### Army Base Realignment Methodology

**Abstract:**
This study assesses the current methodology for studying potential Army realignment actions and recommends a system for tracking actions once they are implemented. Based on literature search, tracking of past actions, and surveys of informed experts, the current Army realignment study process was rated very highly and found in need of only a few minor improvements. The major recommendation was to replace the quarterly status report system with an after action report requirement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The ESC project team of Dr. Lawrence A. Lang, Ms. Jill M. Davis, and Mr. Larry Wright worked under the technical direction of Mr. Gerard F. Greco in production of this report. The document was prepared by Ms. Carol A. Ciampa, Mrs. Estelle C. Coleman, Miss Donna L. Jones, Miss Cynthia J. Jose, and Miss Anne E. Purcell under the general supervision of Ms. Doreen A. Myers. The editor was Mrs. Ruby B. Sherwood. The graphics were prepared by Mr. Abell A. Norris III under the overall supervision of Mr. Christopher K. Lew.

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Additional thanks go to the US Air Force. LTC Charles G. Thomas and LTC Gary Clouse provided cooperation and input on Air Force procedures.
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   APPENDIX F-3--CASE REPORT--FORT WOLTERS CLOSURE
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ABSTRACT

This study assesses the current methodology for studying potential Army realignment actions and recommends a system for tracking actions once they are implemented. Based on literature search, tracking of past actions, and surveys of informed experts, the current Army realignment study process was rated very highly and found in need of only a few minor improvements. The major recommendation was to replace the quarterly status report system with an after action report requirement.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study was conducted by the US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Studies Center at the request of the Director of Management under the sponsorship of the Army Management Division and a Study Advisory Group of principals and subject matter experts. The primary purpose of this study was to assess the current methodology for studying potential Army realignment actions and to recommend an appropriate system for tracking actions once they are implemented. The Management Directorate was concerned that it needed to validate its study process and to institute a means of continuously recording such corroborative data.

The study effort encompassed a comprehensive literature search to define the process and its evolution, tracked several previously implemented actions from the study phase through implementation, and surveyed interested parties to unearth trends and real world insights to data usage. The result was a highly favorable rating for the current Army realignment study process with a few minor fine-tuning recommendations pertaining to methodology. The major recommendation was a proposed overhaul of the tracking system.

ESC proposes that the current requirement for quarterly status reports be replaced with an after action report. That report would compare the original projection of realignment costs and savings with the actual one-time cost data and also would generate a revised estimate of recurring costs and savings. A salient feature is that the after action report should match the data categories originally presented in the case study justification folder documentation on which the realignment decision was based. Another feature of ESC's recommendation is that it places a minimal burden on MACOM and installation personnel in report preparation.

Analysis of the current process and the factors that drive it indicated that there was no requirement for quarterly data at the HQDA level or even at the MACOM or installation levels. Relevant data pertain more to meeting milestone schedules than to meeting any arbitrarily scheduled quarterly resource commitments. Collection of data during the implementation is a key determinant of the accuracy of the after action information. Requiring quarterly reports is one way of ensuring that the data are collected along the way, but the cost of preparing such frequent reports seems excessive. Imposing the requirement and emphasizing its importance is a reasonable and more efficient alternative.

Information utility was the factor which ultimately persuaded ESC of the desirability to produce only one actual expenditure/revised estimate report. ESC investigated the prior usages for realignment summary reports and queried principals at all levels. Their replies indicated that quarterly or even annual reports to HQDA would not elicit revised decisions, changes in MACOM or installation plans, or adjustments in resource allocations. Decisions of a controlling/implementing nature are supported by installation and MACOM schedule slippages. These are already accommodated within the current methodology. Thus, historical and public relations aspects of realignments are the only major reasons for more frequent comparisons with pre-decision
projections. A one-time, after action report will best and most efficiently fulfill these requirements. Any progress reports or interim information that is required by HQDA can best be gathered by telephone or message communication with the MACOM or their implementation team that is on-site.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Army Audit Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Army Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>air defense artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCO-2</td>
<td>Army Forces Command finance and accounting report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCO-17</td>
<td>Army Forces Command finance and accounting report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Army Industrial Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>Advanced Individual Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>United States Army Materiel Command (now termed United States Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Army Management Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSTAF</td>
<td>Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASOPS</td>
<td>Base Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Basic Combat Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bde</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEA</td>
<td>Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bn</td>
<td>battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOM</td>
<td>Bills of Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>United States Army Combat Developments Command (now termed United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (USACDEC))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERL</td>
<td>Construction Engineering Research Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAIA</td>
<td>Craig Field Airport and Industrial Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAMPUS</td>
<td>Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ</td>
<td>civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Comptroller of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>Command Operating Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Chief of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compt Gen</td>
<td>Comptroller General of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Continental Army Command (now termed United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM))</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>Critical Path Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<td>CSFOR-78</td>
<td>United States Army Training and Developments Command finance and accounting report</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSJF</td>
<td>Case Study Justification Folder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Combat Support Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Calendar year</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DAF</td>
<td>Department of the Air Force</td>
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<td>DARCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSCOMPT</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSLOG</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSRDA</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEIS</td>
<td>Draft Environmental Impact Statement</td>
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<td>DESCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Depot System Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Disposition Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Management Directorate</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Economic Adjustment Committee</td>
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<td>Equal Employment Opportunity</td>
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<td>EIFS</td>
<td>Economic Impact Forecast System</td>
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<td>EIPPO</td>
<td>Engineering and Installation Project Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Enlisted Man (men)</td>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>End Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>Engineer Studies Center</td>
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<td>ETIS</td>
<td>Environmental Technical Information System</td>
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<td>F&amp;A</td>
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<td>FAPAB</td>
<td>FORSCOM Command Operating Program Detailed Guidance</td>
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<td>FEIS</td>
<td>Final Environmental Impact Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHMA</td>
<td>Family Housing Management Account</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNSI</td>
<td>Finding of No Significant Impact</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Five Year Defense Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GSA</td>
<td>Government Services Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAAF</td>
<td>Hunter Army Airfield</td>
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<td>HBR</td>
<td>Harvard Business Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHG</td>
<td>household goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQAF</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>United States Army Health Services Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Hawk</td>
<td>improved Hawk</td>
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<tr>
<td>IL&amp;FM</td>
<td>Installations, Logistics, and Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LECS</td>
<td>Local Economic Consequences Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>Letter of Implementation/Letter of Instruction</td>
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</table>
MACOM..............major Army command
MAJCOM..............major Air Force command
MCA.................Military Construction, Army
MFR.................Memorandum for Record
MG.................Major General
mil..................military
MILPERCEN..........Military Personnel Center
MOI.................Military Occupational Information
MP..................Military Police
MPA.................Military Personnel, Army
NY..................Man-year

N..................Nonappropriated Funds
NAS.................Naval Air Station
NEPA.................National Environmental Policy Act

O&M.................Operation and Maintenance
OASD(I&L)..........Office of Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
OASD(MRA&L).......Office of the Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve
                  Affairs and Logistics)
OCE.................Office of the Chief of Engineers
OSA.................Office of the Chief of Staff, Army
off..................officer
OMA.................Operation and Maintenance, Army
OMB.................Office of Management and Budget
OPLAN..............operations plan
OSD.................Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSUT..............One-Station Unit Training

PCS.................Permanent Change of Station
PERT.................Program Evaluation and Review Technique

RDTE..............Research Development Testing and Evaluation
RIMS..............Regional Industrial Multiplier System
RRSR..............Realignment Resource Summary Report

SA.................Secretary of the Army
SAG.................Study Advisory Group
SECDEF.............Secretary of Defense
SOP.................Standing Operating Procedure
STANFINS..........Standard Finance System
STRAF..............Strategic Army Forces

TD.................Tables of Distribution
TDA.................Table(s) of Distribution and Allowances
TDY.................Temporary Duty
TOE.................Table(s) of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC..........United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

USAAA..........United States Army Audit Agency
USAAV............United States Army Aviation Command
USAAVNS......United States Army Aviation School
USACC..........United States Army Communications Command
USACE........United States Army Corps of Engineers
USACES........United States Army Communications Electronics School
USACSA........United States Army Communications Systems Agency
USAF..........United States Air Force
USAMC.........United States Army Materiel Command
USAMPS........United States Army Military Police School
USAPHS.........United States Army Primary Helicopter School
USASIGS........United States Army Signal School
USWACCS........United States Women's Army Corps Center and School

VHFS..........Vint Hill Farm Station
VOLAR.........Volunteer Army
1. **Purpose.** This report presents the results of an ESC review of Department of the Army procedures for estimating and monitoring costs and savings associated with CONUS Army base realignments, reductions, and closures.\(^1\) The review was conducted for the Director of Management, Headquarters, Department of the Army (see tasking directive at Annex D).

2. **Scope.** The study plan was published in November 1980.\(^2\) Initially, the plan called for ESC to conduct a three-phase study (see Figure 1 for the original schedule and phasing) to culminate in a draft report in July 1981. However, based on information acquired during the early part of the study, ESC requested and received approval of the request to rescope the project (i.e., 12 February 1981 SAG approval and 18 February DM approval).\(^3\) Under the revised scope (see Figure 2 for revised study schedule), the project's analysis and synthesis phases were abbreviated and the due date for the draft report was moved up to mid-May 1981. The main goal of the initial project—to develop an improved realignment tracking/monitoring system—was retained in the briefer effort. Some anticipated intermediate project phases and products were dispensed with. The research clarified the problem and revealed a healthier and more responsive realignment study process than had been initially anticipated.

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\(^1\) Throughout the balance of this report, the word "realignment" will be used for brevity to describe all actions related to realignments, reductions, and closures.

\(^2\) DA, USACE, OCE, ESC, Study Plan for Army Base Realignment Methodologies. (Abbreviated to ESC Study Plan in subsequent references.)

\(^3\) DA, OCSA, DM, SAG Meeting Minutes, Army Base Realignment Methodologies (memo).
3. Background.

a. Closure history. Realignment of Army bases is an on-going process which occurs in peacetime and is particularly evident following termination of conflicts. Since World War II, the total number of Army major installations has been reduced from about 600 to about 120. Prior to 1961, the Secretary of the Army made the final decisions on inactivating/excessing installations. Since then, the situation has become much more complex—the DOD and Congress play a larger role in the decision-making process, and there have been many different causes for inquiry into potential major realignments.

(1) There have been numerous studies, task forces, and "hit lists" produced in the 20 years between 1961 and 1981. These have resulted in many installation realignment actions. Figure 3 shows the evolution of these actions in general terms without addressing individual installations.

(2) The intense realignment activity indicated in Figure 3 for the 1960's was prompted by OSD impetus and a series of major realignment studies (e.g., Project 71, the Metropolitan Area Study, Plan for Use of Major Active Army Troop Installations, Project 55c, Projects III-J and III-K, Army Supply and Maintenance System Study, The Future of the Arsenal System Study, The Ammunition Depots and Terminals Study, General Supply Storage Sites Study, Study of Division Training Bases, and the Study of Army Training Center Installations.) Figure 3 shows that between 1961 and 1971 there were 903 potential actions announced as being under study or being implemented. Obviously, there were many duplicate announcements during this period and many

4/ DOD, OSD and DA, SA, Base Closure Announcements.
5/ DA, ODCSLOG, Dir of Instl, Mgt Div, Bibliography of Major Installations Studies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Instl Involved</th>
<th>Year Announced</th>
<th>Source of Action</th>
<th>Reason</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>General move to reduce military installations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Budget decision to cut $6.1 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Weapon system changes, reorganizations, and revised supply management concept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Consolidation of related activities and joint use by military departments--base structuring for STRAF, weapon system changes, Army arsenal study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Basic force level and weapon system changes; consolidation of related activities and joint use of facilities by military departments; discontinuance of Nike-Hercules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Inactivation of 14 US Army Corps HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Close 30 Nike-Hercules sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Nike-Hercules sites, DA general reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Many previously announced actions as listed in 1969.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>DA &amp; DOD</td>
<td>CONCISE Projects (to reduce and streamline Army administrative and logistic support systems).</td>
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</table>

(Figure 3 Continued on Next Page)
# CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT/REDUCTION HISTORY—Continued

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year Announced</th>
<th>Source of Action</th>
<th>Reason</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>OSUT; consolidation of Signal, MP, and Defense Language Institute Schools; realignment of depot system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Reduce high-cost, single-mission installations; streamline depot storage and maintenance operations; reduce number schools (Ordnance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>DA announced decisions and preferred alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Reduce high-cost, single-mission installations; review training base; review medical centers; 8 previous studies still underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx 30</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>DA announced results of previously announced actions—both final decisions and preferred alternatives; several still underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>DA &amp; DOD</td>
<td>OSUT Benning implemented; Dix and Jackson status quo; status quo Letterman and Oakland Medical Center; close VUPS and consolidate INSCOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx 13</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>4 actions approved; 4 preferred alternatives approved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
restudy and status quo decisions. Nevertheless, the number of major Army installations was reduced steadily during this 10-year period.

(3) The decade of the 1970's brought approximately 20 percent fewer announcements pertaining to realignment actions. After the Vietnam Conflict and as a result of pressures to demilitarize, the Army began a program of realignments; the justification was based on reduced workload, increased operational efficiency, and budgetary prudence.

(a) The 1973 Project CONCISE sought to streamline and reduce the Army's administrative and logistic support systems. As the Army's major logistics command, DARCOM was the focus of Project CONCISE and became involved with all stages of the project. CONCISE produced five substantial realignment actions, four involving DARCOM depots and one dealing with the closure of DARCOM's Frankford Arsenal. This latter action subsequently became part of the armament community realignment action.

(b) Since the CONCISE actions, several lists have been issued of bases designated for potential closure. These so-called hit lists, issued in 1976, 1978, and 1979 resulted in many studies which proposed alternatives for realignment. However, for several reasons, the number of actual closures has steadily decreased during the past 10 years. Political pressures and military priorities have interceded to stalemate most proposed actions either at the decision-staffing stages or through the recycling of proposed actions due to consideration of additional alternatives. Today, there are CSJFs throughout the MACOMs in various stages of currency, relevance, and visibility.

6/ DA, DARCOM, Tooele AD, Project CONCISE.
The data in Figure 3 suggest that base realignment actions have diminished in frequency and impact over time, that the major contraction of military bases has occurred, that certain lingering actions are now nearing resolution, that restudy of current proposals comprises most of the future's potential actions, and that only a new rash of joint-service assessments will significantly increase the intensity of the base realignment study.

b. Process history.

(1) The recent impetus for US Army base realignments has resulted from many changes: the VOLAR, the Vietnam wind-down, economy drives, force modernization, force readiness, and Congressional actions in behalf of all these interests. The Army's reaction to these pressures has been to develop a standard process for considering candidates for realignment and to ensure consistency and equity by requiring evaluation of the economic impacts.

(2) As alluded to earlier, between 1945 and the early 1970's, realignment studies were largely the result of task forces, special study groups, and Army reorganizations. Prior to 1961, the Secretary of the Army had the last say regarding realignments. After that date, the DOD overview became a more dominant factor. The studies produced were developed largely independent of one another and in formats that were designed to accommodate each individual case. Thus, they were not uniform in content, technique, staffing process, or timing. After the CONCISE actions of 1972-73, HQDA made a concerted effort to remedy this unevenness of form and content.
(3) A 1974 HQDA letter\(^7\) prescribed a format and study process for realignment candidates. AR 5-10\(^8\) was published in 1977 and built on the groundwork laid by the 1974 letter. In late 1979, revision of the AR began to accommodate management needs for summary data and formats that would facilitate review. The revised AR has undergone extensive change since its first draft and is currently (mid-1981) nearing publication. HQDA is pressing to get this AR revision into effect prior to any renewed intensity in realignment studies.

(4) In addition to format and process changes focused directly on standardizing and systematizing the realignment methodology, there were many indirect influences on the required documentation. Some examples were the National Environment Policy Act of 1969, Executive Orders 11514 and 12114, Council on Environmental Quality regulations, AR 200-2, Executive Order 12049, 10 US Code 2687, the Army's EEO Program, Affirmative Action Plan goals, and Upward Mobility Program objectives.\(^9\) The need to comply with these many requirements, in addition to those concerning the basic economic impacts of candidate realignments, not only significantly influenced the format of the CSJF, but swelled its bulk to its current impressive dimensions. Over the past decade or so, the regulatory and social responsibility aspects of Army base realignments have forced DA and all services to become more aware of the human and physical environment and to incorporate that awareness into their decision processes.

\(^7\) DA, Ofc of the AG, Installation and Activity Consolidations, Realignments, Reductions, and Closures.  
\(^8\) DA, HQ, AR 5-10, Management, Reduction and Realignment Actions. (Abbreviated to AR 5-10 in subsequent references.)  
\(^9\) Sources of requirements stated in AR 5-10.
(5) While AR 5-10 was being revised, this ESC study of the Army base realignment methodology has been underway. As of this writing, the new AR is just out of edit and nearing print--having been drafted, staffed, and approved by the Directorate of Army Management and a committee of MACOM and HQDA staff representatives. During the ESC study period, the draft AR has changed significantly to incorporate many of the changes ESC found lacking in the earlier versions. The ESC study served to substantiate many of the changes that were needed in the new AR. The evolution of the process, and the AR that reflects it, have been so rapid in recent years that any significant shortcomings (which an analysis such as ESC's might otherwise have disclosed) have been remedied. The parallel courses of these two actions have essentially provided more visibility to the process and a keener stimulus to change than either action might have been capable of achieving independently. At this point, with both projects coming to completion within a 2-month period, it appears that ESC's assessment of the methodology will serve more as an outside and independent check on the process than it will a vehicle for wide-ranging changes. Figure 4 is a graphic representation of how ESC's project effort has intersected the evolution of the Army base realignment process. The chart also includes some projection of related events as discussed in the following subparagraphs.

(6) This study report and the new AR 5-10 will prepare the Army for conducting future case studies using more sophisticated costing techniques and more streamlined formats and reporting requirements. The prognosis for the near term is that, although the US military may be entering a period of growth and modernization, the new administration has nevertheless committed itself to saving money--a key by-product of realignment actions. Therefore,
EVOLUTION OF REALIGNMENT PROCESS

CONCISE 1972-1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

AR 5-10 PUBLISHED

AR REVISION

1980

ESC STUDY

STUDY PLAN  CASE HIST RESEARCH  SAG  DRAFT STUDY  ESC STUDY  AR REV ?  DOD DIRECTIVE & MANUAL...

OCT 80  NOV 80  DEC 80  JAN 81  FEB 81  MAR 81  APR 81  MAY 81  JUN 81  JUL 81  AUG 81  SEP 81  OCT 81

Figure 4
there may be another round of realignment studies, updating old actions by the use of new formats and data. The likelihood of actual implementation, however, is not much better than before, since there is still a very brief window during which actions could be approved and implemented, without having a significant bearing on the Congressional elections of 1982. The improved accuracy and sophistication of the process will in no way have negated the ultimate influence of legislative process on realignment decisions.

(7) DOD is simultaneously developing a base realignment manual which it intends to use for outlining policies and procedures of the realignment process. This manual is in draft and has an indefinite schedule for final publication. As the draft stands, it draws heavily on the Army process as set forth in AR 5-10 and on the Air Force process, which as yet is not formally documented. A DOD-wide approach would certainly be desirable if realignments were to take on a more cross-service perspective. Although this is not the current environment, it is certainly likely that by 1982 such will be the case and that a DOD manual will be more useful.

(8) Overall, the realignment picture described is one of a rapidly evolving process which has been sensitive to influences of special interest groups, organizational dynamics, and regulatory requirements. The mood today, within the realignment community, is one of frustration at having developed so many CSJFs while actually achieving so few closures. The management drive at HQDA is to capitalize on learning to date and to issue a thorough, up-to-date, realistic AR for use during the next round of studies, whenever it comes. HQDA wants to do the best job possible with its case studies so that it may be armed with irrefutable evidence of its effectiveness. The

10/ DOD, DOD Base Realignment Manual (Chapters 1-7). (Abbreviated to DOD manual in subsequent references.)
after action assessments that are a part of current and revised format requirements would not only be used in on-going process improvements, but in Congressional reports and budget justifications to maintain credibility for future actions.

4. Discussion.

a. During the initial phase of the study, the ESC study team researched the details of several realignment actions which occurred over the past decade. Because ever fewer bases were subject to reduction and because it takes so much study and staffing time to bring a candidate installation to realignment or closure, very few recent actions were available for scrutiny. Thus, completed case histories generally represent past processes and outdated organizational and policy situations. The data and insights gathered during this phase are discussed in detail in Annex F (Volume I). This research did not yield the anticipated planning-factor insights and procedural-timing information. However, the six realignment actions traced did clearly portray a variety of motives for the actions and a variety of organizations. They also encompassed a cross-section of decision, implementation, and tracking problems. The study team basically found that the realignment community has been rapidly self-improving. The various Army MACOMs have separately and jointly developed processes for projecting costs and savings inherent in realignment actions. The current policies and procedures represent a functional and fairly automatic approach to justifying potential actions. The AR revisions now being issued correct most of the obvious deficiencies discovered by ESC during its research of case histories.

b. In addition to histories of past actions, the study team researched current Army policies and procedures as set forth in AR 5-10, DA
Pamphlet 200-2 (environmental guidelines),\textsuperscript{11} and community impact policy statements. The team collected documents, conducted interviews, and researched files in pursuit of accurately defined practices within and among the MACOMs. These command differences and similarities are discussed in Annex A. The evidence to date is that each command has evolved a process which serves its own peculiar organizational design, its mission characteristics, and its resource composition. The process followed by the Air Force is also described in Annex A as a reference against which HQDA and the Army MACOMs can compare their approaches. The Army produces a much more comprehensive CSJF document than does the Air Force, using fewer resources and requiring less elapsed time. The main area where the Army could perhaps learn from the Air Force is in staffing proposals from the major commands through department headquarters to DOD and Congress (if required). The newly incorporated revisions to AR 5-10 include no significant rephasing of the CSJF staffing process. Yet, the Army has decided to adjust some of its staffing practices which fall outside the purview of the AR. Specifically, the Army plans to adopt the Air Force practice of announcing a “decision” to close or realign rather than announcing a “proposed alternative” as it has been doing in the past. This is expected to reduce the number of times which HQDA will have to recycle from the “decision” stage to the “public scrutiny” stage to the “restudy” stage and then back to a “decision.” The Army process, set forth in the milestone planning chart and sample milestone schedule that appears in AR 5-10, represents an “ideal” case and does not reflect many of the uncertainties and exigencies that would be encountered in an actual realignment action.

\textsuperscript{11} DA, HQ, DA PAM 200-2, Environmental Quality--The Economic Impact Forecast System Description and User Instructions.
Restudy, delay, and status quo decisions will continue to be significant in the realignment study process.

c. ESC's research into the base realignment methodology content and process revealed a wealth of knowledge, expertise, and procedural efficiency. The existing and evolving methodology represent a healthy mixture of academically rigorous research standards and pragmatic implementation planning and staffing. The whole cumbersome documentation and justification process has developed as a result of pressures for specific information with regard to specific cases. Discontinuing preparation of such information would likely expose the Army to public criticism, increased risk of embarrassing oversights, and possible delays in implementation where personnel matters and construction requirements must be phased properly. Paragraph 5 of this main paper summarizes the major changes recommended to methodology; Annex B covers the topic in detail.

d. The ESC assessment and suggested revision of the realignment tracking system were planned to be logical extensions of methodology improvements. However, the methodology needed so little change that this anticipated interface was not required. Instead, ESC was left with assessing the revised tracking system in light of insights gained on the methodology and realistic utility for a tracking system. It became apparent after interviews and research that the generally perceived utility of the existing tracking system, the RRSR, was not consistent with real-world dynamics. That is, the tracking system input gathered by installation, MACOM, and COA personnel during implementation does not necessarily result in HQDA reallocations of resources or adjustments of timing and priorities as expected. This input actually has more utility as regular status reports to provide DA Staff offices the...
information needed to answer high-level inquiries after the action is complete. The last quarterly RRSR of a realignment action provides a helpful after action historical data source to substantiate the costs and savings projections for the action and to add credibility to projections for future Army CSJF actions. The schedule, priority, and activity adjustments required during implementation are made for the most part at MACOM level as soon as they are needed—rather than at HQDA level as the result of a regularly scheduled report. Thus, the tracking system adjustments recommended by ESC are prompted by data user utility, compiler efficiency, and realistic perceptions of accuracy needs. Paragraph 6 of this main paper describes the salient features of the tracking system assessment and recommended changes; Annex C explains the research and recommendations in detail.

5. Recommended Changes. ESC has focused its analysis on ways to improve the current Army base realignment study methodology and implementation tracking processes. This paragraph summarizes the recommendations that have emerged from the ESC analysis. Annexes B and C explain the method of analysis and make recommendations for changes which would be appropriate for inclusion in a revision of AR 5-10. The recommendations are:

a. Put more emphasis on the feasibility study. ESC believes that the text of AR 5-10 and the graphics that support it should be revised to place greater emphasis on the value of a comprehensive, objective feasibility study. MACOM compilers of the feasibility studies should be encouraged to spend more time doing a thorough job of developing alternative ways to achieve the realignment. Cost and noncost factors should be arrayed and weighted to give equal visibility and appropriate emphasis to the factors. Textual and graphic changes are recommended.
b. Institute a system for gathering realignment resource data. The increased curiosity concerning how much it costs and how long it takes to conduct a CSJF has revealed the lack of such data. ESC tried to reconstruct the data and was unable to do so. Because it would not be difficult to develop such a data base, ESC suggests that the effort be undertaken. AR 5-10 could be changed to include a documentation requirement notifying installations and MACOMs that such information will be reported and indicating how and when it will be submitted. Essentially, all that is needed is a statement that development of this document (feasibility study, CSJF, implementation plan, LOI) required X man-months of effort, cost approximately Y dollars, and took Z weeks to complete. This statement would be included in the covering DF or letter transmitting the document to HQDA. These reports would be filed, recorded, and used to develop a data base for HQDA managers and action officers. MACOM usage of the information would be optional, but probably would consist of similar recording at that level for use in developing future CSJF project schedules and implementation plans.

c. Make the CSJF summary data easier for management to use. ESC analysts found the CSJF package extraordinarily bulky and intimidating to use. It was even unwieldy to those expert in interpreting realignment documentation. It seemed that some useful purpose would be served in binding the document into at least two separate volumes. The draft AR revision now allows one smaller volume to be forwarded when the action is small and falls below the 10 US Code 2687\textsuperscript{12} threshold. That volume will contain the realignment summary and detailed data as defined in Appendix C, AR 5-10 (revised). The supporting

\textsuperscript{12} Congress of the US, Title 10, United States Code, Section 2687—Base Closures and Realignments. (Abbreviated to 10 US Code in subsequent references.)
data itemized in that same document should be bound in a second volume and probably will not need to be forwarded any further than HQDA. These supporting data, although useful to staff proponents in ensuring the accuracy of the summary data, certainly are too detailed to be helpful to decision-makers. The first volume will be easier to handle than the current CSJF package and will also be useful in communicating with other government agencies regarding the overall scope of the proposed realignment. Where the proposed realignment breaks the 10 US Code threshold, the CSJF should be bound into two volumes to simplify decision-maker handling. The AR revision does not currently require this processing change.

d. Abandon the quarterly tracking system and adopt a system of after action reports. After studying the current uses of the tracking system and projecting future utility of such information, ESC found that there was strong evidence in favor of after action reporting. Not the least of the advantages of a one-time report is a significant reduction in report preparation time and expense. There would be no loss in operational efficiency, because only telephone and message communication are appropriate for decision-related information needs during implementation. Although DM may have some concern about whether the information is actually being collected while the implementation is on-going, this concern should not manifest itself in unnecessary reporting requirements. The change to AR 5-10 should merely explain the tracking system information requirements, include a copy of the format, and require that the HACOHs submit their reports within 1 month of project completion.

6. **Summary.** The ESC study of Army base realignment methodology has reached a somewhat unusual outcome. It was the finding that, rather than make sweeping changes and conduct additional studies, the Army should rest on its
laurels, entrench its process in preparation for the next rash of studies, and relax its concern that frequent tracking reports are required. The ESC research and analysis effort may well have come at the wrong time to significantly shape methodology. But, it may also have come at the right time to save a lot of unnecessary quarterly report preparation effort. The situation and trend, with regard to potential future realignment studies and actions, needed to be studied and put into perspective. This ESC analysis finds the Army in a very favorable posture vis-a-vis the other services and GAO and AAA standards. Thus, the time is ripe for stabilizing the methodology rather than fine tuning in a realm where close tolerances are not required. The revised AR 5-10 is a necessary next step in preparing for the future environment that appears to be taking shape. Figure 5 builds on the concept presented in Figure 4 and projects process influences out to the 1985-87 time frame.

a. During a period when military preparedness and strength are being emphasized, it seems unlikely that there will be wholesale reductions or closures of military facilities. But, it is certainly conceivable that there might be cost-saving realignments of such magnitude that they would require preparation of summary documentation. The existence of many CSJFs, in various stages of currency and relevance, will certainly help if the Army must begin another round of realignment studies.

b. The history of base realignments described earlier in this report depicted the swing from initial cross-service reductions in the 1960's to Army-centered reductions in the 1970's. It appears to ESC that the pendulum is about to swing again toward cross-service scrutiny of installations in an attempt to consolidate support services, O&M functions, and gain some
economies of scale.\textsuperscript{13/14} If this cross-service assessment were to happen in the next 2 years, it would be desirable for the Army to have completed its AR revision prior to issuance of the DOD directive and manual (as now seems assured) and even to have begun collecting resource commitment data as is recommended in this study. Also, if ESC recommendations are implemented through issuance of a Change 1 to AR 5-10, the Army would not have to produce so many pages of documentation for cross-service coordination. Rather, the Army could publish twice as many copies of Volume 1 as Volume 2, thereby saving printing expenses, mailing expenses, and communicating equally well.

c. Much attention is currently being paid to mobilization planning.\textsuperscript{15} By 1983, the Army should have a clearer picture of its mobilization requirements—especially as they pertain to Army bases or joint use of other installations. Therefore, the mobilization specifics available by 1983 might cause a new and seriously motivated cycle of base realignment studies. HQDA should prepare for this possible event by further refining its study and implementation processes at both the MACOM and HQDA levels. Publication of the revised AR 5-10, subsequent publication of a Change 1 to that document, and distribution of this ESC study to interested parties should serve to maintain interest in this process.

d. As a closing note, there is an on-going project which promises to influence the base realignment study process somewhat. The STANFINS redesign project began in 1980 and will be completed in two phases, one in 1985 and the

\textsuperscript{13/14} GAO Chief Tells the Pentagon of 15 Areas Where It Can Save, "\textit{Washington Post.}
\textsuperscript{15} DA, USACE, OCE, USAESC, Corps Mobilization Capabilities, Requirements, and Planning; Corps Mobilization Posture; and Mobilization Environments.
other in 1987.\textsuperscript{16/17/} When the project is finished, the AMS codes which comprise the basis of the Army's finance and accounting system will be revised; the revised system will somewhat influence getting information on which to base projections and will subsequently help capture data on actual expenditures to comply with whatever tracking system is in effect at the time. Not only will the AMS coding be revised, but there will be remote computer terminals in the major Army installations which will facilitate all interrelated recording of finance and accounting activities, budget and program adjustments, and regularly scheduled reporting requirements. Effective conversion to the STANFINS redesign process should result in less preparation time for CSJF documentation and less effort and time required to prepare the tracking reports. There is currently no requirement for HQDA to interfere with development of the STANFINS redesign project on behalf of the base realignment process. But, HQDA and MACOM personnel involved with base realignment actions should keep posted on the progress of this effort and be prepared to adapt to its changes when they occur.

\textsuperscript{16/} DA, OCSA, Ofc of the Compt of the Army, \textit{A Study to Design an Army Management Structure}.
\textsuperscript{17/} DA, OCSA, Ofc of the Asst Compt of the Army (F&A), \textit{STANFINS Redesign, General System Design}.
ANNEX A

COMMAND DIFFERENCES
ANNEX A

COMMAND DIFFERENCES

Paragraph | Page
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1 Purpose | A-1
2 Overview | A-2
3 Research Process | A-2
4 Details | A-3
5 Status Today and Future Changes | A-13

Figure
A-1 Who Does What in CSJP Process? A-4

1. **Purpose.** This annex describes how the various Army MACOMs and the Department of the Air Force conduct their base realignment studies and how they subsequently monitor implementation of approved actions. These descriptions are intended to be just that—"descriptions"—not judgments or apologies. The goal is to describe the variety of ways in which such studies and actions are conducted, and perhaps, to justify this variety. Given that each MACOM organization is structured to facilitate its missions in light of its resource composition and that each has different missions and resources—it is certainly appropriate that they should function somewhat differently. The Air Force approach is included in this discussion in order to provide some objectivity and to broaden the range of approaches presented. There had been some discussion prior to the ESC project to the effect that the Department of the Air Force was "more effective" in its handling of base realignments. Thus, in the interest of information sharing and increased knowledge, the Air Force...
The approach is described along with those of the three MACOMs—TRADOC, FORSCOM, and DARCOM.

2. Overview.

a. Department of the Army approach. The DM has responsibility for monitoring the progress of realignment actions, assisting and guiding staff agencies, resolving policy issues, and approving study and implementation milestones. In this policy-setting role, the DM works with the various HQ staff proponents to provide for smooth and timely realignment studies and implementation actions. Depending on the type of action, OCE, DCSOPS, DCSLOG, DCSRDA, etc., might act as the HQDA staff proponent for a realignment action. Although the DM establishes policy concerned with realignments and closures, it does not prescribe how these data are to be developed or who within the various MACOMs will be responsible for what functions. This freedom within the realignment study process has enabled DA commands to develop processes which reflect their individual organizational peculiarities.

b. Department of the Air Force approach. Air Force realignment proponency, however, is always with the Basing Branch, which also serves in a policy-setting role to ensure an agency overview. DCSOPS, DCSLOG, and other functional proponents monitor actions and provide input and reports as needed by the Basing Branch.

3. Research Process. The ESC study team researched several previously implemented actions, studying at least one from each of the MACOMs and one from the Air Force. These actual implementations were supplemented with interview and documentary information pertaining to the current MACOM processes for study development, implementation, and tracking. This research revealed that each DA MACOM operates differently, although they all comply
with the requirements of AR 5-10 and other DA regulations and policies. All
commands have also participated actively in revising the AR to take advantage
of their individual and group experience with the realignment business.

4. Details. The DA MACOMs and Department of the Air Force differ with
regard to who prepares the case study documentation within the organization,
how many individuals work for how long conducting the study, who develops the
implementation plan, who coordinates implementations of approved actions, who
prepares tracking reports on them, and whether or not there is a MACOM-unique
or military branch-unique directive on how to prepare a case study document.
The answers to these questions of process, responsibility, and resource com-
mitsments are presented briefly in Figure A-1 and are discussed below.

a. Who, in addition to HQDA, prepares the feasibility study and CSJF
(including EIS and community impact assessments)?

(1) DARCOM HQ prepares the feasibility studies and uses the ad
hoc team method of developing the CSJF. The CSJF preparing team is chaired by
a representative from DARCOM's Directorate for Plans and Analysis. Other
members are usually from the Office of the Comptroller and the Directorate for
Personnel Training and Force Development. At times, a field representative is
called in to serve. Information from other functional areas is requested by
the realignment team from both the DARCOM HQ level and from the installations
being impacted by the proposed realignment. Although the individual composi-
tion of the CSJF team may change from action to action, the experience from
the personnel in the Directorate for Plans and Analysis provides the continu-
ity and the adhesive element DARCOM needs to solidify the CSJF preparation
process. The DARCOM philosophy is to organize a small team to accomplish the
planning and preparation of data for the CSJF. This team provides an

A-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>DARCOM</th>
<th>FORSCOM</th>
<th>TRADOC</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who does feasibility study?</td>
<td>Support team at DARCOM HQ</td>
<td>Action Officer at</td>
<td>CONCISE Special Planning Group</td>
<td>Small team HQAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who prepares CSJF?</td>
<td></td>
<td>DCSOPS or DCSCOMPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes EIS, socio-economics, EEO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CONCISE Special Planning Group with</td>
<td>MAJCOM + contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>installation input</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of resources devoted to CSJF?</td>
<td>4-6 personnel</td>
<td>1 indiv (+ support) 34</td>
<td>1 team chief (+ support) 44 weeks, $72,000</td>
<td>18 months, $100,000-250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-6 months</td>
<td>weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who does implementation plan?</td>
<td>Installation</td>
<td>MACOM LOI with installation input</td>
<td>Installation per MACOM SOP</td>
<td>MAJCOM, implemented by installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who monitors implementation and tracks S/savings?</td>
<td>Installation input to DARCOM HQ</td>
<td>MACOM with installation and DCSOPS input</td>
<td>Installation commander with command group plans</td>
<td>MAJCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the MACOM have an SOP?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there formal MACOM CSJF planning factors?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there reports other than RRSR?</td>
<td>Yes, monthly milestones</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[a/ DA, TRADOC, HQ, TRADOC Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Base Realignment Implementation. (Abbreviated to TRADOC SOP in subsequent references.)\]
integrated viewpoint, as well as an overall perspective for the action. They encompass knowledge of details and the HQ overview which includes the broader aspects of the action. In the future, DARCOM may task a subordinate command (e.g., DESCOM) to produce the essence of a CSJF for realignment actions—depending on the nature of the proposed action. Before forwarding it to HQDA, the Plans and Analysis personnel at DARCOM HQ would review the product to ensure completeness.

(2) FORSCOM operates in a much different way. They assign preparation of the feasibility plan and (subsequently) the CSJF to individual action officers in either the DCSOPS or DCSCOMPT. If the impetus for the proposed action is an operational or mission change, the Force Structure and Stationing Division, DCSOPS, will receive the task. If the proposed action is prompted by a resource savings motive, some element of the DCSCOMPT will be assigned the study. For the most part, these individuals work alone to develop the feasibility study. Of course, they receive substantial input from the installations concerned, the various operational divisions, and administrative elements of the command. When the feasibility study has been completed and forwarded to DA and approved for further study, the same individual very likely will receive the task of developing the CSJF. At this time, depending on the size of the action and the schedule of the study, the action officer may receive some additional assistance from within the DCSCOMPT’s office. Regardless of the size of the action, it is at this point that intensive installation input is required and that trips to those installations occur. Developing the details of the CSJF requires interface with the HSC and USACC regarding the impact the proposed action will have on their support level and their stationing configurations. Depending on how many actions are
(3) TRADOC has taken a third approach to CSJF preparation. It has organized a special office—CONCISE Special Planning Group—which, along with master planning for TRADOC stationing, has on-going responsibility for preparing feasibility studies and for preparing CSJFs and updating them as required. The CONCISE Group is located at TRADOC HQ and has ready access to such MACOM-level data as are available through the resource management elements and operational directorates. Of course, the CONCISE Group makes significant demands on command installations for input regarding program and budget year activities and their status after a realignment action. The institutional memory, centralized project files, and command-level perspectives provide some major resource savings within the realignment planning process. Another peripheral benefit of this centralized approach to realignment actions is that the CONCISE Group has built up over the years a network of contacts throughout the other MACOMs which expedites the data exchange wherever the realignment action crosses MACOM organizational lines. The learning curve is greatly accelerated in this manner.

(4) The Department of the Air Force prepares feasibility studies at HQAF. A small team of officers works in a close-hold environment for about 1 month to complete the feasibility study. They use a computer model to estimate major costs and savings from proposed realignment actions. After a series of briefings in HQAF, there is a decision on whether to undertake and announce formal study for one or more bases. The formal studies are normally prepared at MAJCOM level. The Air Force studies do not contain the level of detail as specified in the DA format covered by AR 5-10. Rather, the Air
Force approaches the formal documentation for a realignment action as a series of somewhat independent studies. These parts are: operations, resources, environment, and socioeconomics. Usually, the operations and resources are combined into a single section. The socio-economic and environmental analyses may be contracted out and are prepared under separate cover. A final summary or cover document is prepared, and this summary serves as major information for the decisionmaker and forms the basis for Congressional reports. Thresholds are aligned with the draft DOD manual.

b. How many people work how long developing the CSJF?

(1) DARCOM's CSJF preparation team is composed of from four to six full-time people working for 4-6 calendar months. This team, as stated previously, is supplemented by special interest personnel as needed and is also supplemented by installation input and HQ-level resources.

(2) FORSCOM basically relies on one action officer to coordinate the effort and may supplement those efforts by two to three HQ-level support workers from somewhere in the DGSCOMPT if data quantity or deadlines are a problem. Again, environmental, EEO, and installation input are obtained on an as-required basis. The duration of the standard CSJF development is estimated by FORSCOM at 34 weeks. FORSCOM considers this a conservative estimate which does not reflect the need for an EIS--only an EA.

(3) TRADOC's CSJFs are developed within the CONCISE Group using input received from the installations. The installation takes about 12 weeks to prepare its input; this takes four people half time and two full time. Back at TRADOC HQ, a team chief coordinates efforts of budget, force development, engineer, and training staff. Overall, the CSJF (with EIS) takes about 44 weeks to produce and costs roughly $72,000. These estimates include
overhead costs, typing, staffing, and printing of 50 copies of a 400-page document.

(4) The Air Force produces a much briefer document than does DA. The Air Force did not indicate the number of people or time required to produce a typical case study. They use a mix of in-house and contractor personnel to complete their formal studies. They estimate that it takes 18 months from the formal announcement of candidate status to announcement of decision via the CSJF process. The cost estimate for a complete study process ranges from $100,000 to $250,000.

c. Who develops the implementation plan?

(1) DARCOM HQ sends the losing installation a general LOI plus an approved implementation plan from an earlier action to serve as template and planning guide. Thirty days is the normal period allowed for this step. The implementation plan is reviewed by both the subordinate command and DARCOM HQ. DARCOM HQ then sends a copy to the DA proponent for information and review. The implementation plan contains milestones geared to appropriate functional elements within the installations.

(2) FORSCOM develops its implementation instructions in accordance with the action's peculiarities. The installation obviously provides most of the detail data required to realign their operations. The guidance for this input comes in the form of an LOI from the FORSCOM element that prepared the CSJF. Thus, the FORSCOM Force Structure and Stationing Division developed a detailed LOI regarding the ADA realignment of 1979 (but only as pertained to the Florida Nike-Hercules sites). The implementation phasing for the Alaska sites was developed at the installation level because of classification restrictions caused by movement of nuclear weapons. The major
milestones for the Alaska move were coordinated with the overall action schedule to ensure proper phasing and to allow monitoring from the MACOM level. The MACOM LOI set out major milestones pertaining to transfer dates, equipment shipment, refitting dates, and closure/caretaker deadlines. The installation's internal transfer, divest, store, and excess actions are left to the discretion of the installation's closure team under direction of the installation's commanding officer.

(3) TRADOC's implementation plans are patterned after the annexes and appendixes of the TRADOC SOP and are prepared by the installation/activity commander. This phase of the study process is conducted after announcement of a decision and after responsibility for the action has been transferred from the CONCISE Special Planning Group to the Plans and Operations Office.

(4) The Air Force implementation plans are developed by the MAJCOM and executed by the affected installations, but they are approved by HQAF. The Basing Branch at HQAF must approve any major changes to the implementation plan. This varies from the Army's way of operating, where MACOMs approve required changes and DA is informed of these changes.

d. Who monitors the implementation once underway and prepares the tracking report for submission to the military service staff?

(1) Once implementation is initiated, DARCOM HQ monitors milestones from the implementation plan on a functional basis by means of a monthly report. AMC Reg 210-18\(^1\) requires submission of the monthly report. These milestone reports contain no financial or cost information and are

\(^1\) DA, DARCOM, HQ (formerly AMC), AMC Reg 210-18, Consolidations, Realignments, Reductions, and Closures Milestone Reports.
prepared at installation level. They were adequate to meet DARCOM HQ needs before the institution of the quarterly RRSR. DARCOM has had no actions requiring use of the RRSR and indicates that it will provide the report to DA on its next reportable action. Direct monitoring and control of the realignment actions is done at the installation and subordinate command headquarters within DARCOM. Corrective actions and decisions are normally undertaken at these levels.

(2) The CSJF preparing officer at FORSCOM has overall implementation responsibility once an action is underway. The action officer tasks installations to provide monthly cost data and weekly milestone reports which are reported in terms of the LOI implementation dates. These data are assembled into aggregate terms from losing and gaining installation-level and MACOM-level data to comprise the RRSR and route it through MACOM HQ to DM.

(3) Once a decision to implement is announced, TRADOC transfers realignment actions to the Command Group Plans and Operations Office for implementation. Wherever troops are actually relocated, implementation is directed by an HQDA/TRADOC movement directive. On an as-required basis, a separate TRADOC LOI is prepared for special guidance which cannot be gleaned from the TRADOC SOP annexes and appendixes covering the spectrum of functional area actions and responsibilities in a realignment action. Installations/activities review the CSJF, incorporate the provisions of the TRADOC SOP, and create an updated and validated implementation plan. The installation/activity commander is responsible for compiling, validating, and maintaining an up-to-date implementation plan, coordinating all on-site realignment actions, and preparing after action reports and other interim reports. However, the Chief, Plans and Operations Office, serves as the TRADOC HQ point.
of contact for overall staff coordination during implementation and after action phases.

(4) The Department of the Air Force has major control and monitoring done by the MAJCOM. HQAF personnel in the Basing Divisions keep informed via phone calls and message traffic. The MAJCOM has primary responsibility for preparing a quarterly cost and manpower report while the realignment action is in process. The quarterly report coupled with phone calls and messages provide HQAF with enough information to keep adequately posted on status of Air Force realignment actions. No other reports are provided to HQAF.

e. How formal are the MACOM processes and how uniform are the CSJF factors?

(1) DARCOM has no formal directive or policy statement which governs how a realignment will be processed through the command. Precedent and action uniqueness determine the process. The current AR 5-10 is used as the template, and all data are assembled to meet the specified formats. There also is no set of prescribed/updated CSJF planning factors maintained by the command. Each set of CSJF calculations is based on Comptroller Office input matched to the case-unique costs and savings elements. There is, as stated earlier, an internal DARCOM requirement to prepare a monthly milestone report on actions being implemented. This meets their needs for internal decision-making and adjustments. Because budget and programming adjustments from realignment actions were accomplished swiftly once the realignment decision was announced, DARCOM HQ has had no need to track actual costs and savings during the implementation—only milestone status was relevant. The RRSR quarterly report is now a requirement which DARCOM will comply with.
(2) FORSCOM also has no formal directive or policy statement which prescribes how a realignment will be processed through the command. The FORSCOM feeling is that its informal policy of assigning the closure study and implementation responsibility to the interested office's domain is sufficient to ensure the proper interfaces and that the salient issues will be resolved thereby. FORSCOM does, however, publish an annual handbook of planning factors\(^2\) to assist action officers in their development of realignment costs. There is no internal MACOM requirement for milestone, cost, or budgeting reports that pertain to the realignment actions underway. The existing finance and accounting, budget and programming systems are already adequate to capture the adjustments needed to support the COB system. The weekly and monthly reporting that goes on during an implementation is based on specific case-unique requests and is mainly useful in helping the action officer capture the RRSR-required data as it is developing, rather than imposing a significant effort on the installation and MACOM personnel at the end of the quarterly reporting period.

(3) TRADOC publishes an SOP booklet which prescribes project responsibilities, interface requirements, phasing of events, reporting demands, and overall MACOM policy on the realignment process. This SOP also includes the essence of the implementation plan which is filled in at the installation/activity level. The TRADOC SOP cites other reporting responsibilities to be executed during implementation: Movement Reports to HQDA, Monthly Summary of Civilian Personnel Actions to Centralized Referral Activity, RRSR to HQDA, Environmental Mitigation Report to HQDA, and unit history input to the US Army Center of Military History. HQ TRADOC also issues an

\(^2\) DA, FORSCOM, DCSOMPT, FORSCOM Cost Factor Handbook.
annual planning factors handbook which addresses the factors to be used in calculating realignment action costs and savings.3/

(4) The Air Force does not presently have an SOP, directive, or manual on realignment action study procedures, responsibilities, or formats. The practice is to use previously completed studies as the templates for new studies. Their study process is aligned with the draft DOD manual and DOD guidance. They do have a tracking report very similar in format to the current RRSR used by DA. It appears that the Air Force was first in instituting the requirement for and format of this report. This is somewhat of a dichotomy that Air Force should be first to require such a report and subsequently be the first to consider it somewhat of an unnecessary burden. Apparently the Air Force was using this report as a means of doublechecking their estimates on a selected case basis. Having satisfied their curiosity and concern for accuracy, they are now rather ambivalent with regard to requiring these data on a regular basis.

5. Status Today and Future Changes. The MACOMs have participated actively in shaping the overall methodology by which they are required to develop a CSJF. This was achieved through participative revision of AR 5-10 under which all CSJF formats are prescribed and explained. The existence of a uniform and up-to-date CSJF format greatly aids staffing within the DA elements and adds credibility to DA studies at the DOD and Congressional levels. Internal MACOM staffing, development, phasing, and controlling of realignment actions have evolved in consonance with organizational needs and mainstream functional alignments. Given the current status of realignment actions and politics (see paragraph 3 of the main paper), it appears that the commands

will not be inclined to adjust their methods. The level of activity and the established repositories of knowledge and responsibility are in a comfortable state of equilibrium and expertise. If there is an intensification of realignment study activity, it is certainly conceivable that at least two of the Army MACOMs may have to adjust their internal processes to accommodate the increased demands. This is not to indicate that they will be required to or find it appropriate to write, staff, and issue comprehensive policies and procedural documents. Rather, they may have to reassess CSJF-preparing responsibilities or make more extensive tasking of installations for participation in the preliminary planning and justification phases of candidate actions. Certainly, all MACOMs would have to make some resource shifts to accommodate any significant surge in study activity (e.g., to embark on a new cycle of cross-service realignment studies). If the Army and Air Force were tasked to prepare a joint service CSJF, the DA procedures, factors, and data availability would certainly place DA in a favorable position relative to the Air Force's stated time phasing and resource commitments. Thus, HQDA should not be too concerned that there might be some difficulty meshing with or adjusting to a cross-service interface.
ANNEX B

METHODOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. **Purpose.** This annex presents ESC's assessment of the current and revised process for realignment studies and implementation. It also recommends a few further changes to the methodology which might be implemented without too much cost or disruption.

2. **Background.** In accordance with the ESC Study Plan, the project team assessed the DA method for conducting realignment studies. ESC had expected that there would be some major improvements which should be made to the existing study methodology. The plan was then to recommend implementation of those improvements and to recommend appropriate adjustments to the tracking system. These adjustments would be designed based on methodology changes and ESC insights into the tracking system's content and utility. The picture which
finally came into focus was one of a dynamic process of realignment study which had been undergoing change even as it was being evaluated. After thorough study, the process/methodology proved to have very little need of improvement. The major sources of information on the realignment study methodology were AR 5-10 (both current and draft revision), previous case studies, and interviews with MACOM action officers and HQDA personnel. The ESC methodology assessment, then, is largely an indorsement of the current state of the process and a discussion of the evolutionary forces that are impacting this process.


a. Description of dynamics. On the overview level, ESC analysts had anticipated that their analysis of the methodology would reveal some sequence, interface, emphasis, or content weaknesses which, if resolved, would improve the realignment study methodology. This broad-scoped objective required that the whole process be simplified to its essential elements to facilitate understanding and to subsequently enable more focused discussion. The diagram at Figure B-1 shows the sequence of key events. This diagram was developed after detailed study of AR 5-10 and after analysis of several past realignment actions. It suggests a great deal about the nature of the process and the forces that drive it. The main message it conveys is that the base realignment process is "driven" by cost and operational factors and supplemented by environmental and socio-economic factors. These implications are developed by tracing the process sequentially and determining when the various factors have their greatest impacts (i.e., in identifying options or in arriving at decisions). The discussion in the next five subparagraphs addresses the overall realignment process and its dynamics.
The proposed realignment action is initiated by either an operational or resource economy motive. All realignment histories researched during this project were initiated either to accommodate operational efficiency improvements or to achieve some savings in manpower or support resources. This is to say that none of these actions were motivated by installation or HQ-level wishes to favorably influence environmental or socio-economic postures in the communities involved. Thus, the economic and operational factors were found to influence primarily the earlier stages of the realignment process. These factors affect the design of the proposed alternative; they shape the economic justification argument subsequently presented in the “realignment summary,” thereby directly influencing the decision.
The feasibility study process consists of identifying, describing, and weighting alternative configurations to an action being considered. The feasibility study may be conducted at HQDA without MACOM input or at MACOM level with installation input. The result of the process is a proposed alternative which is later "justified" in the more detailed CSJF. In examining Figure B-1, it is clear that the feasibility study phase is a key link in the realignment process. If all reasonable alternatives are not identified and considered during this phase, it is highly likely that the process will have to recycle to accommodate another alternative or that the action will terminate here. Once the argument for realignment is scrutinized in an economic sense based on input from installation and MACOM operational and resource sources (during the feasibility study phase), the proposed alternative can be identified and a DA decision rendered. The feasibility study will have addressed environmental and socio-economic impacts in only a cursory manner--identifying obvious problem areas and highlighting controversial non-cost implications. The detailed economic and environmental data must be developed by subject-matter experts within the installations and commands; this time-consuming input must be developed in detail during the following CSJF preparation phase.

(a) The feasibility study's format is rather free form, yet it must include economic data for alternatives considered and must present those data in the realignment summary format that subsequently reappears in the CSJF. As the revised AR 5-10 will require, economic aspects of all alternatives must be arrayed side by side. The new format also requires the arraying and ranking of noncost factors (operational, environmental, and socio-economic data) to facilitate their consideration during the evaluation of alternative realignments.
(b) This accommodation of noncost factors is actually played down more than it should be because the text of AR 5-10 emphasizes economic viewpoints and does not provide a sample realignment summary which ranks/evaluates noncost considerations (24 such considerations are listed in the revised AR, and that list appears comprehensive and relevant). This more subjective element of feasibility studies deserves some stronger explanation in the text and a more detailed example among the graphics. Paragraph 7 of this annex presents a suggested way of handling noncost factors earlier in the overall realignment process and giving them greater weight by increasing their clarity, visibility, and significance to decision-makers.

(3) Development of the CSJF is the third major phase of the realignment process. The groundwork for this phase has been accomplished in the feasibility study phase. Once the feasibility study has been developed at the installation and MACOM levels, it is forwarded to DA for decision. If DA agrees that the candidate action has high potential for payoff, the MACOM is instructed to develop a detailed CSJF. The process by which this case is developed is left to the discretion of the commands. The CSJF format, content, and staffing requirements are prescribed in AR 5-10. When assembled and forwarded, the resulting CSJF includes the realignment summary developed in the feasibility study (updated and refined), the environmental assessment data (as required to terminate environmental process or preliminary to filing of a formal EIS), the community impact data (as developed through appropriate installation—CERL or Department of Commerce interface), and detailed costs-savings backup material if the case breaks the 10 US Code threshold.1

1 The EIS is developed by either the MACOM environmental office, the appropriate USACE district office, or through contract. It is developed concurrently with the CSJF documentation. Community impact data are also an offline project requiring interface and support (CERL's EIFS model or the Department Commerce, BEA's RIMS model).
during the CSJF development that the nuts and bolts of economic justification are ironed out and that the details of noncost implications can be fleshed in for a more complete portrayal of the action for decision-making purposes. If these noncost factors (other than operational perspectives) are ever to influence an action's configuration, it is in the decision-making phase to come that it will impact--based on the data recorded here in the CSJF. The ESC study team's assessment of the CSJF content is contained in paragraph 4 to this annex. Let it suffice for now that, although the CSJF which results from the realignment process just described is too large and unwieldy for decision-maker use, it is still a well-documented, comprehensive, adequately staffed (within the MACOM) document which permits thorough staff review and enhances technical credibility.

(4) Staffing and review of the completed CSJF are described in AR 5-10; this process can take any amount of time from days to years. The channels are prescribed; it is the duration of the process that is indefinite. The various detail sections of the CSJF are formatted to facilitate this staffing and review phase. By having the applicable information arrayed in tabulations appropriate to their particular areas of interest, such staff elements as COA, OCE, and DCSPER can more readily and assuredly review the candidate action.

(a) These reviews consist primarily of validating such items as costs and savings, budget impacts, community impact analyses, the existence of an adequate audit trail, construction requirements and avoidances calculations, environmental documentation adequacy, Homeowners' Assistance Program computations, DOD housing requirements accuracy, Congressional 613 reports, manpower data and analyses adequacy, an adequate audit trail on

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manpower changes, and consistency between end-strength and man-year data. Some of these detailed formats are: one-time costs/cost avoidance ($mil) for each installation affected, resource summary, real property occupied, item/cost explanation sheets, energy resource impact assessment sheets, budget impacts due to realignment, costs and savings by appropriation/budget activity, facilities costs, facilities cost avoidance, construction required, real property acreage data.

(b) EEO summaries, community impact assessments, and environmental impact data are required in separately and clearly specified formats for inclusion in the CSJF package and for separate perusal by appropriate proponents (e.g., EEO Action Agency, COE).

(c) Although these special-interest, narrow-locus formats swell the volume of the CSJF document, they contain necessary detailed backup work which must be performed to develop the summary data presented in the realignment summary which caps the CSJF documentation. These supporting data are not necessary for the decision-maker's analysis, but they should be forwarded throughout staffing as a catalyst to proponent comment. Only the proponent recommendation and the realignment summary are required by the decision-maker unless the case is large enough to break the 10 US Code threshold. In such cases, all documentation is required, but does not need to be bound into a single volume.

(5) As implied by Figure B-1, the decision phase of the action results in one of three actions: recycle to address a new alternative, status quo concerning the candidate installation, or implement the proposed action. Also as indicated in the graphic, the implement decision may well trigger the environmental and socio-economic impacts projected during development of the detailed CSJF.
b. Process in perspective. The process just described has been evolving both in detail and in general. It appears to have some intrinsic flexibility which enables management to refine segments of the process without sacrificing expertise, efficiency, or effectiveness. It seems appropriate to the problems and challenges of base structuring that cost and operational factors should take precedence over environmental and socio-economic factors. It also seems proper that these noncost factors should be identified and estimated as early as possible and that they should be developed in detail at the same time the CSJF is being assembled. By keeping environmental, socio-economic, and operational expertise requirements outside the realm of developing the economic justifications, DA is attempting to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. As it is, planning factors are constantly being revised, the environmental and economic impact estimating processes are evolving independently, and DA and OSD are standardizing certain policies and documentation requirements. Considering the significant, if not overwhelming, impact of politics on ultimate decisions, it would probably be wasteful to go any further in refining the process. The only components of methodology which might deserve refinement are those which focus on minimizing the volume of material required for developing the decision package (i.e., work on those that contribute some more efficient way of summarizing decision-influencing information). The following paragraph will mention a few possibilities along these lines.

4. Methodology--Focus on Specifics. The overview discussion in paragraph 3 above is addressed to the general realignment process viewed from the macro perspective. This discussion of the same process is focused more on the
micro level of information and hence promises to produce more fine-tuning of recommendations than sweeping changes.

a. CSJF methodology. The overall process of initiating, conducting, evaluating, deciding, and implementing realignment actions has been discussed and given high marks. The more detailed CSJF methodology is a highly structured exercise that relies on proper and efficient communication within and among MACOMs. There is a tremendous requirement for data input from elements throughout the installations involved and the MACOM staff that reviews and perhaps compiles the CSJF. To get a sense of the levels of participation and their sequence, Figure B-2 reviews the realignment process in more detail than did Figure B-1. The following subparagraphs cover some salient points that pertain to or can be inferred from the information arrayed in this table.

(1) The impetus for realignment can come from any echelon. It can be proposed by an installation that a major realignment is required for operational reasons. Or, MACOM, DA, or OSD can initiate investigation into resource-saving realignment concepts.

(2) The first major step toward realignment is to conduct the feasibility study. This is developed by either the installation, the MACOM, or HQDA. (See Command Differences discussion in Annex A). This step requires collection of raw data from several installations—as many as required to scope the relative impacts of various alternative realignments. AR 5-10 generalizes with regard to this phase and states that 2 weeks is the typical elapsed time for a feasibility study. FORSCOM recommends a more generous 12-week period. The gross-level economic and noncost impacts of the proposed realignment serve as the basis for a DA decision on the feasibility study. DA decides that the proposal either does or does not hold enough promise to
justify further study. Another possibility is that DA might decide to conduct another feasibility study considering alternatives other than those addressed in the initial cut. Although the current guidance for development of a feasibility study allows a full and effective comparison of alternatives for ranking and decision-maker consideration, the format could be improved to provide equal visibility for all key cost and noncost factors and to allow for more meaningful weighting and ranking presentations. See paragraph 7 for recommendations.

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<tr>
<th>Realignment Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility Level</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Installation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiate realignment action</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct feasibility study</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Select preferred alternative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Announce study</td>
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<td>CSIF preparation</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>EIS</td>
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<td>Economic analysis</td>
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<td>Community impact</td>
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<td>EEO impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reviews</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Make final decision</td>
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<td>Announce decision</td>
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<td>Develop implementation plan</td>
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<td>Implement decision</td>
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<td>Report</td>
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<td>After action</td>
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<td>Tracking</td>
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Figure B-2

B-10
(3) Once the data for all alternatives are arrayed, a preferred alternative is selected by HQDA or by the MACOM for decision by HQDA. From here on out, it is this preferred alternative that all discussions, controversy, and calculations revolve around.

(4) The next step is for DA to decide whether or not to develop a detailed study of the recommended realignment action. If there is a decision to study, this is announced by DA after obtaining OSD clearance or it may be announced by OSD.

(5) Preparation of the CSJF follows the methods described in Annex A (Command Differences). That is to say, that the MACOM uses its own established internal process for developing the CSJF. However, regardless of whether the job is done by a special project team or in an established organizational element, the same data items must be collected, arrayed, factored, projected, summarized, and interpreted. Each MACOM (or armed service) has its own means of developing up-to-date projections and costs and savings estimates. The record shows that these methods are extremely effective—especially when the action is scheduled to take place over a brief time span. The data required to calculate those input critical to the decision (see paragraph 5 for discussions of critical elements) are generally available through established information systems within the commands or at the installations. The manpower, one-time costs and savings, and construction data are not particularly difficult for an experienced action officer to calculate. The difficulty comes in establishing a baseline figure and date for the data and holding them constant throughout the CSJF process. Only in this way can decision-makers have any confidence in the calculations and projections. And, only with a well-defined baseline can effective tracking be accomplished during implementation.
When the entire CSJF package is developed, possibly 8-9 months after initial candidacy, it is forwarded from the MACOM to the ARSTAF proponent for staffing. By this time, the package is extremely bulky, 200-400 pages, and includes the realignment summary, the applicable environmental documentation, the community impact projections, the EEO assessment information, and several covering letters and draft announcements. The proponent staffs the package through the various functional areas (e.g., DCSLOG, DCSOPS, DCSPER, COA), gets their concurrence or nonconcurrence, and forwards the package to the SA for decision. DM conducts an independent analysis and makes recommendations to CSA. Once a decision is made—and this could take from days to months—it is announced.

If the HQDA decision is to implement, the MACOM and installation managers must prepare an implementation plan or LOI which establishes milestones for implementation and includes detailed and phased guidance for realignment. This plan is developed as discussed in Annex A (Command Difference) and is often prepared based on a standardized format which includes typical actions required to realign/close a base. TRADOC realignments must coordinate course schedules with realignment actions, DARCOM must coordinate production schedules and weapons systems adjustments with realignment actions, and FORSCOM must coordinate scheduling and phasing from losing to gaining installations that cross MACOM organizational lines.

Execution of the developed implementation plan is generally conducted at the installation level, often supplemented by a special realignment team which monitors the action in conjunction with the installation commander. Decisions required to compensate for implementation plan shortfalls or unexpected extraneous impacts are generally made at the installation or
implementation team level and sometimes require MACOM concurrence when more than one installation is involved or when major resource adjustments impact on program budgets or construction plans. The case histories researched by ESC showed that short duration plans generally are executed on time or early and that the longer the duration of implementation, the more adjustments and more coordination are required along the way.

(9) As it now stands, there is a requirement for a quarterly status report which compares projected expenditures with actual data and supplies updated estimates of final costs and savings levels. This "tracking" report is discussed in Annex C which recommends replacement of the current system with a more useful, less resource-expensive requirement. The existing reporting requirement has been in effect since April 1979 and has essentially corroborated the overall Army CSJF methodology. Based on ESC concerns and COA agreement, the revised AR 5-10 calls for milestone-related reporting at times set by the MACOMs. This is motivated by HQDA concern that data will be collected while the action is underway. This is an improvement but does not go far enough. Any useful on-going "tracking" system should serve a more realistic management function than ensuring the collection of data. It should be noted that one GAO representative recently stated his opposition to any tracking requirement—insisting that a rigorous estimating process is sufficient and that any further mandatory reporting is not cost-effective.\textsuperscript{2/}

b. CSJF evaluation. The CSJF that results from the methodology described above is detailed to the point that it is debatable if such a tight focus is appropriate. Nevertheless, backing off might appear to be evasion,\textsuperscript{2/}

\textsuperscript{2/} SOURCE: Telephone conversation, 30 March 1981, between Mr. Joe Kelly, GAO Procurement, Logistics, and Readiness Division, Facilities Acquisition and Management Branch and Ms. Till Davis, ESC project team.
and the process has developed to a point of sophistication that tampering with the backup data might shake command-level confidence in the process. The accuracy speaks for itself.

5. Critical Elements. At the outset of this project, the ESC research team planned to review the CSJF elements being used to justify a realignment, to review the realignment problem and isolate any critical elements not being considered, and to recommend a means of revising the methodology to include same. After reviewing the various types of realignments in concept and detail, the team found that the critical elements being used to justify the proposed realignments were in fact comprehensive and not in need of revision. Although there are myriad calculations and estimates included within the CSJF documentation, there are only a few summary type figures which represent critical elements. These are, in fact, those which are included in the "realignment summary"—a report which is initially prepared in the feasibility study and which is revised and corroborated during the detailed CSJF preparation. Although the critical elements vary from action to action, they almost always represent some mix of manpower costs and savings, one-time costs and savings, and MCA costs and cost avoidances. The nature of the organization being realigned and the extent of realignment, of course, dictate which is the key element. But, some balance of these factors must result in a 7-10 year payback period, or the costs incurred must clearly be worth the increase in operational effectiveness to be gained by the proposed realignment.

a. Manpower shifts. Having looked at several examples, it appears that manpower shifts generally account for the single largest and most readily documented or substantiated costs and savings.
The impact of civilian personnel cuts is rather easy to calculate over the short term and easy to trace in terms of jobs eliminated or positions transferred. Over the longer range, say 2 or 3 years, it is much more difficult to assert what value should be attributed to the costs and cost avoidances resulting from civilian manpower shifts. There is no doubt, however, that the amount saved will not be less on an annual basis than salaries and support expenditures at the time of the realignment. Thus, initial manpower savings are clear and calculable at first—they are equally clear but much less quantifiable on a recurring basis. One key question relates to this issue. "How long can one continue to count spaces eliminated as savings? Indefinitely? 5 years?" And, a related question is "Should those cost avoidances be stated in constant dollars or in inflated dollars?"

Savings resulting from transfer or reassignment of military personnel raise another issue which cannot be ignored. Are MPA savings actual dollar savings? Or, do they merely represent an opportunity to increase efficiency or effectiveness without adding to the manpower level? Because this MPA expense item has been accepted by the GAO and Congress and because DA and Air Force find it a convenient way of placing a value on operational efficiency, ESC does not question the propriety of using MPA to increase the amount of costs and cost avoidances represented by a proposed realignment. But, it must be acknowledged that this factor often is the key critical element (especially in FORSCOM actions) in an action and that DA may not actually spend less as a result of realigning many active duty troops; it may be realigning them to perform some higher priority function at another location or organization.
AR 5-10 states the thresholds for realignments requiring CSJF documentation (as expressed in 10 US Code and lesser levels as required by OSD). Because of these thresholds and because it does not take very long to offset manpower savings of such volume, manpower shifts often constitute the main critical element with which a decision-maker must be concerned. It is around these data that all community impact and many environmental impact data revolve. Those noncost factors, however, do not of themselves tend to initiate an action or persuade decision-makers to approve or disapprove a proposed realignment. They serve more as a basis for EAC intervention or for public opposition; they prepare DA and OSD by identifying the Army's vulnerability to implementation setbacks.

b. One-time costs. The one-time costs of realignments are also a major critical element. Unless significant MCA expenses are to be incurred, however, their main function is in their interaction with manpower costs and savings to determine the number of years required for payback. In many larger actions, this is a moot point, since the payback period may be 1 year or less and doubling one-time costs may result in making the payback period only 1 1/2 to 2 years—still justifying the realignment with room to spare. Thus, one-time costs (a category including such items as severance pay, unused leave pay, relocation costs, homeowners' assistance costs, transportation of material) may constitute a very tedious category to calculate, but it also may be of such insignificance that it will permit overruns of several hundred percent without changing the decision on the realignment.

c. Essential MCA costs. Whenever there is a requirement to build new facilities before a realignment can be implemented, the MCA is considered "essential" to the action. Given current construction costs, it takes many
man-years of effort saved to offset a large MCA project within the desired 7-10-year payback period. Obviously the most difficult decisions are those which involve significant manpower reductions but require relatively large MCA construction projects in order to accomplish implementation. The long lead time required to program for such projects also serves to mitigate against implementation in such cases because it allows so much time for groups, on either side of the controversy, to counter the arguments and interpretations of the opposing constituency. Another problem of cost avoidance is that of deciding which particular projected MCA projects can legitimately be used to offset new construction or increased manpower levels. There certainly is some justification for allowing such considerations, but the practice is fraught with opportunities for abuse. In the past, CSJF calculations of savings (based on construction avoided) sometimes were controversial. Projects which had been listed in the FYDP for many years but had never actually moved toward construction were sometimes used as the basis for cost avoidance calculations. In recent years, however, this practice of loading unlikely MCA projects into the cost avoidance category has diminished significantly under close scrutiny and clearly stated policies. The standards DA now uses in evaluating these projects are so rigorous that they have effectively closed this loophole.

d. Other factors. Although it might be possible to construct a hypothetical realignment action in which some other factor is a driving force, it is not necessary to develop any other methodology for handling such a case. ESC analysts think that the existing and soon-to-be-revised methodology can readily be adapted to accommodate a unique situation. After all, with so many CSJFs in draft form now addressing so many of the Army's few remaining installations, the methodology can already be said to accommodate the vast
preponderance of imminent candidates for realignment. The existing formats and methods of calculation appear well suited to handling all the elements of expense which the established finance and accounting systems currently record.

6. **Resource Commitments.** As explained in Annex A (Command Differences), there are vast ranges in resources committed to developing the CSJF documentation and to activating the entire realignment process. The variables in this feature of the realignment process seem easily in line with the variations in the actions themselves. For example, the time it takes to develop a feasibility study, CSJF, environmental assessment, and community impact assessment is related to the size of the installation, the type of realignment being proposed, and the number of persons assigned to conduct the study effort. Because the MACOMs have not collected historical data on the resources committed to CSJF development, the ESC study team had no data on which to base or estimate an average cost or project duration. The MACOMs and the Air Force were cooperative in providing estimates of resources, but these were based on individual memories and general impressions rather than on documented information.

a. Although there is no real need to know how much it generally costs or how long it takes to produce a CSJF, there has been increasing curiosity concerning this point. There is a danger, however, that if such data were collected, there would be pressure to impose limitations based on averages. This would be most unrealistic, given the vast ranges among the different types and sizes of actions and the types and sizes of organizations involved. Nevertheless, some ballpark figures would probably help DA decision-makers when they are contemplating both initial formal studies or a renewed cycle of realignment actions.
b. The current process does not require collection of cost, man-hour, or elapsed time information. It would be possible, without much extra effort, to institute a system for collecting and reporting resource commitment information. This would be achieved by requiring that the information be gathered as the feasibility study, CSJF, and implementation plan (as well as EIS and community impact assessment documentation) are being developed and requiring that it be submitted to DM when completed and forwarded for staffing or information. Once the decisions are rendered, the data would be recorded at DM. The result would be a rapid development of some average, planning-level factors which would not be suitable for use as production standards.

c. Along with other suggestions, the following paragraph contains a specific recommendation for a way of collecting and recording meaningful data on the resources required to conduct the realignment study and implementation process.

7. **Recommendations.** ESC recommends that the methodology prescribed for realignment actions be updated as proposed in the AR 5-10 revisions now being prepared for issuance. The three specific methodology changes suggested in this paragraph are proposed as being appropriate for inclusion in an official "change" or addendum. These changes should first be staffed through the various MACOM and DA Staff element principals.

   a. Put more emphasis on the feasibility study. As shown in Figure B-1, the feasibility study phase is a necessary prerequisite to all detailed CSJF efforts. There are certain calculations and data collection tasks inherent in developing the feasibility study. The better and more comprehensive the feasibility study, the more likely it is that the alternative proposed therein will be approved for conduct of a detailed CSJF. Thus, it is
desirable that the text of paragraph 4-4 in AR 5-10 be revised to include stronger wording as to how essential a well-documented feasibility is to a successful realignment effort. Specifically, the first sentence is weak, and the importance of fully developed alternatives is not mentioned in the discussion of the feasibility study.

(1) The first sentence of paragraph 4-4 is "Experience gained from previous realignment studies indicates that preparation of realignment documentation may be simplified by completing an initial feasibility study to determine the feasibility of an action and alternatives under consideration." This sentence should be deleted and replaced with something more forceful (e.g., "Previous realignment studies indicate that an initial feasibility study is an essential screening phase for candidate realignments prior to devoting resources to a more extensive CSJF effort.").

(2) The repeated recycling of CSJF efforts to add new alternatives proves the value of having the initial feasibility study include as many reasonable alternatives as possible and arraying all data (both cost and non-cost) with equal detail and emphasis. This idea should be incorporated into the text of paragraph 4-4 in AR 5-10. The format for discussion of alternatives should also be changed to increase the visibility of noncost factors in the presentation and consideration of alternatives. Figures B-3 and B-4 are formats recommended to replace Figure A-1 of the revised AR 5-10. This would essentially constitute a revision of one of the realignment summary formats.

b. Institute a system for gathering realignment process data. ESC project analysts recommend that, if DM is seriously interested in collecting cost and other resource data regarding the realignment study and implementation process, they should institute a system for gathering such data while it...
is available. The best way for doing this would be to inform the MACOMs that man-year, duration, and cost data will be reported for all "new" feasibility study, CSJF, and implementation plan efforts. These data would be due at the time the subject document is forwarded to DM for either decision or information purposes. Information concerning actions not approved and implemented would be equally as useful as that for approved cases, and it would not take too long to develop some accurate summary data. It should be noted, however, that the totals are useful for DM purposes, but subtotals should not be forwarded to HQDA. The component subtotal information should be useful to MACOM planners in the development of CSJF study and milestone schedules.

**ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES**

A. Discussion of Alternatives

(1) Alternative A
   a. Description
   b. Accomplishments Expected
   c. Advantages and Disadvantages
   d. Major Function Impact

(2) Alternative B

(3) Alternative C

B. Assumptions and Limitations

C. Evaluation of Alternatives

(1) Tabular display of values

(2) Tabular display of ranks

(3) Detailed discussion of tabular values

D. Sensitivity Analysis

E. Conclusions/Recommendations

---

**Figure B-3**

B-21
## Evaluation of Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Alternative A</th>
<th>Alternative B</th>
<th>Alternative C</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job Impact—Eliminations</td>
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<tr>
<td>One-time Costs</td>
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<td>Annual Cost Reduction</td>
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<td>Differential Cost Economic Analysis</td>
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<td>Strategic/Operational Implications</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>1.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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**Figure B-4**
(1) Figure 4-1 of AR 5-10 lists typical realignment events and indicates the estimated number of weeks required to accomplish these milestone actions for various types of realignments (i.e., those with and without EISs). ESC recommends that these estimates and various categories of effort be eliminated from the figure and that it be used only as a checklist of typical events. The estimates indicated are not typical of the cases ESC analysts researched and do not coincide very closely with the information provided by MACOM experts. The only figure that agrees with ESC’s research findings is the estimated total number of weeks in the process. Thus, the figure is confusing because it totals events that overlap and are concurrent, those that are essential, and those that are optional. Obviously a PERT or CPM diagram or even a Gantt display would be a more effective means of presenting this information. A format such as that shown in Figure B-5 would be more useful than the current table and would serve the purpose of emphasizing the need for milestone planning as a means of phasing and scheduling the study and implementation efforts. The text of paragraph 4-3, Milestone Planning, should then be revised to be more general. Rather than saying “Figure 4-1 provides suggested milestone planning schedules for reportable action,” the paragraph should read something like this: “Figure 4-1 lists some key project events which should be considered when planners schedule realignment actions. These events should be phased at MACOM or installation level using PERT, CPM, or Gantt diagrams based on MACOM experience factors that apply to the particular case attributes.”

(2) The events and milestones listed in Figures 4-1 and A-8, respectively, should at least be stated in comparable terms. For example, the first item in Figure 4-1 is “Initiate study/define objectives/identify...
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<th>Documentation Required/Major Events</th>
<th>MACOM Enter Planning Factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Feasibility Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward Notice of Intent to HQDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Through MACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proponent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Begin USAAA Audit/USAAA Validate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study or CSJF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Detailed Reportable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Realignment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct Environmental Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publish Finding of No Significant</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Through HQDA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare Final Document</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAAA Completes Report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare and File DEIS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Review and Public</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hearings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revise Documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File FEIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Through HQDA and OSD/Decision/</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Announcement/Record Decision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Time</td>
<td>19-44 weeks</td>
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</table>

Figure B-5
alternatives/establish assumptions/start housing survey." It probably should be changed to say "Conduct feasibility study." Then it would correspond to the first milestone entry of Figure A-8, "Feasibility study completion." The two tables need not have a direct one-to-one relationship; but, wherever events and milestones pertain to the same actions, they should be referred to in the same terminology and should use the same number of entries to address the starts and stops of the process.

c. Reduce size of document. ESC analysts found the CSJF package overwhelmingly bulky and intimidating to anyone not already expert in reviewing such matters. It was even unwieldy to those expert at interpreting realignment studies. It seems that some purpose would be served in always binding the document into two separate volumes regardless of the 10 US Code thresholds. The first should contain the realignment summary and detailed data as defined in Appendix C of AR 5-10 (revision). The supporting data itemized in that same document should be bound in the second volume and probably would not need to be forwarded any further than DM. These data are useful to staff proponents in ensuring the accuracy of the summary data, but they certainly are at a level of detail that decision-makers need not inspect personally. The benefit would, therefore, be in ease of handling and in the subtle realm of facilitating public relations.
ANNEX C

TRACKING SYSTEM
ANNEX C

TRACKING SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>C-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>C-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal Tracking System Attributes</td>
<td>C-3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Current Tracking System</td>
<td>C-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed System</td>
<td>C-17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure

- C-1 Management Information Relationships
- C-2 Realignment Management Functions and Information Needs
- C-3 Realignment Resource Summary Report
- C-4 After Action Realignment Report

1. **Purpose.** This annex presents the ESC study team's assessment of the current system for tracking realignment actions and proposes a rationale and design for a simplified and improved system.

2. **Background.**

   a. AR 5-10 states that "within 60 days of completing implementation of reportable actions, a one-time after action report will be prepared and submitted to HQDA." For several years prior to publication of AR 5-10, the after action report served as the Army's mechanism for tracking actual events to CSJF projections and documenting lessons learned during the process. Although a formal format for the after action report was not prescribed by HQDA, the report was required to contain an analysis of actual versus
projected costs and savings. Among the items that had to be covered by the report were:

(1) A direct comparison of actual and estimated one-time costs, manpower and personnel impacts, and savings by FY—with an explanation of the reasons for differences.

(2) The accomplishments and impacts from the standpoints of mission effectiveness, strategic readiness, unit training, operations, and mobilization implications.

(3) A brief discussion of problems encountered and lessons learned during implementation.

(4) Recommendations for avoiding problems identified and applying lessons learned to similar actions.

b. On 10 April 1979, a letter issued by Chief, Army Management Division, Management Directorate, provided guidance and tasked the proponent commands to submit an RRSR report. Unlike the after action report, which this report eventually replaced, the RRSR has a structured format which requires cost and savings comparisons on a quarterly basis during implementation. At the time of this ESC study, a revised AR 5-10 is nearing publication. That revision will officially replace the after action report with the RRSR and will institute milestone reporting rather than quarterly reporting.

3. Approach. ESC took a three-phased approach to developing an improved realignment action tracking system: first, to fully understand the existing report system; second, to determine the utility of any such system; and, third, to adapt the existing system in such a way as to make sure it fulfills

its requirements without imposing any unnecessary burdens on installation, MACOM, or HQDA personnel. Although this approach was pursued in the sequence here cited, these phases are discussed in a different order for the sake of readability and relevance.

4. Ideal Tracking System Attributes. Fundamental principles of systems analysis dictate that the initial step in constructing a model (i.e., a tracking system) is the development of well-defined and obtainable objectives. Given the availability of data, the capability of professional employees, and the wonders of automatic data processing; almost any conceivable tracking system is achievable if DA is willing to commit the resources required to develop/isolate the input. This lack of design limitations opened up the options to be considered and enabled a more rigorous weighting of utility and resource factors. ESC, therefore, established realistic objectives and proceeded to evaluate the existing system and to design an improved system with these objectives in mind. By answering the question, "what benefits can be expected to result from use of the tracking system?", a model could be constructed which provided the necessary informational output. For example, Figure C-1 shows the universal relationship among the objective, desired information, and data requirements. ESC's concept for developing an effective and efficient tracking system was to adapt the general relationships and questions arrayed in Figure C-1 to the more specific tracking system that relates to Army base realignment actions.

a. Management objectives. The objectives of management at all levels of organizations involved in the realignment process vary with the activities and functions being performed. These activities are listed in Figure B-2 and discussed at length in Annex B. The management functions of
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS

MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

*What management functions are being performed?
*What types of decisions will be required?
*What actions will be taken based on requested information?

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

*What type of information is required?
*How should the information be packaged?
*How much is needed?
*How frequently is it required?

DATA REQUIREMENTS

*Are adequate data obtainable?
*Does the accuracy of the data match the informational requirements?
*Do the benefits derived from the information outweigh the economics of obtaining the data?
*What is the minimum amount of data that is required?

a/ In his article, "Management Information Systems," printed in Handbook of Business Administration, Robert A. Shiff, Chairman of the Board, National Record Management Council, explained the difference between data and information as "Data are any raw facts known or available. Information means data that have been processed, that are up to date, accurate, timely, germane, and set in the proper perspective to the issue at hand. A decision-maker wants information, not data. Reports are useful to him only for their information content."

Figure C-1

C-4
planning, execution, and control are portrayed conceptually in Figure C-2.²

Those management objectives dealing with the tracking or after action reporting activity (control function) represent only a narrow segment of the overall realignment picture, but are the ones that initially prompted this study.

(1) DA and OSD have the overall objective of making the right decisions in an environment of limited resources and establishing a process that fosters continued good decisions. As a part of the second objective, DA and OSD need feedback on decision implementation, so that they can learn from mistakes and innovations and have a basis for improving the process. They also want evidence of substantial savings realized so it can be used as public relations information to maintain realized fiscal credibility.

(2) MACOM objectives relating to a tracking or after action report are similar to those of DA—to develop a process that will enable learning from past experiences. The MACOM's objectives are also a little more extensive in that they must collect the data regarding actual cost and savings, array the data for comparison with projections, interpret variances, and report their findings to DA. Thus, the resource allocation to this function is significantly greater than it is for DA- and OSD-level managers who are studying already prepared documentation.

(3) The installation's objectives in tracking an implemented action are similar to those of the MACOM regarding data collection and interpretation. More likely than not, however, the installation will have no objective that includes learning from the completed action to aid in replanning.

²/ Figure C-2 is based on Exhibit 1, Anatomy of Management Information from the Sep-Oct 61 HBR article "Management Information Crisis" by D. Ronald Daniel. It has been modified to address the base realignment process.
REALIGNMENT MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AND INFORMATION NEEDS

Information Needs
- Army Operational Effectiveness
- OSD Trends
- Congressional Pressures
- Resource Level
- Resource Balance
- Socio-economic Input
- Environmental Impact
- Equal Employment
- Opportunity Impact

Planning
- Set Objective
- Formulate Process
- Decide Among Alternative Resource Allocations

Execution

Feedback

Control
- Measure Performance
- Isolate Variances
- Aid In Replanning

Figure C-2

Information Needs
- Decision
- Milestones/Expenditures
- Manpower Shifts
- Extraneous Impacts
- Budget Adjustments
- Construction

Note: Projected and actual.
b. Information requirements. Referring to Figures C-1 and C-2, and the management objectives discussed in subparagraph 4a, management objectives determine actual information requirements. It is not too difficult to relate those general information attributes cited in the figure to the specific information requirements that pertain to tracking base realignment actions.

(1) OSD and DA obviously need planning type information as input to their planning activities. Attributes of planning information are: it transcends organizational lines, shows trends over long time periods, lacks minute details, is future oriented. As such, OSD and DA need to know if an action has been cost-effective, operationally prudent, and in line with national policies, laws, and interests. Such information should be presented in summary form and should contain data that have been processed into information that incisively addresses the issues at hand. The frequency of reporting should not exceed anticipated utility. Hence, information capable of influencing future actions has no use until the action has reached a point where the decision-maker can know for certain that the decision was a poor one or has evidence that it was the proper one.

(2) The MACOM information requirements certainly are more complex and detailed than those of OSD and DA. They encompass after action information to aid in replanning from both the macro and micro perspectives. There is also a requirement for information to assist in controlling the execution of the plan. In this regard, there may be some use for weekly or monthly or milestone reports during implementation (in addition to after action summaries) for MACOM study and assimilation into future actions. After the action is completed, MACOMs need to know how many personnel have been eliminated, reassigned, and added; how much it cost to achieve the realignment
(i.e., one-time costs); and if there were any major problems to be avoided in the future.

(3) Installation information needs during the realignment are very specific, voluminous, and frequent. The information is used to execute the decision and to control the implementation process. Because the installation plays the major role in developing the implementation plan, in subsequently executing their part of the plan, and collecting the data for any tracking or after action reports; their data requirements are as frequent as to be (possibly) daily during implementation. Thus, execution assisting information is not useful either monthly, quarterly, or yearly. It must be either daily, weekly, or milestone oriented. Installations require information to execute and control activities rather than to plan them. The only time it is realistic for installations to collect data for their own future use is when the installation being realigned retains some of its command identity. Otherwise, a closed or consolidated organization would have little use for data portraying lessons learned which pertain to abolished or significantly altered installations. Execution and control information at installation level is more effectively transmitted through memorandums and telephone calls as required than they are through time-dependent reports. Installations need to know such facts as when to do what, how to do it, and how much it should cost. If any of these factors are out of line, they either resolve the problem or refer it to the MACOM for decision. After the action is completed, the installation's records of the action are probably more informative to the MACOM and DA than they are to the installation.

c. Data requirements. Referring again to Figure C-1, the information requirements discussed above are determined by management objectives and
limited by data availability. The figure indicates that some key expectations of that data are its availability, its accuracy and relevance, its cost of development, and its appropriate quantity. The systematic, accurate, and timely accumulation of actual realignment costs and savings data is possible. The key questions are: how much report detail is appropriate, and how often should the report be submitted? A proper comparison of projected to actual expenditures requires the recalculation of realignment action economic data based on new input. Thus, the expense of this process indicates that the less frequent the reporting, the better. If the cost of conducting ongoing tracking calculations can be set at something like one man-week per quarter per installation involved in the action, the product or utility of these reports should be worth a man-month of effort per year. The preceding discussions of management activities and functions are not very persuasive in substantiating the requirement for a “tracking” system. They more pointedly define the need for a one-time, after action report which consists of summary-level economic analysis information.

5. Current Tracking System. The existing realignment tracking system has been in effect since April 1979 and has been used in only the few actions which came through the study phase to implementation. It might be analytically sufficient (as well as dramatic) to say that the current tracking system is too ambitious, too resource expensive, and misdirected. But, we are taking the more arduous route of substantiating this assertion before proposing a replacement system which lends itself more closely to the management objectives and information requirements identified in paragraph 4 of this annex. The outline of this analysis is: description, preparation, experience, and limitations of the existing tracking system.
a. Description. The tracking system being used now, as well as the one to be reiterated as a result of the impending revision of AR 5-10, is a two-page report prepared in the format shown at Figure C-3. This RRSR is prepared quarterly by the proponent command and submitted to DM. This four-part report portrays such tabular data as savings, costs, and cost avoidances; analysis of variance between CSJF projected data and "actual" expenditure and savings data; and narrative discussion of lessons learned and identification of points of contact for the report. Details of interest are cited below.

(1) Part A of the RRSR contains tabular data divided into three sections (manpower savings, recurring costs and savings, and one-time costs and cost avoidances). Actual and estimated values are presented for both the current quarter and the final action. The cost categories presented in Part A are identical to those prescribed for CSJF format in Section II, Figure C-4 of the 1977 version of AR 5-10, but they do not match the format of the revised AR.

(a) The current quarter columns are intended to compare actual costs and savings with phased CSJF estimates. For each item, the percent variance is presented based on a comparison of actual costs and savings versus the estimate. Only variances greater than 10 percent will need to be explained.

(b) The final action column is designed to compare the original CSJF estimates with a current estimate. As before, the percent variance is based on difference between the two figures, with values greater than 10 percent being explained.

(2) Part B of the RRSR is a section set aside for narrative explanation of the significant variances displayed in Part A.
### REALIGNMENT RESOURCE SUMMARY REPORT

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<th>Phased Estimate</th>
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<th>Final Action CSJF Current % Variance</th>
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<td>Civilian</td>
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<td>RECURRING COSTS (Savings):</td>
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<td>Military Pay</td>
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<td>Civilian Pay</td>
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<td>Other O&amp;M</td>
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<td>Military Personnel:</td>
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<td>Placement and Training</td>
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<td>Cost of Putting Installation in Caretaker Status</td>
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<td>Costs of Changes in Installation Services</td>
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<td>Cost of Caretaker Pending GSA Takeover</td>
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<td>Cost of Homeowners Assistance Program</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
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<td>Other (Identify)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL ONE-TIME COSTS/(COST AVOIDANCE)</td>
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<td>TOTAL DOD COSTS/(SAVINGS)</td>
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(Figure C-3, Continued on Next Page)
REALIGNMENT RESOURCE SUMMARY REPORT--Continued

PART B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (Explain Any & Variance Greater Than ± 10%)

PART C. LESSONS LEARNED (Significant and Valuable Lesson From an Army Standpoint)

PART D. POINTS OF CONTACT
Originator

Name: ____________________
Phone: ____________________
Address: ____________________

Figure C-3
(3) Part C is a section for the recording of problems encountered and any valuable lessons learned during implementation. AR 5-10 encourages installation or MACOM preparers to make recommendations to the Army Staff to assist in avoiding problems and applying lessons learned to similar future actions.

(4) Part D contains the name, telephone number, and mailing address of the point of contact who can clarify narrative or verify data.

b. Preparation. The preparation of these RRSR forms is done at either the installation or command level. These quarterly reports must be submitted no later than 15 days following the end of the quarter. Thus, either all the forms are submitted late or it takes less than 15 days to prepare the data. Interviews with individuals who have prepared the RRSR forms for actions being implemented indicate that it takes no less than 3 days and possibly as long as 2 weeks to isolate the data. The variables in this factor are driven by the experience of the preparing official (have they done it before and are they familiar with the way the CSJF is prepared?) and by the complexity of the action (how many installations are involved, when in the quarter were expenditures made, how many military have actually been reassigned?). Aside from these general difficulties with RRSR preparation, there are certain other features that cause problems.

1. Although the RRSR requires quarterly submission of quarterly data and a comparison of quarterly actual with quarterly projected, the CSJF format does not require quarterly projections. Thus, the RRSR preparer must prepare some artificial projection (straight-line or other technique) of quarterly expenditures and savings and then compare this with an actual quarterly cost and cost avoidance figure. This whole exercise results in recording of
figures and comparisons which have no relevance to the successful completion of the action, plus (if the variance is greater than 10 percent) providing an explanation for this variance. Individuals involved in the action may well realize that they are ahead of schedule or on schedule based on their milestone phases, even though the straight-line estimates may make it appear that they are exceeding cost projections for that quarter.

(2) The sources of data for preparing the RRSR vary somewhat depending on the MACOM--since they have their own finance and accounting systems. Generally speaking, though, there are some cost code numbers within the Army Management Structure which designate expenditures for realignments.3/ There also are important data in manpower documents, project managers' reports, and other input regarding MCA costs and contractor services. The key to collecting these data is to notify all finance and accounting, budget and programming personnel, as well as manpower personnel and employees in the MACOM engineer's office that these expenditures are to be flagged as they occur.

c. Experience. The experience gained through using the RRSR on a quarterly basis during an implementation has not been as useful as might have been desired from such a comprehensive appearing report. Much of the experience gained has actually been along the lines of learning what one does not need more than learning what one does need. There have actually been relatively few actions since April 1979 which have been implemented; and, thus, there is not an extensive backlog of data or experience from which to draw. Few individuals have been charged with preparing these RRSRs. ESC analysts

contacted those who had prepared these forms and interviewed them concerning their experience with these forms. The consensus was that they are not terribly difficult to complete as long as one is familiar with the CSJF elements initially. There is a relatively high level of confidence in the accuracy of the one-time costs and manpower data. The recurring costs and savings are not that difficult to calculate, but there is much less confidence in their "accuracy." Some specific problems with the RRSR format are:

1. The quarterly recalculation of estimated end of action totals. As discussed earlier, this is such an artificial and academic exercise that it consumes valuable personnel project time without producing anything of relevance. Changing from quarterly to milestone reporting should produce more meaningful reports but will not necessarily make the report more useful.

2. Although the data categories listed along the left margin previously corresponded to the data required in the CSJF document, this will no longer be the case once the AR is revised. Thus, those completing the RRSR will have more difficulty recalculating the revised estimates because there is a basic mismatch between the initial CSJF projection and the RRSR format.

3. There were no instructions in AR 5-10 to explain how to complete the RRSR form. This is a significant problem whenever a new employee must prepare the form or whenever the action is very complex. Several preparers complained about the quarterly comparison task and said they had no confidence that they were doing it correctly.

d. Limitations. On the surface, it appears that the RRSR is a comprehensive summary report that should be of use to several people. After extensive inquiry as to how these reports have been used since their
initiation, it seems that their major significance is as a historical and public relations, and upward communication document. Some major reasons that this tracking mechanism has not proven as useful as some might have wished are:

(1) The reports contained no significant milestone information and hence anyone reviewing the raw data has no sense for where the project is—in relation to where it was expected or planned to be. This picture was clouded even more by the quarterly report requirement which gives the impression that projections were phased, when in fact they were not. The impending AR revisions will resolve this shortcoming.

(2) The installation and MACOM personnel who develop these reports now staff them through the appropriate command and then forward them to DM. Under the revised AR, they will be forwarded to COA. This will provide an internal mechanism for adjusting actions as a result of the information.

(3) Implementation cadres and the command hierarchy adjust their resource allocations and their project timing to accommodate new information and problems with meeting milestones stated in the implementation plan or LOL. They certainly do not suspend action pending any time-dependent reporting mechanism or cannot delay actions/decisions during the lag time between milestone completion and report preparation.

(4) HQDA policy decisions, resource allocation decisions, and strategy formulation will not be influenced by any interim reporting mechanism. The data of significance to HQDA and OSD are the initial cost-effectiveness picture and the operational efficiency impact. Their role in realignments is not one of controlling or executing. The after action picture
may give them insights into future policy or resource decisions and certainly will provide some historical documentation of project impact.

(5) The inherent inability of any report or research technique to accurately quantify recurring costs and cost avoidances severely limits the utility of preparing such documents. Because these reports can only produce revised estimates, it is unwise to put too much stock in their content. It is analytically more correct to stand by the position of developing a thorough and honest realignment projection than it is to develop a tracking or after action mechanism which records deviations from the projection and consequently puts the preparing MACOM on the defensive regarding events, decisions, and dynamics outside their power to influence.

6. **Proposed System.** ESC proposes a significant revision of the way DA handles tracking of realignment actions. The proposal involves abandoning the concept of "tracking." ESC proposes that DA adopt a system of after action reports similar in content to the CSJF projections which influenced the decisions. The study team is strongly persuaded that report utility, report preparation costs, and a more realistic perspective toward data accuracy indicate that less reporting is completely in line with requirements. Having used the RRSR format for 2 years now, DM should be amply reassured that the CSJF process generally produces extremely accurate projections. Major variations from projections are generally due to circumstances unfolding well after the CSJF preparation and outside the control of the MACOM or DA Staff. The RRSR

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4/ In a telephone interview, Mr. Joe Kelly, GAO, Procurement, Logistics, and Readiness Division, Facilities Acquisition and Management, told an ESC team member that he and GAO policy oppose tracking of realignment actions. He stressed the futility of the exercise and emphasized the need to develop an accurate, honest CSJF, to implement it, and to go on from there. He indicated GAO opposes proliferation of reports.
has, therefore, served a useful purpose in validating the CSJF process. To perpetuate the RRSR requirement, however, would be to attribute more utility to it than is possible or wise. The following approach to realignment "tracking" is suggested.

a. Discontinue preparation of and requirement for the RRSR.

b. Replace this report with a one-time, after action report which corresponds with the CSJF projections which justified the realignment/closure.

c. Require that MACOMs collect the data as the action occurs, but not require submission until the action is complete. AR 5-10 should include instructions for completing the after action report and should include a copy of the format. If MCA is outstanding once personnel are relocated and missions transferred or redistributed, this should be considered a complete action. The report should be developed at this point and submitted as "interim pending MCA completion."

d. DA and OSD should rely on telephone inquiry or written information requests for details on project status whenever they have a specific need for it. This policy is prudent because it acknowledges that even if DA had received a quarterly report, they would still have wanted to know the specifics of project status with regard to milestones accomplished and problems encountered.

e. The after action report format shown in Figure C-4 should be adopted. Based on the management objectives arrayed in Figure C-2 and the information requirements which supplement these objectives, there is no requirement for a more frequent or more detailed submission.

f. Dispense with both quarterly and milestone reporting requirements. This would be in line with DM's role in management information systems.
AFTER ACTION REALIGNMENT REPORT

ACTION ____________
CSJF NO. ____________

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION.

B. BENEFITS/IMPACTS

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<th>ACTION</th>
<th>ESTIMATED</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
<th>% DIFFERENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Dislocated</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Transferred</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Eliminated</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. One-time Costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Construction</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nonconstruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Construction Cost Avoidance</td>
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<td>4. Annual Recurring Savings</td>
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<td>5. Noncosts Benefits</td>
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(Figure C-4 Continued on Next Page)
C. DISCUSSION OF DEVIATIONS.


2. Milestone Schedule.

D. LESSONS LEARNED.

E. POINTS OF CONTACT.

(Figure C-4 Continued on Next Page)
AFTER ACTION REALIGNMENT REPORT--Continued

STEADY STATE ANNUAL RECURRING SAVINGS AND COSTS
(CSJF vs Revised Estimate)

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<td>Costs/Savings</td>
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<td>CSJF</td>
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<td>Net Annual Savings From Realignment</td>
<td>CSJF</td>
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<tr>
<td>From Other Actions</td>
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ONE-TIME REALIGNMENT COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Nonconstruction</th>
<th>Total One-time costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

ONE-TIME COST AVOIDANCE

NOTES

Figure C-4
and in exercising control over report proliferation. The result would be to significantly reduce the number of reports to prepare without losing capability or implementation insights.
DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: Request for Analytic Support on Base Realignments

Chief of Engineers
Department of the Army
Pulaski Building
Washington, D.C. 20314

1. Purpose. To request that the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) provide analytical support on behalf of the Management Directorate, OCSA (DACS-DMA). Specifically, request that a study be initiated which will review the procedures used to estimate and monitor costs/savings associated with base realignments. The final product should provide the Army with a system designed to track/monitor the execution phase of base realignment actions and insure that anticipated savings are achieved, or identify reasons for shortfalls.

2. Background. The Army base realignment process is under constant procedural review. Although the methodology currently used to estimate costs/savings is reasonably good, some areas such as socioeconomic, environmental, and housing costs need more study. Similarly, the Army does not have an adequate management control system that monitors/tracks actual costs/savings once a realignment action is executed. The Army requires assurance that expected savings are being realized and that optimal decisions are being made.

3. Study Scope. The proposed study should investigate the methodology used to generate base realignment costs/savings and review the process (or system) used to track actual costs/savings. As a minimum, the study should:

   a. Perform research on recently completed base realignment actions. This material will provide up-to-date reference sources needed to identify key aspects of the realignment actions. The research should consider existing factors while addressing the impacts of community relations, civilian workforce (directly or indirectly affected), environment, energy, and other factors as deemed appropriate. The goal is to recommend improvements to the methodology for projecting costs/savings resulting from base realignments.
DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: Request for Analytic Support on Base Realignments

b. Recommend a reporting system that will permit better control for managing cost implications during the realignment execution phase. This system should be developed so that it can monitor actual costs/savings over the anticipated implementation period. The new system should, where possible, simplify data requirements, report formats, summary tables, etc. for both estimated and actual costs/savings.

4. Study Administration.

a. Recommend the study begin August 1980.

b. LTC Stacy Reeves, tel 694-4160, will be the DACS-DMA point of contact.

c. A Study Advisory Group (SAG) with appropriate representatives will be established.

d. Request ESC submit a detailed study plan within 45 days after receipt of tasking statement. This plan can serve as the basis for the detailed scope of study and ARSTAF expectations for the final product. The first In-Process Review (IPR) with the SAG would be appropriate at that time.

e. The study should be completed within 9 months after the study plan is submitted. IPR's will be held at two month intervals.

f. As a result of preliminary discussions, it is understood that ESC can accommodate this study according to the above guidelines.

THOMAS U. GREER
Major General, GS
Director of Management
ANNEX E

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