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NATIONALISM: A LESSON FROM GERMAN HISTORY,

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NATIONALISM: A LESSON FROM GERMAN HISTORY

by

LTC Henry G. Gole

Just as military professionals and political wise men writing in our leading publications were deploring the apparent unwillingness of American society to turn its attention from purely private pursuits to matters concerning the nation, recent events in the Persian Gulf area activated latent reserves of American patriotism. The society which recently echoed with anti-war shouts saw chauvinistic demonstrations, profane buttons and bumper stickers damning Iran's holy man and, alas, the burning of flags other than ours. Young Americans raised fists while demanding military action in terms as vehement as those used—wasn't it yesterday?—to get our government to pull American troops out of another foreign land. Was this merely a transient mood filled with sound and fury, so much empty bluster, or was it a realization that soldier-baiting must be set aside when vital national interests are at stake?

* * * *

The history of our century is filled with such turn-about. One must resist the temptation to view contemporary events as completely unprecedented, especially when similarities can be found in the events of only yesterday. Both World Wars were preceded by broadly based pacifist movements. Current American public opinion is probably no more volatile than that found in, for example, Britain before the Second World War.
In February of 1933 the undergraduates of the Oxford Union pronounced that:
"This House would refuse under any circumstances to fight for King and Country."\(^1\)
While votes in the Union are based on the quality of the debate rather than on the specific issue, contemporary British policy reflected the mood expressed. Nevertheless, six years later young Britons fought well and died well. There is a certain irony in the fact that the resolution was made just weeks after Hitler came to power in Germany, but it did clearly express the attitude of many in the Western World during the crises in Abyssinia, Spain, the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and in such a far away place as Manchuria.

On the other side of the Atlantic, on September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act (the Burke-Wadsworth Bill) authorized a peacetime program of compulsory military service. This belated recognition of an uncongenial world was made possible psychologically and politically by the events of 1939-40 in Poland, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain and by Japanese aggression in the Far East. These events would force reconsideration of US noninvolvement dating from the Senate's rejection of US membership in the League of Nations after the Great War. From Warren G. Harding's inaugural address, in which he said:
"We seek no part in directing the destinies of the world,"\(^2\) to President Roosevelt's September 3, 1939 declaration: "This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well,"\(^3\) we see that the US attempt to hold the world at arm's length failed to prevent rascals from being rascals. In brief, to paraphrase the immortal statement of former heavyweight champion Joe Louis, we could run but we couldn't hide.

It has always been difficult for a great power to hide. Action, decisive and swift, is what the world expects of a great power. The components of power include human factors more difficult to measure than the material factors which lend themselves to relatively easy quantification. How can one measure will, the readiness
to act out of conviction or need, to pay a price for something seemingly worth that price? How do people decide what their very lives are worth? When do they subordinate private or class interests to collective concern for national security? When does the appeal of nation dwarf all other considerations?

Interesting in precisely this connection is the question of allegiance faced by German Socialists in the decades before the First World War, a question answered in August of 1914 when the party of peace voted for war credits, and workers—who had vowed that never again would worker face worker over bayonets—not only marched to the sounds of the guns but did so with joy in their hearts.  

* * * *

The tension caused by the simultaneous attraction of a vibrant German nationalism and a great hope for universal peace, manifested in the international socialist movement in the years before 1914, found its release in the declaration of war. The emotional release was powerfully expressed by Konrad Haenisch, a German radical socialist, in these words:

The conflict of two souls in one breast was probably easy for none of us...I shall never forget the day and the hour—the terrible tension was resolved; until one dared to be what one was; until—despite all principles and wooden theories—one could, for the first time in almost a quarter century, join with a full heart, a clean conscience and without a sense of treason in the sweeping, stormy song: Deutschland, Deutschland, Uber alles.

This unashamed expression of patriotism stands in stark contrast to the confidence expressed just months before by Jean Jaures, the French Socialist leader, as war clouds gathered:

Don't worry, the Socialists will do their duty...four million German Socialists will rise like one man and execute the Kaiser if he wants to start a war.

In retrospect one might well ask how the realistic Jaures could be so wrong, but that question fails to take into account the strength of the hope nurtured by Socialists early in this century. And, lest one is tempted to regard the Germans
of 1914 as the hawks and the French the doves, Jaures was murdered for his brotherly attitude by a French nationalist as European armies mobilized in August of 1914.

From its founding in 1889 until its demise in 1914 the Second International shared the spirit of progress that seemed to pervade the age, an age so civilized that war seemed impossible. This spirit was shared by the German Socialists who, indeed, were the stoutest pillar upon which the International was built. There was a logic in the hope for peace. History told the Socialists of 1889 that the blood shed on the battlefields was rarely the blood of princes, bankers, or industrialists. Why should workers die for the unshared profits of capitalism? Perhaps it was ever so. Perhaps cannon fodder has always been found in the inarticulate masses by those who did not bleed but profited from the efforts of others. But now, one could reason at the turn of the century, there was a profound difference: the masses were no longer inarticulate and powerless. Socialism was no longer a mere notion for salon discussions or an experiment to be conducted by dreamers. It was the creed for masses of workers who knew what was good for them. If nothing else was clear in the confused world of mass industrialization, certainly it was clear that the slaughter of worker by worker made no sense. Hope allied with numbers, organization, leadership—and a sense of purpose.

The cause was just, and the champions were many. Peace was the goal, and a mass movement was on the march. Yet, in 1914 the German worker, like the workers in other lands, answered the call to colors and marched with his countrymen off to the trenches. Well might he ask with his French brother:

How is it possible that I, an anti-patriot, anti-militarist, who acknowledged only the International, come to be attacking my companions in misery and perhaps shall die for my enemies against my own cause and my own interest?

How was it possible? What had gone wrong?
The first answer to come to mind is quite simple and plausible: nationalism defeated socialism. Despite the rhetoric of the Second International, when ideals came into conflict with reality the ideals were discarded. The attraction of Blut, Volk and Land overpowered feelings of Party and Class. The brotherhood of the nation stirred men more than the association of workers. Theory surrendered to the martial sound of drums. This answer is attractive, but it over-simplifies a complex relationship. It would be more accurate to say that socialism married nationalism. The wedding was kept secret until the war began. The complete identification of the working man with the State was not fully appreciated until the war was joined.

On the eve of the First World War the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) could look back upon a record of 50 years which had witnessed such continuous growth of the party that the outcome seemed inevitable: in the near future the workers would be the State. While socialism reached further back into German history, the years of great success can be measured from 1875. In that year two wings of socialism, the Lassallean and Eisenacher organizations, merged at Gotha to form the party—a party which promised "... a legal and peaceful but unending, incessant agitation for the introduction of universal and direct suffrage" united with a Marxian party of revolution.8 The fundamental contradiction inherent in this union has often been cited, but the party grew in strength.9 Practical and ideological differences were patched over, if not permanently resolved. Revolution would be unnecessary if enough voters rallied to the Socialist cause through a democratic process. On the surface the simple solution seemed to work. However, "the conflict between revolutionary dialectics and evolutionary-democratic philosophy was always present and continually threatened the organizational unity of the movement."10
Ferdinand LaSalle, founder of the General German Workers' Association, abhorred violence, opposed the use of force and preached that the success of the movement was to be achieved through the state and not over its dead body. Social reform by the state was to be achieved through universal manhood suffrage. Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel, leaders of the radical wing of the SPD, were jailed for two years for agitation against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and for favoring an honorable peace with France. Such were the divergencies in the history of the SPD from the beginning. It is not surprising that the solid middle class citizen, who was proud to call himself a nationalist, saw anarchists, socialists and unionists as one amorphous collection of unsavory radicals conspiring against the nation.

The Socialists were outlawed in 1878. Bismarck used an assassination attempt upon the life of William I, for which the Socialists were not responsible, to force anti-Socialist legislation through the Reichstag. This legislation was to remain in effect until 1890. During the 12 years of Socialist persecution its journals in Germany were closed down, its leaders were harrassed by police and its organization, with the exception of the elected Reichstag members, was forced underground. At first the Socialist vote suffered, but then it rose sharply despite the seemingly unfavorable circumstances forced by the legal controls. The party apparatus, since it was forced underground, required a high degree of organization and central control to survive, characteristics which became permanently associated with the German Socialist movement.

The SPD emerged from the long period of persecution stronger than ever before but with a need to take stock of where it was and where it was going. A compromise made at the Party Conference in Erfurt in 1891 allowed a new spirit, a more positive approach to parliamentarism, an attitude which was to shift the center of gravity further to the right while still holding right wing Revisionists and left wing
Radicals together in a single party. Wilhelm Liebknecht addressed the Congress and said:

If so far we have not achieved results in the Reichstag, that is not the fault of parliamentarism: it is simply the consequence of our not yet having in the country, among the people, the necessary power... To say this is not to maintain that every question can be solved by legislation; but let someone show me any other road that leads to our goal! I know there is another road which, in view of a few among us, is shorter—that of violence,... but that road leads to Anarchism.... The essence of revolution lies not in the means but in the end...

This was heresy for a Marxist, and this is the same Liebknecht who, in 1869, as a spokesman for the Eisenach Party, saw the legislature as an arena "chiefly for propagandistic reasons" and a place to "maintain a negative attitude towards the work of parliament." The conversion of the elder Leibknecht from doctrinal Marxism to a more evolutionary point of view can be explained primarily in terms of success at the ballot box. A winner sees no point in changing the game, and the SPD was looking more and more like a winner. The shift in view suggests that, since the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws in Germany, the SPD had taken on the character less of a proletarian party waging a revolutionary struggle against the state and more a movement of voters willing to work for social and economic reform within the existing framework of government.

There were still those of the left, Rosa Luxemburg unrelentingly so, who believed that socialism could become a government party only on the ruins of the bourgeois State. But Bebel, the political leader, and Karl Kautsky, the master theorist, held the party together. They were ready to use the tactics of opportunism for day to day gains rather than awaiting or creating the circumstances necessary for a single act to seize power. The implications of such a course were not then clear.

The decision to work in the Reichstag was indicative of a conviction now held by an increasing number of German Socialists: society might be transformed
from capitalism to socialism without benefit of the "inevitable" revolution. The
left did not willingly surrender dogma, and there were practical problems which
necessarily followed. Success in parliament depends not only upon cooperation
with sworn enemies, but upon a position of strength measured by the number of seats
occupied by Socialists. Seats in parliament require votes at the polls, and more
votes were obtainable only by broadening the base of the electorate. None of
this disturbs the true democrat, but the first compromise of the Socialists soon
led them to court the nonindustrial vote. Fresh tactics were required, for
example, to win the peasant vote of Bavaria, tactics which would conflict ever
more frequently with the teachings of Marx. Peasants have rarely listened with
enthusiasm to speeches promising the confiscation of their land. Furthermore,
Trade Unionists thrill less to the promise of workers' blood in the streets than
do intellectuals planning the blood-letting over a cognac in a salon. Broadening
the base of the Socialist electorate sharpened the differences between the wings
of the Party.

In the course of the 1890's the party traveled the long distance to quasi-
respectability by a series of compromises. Its image was transformed from that
of bomb thrower to that of a legitimate, if troublesome, member of the Reichstag.
Perhaps it is impossible to pose as the champion of peace in the international
arena while talking of violent revolution and civil war at home. It would seem
as indecent to kill a German postman as a French worker-soldier. In any event
it was possible for the Hanover Congress of 1899 to pass a resolution stating:

Without being under any illusion about the nature and essence of the
bourgeois parties...the socialist Party does not refuse, in this or
that particular case, combined action with certain of them... The
party, however preserves everywhere in its activities its entire
autonomy and its independence, and regards each success it makes as
but a step which brings it nearer to its final goal."

Edward Bernstein's *Evolutionary Socialism* provided a philosophical alternative
to Marxism and was recognized by the left as a threat to the old socialism. In
his book, Bernstein, among other heresies, allows for the probability of success through evolution. Conditions were not getting worse for the worker; they were improving. "I consider the middle class, not excepting the German, to be in the main fairly healthy, not only economically, but also morally." The horned oppressor of the worker, it seems, is not a bad fellow. We come to a point at which we might ask if the SPD was conquering the State or the State the SPD? 

To select the exact point at which socialism consciously joined the nation is quite impossible. That it did in fact join was obvious to all in 1914, but the process had been camouflaged by rhetoric during the two decades before the guns of August. Bernstein eased the assimilation.

As little as it is to be desired that any other of the great civilized nations should lose its independence, so little can it be a matter of indifference to German Social Democracy whether the German nation, which has performed, and is performing, its honorable part in the work of civilizing the world, should be kept down in the councils of the nations.

Nationalism influenced workers as it did all good Germans. An army, a navy, colonies, and all of the other trappings of national prestige in the late 19th century were as attractive to a German worker as they were to a British shoemaker whose drab existence was cheered by the thought that the sun never set on the Empire.

Even the army served a Socialist purpose, according to Bernstein. The larger the German army grew, the more it had to be composed of workers and the less responsive would it be to offensive war. But few armies have had policy decisions made by workers; statesmen and generals were making the policy and formulating the plans.

Colonies not only made bankers fat but also served the worker, according to Bernstein:
The assumption that colonial expansion will hinder the achievement of Socialism rests at bottom on the utterly outmoded notion that this achievement depends on the steady narrowing of the circle of the wealthy and on the increasing misery of the poor.  

Colonies became identified with wealth, German wealth in which the worker shared. Besides, great nations have a civilizing mission to assist "lesser breeds." It was unfair to expect the British and French to bear the White Man's Burden alone.

Bernstein's views were not shared by all German Socialists for he raised too many basic heresies and directly threatened the left, the repository of the true faith. Nevertheless, he was not drummed out of the party nor was he regarded as a "bad comrade" or a renegade. Revisionism failed to alter official dogma, but it influenced the party's mode of action and the thinking of those directing policy. Revisionism coincided with the deeds of the party, if not with official dogma.

The interest of the proletariat was not so easily separated from the interest of the State in this new and complex world of industry, international markets and raw materials. Paul Lensch contended that "...internationalism hasn't the slightest cause to help perpetuate this British suzerainty of one capitalist state over all the others." Another could say: "The necessity obtains that everywhere where the German government actually champions the equality of our industry we must stand behind it. That lies in the interest of the proletariat." Obviously this concern was for the German proletariat. It seems that the horizontal lines of class distinction were, at times, less distinct than political boundaries.

If militarism and aggressive war were sinful, the same was not true of defense. Perhaps on this atavistic level, the question of survival, we finally come to the central issue, the issue which begins to pin-point the question of allegiance in the show-down. In 1897 at the Hamburg Congress, Max Schippel put it in basic
terms: "If one cannot prevent wars, nevertheless one cannot give our soldiers bad rifles, bad cannon." After all, soldiers are workers in uniform, and Socialist ministers in the Reichstag cannot let down Socialists in the field when it comes to voting military funds. It was one thing to denounce the Chinese Expedition of 1900, the Baghdad Railway concessions, and activities in Africa or Alsace-Lorraine as imperialistic, but defense was a different matter.

It is self-evident that no Social Democrat thinks of leaving the Empire defenseless, but we are resolved with all our power to fight against the lust for conquest that is beginning to appear among our people. Nevertheless, we hold it self-evident that it is our duty to defend and protect our culture against any thieving assault... The accusation that the Social Democrats are devoid of patriotism is absurd.

The charge of being rascals without a Fatherland hurt. The fear of invasion by hordes of barbarians from the East touched a Socialist nerve. Defense was, of course, a sacred duty.

The election campaign of 1907 was waged on the basis of the "traitorous Reds" vs. the Kaiser's vigorous foreign policy. The bourgeois parties worked together and inflicted losses upon the socialists. As a result it seemed that fewer anti-national and anti-imperialist speeches were in order. But was it only a tactic? August Bebel must be taken at his word when he says:

The soil of Germany, the German Fatherland belongs to us the masses as much and more than to the others. If Russia, the champion of terror and barbarism went to attack Germany to break and destroy it, we are as much concerned as those who stand at the head of Germany.

Thus far we have concentrated on the intramural struggle within the SPD as it gradually moved toward the right from revolution to evolution, from pure negativism to a spirit of greater cooperation in the Reichstag. It is time to glance at the role of German Socialism in the international Socialist movement.

It seems undeniable that a sincere belief in the community of interest among the proletariat of Western Europe existed, a belief which would render war
impossible. A sincere belief translated into an excellent plan properly executed can result in success. The Second International progressed no further than the belief.

A plan to scuttle national attempts at mobilization was made, but it was not accepted by the International for a sound reason. The most powerful member party was the SPD, and the SPD opposed the general strike. From 1904 until 1914 the chief theme at the International Congresses would be: what could the International do to prevent war? The most frequent answer was the general strike, but as early as the SPD's Congress at Jena (1905) a French journalist would comment upon "the peaceful disposition of the German Socialists..." The trade unions were willing to send the workers out on strike for concrete goals which the worker could understand: wages, hours and working conditions. But the thought of thousands of families going hungry for abstract political principles was less appealing, and there was doubt that the German workers would respond to an ideological call to action. Bebel was caught between the heel-dragging trade union leaders and the shoving of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. At the Jena Congress, the latter, in a passionate speech, reminded the assembly that there was a Revolution going on in Russia. Bebel admitted that he found himself looking at his boots to see if the blood had soaked them, but he knew that the mass of workers so carefully nurtured to make the party the strongest in Europe would neither strike for an ideal nor out of sympathy for foreigners.

The International in Stuttgart (1907) was the first to be held on German soil. Here, it was hoped, the issue of preventing war would be faced and solved. A foreign observer, Domela Nieuwenhuis, was to comment accurately on the German mood:

I was excited at meeting personally German Social Democracy which I for years had only known, and dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders, from its quibbling hair-splitting quarrels about the exegesis of Karl Marx. Now I've seen the German proletarians in the streets of Stuttgart. My naive illusions are destroyed. They are all good, contented and satisfied Spiessburger.
To the German delegation any discussion of the general strike was political dynamite. However, at French insistence it remained the principal item on the agenda and was discussed. The French majority resolution favored the general strike and insurrection in the event of mobilization. The French minority resolution settled for the refusal of money to the government and a propaganda campaign. Bebel supported the minority resolution and referred to Gustave Hervé, a French delegate adamently in favor of the strike, when he attempted to educate the Congress to the German realities:

Hervé's thought that it is all the same for the proletariat whether France belongs to Germany or Germany to France is absurd. If Hervé tried to persuade his countrymen of this, in a crisis, I fear that his own comrades would tread him underfoot... I deny the statement that it would be difficult to say, when the cause arises, what is an aggressive and what a defensive war. Affairs are no longer in such shape today that the threads of war catastrophe are hidden to educated and observing students of politics. Closet diplomacy has ceased to be.  

His appreciation of strong national feelings proved accurate, though one could find a certain irony in the portion of his speech concerned with aggressive versus defensive war. He continued:

...I must declare firmly that these means (the General Strike) with us are impossible and beyond discussion. How things are in Germany, we see in the case of Karl Leibknecht, who is under trial for high treason, although in his writings he only quoted Hervé and declared his tactics as impossible.  

And further:

In Germany we struggle against the existing militarism on land and water in every possible form, and with all our strength, but we cannot be pushed beyond into methods of struggle which might endanger the party activities, and even the very existence of the party.  

Jean Jaurès, who, with Bebel, was one of the greatest leaders of European social democracy, supported the French majority resolution, and the lines were clearly drawn:
It (the French majority resolution) is not the chance spectre of the brain of a dreamer, but has grown up as a necessity out of the great Fashoda and Morocco crises. The proletariat had to ask itself: Shall we suffer this great crime against humanity, which is planned by a few capitalists? Shall we not fight it by means of the great alliance of the powerful masses of organized labor?...if a war arises...between France and Germany, would it be allowable in that case that the French and German working class should murder one another for the benefit of the capitalists, and at their demand, without making the most extreme use of its strength? If we did not try to do this, we should be dishonored.

There it was. Would the socialists call a general strike in the event of mobilization or not? Bebel's reply indicated the futility of resisting a mass wave of nationalism which would accompany the war hysteria. Refusing to reveal the deep split to the world, the Stuttgart Resolution, in August, almost precisely 7 years before the outbreak of war, lamely promised that "the Socialists shall take measures to bring about its (the war's) early termination." This was an expression of hope, not a commitment. James Joll laconically commented that "...the pleasure with which it was greeted obscured the imprecision of its terms."

Still, the last clear chance had not yet arrived. In 1912 the Dutch delegate Troelstra made a final plea at Basel, at an emergency Congress called as a result of the First Balkan War. He said: "The proletariat of the small countries stands with its possessions and its blood at the disposal of the International for anything it decides in order to banish war." But nothing had changed since Stuttgart. Only the French and German Socialists had even the slightest chance of checking governments intent on war. They did not act.

It remains only to trace the final steps which the SPD took toward marriage with the nationalists. At the Party Congress in Jena in 1913 the SPD debated the merits of voting for military credits which were tied to the introduction of direct taxation, a long sought Socialist objective. It is only proper that the complex tale of the marriage of socialism and nationalism concluded with a
dilemma for the Socialists. From the perspective of the historian writing over a half-century after the event, the choice was between sparing the worker's pocketbook or sparing his blood. They saved his pocketbook by voting for direct taxation and the military credits.\(^3\)

In 1914 the jolt of Russian mobilization before the German declaration of Kriegsgefahrzustand (imminent war readiness) pushed the SPD the final inch toward support of the national government. A general strike would mean a de facto alliance of the party with Czarist Russia. The coming war seemed defensive and just. Chairman Hugo Haase, speaking for the party, said to the Reichstag:

> It devolves upon us, therefore, to avert this danger to defend the civilization and independence of our native land. Therefore we must today justify what we have always said. In its hour of danger Germany may ever rely upon us.\(^36\)

The party had by degrees become woven into the fabric of the nation. The SPD--pacifist in principle, patriotic by emotion and internationalist by ideology--made its choice at the decisive moment after years of tension. It chose the nation.

POSTSCRIPT

Certainly the conditions and attitudes of 1980 are not what they were when this century was young. At least one similarity, however, might be worth consideration. A German party of peace joined kindred souls in the Second International. That party and those for whom it spoke decided for the nation when the nation seemed to be in danger. It seems that in our time of danger--now--our leadership has failed to make clear to our young that they must serve the nation, to our citizens that they must sacrifice and to our elected officials that a danger exists. Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan evoked a grass-roots response which, however simplistic, was not recognized by leadership. A readiness to respond to national need is out there, but only leadership and political courage
will sense it and direct it. It is particularly important that a generation of young Americans be made to feel a part of the social fabric rather than an alienated subculture expecting the worst of mindless bureaucrats.

My hope is that despite the "me first" attitude currently demonstrated by American youth—an attitude in no way diminished by the other major forces at work in our society—a recognizable danger to the nation will find a response as Americans late in the 20th century answer the call as other young people have in the past. That hope is based upon the historical record of this century.
ENDNOTES


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13. Ibid., pp. 253-254. (Emphasis Added.)


16. Published in March 1899 under the German title: *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*. Peter Gay quotes a passage from *Evolutionary Socialism* and makes a comment which captures both Bernstein the heretic and Bernstein the socialist humanist. Bernstein says: "Peasants do not sink; middle class does not disappear; crises do not grow ever larger; misery and serfdom do not increase. There is increase in insecurity, dependence, social distance, social character of production, functional superfluity of property owners." Gay says that Bernstein was "as much concerned with the feeling people have about themselves as with the amount of money in their pockets." That is, Bernstein cared about the quality of life as well as the standard of living. Revised socialism focused on the quality of life. Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism*, New York: Collier Books, 1952, p. 308.


18. Ibid., p. 291.

19. Ibid., p. 291.

20. Both citations from Maehl, p. 33.


22. Maehl, p. 34.


24. Ibid., pp. 127-128. Joll cites from the September 21, 1905 issue of "Le Temps."

25. Ibid., p. 129.


34. Maehl, pp. 35-40, traces the debate on this question which took place at the SPD Congress at Jena in 1913. Kurt Geyer, a delegate put the case against the bill succinctly: "To come to the heart of the matter - are we justified in voting for taxes to raise military funds? The moment we give to the government the funds to defray military expenditures, our whole fight against militarism becomes a farce." The argument for direct taxes, which put the burden on the higher income group, prevailed indicating the degree to which the party placed the immediate welfare of its constituency above philosophical commitment. The question of the mass strike as a weapon to prevent the state from going to war was also raised again at Jena. Luxemburg, Liebknecht and Ledebour strongly endorsed the mass strike, as usual, but, for the reason suggested above, they remained a minority. The majority voted against the mass strike and for the military credits.

35. Joll, pp. 175-176, wryly comments "... while the French Socialists were voting war credits to resist the Germans, the German Social Democrats were voting to defend themselves against the Russians."

# NATIONALISM: A LESSON FROM GERMAN HISTORY

**Title:** Nationalism: A Lesson from German History  
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**Abstract:** The German Socialists (SPD), the backbone of the Second International, joined fellow socialists in the vow that never again would worker face worker over bayonets. As August of 1941 approached, however, the pull of nation proved to be stronger than class feelings, and German, Russian, British, French and Austrian workers marched off to join the colors with enthusiasm. Despite the intervening half century, nationalism remains today a very strong emotion.