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CHINA'S DETENTE POLICY: ELEMENTS OF STABILITY AND INSTABILITY, (U)
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Peter W. Colm

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION

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CHINA'S DÉTENTE POLICY:
ELEMENTS OF STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

Peter W. Colm

January 1975
This paper analyzes China's current detente policy and the elements of stability and instability of that policy, particularly the question of whether domestic political issues are likely to affect China's foreign relations. The paper evaluates the general impact of domestic factors on Chinese foreign policy since 1950 and assesses the prospects for the continuation of the current detente. Also assessed are various alternatives to US-China detente and the significance of such alternatives for US interests and policy in East Asia.
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I
INTRODUCTION

The visit of Henry Kissinger and then of President Nixon to Peking was for the United States a dramatic initiative in an evolving East Asian policy; for Peking it was an even more startling reversal of foreign policy. Both sides have clearly gained from the détente,¹ and each has been concerned whether the other side might once again reverse its policy. Chou En-lai personally staked so much on his relationship with Kissinger and Nixon that he must have been deeply alarmed at the paralysis and then collapse of the Nixon administration due to the Watergate affair. Watergate was never mentioned in Chinese propaganda, and Peking went out of its way not to add to the administration's problems. The shakiness of the Nixon administration continues to have Chinese parallels in the still not fully resolved aftermath of the abortive Lin Piao coup. American officials have publicly treated the policy and factional disputes in Peking as domestic issues not related to détente, and indeed the various factions involved have from time to time gone out of their way to associate themselves with visitors from the United States as if to indicate a common view of the new Chinese foreign policy. Such indications

¹China's current policy toward the United States is described in this paper as a "détente" policy, because that term seems accurately to describe the policy. It should be noted, however, that in its own usage, Peking prefers terms like "Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line in foreign affairs." In connection with comments on US-Soviet relations, Peking invariably describes détente as a sham and a fraud, designed to cover up the reality of "contention" between the superpowers; it cannot therefore logically use the term "détente" to describe US-Chinese relations.
should not necessarily be taken at face value, since the détente policy probably was one of the issues at dispute in the Lin Piao affair, and since there have been various minor fluctuations in Peking's line since then. Even insofar as some of the disputes involve only domestic issues, it is possible that in a highly ideologized society like China foreign policy might shift simply because domestic policy did so.

Political developments in China are never revealed to the outside world (or even to China's citizens) in a direct manner. In China, disputes over the periodization of ancient history, the worth of current theatrical works, and fine points of Marxist ideology are likely to reflect bitter factional fights. Even when one phase of a particular campaign seems to have ended and when new party and government appointments are revealed (as was the case in the recently concluded 1975 People's Congress), numerous enigmas remain. Since these uncertainties do handicap Chinese diplomacy and other aspects of foreign policy (such as foreign trade), one can perhaps assume that Peking would resolve the uncertainties if other considerations did not prevent it. Consequently, in planning policy it is safe to assume that various enigmatic manifestations reflect underlying factional and policy disputes and that there really is a considerable degree of instability in the situation in Peking.

This paper examines the elements of stability and instability in China's current détente diplomacy, particularly the question of whether domestic political issues are likely to spill over into China's foreign relations. In order to appraise the impact of domestic instability on foreign policy and specifically on the détente diplomacy of Chou En-lai, the paper addresses several issues. On the basis of the historical record since 1950, the general impact of domestic factors on Chinese foreign policy is evaluated (Chapter II). From that,
the paper turns to a more specific analysis of the détente policy itself, to see how susceptible it is likely to be to possible shifts in the domestic political climate (Chapter III). The recent Maoist campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is examined next in order to isolate the kind of factors in a domestic campaign that are likely to have foreign policy implications (Chapter IV). The analysis in Chapters II-IV also establishes some aspects of the détente policy that are more likely than others to survive future campaigns similar to the anti-Lin campaign and even fairly radical shifts in Chinese domestic political relationships. The paper concludes with an assessment of the prospects for the continuation of China's détente policy (Chapter V). Since a major concern of the paper has been elements of instability and unpredictability, Chapter V also examines some alternatives that are quite possible, and the significance of those alternatives for the East Asian policy of the United States.
II
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The causal interaction between domestic and foreign policies in China has been difficult for outsiders to discern, because major turns in foreign policy have been undertaken at times of domestic political turmoil and because China's international alignment has been intricately involved with--among other matters--its domestic developmental strategy.

Among the many turns in China's foreign policy since the Communist regime came to power in 1949, three have had global importance: the decision by Mao Tse-tung in 1949 to "lean to the side of the USSR" and to avoid any middle road between East and West; the break with the Soviet Union and the maintenance throughout the 1960s of a stance of virtually equal hostility toward the United States and the Soviet Union; and finally, the decision in about 1971 to respond to US overtures and to develop a détente with the United States, as well as other Western countries and Japan, while treating the Soviet Union as the "principal threat" to China's security and goals.

Much of the significance of these foreign policy alignments lies in the fact that each has been associated with a specific domestic developmental and political strategy. In fact, it is likely that each of these foreign policy decisions was motivated first by domestic considerations and only later acquired its own momentum. Each major turn in Chinese foreign policy aroused factional debates, but once the turn was taken it appears that there was a much broader consensus within the leadership on foreign policy than on most domestic programs. This, of course, is not unique to China; most countries--except at times of extraordinary upheaval--seem to face the external
world with more of a consensus than they are able to achieve in dealing with domestic issues.

China's foreign policy alignment with the Soviets in 1949 was a defensive and offensive revolutionary alliance between two regimes that perceived a substantial ideological affinity. At that time, Mao Tse-tung believed that reliance on the West would put China at the mercy of capitalist and imperialist forces and would make impossible the achievement of his Communist social and economic aims. Mao believed that by using the Stalinist developmental model, which emphasized heavy industry and extracting developmental surpluses from the agricultural sector, China could achieve its goals most rapidly and without foreign dominance.

By about 1957-58, Mao's faith in the Stalinist model (and in Stalin's successors) had been severely shaken, and for the next decade China's developmental strategy—so far as there was one—consisted of a series of variations on Maoism and successive retrenchments after man-made and natural economic disasters. This period coincided with the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Mao had become impatient with the achievements of the Stalinist developmental model largely because only a very limited surplus could be extracted from China's agriculture and because the Soviets were not willing or able to supply aid without strings and on a scale sufficient to meet the gap, even if Peking had been willing to rely so heavily on foreign assistance. Mao Tse-tung's first solution was the Great Leap Forward strategy (1958), whereby China would compensate for its deficiencies by a superhuman expenditure of politically (rather than economically) motivated manpower; with this strategy, it was hoped, China would leap-frog an entire developmental epoch to achieve within fifteen years a level of economic development comparable to that of Britain and to pass even the Soviet Union in its transition to the theoretical stage of communism. Mao's "Leap" was one of history's most
spectacular disasters and the next several years were spent in attempts to recover from the economic and political consequences of that disaster, an effort that was handicapped by the cutoff of Soviet aid in 1960 and by severely adverse weather for three years running (1959-61). The developmental strategy, after the abandonment of the most extreme economic and social aspects of the Great Leap, became one mainly of self-reliance and economic rationalism and stressed agriculture rather than heavy industry. China's participation in world trade became the lowest of any major country; the drastic curtailment of trade with the Soviet bloc was compensated only in part by increased purchases of essential items from Japan and Western countries. The austerity and the ideological compromises that were required by this strategy led some Chinese leaders apparently to suggest a softening of China's anti-Soviet stance, including collaboration with the Soviets in providing assistance to North Vietnam (1965). Mao Tse-tung subsequently purged many of those who had advocated such a line and, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, also some of those who had advocated other compromises in order to deal with the economic consequences of the Great Leap disaster. The Cultural Revolution carried with it its own economic and political disasters and brought China for a while to the brink of chaos. Recovery from the Cultural Revolution was another slow, painful (and still incomplete) process, in the course of which Mao's chosen successor, Lin Piao, attempted an abortive coup, which led to his death in September 1971 and the purge in turn of his associates.

By 1972, the outlines of a possible new developmental strategy, signaled by Chou En-lai's détente diplomacy, were beginning to appear: the relatively conventional use of indigenous resources, supplemented by systematic foreign trade, including large-scale importation of industrial technology and equipment—particularly whole plants. If this is indeed
going to be China's third developmental strategy, it could provide an underpinning for détente, since a decade or more would be needed to acquire and assimilate the imported technology.

As each of Communist China's successive foreign policy alignments became apparent, some of the countries most affected expressed serious doubts about how stable the new alignment would be. In 1949, Secretary of State Acheson expressed his view that China's new relationship with the Soviet Union would eventually succumb to more traditional domestic and international predispositions and interests. Several times during the Sino-Soviet dispute, leaders in Moscow appear to have believed that a leadership change in Peking might restore the Sino-Soviet alliance. In the current détente period, Tokyo and Washington have indicated officially that they consider the détente to be stable. At the same time, China's domestic situation and leadership relationships continue—even long after the proclaimed end of the Cultural Revolution—to exhibit characteristics that puzzle outside observers and that point to basic uncertainties. Added questions are raised by the advanced age of Mao Tse-tung (81) and of Chou En-lai (76) and by the questionable health of the latter, if not of both.

In each of the past cases, however, China's foreign policy stance remained relatively stable in its principal aspect—alignment with Moscow in the 1950s and balanced enmity toward Moscow and Washington in the 1960s—and succumbed after about a decade to a combination of seemingly compelling circumstances, domestic and international, rather than to any transient shift in the political balance in Peking.

Within each general foreign policy stance, nonetheless, there were inconsistencies and wide fluctuations in policy that contributed to the international impression of foreign
policy instability.\textsuperscript{1} In the early years of the Sino-Soviet alliance, for example, Peking espoused a doctrine of armed insurrection for non-Communist developing countries, whether or not they had obtained independence. By 1953-54, that doctrine was giving way to what was to become known as the "Bandung strategy," whereby Chinese leaders sought to win the confidence of neutralist leaders like Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno, whom they had denounced as imperialist puppets only shortly before. By 1957-58 some aspects of the Bandung strategy in turn were eroding under the impact of China's militancy in the Taiwan Strait, its conflict with India, and its serious disputes with Japan over recognition, trade, and related issues. During the period of the open Sino-Soviet split, China's external militancy became most pronounced with its support for Sukarno in his withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965; then during the Cultural Revolution, China virtually ceased to have foreign relations as senior diplomats were recalled to Peking or as relations were severed by some newly independent countries because of the revolutionary activities of China's diplomats. As China emerged from the Cultural Revolution, normal diplomatic relations were gradually restored with most countries, and with the onset of Chou En-lai's détente diplomacy, relations were established even with numerous conservative governments that had previously had close relations with Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{1}The foreign policy fluctuations did not affect all countries equally; for example, since the late 1950s, Peking's policy has been uniformly friendly toward Pakistan and uniformly hostile toward India. The best barometer of China's foreign policy stance has perhaps been Burma; the degree of verbal and material support given to the insurgency in Burma and conversely the emphasis given to conventional diplomacy and economic aid have mirrored and in fact often augured shifts in Peking's foreign policy line. See Robert A. Holmes, "Sino-Burmese Relations: Bellwether of Chinese Diplomacy," \textit{Current Scene} (Hong Kong), May 10, 1972, pp. 1-19.
Since the beginning of 1974, there have also been fluctuations, even within the détente diplomacy, e.g., a more restrictive position on cultural and student exchanges, a suspension of entry permits for US journalists and certain "unfriendly" academicians, a tough negotiating position on aviation and fisheries agreements with Japan, and the attack on South Vietnamese forces in the Paracels in January 1974, to name only a few examples that stand in contrast to the relatively more forthcoming and relaxed attitude of the early "ping-pong" days. Nevertheless, despite these tactical fluctuations, China's major emphasis is still on détente.

Although major turns in China's foreign policy can be associated with specific domestic developmental and political strategies, it is much more difficult to associate other tactical turns with similar turns in domestic policy. In fact, some periods of relative moderation in foreign policy coincided with more militant domestic policies and vice versa. For example, the early advocacy of "armed struggle," which allowed little latitude for recognition of non-Communist leaders like Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno, coincided with the consolidation phase of the new regime in Peking, during which numerous non-Communist "democratic personages" were being brought into the government. By contrast, the radical collectivization phase in China coincided roughly with the more moderate Bandung strategy. And many aspects of the Bandung strategy survived even into the militant period of the early Great Leap Forward—which was, however, also the time of great militancy in the Taiwan Strait.

The difficulty of associating fluctuations in domestic policy with fluctuations in foreign policy is compounded by the fact that in the foreign policy field, even more than in the domestic area, Mao's tactics have by no means been uniformly "radical" or "moderate" at any given time, so that militancy, for example, toward Korea in 1950 or Taiwan in 1958 might be
accompanied by moderation toward Hong Kong. In many individual countries, China's foreign policy appeared to have its own dynamics, responding to particular opportunities or challenges with no consistent, overall theme. Exceptions occurred chiefly during the Cultural Revolution, when the intensity of the domestic turmoil spilled over into foreign affairs in numerous ways, for example in 1967 in the Hong Kong riots and the break with Burma, and in the Red Guard raids in Peking of foreign embassies and of the Foreign Office itself.

The historical record, in conclusion, is suggestive of more stability in foreign than domestic policy, but at the same time it may not be a good basis for judging the future of China's détente policy, since that policy marks only the third major turn in Communist China's international orientation. Moreover, détente has definite implications for China's domestic situation, in which a considerable potential for instability remains evident.
III
THE DÉTENTE POLICY

The interests of China that are served by Chou En-lai's détente diplomacy are not difficult to divine. While a calculation of the gains for China that flow from détente does not necessarily create the basis for the conclusion that détente will be a stable policy, such a calculation is nevertheless a starting point.¹

The previous chapter noted the possible link between détente and the developmental strategy projected for the remainder of this decade. In this regard, it is likely that Peking's fifth five-year plan, which is scheduled to start in January 1976, will not simply set extravagant but unrelated goals in the mood of Mao's slogan of achieving "greater, faster, better, and more economical" results, but will attempt some systematic planning in various domestic sectors and in foreign trade. A broad range of imports will be essential to China's economic development, from food grain to offset crop shortfalls to entire industrial plants, particularly in important areas such as petrochemicals and fertilizer production. The plan no doubt will aim at decreasing and eventually ending China's dependence

¹Communist China has by no means consistently followed policies that advanced its interests as those might have been seen by outside observers at various times. For example, the break with the West in 1949-50 and with the USSR in the 1960s took place at great economic and strategic costs to China. Similarly, China's truculent policy toward some potential supporters was a very large factor in making possible the success of the US efforts that delayed the entry of the Communist regime into the United Nations until more than two decades after the regime gained control on the mainland.
on foreign trade and technology, but to reach that goal China will probably have to lean heavily on Western and Japanese sources of supply.

A second, unquestionably important area in which Peking's self-perceived interests are served by détente relates to China's strategic posture toward the Soviet Union. An underlying assumption for détente is Peking's conclusion after the border clashes of 1969 that the USSR had become the major threat to China's security, interests, and goals—not the United States, and not the two superpowers in equal proportions, as had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. There have been differences of emphasis between moderates and radicals in the Peking leadership and between official statements issued at various times about how to treat the residual threat from the United States within the new strategic framework, but there seems to be consistent agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat itself. Peking rationalizes the current détente policy in terms of the traditional Communist preoccupation with singling out the "major enemy" at any given time, with gaining allies against that enemy, and with forestalling coalitions of hostile and potentially hostile groups (in regard to the last point, the Sino-US détente, from Peking's viewpoint, has the utility of potentially disrupting or at least limiting the Soviet-US détente).

In addition, the Sino-US détente carries the possibility, of course, of disrupting or at least limiting the extent of the Soviet-US détente. Peking has stated that détente has enabled the United States to reduce its forces in East Asia—its own in Peking's interest regardless of who is the "major enemy"—thereby enabling the United States to maintain forces in Western Europe to counter the Soviet threat there. This in turn, Peking points out, has eased the Soviet threat and gains China the time needed to develop its military capabilities. This explanation, designed for domestic indoctrination as well
as external propaganda, may be somewhat simplistic but no doubt contains a large element of what in fact is Peking's conception of the strategic role of détente in the complex US-USSR-China relationship.²

There are, finally, a number of specific East Asian objectives that Peking has brought closer to realization by the détente strategy. The resolution of the Taiwan problem looms very large on this list. While in one sense the Shanghai communiqué meant that the issue was being deferred—Peking no longer proclaims its intention to "liberate" Taiwan at an early time—in a more important sense the détente policy has served to erode Taiwan's position.³ Peking unquestionably has gained enormously over Taiwan, including admission to the United Nations and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, and now the major additional short-term gain that Peking may be


The latter document states that: "After World War II, at first it was US imperialism... that was the No. 1 enemy. Later, Soviet revisionism, social-imperialism emerged.... Since then, US imperialism and Soviet imperialism, the two superpowers, have been the common enemies of the people of the world. The present situation is: US imperialism's counterrevolutionary global strategy has met with repeated setbacks; its aggressive power has been weakened; hence, it has had to make some retraction and adjustment of its strategy. Soviet revisionism on the other hand is stretching its arms in all directions and expanding desperately. It is more crazy, adventurist, and deceptive. That is why Soviet revisionism has become our country's most dangerous and most important enemy."

³See Appendix for text of the Shanghai communiqué.
hoping for involves the much more difficult issue of US diplomatic and security relations with Taipei.4

Establishment of normal diplomatic and economic relations with Japan was for Peking probably second in importance only to easing tension with the United States as an element of détente. Peking was able initially to exact a heavy price from Japan for normalization of relations--severance of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Overall Japan-Taiwan economic relations continue to prosper, but within the framework of détente diplomacy, Peking probably now places less emphasis on Japan's ties with Taiwan than on its own access to Japanese trade and technology and on its competition with the Soviets for influence in Japan. Peking probably expects that détente will continue to pay substantial dividends in Japan, not only in the economic sphere but also in political matters. Peking is using all of its resources (including, for example, support from friendly left-wing groups in Japan) to obtain language in the peace settlement with Japan that would by implication support Peking against the USSR (Moscow's protests indicate that Peking's efforts are having some effect).

Events in Korea also appear to reflect Chou En-lai's new diplomacy. Peking's relations with Pyongyang, virtually severed in the early days of the Sino-Soviet controversy, were restored by Chou En-lai at about the time Peking was developing its détente diplomacy. It is possible that Chinese influence was reflected in Pyongyang's moves to establish contacts with the Seoul government, but in any case, those moves represent a Korean response to and adaptation of the détente diplomacy

"Recent indications of Peking's concern in regard to Taiwan may be intended principally to keep alive the issue of US diplomatic and security relations with Taipei, with the hope of an additional breakthrough if a new US administration takes office in 1976."
and have been described in those terms by Pyongyang. Even though the Korean North-South contacts have floundered, tension on the Korean Peninsula appeared for a time to be easing, and this may have represented for Peking another incidental gain from the détente policy. It has been suggested that Pyongyang's currently much harder stance is not only a reaction to the opportunity target presented by President Park, but is also in part a response to what Pyongyang perhaps interpreted as indications of greater militancy in Peking. Such a reaction to events in China is something Peking would want to guard against, since China's objectives in Korea seem to be stabilization and a reduction of risk, on the one hand, and maintenance and extension of its influence, on the other.


7Pyongyang apparently continues to regard the United States, and particularly the US military presence in South Korea, as the principal barrier to its goal of unifying Korea under Communist rule. Peking has evidenced little enthusiasm for that goal, which could be achieved only by military means, and seems not to regard the US military presence in South Korea of immediate concern, although it does support Pyongyang's diplomacy on this issue (e.g., in the UN General Assembly). Perhaps because of this difference, Pyongyang has consistently interpreted détente in much "harder" terms than Peking. For example, various Pyongyang broadcasts claim that only Kim Il-sung provided a "correct" interpretation of the US strategy represented by President Nixon's China trip—namely, that the trip was a reflection of the bankruptcy and defeat of US "imperialism." Pyongyang implies rather strongly that Peking did not and does not see the situation quite in these terms, and Peking's own treatment—including reportage of Pyongyang's statements—does not exhibit the stridently anti-American tone that is typical of North Korean propaganda. See FBIS Daily Report, "Asia and Pacific," August 13, 1974, pp. D-8 to D-24.
Still another East Asian strand of China's détente diplomacy relates to Southeast Asia, where Peking has been working to establish or improve conventional diplomatic relations, while preserving as much as possible of its influence or control over various local insurgent movements and Communist parties. Peking's previous strategy in Southeast Asia did not do well. China sustained a major loss in connection with the fall of Sukarno after the coup attempt of 1965, and the position of the West and in some regards even of the USSR in Indonesia is now much better than it was in 1965. Peking's prospects in Indochina, despite Communist successes there, are unclear. Neither the Hanoi regime nor the post-cease-fire regime in Vientiane is as responsive to Peking's influence as the latter might desire and even Peking's sponsorship of Sihanouk since the coup in Phnom Penh is paying only uncertain dividends because of Sihanouk's tenuous influence among the insurgents. In the non-Communist countries of the region, pro-Peking insurgent and Communist movements also have not extended their influence. Under the circumstances, it is perhaps natural for Peking to attempt to operate by more conventional diplomatic means. This effort was facilitated by the Sino-US détente, which made it possible for such pro-US governments as those of the Philippines and Thailand to open contacts with Peking. Nonetheless, all of the governments of the region are cautious regarding ties with Peking because of the long history of Chinese support for local insurgencies.

Peking has given some of the Southeast Asian leaders assurances—somewhat as it did at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955—that its support for insurgent movements would be curtailed or terminated. Peking's observance of

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8Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia has told the press that during his trip to Peking in June 1974 he was given assurances that the Chinese leaders regard the remnant Communist terrorists in Malaysia as an internal problem that Malaysia should deal with as it thinks best. Quoted in Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia," Problems of Communism, September-October 1974, p. 46.
such understandings, however, is likely to be linked to its estimate of the determination of individual governments to demand compliance before relations are actually established. In the past, for example, Peking clearly has felt it could go very far in aiding insurgents in Burma without prejudicing the more conventional strands of its diplomacy in that country. Similarly, since the fall of the Thanom government in Thailand, it seems to have concluded that the new government would not react strongly to the "unofficial" support given Thai insurgents. Even at best, Peking is not likely to abandon completely the Southeast Asian insurgent and Communist movements, all of which have sided with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute and several of which are virtually adjuncts to the Chinese Communist Party itself and have important segments of their leadership and covert radio transmitters physically located in China. Peking's reluctance in this regard is likely to be augmented by the fact that the suspicions of many Southeast Asian leaders concerning China and its motives are aroused regardless of any Chinese actions by the economic activity of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asian countries.\(^9\) It is doubtful that Peking considers its diplomacy in Southeast Asia to be an important factor in its détente diplomacy; rather, any gains to be made are probably incidental to the more important aims of détente and will not be made at the cost of sacrificing any otherwise viable insurgent movements.

South Asia has been affected little by Peking's détente diplomacy. Enmity toward India seems to continue undiminished, and Chinese support for tribal insurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram near the India-Burma border, according to New Delhi's

charges, may even have been increased. Peking's relations with the other countries of the subcontinent also have not been altered by détente. Peking has not attempted to establish formal relations with Bangladesh. Its friendly relations with Sri Lanka and its near-alliance with Pakistan both pre-date détente, as does the Chinese assistance program in Nepal.

From Peking's viewpoint, the costs of détente, to be measured against the gains mentioned above, would consist of the ideological compromises that have had to be made, the restrictions on Peking's tactics toward neighboring countries--particularly Taiwan--and the risk that China may suffer undue dependence upon the West--particularly the United States--in trade and technology and even in regard to the strategic competition with the Soviet Union. For the near future, the additional gains from détente, particularly in regard to Taiwan, are likely to be less spectacular. The most important interests to be served by a continuing détente appear to be of two kinds: those pertaining to the strategic advantage of facing only one major enemy at a time, and those pertaining to the buildup of the economy in connection with the fifth five-year plan. The major question that arises here is whether China's present or future leaders may come to feel that the ideological and tactical restrictions and compromises implied by détente outweigh the gains still to be made. For Peking, important objectives, such as a lower profile US presence in East Asia, access to US and Japanese technology, international status and UN membership, a better strategic position vis-à-vis the USSR, and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, have already

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10See New York Times, January 20, 1974, New Delhi despatch, "Growing Tribal Insurgency Irks India." Peking participated prominently in the February 1975 ping-pong tournament in Calcutta and emphasized the friendly attitude of the Indian "people" on that occasion, but otherwise Peking's propaganda and diplomatic stance toward India has remained intransigent, particularly in regard to charges of Indian "expansionism" in the Himalayan and Kashmir regions.
been achieved and conceivably could be more or less maintained even if Peking assumed again a more militant anti-US international posture.
IV

IMPLICATIONS OF MAOIST MASS MOVEMENTS

The future of China's détente diplomacy will be conditioned by developments in the domestic arena, where factionalism, ideological debate, and maneuvering for the succession have been intense. This domestic turmoil has been reflected in Maoist mass movements, such as the *p'i Lin p'i K'ung* (criticize Lin Piao; criticize Confucius) movement that has occupied all of China for the past year and more. The anti-Lin, anti-Confucius movement has involved a combination of criticism of Mao's late successor, Lin Piao, and of Confucius, together with praise for the "progressive" first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, who was previously regarded in mainline Chinese historiography as the archetype of a tyrant. The link as villains between Lin Piao and Confucius is tenuous, but the now self-proclaimed link between Mao Tse-tung and the Ch'in emperor who unified China in 221 B.C. has been made before by Mao's opponents, including Chiang Kai-shek and Lin Piao himself, but not previously in a favorable sense by Mao's supporters. The movement is complex and has at times verged on a small-scale cultural revolution (it was described as such by Peking in accordance with Mao's dictum that there must be a cultural revolution every seven or eight years). The movement has continued into 1975, although its present focus is not on ancient Chinese history but on an elaboration of Marxist-Leninist concepts pertaining to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the need to combat bourgeois tendencies, even in the period of socialism that China has been proclaimed to have entered. Like the Cultural Revolution, the movement involves factional, ideological, and policy disputes, but
these have been so veiled in historical analogies and ideological pronouncements that their import emerges only slowly and ambiguously. Many of the issues raised by various aspects of the movement bear on the question of the interaction between Chinese domestic and foreign policies.

The p'ai Lin p'ai K'ung movement started as an academic debate about periodization and similar issues in Chinese historiography. It became joined, presumably at Mao Tse-tung's personal insistence, to the campaign to uncover and publicize the sins and accomplices of Lin Piao following Lin's death. There have been numerous shifts in the movement, and Lin Piao, who was earlier attacked as a "leftist" is now denounced as a "rightist." The movement seemed at times to include attacks on the moderate policies of Chou En-lai by the radical faction of Chiang Ch'ing (Mdme. Mao) and her Shanghai supporters.¹ Then, the movement was metamorphosed into a drive to increase production, and it is now being used to strengthen the party—unlike the movement's earlier characteristic of appealing to the masses over or around the party leadership and cadres at various levels. Recent discussions of the dictatorship of the proletariat have given a more radical but also much more disciplined cast to the movement. In this phase, the "proletariat" (in this context, the party is meant) has been urged to exercise "dictatorship" over persons who are unduly susceptible to remnant "bourgeois" aspects of Chinese life (e.g., the differential pay scale for various grades of workers and officials). This may be intended simply to explain that various pragmatic aspects of current Chinese policy (such

¹The movement also provided an opportunity for the expression of individual grievances through wall posters (even about sensitive matters like secret police actions). Although this form of individual expression has now been largely channeled into orthodox, party-directed lines, the new constitution approved at the 1975 People's Congress specifically guarantees the "masses" the right to use such posters as a "new form" of revolutionary action.
as incentive payments, private farm plots, and the like),
given proper proletarian vigilance, need not undermine Chinese
socialism. On the other hand, as in earlier phases of the
movement, the tone of some of the articles and quotations now
being published could also point to more purges, although most
likely not of the top leadership. In its emphasis on the role
of the party, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" campaign
conceivably might mark a logical conclusion for the anti-Lin
movement, although Maoist movements have a characteristic of
continuing on beyond what one might assume to be their logical
end.

A. STATUS OF CHOU EN-LAI

That the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement might be directed at
curtailing the influence of Chou En-lai is made plausible by
the previous successive purges of Mao's successors--Chou was
the beneficiary of the demise and criticism of Lin Piao and
was therefore conceivably next in line as a target. Also, Chou
En-lai, of all senior Chinese officials, most nearly conforms
to the image of a Confucian-type administrator. On the other
hand, Chou's advanced age, poor health, and political caution
(the latter contributing to his axiomatic survivability) make
it unlikely that he would threaten Mao Tse-tung's primacy as
Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao had done. It is more likely that
the anti-Chou materials that have appeared are expressions of
factional in-fighting and not of Mao Tse-tung's own decision.¹

²See, for example, Chang Chun-chiao's article, "On Exercising
All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie," Peking Review,
April 4, 1975.
³Much of the material that can be construed as being anti-Chou
appeared early in the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement, but it is
possible that Chou is also a target of the recent "dictatorship
of the proletariat" campaign, which seeks to build up the role
of the party at the expense of the government administrative
apparatus headed by Chou En-lai.
(Mao's toleration of the anti-Chou aspects may however reflect an effort to maintain a degree of balance among factions.) Chou's limited activity in the past year is probably not a political indicator but the result of genuine health problems. Even so, the movement has imposed restrictions on Chou, who has had publicly to endorse anti-Confucianism and who presumably suffers from reduced flexibility because of the criticism that would arise were he to tolerate an excessive influx of foreign influences or otherwise to demonstrate an inadequately Maoist outlook.

There may also be a positive aspect for Chou and his supporters in the restrictions that have been placed on foreign influences in the course of the movement. By setting limits, it is possible to define the détente policy in much more nearly orthodox Maoist terms and to assuage the concern of those who genuinely fear that China will become contaminated by foreign influences. This could serve to strengthen the more important, non-cultural aspects of détente--particularly foreign trade and the reduction of the military threat. Given the fact of the movement, Chou may well have tried to strengthen his position by joining in and even insisting that détente be kept in its proper place. However, his ability by sleight of hand to deflect from himself and to profit from some aspects of the p'i Lin p'i K'ung campaign still leaves a considerable area of uncertainty about the future of the détente strategy, especially if Chou should soon no longer be at the helm of that strategy. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who appears to be next in line after Chou as manager of the détente, is potentially much more vulnerable to factional criticism. Prior to his spectacular and surprising rehabilitation, Teng was second only to Liu Shao-ch'i as a target of the original Cultural Revolution (and the focus of personal animosity by Mao and Chiang Ch'ing).

Mao Tse-tung has given his approval to the détente strategy, but he appears to be intent on keeping that strategy in some
kind of dialectic tension with a more radical and more "Maoist" strategy. The personality and political skill of Chou En-lai—apparently even during his illness—have so far been crucial elements in maintaining a degree of balance. It is noteworthy that Chou was retained as premier and delivered the principal report at the January 1975 People's Congress, despite his health problems and age. Under less stressful conditions, Chou might have stepped down, possibly into some honorific but less burdensome post; that he did not do so may have been largely due to a desire to avoid the appearance that "radicals" had pushed him aside and that moderation in domestic and foreign policy was endangered. However, the custom Chou En-lai has developed of meeting foreign dignitaries in a "hospital" and the point Teng Hsiao-p'ing has been making that in various diplomatic functions he is acting "for Chou En-lai" directs an unprecedented degree of publicity upon Chou's health—perhaps to pave the way for Chou's stepping down entirely from his official posts at a later time.

B. REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM AND TRADITIONALISM

The anti-Confucius aspect of the movement has ideological implications that also bear on the détente strategy. Maoism has always had a large, nationalistic component, which was played down during the Sino-Soviet alliance but has since received a strong boost. Nationalistic Chinese progressives and radicals have long sought traditional Chinese roots for modern progressivism, for example, in the state of primitive communism China allegedly enjoyed in prehistoric dynasties and in the concept of a dialectic in Chinese philosophy. Much of this search has tended to veer into utopian directions or otherwise failed to meet strictly Marxist standards. Mao seems now to have in large part resolved this dilemma. Possibly because of a streak of stubborn perverseness, Mao chose not to rebut Lin Piao's charge that he was as cruel as the Ch'in
emperor; instead the Ch'in emperor has been re-characterized as "progressive" in the class context of his time because he was struggling against the Confucianists, who Mao has now determined were attempting to restore the "slave" system of the previous dynasties. (This solution also resolved the debate about whether and when China might have passed through the slave period postulated by Marxism.) The new analysis provides a Marxist class rationalization not only for the tyrannical rule of the Ch'in emperor, but also for the harsh dictatorship exercised by the present Peking regime over those who would "restore capitalism," as Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao are accused of plotting to do. The new analysis at the same time is also very "anti-revisionist"; it conforms to the tone of the Chinese defense of Stalinism and Chinese criticism of the alleged liberal and humanitarian tendencies of Moscow's ideology.

Mao Tse-tung has now placed himself in a line of tradition going back over two millenia in Chinese history. The opposition to Confucianism, in addition, places Mao in a line of Chinese progressivism that goes back to the early decades of this century, when Chinese intellectuals condemned Confucianism as a reactionary and backward ideology. However, previously progressive-minded Chinese had in their rejection of Chinese tradition turned either to Western values and systems (of which Marxism was one) or paradoxically turned full circle to reject much of the anti-traditionalism itself, going so far as to attempt a Confucian restoration (the Nationalist regime in Taiwan continues to sponsor a Confucian cult on that island). Mao, on the other hand, has in his anti-traditionalism adopted other aspects of Chinese tradition now rationalized as "progressive" in their proper historical context. Hence the glorification of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, of the Legist school of ancient philosophy, and of various traditions such as acupuncture and Chinese opera (but the latter only in the revised Chiang Ch'ing versions). The one foreign accretion, Marxism,
has been effectively "sinicised" by the link to ancient China
and because by Maoist definition all the major centers of
Marxism other than China have fallen into "revisionist" error.

So far as China's foreign relations are concerned, the
anti-Confucius campaign creates barriers to foreign ideological
influences, both Western and Soviet. However, as fellow
Marxists, the Soviets far more than Westerners are likely
to find the new development in Maoism deeply offensive. It
is noteworthy that Soviet sinologists have published severe
criticisms of Peking's historical double-thinking (to that
extent seemingly lending substance to Peking's charge that
Moscow is part of the Confucian conspiracy). On the other
hand, US academicians have remained relatively quiet, and
US statements on Confucius have not elicited prominent comments
in China, except for a brief flurry of Chinese criticism of
Owen Lattimore for having once praised Confucius. The national-
istic and traditionalistic aspects of p'i Lin p'i K'ung place
some limits on the degree of rapport that can be expected
between Peking and Western countries, but much more importantly,
the movement further widens the ideological chasm between
Peking and Moscow, and to that extent it probably serves to
strengthen the basis of détente.

The factional and ideological aspects of p'i Lin p'i K'ung
described above provide a basis for appraising certain other
aspects of the campaign.

C. THE TAIWAN ISSUE

The détente strategy, as noted earlier, could be seriously
undermined if Peking's frustrations regarding Taiwan were to
become acute. The anti-Confucius campaign, by placing Mao in
line with the generation of Chinese progressives who lived
through the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and subsequent
decades, provides an interesting variation of Peking's approach
to the Taiwan issue. In its reevaluation of ancient sages and
emperors, Peking no doubt offends most non-Communist Chinese intellectuals, but in commentaries, many of which are beamed by the Peking radio to Taiwan, that recall the early republican anti-Confucianism Peking must strike responsive chords among many older mainlanders in Taiwan. Peking has gone to extraordinary lengths to document and criticize the use of Confucianism during the present century, by Manchu officials desperately trying to salvage the collapsing dynasty, then after that collapse, by Yuan Shih-k'ai and Henry Pu-ji in abortive attempts at dynastic restoration, and finally by Chiang Kai-shek in the maintenance of a Confucius cult in Taiwan. These commentaries are likely to find considerable sympathy among liberal Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan and elsewhere. Peking's emphasis on these matters represents a kind of "united front" propaganda line. The commentaries beamed to Taiwan have a nostalgic cast, since anti-Confucianism has not been a very lively issue in Chinese intellectual circles outside the mainland since the 1920s, but the commentaries dealing with the contemporary period are noteworthy for conforming to the conventional "liberal" appraisal of individuals and movements in modern China. (The only surprising reevaluations have been made by mainland scholars who criticized their own earlier evaluations of Confucius.) Insofar as the anti-Confucius campaign includes a kind of "united front" approach

"Commentaries published in Taiwan have noted that the personal attacks on Chiang Kai-shek's Confucianism were unprecedented for Peking, which has usually disdained even to mention Chiang and his activities, and that they represent a kind of indirect flattery and acknowledgement of Chiang's role in preserving Chinese tradition. See, for example, Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Maoists Deepened Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius" in Issues and Studies (Taipei), June 1974, p. 8."
to Chinese on Taiwan, it is also, of course, a moderate line consistent with the détente itself.5

D. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The anti-Lin campaign, in that it is directed against China's former defense minister, can be assumed to have important implications for China's military establishment and doctrine. And yet, as in other aspects of the movement, what those implications are is by no means clear. Lin's supporters have long since been purged from leadership positions in the armed forces, but an intensive campaign to rewrite the record of Lin's historical achievements as a revolutionary military hero has only gotten under way in the last year. Lin is pictured as having been a defeatist and a muddle-headed military thinker at important junctures in the civil war, when the battle was saved--so the story now goes--only by Mao Tse-tung's personal intervention and instructions. When Lin was at the peak of his power, the Communist armed forces were described as having been created by Mao and commanded by Lin; this phase is now interpreted as revealing Lin's ambition to seize command from Mao. The present line ascribes to Mao the creation and the command of the armed forces, as well as their ideological leadership. Significantly, the January 1975 State Constitution designates the chairman of the Communist Party--that is, Mao Tse-tung--as the commander of the armed forces; this is Mao's only non-party post and even this post he holds ex officio as party chairman. The stress on

5There are of course other, more concrete indications of a "united front" approach to the Taiwan issue, including the recent release of Kuomintang "war criminals" imprisoned since the civil war period. Chiang Kai-shek's death, particularly because it has stimulated foreign speculation about a possible "deal" between Taiwan and the mainland, may give added impetus to this Peking tactic.
Mao's personal role, the role of the party generally, and on radical ideological aspects in military matters suggests the influence of Chiang Ch'ing and her Shanghai supporters, and in fact there is evidence of Chiang Ch'ing's personal involvement and that of troops directly loyal to her in these aspects of the campaign.\(^6\) In the course of the campaign, characteristic emphasis has been placed on the role of the militia, in both military and political affairs; here the influence of the Shanghai-based radical faction again is revealed in the fact that Chinese comments point specifically to Shanghai as a model for encouragement and utilization of the militia.\(^7\) If there is a single unifying theme that Peking stresses in connection with all of the above aspects of the p'i Lin p'i K'ung campaign, it is that the armed forces must take a subordinate position to the party in the Communist regime, that the "party must command the gun," in Mao's phrase.

What distinguishes the military from some other aspects of the campaign is the fact that apparently a balance has not yet been achieved between the radical emphasis cited above and a more pragmatic, professional viewpoint. There were inordinate delays in filling the major posts that became vacant in the aftermath of the Lin Piao affair. A defense minister was designated only at the time of the January 1975 People's Congress, and even then the choice fell to the 76-year old party elder Yeh Chien-yung. Statements that Mao "commands" seem to veil a situation of considerable uncertainty. At the same time, the reflections of radical Maoist influence in propaganda on military questions also probably cannot be taken at face value, since


the armed forces have been downgraded in influence (if they were unequivocally under radical control, one would expect much more emphasis on the political role of the armed forces) and since most of the intermediate commands remain in the hands of long-established professionals—there has been no sweeping purge, except in a few top positions.

The situation in the Chinese Communist military, thus, is still one of uncertainty. Major civilian factions probably are by no means sure of the position the armed forces might take in a crisis, such as one over the succession. The view of the armed forces toward the present Peking foreign policy of détente with the West and tension with the Soviet Union probably also is unclear. Important military leaders in the past have favored a less provocative posture toward the Soviets (even if they probably did not, as the official line charges, advocate capitulation to Moscow), and Lin Piao may well have dissented from Chou En-lai's détente policy. In a future power struggle, it seems likely that factionalism within Communist China generally will be reflected also in the military establishment, possibly with a split between professionally oriented and highly politicized officers. This likely factionalism is an added potentially destabilizing factor, and to that extent makes the détente policy also more uncertain than it would be if the Peking regime were solidly supported by a unified military establishment. However, insofar as the managers of China's détente diplomacy are concerned, the military uncertainties no doubt reinforce the motivation for détente, because they detract from China's military preparedness.

E. SUCCESSION

The current movement is directly linked to Mao's obsession with the problem of succession, since it focuses upon criticism of Mao's last designated successor. Although Chou En-lai seems to have been the principal beneficiary of the fall of Lin Piao,
Chou did not inherit Lin Piao's successor status; in fact, it may be that Chou En-lai's eroding health has been as much a factor in the movement as has Mao's own advanced age. Mao's aims probably include ensuring that the succession does not fall into the hands of "Khrushchev-type" technocrats or administrators. Mao may have been fairly confident that Chou would give proper weight to the doctrinaire "Maoist" revolutionary strand in Chinese Communist policy, even while implementing a moderate, rationalistic policy like détente—particularly if prodded from time to time by a movement like the current one. But most of Chou's potential successors (such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who is 73, and Lin Hsien-hien, age 70) perhaps are seen by Mao as less reliable in this regard—especially when the time comes that Mao himself will not be available to monitor their performance and to initiate "corrective" action when required. The present movement perhaps for this reason gives a much greater role to the party and within the party to its radical wing than might be expected during a period when pragmatism and moderation are the signals in domestic and international policy. In addition, the movement has once again stressed that individual Chinese should "rebel" or go "against the tide," whenever the latter becomes unduly "revisionist." The latitude permitted the radical wing or individual "rebels" has varied in the course of the movement and is presently limited and subordinated to party leadership. Nevertheless, the revolutionary

But in view of this, it is interesting that the January People's Congress left the radical wing of the party severely underrepresented in the new government. The leaders of the radical "Shanghai" clique in the party, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan, have no central government posts, and the Shanghai group is represented only by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who has taken a relatively neutral stance between radicals and conservatives. Chang co-starred with Chou En-lai at the People's Congress, delivering the report on the new constitution, and is ranked after Teng Hsiao-p'ing among vice-premiers. He is in his sixties and much younger than those who rank ahead of him; this may make him an important factor in the succession.
principle has been reaffirmed and could break out with the vigor with which the bands of "red guards" pursued it in the original cultural revolution if the succession should take too conservative a turn in the future.

It is likely, in other words, that Mao Tse-tung is hoping through the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement to institutionalize the balance between the moderate and radical aspects of Chinese policy in such a way that the balance will survive both his death and that of Chou En-lai. That this hope can be realized is problematic, since the present balance seems to exist only because of moves made personally by Mao to "tilt" whenever things lean too far one way or the other and because of Chou En-lai's unique role. It is questionable that the various leaders who will remain on the scene after the death of Mao (assuming Chou En-lai's prior death or incapacity) will be content to remain in balance with one another. It is much more likely that competing factions will, perhaps after a brief "honeymoon," begin to compete vigorously for preeminence. At that time, the precedents that have been established during the past decade and more, whereby political leaders--especially radicals--appeal directly to the "masses" over and around party channels, could be very destabilizing. In a situation of turmoil and demagoguery, the survival of moderation in domestic affairs or détente in international relations is not to be assumed.

The foregoing paragraphs have described how the political style of the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement might affect the succession. In addition, there are implications for the succession also in the content of the movement. In the criticisms of Lin Piao, much is made of his ambition, which is said to have been manifested--even before his coup attempt--in his plot to have himself declared chief of state, in place of Liu Shao-ch'i, who had been deposed during the Cultural Revolution. Such criticism could be a warning to other politicians, although the
most likely, Chou En-lai, would not seem to need the warning. In any case, the comments suggest that there may not be another attempt to prearrange the succession—a factor that contributes to the instability that is likely in any case to arise when Mao dies.9

The historical part of the movement, criticism of Confucius and praise of the Ch'in emperor, also involves problems of succession. It is interesting that every schoolboy in China knows that the Ch'in dynasty did not survive the first emperor by very long, and that this has traditionally been attributed to the Ch'in emperors' excessive cruelty and harsh rule. At first, Chinese commentaries (but not those of Taiwan) studiously avoided this issue, but subsequently even this somewhat difficult point was faced head-on; analyses pointed out that the short rule of the dynasty proves that—as in contemporary China—there were sinister forces at work within the regime seeking to terminate the "progressive" dynasty and restore Confucianism, which did become the official philosophy of successor dynasties. The lesson is not that Ch'in rule was too harsh, but that it was not sufficiently alert to subversive forces within its own system: suppression should have been more thorough. The policy implications of this analysis also do not augur well for stability and moderation during the present final period of Mao's rule.

F. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

The Sino-Soviet dispute is much more pervasively evident in China than its counterpart, the détente with the United States.

9The new State Constitution does not provide for a chief of state, and the latter's ceremonial functions, such as receiving ambassadorial credentials, will be exercised by the Standing Committee of the People's Congress or its chairman—that is, the 89-year old Chu Teh, who has been politically inactive because of age and health for more than a decade.
This is not surprising, since a totalitarian state often finds good uses for a threatening enemy. Furthermore, ideological disputes with heretics are always more interesting and intense than disputes with opponents who do not share the same ideological assumptions. The historical and ideological aspects of the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement have tended to accentuate these characteristics. Some of the reasons why the movement has tended to widen the gulf between China and the Soviet Union have already been mentioned, including the fact that Lin Piao tried to escape toward the Soviet Union and that the movement has accentuated Peking's kind of nationalism, which in the present environment finds a better target in Moscow than in Washington. At an earlier stage in the movement, there were some anti-US and anti-Japanese manifestations, such as atrocity exhibitions based on World War II and the subsequent Chinese civil war period, but much greater emphasis has consistently been given, for example, to Mao's injunction in defense against the Soviet military threat to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." The Soviets are specifically charged with colluding with Lin Piao and other subversive elements and with seeking to "restore" Confucianism. It seems clear that in the factional disputes of the last decade and a half, the Soviet bogey has had much more effect than the US one, presumably because anti-Russian sentiments come more naturally to Chinese than anti-US feelings.

10For a summary of the anti-Soviet, as opposed to the anti-Western, aspects of the movement, see Hsu King-yi, "The Impact of the Current Turbulence in Mainland China on Washington-Peiping Relations," Issues and Studies (Taipei), September 1974.

11Mao's turning against Moscow caused a near-crisis in Taiwan's propaganda organs in the 1960s, since "resist Russia" was a much more important and useful slogan for the Chiang K'ai-shek regime than the "oppose Communism" that was always paired with it.
Conceivably, the same kind of cool logic that led to China's acceptance of détente with the West could at some future time persuade a Chinese leadership to ease tensions also with the Soviet Union—in theory this could be accomplished at relatively little cost, for example, by toning down propaganda diatribes and agreeing to maintain the de facto border while more difficult issues are deferred. Insofar as the p'ī Lin p'i K'ung movement strengthens the doctrinaire "Maoist" components of China's polity, however, a genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union is made less likely. Furthermore, even the pragmatic managers of China's policy of détente with the West are likely to feel that a reduction of the Soviet threat, which would reduce the rationale for détente, would not be worth the ideological concessions that would have to be made.\footnote{Peking has, as noted, recently played down the immediacy of the Soviet military threat against China, but only on the grounds that because of détente the primary contention between the "superpowers" has shifted to Europe and the Middle East. This line does not appear to provide a basis for Sino-Soviet rapprochement, although it could be used to justify some minor easing of tension along the border.}

In a succession situation, as already noted, there are likely to be factional tensions and this also will produce an environment that will make it difficult for Peking to accept the compromises needed to ease Sino-Soviet differences.

It is likely therefore that the effect of p'ī Lin p'i K'ung will be to preserve most of the existing tension between Peking and Moscow for its own sake or as part of the rationale for the détente with the United States, Japan, and Western countries.
V

ASSESSMENT

A. PROSPECTS

The foregoing discussion indicates that there are a number of factors—even in a generally uncertain situation—that tend to make Peking's détente policy relatively stable, including economic, strategic, and ideological interests. Recent indications, manifested in the various aspects of the p'i Lin p'i K'ung movement, of a doctrinaire "Maoist" emphasis in Chinese Communist policy appear to be not precursors of a new turn to the Left but most likely simply represent Mao's precautionary moves to ensure a degree of balance or dialectic tension between competing policy aspects (and factions) at a time when China's moderate and rationalistic foreign policy and economic strategy might otherwise tip the scale too much in the direction of technocracy and pragmatism.

There is nevertheless a considerable destabilizing potential in the situation. Peking's foreign policy remains more susceptible to domestic influences than was the case during the regime's very early years, although less so than during the Cultural Revolution. Among the factors making for uncertainty is the leadership succession, which is likely to involve some bitter disputes in the course of which Mao's careful balance may tip and pragmatism give way to demagoguery. Domestic turmoil inevitably would slow the development of détente, but demagoguery is likely to find more useful targets in Moscow than in Washington, thereby giving détente a better chance of survival than it would have if Sino-Soviet differences were not so deeply entrenched.
In the Chinese situation, the totally unexpected cannot be ruled out. But it is worth noting that even if Sino-Soviet tension eased substantially, that likely would be a reflection of a stronger pragmatic trend in Peking than is now evident. Chinese leaders, calculating the costs and risks of Sino-Soviet tension, could come to feel that the kind of benefit already gained through détente with the West could also be gained on the Soviet front. Such pragmatism would alter the Chinese rationale for détente by putting less emphasis on strategic factors and more on economic ones, but it would not be a reason for terminating détente and might even serve to accelerate and broaden contacts with the West. It does not seem reasonable that Peking's present or future leaders would reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union only to resume the cold war with the United States, since from China's viewpoint the ideological compromises needed to accommodate to Moscow are likely to be seen as more far reaching than the relatively limited compromises that were needed to ease the cold war.

Among the potentially destabilizing aspects of China's East Asian environment, however, one that should be particularly noted is Taiwan. As already indicated, frustration over the Taiwan problem could exacerbate factionalism and doctrinaire Maoist trends in Peking and give ammunition to demagogues who would accuse the architects of Peking's détente policy of yielding too much in regard to Taiwan. Militancy toward Taiwan, depending upon the reaction in Washington (and Tokyo), could produce tensions that would rapidly undermine détente.

Other East Asian issues rank far below Taiwan in their potential for arousing Chinese militancy to the point of
threatening détente. Chinese support for Southeast Asian insurgencies or for subversion within overseas Chinese communities could from time to time impede the process of normalizing relations with individual countries of that region, but Chinese interests and assets are limited and the issues involved lack for China the emotional, nationalistic element that makes the Taiwan problem potentially so destabilizing. Furthermore, the issue is somewhat defused because the governments in the region appear inclined more or less to tolerate a level of Chinese involvement sufficient to satisfy Peking's ideological requirements. Communist gains in Cambodia and Vietnam may lead to a reappraisal in Peking of the strength of the United States and its allies, but they are not likely to undermine Peking's support of détente, particularly since Communist gains in Indochina will have the initial effect for China of opening additional areas of competition with the Soviet Union. In regard to Korea, China's support for Pyongyang involves some risks due to Kim Il-sung's unpredictability, but again Chinese interests and emotions are not deeply involved and China's influence most likely will be a moderating one.

B. CONTINGENCIES

In spite of this paper's general estimate that the elements of stability in China's détente policy outweigh the factors that might push Peking into abandoning the détente strategy, there is sufficient uncertainty in the situation to warrant identification of some contingencies alternative to a continued détente. Given Peking's international environment of three major powers, and its probable perception of a need for some degree of external strategic and economic support, the most realistic alternatives to the present détente with the United
States and Japan are those in which Peking would try to maintain friendly relations with two of the powers, while maintaining or developing tensions only with the third. This would mean, in effect, easing tension with the USSR and focusing that tension instead upon either the United States or Japan, but not both simultaneously. Other reasonably realistic alternatives are those in which Peking would try to maintain (or establish) friendly relations with one major power while expressing hostility and militancy toward the other two, e.g., a return to the policy of the 1960s of equal hostility toward the USSR and the United States, but with an effort to maintain and even extend the détente with Japan. (The development of these alternatives could involve—or might even have as an aim—a deterioration of the current US-Soviet détente, or of the US-Japanese alliance, or both.) Finally, at a lower level of realism, it is conceivable that Peking would in an excess of militancy develop a policy of tension with all three major powers simultaneously—this would carry with it by far the greatest strategic risk and economic cost for China. In all of the alternatives involving tension with the United States, Peking might try to compensate for losses in trade and transfer of technology by depending upon Japan, or, if that is also ruled out or restricted, upon Western Europe.

The contingencies mentioned above could come about in any number of ways: because of developments within China, such as a much more militant mood arising out of the succession to power of doctrinaire young radicals; or because of frustrations over the slow pace of China’s domestic or international progress, particularly in regard to Taiwan. The most likely cause would be an action-reaction sequence that might at the outset not be seen by any of the parties as necessarily implying the end of the present détente system. Peking, for example, might feel compelled for whatever reason to adopt a more militant stance toward Taiwan or to compete more vigorously with Japan.
or the United States in regard to some East Asian issue. If Peking's moves were seen as potentially destabilizing, the United States or Japan, or both, might react strongly, which might in turn lead Peking to take additional measures that could ultimately produce one of the contingency situations listed above. It is not necessary at this point to try to outline scenarios; it is enough to note the range of possible outcomes.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

1. US Interests

There can be no question that US interests have been advanced by the process of developing the détente with China, despite the present stagnation in that process and the uncertainties that have been discussed in this paper. The gains made since Secretary Kissinger's first contacts with Chou En-lai include a much reduced risk of hostilities with China; termination of Chinese opposition to a cease-fire in Vietnam; apparent Chinese encouragement of an easing of tension in Korea; opening of a Sino-US diplomatic channel of communication (replacing the inadequate Warsaw ambassadorial talks); opening of China to US trade (and development of that trade to a surprising dollar volume); and an opening for cultural, educational, and journalistic exchanges. An important gain also lies in the much greater maneuverability the United States now enjoys in its diplomacy and in such fields as UN affairs and arms control negotiations. The policy adjustments—in Peking and Washington—are still incomplete, but cumulatively these and related achievements represent the fruits of détente.

There have been negative aspects of détente, such as the frictions created between the United States and its Asian allies—chiefly Japan and the Republic of China. But Japan has surmounted its "Nixon shocks," and the Republic of China appears not to have been weakened critically. The results
even of these negative aspects are, therefore, not unmixed, since China policy now seems to be much less contentious between the United States and Japan than it has been at various points in the past (and by the same token, China is also much less of an issue between the pro-US Japanese government and its anti-US domestic critics). As for Taiwan, perhaps the diplomatic losses are compensated to some degree by the fact that so long as the détente holds, China's aim of conquering Taiwan is perforce postponed.

Another negative aspect for US interests lies in the role China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is able to play in the United Nations to support and encourage irresponsible positions taken by the "Asian-African" bloc of states in the General Assembly and other UN bodies. However, this factor must be balanced against the flexibility the United States has gained by not having to concern itself with the perennial "Chinese representation" issue. Also, conceivably there is a positive element to the fact that China, as an accepted member of the community of nations, is now subject to a broad range of international influences and thus possibly is less likely to revert to its former pattern of revolutionary isolationism.

2. Alternative Futures

The question arises as to what extent the US gains from détente are jeopardized by domestic turmoil in China and the possibility that that turmoil might somehow lead to Peking's termination of its détente diplomacy. It is necessary first of all to note that the gains from détente just listed are not likely to be lost entirely even if détente is terminated—unless it is done under extreme and unlikely circumstances. A return to the worst of the cold war is improbable, if only because the United States will not readily sacrifice its newly found policy flexibility. Unless Peking abandons altogether its strategy for economic development, a floor is also placed
under potentially deteriorating relations with the non-Communist world by China's need for foreign trade and technology—if not from the United States, then from Japan and Western Europe. Similarly, even if more of an easing of Sino-Soviet tension occurs than is now foreseen, Peking will inevitably retain a substantial residue of unease about the Soviets and will therefore wish to minimize at least the military dimension of tension with the United States or Japan, even if other aspects of détente are abandoned. (Such a limited easing of Sino-Soviet tension would not constitute a threat to the United States and might even contribute to stability in East Asia.)

What seems to be chiefly at stake, from the viewpoint of direct US interests, are not the gains already achieved from détente, but the gains still to be made. The sacrifice of these gains would lie in three areas. First, if we assume that Peking becomes more truculent toward the United States, normalization of diplomatic relations would become unlikely and even the limited effectiveness of the liaison offices might be curtailed. However, it is in any case problematic whether Peking will agree to a normalization of relations so long as the Taiwan problem remains unresolved (and particularly so long as several potential US presidential candidates for 1976 appear to favor making a complete break between the United States and Taiwan). Second, under the assumed circumstances, Peking might choose to curtail trade with the United States. Such curtailment would be more costly

\[\text{1Peking appears to have imposed on the US Liaison Office only those restrictions that are imposed also on diplomatic missions in Peking, even those of countries considered "friendly"; it is to be questioned, therefore, whether much is sacrificed if normalization is postponed. See the discussion of this issue in Michael Lindsay, "US Relations with the People's Republic of China," in \textit{Asian Affairs}, September-October 1974. The sacrifice would lie not in the postponement of normalization but in the danger that additional restrictions would be imposed on the work of the Liaison Office.}\]
to Peking, by limiting sources of supply for key items, than to the United States, for which trade with China at best would represent only a very small fraction of GNP (also, some of the important items involved, such as food grain and petroleum technology, have ready markets elsewhere). Third, and in the long run possibly most significant, if Peking assumed again a radical stance in international relations, the hope for involving China in a more constructive role in the United Nations, in arms control efforts, and in related international endeavors would fade. Finally, in a newly radical phase, Peking's offensive against Taiwan might be stepped up, but that this would assume military proportions would still be unlikely.

The collapse of détente would also have various indirect impacts on US interests, such as US relations with other countries, that might be even more important than the direct impact on US-Chinese relations. For example, if renewed Chinese hostility toward the United States were accompanied by a continuing effort to woo Japan, US relations with Japan could deteriorate. Peking might be able to exact a relatively high price from Japan in regard to the latter's relationship with Taiwan. The resulting US isolation might be particularly serious if the Taiwan situation had given rise to Peking's turn to the left in foreign policy and if China renewed various forms of direct pressure against Taiwan. The consensus—such as it is—between Japan and the United States regarding the strategic importance of South Korea might similarly be undermined by a Chinese policy of tension toward the United States and détente toward Japan. The overall US-Japanese security relationship is similarly vulnerable. However, it should be noted that all of this applies only if Peking continued its détente toward Japan. If Japan and the United States were made common targets of a policy of tension, US-Japanese security cooperation would be more likely to improve than to deteriorate.
The collapse of the Sino-US détente might also have serious repercussions in regard to US-Soviet relations, perhaps removing some of the Soviet incentive for good relations with the United States. In any event, US maneuverability vis-à-vis Moscow would be reduced.

3. US Leverage

This paper has stressed the fact that China's interest in détente is in part strategic (derived from concerns aroused by the Sino-Soviet conflict) and in part economic (derived from China's present developmental strategy). The United States can strengthen both interests, for example, by remaining neutral in matters at issue between Peking and Moscow and by assuming a flexible approach to such economic matters as credit terms and strategic trade controls. The elements of uncertainty and instability in China's policies cannot be disregarded, however. In the final analysis, the United States really has very limited leverage, and Peking's ultimate decisions regarding the Soviet relationship, domestic development strategy, and the détente itself are responsive to a dynamic that is relatively immune to US manipulation. Whether a new cultural revolution might again get out of hand in China, whether the Shanghai "radicals" will gain in influence, and whether Peking will give greater weight to ideological than to economic factors are all matters that the United States cannot predictably influence.

The foregoing sections have speculated that at a time of factional strife in China, demagogues or dogmatists could seize on the failure of Peking's moderate leadership to make progress toward the seizure of Taiwan in order to undermine China's détente strategy. This issue obviously involves the United States quite directly because of US diplomatic and security relations with Taiwan, but even here US leverage is limited. Additional steps by the United States to accommodate
to Peking's demands in regard to Taiwan, such as a phasing out of the US military presence and a scaling down of the US diplomatic establishment on Taiwan, would still leave Peking's ultimate aim of seizing the island unsatisfied and would therefore not eliminate Taiwan as an issue for potential factional exploitation.

The implications of the foregoing are straightforward. Since the direct effects upon US interests of a breakdown in the Sino-US détente would be serious only if hostilities developed, the continuing importance of deterrence, especially in regard to Taiwan, is obvious. Taiwan's defense capability, backed by the US commitment, will be the best insurance of China's continuing caution. If hostilities can be deterred, then the major vulnerability lies in the relationship between the United States and its most important Asian ally, Japan. This vulnerability calls for close US-Japanese consultation and encouragement of a consensus on strategic and diplomatic issues. It was the lack of consultation and consensus that caused the United States and Japan to pay a needlessly high price for the development of détente with China; if they are lacking again at a time when China might for whatever reasons abandon détente, the price to be paid might be even higher.

Otherwise, the limited US leverage means simply that the United States should be sensitive to opportunities that may develop from time to time to broaden the détente. It is entirely possible that the succession crisis will be accompanied by at least temporary manifestations of a harsher Chinese line toward the United States and its allies; in such a situation,

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the United States should not permit itself to be provoked into suspending what has already been accomplished in the development of détente with China. Even so, opportunities likely would again arise for reinforcing through trade and other means those factions in China that have a vested interest in moderate policies.
APPENDIX

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED AT SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27
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ISSUED AT SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces.
to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and
Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
--progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
--both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
--neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
--neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.