and that began to arrive in El Salvador in September 1980. More recently, Colombia suspended relations with Havana in March 1981, charging that Cuba had trained and armed nearly 100 guerrillas who had been captured earlier that month in Colombia.

**U.S. Objectives and Past Policy**

At a minimum, therefore, U.S. policy should aim at, (1) neutralizing the security threat to the United States posed by the Cuban-Soviet relationship, (2) discouraging future Cuban military operations overseas, and (3) arresting Cuban efforts to destabilize and revolutionize the Caribbean Basin. At a maximum, U.S. policy might additionally seek to employ Cuba, as a highly exposed client-state of the Soviet Union, as a fulcrum for constraining Soviet international behavior. More ambitious still, a maximum set of goals might also have the objectives of fundamentally altering, (1) the Cuban relationship with the Soviet Union, and (2) the very composition and nature of the Cuban regime itself.

U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 1977-80 period was not effective in advancing the above minimum or maximum objectives. Instead, the major accomplishment of that policy was to reestablish sub-diplomatic level ties with Castro government in 1977, thereby ending the 16 years of U.S. isolation from Cuba. With the stationing of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, communication with the Castro regime was facilitated, and the U.S. Government became far better informed regarding developments on the island. In themselves, these were two substantial gains for U.S. policy, and they are ones that should be preserved in any future


U.S.-Cuban policy. Additionally, a by-product of the thaw was the return of tens of thousands of Cuban exiles to their homeland on brief visits, which in turn precipitated the surge of political unrest that suddenly confronted the regime in 1979-80, and which ended with the mass exodus of over 125,000 Cubans in the 1980 "Freedom Flotilla." Indirectly, therefore, U.S. policy contributed to developments that had significant impact within Cuba by allowing the return of the exiles.

Nevertheless, the original U.S. premise for moving towards a more normalized relationship in 1977 -- to provide the Castro regime with the political and economic incentive to become less beholden to the USSR, and thereby to wean it away from Moscow -- was soon rendered inoperative by a succession of Cuban policies toward Ethiopia, Nicaragua, the Non-Aligned Movement, and Afghanistan. Indeed, given the initial conciliatory U.S. policy at the time, these developments demonstrated the extent to which the Castro regime's foreign policy interests were not only conflictive but also intrinsically contradictory to those of the United States.

Contradictory interests between the two countries derives from the fact that each adheres to fundamental issues and objectives which cannot be sacrificed by either without irreparable harm to their respective international positions and roles. Hence, with the advent of the Carter Administration's new Cuban policy, Havana might have secured some economic gains with the further normalization of relations with the United States after 1977. But these potential gains were by no means certain since the restoration of commercial relations was contingent in large part upon U.S. Congressional (and public) approval which in turn depended upon Cuba's "good behavior" on the international front. It was at this point that Cuban and U.S. interests were in direct contradiction: the Castro regime could
not forgo its "internationalist" role as a political-military paladin in the Third World, nor its ever closer and more supportive alliance with the Soviets, as Washington demanded, since these roles advanced the regime's maximum objectives of obtaining (1) greater international status and maneuverability (which the United States could not supply), (2) new Third World allies, and (3) greater leverage with Moscow as the latter's highly valued ally. Although reacting negatively, Washington was thus unable to force Havana's abandonment of policies that were leading to a heightened Cuban military presence in Africa (Ethiopia), to renewed Cuban support for the Soviet Union in the Third World, the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement, and to the intensification of Cuba's own revolutionary activities in Central America. Unable to provide credible incentives for Cuba to detach itself from the Soviet Union, U.S. policy has become equally ineffective in discouraging the Castro regime from engaging in increasingly objectionable international behavior at the outset of the 1980s.

If recent U.S. policy was unable to advance even minimal U.S. objectives, what policy alternatives are now available toward Cuba? As will be suggested shortly, a long-term strategy of international leverage toward the Castro regime and, directly or indirectly, its Soviet patron, might well succeed in promoting a range of minimum and maximum objectives. Such a leverage strategy by the United States, however, must be distinguished from two mutually opposing policy options that have been advanced as the method for dealing with Castro. Hence, we now need to look at the conventional punitive (or "hardline") and conciliatory (or "softline") approaches toward the Castro regime.

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8 For a further elaboration of the "logic" of Cuba's international position at the time, see Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (eds.), Cuba in the World (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 3-36.
CONVENTIONAL POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The Punitive Option

The punitive policy would have the United States adopt political and military postures that would punish the Castro regime for its behavior, contain it: active support for revolutionary movements, and, if necessary, eliminate the regime itself.\(^9\) The range of political steps that could be taken involve the closing-down of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, the termination of travel between Cuba and the United States, the reassessment of the U.S.-Cuban fishing treaty of 1977, and the resumption of a major anti-Castro propaganda campaign aimed at the Cuban people. The range of military measures include the resumption of intelligence overflights over the island, the interdiction of Cuban supplies destined for revolutionary forces in the Caribbean Basin, and the active support of Cuban exiles in the waging of a "war of national liberation" against Castro.

Although risky, the punitive option would appear to hold out prospects for realizing several minimum and maximum objectives toward Cuba. It would directly address the principal external "source" for heightened instability and insecurity in the Caribbean Basin, thereby arresting Cuban efforts to revolutionize the region, as well as checking or even eliminating entirely the Cuban-Soviet threat to U.S. security interests. By intensifying political and military pressures on Castro, the United States might also obtain a leverage hold over Moscow, and

ultimately bring down his regime. At the very least, the punitive policy would raise the costs to Cuba were it to persist in its objectionable behavior.

Many of the above punitive measures would be self-defeating for U.S. interests and objectives, however. The closing of respective Interests Sections would eliminate the official U.S. presence in Havana, thereby re-isolating the United States from Cuban developments. The cessation of travel between the two countries would prevent the return of U.S.-based Cuban exiles to the island, thereby shielding the Castro regime from the destabilizing effects that the exile visits have had on Cuban Society. The abrogation of the fishing agreement would not hurt Cuba except perhaps in the distant future since U.S. fishing grounds are presently of marginal importance to the Cuban fishing industry, but it probably would further complicate the consumation of the separate boundary agreement between the two countries which still awaits Senate ratification.

U.S. "aggression" against Cuba, whether directly through U.S. naval and air actions, or indirectly through support for an anti-Castro war by Cuban exiles, could precipitate a wave of terrorist acts in this country by groups allied with Havana. Also, it could seriously undermine U.S. relations with Venezuela and especially Mexico. Both of these countries have emerged as new regional powers in the Caribbean Basin, with Venezuela currently serving as a pivotal U.S. ally in El Salvador, whereas Mexico possesses perhaps an even greater potential as a stabilizing regional force. Furthermore, not only the governments of these two countries but also other Latin American and Caribbean governments as well would most likely be confronted with major domestic disturbances were the United States seen as engaged in military aggression against Cuba.

International law aside, the effective military containment of Cuban support for guerrilla insurrections might also be beyond the immediate force capabilities
of the United States. The interdiction of Cuban supplies at sea would require the redeployment to the Caribbean of U.S. naval and air units that are already stretched thin in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and elsewhere in the world. Both locally and internationally, such an undertaking becomes all the more hazardous since military measures can have consequences which are neither controllable nor predictable. Thus, the United States might intend to employ force selectively in order to minimize the risks of escalating the conflict with Cuba into a broader international conflict. However, there can be no certainty that Castro and the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces will not respond with their own punitive actions given the present seige mentality of the Castro leadership, and the modern, combat proven capabilities of the FAR. In fact, the Flamingo incident in May 1980 provides a recent example of a rash action by the Cuban military, if not the leadership itself, under less stressful conditions. In the meantime, an expanding U.S.-Cuban conflict, would create tremendous pressures on Moscow to assist Cuba at least indirectly, for example, by threatening Soviet military moves in the Middle East or against West Berlin as in 1962.

Once started, the United States could not afford to lose a war with Cuba. But a U.S. victory in Cuba would be costly internationally, especially in the Third World, in the same manner that Afghanistan severely set-back Soviet diplomacy. Unlike Moscow, however, Washington most likely would be constrained by international and domestic reaction, as well as by Soviet pressure, from employing the very level of force necessary to assure a military solution to the Cuban problem. In turn, the longer the United States remains engaged in a military conflict with Cuba, the less sustainable the military action becomes, and the greater the likelihood that the United States would be forced to disengage -- a development that surely would be seen by adversaries and allies alike as a triumph for Castro and as defeat for Washington.
Finally, even the mere threat of U.S. military action, or the renewal of exile attacks and landings on Cuba, is virtually certain to work to the Castro regime's advantage not only because of its effect in galvanizing Cuban nationalism, but also because of the all-inclusive, mobilization character of the Cuban political system. Unlike traditional authoritarian regimes, Castro's political system rests on the organization and mobilization of mass support among Cuba's population of 10 million. Thus, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution alone have a membership of 5.3 million, while the combined, overlapping membership of all four of Cuba's mass organizations -- including the CDRs -- numbers 10,317,000 Cubans. Although purposefully selective in their recruitment, the Communist Party of Cuba and its youth affiliate also have a membership of 434,134 and 422,000 respectively.10 The Revolutionary Armed Forces number 142,000 active-duty personnel, plus 60,000 ready reservists, and will command upwards of 100,000 additional Cuban civilian volunteers who are to comprise the new Territorial Troop Militia, while still other tens of thousands of Cubans work for the Ministry of Interior and other government agencies. Such a vast organizational network and membership has critical ramifications for the security of the Castro regime, and for U.S. policy:

First, by virtue of their membership in the mass organizations and other bodies, the regime is able to command the vast majority of able-bodied males and females 14 years and up:

Second, while a significant portion of those mobilized may only be nominally committed or even opposed to the Castro regime, the mobilization structures and controls enveloping them are likely to make their mass defection or active opposition to the regime highly problematical; and...

Third, at the very least the regime can count on the loyalty of hundreds of thousands of cadres who occupy low and middle-level posts in the mass organizations, the Party, the military and security organs, and the other governmental bodies, and who thus have a strong personal stake in the survival of the Castro regime.

Indeed, it is precisely the spectre of an island-wide bloodbath associated with the fall of the Castro regime, and the return of exile elements to power, that provides the regime with much of its cohesion and mass support. For example, in his speech before the National Assembly of People’s Power on December 27, 1980, Castro warned of the increased possibility of U.S. aggression:

We must raise our guard, vigilance must be increased because the attacks may not involve military action or a naval blockade; they can also consist of the introduction of animal diseases and plant blights -- these people have no scruples of any kind -- and they can consist of sabotaging the economy and starting the business of trying to murder leaders again and that sort of thing.... As we said in the Main Report [to the Party Congress], they'll have to assume responsibility for their acts. This also holds true for counterrevolutionary activity; we must use an iron fist and crush the slightest sign of counter-revolution.11

In turn, to defend against both external aggressors and domestic counter-revolutionaries, and to mobilize the civilian populace even further, the regime has been pushing the development of the new Territorial Troop Militia as a back-up force to the FAR. In celebrating the 20th anniversary of his proclamation of the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution, which occurred on the very eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro thus emphasized that Cuba was again being threatened,

Hence, the similarity between this April 16 and that April 16. This is why we're again having to make a great effort to defend ourselves, to mobilize the people, men and women, all our people, to

organize the Territorial Troop Militia and to accelerate the work of fortification and buttressing our defense capacity in every way. In short, the prospects of a frontal attack from the United States provided Castro with the pretext for renewed mass mobilization in defense of the Cuba patria, thereby helping to solidify his regime and the latter's ties to the popular masses.

The Conciliatory Option

The conciliatory option would have the U.S. Government offer the Castro regime the restoration of trade relations, the availability of U.S. credits and technology, and the normalization of diplomatic relations on condition that Cuba (a) cease being an active military ally of the USSR in the service of Soviet expansionism, and (b) terminate support for revolutionary insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere. The conciliatory approach thus aims at realizing the minimum U.S. objectives of neutralizing the Soviet-Cuban security threat, discouraging Cuba's role as a military paladin of the USSR, and arresting Cuba's promotion of revolution in the Americas. Logically, such an approach might also lead to the eventual realization of the maximum goals of fundamentally altering the Cuban-Soviet relationship and perhaps the regime itself.

12 Ibid., April 26, 1981, p. 3.

13 Apart from evoking the threat of an external enemy, the regime is also able to generate considerable mass support for ideological, political and social reasons. See Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuba in the 1980's," Problems of Communism, March-April 1981, esp. pp. 57-58.

14 See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Reagan's Best Weapon Against Cuba May Be the Threat of Peace," Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1981, Part V, p. 3. In contrast to Lowenthal's position, the conciliatory approach has been advocated in the past without any conditions being attached. This is not a realistic option for U.S. policy, however.

On the other hand, elements of the conciliatory approach reportedly form part of the new Cuban policy being formulated by the Reagan Administration. Thus, when Castro acquiesce to a U.S. ultimatum regarding the cessation of Cuba's destabilizing activities in Central America and elsewhere, "...he can count on compensation in the form of normalization of relations with the
The conciliatory option enjoys three advantages over the punitive alternative. First, it is a low-risk policy that would not precipitate a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation or heightened world tensions. Second, it would not require the redeployment of scarce military resources to the Caribbean, but would instead enable the United States to employ its abundant economic and technological advantages in bargaining with the Castro government. Finally, were Castro to reject U.S. overtures, the conciliatory approach would not solidify the regime and regime-mass relations as with the punitive option, but rather it might undermine regime cohesion and its basis of popular support.

The conciliatory approach has three major difficulties, however. To begin with, it disregards the new make-up of the Castro regime, and how the recent expansion of the fidelista-raulista leadership increases the prospects that contradictory interests will prevent Cuba from accepting U.S. conditions under the conciliatory option. In this regard, the new fidelista-raulista predominance within the Castro regime today suggests that the latter will be even less receptive to a conciliatory approach than was the case four years ago under the Carter Administration. At that time, the upper echelons of both the Party and Government were more representative of other leadership elements, including not only "old Communists" from the Popular Socialist Party, but also newly ascendant managerial and technocratic elites who were precisely most concerned with expanding economic and trade ties with the industrialized West and the United States. Now, however, this earlier trend toward a broader coalition of leadership elites has been entirely reversed.

Thus, veteran fidelista hardliners assumed greater control of the Council of Ministers beginning in late 1979, while prominent technocratic and managerial advantages in bargaining with the Castro government. Finally, were Castro to reject U.S. overtures, the conciliatory approach would not solidify the regime and regime-mass relations as with the punitive option, but rather it might undermine regime cohesion and its basis of popular support.

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elements were displaced, among them Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernandez. The Second Party Congress in December 1980 underscored these changes as the new Political Bureau's regular and alternate membership, and the new Secretariat line-up, contained a far greater concentration of fidelista and raulista veterans than previously.15

As Table I (see Appendix) indicates, the Political Bureau's regular membership was increased from 13 to 16; one of the three new additions is a veteran of the guerrilla campaign, another served as liaison to Castro's guerrilla headquarters (Camacho), and all three are either fidelista or raulista in their leadership orientations. The dominance of the two Castro brothers and their respective followers thus increased to 13 out of the 16-member Political Bureau (including Dorticos, Camacho and Cienfuegos), with the remaining three 'old Communists' from the PSP reduced to a shrinking minority. Equally significant was the apparent rise of a fidelista hardliner to new leadership prominence: reappointed as Minister of the Interior in December 1979, Ramiro Valdes was now moved from seventh (1975) to fourth place in the rank order of Political Bureau members.

15 The distinction between fidelista and raulista officers initially derives from their primary associations with the Castro brothers during the anti-Batista struggle. Generally, the fidelistas joined Fidel in the Moncada attack of 1953, and/or later remained with him on the First Front during the course of the guerrilla struggle, whereas the raulistas later joined the younger Castro brother in establishing the Second Front in 1958. In the post-1959 period, several of the most prominent fidelista guerrilla veterans eventually became civilianized as they assumed permanent leadership positions in the party and government, and thereafter constituted the core of the inner circle around Fidel. A number of other fidelistas remained with the FAR, however, and became professional soldiers. Although some raulista officers were reassigned to civilian posts in the late 1960s and 1970s, the majority remained in the FAR as close associates of Raul. Within the top ranks of the professional military, therefore, there are nearly as many fidelista senior officers as there are raulistas. However, the younger, middle-grade officer corps could well be considered raulista in orientation given Raul's direct control of the FAR.
The biggest change was in the creation of 11 new Alternate Members to the Political Bureau. As Table 2 (see Appendix) reveals, the predominance of the July 26 Movement and fidelista-raulista elements is even greater among the alternates: 7 of the 11 alternates were members of Castro's July 26 Movement; 7 of 11 who were under the command of Fidel or Raul Castro, including Jose Ramirez of the PSP and Vilma Espin, who married Raul in 1959; and still others like Miguel Cano and Roberto Veiga evidently developed close ties with the Castro brothers in the post-revolutionary period. Equally conspicuous is the institutional representation of the MINFAR, the mass organizations, and the Party in the alternate membership, with the Minfar heading the list with Division Generals Colome, Casas and Batista, all veterans of Cuba's Angolan or Ethiopian campaigns, and comprising the army's top command. Only Humberto Perez, as head of the Central Planning Board, represents the more pragmatic, economic technocratic tendency within the government.

As is readily apparent in Table 3 (see Appendix), the new PCC Secretariat heightens the fidelista-raulista dominance even further. Of the nine members, three are fidelista guerrilla veterans, and five are raulista veterans. The "old Communists" from the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) are represented only by Lionel Soto, whereas three ex-PSP leaders were dropped, including two -- Carlos Rafael Rodriquez and Blas Roca -- who had been charter members of the Secretariat even since it was first formed in October 1965. As a result, the new Secretariat contains the highest concentration of fidelista and raulista leaders than at any time during its 15-year existence.

16 Another PSP leader, Raul Valdes Vivo, had been a Secertariat member until December 1979, when he was released to join the editorial board of the World Marxist Review in Prague.
In turn, the value-preferences, dominant goals, and organizational interests of the fidelista and raulista elites, as well as those of Fidel Castro himself, are virtually certain to make the present leadership far less receptive to U.S. economic and diplomatic inducements than would be true of the technocratic-managerial elites who have now become marginalized. In fact, the heightened predominance of fidelista and raulista leaders is likely to sharpen the contradictory interests between Cuba and the United States. Thus, the fidelistas seek maximum political and ideological goals which are contrary to U.S. global and regional interests, including increased international status, leverage and leadership for the Castro regime, while both the fidelista and raulista military elites have an additional organizational interest in strengthening the Cuban-Soviet alliance, which is similarly unacceptable for the United States. Accordingly, the conciliatory approach is doomed beforehand precisely because it requires that the dominant leadership elements within the regime abandon their most valued goals and interests as a condition for securing a less valued objective of economic development through U.S. assistance.

The second major difficulty with the conciliatory option concerns its economic feasibility for the United States. For example, what would it "cost" the United States for Castro to detach Cuba militarily from the USSR, and to cease its revolutionary activities in the Caribbean Basin? In turn, could the United States hope to replace the USSR as Cuba's principal trading partner and subsidizer? We do know approximately how much Castro's Cuba costs the Soviet Union: the USSR provided Cuba with an estimated $5.7 billion in repayable aid between 1960-79, plus an additional $11 billion in grants and trade subsidies for the same 20 year period. During the 1976-79 four-year period alone, however,
Cuba cost Moscow an estimated $9.6 billion in total economic assistance, most of it outright grants and trade subsidies, which amounted to an average bill of $2.4 billion per annum or 47 percent of the $4.567 billion that the United States provided in total development assistance in 1979.17

With regards to the second question, the Soviets supply Cuba with nearly all its petroleum imports, and at a discounted price of approximately 50 percent of the world price, both of which the United States would be hard pressed to provide. Additionally, the USSR is Cuba's principal sugar buyer, again at a preferential price, with Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union due to rise 2.5 to 3 million tons in 1981-82, which the United States could not absorb owing to the established position of domestic and other international sugar suppliers in the U.S. market. Even if Cuba were willing to realign itself, therefore, the United States could ill afford to displace the USSR as the Castro regime's principal benefactor, nor could it adequately satisfy the present requirements of the Cuban economy.

On a more modest scale, the United States might still try to provide Castro with some inducements for distancing himself from the USSR, and for curbing his revolutionary ambitions in the hemisphere, by simply giving Cuba limited access to U.S. trade, technology and credits. But limited access to the U.S. largess provides only weak inducements, which in turn would give the United States little leverage in bargaining for Cuban foreign policy concessions. Indeed, as was demonstrated in 1977-78, the U.S. Government has virtually no bargaining power in such situations because of the Castro regime's ability to both extract very high levels of Soviet economic support and to pursue its own preferred

foreign policy inclinations as Moscow's most valued ally in the Third World. Hence, the United States has little to offer Cuba under such circumstances.

Finally, the conciliatory approach cannot be sustained over the long-term. For it to receive sustained support from within the Executive Branch, Congress and the public at large, a conciliatory U.S. policy would require prompt successes in terms of visible changes in Cuban international behavior. Conversely, such support rapidly dwindles when the desired changes are not forthcoming, as indeed occurred beginning in 1978 with Cuba's new military operation in Ethiopia. Given the new predominance of the fidelista-raulista elites, and the difficulty the United States faces in offering credible and effective economic inducements to Castro, a new conciliatory approach would thus stand little chance of triggering required changes in Cuban foreign policy.

DEVISING A LEVERAGE STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA

Neither the punitive nor conciliatory option constitutes a coherent political strategy toward Castro's Cuba: each lacks a clear definition of realizable goals; each proposes relatively simple, short-term solutions to the complex, enduring conflict with Cuba; and each essentially is a reactive policy -- as has been the history of U.S.-Cuban policy since 1959 -- except that each responds to the perennial "Cuban problem" with a different approach. Clearly, then, there is need for a new U.S. policy toward Cuba.

A leverage strategy would assume the initiative towards Castro: it would aim at advancing U.S. minimum and maximum goals towards Cuba though the employment of a spectrum of political, economic and military policies over an extended period of time, conceivably into the late 1980s. Hence, unlike the punitive and conciliatory options, it would be sustainable within the United States,
as well as politically and militarily feasible in the larger regional and international context. In this respect, a leverage strategy would be keyed to the contemporary Cuban reality, avoiding the strengths of the Castro regime while exploiting its many weaknesses and new vulnerabilities.

A leverage strategy systematically combines both pressures and inducements from the punitive and conciliatory approaches in order to create situations which will oblige the Castro regime to change its international behavior. But it differs from the punitive and conciliatory options: It has a long-term perspective; and most importantly, it avoids working against the strengths of the Castro regime, while exploiting the latter's many weaknesses, and its new vulnerabilities and interests, so as to systematically advance U.S. objectives in the 1980s.

Before elaborating the strategy, we must first define international leverage and its constituent elements as they apply to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Then, we need to identify those particular conditions within the present Cuban situation that make the Castro regime (and Moscow) susceptible to the exercise of U.S. leverage. Finally, we will look at some of the leverage instruments and policies that might be available for effectively promoting U.S. objectives with respect to both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

**U.S. Leverage: Cuba and the Soviet Union**

On an abstract level, international leverage can be defined as State A influencing State B's behavior to A's advantage through B's recognition that it can minimize its vulnerabilities and maximize its interests only by satisfying A. As the leverage practitioner, either State A holds political, 

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18 With but a few notable exceptions, "leverage" remains an elusive and much neglected concept in the literature on international politics. For an early, pioneering effort to develop leverage as a distinct analytical concept, see Richard W. Cottam, *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy* (1967). For other relevant studies, see Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*
economic or military power over State B, or it possesses an essential raw material, a geo-strategic location, and/or political or ideological relationship of great value to B, that obliges the latter to provide policy concessions to A. Thus conceived, international leverage becomes available to and is practiced by "weak" as well as powerful states; and it can be used either in a passive manner to maintain a favorable relationship with the target state, or it may be used actively to wrest specific policy concessions from that state.\(^1\)

Turning concretely to the Cuban case, the United States can generate international leverage on Cuba and, directly or indirectly, on the Soviet Union as well.


\(^{19}\) While it is commonly believed that the superpowers exercise leverage over small states, the reverse is also true. Thus, Finland has used passive and, on occasion, active forms of leverage to forge a relationship with the Soviet Union that maximizes Finnish internal autonomy and safeguards national integrity. Cuba, too, has been a highly successful leverage practitioner in its 21-year relationship with Moscow, using both active and passive leverage to ensure the Soviet commitment. On the U.S. side, Israel has stood out as a skilled player of leverage politics in its dealings with Washington, employing active as well as passive leverage to maintain and strengthen U.S. support for Israel. The Shah was also adept at leveraging the United States, even prior to the energy crisis that began in 1973, and even during the height of the Iranian Revolution when his regime began to unravel. All these states possessed meager conventional "power" capabilities, and were either vulnerable to or dependent upon the superpower. Yet, each was able to leverage the respective superpower by exploiting the value(s) the latter attached to them: Finland (strategic, political), and Iran (strategic, raw material, political). For additional information, see David F. Ronfeldt, "Superclients and Superpowers--Cuba: Soviet Union/Iran: United States," Conflict, Vol. I, Number 4, 1979, pp. 273-302; Steven Spiegel, The War for Washington: The Other Arab Israeli Conflict (forthcoming); and George Maude, The Finnish Dilemma (1975). The author also is currently at work on a comparative study of international leverage that focuses on Cuba, Iran, Finland, and Mexico.
In the first instance, Cuba becomes the direct target of U.S. leverage with the minimum objectives being to induce significant changes in the Castro regime's regional and International behavior, and with the maximum ones being to alter the regime's very complexion and relationship with the Soviet Union. Whatever the objectives, the attainment of leverage rests on the ability of the U.S. Government to exploit actively the Castro regime's vulnerabilities and interests through the intensification of pressures, combined with the offering of inducements.

Pressures and inducements are both necessary, and must be coupled, if maximum leverage over the regime is to be attained. Coupling is vital because U.S. pressures can exacerbate the regime's vulnerabilities, but may be insufficient for gaining leverage if the vulnerabilities can be lessened by the regime's own counter measures on the domestic and foreign policy front. On the other hand, if the pressures are combined with major inducements from the United States, the regime itself -- or key elite elements within the regime -- may conclude that the leadership's primary interests can be best satisfied over the long-term only through accommodation with the United States. Thus, whereas pressures exacerbate regime vulnerabilities, inducements promote regime or specific elite interests in order to obtain maximum U.S. leverage over Cuba.

What are the regime's growing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the United States to intensify regime-mass tensions and inter-elite conflict? Among the more obvious ones are the following:

- two decades of poor economic performance, with the outlook for the rest of the 1980s remaining bleak according to the regime itself;
- a tendency toward renewed centralization and authoritarianism since 1979, reversing the earlier liberalization trends associated with the "Institutionalization of the revolution" in the early to mid-1970s;
an over-extended foreign policy that has syphoned-off Cuba's scarce material resources, entailed war casualties in Angola and Ethiopia, and compromised Cuba's international standing in the Third World because of subordination to Moscow and because of Afghanistan;

perpetuation of a political oligarchy in which the newly enlarged 1980 Party Central Committee still remains unrepresentative of much of the island's population in terms of race (blacks and mulattos make-up only 12%), generations (Castro's 1953 generation still accounts for 56%), and provincial origins (Castro's province Oriente alone continues to account for 37%); and

continued dominance by a guerrilla elite at the highest levels of the Party, State and Government, with the non-guerrilla elites having become more marginalized in these top policy-making organs than at any time since the 1960s.

In turn, the United States is in a position to exacerbate these vulnerabilities through political, psychological, and military pressures.

Although a discussion of these measures is outside the scope of this paper, some suggestions are in order. For example, the United States could beam radio and television programs to the island which would provide Cuban audiences there with alternative sources of information on developments within Cuba and in the world at large, and which would systematically expose the deficiencies of the Cuban economy and polity as well. The United States could undertake joint political and military measures with friendly governments in the region not only to constrain Cuban support for revolutionary groups, but also to discredit the regime internationally and to raise the political costs of its activist foreign

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20 Although commercial Spanish-language radio and TV programs from Miami are received in Cuba, especially in Havana and surrounding regions, there are no information programs expressly directed to audiences in Cuba that are currently being transmitted on standard frequencies.
policy within both Cuba and the regime itself. The U.S. Government could also probe for regime weaknesses and divisions by cultivating dissident or potentially dissident civilian and military circles within the government. The aim of these and other measures would be to intensify the pressures on Havana in order to wrest major changes in Cuban foreign policy and behavior.

Such pressures would not necessarily provide the United States with leverage, however, if the Castro leadership sees that it can effectively neutralize its vulnerabilities, and thereby assure its paramount interests in regime survival, through domestic measures which tighten internal security, mobilize mass support, and develop the Territorial Troop Militia, and through external measures that commit the Soviet Union to higher levels of economic and military support. Thus, together with pressures that intensify the regime's concern over survival, and that raise the costs of its objectionable behavior, the United States also needs to offer major inducements to the regime to alter its behavior.

Inducements would be keyed to the primary interests that the regime -- or elite elements within the regime -- have in assuring regime security and survival, in restoring international autonomy, and in promoting long-term economic development. The United States would be in the position to assure security and survival by virtue of its ability to ease-up on U.S. pressures. Also, unlike the Soviets, only the United States could offer Havana sufficient maneuvering room to enable it to regain Cuba's autonomy internationally. Finally, even though it could not replace the Soviets as Cuba's economic benefactor, the United States nevertheless might be in a position to provide Cuba with sufficient increments of additional trade, technology, and possibly capital investment advantages as to advance the island's developmental prospects. In any event, such inducements would aim at
convincing Cuban leaders that their primary interests, especially that of regime survival, would be better served over the long-run by foregoing Castro's maximum foreign policy objectives, and by thus compromising with Washington. Among the key inducements needed to enhance U.S. leverage, therefore, would be the readiness of the U.S. Government to accept a socialist-oriented regime in Cuba, with or without the Castro brothers, in return for fundamental changes in Cuba's regional and international behavior.

Cuba can also become a fulcrum for obtaining leverage on the Soviet Union, either directly or indirectly. For example, if the USSR becomes the direct target of U.S. leverage, then Cuba would serve as the means by which to constrain Soviet expansionism elsewhere in the world by virtue of its vulnerability as the most exposed salient of the Soviet bloc. Or Cuba could remain the target state, in which case U.S. leverage is indirectly exercised on Moscow as a result of U.S. policies toward the Castro regime. In either instance, Cuba provides the United States with a fulcrum for leveraging Moscow because of a range of Soviet interests in Cuba as a client-state of the USSR, and because of the new vulnerabilities of the Castro regime resulting from domestic problems, rising East-West tensions, and U.S. pressures on Cuba itself.

The Soviets have a strong vested interest in the preservation of Cuba as a client-state because they have made an immense political, economic and military investment in Cuba over the years; because the Castro regime has become a valued international ally that has been especially effective in the Third World; and because communism as a historical process is allegedly irreversible. Additionally, the Soviet commitment to Cuba since 1960 serves as testimony of the Soviet Union's emergence as a genuine world power, capable of extending its
political, economic and military power globally, with Cuba also serving to advance the Soviet strategic outreach into the Western Hemisphere itself. Precisely because of this large Soviet stake in Cuba, Moscow’s increased concern over the viability of its distant client-state should thus make it susceptible to Cuba-derived leverage being employed by the United States, particularly if the latter actively sought to exploit the Castro regime’s vulnerabilities and interests through the kinds of pressures and inducements described earlier. Seen in this context, Cuba would become hostage to U.S.-Soviet relations. However, Washington would have to take great care in not overplaying its "Cuba-card," thereby provoking Soviet retaliation against U.S. allies that are contiguous to the USSR. Thus Washington might need to avoid direct military threats against Cuba in trying to leverage Moscow, and to confine its Cuba-derived leverage to resolving Cuban related problems. Accordingly, Cuba-derived leverage might best be used by the United States to secure Soviet cooperation in minimizing the Cuban-Soviet security threat in the Caribbean, and in otherwise moderating Cuba’s regional and international postures, which are policy areas over which Moscow has some control.

As described above, leverage ought not to be equated with diplomatic "bargaining" and "persuasion," nor with the concept of "power" as traditionally conceived. Bargaining and persuasion will occur in the operationalization of leverage, while power relationships or the invocation of sanctions may become an integral part of a leverage situation, particularly in the exploitation of a state’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. But none of these constitute a political strategy that

21 Bordering on the Soviet Union, and dependent upon the United States, the Shah’s Iran previously was the U.S. client-state that was most analogous to Cuba, and against whom the Soviets could have retaliated in response to U.S. moves against Castro. Although lacking the same kind of symmetry, Turkey and especially Pakistan today present the most likely Soviet targets for checkmating U.S. moves against Cuba owing to their respective internal problems and external vulnerabilities, while West Berlin also remains a logical target.
systematically aims at the creation of a condition whereby the target state (Cuba) becomes obliged to advance its primary interests by altering its behavior to satisfy the objectives of the leverage state (U.S.A.). A leverage strategy would strive to create such a condition through the combined application of pressures and inducements that are keyed to the target state's vulnerabilities and interests. What awaits further research, therefore, is a careful assessment of the types of vulnerabilities and interests that potentially make the Castro regime susceptible to U.S. leverage, and the types of leverage instruments and policies that the U.S. Government could employ towards Cuba over the long-run.
Table 1

16 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE PCC POLITICAL BUREAU (DECEMBER 1980)
(Listed in the Order Given by Granma)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Rank Order</th>
<th>Pre-1959 Political Bureau</th>
<th>Current Primary Institutional Affiliation and Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c) Fidel Castro (1st. Sec)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>Pres., Councils of Ministers* &amp; State; Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Raul Castro (2nd. Sec)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>1st V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State; Minister, MINPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Juan Almeida (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Ramiro Valdes (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State, Minister, MININT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Guillermo Garcia (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Jose Ramon Machado (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Blas Roca (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>PCC Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Osvaldo Dorticos (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.* &amp; State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Pedro Miret (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-6:Fg</td>
<td>PCC Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Sargio del Valle (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>Min. of Public Health; Member, Councils of Ministers &amp; State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Armando Hart (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td>Min. of Culture; Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Arnaldo Milian (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td>V.Pres., Councils of Min.*; Member, Council of State; Min. of Agricul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Jorgé Risquet (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>PCC Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Julio Camacho (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td>PCC 1st Sec., Havana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Osmani Cienfuegos (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td>Sec., Councils of Min.* &amp; State (ex-PSP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (c) = Continuing member; (n) = New member
[1] The abbreviations in this column are:
M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista;
g = guerrilla veteran; u = urban resistance; PSP = Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party).
* Member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Under the governmental reorganization of January 10, 1980, the President, First Vice President, and remaining 12 Vice Presidents, who constitute the Executive Committee, assumed responsibility for designated clusters of ministries and functional areas of government.

### Table 2

**ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE PCC POLITICAL BUREAU, DECEMBER 1980**  
(Listed in the Order Given by Granma)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternates in the Political Bureau:</th>
<th>Pre-1959 Political Order</th>
<th>Current Primary Institutional Affiliations and Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abelardo Colome (Div. General)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>1st V.Min., MINFAR; 1st Substitute Minister of the FAR, respon. for Cuba's overseas forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senen Casas (Div. General)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>1st V.Min., MINFAR; Chief of the General Staff, respon. for Cuba's home front defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixto Batista (Div. General)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>V. Min., MINFAR; Chief, Central Political Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Perez</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>PCC Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humberto Perez</td>
<td>M-26-7:R</td>
<td>V. Pres., Councils of Min.; Min. Pres., Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesus Montane</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>PCC 1st Sec., Holguin Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Cano</td>
<td>u.k.</td>
<td>PCC 1st Sec., Holguin Province Pres., Fed. of Cuban Woman (FMC)*; Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilma Espin (wife of Raúl Castro)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Sec-Gen., Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions (CTC)*; Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Veiga</td>
<td>u.k.</td>
<td>Sec-Gen., Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions (CTC)*; Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Ramirez</td>
<td>PSF: Rg</td>
<td>Pres., National Assoc. of Small Farmers (ANAP)*; Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando Acosta</td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Coord., Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs);* Member, Council of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** [1] The abbreviations in this column are: M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista; g = guerrilla veteran; PSP = Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party); u.k. = unknown  * Mass organization

### Table 3

**9 Members of the PCC Secretariat, December 1980**

(Listed in the Order Given by Granma)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretariat: Name and Rank Order</th>
<th>Pre-1959 Political Origins</th>
<th>Party Position and Areas of Functional Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c) Fidel Castro</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Raul Castro</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Pedro Miret (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>Public Consumption &amp; Serv., Basic Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Jorge Risquet (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Transp., Comm., &amp; Construct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Antonio Perez (Mem.)</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Educ. &amp; Revol. Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Lionel Soto</td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Jose Ramon Machado</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>PCC Org.; General Affairs; State &amp; Judiciary; Mass Org.; Adm. and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Jesus Montane</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fg</td>
<td>Foreign Relations &amp; PCC Americas Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Julian Rizo</td>
<td>M-26-7:Rg</td>
<td>Sugar, Agriculture &amp; Livestock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not Reappointed:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political Origins</th>
<th>Party Position and Areas of Functional Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (Mem.)</td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blas Roca (Mem.)</td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnaldo Hilian (Mem.)</td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio Camacho</td>
<td>M-26-7:Fu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** (c) = Continuing member; (n) = New member

[1] The abbreviations in this column are: M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista; g = guerrilla veteran; u = urban resistance; PSP = Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party)
