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
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
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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

AD A104276

Pentagon Staffs
Is There Potential For Further
Consolidations, Cutbacks?

Highlights Of A Report On
Staffing And Organization Of
Top-Management Headquarters In
The Department Of Defense.

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D.C. 20548

D-183257

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This summary highlights key findings and recommendations of a report (FPCD-76-35, Apr. 20, 1976) requested by the Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services. This summary generally concludes that, although some personnel reductions have been made in Department of Defense top-management headquarters, there is potential for further cutbacks. This potential can be enhanced by

- consolidating like activities, particularly at top-management headquarters;
- improving Defense information policy and control procedures; and
- concentrating on the form and substance of Defense-wide policy issues and evaluating efficient policy extension by Office of the Secretary of Defense staff.

We made our study pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Thomas A. Staats

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

Air Staff	Office of the Chief of Staff, A.r Force
Army Staff	Office of the Chief of Staff, Army
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
DMRR	Defense Manpower Requirements Report
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
HQMC	Headquarters, Marine Corps
MCPASA	Marine Corps Personnel and Support Activity
MMTR	Military Manpower Training Report
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBS	planning-programming-budgeting system

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

HIGHLIGHTS OF A REPORT ON
STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION OF
TOP-MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

D I G E S T

The Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review Department of Defense top-management headquarters. They were primarily interested in the size and decisionmaking processes of the

- Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- Office of the Secretary of the Army;
- Office of the Secretary of the Navy;
- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force;
- Office of the Chief of Staff, Army;
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the
- Office of the Chief of Staff, Air Force.

Although these staffs recently were reduced, they still employ 16,500 civilian and military personnel.

GAO surveyed 1,037 offices employing 13,865 of these people. The large number of organizations performing the same type of activities provides insights into potential redundancies for further consolidations and/or cutbacks. These insights are the key to an alternative to across-the-board headquarters reductions. (See p. 29.)

Difficulties in identifying areas in which reductions should be made arise through organizational peculiarities and inconsistent reporting of headquarters strength.

The current method of defining management headquarters relates to the primary mission of an organization, such as policy development.

This method is difficult, if not impossible, to standardize. The method contributes to distorting the apparent size of Defense management headquarters because it permits transfers of personnel to nonmanagement headquarters without a change in type of work. (See p. 20.)

Defense used 294 persons for congressional activities in fiscal year 1975, which cost over \$6 million. The legislative liaison fund, subject to annual congressional limitation, was set at \$1,305,290 for 60 people in fiscal year 1975. Although Defense apparently met the narrow definition of these activities, these people alone could not handle the inquiries plus the preparation and followup work that results from testimony before the Congress. An estimated 4.9 million staff-hours, or 14 percent of Defense headquarters personnel, were required to work on congressional requests for information in fiscal year 1975. This effort cost about \$54.9 million. (See p. 12.)

Defense reporting requirements have been permitted to expand without effective controls, so that the military departments spend \$850 million annually to produce reports and related information. The various Assistant Secretaries of Defense have circumvented the formal control system and established their own reporting requirements. GAO found instances in which information requests were impracticable and unreasonable. Examples may be seen in portions of the military manpower training information and enlisted personnel bonus management data requirements. They provided redundant and inconsistent data and required extensive amounts of additional work to produce. (See p. 9.)

As a start in reducing unnecessary or duplicative reporting, the Secretary of Defense has cooperated with GAO in its responsibilities for assisting the Congress in developing, identifying, and monitoring information requirements. (See p. 12.)

GAO also looks at problems associated with

- management styles,
- organizational structure,
- decisionmaking,
- the role of the service secretaries, and
- changing workload.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense gradually implement a system to account for headquarters personnel on the basis of type of work performed. The aim of such a system is to improve identification and accountability for headquarters personnel regardless of organizational location. (See pp. 20 and 21.) Defense, however, does not agree with this recommendation and insists that the current organizational approach is adequate.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish thresholds, which clarify Office of the Secretary of Defense decision points in service program review and evaluation, and strongly endorse the role of the service secretaries as managers of their departments. Except for those programs which require cross-service management, he should limit participation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to formulating and evaluating Department of Defense policy and to supervising efficient policy extension. Day-to-day management responsibility should be delegated, to the greatest extent possible, to the military departments with clear accountability established at all levels. (See pp. 23 to 26.)

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense pursue possibilities for consolidating the headquarters' activities, especially those identified in GAO's study. (See pp. 1 to 7.)

Information controls in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be strengthened. This could be done by tightening current policies and procedures to comply with the established information control system or by having the Control group directly under the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This group should assist the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in coordinating all Department of Defense information needs and direct improving and reducing of management information/control systems needed within the Department. (See pp. 9 to 12.)

The need for complying with requirements for controlling information requests and developing accurate cost estimates should be reemphasized by the Secretary of Defense. Net reductions in report requirements should be the basis for measuring achievements against the Secretaries' Management by Objective goals.

In addition, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense:

- Reevaluate the military manpower training information needs and consider consolidating the Defense Manpower Requirement Report and the Military Manpower Training Report data into budget backup data. (See pp. 9 to 12.)
- Establish a single standardized training data base which will most economically meet the needs of all users. (See pp. 9 to 12.)
- Require bonus management data to be processed in the established information control system and limit data required from the military departments to the

minimum needed to formulate, supervise, and evaluate policy execution. (See pp. 9 to 11.)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Congress should require Defense to determine the total workload and the cost of responding to congressional requests for information. This information should be used to assess the usefulness of the information obtained by the Congress, relative to its cost; to assess the reasonableness of the congressional liaison fund limitation; and to determine whether economies are possible.

GAO discussed the report with officials of each top-management headquarters. Although Defense agreed in general with the findings and recommendations, several disagreements remain. Primarily, the Office of the Secretary of Defense does not agree with GAO's recommendation for functional accounting of headquarters personnel and insists that the current organizational approach is adequate. (See p. 22.)

CHAPTER 1

POTENTIALLY REDUNDANT ACTIVITIES AMONG THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICES

Although the eight Department of Defense (DOD) top-management headquarters ^{1/} have made across-the-board manpower reductions, they still employ about 16,500 civilian and military personnel. A large number of organizations within the top-management headquarters do similar-type work. Typical of this problem, personnel work is regularly being performed by 2 separate offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); 2 in the Army Secretariat; 11 in the Army Staff; 2 in the Navy Secretariat; 4 in Headquarters, Marine Corps; 3 in the Air Force Secretariat; and 7 in the Air Staff. (See app. I, pp. 30 through 33.)

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

From fiscal year 1964 to 1975, DOD's top-management headquarters personnel strength decreased faster than total DOD strength. Figure 1 shows the percent of decrease for fiscal years 1961-75 and 1968-75 in each of the top-management headquarters. Personnel strengths of the various top-management headquarters have decreased disproportionately. For example, the Army's top-management headquarters strength decreased at a greater rate than the others', and OSD and Air Force's top-management headquarters strengths have decreased at a lesser rate than the others'.

Some staff reductions in OSD have been only temporary. For example, from the end of fiscal year 1973 to the end of fiscal year 1974, OSD's staff decreased by about 1 percent; however, by the end of fiscal year 1975, it had increased again by about 3 percent. Additionally, the size of OSD staff relative to the top-management headquarters staffs of the military departments increased by 30 percent in the past decade.

^{1/}Includes the Offices of the Chief of Staff, Air Force; the Chief of Staff, Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Secretary of the Navy; and Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Figure 1

Percent of Decreases in the
Military and Civilian Personnel Strengths

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Percent of decrease (from base 1947)</u>	
	<u>1964-75</u>	<u>1968-75</u>
DOD	15	35
Department of the Army	13	44
Department of the Navy (including Marine Corps)	12	30
Department of the Air Force	23	28
DCD's top-management headquarters	29	37
OSD	a/ 8	25
Army:		
Top-management headquarters	46	51
Secretariat	63	62
Staff	44	50
Navy:		
Top-management headquarters	18	33
Secretariat	23	38
Staff	12	26
Marine Corps staff	22	38
Air Force:		
Top-management headquarters	19	20
Secretariat	11	5
Staff	20	22

a/Data available only for 1965-75.

ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTIONS

In October 1973 the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive review of all DOD headquarters. He examined the impact of potential 10-, 20-, and 30-percent across-the-board reductions in headquarters personnel strengths. As a result, he established a goal to reduce headquarters manpower by 25,600 by the end of fiscal year 1976.

Air Force experience in conducting the 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reduction studies and follow-on efforts, as well as parallel efforts in industry, indicates that, to be effective, headquarters streamlining should be based on a detailed analysis of the type of work conducted. Industry experience shows that alternative approaches, such as across-the-board reductions, do not achieve permanent, consistent, or effective results.

This practice reduced the capability of certain headquarters offices to effectively perform their required mission. Moreover, if workload does not decrease along with staff reductions, the "survivors" tend to become overburdened, frustrated, and demoralized.


Army studies indicate that the 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions in the secretariat would (1) result in a "figure-head" secretariat unable to adequately or efficiently support the Secretary of the Army in his assigned responsibilities and (2) diminish his effectiveness in dealing with the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, other principal Government officials, and the public. The Army maintains that reductions of the magnitude suggested in the Army Staff would hurt the staff's capability to guide, direct, and respond to requirements in the field while remaining responsive to OSD and to the Secretary of the Army. The Army also maintains that, if further reductions are to be made, OSD must decrease its staff by eliminating low-priority functions.

ALTERNATIVE TO ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTIONS

The Air Force developed a detailed functional analysis method for streamlining its headquarters. This method is applicable to each of the top-management headquarters. OSD can apply it as follows:

- Establish a working and steering group to make a detailed functional analysis of OSD, using staff subelements as primary data sources.
- Give the steering group authority to recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense reductions up to 40 percent in OSD.
- Establish three subgroups to examine: (1) eliminating, delegating, or transferring functions, (2) information flows, and (3) efficiencies in administrative support.

The key questions are illustrated below.



OSD SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION

In conjunction with the 1973 DOD headquarters review, each of the top-management headquarters submitted an independent study of the impact of the 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions. In OSD each major element made an independent reduction study. These separate studies were conducted along strict organizational lines. For example, each Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) studied the impact of the 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions on his organization. The study reports indicate possible personnel reductions within specific organizations. Also they show gains in effectiveness from consolidating elements across present OSD organizational lines or elements of the military departments and OSD.

Specific suggestions to reverse the trend of an increasing number of major OSD offices were pointed out in the OSD 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reduction studies. They include combining:

- ASD (Intelligence) and Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, and the Defense Communications Agency.
- ASD (Health and Environment) and ASD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).
- ASD (Installations and Logistics) and the Defense Supply Agency.
- Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency.
- ASD (Public Affairs) and ASD (Legislative Affairs).
- The procurement functions of ASD (Installations and Logistics) and the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering into a single acquisition function.
- Certain economic and/or projection aspects of ASD (Comptroller), ASD (International Security Affairs), and ASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation).
- Certain analysis functions of ASD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and ASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation).

--The Net Assessment Group, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), and ASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation).

--The analysis functions within ASD (Intelligence) and ASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation).

STREAMLINING OSD

The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to develop a plan for streamlining OSD activities. Activities and reports that only marginally contribute toward improving the defense posture were to be dropped, and redundant activities within OSD were to be minimized.

Taking the lead in OSD, the Assistant Secretary recently reorganized his office to accomplish the following objectives.

--To concentrate on the development, analysis, and supervision of policy and to minimize involvement in details of execution of service programs.

--To consolidate like functions, to minimize interface problems, and to relieve administrative burdens.

This reorganization amounts to a planned reduction of about 8 percent. The effort to economize is commendable and should be expanded to other assistant secretary-level offices. However, it ignores possibilities to reduce unnecessarily redundant activities by consolidating like functions across assistant secretary-level organization lines.

The charts in appendix I (see pp. 30 to 33) show many suborganizations within the top-management headquarters performing similar activities. Although work identical in all respects has not been pinpointed, dispersion of similar activities is an indication of potential unnecessary duplication. Thus the charts serve as guideposts for consolidating and eliminating some organizations.

Complexity of potential duplication emerges after considering both the number of organizational elements engaged in an activity and the nature of the activity. For example, the Fiscal and Budgetary activity is a logical extension and primary activity of the Comptroller function. It is also a logical subset activity of Manpower, Research and Development, and Installations and Logistics functions, etc.

CONCLUSIONS

Since fiscal year 1964 the relative strength of DOD top-management headquarters as a whole has decreased proportionately greater (29 percent) than the total DOD strength (15 percent). Additionally, the size of OSD staff relative to the departmental headquarters staff of the military departments have increased by about 30 percent in the past decade.

Although we do not make specific suggestions to eliminate or combine elements within the top-management headquarters of the military departments, there is potential for further consolidations and cutbacks. Across-the-board reductions, however, will not achieve permanent or effective results. We found this practice had reduced the capability of certain offices to effectively perform their required work.

The recent effort to economize in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) should be expanded to other assistant secretary-level offices. However, it fails to take into account possibilities for reducing unnecessarily redundant activities by consolidating like functions across assistant secretary-level organizational lines.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense adopt a functional analysis technique similar to the Air Force's to streamline all DOD headquarters and that he strongly support the effort to streamline OSD elements. Developing a plan for streamlining OSD activities and the responsibility for monitoring its implementation should be assigned to an ad hoc group with members representing all the various DOD components, including OSD and the military departments. The director of this group should have direct access to the Secretary of Defense and should be independent of any Assistant Secretary of Defense or equivalent.

Recent efforts to streamline DOD top-management headquarters were limited to reductions within specific organizations (such as offices of assistant secretaries). In addition to possible personnel reductions within these organizations, gains in effectiveness might result from consolidation across organizational lines. The charts in appendix I on pages 30 through 33 provide insights into

potential redundancies for further consolidation and/or cutbacks. These insights are the key to an alternative to across-the-board headquarters reductions. Specific suggestions for consolidation concerning OSD elements, identified by DOD studies, are outlined on pages 5 and 6.

- - - -

Defense agrees with our recommendation to streamline DOD headquarters. Currently an OSD ad hoc group is reviewing the organizational structure of OSD. Recommendation from this group will be presented to the Secretary of Defense for his considerations.

CHAPTER 2

MORE DATA DOES NOT MEAN BETTER MANAGEMENT

STRONGER CONTROL NEEDED OVER DOD INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

DOD spends about \$350 million annually to produce recurring reports and about \$500 million more annually to produce other reports.

Each headquarters element that we reviewed should reexamine its management of information requests. A few large OSD requests, not properly authorized and coordinated under DOD Directive 5000.19 (Policies for the Management and Control of DOD Information Requirements), caused much unnecessary work.

We found instances in which certain aspects of information requests were impracticable and unreasonable. Two examples may be seen in portions of the military manpower training information and enlisted personnel bonus management data required by OSD.

Military manpower training information

Over the past 3 years, education and training information requirements for OSD have more than quadrupled. Much of this data relates to three reports provided to the Congress--Budget Justification, Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR), and Military Manpower Training Report (MMTR). All three reports discuss some aspects of training and have become progressively more detailed. Because of different criteria, they display incompatible data.

Training officials for each service expressed many complaints about the volume of data, its usefulness, and inconsistency between reports.

OSD is working to correct the training data differences.

Enlisted personnel bonus management data requirements

Public Law 93-277, known as the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974, was enacted on May 10, 1974. In testimony before the Congress, the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) stressed that bonuses would be used only as a last resort when persistent and critical skill shortages occur. Additional information was considered necessary on enlisted personnel skill inventories, requirements, and costs. A new bonus management data system that required 22 formats of data was developed as the primary instrument to approve and monitor the military departments' enlisted personnel bonus requirements. Thirteen formats contained data not previously requested from the military departments. Processing of the request was contrary to the DOD directive (see p. 11), and coordination with the military departments was not sought. The data was requested July 23, 1974, for initial submission by the military departments on October 1, 1974.

The staffs of the military departments responsible for providing the data were reported to have worked 16 hours a day to comply with the requirements. The Navy estimated using 3,000 hours of overtime and 3,200 hours of regular time, \$175,000 worth of contractor support, and an undetermined amount of computer time. Even so, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were unable to fully comply with the data requirements and submitted incomplete reports over a month late. OSD compressed its evaluation time to meet budget cycle commitments.

The Air Force submitted 400 pages of tables and 475 pages of backup data. In response to complaints from all military departments on the amount of data requested, an OSD official said about 70 percent of the data requested proved to be unnecessary. Accordingly, OSD subsequently modified the requirement to eliminate unnecessary demands on the services, and only 25 percent of the original requirement for data still remains.

The military departments evaluated the OSD request for data as follows:

- OSD was too involved in micromanagement of service bonus programs.
- Contracts had already been awarded to develop programs for bonus management data previously requested by OSD.
- Data formats did not provide criteria for determining how data would be analyzed or what portions would be used for deriving a need for bonuses.

--Forecasting bonus requirements beyond 2 years is impracticable because of the guesswork involved.

--The need for OSD to have so much data to manage the bonus program was generally questioned. The Air Force provided data for about 250 enlisted personnel specialties, of which only 91 offered bonuses. About 25 of the 1,100 Navy enlisted personnel classification skills were managed as career fields. Thus much of the data required did not exist and was inappropriate to the decision process. The Marine Corps suggested that OSD try to reduce the amount of paperwork associated with bonus management reporting. The Army believed that such detailed data was not necessary at the OSD level.

Efforts to reduce volume of reports

Each DOD component has been asked to reduce requirements for data, information, and reporting. The resulting program has shown considerable results; however, net savings are much less than claimed because new reporting requirements are not considered in savings computations. For example, 72 of the 362 reports in the July 1, 1973, OSD inventory were reported in June 1975 as being eliminated. However, during this time, 94 new reports were added. The result is a net gain of 22 reports over 2 years.

Information control offices

Policies for managing and controlling information requirements are contained in DOD Directive 5000.19. The policies are designed to insure effectiveness and economy in the flow of information within, from, and to DOD and are designed to prevent generating unauthorized and duplicate information requirements. Coordination is required in OSD and in the military departments for each information request.

The organizational level and staffing of the offices in OSD and in the military departments responsible for controlling information requirements appear inadequate. Heads of several control offices said their effectiveness as managers was decreased by their lack of adequate authority and staff. These offices, which are the focal points for management and control of information requirements in OSD and the military departments, employ only about 15 people.

Moreover, only about half of the staff of five working in the OSD Information Control Division were directly in support of internal and interagency reporting. This office develops DOD information management policy and approves requests for information originating in OSD.

The policies established to manage information requirements appear adequate but are not always adhered to by OSD. There is no direct evidence that Assistant Secretaries of Defense have tried to control or coordinate data requests or to meaningfully reduce their number.

GAO responsibilities for
assistance in developing and monitoring
congressional information requirements

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, as amended by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, requires the Comptroller General to

- conduct a continuing program to identify and specify congressional needs for fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information;
- assist congressional committees in developing their information needs;
- monitor the various recurring reporting requirements of the Congress and its committees in order to identify needed changes and unnecessary or duplicative reporting; and
- develop, establish, and maintain an up-to-date inventory and directory of sources and information systems containing fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information.

The Secretary of Defense, as a start in reducing unnecessary or duplicative reporting, has cooperated with us in complying with these requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the Budget Justification, DMRR, and MMTR fulfill the requirements of public law for training information, the data contains inconsistencies that cause confusion and appears to require more detailed information than originally intended. Comparing data in the reports is difficult.

Although full standardization of training data in all areas may not be possible, OSD should make every effort to accomplish this goal in as short a time as possible.

The enlisted personnel bonus management data was requested to increase the bonus programs' effectiveness. We believe the efforts to manage these programs more effectively have involved OSD in too much emphasis on the form and process of bonus management by the military departments rather than on the substance of bonus policy issues. Moreover, the volume of data required went beyond the services' ability to respond within the time allowed.

Increased awareness of the necessity for requesting data and promulgating policy and procedures through the formally established system is needed. We believe the OSD Information Control Office should have authority commensurate with its responsibilities to insure that policies are followed. The present placement of the Information Control Division within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is ineffective. The division cannot prevent the various Assistant Secretaries of Defense from circumventing the formal information control system and establishing such reporting requirements as they, or deputies and directors acting in their name, consider necessary. Additionally, a program to minimize the production of new reports is greatly needed.

WORKLOAD AND STAFFING DEMANDS WHICH ARE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO STAFF REDUCTIONS

We observed a wide variety of activities over which the services have little control but which contribute significantly to their workload. Each of these generate additional staff requirements that hinder the reduction of headquarters staffs.

Legislative Affairs activities

The Congress has developed both a formal and an informal method of acquiring DOD information. The formal method involves calling upon DOD officials to testify before congressional committees or subcommittees or to submit written information to the Congress. The informal method involves letters or telephone calls from Members of the Congress or their staff to various DOD officials. An estimated 4.9 million DOD staff-hours were required to handle legislative activities during fiscal year 1975. This is equivalent to

about 2,300 staff-years, or 14 percent of DOD headquarters personnel. The total cost of providing the information is estimated at \$54.9 million. Field headquarters staff personnel who gather and forward a great deal of the information to Washington headquarters account for additional unidentified costs.

The magnitude and impact of congressional requests are highlighted below.

- In the past decade the number of sessions at which DOD witnesses have appeared has risen by 55 percent, number of witnesses by 38 percent, hours of testimony by 297 percent, total hours of principal witnesses by nearly 400 percent, and length of hearings by 300 percent.
- The number of supplemental questions submitted to the Secretary of Defense has increased considerably. In the first quarter of fiscal year 1975, the Secretary received 293 questions -150 percent above the level for the first quarter of 1974. The service secretaries, chiefs of staff, and others receive similar requests.
- From fiscal year 1970 to fiscal year 1976, significant increases occurred in the number of pages in the congressional budget justification books. Over 12,500 pages of backup data were submitted for the fiscal year 1976 budget in support of five budget areas. The largest, a 500-percent increase, occurred in procurement. Research, development, test, and evaluation increased 169 percent. Overall justification requirements were up 74 percent since fiscal year 1970.
- DOD responded to over 1 million separate written or telephonic inquiries last year, an increase of 50 percent in the past decade. At the top-management headquarters, we identified an estimated 439,200 congressional requests for information for calendar year 1975.

Legislative Affairs costs

DOD had a staff of 294 persons for congressional activities in fiscal year 1975, which cost over \$6 million. The estimated fiscal year 1975 cost for congressional liaison

was reported at \$1,305,290 for 60 people. By themselves, these people could not handle the inquiries, let alone the preparation and followup work that results from testimony before the Congress. Thus numerous people throughout headquarters with nonlegislative responsibilities devote much of their time responding to congressional requests for information.

Other workloads influencing staff reductions

Other activities also influence the military departments' capability to reduce their staffs. For example:

- An estimated 38,000 White House requests for information from DOD top-management headquarters for calendar year 1975 required 27 (13 part-time) staff members.
- For the quarter ended June 30, 1975, 11 separate DOD offices took an estimated 63 staff-years, costing \$1.3 million, to process public reports. This excludes the Department of the Navy.
- Eight Army headquarters offices required an additional 1,026 civilian and 69 military positions to satisfy the additional workload demands generated by foreign military sales transactions.
- About 50 percent of the workload at the Air Force's top-management headquarters stems from requirements of outside authorities. Two examples are foreign military sales and environmental policy requirements which increased 17 and 50 percent, respectively, over fiscal year 1974.
- Increasing demands were imposed on the Departments of the Army and the Air Force to loan personnel to OSD for temporary duty, formally constituted working groups, and ad hoc committees. Army and Air Force staff-year expenditures in fiscal year 1975 amounted to about 92 personnel, up 104 percent from the previous year. (We were unable to obtain comparable information for the Navy and the Marine Corps; however, data obtained in our questionnaire disclosed about 195 staff-years of effort by Department of the Navy headquarters personnel in fiscal year 1975 were devoted to like activities external to Navy.)

CONCLUSIONS

The Congress is increasing its demands on DOD for information, testimony, and other assistance. We do not propose that the Congress should not be concerned with DOD management. The issues are cost and the effect of such demands upon headquarters staffing levels.

Although we found no violation of the congressional limitation for direct liaison, some changes in cost allocations toward this limitation and accounting for legislative affairs personnel are warranted.

Appearing before the Congress, answering written questions, and processing thousands of congressional requests--all subject to deadlines--generate significant headquarters workload and demand the time and attention of many staff personnel. As headquarters are reduced in size, increasing numbers of staff are required to respond to increasing numbers of congressional requests.

The resources required to provide this information appear to be significantly greater than reported. The costs of providing these services should be examined in detail. Reducing external requirements to which headquarters must respond will facilitate further staff reductions in the military departments. This can be achieved by comparable reductions in the staffs of OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense agencies. Staff reductions are also inhibited by requirements for excessive data preparation and administrative policies that do not recognize operating problems or service differences. To respond to these requirements, the military departments create offices which funnel the workload downward and generate an even broader base of staff requirements and paperwork throughout the services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense strengthen the authority of the OSD Information Control Office. This could be done by tightening current policies and procedures to comply with the established information control system and/or having this group report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense rather than the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This group should assist the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in coordinating all DOD information needs and direct the control

function for improving and reducing management information control systems needed within DOD.

The need for complying with DOD Directive 5000.19, particularly the requirements for authorizing reports and the development of accurate cost estimates, should be emphasized. Net reductions in report requirements should be the basis for measuring achievements.

we recommend also that the Secretary of Defense:

- Reevaluate the military manpower training information needs and consider consolidating DMRR and MMTR data into budget backup data.
- Establish a single standardized training data base which will most economically meet all users' needs.
- Require enlisted personnel bonus management data be processed in the established information control system and limit data required from the military departments to the minimum needed for OSD to formulate, supervise, and evaluate policy.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Congress should require DOD to determine the total workload and the cost of responding to congressional requests for information. This information should be used to assess the reasonableness of the congressional liaison fund limitation and to determine whether economies are possible.

- - - -

OSD disagrees with our conclusion that the OSD Information Control Office is ineffective because of its current placement. OSD contends that the information control program can be effective at most any organizational level provided that the necessary resources, policy enforcement, and management interests are available.

CHAPTER 3

COMPOSITION OF DOD TOP-MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS

DIFFICULTY OF COMPARING DOD TOP-MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS

The eight headquarters are difficult to compare because of (1) inconsistencies in personnel strength data, (2) constant changes in organizational structure, (3) unique management echelons, and (4) flaws in the criteria for defining management headquarters.

Inconsistencies

The composition of personnel strength figures provided by DOD varied significantly among the headquarters. For some the data included personnel strength of direct support activities, and for others it did not.

Examples of the inconsistencies follow.

- Staff support agencies were included as part of the Army Staff. In contrast, Air Force Staff data excluded about 600 personnel supporting the Air Staff but assigned to the 1143d Support Squadron. The Air Staff agreed that the 1143d was a support activity but maintained that only about 140 of the 600 personnel directly supported the Air Staff. These 140 personnel were, however, not reported as Air Staff personnel.
- About 162 Navy personnel working full time for the Navy Staff were identified by the House Appropriations Committee Study in March 1975 as authorized or assigned to other Navy organizations. The Navy Staff data did not include them.
- Army Staff data included Army personnel assigned to the National Guard Bureau, a joint Army and Air Force organization. The Air Force, however, did not include Air Force personnel assigned to this organization, even though it was an element of the Air Staff. The Air Force portion of the National Guard Bureau is counted as a separate management headquarters.
- OSD support organizations (e.g., the Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center) were excluded from the data provided on OSD.

Reorganization

Since 1947 DOD's top-management headquarters have been constantly reorganizing.

- In 1961 the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense was established. In 1964 it was abolished and the function was transferred to the Army. In 1972 a separate DOD agency was established for civil defense.
- Eleven agencies commonly referred to as defense agencies were established between 1952 and 1972, drawing multiservice functions and personnel from OSD and the military departments.
- In the forties, the Army finance function was performed by an independent command; in the fifties, it was transferred to the Army Staff; and in the seventies, it was transferred back to a subordinate command and was no longer included in the Army Staff.

Disparities

Fundamental differences in the organizational structure of these headquarters result from similar types of work being performed at different echelons. Figure 2 illustrates some of these organizational differences.

Figure 2

COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION AT WHICH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL STAFF FUNCTIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN EACH SERVICE.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
(1) SECRETARIAT		 (CIVILIAN)	 (CIVILIAN)	
(2) SERVICE STAFF	 (CIVILIAN MILITARY)		 (MILITARY)	 (CIVILIAN MILITARY)
(3) OTHER MANAGEMENT HEAD- QUARTERS (e.g., BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL)		 (MILITARY)		

 - PERSONNEL STAFF FUNCTIONS

As depicted, Army and Air Force civilian and military personnel staff functions are conducted at the service staff level. In the Department of the Navy, civilian personnel staff functions are conducted at the secretariat level for the Navy and Marine Corps. Military personnel staff functions in the Navy are conducted in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, which is one echelon below the service staff level. In the Marine Corps, however, they are conducted at the service staff level.

Definition of management headquarters

On April 11, 1975, DOD Directive 5100.73 was revised to update the DOD system for identifying and regulating the number and size of DOD management headquarters activities.

A major consideration was the approach to be used in defining and identifying management headquarters and ultimately in developing a common method of accounting for management headquarters manpower. After considering a functional approach, i.e., by the type of work done, DOD decided on an organizational approach.

Organizational approach

An organization is designated a management headquarters under the organizational approach if its primary mission requires that it manage suborganizations in any of 32 functional areas and substantially perform for them

- policy development and/or guidance;
- long-range planning, programming, or budgeting;
- management and distribution of resources; and
- reviews and evaluations of program performance.

When the nature of an organization's primary mission is not readily determinable, the organization will be considered a management headquarters if most of its manpower is devoted to the 32 functional areas.

Flaws in the organizational approach

The organizational approach has the following flaws:

- An incentive is provided to respond to pressures on DOD to reduce management headquarters by transferring personnel to nonmanagement headquarters organizations (i.e., organizations which devote 49 percent or less of their resources to management headquarters-type work.)
- The organizational structure of each military department contains hundreds of components and is difficult, if not impossible, to standardize.
- Conjecture is often involved in determining an organization's primary mission and whether a substantial portion of the mission is devoted to headquarters management-type work.

An example of this incentive is the newly created Marine Corps Personnel and Support Activity (MCPASA). Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), like most headquarters, contains management and nonmanagement headquarters functions. In April 1975 about 1,100 officer, enlisted, and civilian positions were deleted from the management headquarters element of HQMC and placed in MCPASA. Personnel assigned to MCPASA are not counted toward the management headquarters of HQMC nor any other management headquarters.

Through such transfers, the number of personnel assigned to management headquarters is reduced. Consequently, an accurate accounting of management headquarters personnel cannot be made.

Functional approach

Under the functional approach, all personnel performing management headquarters work are reported on the basis of type of work performed regardless of their organization and primary mission.

CONCLUSIONS

Accounting for management headquarters personnel under the organizational approach is inadequate. As long as DOD follows the organizational approach in dealing with management headquarters, placing line-type functions (i.e., nonmanagement headquarters-type functions) in these staff-type activities, and vice versa, the apparent size of DOD management headquarters is distorted.

Full functional accounting enhances the identification and accounting of management headquarters and support personnel. However, functional accounting is difficult to implement. For example, existing manpower accounting systems, except the Air Force's, are not capable of handling the requirements of full functional accounting. Although DOD components may have difficulty in changing to a full functional accounting approach in the short term, they could achieve this objective over the long term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a long-term goal for all DOD components to achieve an accurate accounting of management headquarters personnel regardless of location and gradually implement a system to account for headquarters personnel on the basis of type of work performed. Meanwhile, the components should purge designated management headquarters of line-type functions, where feasible. Conversely, management headquarters functions (as defined in DOD Directive 5100.73) currently performed in nonmanagement headquarters should be transferred to designated management headquarters.

- - - -

OSD disagrees with our recommendation for functional accounting of headquarters personnel and insists that the current organizational approach is adequate. OSD maintains that implementing the recommendation would be disruptive and costly without commensurate improvement in headquarters control or accountability.

CHAPTER 4

DECISIONMAKING IN THE CURRENT

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The role of the service secretaries and the nature of decisions to be left to their discretion continue to be key DOD management issues. In its report to the President and to the Secretary of Defense, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed reforms similar to those proposed a decade earlier in the Symington report. Released December 5, 1960, the Symington report evaluated the organization of the Armed Forces and recommended sweeping changes. It proposed to consolidate the Army, Navy, and Air Force departments as separate units within a single Defense Department. When this proposal was not implemented, the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) was introduced as a substitute in 1961.

Secretary of Defense McNamara insisted that in PPBS "centralized direction and decentralized operation" prevailed--that top-level management concentrated on solutions to policy problems and on guidance to lower level managers on implementing approved policies and programs. Department components were expected to exercise full responsibility in executing their assigned tasks. He reported in 1965 that, rather than more power being concentrated at the top of the Defense pyramid, power was being decentralized as other activities were established (for example, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Supply Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency). These agencies were established under the concept of efficient and effective management of multiservice, departmentwide functions. Accordingly, management of these agencies is separate from the military departments and is directly under OSD and/or Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further consolidating common functions was possible, but little interest was expressed for merging the services. Along with the traditions, esprit de corps, and pride of the services, the Secretary of Defense and his deputy believed separate military departments to be essential to efficient resource management.

Influences to change the form of organization come from external and internal sources. External influences over Defense organizational decisions come from the Congress, the White House, the public, and the press. Congressional influence affects Defense organizational structure as evidenced by the statutory existence of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Assistant Secretaries of the military departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The direction and intensity of defense program emphasis is also influenced by legislation not solely directed at Defense, such as the Freedom of Information and the Privacy Acts.

Finally, defense organization is subject to a multitude of internal influences, including the personal philosophy and management style of the Secretary of Defense.

A former Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, stressed decentralizing the decisionmaking process through participative management.

During our review, Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, seemed to have brought still another management style to DOD and promoted centralized operations.

A personal philosophy and management style that enhances OSD managerial involvement in details of the services' programs (micromanagement) reduces the role of the service secretariats. Conversely, a personal philosophy and management style, limiting OSD's involvement in service programs to policy and evaluation (macromanagement), makes full use of the service secretariats.

Concerning OSD's involvement in micromanagement, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that (1) OSD should devote its time to formulating and evaluating policy and to supervising policy execution and (2) the size and complexity of OSD suggested that greater emphasis was being given to the form and process of management than to the substance of the policy issues that OSD should be treating. Adopting the following principles, according to the Deputy Secretary, would lessen any negative results that a change in personal philosophy and management style of a new Secretary may have on the existing organizational structure of the military departments.

1. The tenure of the Assistant Secretaries of both OSD and the military departments and the service chiefs and their deputies should be stabilized.
2. Managerial capabilities should be the dominant consideration in selecting candidates for key DOD positions.

3. Principal officials (e.g., service secretaries and chiefs of staff) should be charged with a degree of accountability equal to their assigned responsibility.

Further, he agreed that continuity within the service secretariats would be enhanced by creating a position of deputy assistant secretary in each organizational element under an assistant service secretary, as is presently the case in the Department of the Army.

The military department secretariats are structured to support the service secretaries as managers of their departments. We found, however, a trend of increasing OSD involvement in the day-to-day management of the military departments. It is especially noticeable in installations and logistics, manpower, personnel, and research and development.

At the time of our review, the Secretary of Defense had 13 staff assistants with specific functional responsibilities and a staff of over 2,000 to support him in DOD-wide management. As requests in the name of the Secretary of Defense are made, each military department organizes and staffs itself to respond to the level of detail imposed. Each almost always creates new offices mirroring the organizational structure of the requesting authority.

Major DOD reorganizations have been repeatedly made. The reasons are many: efforts to improve efficiency, reactions to external realities, and internal bureaucratic maneuvering. Yet, many of the basic organizational faults and problems touched by previous studies still exist. The problem appears to be a flaw in the way the decision-making process works, rather than a failure to hit on the right set of organizational relationships. This problem cannot be solved by continually switching responsibilities within OSD.

DOD's responsibility for managing billion-dollar programs requires strong central policy direction and executive control. The Secretary of Defense should, in our judgment, make decisions, formulate policy, and maintain independent evaluation of policy extension. All key decisions involving major program changes should be subject to close scrutiny and clear decision thresholds established to preclude loss of control by OSD. However, except for those programs which require cross-service management, the

Secretary and his staff ought not be required to execute or manage the day-to-day details of service programs.

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 specifies that the military departments be separately organized, with the service secretaries as resource managers. The service secretaries are, in effect, presidents of operating companies. They serve many functions, particularly in matters of resource management, personnel administration, budget justification, and establishment of service policies. Perhaps their most important role is that of buffers and interpreters between the military staffs and OSD. They act as a check and balance when those parties have jurisdictional disputes.

The service secretaries have a need for assistants with formal functional assignments, such as the Assistant Secretaries of Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This arrangement clarifies communications channels and enhances operating relationships.

CONCLUSIONS

Increasing involvement in service program execution at the OSD level reduces the autonomy and need for the service secretaries. It reduces their ability to make decisions on issues which are more relevant to them or on which they often have more expertise.

Since the military departments are to be separately organized with the service secretaries as resource managers, it is logical that they be given the authority to manage their departments. The existing legislation gives the service secretaries the necessary authority. They should be allowed to fully exercise this authority but be held strictly accountable for efficient management of their departments' resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish thresholds which clarify OSD decision points in service program review and evaluation and strongly endorse the role of the service secretaries as the managers of their departments. Except for those programs which require cross-service management, he should limit participation of the various elements within OSD to formulation and evaluation of DOD-wide policy and supervision of efficient policy extension.

He should strongly support the effort to streamline OSD elements. Developing a plan for streamlining OSD activities and the responsibility for monitoring its implementation should be assigned to an ad hoc group, with members representing all the various DOD components, including OSD and the military departments. The director of this group should have direct access to the Secretary of Defense and should be independent of the office of any assistant secretary of Defense.

Replacing key DOD officeholders should be made in the light of the following considerations.

- The tenure of the Assistant Secretaries of both OSD and the military departments and the service chiefs, and their deputies should be stabilized.
- Managerial capabilities should be the dominant consideration in selecting candidates for key DOD positions.
- Principal officials (e.g., service secretaries and chiefs of staff) should be charged with a degree of accountability equal to their assigned responsibility.

Continuity within the service secretariats would be enhanced by creating a position of deputy assistant secretary in each organizational element under an assistant service secretary, as is presently the case in the Department of the Army. This arrangement fosters the development of a corporate memory that is essential to accomplish organizational goals.

- - - -

DOD agrees that the roles of the service secretaries are to be the managers of their departments. Further, DOD agrees that management participation of the various elements within OSD should be limited to formulating and evaluating DOD-wide policy and supervising of efficient policy extension. Furthermore, DOD officials expressed support for creating a position of deputy assistant secretary in each organizational element under an assistant service secretary.

CHAPTER 5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This report was compiled by reviewing departmental organizational charts, functional statements, policy and guidance directives, and other documents furnished by officials of OSD and the military departments. We obtained additional information and supporting data from studies and reports, interviews of departmental officials, and a headquarters activity questionnaire, designed to gather data on headquarters activities, administered to heads of 1,037 organizational elements in the involved staffs.

We made our review at the following DOD top-management headquarters.

- Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Office of the Secretary of the Army.
- Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.
- Office of the Chief of Staff, Army.
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
- Headquarters, Marine Corps.
- Office of the Chief of Staff, Air Force.

COMMON WORK PERFORMED BY DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONSWITHIN DOD'S TOP-MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS

We developed the charts on pages 30 through 33 by surveying 1,037 offices employing 13,865 of the 16,500 personnel in the eight top-management headquarters. The charts show those activities which are the primary areas of responsibility of the surveyed offices. These activities were identified from a list of 19 subject areas we offered in a questionnaire. Solid color blocks show those activities which were in the top 60 percent of the total activities reported. Striped blocks show activities which were predominant but did not rank within the top 60 percent. The values in parentheses denote the number of organizational elements reporting.

Addendum and Errata Sheet

1. At the bottom of the organizational charts on the following four pages add page numbers 30, 31, 32, and 33.
2. Add at the top right hand corner of pages 30 through 33 "Appendix I."
3. Add at the bottom right hand corner of pages 30 through 33 "Source: DOD Headquarters Activity Survey, June 1975."
4. Under the Subject Area Color Code column on pages 30 through 33 the listing which reads "Congressional Liason" should read "Congressional Liaison."
5. On page 31 the organizational block "Chief of Legislative Liason" should read "Chief of Legislative Liaison."
6. On page 31 the organizational block "Chief, Army Reserves" should read, "Chief, Army Reserve."
7. On page 31 the organizational block "Administration Assistant" should read "Administrative Assistant."
8. On page 31 the organizational elements reported (in parenthesis) in the organizational block "Chief of Information" should read "(4)" not "(2)".
9. On page 32 the organizational elements reported (in parenthesis) in the organizational block "Judge Advocate General" should read "(7)" not "(9)".


Note: If this report contains black and white organizational charts on pages 30 through 33; disregard the above, except for changes 1 and 5, and adhere to the following:

Page


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|-----|---------|---|
| -29 | Line 9 | Substitute <u>letter</u> for solid color. |
| 29 | Line 11 | Substitute <u>number</u> for striped. |

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
-  - RANK IN TOP 60 PERCENT OR GREATER
-  - PREDOMINANT ACTIVITY BUT RANKS IN BOTTOM 40 PERCENT
-  - NUMBER OF ORGANIZATION(S)



**PRIMARY ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN
THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**




PRIMARY ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN
THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



SUBJECT AREA COLOR CODE

-  - RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
-  - PERSONNEL
-  - FISCAL & BUDGETARY
-  - FORCE & CONTINGENCY PLANNING
-  - LOGISTICS & SUPPLY
-  - ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT
-  - LEGAL SERVICES
-  - CONGRESSIONAL LIASON
-  - INTELLIGENCE
-  - PUBLIC INFORMATION



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

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

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


-  - RANK IN TOP 60 PERCENT OR BETTER
-  - PREDOMINANT ACTIVITY BUT RANKS IN BOTTOM 40 PERCENT
- (*) - NUMBER OF ORGANIZATION(S)



**PRIMARY ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**



**PRIMARY ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**



SUBJECT AREA COLOR CODE

-  - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
-  - PERSONNEL
-   - FISCAL & BUDGETARY
-  - FORCE & CONTINGENCY PLANNING
-   - LOGISTICS & SUPPLY
-  - ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT
-  - CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON
-  - FACILITIES & CONSTRUCTION
-  - LEGAL SERVICES
-  - AUDIT & INSPECTION
-  - PUBLIC INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATION ASSISTANT


(1)

DGE SCATE ERAL	CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU	CHIEF OF INFORMATION	CHIEF ARMY RESERVES
	   		 

(1) (2) (1) (1)





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

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
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-  - PREDOMINANT ACTIVITY BUT RANKS IN BOTTOM 40 PERCENT
-  - NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS



S OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY



OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY



SUBJECT AREA COLOR CODE



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-  - FISCAL & BUDGETARY
-  - FORCE & CONTINGENCY PLANNING
-  - LOGISTICS & SUPPLY
-  - ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT
-  - LEGAL SERVICES
-  - INTERNAL STAFF ADMINISTRATION
-  - CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON
-  - COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS
-  - AUDIT & INSPECTION
-  - PUBLIC INFORMATION
-  - ADP



(1) (3)



5) (1)





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
 - RANK IN TOP 60 PERCENT OR GREATER

 - PREDOMINANT ACTIVITY BUT RANKS IN BOTTOM 40 PERCENT


(#) - NUMBER OF ORGANIZATION S*



ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE



ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE



SUBJECT AREA COLOR CODE

-   - RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
-  - PERSONNEL
-   - FISCAL & BUDGETARY
-  - FORCE & CONTINGENCY PLANNING
-  - LOGISTICS & SUPPLY
-  - ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT
-   - LEGAL SERVICES
-   - INTERNAL STAFF ADMINISTRATION
-   - CONGRESSIONAL LIASON
-  - COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS
-  - PUBLIC INFORMATION

