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CONFERENCE ON SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

By L. Belousov

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WP.AFB, OHIO.

Date 3 Sep 1981

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U. S. BOARD ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

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CONFERENCE ON SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Colonel L. Belousov

On 25 May 1963 a military-theoretical conference on the question, "The Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine," was conducted in one of the central directorates of the Ministry of Defense. In opening it, Colonel-General K. F. Skorobogatkin stressed that a comprehensive discussion and study of problems of Soviet military doctrine has great scientific and cognitive significance.

Major General A. A. Prokhorov gave a report, "On the Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine." He noted that military doctrine is an expression of scientifically substantiated views which have been adopted in the state concerning questions of the political estimate of a future war, the relation of the state to war, determination of the nature of a future war and the methods for waging it, the country's preparations for war economically and ethically, and on questions concerning the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. By military doctrines we should mean the system of views on the fundamental problems of war which has been adopted in the state.

Military doctrine is worked out and determined by the political leadership of the state and is a state doctrine. It is determined not only by the general political line of the class which is dominant in the state but also by the economic resources and moral forces which are at its disposal. The content and nature of military doctrine are
also influenced by the geographic position of the country and the national features of its people.

Consequently, it was stressed in the report, the content of military doctrine is made up of: first, the tenets which express the official, state point of view on questions of war and military organizational development as a whole, i.e., the political basis of doctrines; second, tenets on the training and use of armed forces in war and the determining trends in the development of military art - strategy, operational art, and tactics, and also the system for the technical equipping of the armed forces, i.e., what is customarily called the military-technical content of military doctrine.

The political bases of Soviet military doctrine were formulated by V. I. Lenin and in the decisions of our party's Central Committee and the Soviet government on the basis of teachings on war and the army. Our party and government are also guided by them.

Military doctrine is not something perpetual which has been established once and for all and has congealed. It is continuously changed and improved. In which regard, the military-technical aspect of doctrine in the historical development of which, in the opinion of the speaker, we can establish three stages is subject to the greatest changes.

The first stage encompasses the period from the start of the Civil War up to the transition to the regular-army principle for manning a permanent regular Red Army. The second stage encompasses the time from the start of the technical reequipping of the Soviet Army and Navy (the First Five-Year Plan) to the adoption of nuclear missile weapons in the inventory.

The third stage is connected with the introduction of nuclear missile weapons in all the services of the Armed Forces and with the appearance of a new service of the Armed Forces - Strategic Missile Troops.
Next, Comrade Prokhorov pointed out that the following tenents are the specific content of the political aspect of Soviet military doctrine at the contemporary stage: concerning the decisive influence of the world socialist system on the course of social development; concerning peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and concerning the absence of the fatal inevitability of war in the contemporary era and the actual possibilities for the prevention of a world war; concerning the source of aggressive war; concerning the necessity to strengthen the defensive might of the USSR and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces; concerning the nature of war which may arise in the contemporary era and the attitude of the socialist state to them; concerning the factors which decide the course and outcome of a war and concerning the inevitability of the victory of the socialist country; concerning the functions of the socialist state in the defense of the country, and the composition of the armed forces.

The political foundations of our military doctrine are contained in the decisions of the Communist Party and the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government on the principal questions of military organizational development.

The central place in Soviet military doctrine is occupied by the propositions that a future war, if the imperialist unleash it, will be a world nuclear war, a war between two powerful coalitions which will encompass tremendous areas and will assume an intercontinental nature. The main means of destruction will be nuclear weapons and the basic means for their delivery to the target - missiles. The strategic means of nuclear attack will play the decisive role in attaining the goals of the war. At the same time, the possibility of the conduct of local wars is not denied.

In accordance with these tenents, Soviet military doctrine discloses the fundamental problems which pertain to the nature of war, views on the forms of methods for its conduct, and the specific problems of military organizational development.
In the report, attention is devoted to showing the reactionary essence of bourgeois military doctrines which reflect the striving of the imperialists for world domination and which are directed toward the preservation and strengthening of the outmoded capitalist system and towards the struggle with the most advanced social system — socialism.

Colonel V. V. Larionov who spoke next stressed that many different interpretations exist concerning the questions of the interconnection of military doctrine, military science, and strategy. Some consider that military doctrine is subordinate to strategy while others are inclined to deny even the existence of a military doctrine, considering that military science absorbs it completely. There is also the opinion that military science and strategy, as a part of this science, are component parts of military doctrine. It recognizes the presence of the similarity and differences between military science and military doctrine. The key to the resolution of the problem of the interrelationship between military doctrine and military science, in the opinion of Comrade Larionov, is contained in the very definition of the concept of military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine and military science are also linked by the unity of class and national interest which they serve.

At the same time, we cannot fail to note specific differences between these concepts.

Military science is only one of the bases for the formation of military doctrine. Here, its conclusions are considered first of all in working out the military-technical aspect of military doctrine. At the same time, not all the propositions of military science can be used in working out military doctrine, since doctrine is a reflection of the level of economic development and the capabilities of military production which have been obtained by the state at a given point of time. In particular, only those conclusions of military history which contain the embryo of new regular laws which are inherent to nuclear-missile war can be used in its development. Soviet military doctrine responds primarily to everything that is new and which is
provided by military science and the practice of armed conflict. Otherwise, military doctrine would be set dogma. In this sense, in the opinion of Comrade Larionov, military science differs in certain measures from military doctrine. Military science is less fettered; it does not even stop with science fiction, while doctrine relies on the capabilities of the state which exist at a given point in time and the level of development in the means of armed conflict which has been attained. In addition, in their nature the data of military science do not have the form of directive instructions and, moreover, officially proclaimed state ideas while military doctrine is a system of views which has been officially adopted in the state on the nature and methods for the conduct of war and a form of directive instructions which are mandatory for military commanders at all echelons.

In speaking of military doctrine and military strategy, Comrade Larionov noted that these are different concepts but they serve the very same interest – raising the country's defensive might.

Military doctrine, which occupies the leading position in military art, is in essence a source for the formation of views on the basic problems in the conduct of war for military doctrine. Being officially adopted by the political and state leadership, the conclusions of military strategy acquire the form of state doctrine. However, as is known, not all provisions of military strategy can be adopted as military doctrine.

Colonel V. V. Mochalov stressed that recently the trend toward integration of military doctrine has intensified in the West. There is much in common in the military doctrines of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. It is recognized that a future war will be a nuclear missile war. At the same time, the possibility of the conduct of local and limited wars is not denied. Comrade Mochalov noted that we should consider the views of the probable enemies on the nature of future war when working out problems of armed conflict.
Colonel V. K. Denisenko expressed his opinion primarily concerning the question of the initial period of war. Here, he showed that the content and significance of the concept of the "initial period of war" developed and changed historically under the influence of the development of the means of armed conflict.

Colonel K. I. Ivanov, who spoke next, noted that military doctrine is a scientific theory of war which has been raised to the stage of a basic law of armed conflict. Military doctrine takes only what is basic and main from military science. Military doctrine and military science influence one another; they are in close dialectic interconnection. Further, Comrade Ivanov criticizes those comrades who believe that military doctrine is practice and science is theory. It is more correct to say that military doctrine is the embodiment of the unity of theory and practice. Military doctrine, just as military science, has an objective content; it reflects the specific conditions of the international situation and the level of development of the means of armed conflict.

Not agreeing with the speaker, Colonel A. N. Grylev said that it is groundless to distinguish three stages in the development of Soviet military doctrine and to divide its content into two parts. Military doctrine is whole and indivisible. Its content reflects both political principles for the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for war as well as the practical problems in the waging of war. In his opinion, we should speak of two stages in the development of military doctrine: the first stage - is the period when the USSR was the only socialist country in the world, and the second - with the formation of the socialist camp and the appearance of nuclear weapons.

Colonel I. S. Khrebtovskiy dwelled on the tasks of the study and further development of military doctrine and on the question of criticism of bourgeois military doctrine. Further, he talked about the groundlessness of the assertion of some authors to the effect that allegedly "a new world war" is developing beyond the framework of politics and that it is ceasing to serve as a weapon of politics and will not be its continuation.
Colonel V.M. Kulish noted that since the 1930's we have not conducted the comprehensive scientific development of questions of military doctrine, which is evident from the content of the report being discussed. But life has forced us to become occupied by this important problem.

Comrade Kulish stresses that it was correctly pointed out in the report that military doctrine is the views on the nature, form, and methods for the conduct of a future war as well as for the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the country's preparation for war which have been adopted in the state.

In distinguishing the stages of development of Soviet military doctrine, it is necessary to proceed first of all from the fact that the determining factors in its content are the military-political goals of the state, an estimate of the specific disposition of forces in the world arena, and the prospects for changes in their correlation during the period for which the doctrine is being developed. At each stage of its development, military doctrine proceeds completely from those conditions and is subordinate to the tasks of preparing for a war although it also includes a number of general propositions. It would be more correct to divide the history of our military doctrine into the following three stages: first stage - the Civil War (the development and affirmation of the basic provisions and principles of military doctrine); second stage - from the Civil War to the end of the Great Patriotic War (1921-1945); third stage - the postwar period. The latter can be divided into two periods - prior to the acceptance of nuclear weapons in the inventory and after their acceptance. Further, said Comrade Kulish, we cannot agree with the statement that military doctrine allegedly was formulated for the first time by M. V. Frunze and that prior to him no one was occupied by these problems. The political content of military doctrine was developed by V. I. Lenin. In the development of the military-technical aspect of doctrine much was contributed by such military figures as Podvoyskiy, Gusev, Vatsetits, Kamenev, and others. Questions of military doctrine were discussed at sessions of the Central Committee and a number of party congress (7th - 11th), at Congresses of Soviets, and later at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Comrade Kulish spoke about the exceptional importance of the correct determination of the relationship between the offense and defense in a future war for contemporary Soviet military doctrine. Further, he stressed that the solution of problems in the military-technical aspect of military doctrine depends primarily on a detailed study of the nature of a future war and an attentive attitude toward all conclusions of military theory and history, even to those which at first glance are in contradiction with doctrinal tenets.

Colonel G. P. Goncharov dwelled primarily on the question of the philosophical substantiation of Soviet military doctrine. He stressed that contemporary military doctrine is the result of an analysis of the experience of wars, contemporary conditions, and means of conflict.

Colonel V. V. Glazov believes that Soviet military doctrine will also develop in the future on the basis of continuous scientific-technical progress. Here, in his opinion, great influence will be exerted by the improvement and development of the means of armed conflict and the appearance of new types of weapons and equipment which will require a review of the forms and methods for the conduct of war.

Colonel P. V. Nazarov expressed an opinion concerning the necessity of considering the historical experience of World War II and the Great Patriotic War and of studying comprehensively the conditions which determine the types of armed conflict (offense and defense) and the role of each of them under conditions of a future war when working out military doctrine, especially the forms and methods for the conduct of armed conflict, in order not to fall into an over-evaluation of one of them and an underevaluation of another. In his opinion, only such an approach will permit a correct determination of the nature and methods for conduct of operations as well as the role of the services of the Armed Forces and combat arms.

Colonel Ya. I. Stepnykh showed how the significance of the terms "doctrine," "military doctrine," and "military science" is disclosed in political and military dictionaries and in the Great and Small
Soviet encyclopedias and what interconnection exists between these concepts.

Engineer-Colonel V. I. Vaneyev stressed in his talk that military doctrine is the foundation which determines and directs the development of military science. The content of military doctrine determines the organizational development and training of all services of the Armed Forces for war. He also noted that under contemporary conditions special significance is acquired by the introduction of mathematical methods into military science and the development of the ideas of cybernetics. Further, Comrade Vaneyev said that it is necessary to devote more attention to questions of the psychological preparation for nuclear missile war, in so doing considering realistically the moral-political factors. There should be wider propagandizing of military-technical knowledge since ignorance engenders fear while knowledge dissipates it.

Captain 1st Rank I. I. Argunov dwelled primarily on the development of the Navy in the postwar period and its role in nuclear missile war. At the conclusion of his presentation he stressed that independent naval doctrine and naval science do not exist. The fleet is training to accomplish its specific missions in close coordination with the other services of the Armed Forces.

Then Lieutenant General V. S. Golushkevich spoke. He noted that the basis of Soviet military doctrine consists of scientifically substantiated views on the following questions: preparation of the country for war in all regards; the organizational development of the Armed Forces on the basis of the missions put forth by policy; methods of waging war; and the political-moral status of the people.

Next, V. S. Golushkevich expressed his disagreement with the speaker on the question of stages in the development of our military doctrine. In his opinion, these stages are connected with the adoption of our party's programs, beginning with the first program. The refinement and development of the tenents of doctrine, in his opinion, occurred simultaneously with changes in the political situation and the growth in the Soviet state's economic might. Questions
in the organizational development of the Armed Forces were posed and discussed at each party congress beginning with the 8th. The basic tenents of military doctrine were formed in the Field Regulations of 1925, 1929, and 1938. The last time, Soviet military doctrine was defined at the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1960) and in the new program of the CPSU which was approved by the 22nd CPSU Congress.

Colonel P. Ye. Varezhnakov dwelled on the possibilities and role of nuclear weapons in a world war and on the forms and methods for its conduct. In his opinion, the possibilities for improving nuclear weapons are unlimited, and this should be considered in working out methods for the conduct of nuclear missile war.

Lieutenant General V. F. Mernov noted that our party's Central Committee and the Soviet government are constantly devoting attention to the development of Soviet military doctrine. Proceeding from the political tenents of the state and its economic development, the nature of future war, directions for the development and preparation of the Armed Forces and the people for war, and other important questions of military organizational development are determined.

Then V. F. Mernov dwelled on questions of the development and improvement of the forms and the methods of armed conflict and showed the sources and nature of this development, in so doing stressing that each time the development had a spasmodic nature. The jumps occurred primarily when new means of conflict reached the inventory of armies in considerable quantity.

Lieutenant General K. V. Kraynyukov expressed disagreement with Comrade Golushkevich on the question of periodizing the development of our military doctrine. He stressed that the start of the emergence of our doctrine cannot be linked with the adoption of the party's first program (1903) since this program set forth only the outlines of the party's military policy in a general theoretical plane. It is more correct to consider the start of the conception of Soviet military doctrine from the moment of the emergence of the socialist
state. The stages in the development of Soviet military doctrine (and they can be set forth especially conditionally) cannot be identified with the periods of adoption of party programs, either.

Next, Comrade Kraynyukov touched on the term "military ideology," saying that this term was sometimes used by M. V. Frunze as another name for military doctrine. As applicable to Soviet actuality, V. I. Lenin never used this term; it is not encountered in one party document. Marxism-Leninism is the only ideology of a Soviet society. It comprises the ideological and methodological bases for military doctrine and military science.

In conclusion, Comrade Kraynukov noted, that, in his opinion, a single military doctrine of socialist countries can be formed. Here, he proceeds from the fact that an entire series of socialist states has been united within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and has a consultative council and a single command. Therefore, it can be assumed that on the bases of comprehensive discussion and voluntary adoption of basic principles by all the governments of the countries which are part of the Warsaw Pact organization, a single military doctrine is gradually formed, i.e., a unity of views on the fundamental problems in preparation for the repelling of an attack by imperialist aggressors. But this does not deprive the socialist states of independence and does not exclude the possibilities for these states to have their own doctrines which may differ only in that they will reflect the specific character of these states.

The results of the conference's work were summed up by Colonel-General K. F. Skorobogatkin. He noted that:

- the political essence of Soviet military doctrine follows from Marxist-Leninist theory and, especially, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army;

- the economic and military-technical bases of the doctrine, naturally, are worked out and recommended by economic and technical sciences and the political and military leadership select the best
solutions. Here, many other factors are also considered: historical development, national features, and so forth;

- the military-technical basis of Soviet military doctrine is formed by military science. It recommends the most acceptable methods and forms for the accomplishment of the missions put forth by the political leadership.

Soviet military doctrine is the official system of views on the basic questions of preparing the Armed Forces, the people, and the country for war. Its basic tenents are set forth in program documents. Tremendous influence on the formation and development of Soviet military doctrine is exerted by the successes of the international workers movement and by the national-liberation movement in former colonies.