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INSTITUTION VERSUS OCCUPATION:
CONTRASTING MODELS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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The military can be understood as an organization which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends. It is from this standpoint that two models -- institution versus occupation -- are presented to describe alternative conceptions of the military. These models are evaluated as to which best fits current indicators. The basic hypothesis is that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. To describe the move toward occupationalism is not to hold that such a trend is either desirable or inevitable. In point of fact, analytical recognition of this trend has focused attention on the consequences of policies that affect the military social organization.

The contrast between institution and occupation (for convenience, abbreviated henceforth to I/O) can, of course, be overdrawn. To characterize the armed forces as either an institution or an occupation is to do an injustice to reality. Both elements have and always will be present in the military system. But our concern is to grasp the whole, to place the salient fact. This is all to say that the I/O dichotomy serves as a framework by which the researcher can order data. The essential differences between the two models are summarized in Chart 1. Even though terms like institution or occupation have descriptive limitations, they do contain core connotations which serve to distinguish each from the other. These distinctions can be set forth as follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>service; values -- duty, honor, country</td>
<td>marketplace economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>primary commitment to organization</td>
<td>segmental commitment to organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>much in non-cash form or deferred entitlements, pay partly determined by need</td>
<td>salary system; cash-work nexus; pay directly related to skill level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>adjacency of work and residence locales</td>
<td>separation of work and residence locales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>broad purview over military member</td>
<td>narrow purview over military member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>integral part of military community</td>
<td>removed from military community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
<td>esteem based on notion of sacrifice</td>
<td>prestige based upon level of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>&quot;vertical&quot; -- within organization</td>
<td>&quot;horizontal&quot; -- external to organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>&quot;vertical&quot; -- within organization</td>
<td>&quot;horizontal&quot; -- external to organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regard</td>
<td>&quot;vertical&quot; -- within organization</td>
<td>&quot;horizontal&quot; -- external to organization</td>
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<td>Reference</td>
<td>&quot;vertical&quot; -- within organization</td>
<td>&quot;horizontal&quot; -- external to organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>&quot;vertical&quot; -- within organization</td>
<td>&quot;horizontal&quot; -- external to organization</td>
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An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e. a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often seen as following a calling. They are commonly viewed and regard themselves as being different or apart from the broader society. To the degree one's institutional membership is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and primary identification with one's role, it will usually enjoy esteem from the larger society. Although remuneration may not be comparable to what one might expect in the economy of the marketplace, this is often compensated for by an array of social benefits associated with an institutional format as well as psychic income. When grievances are felt, members of an institution do not organize themselves into interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought, it takes the form of "one-on-one" recourse to superiors, with its implications of trust in the paternalism of the institution to take care of its own.

Military service has traditionally had many institutional features. One thinks of extended tours abroad, the fixed term of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations. It is also significant that a paternalistic remuneration system has evolved in the military corresponding to the institutional model: compensation received in non-cash form (e.g. food, housing, uniforms, medical care), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, payments to service members partly determined by family status, and a large pro-
portion of compensation received as deferred pay in the form of retirement benefits. Moreover, unlike most civilians, for whom compensation is heavily determined by individual expertise, the compensation received by military members is essentially a function of rank, seniority, and need.

An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e. prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. Supply and demand rather than normative considerations are paramount. In a modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations. The cash–work nexus emphasizes a negotiation between individual and organizational needs. The occupational model implies priority of self–interest rather than that of the employing organization. A common form of interest articulation in industrial -- and increasingly public employee -- occupations is the trade union.

Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model. This in the face of repeated governmental commissions and studies advocating that the armed services adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay, allowances, and tax benefits into one cash payment and which would eliminate compensation differences between married and single personnel, thus conforming to the equal–pay–for–equal–work principles of civilian occupations. Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there has been some accommodation to occupational imperatives. Reenlistment bonuses have been a staple incentive to retain highly skilled technical personnel. Off–scale pay has been a feature of military compensation for physicians for
many years. Since the advent of the all-volunteer force, bonuses have been used to recruit soldiers into the combat arms.

Despite certain exceptions, the traditional system of military compensation reflected not only the so-called "X-factor" -- the unusual demands of service life -- but the corporate whole of military life. The military institution is organized "vertically," whereas an occupation is organized "horizontally." To put it in as unpretentious manner as possible, people in an occupation tend to feel a sense of identity with others who do the same sort of work, and who receive about the same pay. In an institution, on the other hand, it is the organization where people live and work which creates the sense of identity that binds them together. Vertical identification means one acquires an understanding and sense of responsibility for the performance of the whole. In the armed forces the very fact of being part of the services has traditionally been more important than the fact that military members do different jobs. The organization one belongs to creates the feeling of shared interest, not the other way around.

From this perspective, the sense of community in the military thus runs up and down, not sideways across -- ethnically, racially, as well as occupationally -- as in civilian society. There is therefore an increasing organizational conflict between the fundamental trends of the contemporary military which push toward institutional vertical integration, and those which push toward horizontal identification with like occupational groups in the larger society.

Although antecedents predate the appearance of the all-volunteer force, the end of the draft might be seen as a major thrust to move the military toward
the occupational model. The selective service system was premised on the notion of citizen obligation -- a "calling" in the almost literal sense of being summoned by a local draft board -- with concomitant low salaries for junior enlisted personnel. Furthermore, it is estimated that about forty percent of "volunteers" in the peacetime pre-Vietnam era were draft motivated. The draft also served as the major impetus for recruitment into the reserves and college officer commissioning programs. Even though the termination of the draft in 1973 has been one of the most visible changes in the contemporary military system, it must be stressed that the all-volunteer force in and of itself need not be correlated with an occupational model. It is only that the architects of the present all-volunteer force have chosen the occupational model as their paradigm.

The marketplace philosophy clearly underpinned the rationale of the 1970 Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force ("Gates Commission Report"). Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values captured in words like "duty," "honor," and "country," the Gates Commission argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards. Whether under the rubric of systems analysis, econometrics, or cost effectiveness, such a redefinition of military service is based on the core assumption that the armed forces are best viewed as another part of the labor market. Organizational distinctions between military service and civilian occupations are glossed over. A prime example of viewing the all-volunteer force in marketplace terms is found in the influential Rand Corporation report on military manpower. This is also a theme that recurs
in officially sponsored assessments of the all-volunteer force. The operating principle of the all-volunteer force has been calibrating recruitment and retention policies to supply and demand conditions in the national economy. This mind-set has contributed to moving the American military toward an explicitly occupational format.

Other indicators of the trend toward the occupational model can also be noted.

Compensation and Entitlements. The move toward making military remuneration comparable with the civilian sector preceded the advent of the all-volunteer force. Since 1967 military pay has been formally linked to the civil service and thus, indirectly, to the civilian labor market. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, military compensation increased at a much faster rate than civilian rates. Toward the latter part of the 1970s, however, military pay appears to have lagged behind civilian levels. Precisely because military compensation was being redefined as comparable to civilian rates, increased attention was given to actions and proposals to reduce a number of military benefits and entitlements (notably, a restructuring of the retirement system). A widespread concern with "erosion of benefits" became evident among military members. This was understandable because non-pay elements make up close to half of all career military compensation compared with less than a quarter in most civilian compensation packages. There also seems to be an underlying awareness of the general principle that the more compensation is "in-kind" or tax-free or deferred rather than in direct salary, the more supportive the compensation system will be of institutional rather than occupational tendencies.
Current dissatisfaction is great because, while the military organization is moving in the direction of the occupational model, much of its membership harkens to the social supports of the older institutional format.

Not so well understood is that the institutional features of the military compensation system may have been unwittingly traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military personnel in the early years of the all-volunteer force. A kind of "devil's bargain" may have been struck when military pay was geared to comparable civilian levels. It is highly unlikely that service entitlements can be maintained at past levels if military salaries are to be competitive with civilian scales. Discontent with the erosion of benefits was intensified by the fact that the major pay increases of the late 1960s and early 1970s preceded the reductions in benefits. The pay increases, that is, were not seen as part of a package which would also entail some reductions in benefits. Dissatisfaction with the total compensation package became even more intensified when pay raises since 1972 failed to keep pace with inflation. The heightened concern of military members with compensation in recent years, moreover, can be attributed, at least in part, to the overtly monetary emphasis that has prevailed in the implementation of the all-volunteer force.

Another major outcome of the all-volunteer force has been a dramatic compression of pay scale within the military. In the 1960s, the basic pay of an E-9 (the senior enlisted grade) with 26 years of service was better than seven times that of an entering recruit. Since the end of the draft, that same E-9 makes only three and a half times the pay of the recruit. The paradox is that this "front-loading" of compensation toward the junior ranks and changes to improve lower enlisted life cannot be appreciated by those now entering the ser-
vice — they did not experience the old ways. Instead, junior enlisted members see little monetary or "lifestyle" improvement over the course of a military career, thereby reducing the likelihood of their choosing to remain in the service. Once upon a time sergeants measured their incomes and perquisites against those of the soldiers they led, and felt rewarded; now they see a relative decline of status within the service and compare their earnings against civilians, and feel deprived.

Military Unions. The possibility that trade unionism might appear within the armed forces of the United States was unthinkable a decade ago. Reliance on marketplace models to recruit and retain military members and the blurring of the line between military service and civilian occupations is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism. Several unions, notably the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), affiliated with the AFL-CIO, have indicated an interest in organizing the military. In the fall of 1977, however, the AFGE voted against organizing the military in a union referendum. The membership of the AFGE apparently believed the civilian membership of the union would be overwhelmed by new military members. Nevertheless, the nascent trend toward unionism led to a 1977 Defense Department directive which, while not banning unions outright, forbade any union from engaging in collective bargaining or job actions on a military installation. In 1978, a law was passed which prohibited any organizing activities whatsoever in the armed forces. The constitutionality of the 1978 law is yet to be tested, and the situation of full-time reservists who are already unionized is yet to be clarified.

Despite the statutory prohibitions placed on organizing the armed forces,
the underlying dynamics of the occupational ascendency are still operative. A 1976 survey of Air Force personnel found that 33 percent of those surveyed stated they would join a military union, 31 percent were undecided, and 36 percent would not. Willingness to join a union was greater among enlisted personnel than officers, and was strongly correlated with perceived erosion of benefits. A 1977 survey of Army personnel found essentially similar attitudes toward unionism.

Another development has been the trend toward representation activity or what one study calls "creeping unionism," on the part of service associations. The Fleet Reserve Association and, especially, the Air Force Sergeants Association (AFSA) have taken an increasingly active role in lobbying Congress for servicemen's pay and benefits. Significantly, the AFSA has grown from a membership of 23,000 in 1974 to close to 100,000 by 1980.

Whatever the degree or form representational activity may take in the armed forces, it is important to note that only in the public sector, where there are no owners to oppose, is labor union membership growing as a percent of the American work force.

Attrition. In the pre-Vietnam military it was considered aberrant for an enlisted man not to complete his initial tour of duty. During the late 1970s, however, about one in three service members were failing to complete initial enlistments. Since 1973 over 600,000 young people have been prematurely discharged from the military for reasons of indiscipline, personality disorders, job inaptitude, and the like. The striking finding is that high school graduates are twice more likely than high school dropouts to complete
their enlistments. Attrition varies by service with the rate being highest in the ground force, lowest in the Air Force, and the Navy in between. When education is held constant, however, the attrition rates between the different services are essentially the same. The fact that the attrition rate has been lowest in the Air Force is probably better explained more as an outcome of the quality of its entrants than by what happens to airmen once in the service.

The attrition phenomenon reflects changing policies of military separation — the "easy-out" system of the all-volunteer force — as well as changes in the quality of the entering enlisted force. Put in another way, the all-volunteer military, like industrial organizations, is witnessing the common occurrence of its members "quitting" or being "fired." In time, it is possible that a general certificate of separation will replace the present discharge classification system. Unlike an older era, there would no longer be a stigma for unsuccessful service. Such a development would make the military that much more consistent with the civilian work model. In all but name, the all-volunteer force has already gone a long way down the road toward indeterminate enlistments. Yet it is symbolic that the word "honorable" — a term not found in occupational evaluations — is still used in classifications of military discharges.

Work and Residence Separation. A hallmark of the traditional military has been the adjacency of work place and living quarters. As late as the mid-1960s, it was practically unheard of for a bachelor enlisted man to live off base. Not only was it against regulations, but few could afford a private rental on junior enlisted pay. By 1980, although precise data are not avail-
able, a reasonable estimate would be that about one out of four single enlisted people in stateside bases have apartments away from the military installation.

To the increasing proportion of single enlisted members living off base, one must add the growing number of married junior enlisted people, nearly all of whom also live on the civilian economy. Since the end of the draft, the proportion of marrieds among junior enlisted has about doubled. Like civilian employees, many junior enlisted personnel are now part of the early morning and late afternoon exodus to and from work. One of the outcomes of the large salary raises for junior enlisted personnel used to recruit an all-volunteer force has been the ebbing of barracks life.

Moonlighting. One striking manifestation of the occupational model is found in the growing numbers of military personnel who hold outside employment. According to a 1979 Air Force survey, 21 percent of enlisted personnel and 6 percent of officers reported themselves as holding a second job. If there is a bias in these findings, it would surely be toward the understatement of self-reported moonlighting. If the data were limited to those stationed in the United States, moreover, the figures would most likely be higher (on the presumption that moonlighting opportunities are less available overseas). Whatever the actual incidence of moonlighting, the increasing likelihood of outside employment for service members has become one of the characteristics of the all-volunteer force.

Moonlighting is often attributed to the service member's need for additional income in an inflationary economy. This undoubtedly is a factor for many of the junior enlisted marrieds (though the increase in junior enlisted
marrieds is itself an outcome of the all-volunteer force). Yet the anomaly exists that moonlighting is also increasing among single members of the junior enlisted force, even though their current buying power far exceeds that of the pre-volunteer era. In any event, moonlighting, virtually unheard of a decade or so ago, clearly runs contrary to the institutional premise of a service member’s total role commitment to the armed forces.

Military Spouses. In a manner of speaking, the role of institutional membership in the military community extended to the wife of the service husband. (It was only in 1960 that court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents of servicemen was completely ended.) Wives of career personnel were expected to initiate and take part in a panoply of social functions, such as formal visits, receptions, luncheons, teas, cocktail gatherings, and dinner parties. Military wives and their clubs contributed time and raised funds for such activities as support of orphanages, hospitals, welfare work, youth activities, and other volunteer projects. In recent years, there has been a perceptible growing reluctance of wives at both noncom and junior officer levels to participate in such customary functions. With the rising proportion of service wives working outside the home, moreover, there were bound to be fewer women with either the time or inclination to engage in the volunteer work which has structured much of the social life of military installations. A 1979 Air Force survey showed 66 percent of enlisted wives and 45 percent of officer wives to be gainfully employed. Moreover, even those military wives who were not gainfully employed began to regauge their commitment to volunteer work in light of their perceptions of the lower effort put forth by employed
wives. It is not so much that female liberation has arrived among career military wives, though this is not absent, as it is the growing tendency for wives to define their roles as distinct from the military community.

The increasing proportion of intra-service marriages -- a predictable outcome of the increasing number of female military members -- might at first glance be seen as a trend toward greater institutional inclusiveness. It is plausible, however, that to the degree the services adjust to the requirements of the couple, rather than the other way around, one could expect less institutional maintenance than in the cases where the spouse of the military member is an adjunct to her husband's (or, less likely, his wife's) career. There is also some preliminary evidence which suggests that the retention rate of military women married to military men is markedly lower than that of single women or married men in the military. In any event, the long-term consequences of intra-service marriages on the military system requires monitoring and appraisal.

The Law and the Military. From the 1950s through the 1960s, the federal courts, the Court of Military Appeals, and the Supreme Court brought into military law almost all of the procedural safeguards available to a civilian defendant while narrowing the purview of military jurisdiction. The highwater point in this trend was *O'Callahan vs. Parker* (1969), in which the Supreme Court struck down court-martial jurisdiction for non-service connected offenses. The significance of *O'Callahan vs. Parker* was that the off-duty or off-base soldier was to be treated like any other citizen. Within the armed forces, especially since the advent of the all-volunteer force, the trend has been a shift in empha-
sis from courts-martial to administrative procedures, most notably in the cases of premature discharges.

Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts have emphasized the uniqueness of the armed forces and the appropriateness of its special system of courts-martial to maintain discipline. The trend toward an occupational model, nevertheless, has continued under a different framework. In *U.S. vs. Russo* (1975) and *U.S. vs. Larionoff* (1977), the Supreme Court applied basic contract law to the legal status of enlistments. This dovetailed with the rising tendency of active-duty personnel to bring enlistment grievances into litigation. The net effect of recent court decisions is to move toward a legal redefinition of the military from one based on traditional status toward one more consistent with generally accepted contract principles.

**DOD Civilian Personnel and Contract Civilians.** The increasing proportion of civilian defense workers in total defense manpower — from 27.0 percent in 1964 to 32.1 percent in 1979 — reflects another trend in the American military establishment. The diminution of the proportion of uniformed personnel within the defense establishment is projected to continue and its impact on institutional commitment deserves attention. Interviews and observations of military personnel working in units with civilians indicate a detrimental effect on morale. The narrow definition of the work role among civilians can increase the work load (such as overtime and holiday work) of military personnel. This along with the higher pay civilians may receive for doing seemingly the same kind of work as military members can generate resentment. The point here being that feelings of relative deprivation are unavoidable when the diffuse
responsibilities of the military institution coexist with the more limited work roles found in civilian occupations.

Another manifestation of recent organizational change departs entirely from the formal military organization. This is the use of civilians hired on contract to perform jobs previously carried out by active-duty servicemen. These tasks range from routine housekeeping and kitchen duties, through rear-echelon equipment and weapons maintenance and civilian-manned oilers and tenders, to quasi-combat roles such as "tech reps" aboard warships, operators of missile warning systems in remote sites, and air crews of chartered aircraft in war zones such as occurred in Vietnam. From 1964 to 1978, contract-hire civilians rose from 5.4 percent to 14.5 percent as a proportion of total defense manpower. Almost all of this large increase corresponded to a proportionate decline in enlisted strength in total defense manpower, from 57.3 to 48.0 percent over the same period. Presumably considerations of task efficiencies and costs bear upon decisions to substitute contract civilians for uniformed personnel. Nevertheless, the increased reliance on civilian employees, whose institutional affiliation with the military is attenuated, is yet one more indication of the direction of organizational change in the defense establishment.

The sum of the above and related developments would seem to confirm the ascendancy of the occupational model in the emergent military. This approach can be faulted for presenting too monolithic a picture of trends. There are, of course, always countervailing forces in effect. Indeed, it is the tension
and interplay between institutional and occupational tendencies that characterize organizational developments within the armed forces. This state of affairs account for the research the I/O thesis has generated among both military and academic social researchers. The findings and direction of this research is the topic to which we now turn.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

The notion that members of an organization can be differentiated by their degree of involvement and identification with that organization is a long-standing one. This is no less true for military organizations. Huntington in 1957 defined the officer as a military professional to the degree he adhered to a special type of "vocation," one characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Janowitz in 1960 set forth two polar types of officer professionals — the heroic leader and the military manager. Bachman, Blair, and Segal in a study of the all-volunteer force pointed to the sharp and persistent attitudinal differences between career and non-career military personnel. Other typologies can be found in the writings of military sociologists, both in the United States and Western Europe.

The I/O thesis is informed, but differs from prior formulations in several important respects. Unlike the major emphases of Huntington and Janowitz, the I/O thesis encompasses enlisted personnel as well as officers and is, to a major extent, oblique from distinctions between professional and non-professional. An institutional/occupational categorization is, moreover, by no means isomorphic with career versus non-career orientations. Also, unlike most studies of the all-volunteer force, the I/O approach starts as a description of organizational change (including changes in the civil-military interface) and is not
derived from attitudes held by service members. Rather, military organizational change (including changes in the social composition of entrants) is seen as affecting, if not determining, attitudes of military personnel. At the very least, any understanding of the I/O thesis must keep clear differences between attributes of individuals and characteristics of organizations. Although the two levels of analyses often interpenetrate empirically, nevertheless, they are analytically separable. With this brief background, we can look at the body of research conducted on the I/O thesis over the past several years.

Stahl, Manley, and McNichols of the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) developed measures of I/O orientation in the Air Force. The researchers conducted a survey based on a random sample of 10,687 active-duty Air Force personnel in April, 1977. The respondents represented all enlisted ranks and all officer grades through colonel. Factor analysis of eight attitudinal items revealed two independent dimensions that were labeled institutional and occupational orientations. The institutional orientation was positively associated with career intent, seniority, and job satisfaction, whereas the occupational orientation was negatively associated with those criteria.

The AFIT study noted similarities between the I/O thesis and the cosmopolitan/local construct advanced by Gouldner. The Gouldner construct, subsequently applied to studies of professors, scientists, engineers, and accountants, differentiated between identification with an employing organization ("institutional") as opposed to a broader referent group ("occupational"). The AFIT researchers found that a respondent could score high on both I/O dimen-
sions or low on both. This corresponded with Janowitz's critique of the I/O concept that "we are not dealing with a 'zero sum' game." The AFIT researchers concluded their instrument could be adopted by other services and should be used to assess longitudinal changes along I/O dimensions. Results from a follow-up Air Force survey in 1980 found a detectable increase in occupational orientations.

Babin and O'Mara sought to test the I/O thesis using surveys conducted in sixty Army battalions during 1978 and 1979. The total sample included 9,782 officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted members. The battalions were grouped, for purposes of analyses, into combat, support, and service categories. The questionnaire included individual items (e.g. reasons for enlistment, willingness to deploy, and number of Army friends) and perceptions of organizational processes (e.g. unit participation rate in inspections, ceremonies, sports, and off-duty activities). In general, the findings were that institutional orientations were strongly correlated with rank, but did not vary significantly by type of unit.

Segal and Blair examined the I/O thesis based on analyses of surveys of 2,286 Army personnel conducted in late 1974 and early 1975. The analysis was limited to first-term enlisted men and lieutenants. The sample was categorized into career and non-career orientation (based on stated reenlistment intentions) and by combat and support units. An institutional orientation was most characteristic of non-career officers, followed by career officers, career enlisted men, and non-career enlisted men. This pattern did not differ greatly between combat and support units. The study also concluded that institutional
and occupational orientations could covary and were not necessarily inversely related.

The above studies were all based on secondary analyses of questionnaire items already present in sample surveys of active-duty military personnel. The researchers, that is, were constrained to select items that could fit I/O dimensions on a post hoc basis. The only extant study that constructed items specifically created to measure I/O dimensions was that conducted by Cotton on the Canadian military. Because Cotton has come closest to operationalizing the I/O thesis in questionnaire items, an excerpt of his line of reasoning is given.

In my view, Moskos' argument is that there is evidence available of different levels of acceptance of two basic norms as fundamental principles of military life and the soldier role: (1) military personnel must do their duty regardless of its personal consequences; and (2) military personnel are on duty 24-hours-a-day, i.e. military institutions are always relevant for the soldier. If doing one's duty interferes with, or conflicts with, personal, family, or other interests, the military's claim over the individual has primacy. There is also no limit, in a time sense, to this claim and thus the military's claim is broad in its scope.

The institutional orientation described by Moskos, then, can be defined as a belief that military life should reflect norms of high primacy and broad scope, while an occupational orientation represents a belief that military life should be low in primacy and narrow in scope. In one instance, the image of unlimited commitment, in the other, the image is of limited, i.e. contractual commitment. Each model implies as Moskos suggests a contrasting set of organizational characteristics.

Cotton constructed six Likert-scale items, three of which measured organizational primacy and three of which measured organizational scope. These items were included as part of a general survey of 1,636 Canadian military
personnel in late 1978 and early 1979. The sample was categorized into four rank groupings and combat versus support units. Institutional values were most likely to be found, in descending order, among senior combat officers, senior support officers, junior combat officers, junior support officers, senior support NCOs, senior combat NCOs, junior support troops, and junior combat troops. Differences between ranks were much more pronounced than differences between types of unit.

The overriding finding of the Canadian study was the presence of institutional and occupational orientations in all the subsets. This led Cotton to distinguish three basic latent role types: (1) "soldiers" (the most institutional), (b) "ambivalents" (an in-between category), and "employees" (the most occupational). These role types were extremely powerful predictors of attitudes toward military issues. Importantly, the role types were also much better predictors of military attitudes than rank or background variables. "Soldiers" as contrasted to "employees" were significantly more likely to support regimental traditions, be willing to enter combat, not to have joined the service for job-related reasons, to oppose personnel specialists having authority over troops, and oppose the use of women in combat roles.

Cotton concluded that role cleavages among members of the Canadian forces along I/O dimensions were sufficient enough to entitle his study, "The Divided Army." Significantly, Cotton found much more of a zero-sum or inverse relationship between I/O orientations than did any of the other survey-based studies. This could reflect real differences between the Canadian forces and the American military. More likely, Cotton's measures tapped I/O dimensions
better than was possible for those studies that relied on secondary analyses of existing survey items.

Another set of studies have appeared which, rather than directly testing the I/O thesis, have taken the thesis as a given and a point of departure. Some of these can be mentioned briefly. McCubbin and others have sought to appraise family policy in the armed forces from the standpoint of how family requirements differ in institutional and occupational settings. Blair and Phillips conducted a secondary analysis of 1979 data collected in an extensive youth survey, including both military and civilian populations. They concluded that because of the inclusiveness of military roles and the onerous nature of certain military tasks, the military cannot be experienced by youth as a "normal" organizational setting. If follows, Blair and Phillips argue, that compensation policies that ignore the fundamental differences between the military institution and civilian occupations are inappropriate. Wood conducted in-depth interviews with a small sample of Air Force junior officers in 1978 to assess professional self-images. Wood concluded that the narrowing prestige differences between flying and support functions signal the loss of a unique military identity which should be shared by all Air Force officers. There is also evidence from Wood's data that stronger alliances are being established with civilian counterparts in the same specialties than with other members of the officer corps.

One of the most comprehensive efforts to advance the conceptualization of the I/O thesis is the work of Margiotta. Sensitive to intra- as well as inter-service differences, Margiotta offers the following overarching hypothe-
thesis: "the closer one gets to an organization that will perform in combat, the more institutional that particular organization will be." Thus, in the Air Force, Margiotta proposes that bomber squadrons, fighter squadrons, and missile operations will have a high institutional character. As we move further from the flight line toward support areas, the occupational model appears more prevalent. Even further away from the operational units, such as in the massive logistic complexes, the occupational model becomes dominant.

There is a certain surface plausibility for the hypothesis that institutional qualities will be most prevalent the closer one is to the combat component of a military organization. Such an assumption underlies much of the empirical work generated by the I/O thesis. The data, however, are contradictory on this question. It may be more productive to view I/O qualities not as correlates of responsibilities or skills, but of the degree to which organizational roles are diffuse and inclusive. It would be instructive to look at non-military organization which have institutional qualities (i.e. strong goal orientation and role commitment) to better inform ourselves of the general applicability of the I/O thesis. The Japanese industrial firm suggests itself as one example. Put in another way, it is the primacy the individual gives to his organizational membership that matters, not what tasks the individual carries out.

THE INSTITUTION/OCcupation THesis AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

The attention the I/O thesis has received in the uniformed services, among military and civilian academic researchers, and to a certain degree in
Congress as well, contrasts with the negative reaction it has brought forth from the manpower policymakers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These policymakers have attempted to characterize the debate as one between subjective researchers and objective analysts (usually paired, respectively, with sociologists and economists). This is a false dichotomy. The issue is not subjective versus objective understanding of the armed forces. Rather, the issue is which of two contrasting paradigms of military service does one adopt — social organizational or systems analysis.

If we accept systems analysis, we must accept six of its fundamental tenets. First, there is no analytical distinction between military systems and other systems, especially no difference between cost-effectiveness analysis of civilian enterprises and military services. Second, military compensation should as much as possible be in cash, rather than in kind or deferred (thereby allowing for a more efficient operation of the marketplace). Third, military compensation should be linked as much as possible to skill differences of individual service members. Fourth, social cohesion and goal commitment are essentially unmeasurable (thereby an inappropriate object of systems analysis). Fifth, inasmuch as the quality of service members is hard to quantify (and, in any event, correlated to performance in an unknown way), we must emphasize end-strength figures. Sixth, if end-strength targets are met in the all-volunteer force, notions of citizenship obligation and social representativeness are incidental concerns.

The thesis that the military was being redefined less as an institution and more as an occupation was novel when first introduced. Over the past
several years, however, the I/O thesis has come to be a major element in the emerging counterposition to the prevailing systems analysis understanding of the all-volunteer force. It is beginning to serve as a benchmark by which the military can evaluate personnel policies on other than econometric grounds. It emphasizes the distinction between an organization based on primary role commitment and one based on segmental role identification. The institutional versus occupational thesis brings to the forefront the question of whether the armed forces are to be based on a marketplace framework or on a service ethic.
FOOTNOTES


4. See, for example, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, America's Volunteers (mimeographed, 1978).

5. It has become part of accepted information that civilian pay raises have exceeded those of the military during the latter part of the 1970s. See, notably, Melvin R. Laird, People, Not Hardware (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 8-9. A report of the 'General Accounting Office (CAO), however, states enlisted military pay has increased faster than civilian pay (measured by wages in manufacturing) during 1976-1980. See,
FOOTNOTES (continued)

General Accounting Office, Preliminary Analysis of Military Compensation Systems in the United States and Five Other Countries, FPCD-81-21 (GAO, dated December 31, 1980), p. 6. Similarly, it has been stated that between 100,000 and 275,000 military families may be eligible for food stamps in 1980.


11. For the male enlisted cohort entering the service in 1977, the attrition rate after three years was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>High School Graduates</th>
<th>Non-High School Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. In 1980, among Army enlisted personnel, 4 percent of all married males had a military spouse as did 56 percent (!) of all married females.


16. Cooper, op. cit., p. 11.
FOOTNOTES (continued)


20. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins distinguishes between "ascriptive" officers (accepting the military as the primary reference group) and "achievement" officers (emphasizing professional ties external to the military). Harries-Jenkins, "The Dysfunctional Consequences of Military Professionalism," in Morris Janowitz, ed., On Military Ideology (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 139-165. Using survey and interview methods, two groups have been identified in the French Army: "traditional" (intensive identification with the Army) and "professional" (external reference groups). M. Catinaud, "Evolution of the Military Community," in M.R. Van Gils, ed., The Perceived Role of the Military (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1970), pp. 171-180. Researchers of the cadets and staff at the Royal Netherlands


1. If I left the Air Force tomorrow I think it would very difficult to get a job in private industry with pay, benefits, duties, and responsibilities comparable with those of my present job.
2. An Air Force base is a desirable place to live.
3. The Air Force requires me to participate in too many activities that are not related to my job.
4. Air Force members should take more interest in mission accomplishment and less interest in their personal concerns.
5. I wish that more Air Force members had a genuine concern for national security.
6. What is your opinion of discipline in today's Air Force?
7. More supervision of member performance and behavior is needed at lower levels within the Air Force.
8. An individual can get more of an even break in civilian life than in the Air Force.


FOOTNOTES (continued)


1. In thinking about the kind of job you would like to have, how important are each of the following:
   a. a job that gives me a chance to serve my country well.
   b. a job that gives me a chance to make world a better place.
   c. a job that is steady; no chance of being laid off.
   d. a job where the pay is good.
   e. a job where the fringe benefits are good.

2. Indicate how important were the following in your decision to enlist or accept a commission in the Army:
   a. wanted to serve my country.
   b. to continue a family tradition of military service.
   c. job opportunities looked better than in civilian life.
   d. a secure job with promotions and favorable retirement benefits.


27. Charles A. Cotton, "The Divided Army: Role Orientations Among Canada's Peacetime Soldiers," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 1980. See also, Cotton, "Measuring Military Ethos Patterns: A Note on the Moskos
28. Ibid.

29. Cotton constructed six scaled items as given below. The first three items deal with organizational primacy while the second three deal with organizational scope.

1. No one should be compelled to take a posting he or she does not want.
2. Military personnel should perform their operational duties regardless of the personal and family consequences.
3. Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for military personnel.
4. What a member of the forces does, in his or her off-duty hours, is none of the military's business.
5. Differences in rank should not be important after working hours.
6. What a member does in his private life should be no concern of his supervisor or commander.


FOOTNOTES (continued)


35. The degree to which Japanese industrial organizations differ from those of Western Europe and North America has been a matter of some scholarly attention and debate. See, for example, Ronald Dore, *British Factory—Japanese Factory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert E. Cole, *Work, Mobility and Participation: A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). There is a general consensus, however, that Japanese firms require and receive much more role commitment than counterpart organizations in the West. While cultural factors play a major part in distinguishing Japanese and non-Japanese firms, it is informative to focus on social organizational variables. The below listed attributes of the Japanese firm is adopted from Dore, *op. cit.*
The parallels with the "institutional" format given for military organizations should be apparent.

1. Workers are divided into two categories: (a) temporary employees with no job security or entitlements, and (b) permanent employees with an implied career-long contract (with an early retirement age). The latter group serves as the principal referent for the following generalizations.

2. Recruitment into the firm is for a general range of work roles, and all employees have a reasonably clear career progression.

3. The bulk of training is a cost of the firm rather than of schools or of the individual.

4. Rather than a market price for skills, compensation is largely determined by other variables, e.g. seniority, a man's age, "co-operativeness."

5. Everyone is paid monthly with no concept of differences between salary and wages.

6. Within a firm, the compensation system fosters the identification of a worker with those of the same rank and age rather than with those who are doing the same kind of work (who may be superior or subordinate).

7. One does not cease to be an employee of the firm when one is not at work, i.e. the firm is concerned with the employee's off-work morals.

8. Workers live close to work and are always on call.

9. When the claims of the family conflict with the claims of the firm, the firm takes precedence.

10. A worker's family members are considered members of the firm.