THE U.S.-ROK SECURITY RELATIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

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THESIS

THE U.S.-ROK SECURITY RELATIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF KOREA

by

Philip Pyong Sunoo

March 1981

Thesis Advisor: C. A. Buss

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This thesis, entitled "The U.S.-ROK Security Relations: Their Implications for the Future of Korea," reviews the development of the U.S.-ROK relationship through three distinct periods; until the end of the Korean War; from the Korean War to President Carter's assumption of office; and...
during the Carter Administration. In the light of the explosive strategic environment in Northeast Asia, the hypothesis is examined that the mutual interests of South Korea and the United States demand that the stability of South Korea and the continuous undiminished U.S. commitment to South Korea's security are essential for the protection and progress of their mutual interests. An in-depth analysis of both political and strategic implications involving such issues as a phased U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea, a North-South non-aggression pact, a multilateral guarantee of Korea's neutrality, and a cross-recognition of North and South Korea and a possible 4-power or 6-power conference has been made.
The U.S.-ROK Security Relations: Their Implications for the Future of Korea

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States served as a midwife at the birth of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and fought for its survival when North Korea launched its attack in 1950. The United States has continued to assume a special relationship with South Korea to share heavy burden of responsibility for the defense of South Korea. American involvement in the Korea War led to the beginning of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. Under this treaty, the United States has continued to deploy its combat troops there, thus helping to deter North Korea from launching another armed invasion.

More than a quarter of a century after the termination of the Korea War, Korea is still technically at war. This is evident from the cold war pattern still intact on the Korean peninsula where more than one-million armed troops face each other across the Demilitarized Zone.

Despite many fundamental changes in the general international scene in recent years, relations between the two Koreas are still marked by deep-rooted animosity, distrust and suspicion.

Given the hostilities on both sides of the DMZ and conflicting interests of the Great Powers, the possibility of renewed conflict cannot be ruled out. President Carter was entirely aware of this situation when he assumed office
in 1977. However, in 1977, President Carter, citing South
Korean economic growth and many recent fundamental changes
in the international scene, announced the decision to con-
tinue the policy of withdrawal of U.S. combat troops which
was begun in 1970. At the same time, he emphasized that the
Korean armed forces should be modernized and the global
deployment of the U.S. forces should be reexamined to provide
a maximum degree of mutual security for both the ROK and the
United States. Of special concern to the people of the ROK
is what effect this decision will have on the Korean
peninsula. Whether or not this decision will enhance the
possibilities of war, what will be the precise nature of
constitutional processes as defined in the Mutual Defense
Treaty, are matters of controversy.

This paper will make an in-depth analysis of these issues
from all points of view and highlight implications of various
alternative scenarios for the future of Korea.

On the surface, the military situation on the Korean
peninsula has been stable since the conclusion of the Korean
War; underneath the surface, the condition of hostility has
persisted. At the same time, the global confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the Communist supporters on the one hand,
and the United States and its friends and allies on the other,
has continued. The effects of the Carter announcement must be
examined in the light of these two fundamental facts.
It is my hypothesis that the total package of U.S. policy toward Korea, 1) phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops; and 2) expedited modernization of the Korea armed forces, will have a profound effect on U.S.-ROK relations. These effects will be examined from a military and psychological point of view as perceived by different groups within the ROK. It is anticipated that my research will expose the nearly unanimous opposition on the part of South Koreans to the directions in American policy under President Carter.

Because of this critical Korean reception of Carter's policies, this writer wishes to examine whether 1) the timing of the Carter announcement was appropriate; or 2) whether it contributes to accomplishment of peace, stability and unification. This writer also examines other alternatives such as a North-South non-aggression pact; a multilateral guarantee of neutrality of the Korean peninsula; a cross recognition of North and South Korea and a possible 4-power or 6-power conference.
II. THE U.S.-ROK SECURITY RELATIONS

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In strategic and geopolitical terms Korea is one of the most sensitive areas in the world. Situated at a crossroads of its stronger neighbors—China, Japan and Russia, it has been subjected to foreign interference and control throughout much of its modern history. How deep Korea's destiny was intertwined with the Northeast Asian power conflict between these powerful neighbors is evident from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, both of which were fought over the control of the Korean peninsula.

Even before the dawn of the present century, Korea found itself indulging in weakness, playing the three stronger neighbors off against one another. At the same time, Japan, inspired by the military strength of the Western powers, was bent upon modernizing the country under the slogan of Hukoku Kyohei, "a wealthy nation, strong army." At the turn of the present century, Japan saw Korea as a dagger pointed at its heart. China regarded Korea as a buffer zone shielding it from an external invasion, and Russia regarded Korea as a springboard for its expansion toward warm waters in the Pacific.

Korea has never provoked any one of its neighbors. Yet, it has not been left alone in peace. Korea by itself has
never become a threat to anyone. It becomes a threatening dagger for Japan when it falls into the hands of China or Russia. However, it becomes a stepping stone for Japan or Russia when it falls into their hands. Korea's geographical proximity to these big neighbors and its strategic location made it a victim of log-rolling international power politics in East Asia. Thus, it was the sad fate of Korea to have become a perennial battleground between these stronger neighbors the three quarters of a century ago. For a weak Korea, there was no way out of this predicament.

As a result of Japan's overwhelming military victory over Russia in 1905, Japan made secure its strategic position in Korea and Korea became the target in a new kind of international conflict. In the Katsura-Taft secret agreement on July 29, 1905, "the United States approved Japan's paramountcy of interest in Korea in return for her disavowal of any aggressive intentions toward the Philippines."¹ Japan then proceeded with its plans to establish a protectorate over Korea.

Following this understanding, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 without any formal protest from the United States. Kyung Cho Chung in his Korea Tomorrow states:

...the United States raised no objection to Japan's interest in Korea, in return for Japan's promise to stay out of the Philippines. All of the Western powers in the Pacific were hopeful that Japan would provide a permanent block against Russian expansion toward the Pacific; in addition, they expected Japan to be so
occupied with her northward expansion that a southward advance would be impossible.  

From the U.S. viewpoint, the acceptance of Japanese hegemony over Korea was part of the price the United States had to pay for Japanese acceptance of the Open-Door policy. The U.S. policy appeared to be justified in terms of world peace and status quo in East Asia.

1. The Wartime Agreement in Cairo and Yalta

Though Korea was eclipsed from the world atlas, many Korean patriots at home and abroad kept alive their ardent desires for Korean independence. Korean exiles in the United States and China, who had maintained a provisional government of Korea following the 1919 independence movement, began to publicize the case for Korean independence and official recognition, but they received little more than expressions of sympathy.

The question regarding the future of Korea was discussed for the first time at the White House between President Roosevelt and Anthony Eden on March 27, 1943. President Roosevelt suggested that "Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States and one or two other countries participating." The reaction was instant. Syngman Rhee, chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States, was alarmed by this. In his letter addressed to President Roosevelt in May 1943, Rhee urged him "to rectify the wrong and injustice done to the Korean people and their nation during the last 38 years," blaming the
United States for allowing Japan "to occupy Korea in 1905 and annex Korea in 1910, all in violation of the American-Korean treaty of 1882." Rhee reminded President Roosevelt of "the danger of Russian expansion in the Far East, so feared and dreaded by the United States 40 years ago." Rhee warned: "If the American statesmen fail to realize this fact, the postwar settlements will leave the way open for another and even greater disaster than the present world conflagration." He urged recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea in Chungking, China, anticipating that "the Korean divisions trained and maintained by the Soviet government as a part of the Soviet Far Eastern army will be used by Soviet Russia eventually to invade Korea and to set up a Soviet republic there, affiliated with the U.S.S.R." However, the United States totally ignored all of his warnings. Even China, who always wanted to see Korea independent, showed a lukewarm attitude toward the question of recognition primarily because of disunity among the members of the Provisional Government of Korea in China.

Korea reentered the limelight of world history during World War II, when its struggle for independence was given formal recognition on December 1, 1943, by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and China in a joint statement issued in Cairo. In the statement, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that the United States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea," are determined 'that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.'\(^1\)

This statement constituted an epoch-making event marking a dramatic turning point in U.S.-Korean relations. In it, the United States made not only a formal commitment to Korean independence before the whole world, it also assumed a leading role of deciding the future destiny of Korea.

In retrospect, from the Korean viewpoint, the unfortunate phrase "in due course" was totally unacceptable. The phrase was regarded as cold water poured into the burning desire of the Koreans for immediate independence following the termination of the war.

In preparing for the Yalta Conference, the State Department drew up a number of briefing book papers, including one on Korea's postwar legal status which indicated that "military operations and subsequent occupation in Korea by any single state alone might have far-reaching political consequences."\(^2\) Since the State Department was aware of the traditional interests of both China and the Soviet Union in Korean affairs, it stressed the importance and necessity of joint action by interested powers for military operations and subsequent occupation. As for post-occupation periods, the Statement Department supported Roosevelt's concept that an international trusteeship be established "until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves."\(^3\)
The State Department suggested that with the completion of military operations in Korea, there should be "Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government in Korea" and that "such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future of Korea, such as the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union if it has entered the war in the Pacific."\textsuperscript{14}

Foreseeing the serious consequences of territorial division by interested powers, the State Department added that "such military government should be organized on the principle of centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones."\textsuperscript{15} The State Department strongly felt that following a period of occupation and prior to Korean Independence, "an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea under the authority of the projected international organization or independent of it."\textsuperscript{16} The State Department also felt that "it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim international administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enter the war in the Pacific."\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, a briefing book paper focused on the question of "Allied representation in the military occupation and in an interim international administration of trusteeship. But the State Department had not yet decided what powers should
actually participate in the military occupation and in an interim international administration or trusteeship. Yet it anticipated that the Soviet Union "will wish to participate in the military occupation of Korea"\textsuperscript{18} even without its participation in the Pacific war. While the State Department was strongly in favor of Soviet participation in post-war Korean affairs, it held the view that "an agreement must be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers"\textsuperscript{19} on the question of which powers should be represented in an interim international administration.

At Yalta, it was agreed as a modus vivendi, not a part of the official agreement, that Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship. This is evident from the following conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin:

He said he had in mind a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only true experience the United States had in this matter was in the Philippines, where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He held that in the case of Korea, the period might be from twenty to thirty years. Marshall Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. The president replied in the negative, to which Marshall Stalin expressed approval. The President then said there was no question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he held that they might resent this. Marshall Stalin replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us."\textsuperscript{20}

The question is why Roosevelt and Stalin did not conclude a formal agreement on Korea. What is known is the fact that "this was an unusual arrangement with no parallel."\textsuperscript{21} In
retrospect, had Roosevelt been more keenly aware of the historical nature of the Korean question, and had he reached a concrete, formal agreement at Yalta with a view to stifling Soviet's ambition for Korea, the United States certainly might have avoided the artificial division of Korea six months later.

2. The Development of a Divided Korea

The Russian ambition for a division of Korea has deep historical roots. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, Rosen, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, proposed in 1903 to Japan that "the portion of Korea north of the 39th parallel be designed as a neutral zone" to secure Russian interest in Manchuria. Japan turned it down and the Russo-Japanese War settled the issue. Russia was defeated and its ambition for a division of Korea did not materialize. This attests to the fact that Japan was as eager as Russia to secure a dominant position in Korea.

At a Potsdam military staff meeting on July 24, 1945, less than one month before the termination of the war in the Pacific, the Soviet side once again showed its interest in Korea, asking "if it would be possible for the United States to operate against the shores of Korea in accordance with the Russian forces which would be making an offensive against the peninsula." No agreement was reached on ground operations on the Korean peninsula simply because such amphibious operations had not been contemplated, and
particularly not in the near future." But for air and naval operations both sides agreed on separating Manchuria, Korea and the Sea of Japan into U.S. and Soviet zones.

Contrary to the widespread misconception that the division of Korea was another secret agreement made either at Yalta or Potsdam, the idea concerning the actual division of Korea was originated from military planners in the U.S. War Department Operations Division. Due to the Russian entry into the war against Japan on August 9, 1945, and Japan's first offer of surrender on August 10, 1945, U.S. planning had to be abruptly switched from an invasion strategy to that of occupying the enemy territory and accepting Japan's surrender. Under such circumstances, U.S. military planners drafted General Order No. 1 including the provision concerning the 38th parallel line, which was finally approved by Truman on August 13, 1945. This order stated that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel in Korea would surrender to Soviet troops, while those south of the 38th parallel would surrender to U.S. troops.

The text of this order was communicated to the British and Soviet governments. In his reply on August 16, 1945, Stalin requested some changes but made no reference to the provision having to do with the 38th parallel line. It is worthy of note that Russian forces entered North Korea on August 12 while General Order No. 1 was still under discussion. This time factor clearly proves that the division of Korea
along the 38th parallel was made neither at Yalta nor Potsdam. But one may raise the question why the 38th parallel was selected as the line of demarcation. From the U.S. strategic standpoint, the division of Korea along the 40th or 39th parallel was an ideal situation. Was it because the 39th parallel would place Dairen in the military zone to be occupied by U.S. forces? There is not the slightest doubt that the Russians would have not accepted a surrender line that barred them from Dairen and other parts of the Liaotung peninsula. In any case, it was politically and militarily infeasible for the United States to move a surrender line north to the 39th parallel because the Yalta agreement states that:

The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored.4

Even without this secret agreement, it would have been impossible for the U.S. forces to occupy the northern part of Korea because they were some 600 miles away on Okinawa, while Soviet forces already had invaded North Korea and Manchuria. It was totally unnecessary for the U.S. forces to occupy all of Korea even if it could because the United States expected that joint control would extend throughout Korea under a joint trusteeship following the termination of the occupation. One may conclude, therefore, that the United States regarded a surrender line along the 38th parallel as a temporary one.
Another question that may be raised is why Stalin did not raise objection to a surrender line along the 38th parallel. Soviet forces were strategically in a better position to occupy the whole of Korea. There was then no way for the United States to block a Soviet southward invasion in Korea in the absence of a formal agreement. It is most likely that Stalin's acquiescence regarding the demarcation line was largely motivated by the desire to have the United States "authorize the Russian forces to accept the surrender of the Japanese in the Northern half of Hokkaido." 27

Although the United States officially maintained that the purpose of the occupation was to enforce the instrument of surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, it was apparently desirable, viewed from the U.S. viewpoint, to secure a military, political foothold in the southern part of Korea which would be used, if necessary, as countervailing forces in the future. The desirability for the presence of American occupation forces may have stemmed from the U.S. fear that a Soviet dominated local government would be set up, regardless of the outcome of the projected international trusteeship. As early as July 1945, in his memorandum to President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson expressed such fear when he stated,

The Russians, I am also informed, have already trained one or two divisions of Koreans, and, I assume, intend to use them in Korea. If an international trusteeship is not set up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these
Korean divisions will probably gain control, and influence the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government, rather than an independent one. This is the Polish question transplanted to the Far East. My suggestion is that the trusteeship be pressed. I suggest also that at least a token force of American soldiers or Marines be stationed in Korea during the trusteeship.28

The U.S. intention to gain a foothold in Korea was clearly reflected when General Lincoln suggested that "if the Russians failed to accept the U.S. proposal on the 38th parallel, and if Russian troops occupied Seoul, American occupation forces should move into Pusan."29

Thus, one may come to the conclusion that the decision by the United States of temporarily dividing Korea into two zones was based on both military and political considerations to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and to deter the Soviet Union from taking advantage of political and military vacuum in Korea.

3. The Moscow Agreement on Trusteeship

By the terms of the Cairo Declaration the United States, Great Britain and China are committed to the complete independence of Korea in due course. However, it was at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 that the vague term "in due course" came to mean "a four power trusteeship for a period of up to five years."30 The Koreans described the Moscow Agreement on Korea as an insult to themselves and as another form of subjugation from which they had just emerged. The trusteeship, however short, would mean a postponement of independence for Korea. To the Korean people one master
would be simply replaced by four new masters. Therefore, the whole nation staged demonstrations against trusteeship and in favor of immediate independence.

The embarrassed U.S. military command sought to interpret the meaning of trusteeship as "help and advice." Secretary of State Byrnes in a December 30, 1945 broadcast to the American people went so far as to state that the Joint Soviet-American Commission "may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship."  

Then, on January 2, 1946, the communist groups in Korea, doubtless on Russian instruction, suddenly changed their attitude and came out in favor of trusteeship. Well-rehearsed demonstrations in favor of trusteeship were held in North Korea and leftist groups in the south dutifully fell into line while the nationalists stubbornly maintained their opposition. The communists favored it because in their view it more than promised ultimate communization of all Korea. This was the first crack in the frozen ice into which the whole nation was to submerge with political turmoil.

The U.S. military government assured anti-trusteeship leaders such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo that the United States would exert its utmost efforts for early independence of Korea, and it asked that they call off strikes which they used as part of the anti-trusteeship campaigns. The anti-trusteeship forces somewhat refrained from strikes.
However, they continued their agitation against the Soviet Union, denouncing it for delaying independence.35

The Soviet Union did not remain idle to this situation. Tass, the Soviet news agency, denounced the U.S. military government for instigating demonstrations against the decision of the Moscow Conference of foreign ministers.36 On January 26, 1946, General John R. Hodge, commander of U.S. armed forces in Korea, described the Tass statement as being "preposterous."37 Adding fuel to the fire was a statement made by Colonel General Shtikov, chief of the Soviet Mission to Seoul. He told a press conference the same day that it had been the United States which had proposed the trusteeship plan for Korea, that the United States had insisted on trusteeship of up to 10 years and that the United States had had no interest in the establishment of a provisional government of Korea, prior to the setting-up of trusteeship.38 In disclosing a proceeding of the Moscow Agreement, the Soviet Union was apparently motivated by the desire to present itself as a true protector of Korean interest and to cause the Koreans to believe that they had been betrayed by the United States.

General Hodge's embarrassment was compounded when Acting Secretary Acheson confirmed the Russian version. His confirmation did not conform to what the U.S. military command in Korea had assured the Korean leaders all along that the United States would strive for early independence.
of Korea. In a conciliatory gesture, John Carter Vincent, director of Far Eastern Affairs, stated that "self-government and independence are the goals" and that "trusteeship is only a procedure which may or may not be necessary." This was a great deviation from the earlier U.S. position that trusteeship was considered essential to prevent the Soviet domination of Korea. But the Soviet Union gave no indication that it would be willing to dispense with the trusteeship plan.

The Moscow agreement provided that a conference of the U.S. and Soviet commands in Korea shall be held within two weeks to solve urgent problems affecting both the North and South. The first meeting was held on January 16, 1946, in which the U.S. delegation voiced its desire for prompt elimination of the 38th parallel and integration of the two zones. But the Soviet delegation viewed the problem as merely one of exchange and coordination between two entirely separate zones of administration. Given this divergence of views, the conference was able to reach agreement only on such minor matters as the exchange of mail, allocation of radio frequency and military liaison.

The joint commission established by the Moscow Agreement to take steps for the formation of a provisional democratic government in Korea held its first meeting on March 20, 1946. The Soviet delegation refused to consult with Korean political parties and social organizations which
had opposed a trusteeship in proceeding to the formation of a provisional government. This means that only a communist minority which had supported a trusteeship would be included in the consultation. The U.S. delegation argued that the Korean people should be permitted to express their views on the trusteeship. Under the terms of the Moscow Agreement, the question of trusteeship must await an agreement by the four powers after consultation with the provisional Korean government. From the U.S. viewpoint, exclusion of Korean parties and social organizations which had opposed the trusteeship was a wanton violation of the basic principle of freedom of expression and democratic procedure. The second session, which was reconvened from May 21, 1947 until late August of that year, remained stalemated due to the Soviet reversal to its 1946 position.

In retrospect, and hypothetical as it may be, it is questionable whether the widespread opposition to the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow Agreement was the unique stumbling block standing in the way of a united Korea. Some argue that if the trusteeship plan had been implemented, the division of Korea would have been prevented. However, even without the widespread opposition to the trusteeship, bilateral negotiations by the two contending powers might have failed to reach any satisfactory agreement. From the Soviet viewpoint, the establishment of a provisional government loyal to the Soviet Union would be desirable because of Soviet
strategic interest in Korea. Given the drastic change in U.S. foreign policy, which was characterized by its "containment" of communism, the conflict of national interests between the two opposing powers could not have been avoided. Each was persistent in pursuing its own predominant position in Korea. Henry Chung in his *The Russians Came to Korea* states:

To submit to the Russians terms for governing Korea means not only selling the southern half of the country down the Volga (the northern half had already been sold out by the blunder of an American president), but also sounding the retreat of the United States from the Asiatic mainland. Since military strategy dictates that whoever control Korea will ultimately control Asia, the United States cannot afford to have the Japanese menace replaced by the Russian menace. There is no alternative for the American government but to carry out its commitments to the Korean people without Russian cooperation, limited though it is only to the American zone of occupation.44

B. THE BIRTH OF THE ROK IN 1948

1. U.S. Policy Toward Korea in the United Nations

The obvious failure in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission to make progress toward the establishment of a Korean provisional government led the United States to search for a solution to the Korean question at the governmental level. Acting Secretary of State Lovett proposed in August 1947 that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet "to consider how that Agreement may be speedily carried out."45 The core of his proposal was the idea of holding a general election in the two separate zones to establish separate legislative assemblies under the guidance of the
United Nations. His proposal was accepted by China and the United Kingdom. However, the Soviet Union rejected this proposal on the ground that the possibility of reaching agreement within the framework of the joint commission had not been exhausted. Faced with this impasse once again, Acting Secretary Lovett informed the Soviet Union on September 17, 1947, of the intention of the United States to place the Korean question before the UN General Assembly, stating that "bilateral negotiations have not advanced Korean independence" and "the Soviet government does not agree to discussions among the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement." On the same day Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his address before the UN General Assembly stated that "it is therefore the intention of the United States Government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly."

Unilateral action by the United States to refer the Korean question to the UN General Assembly was tantamount to an admission by the United States of failure in Korea and was a violation by the United States of an international agreement regarding Korea. But this course of action seemed, under the circumstances, inevitable and the most promising alternative. As one analyst put it, "it would place on the United Nations and its members some of the responsibility which the United States had hitherto assumed alone. At the same time, since American security was not considered to be at stake, no vital interest would be jeopardized."
Judging from the Soviet negative attitude toward both the joint commission and a four-party conference adhering to the Moscow Agreement, there was obviously no prospect for obtaining cooperation from the Soviet Union even in the United Nations. The draft resolution regarding Korea presented by the United States before the UN General Assembly session in November 1947 was almost identical in its basic ideas with the proposal which Acting Secretary of State Lovett in August 1947 had made to the governments of China, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It was merely different sides of the same coin.

The prime emphasis of the U.S. draft resolution was on holding a general election by March 31, 1948 on a national, not on a zonal basis, under the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea and on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the two separate zones following the formation of a united, independent Korea. The Soviet Union introduced a counter-proposal, calling for U.S. and Soviet troops to leave Korea simultaneously at the beginning of January 1948 "to give to the Koreans the opportunity of forming a government by themselves" without interference of outside forces. The Soviet resolution was voted down; the U.S. resolution won approval.

The United States, through the decision of the UN General Assembly, won a victory. However, the Soviet negative attitude toward the resolution made a general election throughout Korea impossible. With its failure to gain access to the Soviet occupation zone of North Korea, the UN Temporary Commission was compelled to take an alternative course of action,
that is, the holding of a general election only in South Korea on May 10, 1948.

That this course of action would have serious consequences for Korea was quite obvious. The establishment of a South Korean unilateral government would induce the Soviet Union to establish a communist regime in the north. The United Nations had no better choice but to take the risk of creating two Koreas, instead of preventing the creation of two hostile, irreconcilable regimes. From the U.S. viewpoint, the birth of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 1948 was a testimony of the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to Korea because of implementation of the UN resolution written by the United States and supported by the majority of UN member nations.

2. Withdrawal of U.S. Occupation Forces

With regard to the U.S. interest in South Korea, from the point of view of U.S. military security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the later part of 1947 regarded U.S. forces there as "a military liability" on the ground that they could not be maintained there "without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities" and that "any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct in the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula." But some had doubts whether the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea should be carried out without considerations of its political and military consequences. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, in his report on China-Korea to President Truman, warned:
The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or as seems not likely, by the Korean units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite communist regime in all of Korea.51

Francis B. Stevens, assistant chief of the Division of European Affairs, raised the question of whether the United States could get out of Korea without losing its prestige. The United States had the fear that continued lack of progress toward the Korean question would create a chaotic political and economic situation, including violent disorder, making the position of U.S. occupation forces untenable. "A precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States."52 Furthermore, the United States was convinced that the Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces at the beginning of 1948, if accepted, "would lead to the early establishment of a dictatorship in Korea."53 Precisely for these reasons, the United States objected to the Soviet proposal for withdrawal, made at the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission in September 1947.

Leaving Korea to its own fate prior to reaching an agreement on Korea in the United Nations would be tantamount to U.S. abandonment of Korea. The decision of withdrawal was thus delayed through 1948 when the UN General Assembly adopted the U.S. draft resolution calling for mutual withdrawal of occupation forces "as early as practicable."54
Given the Soviet politico-military objectives in Korea, U.S. withdrawal would apparently leave a vacuum behind "unless the United States, upon withdrawal, left sufficient indigenous military strength to enable South Korea to defend itself against any but an overt act of aggression." With this in mind, the National Security Council in a report of April 2, 1948 advocated the withdrawal of occupation forces by December 31, 1948. President Truman later approved this. It is clear, therefore, that the United States had made the decision for withdrawal long before the Soviet announcement for withdrawal in September 1948. U.S. forces began their withdrawal on September 15, 1948.

Soon after the initial withdrawal of U.S. forces, the situation in the new Republic deteriorated due to armed insurrections and daily surging domestic turmoil. Under these circumstances, the State Department reviewed the conclusion set forth in NSC-8 that the United States should withdraw its forces from South Korea as soon as possible with a minimum of bad effects. "The complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea at this time," the State Department argued, "would seriously jeopardize the security and stability of the Government of the Republic of Korea." However, the State Department recognized that the continued retention of U.S. forces "entails the risk of being forced to choose between military involvement and precipitate withdrawal."
event of war in Korea. The State Department recommended that the April 2, 1948 decision made in the NSC-8 be reviewed.

In support of the policy of early withdrawal, the Department of the Army presented the following views: 59

1) the U.S. has little strategic interest in maintaining its troops and bases;

2) the Army made no budgetary provision for the retention of troops beyond Fiscal Year 1949;

3) the ability of the ROK forces to cope with internal disorders minimizes the need for further retention of U.S. forces; and

4) the mission assigned U.S. forces prohibits involvement in actions precipitated by any faction or any other power which could be considered a casus belli for the United States.

At the same time, the Department of the Army held the view that the withdrawal of one regimental combat team remaining in Korea be completed not later than March 31, 1949, despite a request from the ROK Government for the retention of U.S. forces for a few months.

The disagreement on the timing of total withdrawal between the Department of State and the Army was finally solved when President Truman approved the March 22, 1949 NSC-8/2 report calling for the completion of withdrawal of the remaining U.S. combat team not later than June 30, 1949. In its report, the NSC concluded that "this step in no way
constitute a lessening of U.S. support of the Government of the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step toward the regularization by the United States of its relations with that government." As was the case with the NSC-8 report, the NSC-8/2 report supported the political independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea.

Six months after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from North Korea in December 1948, the last of U.S. forces left Korea only to return one year later. Thus, for the first time in half-a-century, the Koreans were left alone by big powers, in spite of the fact that their country was divided into two hostile forces along the 38th parallel.

C. THE KOREAN WAR

1. U.S. Intervention

The strategic value of a particular piece of real estate should be measured by how much impact which its loss would have on increasing the adversary's capability to launch another attack on another piece of real estate we value, and on decreasing our own capability to resist enemy's further attack. The scenario that South Korea had no strategic value was used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a justification for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in 1948 and 1949.

Secretary Acheson's remarks of January 12, 1950, on the U.S. defense perimeter running along the Aleutians-Japan-
the Ryukyus—the Philippines—added little to what was known to be the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His remarks clearly implied that the Republic of Korea was placed outside the U.S. defense perimeter. What was new in his remarks was that "so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack."

Precisely for these remarks, North Korea seems to have been encouraged to embark upon its military invasion against the South, convincing itself that there would be no military involvement by the United States in case of a full-scale invasion. The North Korea apparently had taken his remarks at face value. What was miscalculated by the North Korean leadership was a new U.S. military and diplomatic approach toward Korea; that is, support for the collective security system embodied in the UN Charter. In his speech, Secretary Acheson stated:

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not provoked a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

Contrary to the general belief that Acheson was going to abandon Korea, he clearly stated:
We have given that nation great help in getting itself established. We are asking the Congress to continue that help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should scrap all of that, that we should stop half way through the achievement of the establishment of this country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia. But there our responsibilities are more direct and our opportunities more clear.

John Foster Dulles made a more precise statement before the ROK National Assembly on June 19, 1950. In it, he said:

Already the United States has twice intervened with armed might in defense of freedom when it was hard pressed by unprovoked military aggression. We were not bound by any treaty to do this. We did so because the American people are faithful to the cause of human freedom, and loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it.

He concluded:

You are not alone; you will never be alone, as long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.

This assurance by Dulles seems to have come too late for the North Koreans to affect their plan for military action. The southward invasion by North Korea in June 1950 might have been prevented if Acheson had made it clear that Korea had the deterrent value of defending Japan which he said the United States would never abandon and that the United States would give full support to collective security action by the United Nations, including the use of armed forces if necessary.

Why did the United States suddenly reverse its policy toward Korea when North Korea launched its all-out attack
on the Republic of Korea? Acheson's testimony before a congressional committee explained it. He stated that the attack on the Republic of Korea was seen as a "challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world." If the attack were appeased with U.S. arms folded while a free country was swallowed up, it seemed obvious to U.S. policy makers that the Soviet Union would be encouraged to launch further attacks on other areas adjacent to itself. The primary political value of U.S. intervention was that any other free countries could count on the United States and collective security action by the United Nations in case of attack, with or without firm U.S. commitments.

In retrospect, if the United States had dropped Korea in the face of aggression, the worldwide political, economic and military impact would have been enormous. Japan, which the United States values most in Asia in political, economic and strategic terms, could have been forced to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of aggression which, alone, it could not resist. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not have been given a powerful impetus to its military build-up and its political solidarity. Among other things, the United States could have lost its worldwide credibility, weakening the confidence of those who count on the United States. But, as a result of U.S. intervention, the confrontation between China on the one
hand and the United States on the other served well the Soviet political and security interests for the best part of 30 years.

2. **Armistice**

The UN collective action in Korea was undertaken to achieve the military objective of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. It was not the U.S. position to establish a unified, independent, democratic Korea by force of arms. The signing of the July 1953 Armistice Agreement thus constituted the fulfilment of the military objective of UN collective action in Korea. The military demarcation line corresponding to the battle line at the end of the hostilities was established. Although this line does not coincide with the 38th parallel, both North Korean and Chinese communist forces were driven back to a line farther north than south of the 38th parallel.

For the North Korean regime one can say that it was totally denied the "liberation of the fatherland" by force of arms. For the Chinese communists one can argue that if Chinese military intervention was motivated by the buffer zone concept to maintain a friendly communist state in the area adjacent to China, one should admit that it achieved its military objective. If China had a limited military objective based on the buffer zone concept, why did the Chinese forces cross the 38th parallel and launch a general
offensive in 1951? Viewed from this context, one can also argue that China certainly sought to drive UN forces from the whole of Korea, outrunning its original limited military objective. The Armistice Agreement thus denied China the fruits of aggression.

Syngman Rhee was strongly opposed to an armistice which left Korea divided, denouncing the prospective cease-fire as a "death sentence" to the Republic of Korea. Rhee reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire only after the United States promised him the following:67

1. Promise of a mutual security pact.
3. Agreement to implement the planned expansion of the ROK Army to 20 divisions with modest increases in the navy and air force.
4. Withdrawal from the political conference after 90 days.

The war was over with the signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, but Korea remained divided, this time along demarcation line.

Today's divided Korea is still technically at war. The first important factor is that the Armistice Agreement is not a peace treaty which legally terminates hostilities. The agreement merely insured a cessation of hostilities between
the belligerents until such time as a peaceful settlement is achieved. The parties signatory to the agreement merely have tacit commitments to the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. The second is that most of the provisions of the agreement, other than ending the hostilities and exchanging the prisoners of war, have not been fully implemented.

Within 24 hours of the signature of the Armistice Agreement, the communist side began to introduce aircraft into North Korea. A report of the UN Command specified on August 9, 1957 that "the communists have illegally introduced large numbers of combat aircraft, mostly jet fighters, and now maintain an air force of more than 700 planes based in North Korea."68 North Korean air force strength thus increased from zero in 1953 to more than 700 in 1957. The report added that the communists have also illegally introduced artillery pieces in the category of 122mm. mortars and 75/76 gun/-howitzers.69 All of this was a wanton violation of sub-paragraph 13 (D) in Article 11 of the Armistice Agreement, which provides in part:

Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.70

Accordingly, on 21 June 1957, the UN Command announced its plan to reinforce UN forces in Korea. The UN Command
had no better alternative but to renounce the sub-paragraph 13 (D) to restore the relative balance of military strength which the armistice was intended to preserve. Neither side had any means to prevent the other side from violating the agreement. In view of this fact, the Armistice Agreement as such became non-existent. What remained was a nominally, uneasy cease-fire during the years that followed this event.
FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid., p. 1093.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 1093-1094.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 1095.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 359.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 361.

18. Ibid., p. 360.

19. Ibid., p. 361.

20. Ibid., p. 770.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 530-531.


35. Seoul Sinmunsa, p. 89.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 90.


41. The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960, pp. 4-5.

42. Ibid., p. 5.

43. Ibid., p. 6.


47. Ibid., pp. 622-623.


50. Ibid., p. 817.

51. Ibid., p. 803.

52. Ibid., p. 818.

53. Ibid., p. 883.

54. Ibid., p. 859.


56. Ibid., p. 1169.

57. Ibid., p. 1338.

58. Ibid., p. 1339.

59. Ibid., pp. 1342-1343.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 117.


65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 1715.


69. Ibid.

III. SECURITY RELATIONS, 1953-1976

A. U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT

1. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

The most direct result of the Armistice Agreement was the security treaty with the Republic of Korea, which reversed the 1950 U.S. policy of leaving the ROK defense responsibility to South Koreans themselves first and to a UN collective action later. There is no doubt that the conclusion of the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signifies the recognition by the United States of Korea's strategic and deterrent value in defending U.S. interests in the Far East and in the Western Pacific.

Article III is the key point of the treaty. Under that article "each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."¹

Under Article III, there are no obligations whatsoever for either party to come to the aid of the other without going through its constitutional processes. The constitutional process is time consuming. In a sudden attack, it would be impractical to seek to determine the nature,
timing and exact extent of collective action to be taken. In such a case, this element of time would prove decisive. By sharp contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty approach makes an armed attack on one tantamount to an attack on all. One may wonder if an armed attack on the Republic of Korea would be regarded by the U.S. Congress as an attack on the United States itself. Viewed from the South Korean standpoint, this is an essential vulnerability of the treaty. However, under Article III of the treaty, the United States does not permit itself to be automatically involved in any future conflict in Korea. This gives the United States an advantage of taking any action which it deems appropriate and necessary.

The scope of U.S. commitments under the treaty is limited. In the case of an armed attack from North Korea, the obligation of the United States would be limited only to the area which the United States recognized that the ROK government had lawfully brought under its administrative control. The limitation that the United States imposes itself on the scope of its commitments is apparently designed to deter the Republic of Korea from launching an armed attack on North Korea. The treaty is undoubtedly defensive in nature. Precisely for this reason, the treaty has a negative objective of forestalling a repetition of the Korean War "by a clear warning to potential aggressors that the United States and the Republic of Korea will regard an
armed attack on the territory of either party as dangerous to their peace and security." ²

The treaty, which "grew out of the Korean Armistice negotiations and the legitimate concern on the part of the Republic of Korea for its security in the period following the armistice" ³ constitutes a symbol of collective security and solidarity in the Pacific area, an essential factor which may play a major role in preventing a recurrence of a second Korean War.

2. The Deployment of U.S. Forces

The main pillar of ROK national security rests upon a double foundation. For the past three decades the United States has stationed its troops in the Republic of Korea. The first function of U.S. troops there is to observe the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The second is to deter an armed attack from North Korea. Being a signatory to both Armistice Agreement and the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, the United States has the right to station its troops there. In Article IV of the treaty," the Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement." ⁴ However, the United States would be under no obligation to station its forces in the Republic of Korea under the treaty. This seemingly places the security of
the Republic of Korea in an unfavorable position. In actuality the security of the Republic of Korea was already reinforced when the 16 UN members with troops in Korea, including the United States, declared on July 27, 1953:

that if there is a renewal of the armed attack...we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so great that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

When the Mutual Security Treaty was concluded, the international security system was characterized by a bipolar cold war relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both North and South Korea were, respectively, a component of these two opposing forces. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable for the United States to shift its security policy toward Korea. The pre-Korean War U.S. defense perimeter was subsequently replaced by a new one linking Korea and Taiwan--the areas adjacent to the communist countries. Since then, the Republic of Korea has emerged as a vital U.S. forward defense area in East Asia and in the Western Pacific region.

The new international situation required a new worldwide defense policy. As early as December 1953, President Eisenhower announced a progressive reduction of U.S. ground troops in Korea. He went on to point out that U.S. military forces in the Far East will feature "highly mobile navel, air, and amphibious units"; and he added that in this way, despite some withdrawal of ground troops, the United
States will have a capacity to oppose aggression "with even greater effect than heretofore."

Testifying before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate on 14 January 1954, General Ridgeway stated that "the contemplated withdrawal of two Army divisions would not weaken our position over there, but that "it would add to our flexibility." These two statements clearly imply that the United States would not engage itself in an Asiatic land war, nor would it employ the same policies and resources to fight another war as used in the Korea conflict. The redeployment of these two divisions was an integral part of the Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" defense policy which was to place less emphasis on ground forces to deter future aggression.

The Eisenhower Administration perceived a high level of domestic disenchantment with the limited war in Korea and assumed that reduced defense spending and a balanced federal budget were essential to a strong economy. The result was a defense strategy known as massive retaliation. This strategy was "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." to deter communist aggression. This strategy was used as a rationale by the Eisenhower Administration to carry out a progressive reduction of ground troops in Korea.

Both the 40th and 45th divisions left Korea in June 1954. Again the State Department announced on August 1954
that four of the six remaining divisions would be withdrawn, saying that the impending withdrawal would not have any setback in the defense of the Republic of Korea because of the withdrawal of some 200,000 Chinese troops from North Korea. The ROK Government was strongly opposed to the impending troop withdrawal, pointing out that North Korea had introduced "more than 400 fighter planes since the signing of the Armistice Agreement." The National Assembly convened a night session and adopted a resolution denouncing the withdrawal. Nationwide demonstrations were held, demanding that the U.S. troops remain in the country.

Despite the nationwide anti-troop withdrawal campaign, the three army divisions—the 25th, the 3d and 24th—and one marine division left Korea in 1954 and 1955 respectively. The United States in return agreed to provide the ROK Government with a $700 million military and economic assistance program for FY 1954-1955. Washington reaffirmed its pledge to use military force, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to defend the Republic of Korea against any outside aggression.

As noted earlier, even before the ink was dry, the North Korean side began to introduce fighter planes and heavy weapons in violation of the provisions of sub-paragraph 13(D) of the Armistice Agreement which were specifically designed "to insure the freezing of the military status quo by maintaining the relative military balance existing on July 27,
1953." In view of these facts, the United Nations Command side to the Military Armistice Commission on 21 July 1957 informed the Communist side of its intention to renounce the provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (D) of the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command side said:

The stability of the Armistice and the maintenance of the relative military balance, which it was the primary purpose of these provisions of the Armistice Agreement to insure, can now only be restored and maintained by the replacement by the United Nations Command of its old weapons with new items currently available. The United Nations Command is taking appropriate steps to this end.

Earlier indications of U.S. intentions to take steps which would restore the military balance in Korea were given by Secretary of State Dulles at his news conferences of April 2, and May 14, 1957. On May 14, he stated:

The Armistice Agreement has to be interpreted, I think, in a realistic way. It was made nearly 5 years ago, presumably for a brief duration, and called for a replacement of weapons only on a piece-by-piece basis of comparable quality. Well now, in the passage of that 5 years much of the stuff that was there is no longer made, has become obsolete. Therefore, it is not practical to replace it exactly on a like-for-like basis, and there must be some elasticity there. Furthermore, we have good evidence that the Chinese Communists from their side are introducing weapons, planes into the area upon a basis which does not involve by any means a strict or reasonable compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Under those circumstances we are considering introduction of more modern, more effective weapons ourselves into the Republic of Korea.

Thus, the United States regarded the old prohibition of the armistice agreement as no longer inhibiting the United States in modernizing UN Forces in Korea because of prior violations on the communist side. As early as 28 June 1957, F-100 fighter planes and B-57 fighter bombers were introduced
into Korea. Ground troops were provided with new-type rifles and bazookas, and H-21 helicopters. Most significant was the fact that the 7th Infantry Division was reorganized as a "petomic" unit which was armed with 280 mm atomic guns and surface-to-surface missiles. The 1st Armored Division was redeployed from Japan to Korea on 1 August 1957.\(^\text{16}\)

All of this was a clear indication that the Korean peninsula has been turned into an arsenal and that the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an attack from North Korea.

Meanwhile, U.S. military assistance to the Republic of Korea in the FY 1958 alone totaled $331.1 million. This represented more than 60% of the total amount of military assistance the Republic of Korea had received in the immediately preceding five years.

Under these circumstances the North Korean reaction was most dramatic. In its statement on February 5, 1958, North Korea made a proposal calling for the simultaneous withdrawal of "U.S. army and all other foreign troops including the Chinese People's Volunteers" from North and South Korea and a reduction of both North and South Korean armed forces to the minimum in the near future.\(^\text{17}\) On February 7, 1958 the Chinese issued a statement in support of the North Korean proposal.\(^\text{18}\) Without waiting for U.S. response, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Korean Premier Kim Il-song issued a joint statement in Pyongyang on February
19, 1958, confirming that the Chinese People's Volunteers will be completely withdrawn before the end of 1958. In October 1958 the withdrawal of all Chinese People's Volunteers from Korea was allegedly completed.

Why didn't China trade off the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers from Korea for one by the UN Command side? It may be assumed that both North Korea and China might have been simply unwilling to take the risk of another armed conflict under the new military situation in Korea where U.S. forces were armed with new-type weapons with tactical nuclear capability. It is also conceivable that China might have no longer had access to modern Soviet weapons because of a restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. If these assumptions are correct, the presence of U.S. forces with nuclear capability, as stressed by former secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger, not only operates as a restraint on North Korean adventurism, but also functions as a restraint on other powers in the area.

The United States has not forgotten what happened within several months after the United States withdrew its troops from Korea in 1949. The United States had no intention of making the same mistake again, especially when North Korean forces were heavily armed in violation of the armistice agreement. Even without the presence of Chinese forces in North Korea, North Korea always has the advantage of a communist mainland beyond the Yalu River, across which
supplies and reinforcements can be sent to support a new aggression. The implication is that to withdraw UN forces from the Republic of Korea would leave Korea once again exposed to the threat of renewed communist aggression.

With these considerations in mind, the UN Command justified its continued presence in Korea in the following words:

United Nations forces are in Korea at the instance of the United Nations. In accordance with the existing recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Government concerned are prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.20

In sum, the U.S. military commitment to Korea under the Eisenhower Administration placed its emphasis on reducing the presence of U.S. forces, building up ROK forces through military assistance programs and relying on the strategy of massive retaliation to deter communist aggression.

B. ROK PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Commenting on the motives for Korea's dispatch of combat forces to South Vietnam, Chyun Sang-jin, former ROK vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote:

The Republic of Korea's voluntary dispatch of its armed forces to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people uphold their independence and sovereignty was prompted by bitter experience during the Korean War and lessons it learned from international cooperation. The resolute action was also based on its own apprehension of situation and on the call of conscience. This is not at all an offensive involvement for war but a defensive involvement for peace. The action was firmly based on the belief that peace can in no circumstances be achieved through appeasement only, but that a proper exercise of strength is inevitable to preserve peace.22
It is understandable that the initial decision to send non-combat troops was undoubtedly motivated by the strong desire to compensate for the debt Korea owed to the United States and other friendly countries. A deep sense of moral obligation was deeply ingrained in Korean conscience because of the aid given by the United States to Korea during the Korean conflict. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 1964 when the National Assembly unanimously voted for a dispatch of a group of self-defense instructors and a medical team.

There was growing criticism among opposition political forces in the National Assembly on the decision of over-extending military commitment. The controversy over military commitment reached its peak in early 1966 when the ROK Cabinet decided to send additional combat troops. The opposition forces argued that "the pulling out of 49,000 elite troops would jeopardize the security of the country" and that "such a move might induce a similar counter-action by North Korea on behalf of Hanoi, thus increasing the chance of renewed North-South conflict in Korea." 22

In making this decision which would affect the security of the country, the ROK Government was most probably motivated by the following factors:

First, the ROK Government was motivated to forestall the redeployment to Vietnam of the remaining U.S. combat troops.
A second factor was to further strengthen a ROK security position by obtaining a guarantee for the U.S. automatic and immediate response in case of aggression.

A third inducement was to modernize ROK armed forces through U.S. military and economic assistance programs.

The first case was substantiated by the fact that "the ROK capital defense line had been moved from the Han River northward to the Imjin River just south of the DMZ. This move was significant because it implied that both the U.S. and South Korean forces were committed to the defense of capital city of Seoul rather than retreating southward to more advantageous terrain."23

The second was evidenced by the fact that South Korean leaders always fear that the "constitutional process" clause under Article 3 of the mutual security treaty will slow U.S. reaction in a crisis. For this reason, when Cyrus Vance was sent by President Johnson to Seoul in February 1968 to soothe Korean fears in the wake of the Pueblo crisis, the Korean leaders demanded "immediate and automatic U.S. military intervention" in case of aggression and the holding of annual meetings at the ministerial level of defense ministers to discuss and consult on defense and security matters of mutual interest and common concern.24 President Johnson and Park held a summit meeting in Honolulu in April 1966, and Johnson "reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance
to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea."²⁵

The third was proven by the fact that on March 7, 1966, Withrop G. Brown, U.S. ambassador to Korea, presented to the ROK Government a 14-point memorandum. With this memorandum, the U.S. Government officially confirmed its agreement to give additional military and economic aid as a reward for Seoul's plan to send more troops to South Vietnam.²⁶ It was at the first ROK-U.S. defense ministers' meeting in Washington in May 1968 that the United States agreed to provide aid for developing a ROK munitions industry and arming the 2.5 million Homeland Reserve Defense Forces.²⁷

A major negative effect of South Korea's involvement in Vietnam was the escalation of tensions along the DMZ. The armed provocations of North Korea on land and sea in and near the DMZ and the infiltration into the Republic of Korea of armed agents were further intensified with each passing day in parallel with an increase of ROK troops in Vietnam. It is fairly safe to assume that North Korea deliberately brought the situation in Korea to a brink of war by raising the possibility of a second front to thwart the U.S.-ROK war-efforts in Vietnam.

A report made by the UN Command in Korea to the United Nations on November 2, 1967 indicated a drastic increase of violations by North Korea of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.
A total of 543 incidents, in contrast to 50 incidents in 1966, has taken place in 1967, resulting from the infiltration into the Republic of Korea from North Korea of armed agents. Casualties and incidents caused by infiltration are shown by the following table:

### TABLE I

**CASUALTIES CAUSED BY INFILTRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>(To Oct. 18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Incidents:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ Area</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior of ROK</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exchange of Fire:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ Area</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior of ROK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Koreans Killed:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within ROK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Koreans Captured:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within ROK</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Command Personnel:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within ROK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Command Personnel:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within ROK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROK National Police &amp; Other Civilians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROK National Police &amp; Other Civilians Wounded:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Korea's policy of deliberate, reckless brinkmanship was further demonstrated by the assassination attempt by a 31-man North Korean commando team on the life of President Park on January 21, 1968, the seizure by North Korea of the U.S.S. Pueblo on January 23, 1968 and the shooting down of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft EC-121 on April 15, 1969. All of these incidents clearly shows that North Korea appeared to be ready to risk even an all-out military confrontation with the south.

The Seoul Government maintained that the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo by North Korea was designed "to upset and obstruct the political stability and economic progress in the Republic of Korea and to apply braking pressure on Korea in her assistance to the Republic of Vietnam." For these reasons, the Seoul government insisted on taking firm and resolute actions against the north. In light of America's mild reaction to the Pueblo crisis, the ROK leaders started seeking new approaches toward national security based on "self-reliance." The series of new security arrangements made between the United States and the Republic of Korea in the wake of the Pueblo crisis eloquently spoke itself.

From 1969 there has been an increase in major weapon supplies to the Republic of Korea. This reflects two factors. First, increased military assistance has been provided to the Republic of Korea as a quid pro quo for ROK combat troops in Vietnam. Secondly, after the Pueblo incident,
U.S. arms supplies and military assistance were increased. In addition to regular military aid and $32 million for anti-infiltration equipment scheduled for 1968-1969, a $100 million request was added to the President's annual foreign aid message. It was to be spent on anti-aircraft equipment, patrol boats, radar, ammunition and aircraft. The Republic of Korea received a squadron, valued at $52 million, in the summer of 1969.30 Thus, the removal of ROK combat troops from the Korean front line was offset by increased U.S. arms supplies after some five years of declining U.S. military aid. (see Table 2 below)

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Military Assistance (U.S.mn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>124.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>173.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>153.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>149.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>197.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>210.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite a vulnerable Korean situation created in the wake of North Korea's armed provocations, ROK's military commitment in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam changed the ROK's image from a U.S. client-state to its more reliable
ally. It has thus laid a solid foundation on which to build more secure security ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

C. THE DOCTRINES OF NIXON AND FORD

1. The Nixon Doctrine

The ROK leaders seemed to have the notion that the enunciation in 1969 of the Nixon Doctrine had no applicability to the vulnerable Korean situation. This notion probably rested on the contention that there would be no change in a level of U.S. troops in Korea as long as ROK troops remained in Vietnam. Contrary to their contention, then Secretary of Defense Laird made the following remarks before a House subcommittee in 1969:

There is no bargain, there is no understanding along that line. I want the record to show that there is no commitment as far as the United States is concerned along that line, and we shouldn't let anyone think that there is any kind of commitment like that because, as far as I am concerned, I would not go along with any commitment like that.31

The announcement on July 5, 1970 of the reduction of U.S. troops by one army division came as a "Nixon shock" to the South Korean people in general and to their leaders in particular. "If GI's go, I go," remarks made by the Prime Minister Chong-Il-kwon, represents Korea's protest over the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea.32

It is apparent that the ROK leaders regarded what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine in its worst possible light—America's total retreat from Asia,33 despite repeated
assurances that the United States would keep all its treaty commitments through military and economic assistance in case of aggression.\textsuperscript{34}

The ROK's uneasiness over its security was surfaced during 1969, initially by indications that the U.S. military presence on the Ryukyu Islands might be affected by the conversion of the islands to Japan in the early 1970's. The ROK Government had regarded Okinawa as a "bulwark to the security of the Republic of Korea and Free Asia." It was against this backdrop, in March and June 1969, that an alarmed ROK Government suggested to the United States the use of Cheju Island as a substitute for Okinawa or as a new naval and air base complex.\textsuperscript{35} The U.S. refusal mystified the ROK leaders.

It was against this background that ROK's uneasiness over its security was aggravated by the U.S. decision to remove one army division from Korea. Its uneasiness stemmed from one primary concern; that is, the obvious removal of deterrence. However, Senator Joseph Tydings expressed the opposite views.

Senator Tydings challenged those who contend that U.S. deterrent would not be credible without the presence of two U.S. army divisions in Korea. He argued that employing one army division along the DMZ as a "trip-wire" vitiates the critical "constitutional processes" clause in the U.S.-ROK security treaty because an attack
on the U.S. front line division would automatically insure U.S. involvement in the conflict. If such is the case with respect to the ROK security, it may be safe to conclude that it is no longer Washington, but Pyongyang, which will determine the form of U.S. action in response to a threat to the ROK security. For the United States, then, the "constitutional processes" clause will become totally meaningless.

In addition to this argument, the principal reasons which in his opinion constituted a compelling case for the withdrawal of one U.S. army division from Korea are:

First, the Republic of Korea possesses the military manpower and resources to cope with any invasion from North Korea, providing U.S. air support is continued. In his Guam speech, President Nixon indicated that "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense." The Nixon Doctrine is keyed to the utilization of local manpower whenever possible. The use of local forces can be maintained at less cost to the United States; for example, Korea can maintain twenty troops for the cost of one U.S. soldier. Given the excellent fighting ability of ROK troops, coupled with a population of 31 million in the south and its economic resources, it was apparent to Senator Tydings that the "Koreanization" policy would permit the replacement by Korean troops of a departing U.S. division from Korea at less
cost, just as "Vietnamization" was expected to permit the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

Second, the United States is party to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Article II of that treaty commits the United States to take appropriate action in case of communist aggression. Finally, the 16 nations, including the United States, which furnished military forces to the UN Command during the Korean War issued a statement in July 1953 pledging themselves to renew the war if communist aggression recurred. Senator Tydings believed the U.S.-ROK security treaty and the pledge made by other allies to be another factor serving to reinforce the credibility of the U.S. commitment as a deterrent.

It is highly doubtful, however, that the United States would commit its combat troops once again should a similar situation develop. The reason is that the Nixon Doctrine is designed to extricate the United States from the morass of the future Asian conflict in favor of greater self-reliance and independence among the Asian allies of the United States. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that other allies would commit their troops once again should the United States refrain from its military involvement. For these reasons, it was apparent to the ROK leaders that the pledge made by the United States and other allies was regarded as unreliable. Premier Chong Il-kwon summarized the problem from Seoul's
point of view this way: "No matter what the United States takes out, North Korea will take the beginning of a withdrawal as a wavering or weakening of United States intentions here."\textsuperscript{40}

With the planned reduction of one-third of the approximately 64,000-man force level authorized for Korea, the United States had a credibility problem, not only with Seoul but also with Pyongyang. U.S. failure to "punish" North Korea for the capture of the spy ship Pueblo and the shooting down of an unarmed EC-121 reconnaissance plane did little to strengthen Pyongyang's view of the credibility of the United States to use its military might in a crisis.\textsuperscript{41}

Is there any "magic number" below which North Korea would assume it was safe to risk a second Korean war? There is no magic number. However, South Koreans always remember that the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1949 was followed by an invasion in 1950 from the North. Whatever the rationale behind the U.S. move to reduce forces, the ROK leaders believe that no U.S. assurance to Seoul is greater than the presence of combat troops as a tangible evidence of the U.S. defense commitment.

After the decision to reduce U.S. troops in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000, the United States shifted a wing of 54 phantom F-4 fighter bombers from Japan to station them permanently in South Korea, and proposed special budget request of $1.5 billion over a five-year period for Korean
force modernization. This move is a clear reflection of the altered concept of a U.S. defense posture in Korea embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The scenarios of this concept are: (a) with the reinforcement of U.S. air force and expanded military assistance programs, ROK forces can provide its own ground troops to counter North Korean invasion which does not involve any outside forces; and (b) in a future Asian conflict, if it does involve China, there is a possibility that the United States may intervene with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With regard to U.S. intervention in a future Asian conflict, President Nixon stated in his foreign policy statement:

--the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO or Chinese attack on our Asian allies:

--the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces.42

A major effect of this new U.S. defense posture was seen in a 5-year modernization program for the ROK armed forces. An important part of the program was the transfer of excess material to the ROK Government. By June 1972, the United States transferred approximately $95 million of equipment from withdrawing U.S. troops and excess defense articles. Examples of major items transferred include TOE
equipment of eight former U.S. batallions, M48A2C tanks and army aircraft, and wheeled vehicles with the associated repair parts and secondary items. But the progress of the modernization program depends on Congressional appropriations. The Congressional cut in the military grant assistance portion of the foreign aid program impacted heavily on the modernization program. In the fiscal year 1972 alone, the U.S. Congress appropriated approximately $150 million for the ROK, nearly 40 percent less than had been requested. In addition, U.S. military grant-in-aid for the ROK came to a virtual end in the latter half of 1975. Thus, the action by Congress was a great setback to this program.

Another effect of the U.S. new defense posture was that in March 1971, the 2nd Infantry Division pulled back from the DMZ and turned over its area of responsibility to an ROK Army Division. ROK troops now guard all but a 500-meter sector of the DMZ around Panmunjom, site of the Military Armistice Commission meetings between the UN Command and North Korea, and the highway from Munsan-ni to the Liberty Bridge.

For the first time since the termination of the Korean War in 1953, the Koreans have assumed the responsibility for the defense of the entire 155-mile DMZ from sea to sea. This conforms to the concept of the Nixon Doctrine that U.S.
allies can and should assume the responsibility for their own defense. On 9 February 1971, President Park Chung Hee stated: "To assume this primary responsibility for the defense of our own land, this is the basic spirit and posture, in my view, for self-reliant national defense." His statement was a clear indication that the Korea's initial concern over the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea has been replaced by a growing pride that now the Koreans defend their own country with the reduced level of U.S. troop strength.

Despite sweeping cutbacks and redeployment of U.S. troops, Korea's faith and confidence in the United States and in itself has been sustained, if not enhanced. First of all, while the ROK Army has taken over the responsibility for defense of the DMZ, the United States has continued to bear a substantial responsibility in countering the North Korean threat in the air. A significant improvement in the air defense was achieved in March 1971 when the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Kunsan Air Base. Secondly, the U.S. commitment was not abandoned. President Nixon himself said of the U.S.-ROK security treaty: "Our treaty is very clear that in an attack on either one of us in the Pacific area, we will act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes...I think our actions show better than words that we do intend to abide by the commitments that we made to Korea in that
One action that the United States demonstrated was "Exercise Freedom Vault," staged in March 1971. The Exercise was intended to show the U.S. capability and intention to meet aggression whenever it occurs in support of its treaty obligations.

Despite repeated U.S. assurances for the security of Korea, ROK leaders seemed to have perceived the Nixon Doctrine to be an "unmistakable signal" for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea in the foreseeable future. Their perception of the Nixon Doctrine was reinforced by the U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam and the subsequent collapse of Vietnam in 1975. Therefore, it may be safe to assume that what had happened in Vietnam in 1975 probably prompted ROK leaders to initiate their ambitious and expensive ($5 billion) five-year Forces Improvement Program which would be financed primarily by a new income surcharge tax.

In addition, the program called for completing a $1.5 billion U.S. military aid plan, drawn up in 1970, that was running well behind schedule. For this reason, President Park asserted that "at least until the modernization is fully accomplished, it is absolutely necessary for the United States forces in Korea to be kept at their present level."

His statement appears to open the way for the reduction and eventual withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops from Korea. But any reduction of the remaining U.S. troops
depends on how soon the Forces Improvement Program would be
completed. Conversely, progress of the program depends on
ROK's economic growth and U.S. military grant aid programs.
It seems that the U.S. move from much larger grant aid
programs to smaller ones, to credit programs, to cash: sales
would make it more difficult for Korea to fulfill the
modernization program as scheduled. As a result, the U.S.
ground combat troops would be compelled to remain hostage
at least until the modernization program is completed,
because a phased withdrawal of the U.S. troops is contingent
on prior consultation by the U.S.-ROK Security Consultation
Committee.

One disadvantage of the Nixon Doctrine is that if the
United States continues to assert its national interests in
Korea while both adopting a budget-constraint strategy and
arbitrarily shifting the level of U.S. troop strength, the
United States will be faced with a situation where the U.S.
role in the absence of an active U.S. presence may not
satisfy the U.S. national interests. Under this circumstance,
the United States will merely react to things as they happen.
As a consequence, the United States will find itself in an
unfavorable situation where the United States will lose its
initiative and choice before it even has a chance to consider
better alternatives to cope with that situation. But one
advantage of the Nixon Doctrine is that if the doctrine is
thoroughly implemented, the United States will have its
security commitment to Korea on U.S. terms, rather than at the mercy of Korea.

2. The New Pacific Doctrine

The Nixton Doctrine called for American military disinvolve in Asia, a lowered profile and a sharing of burdens.

The Asian strategy of the 1950's and 1960's, which was characterized by containment of communism in Asia by force of arms, collapsed when Saigon fell in 1975. With the fall of Saigon, the Ford Administration learned a painful lesson at a great cost that "equilibrium in the Pacific is essential to the United States and to the other countries of the Pacific." This prompted the Ford Administration to formulate its new, forward-looking policy toward Asia, which President Ford described as a "Pacific Doctrine of peace with all and hostility toward none." The principal difference between the Nixon Doctrine and the Ford Pacific Doctrine was in President Ford's pledge of continued "America's active concern for Asia and our presence in the Asian Pacific region."

Far from retreating in disgrace after defeat in Indochina, President Ford affirmed a U.S. obligation "To take a leading part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities and preserving peace." This affirmation reflects a firm U.S. determination to stay in Asia in its quest for an Asian peace and stability.
The six premises of U.S. policy toward Asia put forward by President Ford in Honolulu on December 7, 1975 are:56

1. No isolation for America. "American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific."

2. Partnership with Japan is a "pillar" of U.S. strategy.


5. Settlement of outstanding political conflicts in Korea and Indochina.

6. A structure of economic cooperation with Asia.

The primary goal of the Ford Pacific Doctrine was to prevent the outbreak of a second Vietnam war in a region where the United States has fought three costly wars since 1941. President Ford believed that this could be achieved by buttressing U.S. allies in Asia on one hand, while cooperating with China on the other.

This flexibility in the U.S. approach to Korea and China was clearly seen when American troops were pulling out of Taiwan to help speed normalization of U.S. relations with China and, at the same time, the United States remained committed to security on the Korean peninsula, as the presence of U.S. forces attested.
Meanwhile, the United States also was willing to establish links with North Korea. This was demonstrated by Kissinger's proposal on (2) the simultaneous admission into the United Nations of both North and South Korea and (b) cross recognition by major powers of the two Koreas. The United States rejected North Korean overtures for a Washington-Pyongyang peace agreement without the participation of the Republic of Korea. This is what President meant when he said: "The United States is ready to consider constructive ways of easing tension on the Korean peninsula," but not at the expense of the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Korea.

All of these moves on the part of the Ford Administration was apparently motivated by the desire to attain one single objective; that is, regional stability.

Despite the change of U.S. security interests in East Asia from "containment" to "regional stability," and despite the U.S. flexible approach to communist countries in East Asia, what remained intact was a continued presence of U.S. ground troops and air force.

In his FY 1975 Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress, Former Secretary James R. Schlesinger gave the following reasons for a presence of U.S. forces in Korea:

In Northeast Asia, South Korea's defense capabilities have been considerably improved in the last five years—to such an extent that, when the present modernization program is completed, we may have reasonable confidence
in South Korea's ability to defend itself against an unaided attack by North Korea. At the moment, the principal role of our forces in Korea is to provide a hedge against the uncertainties and deficiencies in South Korea's defense posture, and to provide an inducement to caution on the part of North Korea against the precipitation of new hostilities.58

In his interview with the New York Times on August 18, 1975, President Park stressed the need for the presence of U.S. forces in Korea this way: "I am of the opinion that the United States should look at the presence of U.S. forces in Korea from the viewpoint of global strategy. It is necessary to maintain a balance of power in this very delicate part of the world."59 This means that Korea is a crucial area in East Asia where the interests of major powers are closely interlocked. For this reason, the presence of about 40,000 U.S. forces not only serves as a deterrent against North Korean misbehavior, but also functions as a checkmate against manipulation by China or the Soviet Union on the Korean peninsula. In addition, the U.S. presence in Korea serves as a "pendulum" maintaining a delicate power of balance in East Asia where no nation—be it China, the Soviet Union or the United States—can emerge predominant.

President Park's assessment of the role of U.S. forces coincides with that of the Ford Administration. But many members of the U.S. Congress questioned the continued presence of U.S. forces there, contending that they risk involving the United States in another politically unpopular
war in Asia. This notwithstanding, the Ford Administration assured the ROK government that the U.S. government would render "prompt and effective" assistance to the Republic of Korea in the event of aggression from the north. With regard to implications for this U.S. policy toward Korea, Ralph N. Clough in his *East Asia and U.S. Security* stated:

"In pursuit of its long term interests in East Asia, the United States should work to prevent armed conflict between the two Koreas, to strengthen the interest of all four big powers in peace in Korea, and to avoid actions toward Korea that would undermine Japanese confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan. 60

The United States has intrinsic interests of the highest priority in Japan. 61 Therefore, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea is easily justifiable in terms of U.S. credibility to both Japan and Korea. As long as the United States regards the partnership with Japan as a "pillar" of U.S. strategy in East Asia under the Pacific Doctrine, U.S. commitment to the republic of Korea seems to be logical and essential. However, U.S. commitment to South Korea does not necessarily require the deployment of 40,000 ground troops."
FOOTNOTES

2. Ibid., p. 903.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 898.
5. Ibid., p. 908.
8. Ibid., p. 909.
10. Ibid., p. 304.
11. Ibid., pp. 568-570.
14. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 1922.
20. Ibid., 1925-1926.


27. Seoul Sinmunsa, p. 349.


32. The Dong-A Ilbo, July 18, 1970.


37. Ibid.


41. Ibid.

42. Richard Nixon, p. 129.


44. Ibid.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 67.

49. Ibid., p. 69.


51. Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.


61. Ibid., p. 30.
IV. CARTER POLICY

Given the hostilities on both sides of the DMZ and conflicting interests of the major powers, their possibility of renewed conflict cannot be ruled out. President Carter was entirely aware of this situation when he assumed office in 1977. However, in 1977, President Carter, cited ROK economic growth and many recent fundamental changes in the international scene, announced the decision to continue the policy of withdrawal of U.S. combat troops which was begun in 1970. At the same time, he provided that the ROK forces should be modernized.

The unilateral and unprecedented decision to withdraw U.S. combat troops from one of the world's most sensitive areas will have a significant impact--politically, economically, militarily and psychologically--on the Korean peninsula. This chapter will focus on the above issues beginning with the President's withdrawal plan.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL DECISION

There is one thing in common between the proponents and critics of Carter's troop withdrawal decision: American troops should not remain in Korea forever. However, the logic of Carter's troop withdrawal decision was questioned by some critics. The issue emerged in May 1977 when Maj.
Gen. John K. Singlaub at the United Nations Command in Korea was removed from his job because of his comments that the U.S. Second Infantry Division in Korea served as a powerful deterrent that, once removed, could lead to war.

Obviously, the presence of U.S. combat troops serves as the symbol of American power and determination and as a deterrent to another land war in Asia. Conversely, backed by nuclear arms and deployed along the historic invasion corridor between the DMZ and Seoul, some 25 miles to the south, U.S. combat troops there constitutes a "tripwire" which almost guarantees automatic U.S. involvement in the event of war.

It is precisely for this potential "tripwire" that President Carter decided to pullout troops from Korea. A congressional critic pointed out that if this "tripwire" argument is valid, the United States "ought to withdraw troops from all over the world and return to the concept of 'Fortress of America'." ¹

Basically, President Carter had justified his withdrawal decision on three premises: First, he cited as a precedent the withdrawal of 20,000 American troops from Korea by President Nixon in 1970-1971. Secondly, he considered the strategic relationship between major powers in Northeast Asia stable enough to facilitate the pullout. Third, he felt that with its strong economies, the Republic of Korea would grow into a position of defending itself.²
A critic of the Carter decision pointed out: First, there are profound military, political and psychological differences between a reduction of troops and the total withdrawal of combat troops, and secondly, in the earlier troop reduction, the United States failed to induce reciprocal action by North Korea. To the contrary, North Korea responded by promptly initiating a massive five-year built-up of its forces. 3

As seen by Washington, the political climate in Asia has changed. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 1, 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown elaborated this way:

Growing Soviet and Chinese military capabilities in East Asia are largely directed toward each other, absorbed in mutual hostility. Neither has been able to transform military power into significant political advantage in East Asia. The U.S. relationship with China has also been transformed, with both sides recognizing the value of stable ties with each other. Neither the Soviet Union nor China has any incentive to encourage or underwrite military adventures in the Korean peninsula. 4

Triangular relationships in Asia also involve Peking, Moscow and Pyongyang. It is precisely for the Sino-Soviet dispute that North Korea finds itself in a situation it can play a role of pivotal power. North Korea has acquired something close to a capability to move out on its own militarily. For this reason, China on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other need to include North Korea in a coalition to make it a winning one. The result is that
North Korea is able to influence the policies of the two communist neighbors more than one might think possible on the basis of its small size. It is fairly safe to say, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet dispute could compel both China and the Soviet Union to honor their treaty commitments to North Korea in one way or the other in the event of war.

Under this circumstance, despite President Carter's firm commitment to the Republic of Korea, the unilateral removal of combat troops could induce North Korea to miscalculate what the United States would do if it attacked. That is why General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had recommended "a phased partial withdrawal" of 7,000 army troops over the next five years rather than the full withdrawal of ground combat troops.\(^5\) General Brown's recommendation was a clear indication that the removal of American combat troops would heighten the possibility of a new land war in Asia either by an irrational act or serious miscalculation on the part of North Korea. However, the Joint Chiefs endorsed the President's plan because under it the ROK forces were to receive "tanks, tactical aircraft, anti-tank weapons and artillery" in order to offset the pullout of American troops.\(^6\)

Finally, despite its recent economic momentum, the Republic of Korea still is a developing nation. Why should it be more capable of defending itself than Japan, an
economic superpower in Asia? By deciding to remove combat troops from Korea, the Carter Administration obviously was insinuating to Asian allies that U.S. national interest in Asia was secondary to that in Western Europe or that the United States did not want a repeat of 1950.

B. THE WITHDRAWAL AND MODERNIZATION PLAN

In March 1977, President Carter announced his intention to withdraw all 28,000 U.S. ground troops from Korea in 4 to 5 years. The withdrawal was to consist of three stages. The first stage was to end in 1978 when 6,000 troops, including a combat brigade of three battalions of the 2nd Division, would be withdrawn. The second stage was to involve primarily support troops. The third stage was to involve all of the remaining ground combat troops, including two brigades of the 2nd Division, which were scheduled to be withdrawn by 1981 or 1982. The timing of this stage was important because it was to take place after the 1980 Presidential election. As such, it allowed either a reelected or a newly elected President to reassess the most important of the three withdrawal stages. This phasing permitted the United States to reevaluate the situation throughout the withdrawal effort.

To compensate for the withdrawal of the 2nd Division from Korea, the following actions were to be taken: 8
1) Increase the U.S. Air Force presence by adding in 1978 12 F-4's to the 60 already in Korea and continue to maintain indefinitely logistics, communications, and intelligence personnel.

2) Provide Korea $275 million in FMS credits in FY 1979 and a like amount for each of the next several years. Most of the FY 1979 credits will be used to continue programs already underway to improve firepower and mobility in the following categories:

   a) More than $35 million for improved anti-tank capability by purchasing more TOW missiles and kits to upgrade M-48 tanks;

   b) About $52 million to improve air defense by increasing the number of HAWK missiles and acquiring additional AD command and equipment;

   c) About $125 million to procure F-4 and F-5 aircraft, improved air munitions, and radar homing and warning systems;

   d) Some $30 million to improve mobility by acquisition of C-130 transport aircraft and helicopters; and

   e) Some $20 million to acquire HARPOON missiles to counter North Korean ships and to interdict fast infiltration craft.

3) Provide Korea with $800 million worth of equipment on a cost-free basis. Identified equipment slated for transfer included:

   a) Upgraded M-48 tanks and TOWs;
b) Honest John rockets and howitzers;
c) Trucked and wheeled vehicles and helicopters;
d) Engineer combat construction equipment, trucks, and tactical raft sets;
e) Radars and target acquisition equipment; and
f) Communications and air traffic control equipment.

4) To ensure the effective use of the transferred equipment, technical and operations training were to be provided. The estimated cost of training was $2.5 million.

5) $90 million in additional ammunition stockpiling authority.\(^9\)

6) A one-shot credit of $300 million.\(^10\)

The form of the withdrawal and its relationship with the modernization program are closely related with each other. A joint communique issued on July 26, 1977 at the conclusion of the 10th annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul made clear that compensatory measures to modernize and strengthen the ROK forces would be implemented "in advance of or in parallel" with the troop withdrawals.\(^11\)

Therefore, Congressional support is necessary for the withdrawal and modernization plan to succeed, and this reality is reflected in the President's announcement on April 23, 1978 of readjustment of the withdrawal schedule.

Under the new withdrawal plan, instead of taking out 6,000 troops by the end of 1978, including one of the three battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division, the United
States planned to: First, continue with the withdrawal of about 2,000 support troops; second, withdraw one infantry battalion to achieve a total withdrawal of about 3,400 by the end of 1978; and third, keep the remaining combat battalions of the brigade and other support elements, which also up to 2,600 personnel, in Korea until 1979. This change did not alter the overall withdrawal schedule. It changed only the timing of the first stage of the withdrawals.

The immediate U.S. consideration in implementing the withdrawal program was to avoid any reduction in the combined U.S.-ROK combat capability and take action to replace the combat capability represented by the 2nd Division. For these reasons, Gen. David C. Jones, acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged the support by Congress of the security assistance package, contending that the success of this first phase of the withdrawal and of the subsequent phases over the next four or five years would be dependent on timely and orderly transfer of equipment and weapons necessary to maintain the prevailing military balance on the Korean peninsula.

To boost ROK military capabilities prior to the completion of the troop withdrawal over the next few years, it is also necessary for the United States to provide Korea with continued military assistance in the form of FMS credits. A five-year Force Modernization Plan for the ROK armed forces, which started in 1971 and financed by
$1.5 billion in U.S. military assistance, was "two years behind schedule" when President Carter announced his troop withdrawal plan. The final U.S. contribution came only in 1977. (see Table 3)

TABLE 3
Force Modernization Plan
(In millions of dollars; fiscal years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>1971-75</th>
<th>1976-77</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant.......</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS.........</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since 1976, the Republic of Korea has initiated its own 5-year Force Improvement Plan (FIP), with an estimated cost of $5.5 billion and foreign exchange costs of $3.5 billion. The United States FMS credit contribution to the FIP would be $1.4 billion in fiscal years 1977-81. The FIP is being financed by substantial increases in the ROK defense budget, made possible by the continuing high rate of growth of the ROK economy. The table below summarize defense outlays from 1973 to 1978:
TABLE 4
Defense Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>Total Exp.</th>
<th>%GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unlike the previous force modernization plan 1971-1975, the U.S. contribution to the current ROK modernization efforts is small proportionately. Therefore, the ROK has to finance the bulk of the modernization program. Thus, the ROK faces the problem of balancing its economic development needs and its military expenditures in a way that will not adversely affect its economic growth. Much of ROK's economic development depends on foreign investment. Foreign investment in turn depends on credible security in the face of the North Korean threat. As the United States withdraws its ground combat troops from Korea, the United States must insure credible security and investor confidence. This can be done by providing credits for U.S. military sales needed to finance ROK's purchase of equipment and weapons.

There was the possibility that the Koreagate scandal would be linked to further military aid funds requested for
Korea. But the Koreagate issue was overridden by the U.S. basic security concern over the security situation on the Korean peninsula and its importance to the peace and stability of the region. The U.S. basic security concern over the situation in Korea found its expression when both the Senate and the House of Representatives approved $275 million FMS credits and $800 million for arms transfer for FY 1979 to support the ROK's five-year FIP. In approving the bill, the House gave the U.S. president a responsibility to transmit a report to the Congress on the viability of troop withdrawal 120 days prior to each phase of the withdrawal through FY 1983. The report should include:

1) Assessment of the military balance on the peninsula;
2) The impact of withdrawal on the military balance;
3) The adequacy of U.S. military assistance;
4) The impact of withdrawal on the UN-ROK command structure;
5) ROK's defensive fortification and defense industry development; and
6) U.S. reinforcement capability and the progress of diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions in Korea.

The prudent approach by both the Carter Administration and Congress to the withdrawal and modernization plan may accomplish three important things. First, it reduces the chances that the deterrence now provided by U.S. combat
troops will be weakened considerably. Second, it will improve ROK military capabilities vis-a-vis North Korea's. And third, it will provide incentives for a resumption of North-South dialogue to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula. If tensions rise the President can slow down or even reverse the timetable.

C. THE MILITARY BALANCE

There are some variations in the assessments of relative military balance between North and South Korea. Their military capabilities cannot be measured merely by counting numerical one-to-one parity in weapons and equipment. Given the unique geopolitical and military situation in Korea, several aspects of the balance should be taken into account; such as, terrain, population, military manpower, GNP, defense expenditures, firepower, the type of weapons, and U.S. ground, naval and air power.

1. Population and Military Manpower

In population South Korea outnumbers North Korea two to one. When measured by manpower alone in active forces, the balance is definitely in favor of South Korea. North Korea solved this disadvantage by extending military service; seven years for the army, five years for the navy, and three years for the air force. Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report to the Senate in January 1978 indicated that North Korea has almost nullified South Korea's active duty manpower
advantage since the North Korean draft age has been lowered to age 16. The table below shows a disparity in military manpower.

TABLE 5

Military Manpower Balance Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>635,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para-military:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 40,000 security forces & border guards | 2,200,000 homeland reserve forces
| 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 civilian militia |


ROK ground forces--the fifth largest army in the world--outnumber those of North Korea by 635,000 to 500,000 and have more combat experience than the North Koreans. According to Defense Monitor, at least 300,000 South Koreans are experienced combat veterans of the Vietnam war.15

2. Defense Expenditures

North Korea has spent as much as 14 percent of its GNP on defense from 1973 through 1977. The total military spending of North Korea during the same period was estimated
at $4.29 billion. South Korea has spent as much as 5 percent of its GNP on defense during the same period. The year of 1976 marked the turning point in which South Korea's defense outlay exceeded North Korea's in aggregate. This sharp rise in defense outlay since 1976 was attributable to the establishment of defense tax to finance the ROK FIP. The table below shows a disparity in defense outlays:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North Korea GNP (a)</th>
<th>Defense Exp. (b)</th>
<th>b/a (%)</th>
<th>South Korea GNP (a)</th>
<th>Defense Exp. (b)</th>
<th>b/a (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. **Military Capabilities**

The North Korean army includes tank and motorized infantry divisions along with the mainstay of infantry units. North Korea enjoys roughly a 2-1 advantage over the South in tanks and artillery. The North Korea army is structured and positioned to be capable of delivering a massive firepower on South Korea. Its forces are deployed along the
DMZ so that a surprise attack could be mounted with little warning. This is evident from the fact that North Korea is in a position of choosing the time and place to launch such a surprise attack.

The ROK army, more than 500,000 strong, still has serious vulnerabilities. The ROK army lacks the quantity and quality of first line tanks and sufficient anti-tank guns needed to assure that an armored advance across the DMZ will be halted north of Seoul. The ROK army is also handicapped in ground operations because Seoul, the capital city, is only 40 km away from the DMZ, well within range of heavy artillery and FROG surface-to-surface missiles. As one expert put it: "The short distance precludes defense in depth and the nature of the terrain and the road patterns impede the rapid lateral movement of reserves from east or west into the battle zone." Thus, the geographical proximity of Seoul to the DMZ, North Korea's long-range missiles and its numerical superiority in tanks and artillery pieces suggest that the North Koreans have the great advantage over the South Koreans in the ability to make an offensive breakthrough.

Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report cites several factors as being vital for the defense of Seoul and the heavily fortified FEBA-ALPHA line two to five miles south of the DMZ. These include adequate warning time; superior
firepower, mobility; good ROK Army leadership; tactical air support; and secure lines of communication to the rear. These factors, however, cannot be taken for granted, especially without U.S. ground forces: 19

1) Warning time is critical and may be inadequate;
2) North Korea has superior firepower marshalled near the DMZ;
3) South Korean forces alone lack adequate mobility;
4) Poor visibility or a first strike could temporarily limit critical U.S.-ROK tactical air support; and
5) North Korean naval superiority at the outset would allow amphibious landings of guerrilla forces to disrupt ROK communications.

However, the South Koreans have an important advantage in manpower and also have those advantages that come from the defender. They are: 20

1) The strategic hills and ridges north of Seoul favor the defending forces. Retention of this terrain by ROK forces would restrict or slow down a North Korean attack;
2) Extensive fortifications in the traditional invasion routes should enable ROK forces to incur a high cost on an invading force; and
3) ROK forces enjoy the benefits of impressive training, high morale and extensive combat experience.
THE U.S.-ROK SECURITY RELATIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

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Finally, there are two worrisome aspects which could change the dimension of any comparison of North Korean and South Korean capabilities and vulnerabilities. First, there is the great possibility that North Korean guerrilla forces, who are already infiltrated into South Korean rear areas, may attack vital defense installations. In that situation, South Korea would be compelled to "divert its forces from their primary mission of repelling an attack on the DMZ to counter special warfare activities of the North." And secondly, two North Korean tunnels have already been discovered, one of them big enough to rush an assault force beneath and beyond the South Korean fortifications near the DMZ. It was believed that at least eight more were under construction. Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report indicates that these tunnels could be traversed by "3,000 to 5,000 troops per hour." These two factors can be seen as North Korea's offensive posture and its special warfare capability as well. (See Table 7 indicating comparative army strengths, 1977).
## TABLE 7

**Comparative Army Strengths, 1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infantry</strong></td>
<td>20 Inf. Divs.</td>
<td>17 Inf. Divs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Mot. Inf. Divs.</td>
<td>5 Special Forces Bdes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 AB Bns.</td>
<td>2 AD Bdes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td>2 TK. Divs.</td>
<td>7 Tk. Bns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Indep. Tk. Regts.</td>
<td>M-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-34: 350</td>
<td>M-48, 880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-54</td>
<td>M-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-55: 1,400</td>
<td>M-113, 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-59 Med.</td>
<td>M-577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT-76: 150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-62 Lt. Tks: 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTR-40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTR-50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTR-152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-1967 APC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Arty. Regts.</td>
<td>SP Guns/How.: 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 AA Arty. Regts.</td>
<td>Mortars: 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guns/How.: 3,000</td>
<td>TOW, LAW ATGW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars: 9,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCL: 1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA: 5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missile</strong></td>
<td>3 SSM Regts. w/FRG</td>
<td>1 SSM Bn. w/Honest John.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FROG-5/7SSM: 24</td>
<td>2 SAM Bdes. w/HAWK &amp; Nike Hercules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HAWK: 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nike Hercules SAM: 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ROK Air Force is quantitatively inferior by a 2-1 margin to North Korea. (see Table 8 below). An attack would be launched primarily from bases North of Pyongyang, but some aircraft could be launched directly from bases near the DMZ. Although North Korean flights are carefully monitored, the flight time from North Korean air bases near the DMZ to Seoul and ROK air bases is so short that a surprise air attack can be achieved "if an attack is launched from what appears to be a routine exercise." Thus, the North Korean air attack makes the ROK air force vulnerable.

**TABLE 8**

Comparative Air Force Strengths, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>Il-28: 80</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>Su-7: 20</td>
<td>F-4D/E: 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIG-15/17/19: 400</td>
<td>F-5A/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIG-21: 130</td>
<td>F-86D/F 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AT-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RF-5A: 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S-2F: 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(On order: 240V-1G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>SA-2: 250 (3 SAM Bdes)</td>
<td>(Sidewinder AAM on order)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Korea exceeds the ROK in total number of vessels, but is inferior in tonnage (see table 9 below). The North deploys 10 submarines, but has no surface ships of the destroyer-class or larger. Backbone of the North Korean navy is a large fleet of speedboats, including 19 guided missile boats. The ROK navy has no submarines, and relies on destroyers and destroyer escorts/chasers.

**TABLE 9**

Comparative Navy Strengths, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Patrol Craft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Torpedo Boats</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Minesweepers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Missiles</td>
<td>18 (styx)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Craft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Chasters/ Escorts</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Tonnage</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most formidable threat to the South is the North Korean submarines and its fast patrol boats. The North Korean submarines would sink or damage ROK merchant ships for trade or resupply of war material. The North Korean fast patrol boats would be useful for landing its commando forces in the South Korean rear areas, with their infiltration capabilities.

Considering the overall military potential of North and South Korea and taking the 42,000 U.S. troops present in the South into consideration, military power on the Korean peninsula was seen as roughly in balance. As one analyst put it:

With the present military balance, however, a blitzkrieg against Seoul might look more promising to the North Koreans if they were no longer deterred by the presence of U.S. forces.25

D. ROK'S REACTION TO THE CARTER ANNOUNCEMENT

Since the South Koreans have always perceived an military threat from the North to be real, their reaction to the Carter announcement on American withdrawal was negative. They worried that after 1982, with no U.S. combat troop astride the invasion routes to Seoul, U.S. intervention in any type of conflict might not be prompt and automatic, President Carter's promises of continued American support notwithstanding. Obviously, the price that the ROK Government demanded of U.S. withdrawal was "automatic U.S. involvement" in the event of war, which Philip
C. Habib, under secretary of state for East Asian Affairs, described as "next to impossible" since it would involve U.S. constitutional processes.²⁶

President Carter's announcement was incomprehensive even for President Park because he shared the view that U.S. troops in Korea, together with the NATO forces in Europe, are two pillars with which the United States can contain the Soviet Union."²⁷ Although President Park said that he had no intention to ask U.S. forces to stay longer, his great concern over the prospects of American withdrawal was clearly expressed when he demanded that "nuclear weapons" in South Korea be turned over to South Korea. Habib and General Brown refused to even discuss nuclear weapons.²⁸

Stunned by Carter's move, many South Koreans were unhappy about Major General Singlaub's removal, and his blunt prediction of another war left them seriously worried because it had come from an authoritative mouth. "He spoke for all of us," said former president Yun Po-sun. Yun and other opposition leaders likewise have asked for the withdrawal to be postponed.²⁹ They also had fear that with no U.S. presence restraining the ROK Government, their remaining freedom would be threatened. It was not fortuitous that the National Assembly on July 7, 1977 adopted a resolution opposing "one-sided withdrawal."³⁰
Assurances by President Carter that U.S. determination to provide prompt support to the Republic of Korea in the event of war would remain firm, had done little to alleviate public gloom. Perhaps the mood was illuminated by a front-page cartoon in a South Korean daily that showed a bewildered Korean holding President Carter's letter promising American support while U.S. soldiers were seen sailing away. "Only this letter" the Korean was inquiring.

After the July 26, 1977 Security Consultative Meeting, the U.S. side agreed to augment ROK forces "in advance of or in parallel with the withdrawals." Obviously, the phrase "in advance of or in parallel with the withdrawals" reflects two differing positions. The former represents the ROK's view that U.S. ground troops should stay in Korea until the FIP program has been completed. The later represents the U.S. view that withdrawal would be delayed unless compensatory measures were approved by Congress. Since either of these two approaches definitely satisfied the ROK Government's position, ROK's concern began to subside.

However, there remained the question whether the deterrent now provided by U.S. combat troops could be maintained by ROK forces alone after American withdrawal. Lt. Gen. Lew Byong-hion, director of ROK Chiefs of Staff, put this way:
Even if the United States provides all the military aid Seoul has requested to upgrade its own forces, the planned withdrawal of U.S. ground troops here will leave South Korea without the deterrent capability now provided by American support.32

His comment reflects the sense of uncertainty about the reliability of the U.S. commitment. With Carter’s unilateral move, ROK leaders must have foreseen the eventual possibility of a future without U.S. support. This was reflected in South Korea’s attempt to purchase more sophisticated weapons and to diversify arms suppliers. A request by South Korea for 60 F-16 aircraft with 1.2 billion and its purchases of some ship-to-ship missiles and anti-submarine helicopters from France were obviously motivated by the strong desire to redress the military imbalance with the North and avoid its total dependence on the United States, its sole arms supplier.

Successful completion of the FIP would still leave South Korea with a firepower imbalance.33 This added to the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops with nuclear weapons would eventually drive South Korea into a blind alley in which South Korea might not rule out the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. When Habib and General Brown told ROK officials in June 1977 that all missile units would be pulled out with the ground troops, Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin let it be known that despite the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Republic of Korea “would make an independent judgement” if the country’s survival was at

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stake." More significantly, a leader of the opposition party told the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that his party would not oppose the demand of the ruling party that South Korea build its own nuclear weapons.  

Seoul signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on April 23, 1975, a few days before the final fall of Saigon. In particular, the rise of tensions on the Korean peninsula in the spring of 1975 gave the political decision-makers in Seoul second thoughts about the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. In June 1975, President Park declared that South Korea would and could develop its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear weapons were removed.

It seems that for the decision-makers in Seoul the question of acquiring nuclear capabilities was considered to be rather an urgent matter because of the geographical proximity of South Korea to the sources of threats and because of the changing U.S. military posture in Asia. With the credibility of the U.S. security umbrella eroding, they may have convinced themselves that South Korea may face the fate of a second Vietnam without a deterrent of its own.

Fears of a South Korean decision to go for nuclear weapons tentatively subsided somewhat when the Ford Administration was determined to fulfill the U.S. commitments to Seoul, despite the setback of the former in Indochina.
However, the U.S. decision to remove nuclear weapons from Korea as part of the Carter Administration's nuclear non-proliferation efforts revived a dormant South Korean nuclear paranoia.

Would Seoul feel that the threat of going nuclear strengthens its bargaining position with the United States and North Korea? An American analyst believes that any remaining U.S. commitment might be more worthless to Seoul than before, but it would still serve to hold open the possibility, if no longer certainty, of U.S. intervention even against the North Koreans alone. He argues that a South Korean decision to seek nuclear weapons in defiance of the United States and at the cost of any U.S. commitment would invite a possible pre-emptive strike by an alarmed North Korea.  

The emergence of a nuclear South Korea might push its unification goal beyond reach and tilt a military balance between the North and the South. Nuclear weapons are not anyone's monopoly. It is not too hard to predict what serious consequences would arise from such a situation. When taking into consideration all these disincentives, it may be safe to suggest that the supply of conventional arms, protected by the American "nuclear umbrella," would be the most effective way to prevent a painful and costly course of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
E. CARTER'S NEW POLICY, 1979-1980

There was an assumption that the normalization of relations between the United States and China and the concurrent movement between China and Japan would have a favorable impact on international situations in Asia as a whole. However, the Carter Administration since early 1979 took a cautious, gradual U-turn in its policy toward Asia in general and Korea in particular. What accounted for this shift in priorities by President Carter?

1. Carter's U-Turn policy

To begin with, President Carter's decision to bring U.S. combat troops from South Korea was one of the examples showing that his foreign policy was too dedicated to idealistic goals in favor of promoting moral principles over military solutions. As a result, under the Carter Administration, U.S.-ROK security relations were chilly over such issues as Koreagate scandal, human rights and troop withdrawals.

President Carter's passive approach in the world of Realpolitik, however, unraveled in the face of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.

It seems safe to assume that both the United States and Japan must have maintained that their expanded relations with China would provide a bulwark against the threat of the
Soviet Union in the Far East. It was also assumed that this trilateral relationship would induce North Korea to defuse tension somewhat on the Korean peninsula. However, their rising expectations were shattered by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia at the time when the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was in the offing. When border clashes between China and Vietnam escalated into a state of open war, there was fear that the Soviet Union would maneuver to bring North Korea into its orbit to form a second front.

The Carter Administration, concerned over an escalation of war in Asia, saw the potentiality of a Sino-Soviet war. If such a war broke out, North Korea probably would be tempted to launch its own southward invasion. The possibility of another war in Korea was believed to be greater than at any time in the past. As early as January 1979, President Carter admitted in his report on Korea to Congress that "the North Koreans are substantially stronger than had been estimated earlier."³⁹

Shocked by the outbreak of hostilities between Communist countries in Asia and the potentiality of a Sino-Soviet conflict, the Carter Administration began to have second thoughts about Asia and to set two primary goals in its foreign policy: 1) to prevent any non-communist nation from being drawn into the intra-Communist wars, and 2) to protect U.S. political and economic interests in Asia.⁴⁰
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke told the Koreans that the new U.S. policy meant the United States will "maintain an ability to react in the region and will remain deeply involved." \(^{41}\)

As a result of these developments, the first step taken by the Carter Administration was an announcement in February 1979 that "withdrawals of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea would be held in abeyance pending the completion of a reassessment of North Korea's military strength." \(^{42}\)

The second step was President Carter's state visit to Seoul from June 29 to July 1, 1979 where he reaffirmed the commitment of U.S. military power in Asia. \(^{43}\)

The final step was President Carter's decision to freeze further withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. In his statement on July 20, 1979, President Carter stated: \(^{44}\)

1) Withdrawals of combat elements of the 2d Division will remain in abeyance. The structure and function of the Combined Forces Command will continue as established in 1978;

2) Some reductions of personnel in U.S. support units will continue until the end of 1980; and

3) The timing and pace of withdrawals beyond these will be reviewed in 1981.

These decisions followed an intelligence reassessment which had confirmed a significant increase in North Korea's
ground forces, armour, firepower and mobility since the U.S. ground combat troop withdrawal began in 1977.45

All of these decisions was a reflection of the changing political and military posture of the United States in East Asia, a sign that the United States will remain an actively involved Pacific power. In the security arena, this new posture was underlined when the United States assured the Republic of Korea that:46

1) The United States will continue to provide its nuclear umbrella to the Republic of Korea;

2) The United States will continue to make available for sale to Korea appropriate weapons systems and defense industry know-how;

3) The United States will coassemble F-5E and F-5F fighters in Korea and will transfer 36 F-16 fighter bombers to Korea by 1986; and

4) The United States will deploy A-10 close air support aircraft in Korea.

These measures of U.S. support for ROK's security did not necessarily parallel U.S. efforts to solve differences over human rights and political liberalization. Wide differences over human rights continued to be what one analyst described as "weak thread in an otherwise solid fabric of relations."47 between the two countries. Therefore, the purpose of President Carter's visit to Seoul was three-fold. The primary reason for his visit was to alleviate the deep
South Korean and Japanese concern over obviously diminishing U.S. commitments to Seoul. He accomplished this by freezing the withdrawal and pledging further U.S. military aid to Seoul. The second reason for his visit was to attempt to reduce tensions in the peninsula by calling for three-way talks with North and South Korea. The third reason was to put some pressure on Seoul for human rights reform.

The one thing which did not please the Park government during Carter's visit was the U.S. President's tough public stand on the limitation of human rights in South Korea. In his nationally-televised address in Seoul, President Carter stated:

There is a growing consensus among the international community about the fundamental value of human rights, individual dignity, political freedom, freedom of the press and the rule of law... There is abundant evidence in Korea of the dramatic economic progress a capable and energetic people can achieve by working together. I believe this achievement can be matched by similar progress through the realization of basic human aspirations in political and human rights.

The displeasure of the Park government over Carter's lecture was expressed by one Korean official this way:

Sometimes it seems that U.S. asks much more of its friends than of countries that do not even try to measure up to American ideals on things like human rights.

Nevertheless, Seoul responded to President Carter's pressure by releasing some dissidents later in the month. But the Park government did not lift decree No. 9, which outlawed criticism of the 1972 Yushin (revitalizing)
constitution, one concession which had been urged on Park by Carter during his brief visit to Seoul.\textsuperscript{51} The Achilles' heel of the Park regime was the Yushin constitutional system which centralized an unlimited power in the presidency while limiting the power of the National Assembly.

The outbreak of mass anti-government demonstrations in Pusan and Masan in October 1979 compounded political turmoil, which began with the expulsion of opposition leader Kim Young Sam from the National Assembly and the resignation of all opposition members from the National Assembly. As with the downfall of the Shah of Iran, there was fear that South Korea's vicious cycle of repression, protest and further repression would jeopardize the U.S. security role in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Carter Administration recalled Ambassador William Gleysteen from Seoul after Kim's expulsion.

Secretary Harold Brown's arrival in Seoul for an annual security meeting coincided with serious rioting in Pusan. In a press conference in Seoul on October 19, 1979, he stated:

\begin{quote}
I do not believe that any attempt by the U.S. to manage the U.S. security role here to achieve some particular political objectives would benefit either our long-term strategic interest or contribute constructively to political development in Korea.\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}
The message was simple and clear. The U.S. security interest in Korea transcended its concern over human rights issue. Regional U.S. security requirements dictated South Korea's political stability. Brown tried to keep the security issue separate from the human rights issue with an understanding, if not approval, of each other's on human rights.

Opposition leader Kim Young Sam asserted that the two issues were closely related, contending that "the most effective weapon against North Korean aggression and the strongest possible guarantee for national security would be the government's promotion of democracy." A few days before Secretary Brown's arrival in Seoul, Kim Young Sam urged the United States to put "direct and public pressure" on the Park government to ease political repression. Obviously, Kim's statement put the United States in a dilemma because any decisive move by the United States in favor of one side against the other would be regarded as U.S. interference in South Korea's domestic affairs.

Precisely because of U.S. reluctance to use its security commitments to force the ROK Government to ease its political repression, and because of President Carter's reversal of the troop withdrawal policy, U.S.-ROK security ties were, as Secretary Brown put it, in "excellent shape." Their closer security ties were evident from a joint communique issued in Seoul at the close of the 12th annual U.S.-ROK
security talks in October 1979. In it, the United States affirmed, among other things, that "the security of the Republic of Korea is indispensable to that of the United States."

Thus, the security of the Republic of Korea emerged once again indispensable to preserving peace and stability in East Asia. This was reinforced immediately after the assassination of President Park on October 26, 1979 by Washington's hands-off warning to Pyongyang: The United States will "react strongly...to any external attempt to exploit" the political turmoil in South Korea.

With the central figure removed from the political scene, South Korea faced a struggle for power. A subsequent coup on December 12 by Maj. Gen. Chon Doo Hwan and his colleagues cast doubt on the future of civilian government. Whatever its motives, the coup obviously was a step away from any semblance of Western-style democracy but a step toward a potential inducement to a Park regime without Park.

With the developments of these events in South Korea, the United States main concern was over South Korean security. The United States was to remind the new South Korean military leaders not to create a situation in which the North Koreans would miscalculate that they could launch a successful southward invasion. Should such a situation be created, it would affect the U.S. geopolitical and strategic position on the Korean peninsula and subsequently the balance of power in the region.
Whoever rules South Korea, South Korea's security relations with the United States were and will remain imperative, and, therefore, must be accepted as the basis of South Korea's very survival. Viewed in this context, it seems unthinkable that the new South Korean military leaders "would take a less supportive view of the American military presence than President Park Chung Hee did." 61

President Carter's visit to Seoul in 1979 seemingly marked the end of the so-called three crises in U.S.-ROK relations--the Koreagate, the American troop withdrawal and the human rights issue in Korea. However, due to South Korea's continually blemished record on the human rights issue, the Carter Administration chilled U.S. relations with the South Korean military leadership by withholding an annual Security Consultative Meeting in 1980. The six-month freeze in U.S.-ROK relations imposed by the Carter Administration came to an end when the Reagan Administration made its position on Korea clear by placing security as unchallenged first priority in Washington-Seoul relations. 62
FOOTNOTES


2. Commanders Digest, July 21, 1977, p. 27.


6. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 31.


29. Ibid., p. 12.


33. Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 33.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


41. Ibid.


44. Ibid., "U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea," p. 37.

45. Ibid.

46. See U.S.-ROK Joint Communique, July 1, 1979 issued in Seoul at the conclusion of President Carter's visit to Seoul; Also see U.S.-ROK Joint Communique, October 19, 1979, issued in Seoul after the Conclusion of the 12th Annual Security Consultative Meeting. The sale of F-16 fighter bombers was disclosed at a press conference by Defense Secretary Brown and ROK Defense Minister No after the conclusion of annual security talks in Seoul. See HAPTONG Annual 1980, p. 169.


48. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in East Asia, Hearings before the

50. James N. Wallace, "Koreans to Carter: 'Yankee, Stay Here!'

51. Andrew Nagorski, "Pressure on Park," Newsweek, (October

    South Korea to East Repression," NYT, October 10, 1979,

53. Stephen Barka, "Nothing But Personal Affairs," FEER,

    P.A12.


58. Philip Taubman, "Washington Warns North Koreans: It Will
    'React Strongly' to Instrusion," NYT, October 27, 1979,
    p. 1.

    16, 1979, p. 8.

60. Drew Middleton, "Seoul Events May Reshape U.S. Military
    Stance in Asia," NYT, October 27, 1979, p. 6.

61. Ibid.

62. For a joint communique issued at the end of the Reagan-
    Chon summit talks 2-3 February 1981, see Dong-A Ilbo,
    February 3, 1981. In the communique, President Reagan
    gave assurance that the United States has no intention
    to withdraw its ground troops from Korea.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA'S FUTURE

In analyzing the Korean question, one ought to focus on two important factors: both the military and political implications. Both factors are invariably related to each other because any satisfactory and final settlement of the Korean question ought to be preceded by a parallel solution to both political and military issues. What makes the Korean question so complex and difficult was, and will remain, the conflicting political and military interests of major actors on the Korean peninsula--the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and, above all, the two Koreas.

The two Koreas are fully aware of this historical dimension, the fact that Korea's geopolitical and security position is likened to that of a shrimp among whales. Despite their awareness of this dimension, their relationship remains frozen, with no prospect of reaching an acceptable agreement.

The subsequent outcome of their thorny relationship is reflected in the endless cycle of political confrontation, with an intermittent face-to-face dialogue between the two sides merely repeating the stereotype scenario, national unification in a peaceful way. At the same time, there is mounting evidence, in North Korea's behavior, that it will not refrain from resorting to force of arms. All of
this suggests that the danger of war still exists. In such a war, the major powers in the region may be willy-nilly drawn in for one reason or another. It is quite safe to state, therefore, that only one actor, North Korea, is perceived as the major stumbling block to preserving the status quo and stability.

Under these circumstances, the role the United States can play is twofold: both military and political. Section one of this chapter examines the threat from North Korea and the role of U.S. forces as a deterrent. Section two explains suggested alternatives: 1) a peace agreement; 2) a non-aggression pact; 3) a cross recognition; and 4) a four-power or six-power conference.

A. NECESSITY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

The most tangible indication of North Korea's intention is found in its offensive military posture. At hearings before a House of Representatives committee on May 25, 1977, Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub cited the following evidence:

1) The number of tanks has increased from 500 to 2,000 over about a 4- or 5 year period.

2) North Korea had over three times as much artillery; it had large numbers of rocket launchers that the South did not have.

3) North Korea had twice as many combat jet aircraft, fighter and bomber aircraft.
4) North Korea had a large air transport fleet capable of transporting its unconventional warfare units into the South.

5) The North Korean navy had submarines which South Korea did not have.

b) North Korea's continuing infiltration of agents and personnel across the DMZ and infiltrations by sea.

7) North Korean tunnels have been discovered underneath the DMZ.¹

As some analysts put it, it is difficult to predict the intention of North Korea with certainty. But its deployment posture in "attacking positioning" and its firepower superiority gives it an offensive capability.² North Korea's belligerent military position was reinforced by Kim Il-song's warning in Peking on April 18, 1975: "If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors. "In this war we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification."³ The current North Korean offensive military posture and its invariable and persistent demands for national unification on its terms are the most destabilizing factors on the Korean peninsula.
Major General Singlaub believed that there was no military balance in Korea, even with the 2d Infantry Division there, when the troop withdrawal decision was made. Then, one may raise the question whether the ROK force improvement plan, if or when fully implemented, would offset an imbalance in favor of the North. He elaborated this way:

The 5-year force improvement plan is actually funded for a 5-year period but the time for them to receive the equipment and the material to be purchased by that extends over an 8-year period. At the end of that 8-year period they would have a higher level of balance with the North, but that plan was not developed with any assumption that the 2d Infantry Division would be withdrawn or that the U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn.

If his assessment is correct, it is quite safe to assume that the probability of a southward invasion from the North will be high if the U.S. combat troops are removed. With the presence of the U.S. combat troops in Korea, the two elements of deterrence are viable.

One element of deterrence which North Korean military planners must recognize is a situation in which they would have to face a powerful U.S. force stationed in between the two classic invasion corridors if they were to attack. In such a situation, the United States would be faced with two alternatives: "To reinforce or to withdraw." The probability of reinforcement being high, the presence of U.S. combat troops constitutes a serious restraint on any reckless behavior by North Korea.
Another element of deterrence is the restraint both China and the Soviet Union impose on North Korea's adventurism. Neither China nor the Soviet Union want to be directly involved in any conflict in Korea with the United States. Thus, they restrain Kim Il-song from doing what he wants to do. If the U.S. combat troops were removed, that element of restraint would also be removed because there would be no better justification for China or the Soviet Union to restrain Kim's behavior.⁶

Thus, American physical presence in Korea can be seen as both a physical and a political deterrent. It is precisely for this reason that the North Korean news media continuously emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Kim Il-song sees American presence in Korea as the main obstacle to the peaceful and independent unification of the country on his terms.

From Kim's viewpoint, the removal of U.S. troops would not only eliminate the threat to the security of North Korea, but would make U.S. military intervention less credible. In such a situation, neither China nor the Soviet Union have any alternative but to lend political and material support to a North Korean invasion toward the South. And Japan would be less enthusiastic about supporting the ROK Government if U.S. military support for that government were no longer assured.⁷ Thus, Kim Il-song may reason that the removal
of U.S. troops would improve his prospects for making a breakthrough in his showdown with South Korea.

From South Korea’s viewpoint, the removal of the American ground forces would cause Kim Il-song to play with fire out of miscalculation. The question is how to prevent Kim from making such miscalculation. The answer is by a "self-reliant defense capability." It means an ability to defend themselves on their own against an invasion launched by North Korea alone without an intervention by its allies. South Korea is wary of the possibility that either China or the Soviet Union will automatically intervene in case of war. In addition, there are other geopolitical and psychological factors that should be taken into account. Both China and the Soviet Union border on Korea. Both of them historically, geopolitically and militarily have great interests in Korea. The United States lies thousands of miles away from Korea.  

This geographical distance casts doubt that "the survival of South Korea will be as important to Americans as the survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be to the Chinese and the Russians." This basic asymmetry, as South Korea sees it, gives South Korea a sense of insecurity. Thus, the presence of U.S. ground troops is important to South Korea as a guarantee that the United States would respond to an attack and as an effective deterrent to any intervention by North Korea's allies.
As President Park put it: "The best national security policy is to prevent a war." To achieve this goal, the ROK forces must acquire a defense capability as great as that of those units of the 2d Division that are removed. If not, the ROK forces would weaken its defense capability. Even if the ROK force improvement plan is fully implemented, the deterrence now provided by U.S. forces in Korea cannot be replaced by any number of ROK divisions simply because only U.S. nuclear weapons have the capability of deterring both North Korea and its communist allies from any actions destabilizing the Korean peninsula and region. Viewed from this, the total pullout of U.S. ground combat troops would adversely affect the military equation in Northeast Asia.

The removal of the U.S. 2nd Division means the removal of nuclear weapons. Even though the security of South Korea is protected by the "nuclear umbrella," the removal of the U.S. 2d Division will "drastically reduce the likelihood that the U.S. Government will feel obliged to use nuclear weapons to defend a major U.S. military unit." As a result, it will adversely affect the "credibility of the deterrence."

For these reasons, President Park's top national security advisors told U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations staff:

"We are in the post-Vietnam era and now verbal commitments cannot do what physical presence does...the purpose of troop withdrawal from South Korea must be seen by North Korea as a U.S. option not to become involved in another Asian ground war."
President Park and other ROK leaders did not forget what happened to South Vietnam. Uncertainty over the fate of Taiwan in the process of U.S. efforts to normalize its relations with China was seen by them as U.S. abandonment of its treaty ally. As the only country in Northeast Asia exposed to the threat of aggression from its adversary, they were concerned about these developments. Their immediate concern was a grave consequence that might arise from U.S. military disinvolvement in Korea; that is, a second Vietnam in Korea? With this in mind, President Park told a press conference on April 20, 1977 that the United States should view the question regarding the American physical presence in "higher-dimentional" strategic terms. President Park saw the deterrence and defense in Korea as an integral part of the U.S. global strategic requirements.

Four major regional powers involved in Korea are China, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union. All four regard the Korean peninsula as an area of strategic importance where their interests conflict with one another. North Korea is allied with China and the Soviet Union on one hand, South Korea with the United States and Japan on the other. What this suggests to many observers is that a war in Korea would easily bring two or more of the major powers into direct conflict with one another. The most grave consequences of such a conflict would be its effect on the regional and global peace and stability.
What all of this suggests is that the South Koreans view the American physical presence as a credible guarantee of U.S. response if deterrence fails. Thus, the decision to remove the American physical presence should be made, in the words of Ralph N. Clough, an authority on Asian affairs, "only when other changes in and around Korea have so reduced the risk of renewed conflict there that their presence is generally recognized in South Korea and Japan as no longer being necessary."\textsuperscript{15}

B. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

After a quarter of a century of bitter political and military confrontation, relations between the two Koreas entered a new phase when the North-South dialogue was announced on July 4, 1972. Under the July 4 joint statement, the two Koreas agreed on three basic principles: "independence, peace and great national unity."\textsuperscript{16} However, both sides have been far apart from each other in their approaches toward mutual reconciliation and eventual national unification.

This section will discuss briefly the North-South dialogue that has taken place since July 1972, and analyze the divergent viewpoints of the two Koreas and of the major regional powers involved in Korea regarding the Korean question. Finally, suggested alternatives will be presented.
1. The North-South Dialogue and the United States

As enunciated by President Park on June 23, 1972 in his New Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, South Korea adopted a step-by-step approach: "peace first, unification later." From the North Korean viewpoint, Park's proposal would merely freeze, perpetuate and legitimize the status quo of the divided Korea by seeking international recognition of the situation. North Korea has maintained that the best way to remove both misunderstandings and distrust and to mitigate increased tensions is to solve both political and military issues first. Specifically, North Korea proposed that:

1) The arms race and armed confrontation be ended;
2) Foreign troops be withdrawn; and
3) Both Koreas be admitted to the United Nations under the single name of "Confederal Republic of Koryo" but not before the establishment of "a confederation" as an interim basis for reconciliation and cooperation.

Pyongyang's version is in sharp contrast with Seoul's evolutionary approach. The version offered by Seoul was envisaged as having three sequential stages: 1) the reunion of separate families; 2) cultural and economic interchange; and 3) political negotiations. Simply stated, Seoul committed itself to a solution of the easiest problems first. Pyongyang, on the other hand, insisted that the most difficult and urgent problems be solved first to remove the state of
military confrontation, thereby reducing the tension in the Korean peninsula.

From the inception of the North-South dialogue, when North Korea attacked South Korea's contention that UN forces were not outside forces, signs of troubled surfaced. The July 4 joint statement provides that national unification should be carried out without outside interference. Evidently Pyongyang viewed the presence of U.S. forces as an obstacle to unification either by force or in a peaceful manner. Probably Pyongyang expected that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Korea once the North-South dialogue had started. If this assumption is valid, Pyongyang's proposal in early 1974 for direct talks with the United States may have been motivated, as Seoul saw it, by the desire to put pressure for U.S. troop withdrawal at an early date.

When the dialogue was unilaterally suspended by North Korea, it proposed specifically that: 1) all American troops be withdrawn; 2) the two sides each reduce the number of armed forces to 100,000 or less; and 3) the present armistice agreement be replaced by a peace agreement. 20 South Korea viewed the North Korean proposal as being meant to undermine South Korea's defense capability. 21 If a peace agreement were signed, there would be no reason nor grounds whatsoever for U.S. forces to remain in Korea. From the South Korean viewpoint, such a situation would greatly affect the military balance in favor of North Korea.
In January 1974, South Korea proposed in return the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two Koreas. The main contents of which are:

1) Both Koreas will not invade each other under whatever circumstances;
2) Both Koreas will refrain from meddling in one another's internal affairs; and
3) The present armistice agreement should remain in force.

Obviously the theme of this proposal was peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas until cooperation and reconciliation could be established. North Korea viewed this proposal as a justification for the perpetuation of territorial division and the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. In short, North Korea denounced peaceful coexistence as a "two Korea plot." Pyongyang wanted to remove the status quo of division and the American presence in Korea, which Seoul wanted to retain.

When the North-South dialogue floundered, North Korea demanded direct talks with the United States to replace the present armistice agreement with a peace agreement. North Korea argued that South Korea was not a signatory to the armistice agreement and that, therefore, the situation dictated bilateral talks with the United States. There is little doubt that direct talks with the United States would be an attempt by North Korea "to negotiate future security
arrangements on the peninsula" without South Korea's participation. The North Korean proposal was obviously designed to isolate South Korea, precipitate U.S. troop withdrawal and dissolve the armistice agreement without substituting suitable arrangements to maintain peace and stability.23

Toward the end of 1974, the United States presented to China and the Soviet Union what is called a cross-recognition formula, a parallel recognition by Washington and Tokyo of Pyongyang and by Moscow and Peking of Seoul. This formula conforms to South Korea's open-door policy toward any country which is ready to have diplomatic relations with it on the basis of principles of reciprocity and equality. In January 1975 Pyongyong denounced the formula as a two Korea plot,24 although it accepts cross-recognition from many countries.

On September 22, 1975, Secretary Kissinger proposed a four-party conference involving the two Koreas, China and the United States to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. The Secretary restated the proposal in a speech July 22, 1976. North Korea rejected this proposal a few days later.25

U.S. position on Korea is clear. The Ford Administration:26
1) Urged the resumption of serious North-South
dialogue, which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which
North Korea has broken off;

2) Was ready to take reciprocal steps toward South
Korea if North Korea's allies were ready to improve their
relations with South Korea;

3) Would continue to support dual entry of both
Koreas into the United Nations without prejudice to their
eventual unification; and

4) Was ready to negotiate a new basis for the
armistice or to replace it with more permanent security
arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties
concerned.

The Carter Administration inherited a Kissinger
formula from the previous administration, under which the
United States would not negotiate with North Korea without
South Korea's participation.

As enunciated on June 23, 1973, South Korea's
position is: to maintain peace on the peninsula; to continue
a dialogue with Pyongyang; to open its door to all the
nations of the world irrespective of their ideological and
political differences; and to conclude a non-aggression pact
with Pyongyang as a prerequisite to U.S. troop withdrawal.

On the other hand, North Korea's position on direct
bilateral talks with the United States remains unchanged.
South Korea will be allowed to participate in the talks.
between the United States and North Korea only as an observer. Even in that case, talks should be proceeded first between North Korea and the United States. This policy is stated in a statement issued by a spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry on July 10, 1979. The statement was issued in a response to the U.S.-ROK proposal for three-way talks.27

In its statement, North Korea denounced the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations and the cross-recognition formula as "an insidious attempt" to fix the division of Korea by creating two Koreas.

This position was later reaffirmed by North Korea's Premier Yi Chong-ok in his 13 July address. He characterized the U.S.-ROK proposal for three-way talks as "utterly unreasonably and infeasible."28

The critical point that deserves attention in the foreign ministry statement is "whether the United States and South Korea want negotiations for one Korea or for two Koreas." From the perspective of North Korea, "what is the use of the talks, if it is aimed at permanent division, not reunification?"29

The bone of contention between the two Koreas is focused on the problems relating to military affairs and the question of unification. The lack of progress in the intermittent North-South dialogue may be ascribed to different reasons:
1) To North Korea, the Korean question has two aspects. One is the unification of Korea, an internal matter which is to be solved by the Korean people themselves without outside interference, the other is the question of U.S. troop withdrawal and that of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace agreement, an external matter which is to be solved between North Korea and the United States, the actual parties to the armistice agreement. These two different questions require two different sets of negotiation parties. 

2) To South Korea, these two questions are inseparable. Although South Korea is not a signatory to the armistice agreement, it is entitled to participate to talks related to the question of U.S. troop withdrawal and of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace agreement because it is one of the main actors directly involved in Korean affairs.

Another major cause is deep-rooted animosity and suspicion about the intentions of the other. This is evident from the fact that both Koreas are escalating the arms race. As a result, both parties want to negotiate with each other from a position of strength. This eventually leads to confrontation rather than to cooperation.

In the final analysis, the perception of threat from each other makes the leadership of both Koreas take
two different approaches toward a solution of the Korean question. Their perception must be viewed from the geopolitical environment and psychological effect of both Koreas:

1) North Korea's geopolitical proximity to its principal allies is a great advantage over South Korea. The security treaties North Korea signed with both China and the Soviet Union provide for immediate assistance in case of war. However, in Pyongyang's eyes, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea constitutes a threat to the security of North Korea and a stumbling block to the independent unification of Korea as well. Therefore, Pyongyang views the question of removing U.S. forces from Koreas as a matter which brooks no momentary delay. This is evident from North Korea's persistent demands for U.S. troop withdrawal.

2) The U.S.-ROK security treaty provides for assistance in accordance with their constitutional processes. In addition, South Korea is far away from the United States. So far as the geopolitical environment is concerned, South Korea is definitely at a disadvantage. Therefore, Seoul views the presence of U.S. forces in Korea as a deterrent to renewed conflict and a psychological support to it.

Thus, it may be safe to state that although the goal of both Koreas--national unification--is identical, their
approach toward that goal is conditioned by their geo-
political environment and psychological effect.

Prior to the Carter-Park call for three-way talks, on January 19, 1979, President Park called for an uncondi-
tional resumption of the North-South dialogue "at any time,
at any place and at any level." For the first time in almost six years since the rupture of talks for unification, representatives of both Koreas resumed contact on February 17, 1979. After three rounds, the talks were suspended since each side failed to attend a subsequent meeting called for the other side.

The initial North Korean response came in the name of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland. The North Korean proposal stated:

1) Both sides should reaffirm and adhere to the principles of the July 4 joint statement;
2) Both sides should refrain from slandering each other;
3) Both sides should suspend all military activity along the DMZ as of March 1, 1979; and
4) All-nation Congress should be convened in Pyongyang in September 1979 with representatives of all political parties and social groupings attending.

South Korea rejected this, insisting that it would talk only with the "responsible authorities." To South Korea, the North Korean united front tactic was not
acceptable because Seoul did not want to pluralize the channel for the inter-Korean talks, but did want to represent all South Korean society with "one single voice" founded on national consensus. Seoul pressed for a resumption of the meeting of the North-South Coordination Committee, a body which was formed in 1972 as the vehicle for the North-South dialogue, and which Pyongyang declared to be defunct. Thus, the talks were doomed to failure even before that meeting.

How firmly the Seoul government adhered to the "one single voice" formula can be seen when it was infuriated by a controversial statement on the deadlocked North-South dialogue made by Kim Young-sam, president of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), on June 11, 1979. In that statement, Kim said: "I am ready to go immediately anywhere at any time, whether it be within Korea or abroad, to work for the peaceful and democratic unification of our land."34

In Pyongyang's eyes, Kim's statement conformed to the North Korean proposal to hold all-nation congress, undermining the basic position of the Seoul government toward the need for the talks between the North-South responsible authorities. With this in mind, North Korea's reaction was quick in calling for a "preliminary contact between the Korean Workers Party and the South Korean NDP at Panmunjom or in a third country
at a time convenient to the NDP.\textsuperscript{35} On the other hand, the ruling Democratic Republican Party demanded that the NDP retract Kim's statement on the inter-Korean talks, blaming the NDP for its "attempt to enervate the government's enthusiasm for the national unification."\textsuperscript{36}

Whatever the motivation underlying North Korea's proposal, North Korea, as observed by a Korean analyst, was able to project its image as being positive toward the dialogue with the South while creating the impression that it was the South that ruptured the dialogue in the end.\textsuperscript{37}

The crucial point that deserves attention was that the incident involving Kim Young-sam's statement and the subsequent reaction of both Koreas to it created a grave impact on the South Korean political scene in 1979; simply stated, a decisive, deep-seated disunity characterized by chaos and instability. It was precisely because of this political turmoil that the "Yushin (revitalizing) constitutional system," the myth of a mighty perennial presidency, came to an end when President Park was assassinated. With the disappearance of this central figure from the South Korean political scene, another crucial remaining question was whether both Koreas would modify their position on the question of what they believe to be the supreme goal of the nation, national unification.
In the spring of 1980, there were visible movements to pave the way for a North-South Premiers' conference. The expectation for a resumption of North-South talks was raised when, in January 1980, North Korea's Premier Yi Chong-ok proposed such a conference. What prompted Pyongyang to make such a proposal is not difficult to discern. Since Yi's proposal came at a time when the South Korean political situation was quite fluid following the assassination of President Park in October 1979 and the military coup of December 1979, it may be safe to assume that Pyongyang wanted to fish in the troubled waters. From the North Korean viewpoint, a dialogue with the South might create a peaceful climate so that the South Korean military could make no excuse for taking over the government.

Among other things, Pyongyang's use of the term "the Republic of Korea" marked an epoch-making event in North-South relations. The proposal also coincided with the idea of an unconditional resumption of North-South talks "at any time, at any place and at any level" that the late President Park had proposed on January 19, 1979. Given this reconciliatory gesture on the part of Pyongyang, Seoul was compelled to accept a new challenge from Pyongyang.

As was the case with previous talks, both sides failed to agree even on the agenda of the proposed conference. To make matters worse, the turbulent political upheavals in May 1980--the Kwangju uprising, total martial law and the
widespread arrest of potential political rivals—provided Pyongyang with ample ammunition for propaganda. Meanwhile, there was a series of incidents involving the infiltration of North Korea armed agents into the South. Both sides exchanged a barrel of charges and counter-charges. On September 24, 1980, Pyongyang issued a statement unilaterally suspending the talks, justifying the action as follows:

An intolerable grave situation going against the fundamental idea of the dialogue and contradictory to the desire of the whole nation for peaceful reunification has been created of late in South Korea by the new fascist rulers...Considering that it is meaningless to continue the contact...we will not go to the place of dialogue for the time being till everything returns normal in South Korea.38

Then on January 12, 1981, it was South Korea which took the initiative. In his New Year Policy Statement, President Chon extended a formal invitation to Kim Il-song for a summit meeting through an exchange of mutual visits.39 The invitation to Kim was a chance for both sides to help restore a sense of mutual trust, prevent the recurrence of another fratricidal war, and to resume the suspended dialogue, thus paving the way for peaceful unification.40 Pyongyang rejected Chon's proposal in a statement issued on January 19 in the name of Kim Il, chairman of the Committee of the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, declaring that "Chon Doo Hwan is not a man worthy for us to do anything with."41 In that statement, Pyongyang presented a five-item demand:42
1) To apologize to the whole nation for the Kwangju incident.

2) To release Kim Tae Jung and all other imprisoned democratic figures.

3) To renounce the anticommunist policy.

4) To revoke the "June 23 statement" of the late President Park which declared "two Koreas" a policy.

5) To demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

Any glimpse of hope that North Korea might have had for the emergence of democratic forces in the post-Park era was fading away. From the North Korea perspective, accepting Chon's invitation for mutual visits would merely legitimize the ascendancy of President Chon. It is highly improbable, therefore, that North Korea will take the initiative as it did in the spring of 1980 for proposing a higher-level meeting with the South in the foreseeable future.

2. Attitudes of Major Regional Powers

The major regional powers (Japan, China and the Soviet Union) surrounding the Korean peninsula have conflicting interests in Korea. Aside from their geographic proximity there is one other thing they hold in common; their desire to maintain the status quo. The attention of these three powers is always focused on Korea. Each has security interest. In addition, Korea is one of the troublespots in the world. As noted earlier, despite the intermittent
North-South dialogue for unification, there seems to be no prospect for peace in Korea in the foreseeable future. The danger of renewed conflict still remains. According to Ralph N. Clough, whether that danger increases will depend not only on the evolution of relations of both Koreas, but on the attitudes of the major regional powers toward each other and toward Korea.  

It is to a great extent due to its crucial geopolitical and strategic location in Asia that both North and South Korea have aligned themselves with major powers. North Korea has an alliance with China and the Soviet Union against South Korea's alliance with the United States. When the structure of international relations in East Asia was characterized by a bipolar system during the cold war era, the most pressing concern of both North and South Korea was superpower protection from a threatening enemy coalition.

Today, the structure of international relations in East Asia is characterized by a multipolar system. Under this system superpower protection has become less credible. This is evident from the recent international political trends: a disintegration of the cold-war coalition in both the communist and non-communist blocs and changes in friendships and adversary relations within each of the grand coalitions.

A long Sino-Soviet ideological and territorial dispute finally led to the renunciation of the Sino-Soviet
security treaty. Now China has mended its fences with both the United States and Japan. U.S. and Japan's political and economic cooperation with China coincided with their growing concern over the Soviet Union's growing military power in Asia. This concern is multiplied by growing tension along the DMZ separating the two Koreas.

Both China and the Soviet Union attach the importance to North Korea in part due to North Korea's strategic importance. A hostile power in the peninsula could pose a greater security threat to Peking than to Moscow because of geographic proximity to the peninsula to China's industrial center in Manchuria.

a. Attitudes of China

China maintains that North Korea is the "sole sovereign Korean state." As a result, China, in public, opposes the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, a cross-recognition of both Koreas and a simultaneous admission into the United Nations of both Koreas. Peking's support for Pyongyang's "one Korea" policy, however, should not be viewed as an endorsement of a military confrontation. To the contrary, armed conflict in Korea would merely spoil China's grand global strategy for having the United States and Japan as a counterweight to Soviet expansionism. In addition, China is now preoccupied with its "four modernizations" program. Its economic development must take
precedence over a unified Korea under communism. Viewed in this context, the status quo in the peninsula seems to be essential for China's own security and economic interest at least for the time being. If past experience is any indication, it will not be difficult for the Chinese leadership to realize that the presence of U.S. forces in Korea has a stabilizing effect on the Korean peninsula. If this argument is valid, it may not be too bold to conclude that China is probably paying lip service to Pyongyang's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

China still is a divided nation. China endorses the "one Korea" policy as a matter of principle because China itself has fought for the "one China" policy. It is unrealistic for anyone to naively believe that China would endorse the "liberation" by Pyongyang of South Korea while seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. The pragmatic Chinese leaders must be aware of the fact that a precipitous change in the current status quo in the peninsula would be tantamount to an open invitation to Moscow's intervention. The unification of Vietnam, for example, is now against China in alliance with Moscow. China simply cannot afford to turn a unified Korea into another Vietnam, especially when it is faced with the paramount task of the "four modernizations." One of the four is the modernization of China's own armed forces into a more effective and deterrent against the Soviet threat.
This historic Herculean task would be delayed by draining of military weapons and equipment if China were to be involved in another Korean conflict which it does not want. Precisely for these reasons, it is imperative for China to restrain both Moscow and Pyongyang; deterring them from taking any action that would destabilize the status quo in the peninsula. Thus, for China, the unification issue is not one which brooks not even a momentary delay, but is one which should be solved in a peaceful way and in a broader timeframe. Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's remarks on this issue eloquently bespeak itself:

Divided countries are ultimately unified...if these problems can't be solved in 10 years, they will be solved in 100 years. If not in a century, then in 10 centuries.46

b. Attitudes of the Soviet Union

Soviet interest in Korea stems primarily from its strategic location contiguous to both China and the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Soviet basic policy toward Korea is limited in scope due in part to its somewhat cool relations with Pyongyang. Anyone who took the Chinese side on the recent Sino-Vietnam conflict, as Pyongyang did, is not dependable in Moscow's eyes.

Nevertheless, Moscow is not in a position to push Pyongyang too far to the wall. If it does, the outcome will be obvious; the fall of Pyongyang into the arms of Peking beyond Moscow's reach.
The most basic question that has to be answered is the reason for the incompatibility of interests between Moscow and Pyongyang. There are a number of issues and developments that have had adverse effects on relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. Some issues are considered to be more significant than others.

First, Moscow appears to be taking a lukewarm attitude toward the issue of unification even though it publicly advocates the North-South dialogue. Moscow's reluctance is understandable when taking into account its policy toward the "two Germanies." There appears to be some differences of view between Moscow and Pyongyang on the claim by the latter that North Korea is the "sole, legal government" in the peninsula. On many recent occasions, despite Pyongyang's obvious displeasure, Moscow has admitted into the Soviet Union South Korean scholars, sportsmen, reporters and other groups to participate in international conferences or athletic games. Is this a signal of Moscow's intention to tolerate, if not to recognize, the status quo in the Korean peninsula? Donald S. Zagoria believes that the principal cause of strain between Moscow and Pyongyang lies in Pyongyang's fear that Moscow may yet recognize the South Korean government, a fear reinforced by the American proposal for the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the major regional powers.
In recent years, the South Korean government has made overtures for trade and other contacts with Moscow on many occasions. However, an improvement in such relations seems to be a remote possibility. According to Prof. Fuji Kamiya, as long as Pyongyang adheres to the principle of not recognizing the two Koreas, Moscow will feel obliged to refrain from expanding its contacts with Seoul. In other words, Moscow, like Peking, wants to maintain the "status quo." 49

Secondly, Moscow has found Kim Il-song an unreliable partner, obviously because Kim took the Chinese side on Yugoslavia, the Sino-Indian border conflict, and the Cuban missile crisis. 50

Third, there appear to be some differences of view between Moscow and Pyongyang on their approach toward the problems concerning the future of Korea. This is evident from the fact that Pyongyang rejected former Secretary Kissinger's call for a 4-party conference involving the United States, China, and North and South Korea. 51 Moscow has not denounced Kissinger's proposal. China made clear that it would line up squarely behind Pyongyang's position on the Carter-Park joint proposal for a 3-party conference. Moscow was unhappy with the proposal for fear that it might be cut out of diplomatic maneuvering that affects its interests. 52
Fourth, Moscow, like China, supports a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea. However, there is little evidence that Moscow regards the presence of U.S. forces in Korea as a threat to its security. Moscow has started reinforcing its armed forces in the Far Eastern region only after the Sino-Soviet dispute has become escalated. There is no reason to believe that Moscow would be willing to risk the danger of war in support of Kim Il-song's militant strategy for unification.  

Finally, in the past few years Pyongyang has decisively tilted toward Peking. Of all the factors affecting Moscow's policy toward Pyongyang, Moscow's failure to woo Pyongyang away from Peking is the most significant. Moscow's discontent over Kim Il-song's pro-Peking position was reflected when: 1) Kim's trip to Peking in 1975 was not followed by an invitation to visit to Moscow; and 2) although repayment of Pyongyang's debts to Moscow was rescheduled, Moscow did not bail Pyongyang out of its financial default on debts to Japan and western European countries.

The above issues and developments emphasize the incompatibility of interests between Moscow and Pyongyang. However, recent changes in friendship and adversary relations among the regional powers surrounding the Korean peninsula might affect Moscow's policy toward the Korean peninsula and towards its adversaries. There is no reason to doubt that Soviet interest in Korea has been reinforced recently by the need to counter the formation of the Washington-
Peking-Tokyo axis. Moscow may regard the axis as a triangular anti-Soviet united front in Asia.

There is fear that Moscow is so hostile to the growing triangular axis that it is "thought likely to make efforts to disrupt it - possibly through their opposing interests in the Korean peninsula." If Moscow were to make such disruptive moves, its passive approach supporting the status quo on the Korean peninsula would have to be modified to support Pyongyang's militant strategy for unification. This will complicate Pyongyang's pro-Peking position and Peking's policy toward Korea as well.

c. Attitudes of Japan

Today, the dominant view in Japan is that Japan's security is inseparable from that of the Korean peninsula. This is evident from the May 1979 Carter-Ohira joint communique which states that "the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is important for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan." The most significant point that deserves attention in the joint communique is the phrase "the Korean peninsula." This broader Korea clause is in sharp contrast with the "ROK" clause in the November 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique. It is clear that Sato's "ROK" clause became a broader "Korea" clause.

A shift of Japanese attitude toward the Korean question was surfaced in 1975 when Japan declined to reaffirm
that South Korean security was essential to Japan. The Korea clause in U.S.-Japan joint communiques issued since 1975 should suffice to illustrate the point. The August 1975 Ford-Miki joint announcement to the press only states that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan." The March 1977 Carter-Fukuda joint communique also notes "the continuing importance of the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole."

What implications are there in the change in Japanese attitudes? The answer to this question should be sought from the context of an adjustment of Japanese policy to the new realities of the regional environment.

The shift of Japanese policy toward Korea coincided with the fall of Saigon in 1975. The sudden turn of events in Vietnam created the fear that "After Vietnam, it may be Korea." As if to underscore this fear, Kim Il-song made a visit to Peking on the eve of Saigon's fall. This gave rise to speculation that a southward invasion might be imminent. This speculation was further reinforced by the discovery of a tunnel the North Koreans had dug underneath the DMZ. It is not very difficult to assume that the reverberations of these alarming events in and around Korea were felt even in Japan for one simple reason: a
fear of Japan's getting involved in another Korean conflict.

In case of war in Korea, a policy of neutrality would be infeasible, primarily because of a series of security arrangements Japan has made with the United States under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The Japanese immediate concern would be with the heightened polarization of public opinion on the process of determining how they should deal with the new situation. Domestic politics would be focused on whether Japan, under the "prior consultation" clause of the treaty, should permit the United States to use Japanese bases to wage combat operations. Their other concern would be with a threat not only from a unified Korea hostile to Japan but also from one of the regional powers which might emerge as a result of what happens in Korea.

In any case, all of this would have an irrevocable and destabilizing effect on both the Japanese political scene and U.S.-Japan relations. In the Japanese context, it is natural that as Toru Yano at Kyoto University put it, "Japan has a stake in the maintenance of two Koreas, rather than unification." This concept of two Koreas is reflected in the Japanese government position supporting the cross-recognition formula and the entry of both Koreas into the United Nations. Precisely for these reasons, the
dominant Japanese view on, and concern with, the Korean peninsula was and remains unchanged: 1) what is essential to Japan is not the security of the Republic of Korea but rather the peace and security of the Korean peninsula in its entirety; and 2) how to deter explosive changes from occurring in the existing status quo on the Korean peninsula.

The relevant question is: what can Japan do? Tokyo has thus far taken a one-sided commitment to Seoul, despite twists and turns that have taken place in Tokyo-Seoul relations in recent years. Whether Tokyo's asymmetrical commitment to Seoul will remain unchanged in the future is a matter of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it seems that Japan's attitudes and policy toward Korea may be significantly influenced by U.S. policy toward Korea when taking into account both the recent changes in the international environment in East Asia and Japanese security and economic interests in the region.

Japan regards the presence of U.S. forces in Korea as a deterrent to a unification adventure either by the North and the South. Obviously, U.S. physical presence there constitutes an insurance to Japanese economic investment. By the same token, an American decision for phased withdrawal could well lead Japan to a more "symmetrical posture balancing Japanese economic interests in Seoul and Pyongyang."62
One should not rule out the possibility that in time, the close Sino-Japanese economic relation and Pyongyang's pro-Peking position could well provide a powerful momentum for Japan to pursue a more even-handed approach toward Pyongyang's economic problems. In that case, from the Japanese perspective, Pyongyang could be induced, at least for the time being, to refrain from actions detrimental to a sound regional economic environment. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that it is in the best interest of Japan to see relations between the two Koreas and the great powers normalized.

3. Alternative plans

A peaceful solution to the Korean question still remains a puzzle to policy-makers. It is worthwhile to search for alternative plans for a peaceful settlement. It is the objective of this section to shed some light on the two sets of proposals: 1) a multilateral guarantee of neutrality; and 2) a four-party or six-party conference.

a. A Four-Power Guarantee of Neutrality

A four-power guarantee of neutrality for Korea's security was a political issue during the April 1971 presidential election in the Republic of Korea. Opposition presidential candidate Kim Tae Jung suggested that the Republic of Korea seek a four-power guarantee for neutrality for the Korean peninsula as a means of preventing the renewal of war. His proposal apparently reflected the
general public sentiment of insecurity on the one-sided reliance of ROK's security on somewhat dwindling U.S. commitment.

The reasons that caused some doubts on the part of South Koreans about the American commitment should be sought in both domestic and international dimensions. On January 23, 1968, North Koreans seized the American intelligence ship "Pueblo" in the East Sea. A U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down by Pyongyang on April 15, 1969. These two incidents, coupled with the "January 21, 1968 incident" involving the attempt of 31 North Korean commandos to assassinate President Park, served to alert the South. America's non-action on these three incidents let South Koreans wonder whether the United States would carry out its commitment of the defense of South Korea. Insecurity over their own security was aggravated when the United States announced its decision to withdraw one of its army combat divisions from Korea under the Nixon Doctrine. The situation was compounded by cautious U.S. efforts to accommodate with China in 1969.

At his New Year press conference on January 11, 1972, President Park described the so-called four-power assurance of Korea's security as "an illusory concept that must be strictly guarded against." Park doubted the feasibility of big powers' guarantee for Korea's security on the grounds that: 1) big powers will never reach an
agreement as long as their interests differ from one another; and 2) even if any temporary agreement is reached, such a guarantee can't be trusted, as shown in the Indo-Pakistan situation. \(^6\)

In the heat of the election campaign, North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Dam hinted Pyongyang's support for Kim's proposal. \(^6\) Aside from what motivated Pyongyang to support Kim's proposal, it seems that the concept of neutrality did, and still does, conform, in principle, to Pyongyang's approach to a relaxation of tension between the two Koreas. There seems to be no concrete evidence indicating that Pyongyang would be opposed to holding an international conference for such a purpose. However, Pyongyang would most likely insist that such a conference be preceded by an understanding among all parties concerned to discuss two vital issues to Pyongyang:

1) A total withdrawal of U.S. forces along with their nuclear weapons from Korea; and

2) A simultaneous renunciation of the security treaty signed by both Seoul and Pyongyang with their respective allies.

As if to underscore the above-mentioned possibility, Kim Il-song told a delegation of the Liberal-Democratic Party from Japan on September 14, 1980 that the security treaty signed by both Seoul and Pyongyang with their respective allies should be renounced simultaneously "on
the prior condition that U.S. forces are withdrawn."\(^{67}\)

Kim added that "only a non-aligned policy would brighten the future of the Korean peninsula."\(^{68}\)

When President Carter decided to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea over a four to five year period, he should have proposed some sort of neutralization of the Korean peninsula as an alternative to the continuing U.S. military presence in Korea. In this connection, Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, an authority on East Asian affairs at Harvard University, suggested the need for a four-power agreement on the peninsula. He states:

Looking beyond the present problems of the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea, the ultimate goal for the Koreans themselves is reunification and for others, the isolation of tensions in the peninsula from broader international problems. We should be working toward a four-power understanding between the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China in which all four will recognize both Korean regimes and will not allow developments there to involve them in conflict with one another. In this way, Korea would be neutralized and foreign pressures withdrawn, allowing the Koreans, on their own, to seek reunification they all so ardently desire.\(^{69}\)

One may argue that Korean neutralization can not be institutionalized in a four-power pact so long as the Sino-Soviet rift continues. However, it seems that in view of the Chinese and Soviets, their security and economic interests of converting the whole of Korea into a neutral buffer zone may be far greater than those of preserving the unstable status quo in the divided Korea. In view of
Moscow’s need for economic cooperation of Japan for Siberian development, a stable neutral Korea must be as important to Moscow as to China. In Moscow’s eyes, a neutral Korea could make Japan refrain from going nuclear. A weak Japan would be in the best interest of Moscow unless it is strong and pro-Moscow.

The conclusion of the Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations can be viewed as a move to counter the Soviet Union. Therefore, China can not afford to be encircled by Moscow and a pro-Moscow Pyongyang. Viewed from this contest, Peking may consider the neutralization of Korea to keep Pyongyang away from Moscow. In this connection, one Korean analyst argues: "If the 'containment' of Soviet Russia continues to be the basic motivating factor behind Chinese foreign policy, a four-power agreement (China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S.) on a neutralized, independent Korea would not be unaccept-able to the Chinese."\(^7\)

In the Japanese view, so long as the U.S.-Japan security treaty continues to exist, there is the danger of Japan’s involvement in another Korean War. But Japan is not in a position to abrogate the treaty so long as it perceives the Soviet Union to be a threat to its own security. Going nuclear for Japan is politically infeasible because of the nuclear-free Japanese Constitution and also because of its domestic pressures. A conceivable alternative to
all these factors is to see some form of unification on the peninsula developed in an evolutionary process. In this way, one source of war can be eliminated from the Korean peninsula. Viewed from these salient aspects of Japanese security interest, it seems evident that a stable, neutral Korea would be more attractive to Japan, "with the potential influence of the other great powers reduced." With this in mind, Prime Minister Miki apparently urged President Ford to hold talks with North Korea when the former conveyed to the latter a message from Kim Il-song.

b. A Four-Party or Six-Party Conference

In September 1975, Kissinger proposed a four-party conference including North and South Korea, the United States and China—the parties most immediately concerned—to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. He also noted that the United States would be ready to explore possibilities for a larger conference to negotiate more fundamental and durable arrangements. In August 1976, Kissinger called again for such a conference.

While responding negatively to Kissinger's proposal for a conference, Pyongyang proposed instead direct bilateral talks with the United States. Pyongyang insisted upon unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command which is a signatory to the armistice agreement. It claimed that if the command is dissolved, the armistice agreement
itself would cease to exist. It also demanded the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.75

Pyongyang's insistence upon direct bilateral talks with the United States may have been motivated by various considerations. First, Pyongyang's claim that it is the only legal government of the Korean peninsula would be justified. By the same token, Seoul's legitimacy and integrity would be jeopardized. Second, the relations between Seoul and Washington would deteriorate. Third, Seoul would be deterred from directly dealing with Chinese representatives. Fourth, Seoul would be unable to exercise its veto power in the process of negotiations. From these considerations on the part of Pyongyang, one may easily infer its response to Kissinger's proposal for a four-party conference.

The Kissinger proposal was hardly an incentive to Pyongyang, primarily because his proposal sought to replace the existing armistice with more permanent arrangements on a new permanent legal basis rather than to replace it with a peace agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. In Pyongyang's eyes, his proposal was viewed as a mechanism designed to prolong and legalize the division of Korea on the basis of the status quo.

On the other hand, the demand by Pyongyang for the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea was regarded by Seoul as "an act of interference in internal
affairs." Seoul claimed that the presence in Korea of U.S. forces is "an bilateral issue" between Seoul and Washington. This conflicts with Pyongyang's claim that the question of U.S. troop withdrawal is an external matter which is to be solved between Pyongyang and Washington, the actual parties to the armistice agreement.

In particular, the point that deserves attention in the Pyongyang claim is that China is not included in discussing the question of U.S. troop withdrawal although it is a signatory to the armistice agreement. Pyongyang seems to reason that China lost its legal grounds for being an effective party to the armistice agreement when the Chinese People's Volunteers were withdrawn from Korea. If this line of reasoning is correct, one may readily argue that once U.S. forces are withdrawn from Korea, there would be no reason whatsoever for the armistice agreement to exist. By the same token, once a peace agreement is signed between Pyongyang and Washington, as insisted upon by the former, the Korean question would be turned into a de jure internal affair. In that case, the United States would be precluded from any future intervention in any internal affair of Korea.

On the other hand, China adheres to the "one state and one government in one nation" principle. This would make China's position very difficult to openly endorse any formula freezing the status quo in the name of stability and security on the Korean peninsula. On top of that, China
competes with the Soviet Union for influence in North Korea. It is apparent that China would be reluctant to be the first to endorse any formula unacceptable to Pyongyang. Any pressure by Peking on Pyongyang regarding any sensitive issue would risk pushing Pyongyang closer to Moscow. These were precisely some of the negative aspects mentioned by President Park about Peking-Pyongyang relations. King Kyong Won, former advisor of national security affairs to President Park, was of the opinion that Peking had no influence over Pyongyang because Peking's leaders were eager to keep Pyongyang from going over to Moscow. He noted that this is evident from the fact that North Korea is the only country that both Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping have visited since they came to power. If his analysis is correct, it is safe to conclude that contrary to the rising expectations of some quarters, the normalization of Peking-Washington relations does not necessarily constitute a decisive factor conducive to bringing Peking to a four-party conference.

This brings one to the question of what alternative course of action should be taken to hold an international conference. If the essence of international relations is a reciprocal compromise based on a "give and take" principle, all four big powers must, and can, find a recipe agreeable to both Koreas. One American analyst made the following suggestions:
1) The United States must first give a signal to Pyongyang its interest in negotiating an agreement which provides for the mutual reduction and pullback of forces, and an eventual withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Korea.

2) An offer to negotiate a U.S. military withdrawal must be made in exchange for significant military concessions by North Korea.

The first item cited above coincides with the proposal that Pyongyang has made all along. South Korea would not be opposed to such a military accord, provided that Pyongyang were to accept a North-South non-aggression pact, as insisted upon by President Park, prior to a U.S. military withdrawal from Korea. It is a well-known fact that Pyongyang already rejected such a pact.

At the time of this writing, a group of South Korean college professors have suggested that the ROK Government seek "a Locarno style non-aggression pact" involving North and South Korea, and the four major regional powers in an effort to settle peace on the peninsula. The professors noted that the four major regional powers should first open reciprocal trade with both Koreas, and then mutually recognize both Seoul and Pyongyang, creating an international atmosphere conducive to the peaceful unification of Korea.
Whether Pyongyang would accept such a proposal is a matter of pure speculation. However, when taking into account its preference for economic development, as adopted at the October 1980 Korean Workers Party congress, North Korea might be induced to take a more flexible attitude. Even in that case, a U.S. military withdrawal from Korea would most likely be seen by Pyongyang as a prerequisite. As Professor Young C. Kim at George Washington University put it:

The most critical factor shaping North Korea's attitude would be whether a conference is designed to, or is likely to result in the total withdrawal of U.S. troops and a movement forward toward the reunification of Korea. So long as such a conference is perceived to have been designed to stabilize, prolong, or legitimize the division of Korea, North Korea would be opposed.81

In sum, time is overdue for all parties involved in Korea to determine if their policies should be redefined to move forward toward a settlement of the Korean question. The immediate steps to be considered are not the cross-recognition formula nor the simultaneous UN membership of both Koreas. The first breakthrough must be made through a reciprocal open-door policy by all four major regional powers toward both Koreas. But the initiative must be taken by both Koreas to create objective conditions conducive to holding an international conference for such a purpose.
FOOTNOTES


2. A report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senators Humphrey and Glenn on "U.S. Troop Withdrawal ..." p. 32.


5. Ibid., p. 31.

6. Ibid.


9. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence... pp. 23-25.


15. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence..., p. 61.

17. Park Chung Hee, pp. 84-85.


20. Park Chung Hee, p. 94-95.

21. Ibid., p. 95.

22. Ibid., p. 97.


26. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. The Korea Times, June 12, 1979.

Committee of the Korean Workers Party, on Kim Young-sam's overtures for talks for unification.


40. Ibid.


42. Ibid.


45. Ibid.


51. For Kissinger's proposal, see NYT, July 23, 1976, p. 4. For Pyongyang's rejection of the proposal, see NYT, July 24, 1976, p. 4.
56. The November 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique states that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." For the joint communique see State Department Bulletin, December 15, 1969, p. 555.
64. Park Chung Hee, p. 50.
65. Ibid., p. 50-52.
68. Ibid.

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71. Ibid., p. 138.


75. Ibid. For Pyongyang's rejection of the 1976 Kissinger proposal, see NYT, July 24, 1976, p. 4.

76. Park Chung Hee, p. 218.

77. Ibid.


79. Gareth Porter, "Time to Talk with North Korea," Foreign Policy, No. 34, (Spring 1979), pp. 70-73.


VI. CONCLUSION

Divided by external powers, plunged into a fratricidal war, protected by external powers, converted into a cockpit of East-West confrontation, the two Koreas still remain no more secure than they were in 1953. As if to ride on the back of the tiger, the United States has been grappling with the Korean question since becoming deeply involved in Korean affairs more than three decades ago. The central and controversial issue involving U.S. security relations with South Korea since the birth of the latter was phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Whenever the United States started to talk about withdrawal, the withdrawal issue became a bone of contention because of South Korea's threat perceptions on the one hand and U.S. worldwide strategic necessity on the other.

As long as the United States is committed to the security of the Republic of Korea, there are two alternatives available to the United States for attaining its goals in Korea. The alternatives are either 1) to maintain the current level of deployment of U.S. forces or 2) to redeploy U.S. ground troops elsewhere by expanded ROK forces. How and when to modify a U.S. military posture depends mainly on the military balance, a reduction in tensions and changes in the strategic environment of East Asia. It is in this
context that, in 1979, the Carter Administration reversed the 1977 troop withdrawal plan.

On the surface, there is a unanimous view that the abnormal state of the Korean peninsula must be removed sooner or later. Despite an intermittent North-South dialogue, no tangible sign of progress toward that goal is in sight because of the legacy of the cold war. There is no enthusiastic movement toward that goal either among the four major regional powers because of their conflicting interests in Korea's strategic geographic location.

The United States fought for the survival of the Republic of Korea 30 years ago and the latter fought side by side with the former in Vietnam. For the United States, the Republic of Korea has become increasingly important ally for both strategic and economic reasons. In early 1981, U.S. security relations with the Republic of Korea ushered in a new era with full of hope and confidence rather than despair and doubt, leaving behind the recurrent uncertainty and anxiety that had characterized the bilateral relationship in the past decades. This attests to the importance of the Republic of Korea as a reliable U.S. ally in time of war and peace.

Since the strategic environment in East Asia remains volatile, the mutual interests of South Korea and the United States demand that the stability of South Korea and the continual undiminished U.S. commitment to South Korea's
security are essential for the protection and progress of their mutual interests. By the same token, as long as the situation on the Korean peninsula remains potentially explosive, the role that the Republic of Korea now plays as a valued U.S. ally defending the mutual interests in East Asia should not be underestimated. Precisely for these reasons, it would seem appropriate to conclude this thesis with the remarks by former Secretary Kissinger: "Your security is not a favor which we do to Korea; it is something which we undertake in our common interest."
FOOTNOTE

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