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COUNTERFORCE, CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AND CONFUSION: A COMMENT ON THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE,

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Just as mathematics is a language, so words are symbols and there is nothing to prevent verbal analysis from being every bit as logical and rigorous as formal mathematical analysis. But it is far easier with words than with formal mathematics to be illogical, just as it is perhaps easier with formal mathematics than with words to be irrelevant.

Milton Friedman

I. INTRODUCTION

The famous conference on "NATO, The Next Thirty Years," in Brussels on September 1-3, 1979, produced a great uproar because of Henry Kissinger's opening address. In consequence, the other papers at that conference were neglected. Now we can consider the Symposium as a whole, thanks to The Washington Quarterly. About one outstanding paper we need say little. Professor Samuel P. Huntington's "American Foreign Policy: The Changing Political Universe" presents an admirably succinct summation of trends in America, buttressed by solid evidence and apt synthesis that brought reassurance to Europe. He proved that American public opinion is moving toward support of a stronger military posture, which pleased our shaken allies.

Professor Michael Howard's "Social Change and the Defense of the West" is, to this reader, a classic. His scope is global, and his depth extends to historical trends measured by the centuries. He understands war, in all its complexity and horror, and, as a corollary, the resultant aversion in the West even to consider it. Yet never has the sensible case for conventional defense in NATO been put better, in terms that reduce vast complexities to straightforward common sense. Given my opening allusion to mathematics, Professor Howard achieves the ultimate accolade of elegance. We shall return to his paper.
II. NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

But I did not insert that mathematical allusion in order to compliment Howard's paper. At least two papers call for simple clarification by means of arithmetic. Both Henry Kissinger and Irving Kristol raised havoc in Europe, because they directly brought into question the nuclear guarantees to NATO that have been pledged by every American President for 30 years, as we shall see. Why did they do it, when the vast damage to NATO Europe was so obviously predictable? I speculate that they did it to shock our allies into making greater military efforts. But the result was the very opposite of what they wanted, because they were technically wrong. We must correct their errors.

Dr. Kissinger, of course, got all the headlines, because everyone knows that Nixon/Kissinger, and then Ford/Kissinger, conducted the foreign policy of the United States for eight years. What is central here, however, is the distinction between being a diplomat and diplomatic historian, which Dr. Kissinger is, and being a statistician. Nobody ever accused him of being a statistician, and Kissinger likes to joke about not being an economist. The big uproar in Brussels may well have been just a tempest in a teapot; although, granted, it was a big tempest, while the teapot in question is very valuable. Let us, therefore, consider his paper.

On p. 3, Kissinger states that:

Since the early 1960s, every new American administration that has come into office promises a new look at Europe, a re-appraisal and reassessment. Each of these efforts has found us more or less confirming what already existed and what had been created in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with just enough alliance adaptation to please the endlessly restless Americans who can never restrain themselves from new attempts at architecture....

I think the fact that in the late 1970s we are operating an alliance machinery and a force structure under a concept more or less unchanged from the 1950s should indicate that we have been depleting capital.
I disagree. "During the first phase [1949-1954] deterrence was largely based upon a conventional force designed to defend against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. . . . The second phase of NATO's deterrence strategy explicitly emerged in 1954 with Secretary Dulles' confirmation that the United States had adopted a strategy of massive retaliation. . . . a relatively lightly defended line of defense in Europe would in theory bring about a massive retaliation of U.S. nuclear force." Here you see the promise of the President of the United States to invoke massive nuclear retaliation, if necessary, to defend Europe. It is usually called the "strategic umbrella," and every American President in the last 30 years has made that promise.

In formal terms, "The Strategy of Massive Retaliation" was embodied in a Military Committee Document (MC-14/2) that was not formally approved by the North Atlantic Council until May 1957. However, the preceding MC-14/1 strategic concept had been approved by the Council in December 1952, and it in practice reflected the "massive retaliation concept." The astounding truth is that MC-14/3, "The Strategy of Flexible Response," was not adopted until December 1967.

To the 1949-1952 informal doctrine, and the formal three versions of MC-14, noted above, for a total of four versions, we must add three more vital changes. The fifth occurred when General Gruenther succeeded General Ridgeway as SACEUR. He changed the concept by a speech in January 1954:

If 70 divisions, for example, are needed to establish a conventional line of defense between the Alps and the Baltic, then 70 divisions minus X divisions equipped with atomic weapons would be needed.

The sixth change occurred when General Norstad, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), invented the "pause" in 1957, which modified "massive retaliation" and stressed the utility of conventional arms. That, of course, got him into a lot of trouble. He briefed NATO's Military Committee in December 1957 and forwarded his study to Washington. In theory, the Military Committee should have considered strategy and given official guidance to SACEUR. In practice, it was the other way around. Did President Eisenhower like the idea? No, he did not.
However, General Norstad's staff had done their homework well, so that he was well prepared to express his views. Their essence is conveyed by this quote:

The hard core of the West's military strength is its retaliatory forces. Their most powerful single element is the United States Strategic Air Command.

In spite of the retaliatory forces, there remains the possibility that war could start because the enemy made an error in judgment or took some reckless or opportunistic action. Because of this chance—rather, mischance—we cannot omit or skimp at any point along our eastern frontiers the defense strength which the Soviet threat dictates. For if our line is not defended throughout, the enemy might trump up a pretext for crossing it. We would then face not only an accomplished fact, but also a dilemma: If we did not take immediate action, we would fail to meet the commitments of the Alliance; if we did take it, we would start a war.

On the other hand, if our line is being held in reasonable strength, and if the enemy knows this beyond doubt, then any inclination on his part to cross the line makes him face the terrible decision of detonating World War III, with a sure prospect of his own annihilation. The defensive forces deployed on our eastern boundary thus become an essential part of the deterrent.7

The seventh change, of course, was the U.S. advocacy of "flexible response," after President Kennedy assumed office. Conventional forces were stressed, in order to avoid the necessity for NATO to "go nuclear first" merely because it lacked enough conventional strength. A running battle developed, in consequence, between the United States and her allies, which was not settled until NATO adoption of "Flexible Response" in December 1967. In sum, Kissinger (p. 3) says that "we are operating . . . under a concept more or less unchanged from the 1950s," and I say that the concept changed seven times in vital ways.

Did these changes matter, or are we discussing "strategic concepts" as if they were merely theology? The changes mattered very much for two reasons. First, as we have seen, they supplied an excuse for Europeans to slacken their military efforts, and they have become addicted to insufficient efforts. Second, when you change a "strategic concept," you alter the nature of the arms that should be purchased in major ways.
NATO nations have wasted staggering sums of money in buying weapon systems to fit one concept, only to find them of dubious merit when the concept changed.
III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

On p. 5, Kissinger says that "one can argue that the United States will not be in a position in which attacking the Soviet Strategic forces makes any military sense." He goes on (pp. 6-7):

Moreover our weapons had been deliberately designed, starting in the 1960s, so as to not threaten the weapons of the other side. Under the doctrine of "assured destruction," nuclear war became not a military problem but one of engineering; it depended on theoretical calculations of the amount of economic and industrial damage that one needed to inflict on the other side; it was therefore essentially independent of the forces the other side was creating.

This general theory suffered two drawbacks. One was that the Soviets did not believe it. And the other is that we have not yet bred a race of supermen that can implement it. . . .

And therefore I would say—what I might not say in office—that our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. Our strategic dilemma is not solved by verbal reassurances; it requires redesigning our forces and doctrine. [Italics added]

Kissinger therefore implied that (1), "when in office," Nixon/Kissinger and Ford/Kissinger had not told our allies the truth; (2) that our U.S. doctrine for sizing our nuclear forces, by using the criterion of "Mutual Assured Destruction," was identical with our strategy for employing our strategic forces; and (3) that "counterforce" objectives for employing our forces no longer made sense. He is wrong on all scores. Let's see why.

A strategic planner, like Defense Secretary Harold Brown, must simultaneously deal with (1) "sizing" the strategic forces of the 1990s via decisions now about development and production; and (2) with "employing" the strategic forces that he has inherited from the development and production decisions that his predecessors made, roughly speaking, a decade or more ago. Currently the "sizing" decisions are, and have been since the mid-1960s, determined mainly by the criterion of
"Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)." But the numerical tests to implement that criterion are so devised that, if the tests are applied properly, you will buy more strategic forces than will be needed for a MAD operational capability a decade hence. The "sizing" decisions apply the philosophy of modern statistical decisionmaking, under conditions of uncertainty. In McNamara's words:

When calculating the force required, we must be conservative in all our estimates of both a potential aggressor's capabilities and his intentions. Security depends upon assuming a worst plausible case, and having the capability to cope with it.

A "risk" is associated with recurring events that yield known probabilities, as, for example, the risk that you will be in a car accident during the course of a year. Insurance companies can measure such chances in the light of how many accidents there were last year. When they so measure the risk, they can establish a fair premium to be paid for your insurance, and you can shop around for the best deal.

Uncertainty is a very different thing. What is the probability of a thermonuclear war next year, given that one has never happened? The insurance companies have no evidence, so they are disinclined to issue insurance policies. Lloyd's of London, to be sure, may not mind gambling, but they are an exception to the rule. All Lloyd's has to do is to operate like a good gambling casino at Las Vegas. They establish a "betting line," and vary the price until they get as many people betting against the chance of war as they have people betting that it will happen. Then they establish a price which will ensure that the "house" makes money, whether there be war or peace. We are not joking. When a military professional speaks of taking a "calculated risk," he means that he is gambling, beclouded by genuine uncertainty, not insurable risk. Wars are like that. The point is simple but essential.

We need a numerical example. Let us consider "sizing" the bomber force, to carry cruise missiles years from now. Our left column in Table 1 gives our best estimate of expected performance, after a clever Soviet attack. Then Soviet submarines will be presumed to launch
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Performance</th>
<th>Pessimistic Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. P that missile-carrying bombers are available (not under repair)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. P that bombers get airborne before enemy missiles arrive</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. P that bombers survive to point where our cruise missiles are released</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. P that cruise missiles work</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. P that cruise missiles penetrate Russian air defenses</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. P that cruise missiles are accurate enough</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Multiply probabilities</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

missiles from the south at our bomber bases, timed to match the launch of Soviet missiles from the north.

Our right-hand column, in contrast, illustrates deliberately pessimistic but reasonable estimates. That right-hand column applies McNamara's point about using "a worst plausible case." To secure "high confidence" in our future capability, we need to buy a force that is big enough to be able to do its job even when the pessimistic numbers apply. We need to multiply the performance estimates in each column, as if each were a hurdle that must be leaped in turn by the remaining force. So let us look at Table 1. We assume, consistent with SALT II, that one B-52 can only carry 20 cruise missiles. The letter "P" stands for probability.

Suppose that you want the cruise missiles to destroy 200 targets, after you allow for the missiles that fail to do the job. If you use the numbers from the middle column above, then you buy 357 missiles \((357 \times 0.56 = 200)\), to be carried by 18 bombers. But the force size differs if we want to have high confidence about destroying those
200 Soviet targets. Then we look at the numbers in the right-hand column of Table 1. Using those numbers, we need to buy 12 times as many, or 4348 missiles [(4348) (.046) = 200], to be carried in 217 bombers.9

For our purposes here, let us leap to the 1990s, and assume that NATO in Europe is subjected to overwhelming nuclear attack, while America is not attacked. If, in the 1980s we bought 217 missile-carrying bombers, each with 20 missiles, we would have 4340 cruise missiles. We expect their performance to be measured by the left column in Table 1, except that one number changes. The probability of getting the ready bombers airborne rises, by definition, to 1.0 from the 0.8 estimate. Suppose that we launch half of our 4340 missiles at Soviet military targets, responding to Dr. Kissinger's desire (p. 7) for a "counterforce capability." We keep the other half of the 4340 missiles in reserve, for bargaining power. Now how many targets do we hit?

Well, if we multiply our left column, after the one change, we get a probability of (0.694) for each missile. Multiplied by the 2170 missiles that we launch, we can hit 1507 targets. Let's make them military targets, not cities. As we only wanted to be very sure about killing 200 targets, we get a 7.5 "overkill"; plus the threat of those other 2170 missiles that we held in reserve.

Now Russian planners understand the point. That explains why no sensible mass Soviet attack would be aimed solely at NATO Europe, because such an attack would leave the United States with such awesome untouched strategic retaliatory forces, which could be applied against purely military targets if our Commander-in-Chief sensibly ordered a large retaliatory attack. Or he might use a smaller "Limited Nuclear Option (LNO)" retaliation.10 Remember, we have to add also our untouched ICBM force, plus our submarine-launched missiles, to fit this scenario. Our response then should be a "city-sparing" attack, because we want to leave their cities as "hostages" to us.

A "city-sparing" attack, by definition, is a "counterforce attack." The other half of the definition is that we should retain, in strategic reserve, an ample capability that we could use against Russian "hostage" cities if we had to use them. The capability for such a "counterforce attack," in this scenario, we already possess. So our European allies
should be reassured about our continuing capability to deter an overwhelming attack that would be confined to the European land mass.

Moreover, our same numerical example can be used, in reverse, to reinforce the point that our strategic "umbrella" is much stronger than Kissinger implies. All the reader has to do is look at the same table, assuming that it applies to a Russian strategic planner. The Russian planner, like the American planner, will want to have high confidence in the performance of his forces. Accordingly, the Russian planner will "size" his strategic forces by using a similar right-hand column of estimates.

Suppose the Russian political leaders ask him, a decade hence, whether he can certainly destroy all of the American retaliatory forces. His answer will have to be no. He will probably add that he expects that the Russian forces could do a good job, but that there is no way to guarantee certainty about the results. That will give the Politburo a very disturbing outlook. Precipitating a nuclear war is a very grave and scary business. Mutual nuclear deterrence is thus much more stable than Kissinger implies.

Our numerical example, and Kissinger's own words, suggest that he never has understood the evolution of the "Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)" for using our strategic forces. In office, it appears, he did nothing to change it. Nor does he appear to understand strategic defense, which led him to negotiate a bad SALT-I agreement. In his words (p. 10), he now appears to agree with his critics:

By 1970, when we had an ABM program, however inadequate, it was the only subject the Soviet Union was willing to discuss with us in SALT. When we gave up the B-1 bomber, we asked the Soviets to make a reciprocal gesture. We have yet to see it. When we gave up the neutron weapon, we were told that this was in correlation with the deployment of the SS-20. (If so, the result was in inverse correlation with the SS-20.) And now we are told that of course we are all for theater nuclear forces, but first let us have another effort at negotiation. I saw a report about a distinguished American senator returning from Moscow the other day who said: "It is virtually certain that cruise missiles will be deployed and that NATO will undertake a build-up of its own unless negotiations to a new treaty are begun soon." If this is our position, all the Soviets have to do is to begin a
negotiation to keep us from doing what they are already doing, negotiation or no negotiation.

Such a version of détente leads to unilateral disarmament for the West.

My technological colleagues have estimated that, in a relative comparison, we were more than 10 years ahead of the Soviets in ABM defenses when SALT I was negotiated. We therefore had, in negotiating SALT I, a very powerful "bargaining chip." We should have used it, in my opinion, to get much better reciprocal concessions from the Soviets.

I do not want to be misunderstood. Neither Dr. Kissinger, our military leaders, nor I are complacent about our strategic posture. We must worry seriously about another unlikely but extremely important "scenario"; namely, a Soviet nuclear attack aimed concurrently at Europe and the United States. When Dr. Kissinger asks for a higher defense budget, as he did in his testimony about SALT II, I reserve my right to argue about its magnitude and composition. But, in principle, I agree with him. This is no time to waste our energies in fruitless debate about who shares what blame, at what time, for past sins of omission and commission. It is a time to act together to mend our defenses and our diplomacy.

In sum, however, if we use the proper statistician's test for high confidence in procurement decisions now, even if tested by a "Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)" criterion, we will buy a force for use a decade later that will be ample for flexible use in a variety of situations, in appropriately different ways, as the Commander-in-Chief may choose to use it. That force should also have qualitative attributes for flexible employment. If, however, you use a low confidence criterion for purchasing a "MAD" capability, our President in the 1990s will find that his force is so small that it cannot be flexibly used. He will be in deep trouble. I like the way George F. Will put it (Newweek, October 1, 1979): "Let not thy will roar, when thy power can but whisper."

As every U.S. Secretary of Defense since 1962 has applied this simple test and sought "counterforce capabilities," we need merely to read their once-classified statements:
Extract from FY 1964 Posture Statement of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara

By building into our forces a flexible capability, we at least eliminate the prospect that we could strike back in only one way, namely, against the entire Soviet target system including their cities.

Extract from FY 1970 Posture Statement of Secretary of Defense
Clark M. Clifford

Our major hope for limiting damage if a nuclear war occurs is that it can be stopped short of an all-out attack on our cities. We try to bring this about by providing our forces with characteristics that will permit them to be used effectively in a limited and controlled retaliation.

Extract from FY 1973 Posture Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird

We design our forces so that we have strategic alternatives. This means capabilities that enable us to carry out an appropriate response without necessarily resorting to mass urban and industrial destruction.

Extract from FY 1974 Posture Statement of Secretary of Defense
Elliot L. Richardson

In particular, it is our goal to be able to respond to a nuclear attack without having to resort to mass urban and industrial destruction in retaliation.

However, you should read the entire Hearings, because the Secretary of Defense at that time, James R. Schlesinger, did more than any Secretary of Defense since McNamara to generate "city-sparing" (counter-force) capabilities. As his colleague at The Rand Corporation, I know that he was determined to do whatever he could to implement this modification in our planning for strategic forces. Even foreign scholars were quick to discern the change when Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense.

Currently, Secretary Harold Brown puts pure "city-attacks" third in his list of strategic force requirements:

first, to maintain the second-strike forces necessary to attack a comprehensive set of targets, including targets of political and military as well as of economic value;
second, to withhold retaliation against selected targets;
third, to cover at all times a sizeable percentage of the
Soviet economic base, so that these targets could be
destroyed, if necessary;
and fourth, to hold the elements of a reserve force for a
substantial period after a strategic exchange. 15
IV. FOREIGN REACTIONS

Naturally, Kissinger's European audience was upset: "The general reaction by senior European officials and experts ranged from one of anger to dismay. . . . Your former Secretary of State has implied that he was a liar while he was in office, and that your President, your current Secretary of State, and your current Secretary of D- fense are liars now. . . . What do we, the British, and Germans do--admit that General DeGaulle was right? . . . this is word after word of abdication without defining a reason for hope. . . . In little more than an hour, Henry Kissinger managed to virtually destroy the credibility of extended deterrence, to describe NATO theater nuclear forces as totally inadequate, to provide a throw-away wholesale condemnation of NATO's conventional posture. . . ."16

And, to be sure, the Frenchmen who have preached that one must have a nuclear retaliatory force of one's own, because the U.S. nuclear guarantee had seemingly been incapable of protecting allies, were quick to chortle. As but one example, Michel Jobert, Foreign Minister of France from April 1973 to May 1974, was quick to write "Ah, Mr. Kissinger, We Agree"; beginning with "Thank you [Kissinger] for finally saying out loud what I've been saying in public for years."17 But that conclusion does not follow, because Kissinger was wrong, as we have seen.

More specifically, Uwe Nerlich's paper on "Theater Nuclear Forces" at the Conference puts the issue starkly:

The SALT process had three enormous advantages for the Soviet Union. First, it provided a pretext for major Soviet strategic force improvements without jeopardizing the American framework for the pursuit of stability; second, it denied the United States any strategic utility, both in terms of flexibility and superior qualities, thereby driving NATO further into a posture of self-deterrence; and third, it kept the United States and Western European governments committed to a process that led increasingly to unilateral constraints inside, as well as outside, the framework of ongoing negotiations.18
Given that a comment about all of the papers would be much too long, however, we must neglect most of them. The issue of "theater nuclear modernization" was raised by Nerlich and other papers as well as by Kissinger. However, so much is happening about that topic, with more to come, that papers can easily be overtaken by events. The comprehensive coverage of Uwe Nerlich's paper, in particular, and my forthcoming paper, have already suffered this fate. A later detailed consideration must be undertaken, given the gravity of the subject. Nerlich's paper has the most thorough documentation of materials that were relevant to Helmut Schmidt's celebrated Alastair Buchan Memorial Speech of 1977. Every student of the topic should read his paper, whether he agrees with him or not. I disagree in part.

As this paper is concerned with technical aspects of nuclear weapons that do have major political implications for NATO Europe, however, let us consider some of Nerlich's technical points. He says that (pp. 109-110):

Soviet nuclear counterdeterrence in the early 1960s was put off by sheer quantities. While the United States no longer had an adequate employment doctrine, American intercontinental capabilities as well as short-range theatre nuclear forces turned out to be clearly superior in numbers to corresponding Soviet forces.

While then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's annually celebrated ratio of American strategic superiority replaced usable strategic options, superior short-range TNFs were somehow seen to provide NATO with an advantageous first-strike capability. This kept U.S. strategic posture essentially unchanged except for modernization and an increase in warheads after the decision to go ahead with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—the only major American strategic force decision after March 1961.

A German scholar like Nerlich should be very interested in the change in American intercontinental employment capabilities between March 1961 and June 1962. Why? The Berlin Crisis of 1961 became acute on August 13, 1961, with the "sealing off" of West Berlin from East Berlin by the infamous Wall, with dire threats against NATO.
The revised SIOP, with its five options to replace one option, plus suboptions, was not officially adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until January 1962; and the new target lists were not adopted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff until June 1962. The intent and capability for "city-sparing" attacks were not, in short, available to meet the Berlin Crisis in 1961. They were available to meet the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The import is obvious. Yet Nerlich (p. 111), in discussing the early 1960s, speaks about "the neutralization of major SIOP options in regional contingencies."

Further, Nerlich (p. 119) asserts that:

In the early 1960s the United States opted for delayed massive retaliation and flexible substitution, relying essentially on superior quantity. The numbers game has not paid off, and negotiations are bringing it to a close.

Let us, therefore, briefly discuss quality as well as quantity. The new options required many qualitative changes. But we need not belabor the point, as 18 years of qualitative improvements have served to reinforce the credibility of American nuclear guarantees to our allies.

A scenario in which the Soviets launch mass attacks on Europe, but not at America, is an "easy" scenario for our strategic planners. Then, for example, the more accurate our missiles and bombers are, for "silodestruction" missions, and the like, the better off we are for deterrence and defense. For a scenario in which one postulates a global Soviet nuclear attack, some strategists have argued that inaccuracy is a virtue, not a vice, because somehow it "stabilizes" the global balance. That perennial debate between "stabilizers" who want less quality, not more, continues. But opponents in this argument can agree that, for the "Europe only" attack scenario, qualitative improvements are a virtue.

Here Kissinger (pp. 6-7) presents a cogent argument for quality, and, in my opinion, he is absolutely correct. Or (p. 10), again I agree: "We need a credible strategy; we need an agreed strategy and we need to build urgently the required forces." In a different paper, Howard puts the same good point even more forcefully:
If nuclear war breaks out at all, it is quite likely to break out here. And in Europe such a conflict would involve not simply an exchange of nuclear missiles at intercontinental range, but a struggle between armed forces for the control of territory, and rather thickly populated territory. The interest displayed by Soviet writers in the conduct of such a war, which some writers in the West find so sinister, seems to me no more than common sense. If such a war does occur, the operational and logistical problems it will pose will need to have been thoroughly thought through. It is not good enough to say that the strategy of the West is one of deterrence, or even of crisis management. It is the business of the strategist to think what to do if deterrence fails, and if Soviet strategists are doing their job and those in the West are not, it is not for us to complain about them.
V. CONVENTIONAL ARMS

But I referred to Professor Howard's Conference paper as a classic, so let us close by seeing why it merits this distinction. What questions are always put to anyone who seeks NATO preparedness for credible deterrence and defense? People ask why, and how, war could ever again afflict Europe, and why they should spend money on conventional arms. Howard supplies the answers:

For whether they had predatory intentions or not, the cold hostility of the Soviet leadership to the West was made unmistakably clear after the Second World War, and there is no sign that it has ever abated. . . [Still] it is probably many years since Western Europe presented itself to them as an attractive, even if an attainable, prize. It is not only the strength of the locks on their doors that protects aging spinsters from rape. . . .

But we should be wary of drawing too much comfort from the best-case analysis presented above. It has to be pointed out that, in disorderly societies, aged spinsters do get raped. . . .

The Soviet Union would undertake the invasion and occupation of Western Europe without enthusiasm . . . the attack would be improbable unless the Soviet military could promise rapid success without nuclear escalation, and the alternative appeared to be the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. But it is in precisely these circumstances that wars usually begin . . . it will remain the task of Western military leaders to ensure that their Soviet opposite numbers are never in a position to give such advice to their political masters, and their own political masters must provide them with the means to do so.

I could never say it that well, nor agree more completely. But in Europe, I was once so ungracious to my hosts as to say the following:

If ever your country needs rescue, owing to a neglect of conventional defenses, better that it should be by a [nuclear] surgeon than by a butcher. These harsh terms are deliberate, for the purpose of clarity rather than shock. 24
Howard's advice is sound; Kissinger's exposition of American nuclear employment policy is wrong, which explains why I could make the above remark; and sound NATO cooperative action can still protect us from a huge threat if we act.
Appendix

SALT COMPLICATIONS

Now, unfortunately, we have to complicate our calculations, if we ratify the SALT II Treaty. Our missiles that are "MIRVed" are limited to 1200 by Paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty. However, Paragraph 1 permits us to add 120 bombers that "carry cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers," if we deploy 1200 MIRVed missiles, for a total of 1320 MIRVed missiles and 2400 cruise missiles carried by 120 B-52s. Accordingly, in our example, do we want the maximum permissible MIRVed missiles, in which case we reduce our missile-basing bombers from 217 to 120? If we do, our air-delivered cruise missiles whether they carry nuclear or nonnuclear warheads, will have to be reduced from 4348 missiles to 2400 missiles. Or, if we want to keep the 217 bombers, with their 4348 cruise missiles, we shall have to reduce our "MIRVed" missile force from 1200 to 1103 missiles. Which mix do we prefer, within the "MIRVed" subceiling of 1320 missiles?

Our plan to buy bombers that carry cruise missiles is not finally settled, so perhaps we shall buy the full 1200 "MIRVed" missiles. "By the mid-1980s the U.S. will have only about 700 non-MIRVed delivery vehicles to count against those permitted. If B-52 Hs are converted to cruise missile carriers, the non-MIRVed count would drop to about 600 and the overall delivery vehicle count would be 1900. The Soviets are expected to deploy the full force permitted [2250 vehicles]" or 350 more missiles than we plan to buy.\textsuperscript{25}

Now that numerical estimate may upset some supporters of SALT II. Formerly they could argue that each side gets "parity" at 2250 vehicles each, even if Soviet missiles are much bigger than ours. But for Fiscal Year 1981, Secretary Brown plans to reduce active strategic forces by 56 vehicles.\textsuperscript{26} How does he get a higher total number? He adds in the 220 old (1950 models) B-52s that are in "deep storage" in Arizona, when he discusses SALT II Limitations.\textsuperscript{27} The Soviets' total, for them to reach at least 2250 vehicles, includes nothing that is in deep storage, unless it is hidden. Secretary Brown can reduce our "deep storage" B-52s, and he is destroying 33 of them.\textsuperscript{28}
FOOTNOTES


3. Rowny, ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 167.

5. Robert E. Osgood, op. cit., p. 109. That "70 division" number, however, was only a hypothetical illustration. It was not the old force goal, which was 45 divisions. See A. Buchan, NATO in the 1960s (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1960), p. 86.


8. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 53. In the early 1960s McNamara was able to "size" the force to have a greater capability for "Damage-Limitation" as well as MAD. However, the expansion of Soviet strategic forces, and his inability to persuade the American populace to undertake civil defense measures, led McNamara to abandon the second test. McGeorge Bundy correctly mentioned this second test in his rebuttal of Kissinger's speech, but wrongly argued that President Kennedy and President Johnson did not believe in it. Neither President can comment now. But Bundy praises Nixon/Kissinger for abandoning any goal of "strategic superiority," and I disagree. So does the "new" Kissinger. See Survival (November/December 1979), pp. 270-271.

9. As we do not wish to complicate matters here by applying SALT II rules, we shall address them in the Appendix.

10. For an explanation of LNOs, see the Staff Report, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, SALT and the NATO Allies (October 1979, p. 5).

11. David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, Seventh Printing), on p. 151, documents that charge. Landau seems to know the subject, as he speaks about modifying the 1962 SIOP. The 1962 SIOP was fundamentally changed from the 1960 SIOP. See Desmond Ball, "Vita Nuova: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration," California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (December 1974).
12. "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies," Hearing, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 4, 1974.
14. See, in particular, Desmond Ball, op. cit.
15. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Department of Defense, Annual
16. Bridget Gail, "NATO, Kissinger, and the Future of Strategic
Deterrence," Armed Forces Journal (November 1979), pp. 58
forward.
extremist: "Likewise, to agree to install French atomic weapons
in Germany, or to agree to man a sector, on the Czechoslovak
border or elsewhere, as proposed in NATO plans, would be
similarly irresponsible." Fortunately, Jobert cannot speak
as the official voice of France. If he did, we could only
ask, "With allies like this, who needs enemies?" But American
speeches should help Jobert's opponents in France, not his
supporters.
19. Malcolm W. Hoag, Forward Based Nuclear Systems in Historical
21. Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs,
Documenta on Berlin, 1945-1963 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963),
pp. 266-291.
Affairs (Summer 1979), pp. 982-983.
24. Malcolm W. Hoag, "One American Perspective on Nuclear Guarantees,
Proliferation, and Related Alliance Diplomacy," in Johan J.
Holst, ed., Security, Order, and the Bomb (Norway: Hestholms
27. Ibid., p. 40.