STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

VZAIMODEYSTVIYA--
A SOVIET PROBLEM

LTC Charles Nation
1981

GARMISCH, GERMANY

APO NEW YORK 09053

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FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

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GEORGE H. KLEB
LTC, MI
Commanding
SUMMARY

In this paper the Soviet principle of military art of взаимодействия (coordination) is defined. A recent discussion found in Voyennyy Vestnik (Military Herald) is used to illustrate the Soviet view of the problems being experienced in the Soviet armed forces, Soviet proposed solutions, and finally the writer's own analysis of the Soviet discussion.
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INTRODUCTION

During the war with Sweden, in November 1700, Peter the Great joined in a decisive battle against Charles XII. Peter's soldiers, who were laying siege to the city of Narva, enjoyed several advantages: they outnumbered the Swedish troops about four to one; they occupied well-prepared fortifications; and the Swedish forces were exhausted from a long march.

On the eve of battle, however, Peter found it necessary to depart the battlefield to conduct strategic discussions with his ally, King Augustus of Poland. Peter appointed Duc du Croy (a foreigner with impressive credentials, who represented King Augustus) to overall command in his absence.

Somewhat unexpectedly, Charles XII arrived on the battlefield, attacked immediately, and won an impressive and overwhelming victory. In effect, Peter's army was destroyed.

Why, when so many factors favored Peter's army, was Charles XII able to completely route the Russians? Simply—a lack of coordination. The general that Peter had appointed as his commander spoke no Russian and was unable to effect any coordination with or control over, his subordinate commanders. They, therefore, ignored him and fought the battle in a piecemeal fashion. Some soldiers (several thousand cavalry) did not even take part in the battle.¹
While in this example Russian, not Soviet, soldiers were involved, a number of parallels may be drawn with current Soviet problems. The Soviets place maximum emphasis on the principle of coordination of aggressive action at company and battalion level, with which to insure maximum use of the combined arms forces. As any Soviet military officer would quickly note, had Peter followed this principle, his chances for victory would have been greatly enhanced.

In a more contemporary example, Soviet Marshal Zhukov, writing in his memoirs, claims that the battle of Moscow was won in large measure due to the excellent coordination between combined arms forces. Soviet military journals and newspapers have presented, over the years, a large volume of material on the subject of coordination. In these articles the absolute importance of this principle is constantly stressed.

What, then, is this "magic" formula for victory--this principle of vzaimodeystviya? This essay will attempt to define this principle; to note some of its major characteristics; and to analyze some of the current discussion concerning its implementation.

The subject of coordination was selected as the topic for this paper because it highlights what the Soviets, themselves, consider to be an important contemporary problem. In addition, an analysis of the current discussion will provide an opportunity to look at Soviet military self-criticism--some of which is indeed sharp and to the point.

**DISCUSSION**

In 1980 Voyennyy Vestnik (The Military Herald) devoted a series of articles to this subject. The discussion began with an article entitled, "Precise Coordination is the Guarantee of Victory in Battle". This
subject was then offered by the editors to the general readership for discussion. 3

The procedure used to present analysis of this subject is as follows:

1. **Problem As Presented**--A short synopsis of the Soviet problem presentation;

2. **Discussion**--Criticism, disagreement between authors, and any combat examples will be summarized;

3. **Solution As Presented**--How do the Soviets say they can solve the problem?; and

4. **Analysis and Comment**--Comparisons between articles published previously, comparison between the current articles, and finally comment by this writer.

(Four of the 12 articles in this 1980 series were selected for analysis.) They were selected because they show the structure of the current discussion which allows identification of the primary elements of the principle of coordination.

Vzaimodeystviya may be literally translated as coordination, interworking, or interaction. All three terms are used interchangeably in translation--however, in this essay the term coordination will be used primarily. According to U.S. sources, "In the Soviet Army, it (coordination) is seen as the requirement to assure that all elements of the combined arms and services operate together in battle." 4

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia establishes coordination as, "...one of the principles of military art." 5 This same source explains that coordination is the organization according to the mission; direction of advances; (control) lines or areas; and time of action of all participants in the battle. 6

In this discussion of the various (Soviet) principles of operational art and tactics, Col. V. Ye. Savkin elaborates on the subject of
coordination. "The success of contemporary combat operations may be achieved only through the joint efforts of all forces and means participating in an operation or battle on the basis of their close and continuous interworking and fullest use of combat capabilities." Savkin explains that coordination became even more critical and difficult with the advent of nuclear weapons and the need to exploit their results. He also emphasizes that, "The interworking of troops for the duration of an entire battle or operation must be continuous and flexible..." He contends that a great deal depends on the exercise of initiative of those subordinate commanders.

This work by Savkin is considered to be particularly significant in that it helped to redefine Soviet principles of operational art and tactics in a nuclear environment. It should be noted that many comments in the current discussion in Voyennyy Vestnik are taken practically verbatim from Savkin. In consonance with Soviet doctrinal trends, there is almost no discussion of coordination in the defense or of defensive operations.

In introducing the first in the series of articles on coordination, the editors of Voyennyy Vestnik set the stage for the desired discussion. In addition to noting that coordination is an important, current and often very difficult problem for young commanders, the editors requested that readers present their experiences and views on this subject. The discussion, in general, was obviously oriented toward small unit leaders. As noted by the editors, "Problems of maintaining and restoring coordination in the dynamics of combat, when the battalion or company makes an assault crossing of a water obstacle... etc., especially need a more detailed coverage." For whatever reasons, the editors chose to ignore the problem of larger-than-battalion combined arms teams.
SECTION I:

"Precise Coordination is the Guarantee of Victory in Battle."

Problem as Presented:

The author of this article begins with a very positive statement of the problem. Drawing on World War II experience, LTC Sokolov states: "...that victory in battle was attained considerably easier when there was precise, continuous coordination among the participating troops Skillfully organized, etc., "...would make up for the shortcomings some with the merits of others, which then provided for successful accomplishment of missions with fewer losses and in shorter periods of time."

At this point the author provides us with his definition of coordination: "Coordination consists of coordinating combat missions, axes, lines and time and mutual assistance of operations all combat arms and special troops, as well as adjacent units for interests of most successful accomplishment of combat missions." The author contends that organizing and maintaining coordination is one of the most important elements (emphasis added) of the commander's job at the present time. He acknowledges that this is due in large part to the more advanced equipment and maneuverability on the modern battlefield.

While contending that coordination can be effectively executed on the modern battlefield, LTC Sokolov finally comes to the real point of statement: "...there are still commanders who do not fully understand the role and importance of coordination and who do not fully realize the disruption of it will result in blood spilled in vain in battle and multiplied losses in personnel and equipment."
Discussion:

Since this is the first in the series of articles, the author presents no discussion, as such, but outlines those things which make it difficult for a commander to effectively conduct coordination. In order to show some of the related problems, he uses as an example, a recent training exercise which did not go well. He cites Guards CPT L. Plokhotnyuk as being deficient in this area. Having received information that the "enemy" would attempt to counterattack with a superior force, the officer "irrationally" used the available time. The author indicates that the Guards CPT did several things wrong: He failed to use his reconnaissance patrol correctly; he failed to assign specific missions to the artillery; and the engineer platoon, with its mines, was completely forgotten. As a result, the enemy surprised the battalion and the exercise had to be stopped and new instructions issued.15

In general, LTC Sokolov indicates that coordination will be even more difficult to maintain in battle, especially when the commander and chief of staff have poor knowledge of the situation.

Solution As Presented:

If some commanders really don't understand coordination, and if exercises such as the one cited do not go well how are these problems of coordination to be solved?

Here, the author gets back into his "positive mode" again. He reiterates the difficulty for the battalion commander, who today must coordinate a greater number and variety of subordinate units than in any previous time. Again the author emphasizes the fact that, "In the final account, all preparations for combat are subordinate to it (coordination)."16
In order to be able to successfully organize coordination, an officer must have: good tactical training; a firm knowledge of combat capabilities of the weapons and equipment; knowledge of contemporary combined arms warfare; the ability to understand the senior commander's concept correctly; and ability to assign missions to subordinate units based on understanding of their capabilities. After explaining this the author reveals the steps necessary for successful coordination: "The commander decides the major issues in his decision -- outlining sequences of action, missions, means and nature of maneuver; and where he thus establishes the tasks, axes, lines, and time for which podrazdeleniye operations must be coordinated." In addition, the commander must think in more detail about exploitation of nuclear fires, artillery, and air strikes; assign common reference points; designate targets; clarify missions of adjacent units; assign missions to subordinates; designate responsibility for flanks and boundaries, lines of departure, dismount lines; and time for implementation of all control measures. Finally, the author emphasizes that to organize coordination properly, the commander must conduct personal reconnaissance. "And only as an exception, in the absence of time for going out on ground reconnaissance, can this work be conducted on a terrain model."

In order to illustrate how well all aspects of coordination may be organized, LTC Sokolov refers to a recent training exercise conducted by Guards MAJ V. Semka. This example was used by the author to show how all elements of coordination should be organized: Correct understanding of the superior commander's concept; situation estimate; organization by missions, time, control measures, etc.; and organization on the terrain. Two aspects of this example should be emphasized. First, the author
dwells at length on the role of the chief of staff in conducting coordination. The chief of staff discussed with and helped the commander in making his estimate; coordinated control measures with adjacent units; and communicated the order, control measures, etc., to the subordinate commanders. Second, the author makes some interesting comments on the relationship between the commander and his subordinates. It was obvious that the commander maintained strict control over all aspects of the training and issued detailed instructions to his subordinates. However, "The commander and chief of staff discussed several possible variants of the upcoming battle during a free exchange of opinions." (Emphasis added.) In addition, the commander allows the subordinate commanders to participate in discussion concerning their own missions. While the relationship described here may not seem unusual to Western leaders, it appears to be a real deviation from the didactic, dictatorial methods of leadership normally attributed to Soviet commanders.

To sum up, the author contends that problems of coordination at battalion and company level may be successfully solved if officers are well-trained in tactics and if they will follow the example provided by such leaders as Guards MAJ Semka.

Analysis and Comment:

This article, since it is the first in the series, has been discussed at some length. This was done in order to introduce the topic and provide the background necessary for the entire discussion.

How does this article compare with other information already known about coordination? The basic definition from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and other writings is again presented in this article. That coordination consists of certain organizations conducted by the commander, and based
on missions, times, control measures, etc., was already clearly established. What, then, has the author provided that needs more careful analysis? This article clearly indicates that there are serious deficiencies among junior officers. The term junior officers, as applied here, may be somewhat misleading. Since, in many cases, even battalions are commanded by captains, a rule of thumb for judging junior officers may be to consider junior officers to be those who lead platoons or command companies. Also, as will be seen, this discussion of coordination provides a forum to discuss a number of other problem areas.

This is, of course, not the first article which has been critical of coordination among junior leaders. A good example of this is an article entitled, "Before the First Shot Sounds," which appeared in Vovenny Vestnik, in 1978. This article by a Colonel Simchenkov also outlined, in detail, the steps of coordination for combat. Colonel Simchenkov also pointed out that, "Unfortunately, there are still unit commanders who do not complete these requirements (of coordination)." (Simchenkov also published an article in this 1980 series.) This is typical of the articles surveyed; however, none contained criticism as sharp or as consistent as the current series.

One aspect of this criticism is that of officers who conduct "easy" training. This is clearly not a case of acknowledging that leaders make mistakes. On the contrary, this accuses officers of being lazy or incompetent -- or both.

LTC Sokolov also seems to favor a full exchange of views and concepts between the commander and his subordinates. For example, "The commander and chief of staff discussed several possible variants of the upcoming battle during a free exchange of opinion" (my emphasis). (We will see later that this concept is sharply criticized.)
The criticism that the junior officers are deficient in coordination raises a question of why they do not receive more intense instruction in their training sources in this area. It seems to be implied here that such is not the case. Therefore, the onus for the deficiency shifts somewhat from the young officer to those responsible for officer training.

Following this introduction, the remainder of the articles will be briefly summarized to show additional aspects of the problem of coordination.

SECTION II:

"Before the Attack"

This article is a composite of several letters offered by the editors as depicting the thoughts and ideas of the general leadership. The more detailed will be analyzed here, with comments on the remainder.

The first is written by Guards CPT V. Markuzov, a motorized rifle battalion commander.

Problem As Presented:

CPT Markuzov generally agrees with the Sokolov article that there is a problem. "In organizing coordination, commanders, and especially young ones, almost always encounter certain difficulties." The author here indicates that problems exist in presenting missions to subordinates; that some forget entirely about artillery or other supporting fire weapons and special units; and that many devote excessive time to secondary matters.

Discussion:

Since Captain Markuzov does not, basically, disagree with the lead article, disagreements of other letter writers will be outlined here. In a very short letter LTC M. Lazerev expressed strong disagreement on
several aspects of LTC Sokolov's article. He disagreed that a "free exchange of opinions" should take place when organizing coordination. He notes that, "This is a complex process requiring careful calculations in modern warfare." CPT Markuzov, on the other hand, agreed that he listened to his officers very carefully.

In addition, LTC Lazerev indicates that coordination must be organized not only for the combined-arms units, but for all units participating in the operation. He also chides LTC Sokolov for coordinating boundaries with adjacent units, since those have already been assigned by the senior commander.

While not specifically disagreeing with LTC Sokolov, LTC A. Ryzhkov (district combat training department officer), changes the perspective of the discussion when he notes that, "At the same time, senior commanders who are conducting exercises do not always give sufficient time for training officers in organizing for combat and coordination on the terrain." This is hinted at also in CPT Markuzov's letter when he notes that only a limited amount of time was allowed for his own preparation.

Solution As Presented:

CPT Markuzov uses his own preparation for a recent mission to explain what should be done to organize coordination for an offensive operation. He states, "I see the goal of organizing coordination in having every officer, NCO and private in combat have a clear idea of his mission and the procedure for accomplishing it..." In explaining his own actions, the author echoes points made in the lead article. The author states he began planning for coordination
immediately on receipt of his mission; communicated his ideas in the warning order; then refined his decisions after issuing the operations order. He stresses several key factors necessary for success: (1) **Initiative** -- He urges that junior officers develop their own and their subordinates' initiative before and during combat. He cites as an example a subordinate officer who thought to use a terrain model for issuing his own orders. CPT Markuzov then ordered this system to be used by all. (2) **Detail** -- CPT Markuzov issued an operations order which contained very precise detail on every aspect of the operations. Every officer was expected to understand exact routes, formations and times for completion of every task. (3) **Reconnaissance** -- While acknowledging that there was little time for doing so, CPT Markuzov conducted final coordination on the ground to insure everyone understood every phase of the operation.

**Analysis and Comment:**

In reviewing a number of articles concerning coordination, a great similarity was noted among the various authors. What is difficult to ascertain are differences of opinion or disagreement. A bold disagreement was noted in the letter by LTC Lazerev concerning the relationship between a commander and his subordinates. Possibly, what is seen here is a conflict between actual relationships and what some commanders proclaim it to be. The Soviet system does lend itself to strict, authoritarian leadership although, occasionally, a leader will speak out for more discussion between subordinate and commander. This apparent conflict may, in fact, have serious implications for another of the major points made in these articles. Officers are constantly encouraged to display initiative and to encourage it in subordinates. This would seem to be especially true for organization of coordination. Savkin claims that, "Special
importance for maintaining constant interworking is assumed by the ini-
tiative of subordinate commanders. In all cases of disruption of inter-
working, they themselves have to attempt to establish contact with
adjacent units and with the senior commander and coordinate mutual
actions without awaiting special instructions for that." As was
pointed out earlier, CPT Markuzov placed heavy emphasis on initiative.

At the same time, however, he showed his own methods of operation. While
claiming he listened to his officers' suggestions and recommendations,
he also produced an operations order that contained the restrictive
control measures mentioned. He also made it clear he expected all his
subordinates to understand all details from his point of view.

These concepts appear to be in conflict. A junior officer who is
subject to strict, authoritarian leadership will probably not be accus-
tomed to exercising his own initiative. In addition, while some control
measures are obviously necessary for offensive operations, a commander
who dictates every formation, exacting changes of maneuvers and "over-
supervises," will stifle initiative in unforeseen situations. That
appears to be the situation expressed in these articles.

Another aspect of the discussion here is somewhat more subtle.
Who really is responsible if junior officers are unable to properly
recognize the importance of organizing coordination? Who is responsible
to teach them? The answer is hinted at here. CPT Markuzov notes that
his time was very limited to conduct coordination. LTC Sokolov indicates
very clearly that adequate time must be allowed for coordination. In
quoting World War II instructions from the Supreme High Command he shows
that very specific time limits were set: "...and give the rifle
battalion commanders at least three hours of daylight to arrange
coordination on the terrain..." In his letter LTC Ryzhkov laid the blame specifically on the higher level commanders. While acknowledging that one must be able to organize for modern combat in shorter periods of time, he states, "...We must teach the officer to do this now so that he can organize for combat in a limited amount of time."34

This discussion ties in with the question raised earlier concerning the level of coordination. Coordination, by definition in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, must take place at all levels of command. Nevertheless, the majority of discussion in this series of articles continues to be pitched at the inadequacies at the junior officer level -- with the obvious implications for higher-level commanders.

SECTION III:
"Jointly With Artillery"

Problem As Presented:

MAJ G. Basyuk, commander of an artillery battalion, notes that the question of coordination raised by LTC Sokolov is an important one. From that point he diverges completely from the problem as outlined in the original article. He contends that the real problem is one of coordination of supporting fires. "During organization of coordination difficult questions must be specified, which have to be decided in the interests of fulfillment of this or that mission by the combined arms podrazdeleniye and other type units."36

The author points out that a decisive role in the destruction of the enemy is played by various types of fire support. So what is the problem? MAJ Basyuk contends that, in fact, in organizing coordination, commanders often forget about fire support units altogether!37
Discussion:

The author goes on to cite World War II experiences that without fire support units were often unsuccessful. Then he strikes at the heart of his argument: "Such similar deficiencies, unfortunately, sometimes may be encountered today." Here he cites, as a specific example, the unit so highly complimented by LTC Sokolov. While MAJ Semko analyzed his mission, clarified his unit's role, evaluated the situation, etc., he ignored his fire support. In fact, MAJ Basyuk accuses that commander of not issuing any orders to any of his fire support units. He goes on to say that any coordination which is conducted without full cooperation of fire support means (especially the primary one for lower level units -- artillery), will result in shallow organization for combat.

Solution As Presented:

MAJ Basyuk's solution to this problem is simple in concept. Every combined-arms commander must be fully knowledgeable about all supporting fire means. Next, complete coordination must be conducted with the commanders of the supporting fire units. Special care must be taken that the artillery commander knows the full mission, all control measures, and the expected role of his unit. Only in this fashion will success in combat be assured. Additional details of that coordination will not be presented here. (In fact, a much clearer presentation of coordination required of the artillery commander is contained in "Decisions of the Artillery Commander," by General-Major (of Artillery) V. Lutsenko and COL M. Teslenko in 1978.) However, the basic concept is clear -- the supported commander is responsible to conduct close coordination with his supporting fires commanders.
Analysis and Comment:

The whole argument presented here seems fairly straightforward. MAJ Basyuk takes LTC Sokolov to task because the unit commander he praised did not use his supporting fires. In fact, he misquotes LTC Sokolov's article. While LTC Sokolov does not dwell on supporting fires, he makes it clear that, "In assigning missions to the podrazdeleniye, Guards MAJ Semka tried where possible to tie in the operations of the battalion and the attached and supporting weapons by missions, lines and time." In this same line, fire support was mentioned in several instances.

Therefore, by using a misinterpretation MAJ Basyuk launches into his problem of coordination of fire support. Other than this, his analysis of the importance of fire support means is quite conventional for the Soviets. The type analysis he presents may be found in many discussions on organization for combat. The article by Lutsenko and Teslenko is a very good example. The Soviets, in fact, put a great deal of emphasis on fire support means. As is pointed out by Savkin, all fire support means must be considered. This, for the Soviets, on the modern battlefield, very clearly includes exploitation of nuclear weapons fires (a point that was not specifically discussed by MAJ Basyuk).

SECTION IV:

"Coordination Must Stand"

The last article that will be discussed is also the last in this series. This is an article by a COL P. Simchenkov.

This article does not lend itself very well to the format used earlier, therefore, it will be summarized. The article adds nothing new to the information presented earlier. It does, however, present a final summation of views presented in the series of articles.
What is important about vzaimodeystvija? Of all that has been noted in the previous articles: artillery, communication, special conditions, etc., it remains most important that the accepted decisions be put into effect. It is necessary to destroy the enemy with the minimum of casualties. This may be achieved, as noted by Sokolov, when the commander and chief of staff coordinate action between all participants in the battle. Well thought-out and uninterrupted coordination plays an important role in success in combat.

The author uses a World War II example to show that when all elements of coordination are adhered to -- success in combat is highly probable. He also notes that some deficiencies still exist -- especially among junior officers.

However, these deficiencies may be overcome. With proper training and with stress on conducting realistic training the junior officers will be able to accomplish efficient coordination.

SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

Due to the length of this essay, only four articles on the subject of vzaimodeystvija were presented in detail. However, the major points noted in these articles were also emphasized in many other articles. In the other articles in the recent series under discussion, while writing about Polar conditions, night operations, or the difficulty of maintaining communications, the authors still stressed the same aspects of coordination.

There is obviously no disagreement that coordination must be conducted at all levels of command. Coordination must include every unit involved in a given operation. Within this concept the Soviets emphasize several major points which apply to all units. Among these are: All
Soviet leaders must understand the principle of coordination; all leaders, but especially junior officers, must be fully knowledgeable of tactics, weapons capabilities and employment of supporting units; and officers at all levels must exercise creativeness and initiative to make coordination work.

As has been noted, in almost every article from the recent Soviet military press, a major portion of tactical discussion includes the topic of coordination. Why? Coordination is considered by the Soviets as a major principle of military art. In addition, it is clear that the Soviets have considered this to be a major problem area for some time. This is especially true on the modern battlefield as the Soviet army has become more mobile and the Soviet officer is expected to exploit this greater mobility and the great advances in all types of fire support means -- conventional and nuclear.

Finally, discussion of a problem such as coordination provides a forum to emphasize other deficiencies of junior officers. Some of those that were discussed in a number of articles were: lack of initiative; inability to conduct realistic training exercises; improper relationships between commanders and their subordinates; and in general, a lack of tactical and technical knowledge.

While Voyennyy Vestnik is usually aimed at company and battalion level officers, there are some strong hints in this series of articles for more senior levels of command. After all, if junior officers are really so deficient in such an important area, who is really responsible?

In this series of articles the Soviets have provided an ample opportunity, for interested observers, to look at a current difficult problem. There obviously are serious tactical problems at the company
and battalion level. However, there is no indication that those units are incapable of performing their mission. The observer should understand that what he is seeing is a continuing effort to upgrade Soviet ground forces and to overcome existing leadership problems.
FOOTNOTES


3LTC V. Sokolov, "Chetkoe Vzaimodeystviya - Zalog Pobedy v Boyu," (Precise Coordination is the Guarantee of Victory in Battle) Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 1, (Moscow, 1980), pp. 17-21.


6Ibid.


8Ibid., pp. 1-55.

9Ibid., pp. 1-15.


11Ibid.

12Ibid., p. 16.

13Ibid., p. 17.

14Ibid., p. 19.

15Ibid., p. 20.

16Ibid.

17Ibid., p. 18.

18Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 16.
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Ibid., p. 18.


23 Sokolov, p. 18.

24 "Pered Nastupleniyem," (Before the Attack...) Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 2 (Moscow, 1980), p. 34.

25 Ibid., p. 36.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 37.

29 Ibid., p. 34.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., pp. 34-36.

32 Savkin, pp. 1-55.

33 Sokolov, p. 17.

34 "Before the Attack...," p. 37.


37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., p. 42.

42 Sokolov, p. 18.

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