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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF "SECURITY"

by

Robert H. Donaldson

30 June 1980

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Janet C. Smith.

FOREWORD

This memorandum explores how Soviet leaders perceive their country's "security." The author contends that the dominant Soviet image of security requirements is not markedly different from perceptions that US leaders have of America's security requirements. For both countries, "security" means far more than simple physical survival, but also includes elements of economic well-being and internal political stability, as well as the preservation of fundamental alliances. He concludes that it is not yet certain that either the United States or the Soviet Union will be willing to abandon the quest for an "absolute security" founded on an equal insecurity for the other power. -

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DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

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DR. ROBERT H. DONALDSON is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Vanderbilt University. Dr. Donaldson holds a doctorate from Harvard University and has been a consultant to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship Program. He was a visiting professor with the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College from August 1978 until August 1979. He has contributed numerous articles and chapters on Soviet and American foreign policies to scholarly publications and is the author of *Soviet Policy Toward India: Ideology and Strategy* (1974).

SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF "SECURITY"

The prolonged congressional and public debate over the ratification of the SALT II Treaty underscores important questions about the foreign policy intentions of the leaders of the Soviet Union. Having presided for more than a decade over simultaneous campaigns both to increase strategic and conventional military capabilities and to promote relations of "peaceful coexistence" (or "detente") with the United States, Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues have provoked grave doubts in the West about Soviet purposes. Speeches by Kremlin leaders have sought to put a benign face on Soviet foreign and defense policy, but Western analysts have been sharply divided in their interpretations of Soviet pronouncements and behavior.

Close observers of the Soviet political landscape have long been aware of the need for caution in interpreting the Soviet political vocabulary. For in the speech and writing of Soviet officials and analysts, concepts that are quite familiar in Western political parlance are often employed with very distinctive meanings. Quite apart from any international Soviet effort at deception, in the context of a propaganda offensive or the "ideological struggle," this "vocabulary gap" often simply reflects the longstanding differences between Eastern and Western ideological frameworks

and political cultures. To someone operating from a Marxist-Leninist view of the world, it would be quite evident that "bourgeois" and "socialist" uses of such concepts as "democracy," "liberation," and "sovereignty" could not but reflect contrasting class-based interests and orientations. The cause of genuine cross-cultural communication and understanding necessarily suffers as a result of this phenomenon—the more so when the concept is one whose meaning is already the subject of confusion or controversy among Western analysts themselves.

THE AMERICAN USAGE

"Security" is just such a concept. The English word derives from the Latin roots *se* (without) + *cura* (care), and it is popularly defined as the quality or state of being easy in mind or free from risk of loss. According to Webster's, this can imply freedom from danger, freedom from fear or anxiety, or freedom from want or deprivation.¹ The use of the term in the social sciences reflects this breadth, encompassing the absence of or protection from not only physical danger, but also psychological anxiety or even material want.²

In the study of foreign policy and international politics, the concept is more usually expressed as "national security," and it has given its name to an entire field of study. In this context, it generally means the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats.³ Walter Lippmann is credited with having first explicitly defined the term, writing that "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war."⁴

In its international political and military context, the concept of security is not usually understood to imply complete freedom from danger or anxiety, but rather to suggest the capability to protect valued possessions or interests when threats do arise. There is, in other words, no assumption that security requires an absence of threat. In fact, national security is usually defined in terms of existing or foreseeable dangers and the requirements for protection against them. Nor is the concept in its typical Western usage confined to *military* threats or requirements. Secretary Harold Brown's extensive discussion of the concept in the 1979 Defense Department annual report is illustrative:

We who are concerned with military forces may tend sometimes to regard security as a function exclusively of external military threats to the United States, and of our ability to counterbalance or remove them Now, in addition, we understand very well that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness require much more than freedom from external military threats. We are not secure as a nation—in fact, we cannot even be secure militarily—if our economy is under repeated attack from inflation, recession, and shortages of energy or essential raw materials. We are not secure as a nation if we are increasingly an island of democracy surrounded by authoritarian states and cut off from external markets and cultural exchanges. And surely, we are not secure as a nation if we lose confidence in our ability to cooperate among ourselves in the solution of our foreign and domestic problems.'

Brown's statement is quoted here not because it is unusual or controversial; most American politicians and analysts would agree that US security can be threatened by economic disruptions, by loss of contact with like-minded nations, or by domestic dissension and lack of will. The point is rather that a common American understanding of national security envisions a wide range of political threats. It implies a requirement for political, economic, and even spiritual capabilities and relationships, in addition to the military capability to ensure our mere physical survival as a nation.

Underlying American security requirements are usually found certain expectations about (if not preconditions for) the nature of the political, economic, and ideological dimensions of the international order and about the behavior of other states in it. The task of protecting the American way of life (including, presumably, the standard of living to which our citizens have become accustomed) necessarily makes demands on other states, requiring that they act in certain ways to support the international order that we favor (and that favors us). According to the contemporary American vision, the international order will therefore enjoy a stability and legitimacy that is founded both on balanced power and on the willingness of states to abide by certain "rules of the game."

This vision was most fully articulated in President Nixon's 1973 "State of the World" message. National security, it asserted, must rest on a "certain equilibrium" or "balance of power" between potential adversaries. But "solid security" requires, in addition to this balance, both self-restraint and "external restraints on potential opponents."⁶ Unfortunately, as students of international politics have long recognized, the search for "solid security" cannot easily be reconciled with the maintenance of a "balance of

power," given the uncertainties that are inherent in that concept. Nicholas Spykman, the famous student of geopolitics, expressed the dilemma thus:

The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger.⁷

THE SOVIET USAGE

Of course, the United States is not the only state that has found the quest for security vastly complicated by the elusive and uncertain nature of the balance of power. Soviet leaders have also proclaimed an objective of "reliable security"—founded, they say, not on military superiority but on the "equal" and "undiminished" national security of each of the rival superpowers. While recognizing the existence of an "approximate equilibrium" of military strength between the United States and USSR and professing a concern that it not be upset, Soviet leaders and writers have publicly professed a belief in the unreliability of the existing "balance of terror" and have called for it to be replaced by a world of reduced arms and strengthened international cooperation. As Leonid Brezhnev put it:

We are not seeking military supremacy over the West, we do not need it. We need only reliable security. And security for both sides will undoubtedly be greater if the arms race is curbed, if military preparations are reduced, and if the political climate of international communication is normalized.⁸

In the Soviet political lexicon, as in that of the United States, the word "security" (*bezopasnost*—literally, without danger) is usually preceded by a modifying adjective. In addition to "equal," "reliable," and "undiminished" security, one finds "national security" (though far less often than "international security") and "collective security." The latter phrase, in fact, has been at the center of Soviet diplomacy for the past decade and more, as Moscow has pursued campaigns promoting systems of collective security in both Europe and Asia.⁹ In both cases, the requirements for regional security have been publicly defined in terms that have emphasized reduction of military forces and substitution of broad-ranging peaceful cooperation for military confrontation.¹⁰

Although the requirements may be stated in terms that carry a special meaning for the Soviets distinct from their Western meaning, nonetheless security appears to be as much a preoccupation in the Kremlin as in the chanceries and legislatures of the West. But what kind of security? Do the Soviets conceive of a sort of security-for-them that is founded on the zero-sum assumption of fundamental insecurity-for-us? If so, it would certainly not be the first time that one nation felt that its security could best be assured and increased in conflict with and at the expense of others. Or are the Russians sincere in their professions of preference for an approach to security that seeks to foster international cooperation, on the assumption that one nation's security can grow only if all other nations also feel less insecure? Have Soviet views of "security" changed in recent years? Are the Marxist-Leninist and Western approaches to security still fundamentally opposed, or have they begun to bridge differences in ideology and culture and move closer together? Western Sovietologist William Zimmerman has made the case that as the influence of ideology has eroded and the changing international environment has altered the perceptions of members of the Soviet elite, their basic perspectives on international relations have tended to converge with those of the West.¹¹ Agreeing that the two approaches are growing more similar, a widely-published Soviet scholar argues, not surprisingly, that it is the *West* which has begun to modify its views:

The concepts of international security circulating in the West still involve many obsolete facts which are incompatible with common sense. However, one cannot fail to see that with the influence of the demands of the time, they are undergoing a certain evolution, and are moving closer to the corresponding concepts of the socialist countries on a number of points.¹²

ONE WORLD VIEW OR MANY?

Indeed, quite apart from the mutability and content of Soviet conceptions of security, can one speak at all of a "Soviet view," or are there essential differences in perception among Soviet officials and analysts? While by no means easy to answer, such questions would seem to be extremely pertinent to any effort to assess current Soviet foreign policy, either as an end in itself or as a necessary part of the process of formulating America's own foreign and defense policy.

A large part of the difficulty in grappling with such questions

stems from the methodological complexity of the task. A search through the pronouncements of Soviet officials and scholars in search of the "real meaning" of a particular concept plunges the analyst into an analytical quagmire. In a recent study, Paul Marant has enumerated eight questions that the analyst must confront in the process: (1) Why is a particular pronouncement being made? (2) What audience is it intended to reach? (3) What views possibly held by the speaker/writer does he hesitate to voice because of ideological constraints? (4) What ideological formulae must be incant even if he does not believe them? (5) When did the concept first appear and how has its meaning changed? (6) What degree of diversity of views can be found among leaders and scholars (or even in the speech of a single leader)? (7) Does militant language serve only to cover political flanks (either domestically or within the Communist movement) and thus to provide a mask for an actual shift to a more moderate policy? (8) In general, what connection is there between a particular pronouncement and Soviet behavior in a given realm?¹³

Close attention by students of Soviet policy to the nuances of expression characteristic of "esoteric communication" can help to shed light on some of these issues. Thereby the public pronouncements emanating from the USSR can provide clues to the debate among competing interests and policy alternatives that occurs behind the outwardly uniform Soviet facade.

In fact, rather than being simply the product of the perceptions and calculations of a monolithic decisionmaking elite, Soviet foreign policy is more accurately perceived as emerging from the interaction of decisionmakers representing a variety of personal and institutional perspectives and involved in the simultaneous resolution of a number of internal and external issues. Though necessarily oversimplified, a conceptualization of "left" and "right" in the Soviet policy spectrum might identify on the one side a grouping consisting of representatives of the police, armed forces, ministries and enterprises producing defense and heavy-industrial materials, and the section of the Party apparatus devoted to the preservation of ideological purity and the dissemination of propaganda. On the other side would be elements of the Party and state bureaucracies involved with agricultural and light-industrial production or concerned with upgrading the consumption standards of the Soviet population. These two groupings have tended to be on opposite sides in their perceptions of the international arena

(and specifically the degree of danger to Soviet security interests and opportunity for expansion of Soviet influence) and in their views of the competition for budgetary resources.¹⁴

THE "BOLSHEVIK" CONCEPTION OF SECURITY

To assert, then, that there is no single Soviet world view—and, by implication, no single conception in the USSR of the meaning and requirements of "national security"—challenges the hoary but still popular assumption that there is a certain distinctive set of values and beliefs that is founded in Leninist ideology and Russian culture and that has persisted virtually unchanged and unchallenged from the days of the original Bolsheviks to the present. This notion of an alien and monolithic "Bolshevik" world view is most fully developed in Nathan Leites' concept of the "operational code" as presented in his monumental work, *A Study of Bolshevism*.

As described by Leites, the Bolshevik image of politics is founded on a profound insecurity that was perhaps appropriate to the leaders of an upstart revolutionary regime taking power in a war-torn country and facing civil war and military intervention by ideological enemies. In this political universe of acute and irreconcilable conflict, the fundamental question is *kto-kavo*—who (will destroy) whom? No security can be found in compromises or the search for stable intermediate positions in such a world; the alternatives are limited to total world hegemony or total annihilation. Constant vigilance, obsessive attention to maximizing power, readiness to counterattack or even to retreat at a moment's notice—these traits are essential to the very survival of the Bolshevik politician.¹⁵

The image of a Soviet political elite plagued by a paranoiac insecurity, fundamentally inimical toward the existing international system, and finding safety and respite only at the expense of the autonomy of others became the keystone of the American postwar policy of containment. The thesis of an unceasing Soviet search for absolute security dominated George Kennan's classic 1947 exposition of the "sources of Soviet conduct." Stalin and his lieutenants were depicted as too insecure to tolerate the existence of rival political forces either at home or in satellite countries. A fierce and jealous fanaticism, untempered by

a tradition of political compromise and fueled by a doctrinaire ideology, drove them to subjugate or destroy all competing power. In the search for their own security, Kennan argued, the Soviet leaders would accept no restraints, for they were convinced by their ideology of the implacable hostility of the outside world and of the utter necessity to overthrow its existing order.¹⁶

Although Kennan's description seemed to be a close fit to Stalin's own personality and methods of rule, he stated unequivocally that these characteristics applied to the regime itself and not simply to the style of one dictator. Certain attributes—secretiveness, duplicity, suspiciousness—were said by Kennan to be characteristic of Soviet policy and basic to the very nature of Soviet power.¹⁷

Both Leites and Kennan penned their gloomy thoughts about Soviet insecurity during the last years of Stalin's reign, when the dictator's paranoia and xenophobia were at their height and the monotonous rigidity of Soviet society was unsurpassed. And yet it is not at all uncommon to find almost identical descriptions of the Soviet world view propagated 30 years later, in the midst of the US national debate about Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities. One prominent figure in that debate, Richard Pipes, has likened the world view of the present Soviet elite to that of the Russian peasant. This orientation, he maintains, is better understood from a knowledge of Russian proverbs than from the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The peasant proverbs teach that life is hard, that one's survival depends on one's own resources rather than on others, and that force rather than decency is the surest means of getting one's way. The Russian peasant, Pipes contends, sees the world as an arena for ruthless combat, "where one either eats others or is eaten by them, where one plays either the pike or the carp." Out of this history comes a special mentality stressing slyness, self-reliance, manipulative skill, reliance on force, and contempt for the weak. As Pipes sees it, Marxism-Leninism, though it exerts through its theories only minor influence on Soviet behavior, does serve to reinforce these predispositions in the Russian national character.¹⁸

Colin Gray, arguing from the standpoint of the geopolitician rather than from that of the student of Russian history and national character, arrives at essentially the same conclusion. Soviet paranoia, Gray contends, is manifested in a search for "*absolute security*" that inevitably leads the USSR on the path of

world conquest. "Expansion is the Russian/Soviet 'way:' the Pacific Ocean has been reached, but not (yet) the Atlantic." In Gray's estimate, Soviet officials are extremely unlikely to settle for anything less than complete control of "the entire World-Island of Eurasia-Africa."¹⁹

Dimitri Simes, formerly a researcher at the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations, uses language somewhat less apocalyptic to reach much the same judgment: the Soviet leadership has an "absolutist" definition of security, founded on a "traditional respect for power" and contempt for being "weak and kindly." Like the Tsars, the present Soviet leaders seek to erect an adequate shield against all conceivable threats, even if this means that "all rivals are left without many teeth with which to defend their vital interests." In Simes' view, Henry Kissinger's condemnation of the search for "absolute security" for one superpower on the grounds that it means "equal insecurity for another" would evoke little sympathy from the present Soviet leadership.²⁰

Thus, the Pipes-Gray-Simes thesis asserts the existence of a single-minded and persisting Soviet conception of national security threats and requirements that is essentially unchanged from the Leites-Kennan image of 30 years ago (the "Bolshevik" conception) of paranoiac insecurity and irreconcilable hostility. The burden of the argument of this paper is that this image is a serious distortion and oversimplification of the current Soviet view (or views) of security. Not only is it inaccurate to posit a monolithic and unchanging "Soviet world view," but it is also wrong to suggest even that the *dominant* Soviet conception is one founded on the quest for absolute security and a fundamental enmity to the existing international system. On the contrary, a moderated variant of the "Bolshevik" image persists as a *minority* view in the Soviet elite, but it has been overshadowed for several years by an image of security that is far more confident of Soviet strength and more reconciled to the present international order.

THE GROWTH OF SOVIET CONFIDENCE

The basic error of Pipes and Gray—one also committed by Leites and Kennan three decades ago—is the assumption that the views of the Soviet leaders are so rooted in an unchanging ideology and "national character" that they are entirely resistant to change. As

important studies by William Zimmerman²¹ and Jan Triska and David Finley²² have documented in detail, perceptions of international events and of the changing international system have had an impact in modifying (and "softening") the *Weltanschauungen* of Soviet officials and scholars—and particularly of those who have carried major operational responsibilities for the conduct of foreign policy. As Zimmerman concludes from his study of a decade's work by Soviet scholars in the major foreign policy institutes, these experts "no longer let Lenin do their thinking," though they continue to use Lenin to legitimize their arguments.²³

The lessened relevance of Leninism and the "Bolshevik" image of the world is in large part a result of the shift in what the Soviets term the "correlation of forces." The "operational code" of which Leites wrote was forged in an environment of Bolshevik weakness, in which the enemies of the Party and the Soviet state called the tune. But, as Politburo member and close Brezhnev associate Konstantin Chernenko recently put it, "the times of imperialism's omnipotence in international relations, when it could unceremoniously and with impunity throw its weight around in the world . . . have receded irretrievably."²⁴ As "imperialism" has been tamed, the USSR's sense of threat and alienation from the international system has lessened considerably.

The contrast between the early postrevolutionary period, in which it could truly be said that the Russian working class had "nothing to lose but its chains," and the present position of the USSR in the world is graphically depicted in a leading Soviet textbook. The book recalls the long and difficult road traversed by Soviet foreign policy, from its beginnings in a land torn by war and famine and encircled by hostile capitalist states, to its achievement of the status of the world's second-largest industrial power, embarking on the building of communism and leading an entire community of Socialist states. In sum, "it is one of the world's leading powers without whose participation no international problems can be settled."²⁵

This statement—and especially the last sentence, which Foreign Minister Gromyko repeats at every opportunity—reflects an attitude of pride and confidence that is quite different from the earlier aura of hostility and suspicion. As the USSR's stake in the international order has increased, its unwillingness to mount a risk-laden challenge to the status quo has been reflected in a marked loss

of revolutionary fervor. The Soviets have long claimed that their chief internationalist duty is not the export of revolution abroad, but the building of communism at home. Patriotism and emphasis on defense of the national state, once considered a bourgeois deviation from proletarian internationalism, have become the hallmark of Communist rhetoric. "As long as national statehood remains a political form of social development, patriotism, loyalty to one's homeland, and concern for the welfare of one's people will remain *the major principle* of the Communist doctrine."²⁶

World War II—the great "patriotic" war—not only helped to weaken the "imperialist system," but it also left the Soviet Union with frontiers more defensible than even the Tsars had dreamed possible. From the perspective of the mid-1970's, the officially sanctioned history of Soviet foreign policy could present a relatively "satisfied" view of the outcome of World War II and the shape of the postwar world:

The victory led to the establishment of *just Western and eastern frontiers* ensuring the Soviet Union's security. The capitalist encirclement . . . was thus broken. An end was put, *once and for all*, to the attempts of the imperialists to isolate the Soviet Union geographically by creating along its frontiers the infamous 'cordon sanitaire.' . . .²⁷

Events of recent decades have thus helped shape the perceptions held by Soviet leaders in the direction of greater confidence and patriotic pride and a lessened sense of insecurity about frontiers. But to argue this is not to suggest that the men in the Kremlin are therefore completely satisfied with the international order or complacent about the USSR's position in it. Nothing said above is meant to deny that the Soviet leadership regards itself as still locked in a highly competitive relationship with the United States, engaged in a struggle for greater influence in far-flung areas of the globe. Indeed, as Robert Legvold has put it, what we have seen in recent years is a "shift in the Soviet preoccupation from the struggle to secure Soviet power against the external world to a quest for a larger place in it."²⁸ But, to say that the Soviet Union is engaged globally in a competition for influence is not at all to conclude that its vital security interests are everywhere involved, much less to assert that some sense of omnipresent threat and possible annihilation is driving the Soviet Union toward world domination. Global involvement has created for the Soviet Union—as for the United States—a far more complex security situation, requiring a

more precise assessment of threat and a more careful specification of just which interests are truly vital to its security. And it is on the basis of this assessment that the USSR will formulate its estimate of defense requirements.

THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THREAT

In neither of the superpowers have political leaders and defense analysts avoided the temptation to specify how much in the way of military capabilities the *other* side "legitimately needs" to protect its vital security interests. Our own estimate of the threat we and its other adversaries pose to the Soviet Union is necessarily lower than the Soviets' own estimate will be. Each side plans its defense on the basis of a "worst case" analysis of threat. And since perception of threat rather than "actual threat" is the foundation of defense planning, a security problem exists for a country where its own leaders feel it to exist.²⁹ The prominent Soviet "Americanologist," Georgi Arbatov, recently elaborated on this point:

... the arguments about what defense needs are legitimate in another country are dubious. No country has the moral or political right to determine what another country's defense needs really are. Each country must do this for itself. The Soviet Union is forced to think seriously about its security and defense in order to meet the challenge by the military potential of the United States and Western Europe and . . . China It would be interesting to see how those who criticize the Soviet Union would talk about legitimate defense needs if they were in this country's position.³⁰

While Arbatov's assessment of the USSR's "legitimate defense needs" is understandably focused on the military threat, there is another sort of challenge to the security of the Soviet regime that the Soviets seem to regard with equal seriousness. "A guarantee of the national security of a state implies, first and foremost, protection of its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its frontiers, and noninterference in its internal affairs on whatever pretext."³¹ This latter phrase is a euphemism encompassing the fear of subversion, of infiltration of alien bourgeois ideas, of "softening up," and ideological infection. It is probably their acute awareness of the very attractiveness of Western culture and ideas—and of the corresponding unattractiveness in the West of Soviet ideology and society, which deprives them of a counterthreat—that has made the Soviets so

sensitive to the subversive potential of "Basket III" or the "human rights campaign." For these campaigns challenge the very *legitimacy* of the regimes both in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself, and their effectiveness as a threat is heightened by the fact that relative economic and political backwardness make the European Communist regimes so vulnerable. Indeed, it was the perceived subversive campaign from outside married with the resurgence of "counter-revolutionary elements" within that led to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 1968. In proclaiming the "Brezhnev Doctrine," Soviet authorities left no doubt that they regarded such developments as a serious threat to vital interests in a "core" security area.³²

The importance to the Soviet Union of the long campaign for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation was precisely in its objective of shoring up the legitimacy of Socialist Europe by extracting from the West a recognition of the territorial and political *status quo* of divided Europe. And although the Helsinki conference did go far toward achieving this goal, it threatened to backfire on the Soviets by simultaneously legitimizing the "subversive" Basket III concern with the free flow of peoples, ideas, and information.

In suggesting the dominant Soviet perception of "legitimate defense needs," the above emphasis on the dual political-military and ideological threat perceived in Europe must be matched with a stress on the same sort of multidimensional threat that Soviet leaders see in China. The very existence of the threat of a two-front conflict vastly complicates Soviet defense planning. It was this phenomenon to which Gromyko was probably referring when he wrote: "Naturally, in assessing the defense needs of the USSR, we should take into account the geographical position of our country."³³ The salience of the "China factor," and in particular of the nightmare of an active Sino-US combination against Soviet interests, was evident in the round of election speeches delivered by the members of the Soviet Politburo in February and March, 1979. Not one of the leaders failed to deplore in the strongest terms the growing threat posed by the Chinese leaders and certain unnamed "imperialists" who were said to be teaming up with them.

Indeed, a "worst-case analysis" by a Soviet politician or planner looking at the potential threat facing his country would have to include the possibility of an increased danger of confrontation with

the United States. A Sino-American alignment is only one possible increment to the threat from the United States; to it could be added the possibility of leadership paralysis or change in Washington giving rise to a loss of power by the "more sober representatives of the bourgeoisie," or the possibility of rapid development of new strategic weapons and additional conventional fighting forces deployed against the USSR.

THE SOVIET DEFENSE DEBATE

In the light of such a perceived present and possible future threat, Soviet leaders have taken and will undoubtedly continue to take great pains to ensure the adequacy of their military capabilities. But how much is enough for "adequate" defense? Have the Soviets not themselves provoked a reluctant military buildup from the West precisely in response to their own rapid arms buildup? In thinking about these questions, it is helpful not only to recall Spykman's aphorism ("there is security only in being a little stronger"), but also to reflect on the likely Soviet perspective on the issue of which side is "building up" and which side is "responding" in the arms race of the past decade. In fact, a series of high-level Soviet statements in recent years have sought to underline the USSR's determination to be adequately defended, while denouncing the West's "myth of the Soviet menace" and denying any ambitions for a military superiority that allows first-strike capability. Brezhnev's January 1977 speech at Tula was one such statement:

Of course, comrades, we are improving our defenses. It cannot be otherwise. We have never neglected the security of our country and the security of our allies, and we shall never neglect it. But the allegations that the Soviet Union is going beyond what is sufficient for defense, that it is striving for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a 'first strike' are absurd and utterly unfounded . . . the Soviet Union has always been and continues to be a staunch opponent of such concepts Not a course aimed at superiority in armaments but a course aimed at their reduction, at lessening nuclear confrontation—that is our policy. On behalf of the Party and the entire people, I declare that our country will never embark on the path of aggression and will never lift its sword against other peoples.'

Although Brezhnev's statement probably had the approval of a majority of the Politburo, there have been signs for several years of top-level Soviet disagreement over defense policy. While it has been

more obscured from public view than its American counterpart, an intense debate has been conducted in the USSR over such issues as how much defensive capability constitutes an "adequate" level, how grave is the threat facing the USSR and how immediate the danger of war, and how reliable and mutually beneficial is the path of "detente" in advancing Soviet foreign policy interests?

Some of the participants in this debate have approached it from an image of the world approximating the "Bolshevik" image described by Leites and Kennan (and put forward by Pipes and Gray as the prevailing Soviet view). The contemporary Politburo-level Soviet leader whose speeches and writings most nearly approached the "Bolshevik" conception of security was the late Marshal Grechko, Minister of Defense until his death in April 1976. His pronouncements tended to stress the dangers facing the USSR, the aggressive and untrustworthy nature of her adversaries, and the buildup of strong military forces as the only reliable guarantee of Soviet security.³⁵ Marshal Grechko's successor, Dimitri Ustinov, has not tended to indulge in rhetoric as hot or estimates as pessimistic, and he frequently has positive things to say about Brezhnev's detente policies.

An intensive reading of Supreme Soviet campaign speeches delivered in February and March of 1979 by the members of the Politburo shows that the "Bolshevik" image of Soviet security requirements has largely disappeared from such public pronouncements of the leadership.³⁶

The speechmaking ritual at the time of the Supreme Soviet elections provides analysts with the rare opportunity to study views of individual leaders on a variety of issues within a constricted timeframe. Although the 1979 election speeches reflect in some respects the specific domestic and foreign context of a particular period of time, both the individual perspectives and the collective profile of views do not differ significantly from other leadership pronouncements of the late 1970's. Thus Table I, which records key phrases on major issues of detente and defense from each of the Politburo members' speeches, warrants careful note. Together with Figure I, which graphically depicts the relative positions of the thirteen Politburo voting members on the "detente" and "defense" axes, the table shows relatively high consensus in the Soviet leadership on major foreign policy issues. That consensus supports a view most fully articulated by Brezhnev himself and most closely echoed by Konstantin Chernenko and Andrei

TABLE I
 SOVIET LEADERS POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, FEB-MAR 1979

SPAKER AND DATE	STRENGTH OF DETENTE	DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, SALT	OPONENTS OF DETENTE	ADROQUACY OF DEFENSE	MOST PRESSING TASK
BREZHNEV 2 March 1979	USSR making maximum efforts to frustrate plans of aggressive circles & deepen relaxation of tensions	SALT a reasonable compromise. Equal security & mutual advantage. SALT 3 will reduce arms. Other negotiations ongoing; enumeration of Soviet proposals	Most reactionary forces of imperialism, arms manufacturers, cold war advocates; campaign against detente; myth of Soviet menace. Merging with China's position.	SALT won't damage Sov. security. Party's line includes strengthening defenses might. We spend on defense as much as is necessary; not more, but not less either.	To end arms race, prevent danger of world nuclear war. To spread detente to military sphere.
KOSYGIN 1 March 1979	Opponents, despite efforts, haven't managed to cancel out positive advances. Trend to relaxation of tensions still a leading one. Enhance with trade, exchange	Struggle for detente & disarmament aimed at giving people chance to use resources for constructive ends	Aggressive Chinese encouraged by activities of imperialist reaction, which opposes detente.	People can depend on firmness of our defenses. Marked rearmament of activities of aggressive forces, we must maintain & strengthen defense potential. Should have everything they need to counteract effectively world war.	Efforts aimed at ensuring peace should become stronger. All our resources & prestige being used to defuse intl tension, stop arms race. Most important problem prevention of new world war.
SUSLOV 28 Feb 1979	Growing danger to intl detente thru Chinese uniting with intl reaction	In struggle against imperialist aggressive buildup, we unflinchingly put forward constructive proposals	"Imperialism's aggressive policies" lowering intrigues of Chinese leaders are uniting with reactionary imperialists maintain defense might at proper level to ensure security.	We're vigilantly following intrigues of imperialists & followers. Will continue to maintain defense might at proper level to ensure security.	Increased might of socialist community. Main direction of our work further developing cooperation & cohesion of socialist countries.
KIRILENKO 27 Feb 1979	Shift away from tension toward detente successfully secured & detente substantially consolidated, esp. in Europe. But path strewn with obstacles.	Constructive Soviet proposals whose realization would end arms race, promote disarmament. We struggle persistently for this.	Aggressive policies of reactionary imperialist circles, of which Chinese act as zealous accomplices.	While struggling for relaxation of tension & end to arms race, it is essential to deem it essential to maintain defense capability at necessary level & preserve high political vigilance.	Convinced that world war can and must be averted.

Resistance to detente Constructive Soviet Resistance of reac- Successes based on
 due to zigzags in proposals...to end tionaly militarist reliable defense
 West's policy. But arms race, promote forces has increased potential. Party has
 peace on earth ever disarmament.Reduced --Chinese in concert paid close attention
 more reliable. Times arms & military bud- with reactionary to its maintenance
 of imperialism's Gets allows consoli- forces of imperialism at proper level.
 omnipotence have re- dation of military
 ceded irrevocably. security at lower
 levels. SALT close;
 further measures
 allow transfer of
 considerable resour-
 ces to creative ends

USSR intl. position
 stronger than ever.
 No cause is more
 sacred than preser-
 vation of peace.

CHERNENKO

26 Feb 1979

Persistent Soviet Constructive Soviet Forces in US & USSR's intl position
 efforts to channel proposals...to end elsewhere that would efforts in the face of is firm. Have reason
 relations increasing-arms race, promote like to return to growing NATO military to look confidently
 ly in path of peace- disarmament. SALT Cold War.Chinese potential. Our borders into future, no mat-
 ter how contradictory
 full coexistence.USSR shortly, if equal want to put USSR & have and must have
 wants more smooth & security principle US at loggerheads. strong locks.
 stable relations observed.Nobody more futile to play intl. position becomes,
 with USA. persistent than USSR "China card." we can to improve
 in efforts against relations with West.
 arms race; many pro-
 posals, all rejected

GAOMYKO

26 Feb 1979

Relaxation of tension One of our aims is Forces of reaction While imperialists
 has become objective struggle to end arms race all possible continue arms race &
 reality, though every recs. Main problem obstacles in path. prepare for new world
 step is at great cost to disarmament. Reactionary US cir- war, we must maintain and extend the scale
 & demands patience. close assume role of high vigilance.Constant of its aggressive
 Obstacles from forces leaders; seek more readiness to rebuff preparations.
 of reaction. Very real military budget;seek aggressor.Troops at
 possibility for deep- to play "China card" a high level of com-
 ening detente. Chinese leaders in harness with reac-
 tion.

USTIMOV

23 Feb 1979

TABLE I (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND DATE	STRENGTH OF DEFEATE	DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, SALT	OPONENTS OF DEFEATE	ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE	MOST PRESSING TASK
AMUROPOV 22 Feb 1979	Peace & security can't be strengthened thru military rivalry. Arms race undermines trust, inflames crisis. Detente has many opponents. But no doubt that trend to easing tension is leading.	Paramount significance given to limitation & reduction of arms, peaceful undramatic settlement of disputes. No serious alternatives.	Danger of opponents cannot be overestimated. Many opponents. Some circles would like to use Chinese to put pressure on USSR.	As long as forces preparing to jeopardize peace are active, firm & reliable defense vitally necessary. Our defense might restrains aggressor, forces imperialists to recognize parity.	Obligated to pay paramount attention to consolidate might and defense capabilities. Leading trend of easing tension. USSR will struggle more persistently. Situation complex & contradictory.
PELSE 21 Feb 1979	USSR peace program being consistently implemented.	Constructive Soviet proposals aimed at peace, detente, halt to arms race & disarmament help lessen chilly climate.	USSR resolutely opposes plans of reaction-ary imperialist forces & Peking hags who are striving to hinder easing of tension. Enemies of peace haven't abandoned attempts.	While consistently pursuing peace-loving policy, at same time pay unremitting attention to strengthening defense might & heroic armed forces. Can rest assured will enhance combat readiness & vigilance.	Cannot fail to be pleased by results of our efforts to strengthen security. USSR intl situation firmer than ever.
KHMYTCH 19 Feb 1979	Must struggle against dangerous maneuvers of intl reaction & for lasting peace.		Must persistently struggle against attempts by imperialists & Peking to exacerbate intl situation.	While consistently pursuing peace-loving policy, at same time pay unremitting attention to strengthening defense might & heroic armed forces. Can have confidence in combat readiness & vigilance.	Struggle for peace the cornerstone of USSR foreign policy.

BOZHANOV
 16 Feb 1979

Contradictory & complex.
 Alternative: ending arms race or test-
 ing on brink of war. Efforts to halt arms race must be doubled.

Enemies of détente not abating. Aggressive circles in number of states meet Soviet proposals with new military buildup (e.g., US arms budget).

Party line: one item in list is growing economic and defense might of Soviet state operation between all countries. World situation remains contradictory & complex.

Main goal to eliminate threat of world war, achieve stable peace & friendly cooperation between all countries. World situation remains contradictory & complex.

BECHERBITSKIY
 15 Feb 1979

Peace in world has become more safe. At the moment, détente remains a leading trend.

Noticeable invigoration of reaction of imperialist forces trying to impede socialism & struggle for liberation. Growing capitalist instability. NATO stirring hotbeds of tension; China card. All reactionary forces uniting.

Invigoration of aggressive forces & hegemonist ambitions of imperialists remind Soviet people of need to increase political vigilance & repel hostile intrigues. We are impelled to strengthen defenses. Any imperialist attempt by military force is doomed to fail.

USSR intl situation is as stable as ever.

GRISHIN
 14 Feb 1979

USSR persistently struggles against attempts to exacerbate intl situation & bring back cold war armament.

Constructive Soviet proposals...for ending arms race, affecting disarmament.


While consistently implementing peace-loving policy, at same time USSR paying attention to strengthening country's defense might & heroic armed forces; are vigilantly guarding our gains.

Complex intl situation; demands vigilance. Peace a necessary condition for implementation of Party's program; will do everything necessary to provide peaceful conditions for communist construction.

SOURCES: Election Speeches of Soviet leaders, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information System, Daily Report, Soviet Union, various issues, February-March 1979

FIGURE 1

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF
1979 SOVIET POLITBURO ON SECURITY ISSUES



SOURCE: Election speeches, February-March 1979, and Table I.

Gromyko. A cluster of leaders, including Arvid Pelshe, Grigory Romanov, Andrei Kirilenko, and Dinmukhamed Kunayev, expressed themselves in far less detail on international issues, but what they did say was essentially supportive of Brezhnev's relatively confident assessment of the prospects for advancing detente and arms control. Party ideologist Mikhail Suslov, Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov, and KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov reflected their institutional interests in the relative emphasis they gave to defense and the need for vigilance against the imperialist threat, but even they were not in basic disagreement (as Ukrainian party secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was) with the thrust of Brezhnev's assessment.

**THE DOMINANT VIEW:
"SECURITY THROUGH COEXISTENCE"**

The currently dominant Soviet conception, which might be labeled "security through coexistence," is far more confident of the USSR's relative security and international standing, as well as of its ability to achieve its interests through further pursuit of detente and arms control. While it does not deny the need for strong military capabilities and the existence of certain forces that are striving for a resumption of the cold war and an unrestrained arms race, this view emphasizes the adequacy of Soviet defenses and the sobriety of leading statesmen of the "imperialist" camp and it asserts that both sides can advance their legitimate interests through the moderation of their rivalry. Brezhnev described his understanding of the meaning of the "detente" concept in his speech at Tula:

What is detente, or the easing of tension? What meaning do we attach to this concept? Above all, detente signifies the overcoming of the cold war and a transition to normal, equable relations between states. Detente means a willingness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, not by threats and saber-rattling, but by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. Detente means a certain trust and the ability to take one another's legitimate interests into account."

In other pronouncements Brezhnev has been careful to remind his listeners that not only does detente not imply the cessation of political and ideological struggle with the West, but that it in fact creates even more favorable conditions for the pursuit of Soviet

objectives. These specifically include the promotion of "national liberation movements" in the Third World and the struggle for "social progress" in the capitalist world. Just as they have reaffirmed their own objectives, the Soviet leaders have also expressed confidence that Western politicians will continue to pursue conflicting goals, including a sharpened effort to spread ideological subversion in the Socialist camp.

As Brezhnev and his allies have expressed it, then, detente implies a continuation of a limited-adversary relationship with the United States. It brings both sides the benefits of a reduced level of tension and a diminished threat of nuclear war, and it holds out the promise of mutually beneficial commercial ties. For the United States it signifies a forced recognition of a shift in the correlation of forces and of the bankruptcy of its former role as "world policeman." And for the USSR it symbolizes attainment of a status of nuclear and diplomatic equality, it increases access to Western credits and technology, and it preserves Moscow's opportunities to prevent collusion between the United States and China.

More pointedly, the proponents of this view argue that not only does detente bring more reliable security than the arms race, but that the quest for military superiority actually squanders resources while *lessening* security. One Soviet civilian analyst recently described the concept of military security as the "antipode" of the principle of undiminished security. The arms race and a policy based on armed force cannot ensure security; rather, he said, each new advance in weapons technology brings further instability and danger of war. "The national security of states can best be ensured through peace and detente."⁸ A prominent military writer agreed, noting that a new spiral in the arms race, far from ensuring security, "can only lead to the squandering of national resources, and that means the lessening of national security." He too professed to see the path to strengthened security in the development of mutually advantageous cooperation and further limitation of the arms race.⁹

In its ostensible rejection of the path of resumption of the arms race and its advocacy of further progress toward arms control, the prevailing Soviet conception of security stresses the principle of "the undiminished national security" of both sides. Brezhnev recently said of the SALT II treaty that "it can be said definitely that its implementation will not inflict any damage to the security of the Soviet Union, or to the security of the United States for that

matter. On the whole, I would say, it will be advantageous to both countries."⁴⁰

Both by implication, as in this pronouncement, and in explicit statements, some Soviet leaders and analysts have renounced the "zero-sum game" image of international politics. Georgi Arbatov, for example, has written that international politics "is not like reckless gambling, in which one player wins the same amount the other player loses. Completely different situations are possible here, situations in which all sides are winners."⁴¹ Through such statements, these officials have moved—in their public position, at least—far from the *kto-kavo* imagery of the "Bolshevik" conception of security. Even beyond the change of imagery, however, some Soviet analysts have begun to employ the argument that the security of each superpower is inextricably bound up with the other—that in order for one to be secure, the other must be also. According to a recent article in *New Times*, enormous nuclear overkill capacity means that "the national security of some countries is inseparable from that of others Security has ceased to be a purely national problem." Like peace, universal security is indivisible, and only peaceful coexistence, arms reduction, and the promotion of mutual trust and cooperation can effectively ensure national security.⁴²

Indeed, there appear to be some officials in the USSR who have progressed beyond the view of "security through coexistence" to a stance of "security through cooperation"—a conception that minimizes the importance of national military power and stresses the need for conscious efforts to increase international cooperation, on the assumption that the security of one nation can increase only if the security of all nations increases. Dzhermen Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, is one of the few Soviet officials who has voiced such a "globalist" perspective:

The interdependence of nations and continents is an obvious fact from which one cannot escape. In this respect, the entire humanity has a common fate. All of us, if one may say so, are aboard the same spaceship which, by the way, does not have any exhaust pipes.⁴³

Even Gvishiani's father-in-law, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, utilized some of the globalist rhetoric in his recent election speech. Referring to certain "global problems"—preventing war, supplying adequate energy and food, and protecting the en-

vironment—Kosygin declared that they could be solved only through international cooperation and “the collective efforts of the peoples.”⁴⁴

THE IMPACT OF US POLICIES

This final conception of security through cooperation is by no means dominant among Soviet officialdom. Yet it is important for us to be aware that such views exist in the USSR, if only to realize that a return to the “Bolshevik” image of security through confrontation is not the only alternative to the currently dominant conception of security through coexistence. It is also important for Western officials and other participants in foreign and defense policy decisionmaking to realize that the debate over security options in the USSR is by no means over. Western rhetoric and especially Western actions are one of the subjects of controversy, and a change in their content can have an impact on the outcome of the Soviet debate. A Western policy of “detente” that is pursued antagonistically, with the avowed object of weakening Soviet influence in Eastern Europe or promoting the spread of “human rights” dissidence in the USSR, will be interpreted by the adherents of the “Bolshevik” image as evidence that detente, by spreading ideological infection, actually lessens Soviet security. Similarly, Senate rejection of the SALT II treaty or US action taken in an effort to regain a clear margin of strategic superiority may also weaken the hand of Soviet officials who are arguing against continued pursuit of the arms race. This is not to argue that the United States should make such decisions solely on the basis of their likely impact on the Soviet debate; rather, it is simply a plea for awareness that such decisions will necessarily have such consequences in the USSR.

This study has shown that today’s dominant Soviet image of security requirements is not markedly different from perceptions that US leaders, such as Secretary Brown, have of America’s security requirements. In each case, “security” means far more than simple physical survival, but also includes elements of economic well-being and internal political stability, as well as the preservation of fundamental alliances. While “detente” policies are recognized in both countries as promoting the relaxation of international tension, bringing benefits of mutual trade and economic progress, and reducing the dangers of war, they are

simultaneously seen as raising new challenges to internal political consensus and bloc solidarity. Detente's promised vision of greater mutual security is thus accompanied by a large dose of uncertainty and complexity along the way. To recall Henry Kissinger's phrase of several years ago, it is not yet certain that either the United States or the USSR will be willing to come to terms with their mutual vulnerabilities and ultimately to abandon the quest for an "absolute security" that is founded on an equal insecurity for the other power.

ENDNOTES

1. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, Eighth Edition, 1977, p. 1045.
2. Daniel Lerner, "Security (Political Science)," in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, edited by Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, p. 626.
3. Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, "National Security," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by D. L. Sills, Vol. 11, p. 40.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Harold Brown, *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs*, pp. 28-29.
6. Richard Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace: A Report to the Congress*, p. 232.
7. Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics, the United States, and the Balance of Power*, p. 21.
8. *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), February 4, 1972, p. 3.
9. Boris Ponomarev, et. al., eds., *History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970*, pp. 404-405.
10. Leonid I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation*, p. 177.
11. William Zimmerman, "Elite Perspectives and the Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1970, pp. 84-98.
12. D. Proektor, "Socialism and International Security," *Kommunist*, May 1977. Translated in *JPRS* No. 69251, p. 148.
13. Paul Marantz, "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological Considerations," Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 1979, pp. 2-13.
14. For a more extended discussion see Robert H. Donaldson, "Global Power Relationships in the Seventies: The View From the Kremlin," in Paul Cocks, R. V. Daniels and N. W. Heer, eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, pp. 309-333.
15. Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, pp. 24-25, 29.
16. "X." (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, pp. 568-569.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 572.
18. Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," in *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, edited by Richard Pipes, pp. 11-12.
19. Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution*, pp. 35, 38.
20. Dimitri K. Simes, in *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, p. 94. See also the contribution to this volume by Edward Luttwak, who contrasts (pp. 340-341) Western "defensive" views of security with Soviet "imperial security."
21. William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 1956-1967*.
22. Jan Triska and David Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, especially Chapters 3-4.
23. Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 1956-1967*, p. 287.

24. Konstantin Chernenko, "Constantly Strengthening the Ties With the Masses," *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, February 27, 1979, pp. 1-3, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS*), Supplement, March 20, 1979, p. 71.

25. Ponomarev, *et. al.*, pp. 547-548.

26. G. Shakhnayarov, "Effective Factors of International Relations," *International Affairs*, February 1977, p. 86. (Emphasis supplied)

27. Pnomarev, *et. al.*, p. 11. (Emphasis supplied)

28. Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 68-69.

29. For an interesting discussion of this point in the East European context, see Peter Bender, *East Europe in Search of Security*, pp. 1-9.

30. Georgi Arbatov, Radio Moscow, July 5, 1978, *FBIS*, July 6, 1978, p. B1.

31. V. Levonov, "Disarmament and International Security," *International Affairs*, July 1978, p. 79.

32. Sergei Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968.

33. Andrei A. Gromyko, "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State—A Powerful Tool of the Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace and Social Progress," *Novaia i noveishaia*, No. 5, 1978, in *JPRS*, No. 72269, p. 12.

34. *Pravda*, January 19, 1977, pp. 1-2.

35. Andrei A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*, p. 12.

36. Indeed, on this occasion the most noticeable emphasis on the threats facing the USSR and the need for greater vigilance came from Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian first secretary. Long thought to be a protegee of Brezhnev's, Shcherbitskiy has recently been the object of ceremonial slights in status. (Since the top leaders usually deliver their speeches in inverse order of their political standing at the time of the election—with Brezhnev's own speech coming on the very eve of the election—the fact that Shcherbitskiy's was the second earliest confirms his present low standing in the hierarchy.) The flavor of his utterance on foreign affairs is suggested by the following excerpts:

. . . one must not overlook the noticeable invigoration of reactionary imperialist forces . . . In inflating the war psychosis, in instigating the arms race and in foreign political adventures, imperialist forces are obviously trying to find a way out of unsettled internal difficulties . . . reactionary circles [give] open support to fascist, revanchist and other reactionary regimes and forces. The ruling circles in NATO countries are directly responsible for creating hotbeds of dangerous tension . . . The attempts by the most thick-headed imperialist circles to play the 'China card' and to profit by militant Chinese chauvinism represents a serious danger to the cause of peace.

(V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Electoral Speech, *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), February 16, 1979, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS*, February 27, 1979, p. 29.)

37. *Pravda*, January 19, 1977, pp. 1-2.

38. Levonov, pp. 82-85.

39. M. Milshteyn, "Where American Missiles Are Targeted," *Izvestiia*, July 19, 1978, p. 3, in *FBIS*, July 26, 1978, p. B6.

40. *FBIS*, March 5, 1979, pp. R6-R7.
41. *Izvestia*, June 22, 1972, pp. 3-4. See also Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 2, 1978, p. 9.
42. Vyacheslav Boikov, "On the Pretext of Security," *New Times*, No. 48, 1977, p. 17. (Emphasis added)
43. Quoted in Walter C. Clemens, *The USSR and Global Interdependence: Alternative Futures*, p. 24. Clemens' monograph is a provocative study of alternative Soviet stances in the coming era of international relations; it is extremely useful reading for anyone interested in Soviet images of the world—including conceptions of security.
44. *FBIS*, March 2, 1979, p. R12.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum explores how Soviet leaders perceive their country's "security." The author contends that the dominant Soviet image of security requirements is not markedly different from perceptions that US leaders have of America's security requirements. For both countries, "security" means far more than simple physical survival, but also includes elements of economic well-being and internal political stability, as well as the preservation of fundamental alliances. He concludes that it is not yet certain that either the United States or the Soviet Union will be willing to abandon the quest for an "absolute security" founded on			

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