

Essays
on
War

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Walter "R" Thomas

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ESSAYS ON WAR:

1. The Inconsequence of Superpower War.
2. Quarantine.
3. The Quagmire of Self-Defense.

by

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Senior Research Fellow

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1981

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Washington, DC 20319

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FOREWORD

Rarely does the career military officer have an opportunity to step back from the daily press of a line or staff assignment and reflect upon the lessons learned from his career. Captain Walter "R" Thomas, USN, when afforded this opportunity in the form of a National Defense University Research Fellowship, responded enthusiastically. His three essays represent a senior career naval officer's observations on various aspects of international law and human conflict.

In his first essay, "The Inconsequence of Superpower War," Captain Thomas assumes that the possibility of war between the United States and the Soviet Union is remote, at least as long as these two nations maintain their relative power. The greatest danger is viewed as a confrontation which could occur by error, miscalculation, or involvement in someone's else's "splendid little war."

In the next essay, Captain Thomas proposes that "Quarantine" operations could be adopted as an alternative to war when they are directed by regional agencies—as the Cuban Quarantine was when it was invoked under the auspices of the Organization of American States. Similar maritime operations by regional agencies are suggested as actions short of war which nations might impose to discipline aggressors and resolve disputes.

"The Quagmire of Self-Defense," the third essay, discusses self-defense as a basic right of nations, but alleges that it often is a political gambit which nations use to justify their use of military force. While the doctrine of self-defense is defined generally in the United Nations Charter, the author notes that governments often deliberately apply the concept imprecisely. Since the principle of self-defense has reasonably flexible margins, Captain Thomas suggests that developing nations might organize regional defense forces to halt local aggression or deter regional hegemony, rather than rely on the members of the United Nations or the super-powers to guarantee their borders.

In addition to their content, these essays represent a new addition to the NDU publications program. We have decided to publish occasional essays, such as this collection, to join our NDU Press monographs, books, issue papers, reports, and *Proceedings*. We hope our readers will find such essays a source of interesting commentary on national security matters.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. G. Gard, Jr.", written in a cursive style.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain Walter "R" Thomas, USN, is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. He received a BS degree in Naval Science from the United States Naval Post-Graduate School and an MS degree from George Washington University in International Affairs. He also is a graduate of the Naval School of Command and Staff, the Naval War College, and the National War College. Captain Thomas is a naval aviator and has served in numerous flight units, including assignments as Commanding Officer of Reconnaissance Squadron Four and Operations Officer of the helicopter carrier, USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) in Vietnam. His shore duty has included Washington assignments in the US Navy's Human Goals Program, Personnel, Congressional Liaison, Politico-Military Affairs and, most recently, as Assistant Chief of Information. He is the author of two books, *From a Small Observatory* and *The Complete Pentagon Capers*, as well as numerous articles in *Navy Times*, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, and the *Naval War College Review*.

1. THE INCONSEQUENCE OF SUPERPOWER WAR

Inconsequence: "Illogicality; lack of just or logical
inference or argument."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary

A RATIONALE FOR WAR?

Once the first gun is fired, there are no more explanations; passions rise and men who cannot agree kill each other.

Napoleon

All nations should recognize the dichotomy which exists between the affluence of the United States and the USSR, and their inability to use riches influentially. Both nations have increasingly less maneuvering room. "The US-Soviet rivalry is now more than three decades old, with no end in sight—realistic appraisal requires discrimination between real and illusory dangers."¹ Recognizing this dilemma, at least for the remainder of this century, it becomes worthwhile to examine some of the realities and illusions which may exist for the United States and the USSR from 1980 to 2000.

To illustrate the quandary of reality versus illusion, the United States and USSR probably will continue to expend money for nuclear arms that they cannot employ rationally against each other. Additionally, neither power can expect to intervene with impunity in a third nation's dispute where the other's real interests are at stake, nor become embroiled in peripheral wars which will attrite its own combatant forces. In sum, their mutual capacity for nuclear war may have attained for them a force without flexibility. In future situations they may find that they can threaten, but not intimidate; probe, but not penetrate; and, declaim, but not demand. And, with regard to a war between the United States and the USSR, there no longer may be the reality of a favorable termination of conflict, only the illusion of victory—and the inconsequence of war!

The fact that war may be inconsequential for the United States and the Soviet Union is not the same as declaring that war will not occur. History is scarred with war wounds which have been inflicted by unreasonable men—frequently because reasonable leaders believed that rationality could be judged in advance. But to anticipate an irrational act is to assume that guidelines exist which

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can predict all human behavior. They do not! Laws exist to define such acts, but despite governments, publicists, judges, psychologists, sociologists and theologians, mankind has failed to discourage internecine conflicts or eliminate war. One rational deterrent is the surety that retribution will be swift and severe and, of course, it is the lack of such surety that permits and sometimes encourages human beings, individually and as nations, to take advantage of their fellow men.

The favorable probability of unlawful gain without punishment then, may encourage a premeditated antisocietal act; and, since a high regard for survival has to be assumed at a national level, wars usually will be initiated by an aggressor nation only when it foresees a favorable probability of victory.

Throughout the world, there probably are many nations actively weighing the probability of success in war against their neighbors; and, threaded through this historic pattern today are the warp of internal revolts and the woof of externally sponsored revolutions. The consequences of such acts, however, seem woven inextricably into the patchwork policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, neither of which can always afford to espouse the cause of client states which sponsor local aggression.

Therefore, these two more powerful nations should define their interests more exactly, so that each fully understands that while other nations may wage wars, there can be no probability of gain without punishment in a conflict between these two major powers. The surety of retribution is too distinctly measurable.

It seems, then, that some historical reasons for war, which will be discussed in the opening section, may no longer pertain to the United States and the USSR if the element of risk is mutual decimation rather than individual capitulation.

Neither can the ideological sponsorship of their client nations' struggles be pursued by the United States or the USSR to the point where the other feels that its geographic boundaries are infringed

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upon, its buffer zones challenged, its national security threatened, or its economy destabilized.

The United Nations still serves as a national sounding board for the United States and the USSR to discuss these issues in the company of all other nations, despite the UN's proclivity toward Shakespearean sound and fury. Similarly, it is helpful to have a continuing dialogue between these two world leaders which, at most, may lead to minor arms agreements and token troop withdrawals in the European arena. For it is not that nonsubstantive intercourse or a few military gestures may change the will or the goals of either, but only that such acts signify a better understanding by both nations of their mutual resolve to remain predominant.

This resolve to remain predominant probably will persist—and will remain expensive. Maintaining their military establishments may soon cost the United States and the USSR about one trillion dollars every 5 years. Such expenditures are so far out of reach for other nations that the title of superpowers, once thought to be transient, may become even more appropriate by the year 2000. And the financial sacrifices will be absorbed, for neither nation may be expected unilaterally to abdicate its leadership position.

Since both nations also have allies and client states which, to some extent, have been asked or required to share the costs and burdens of these armaments in exchange for their sponsor's protection, it would be worthwhile for other countries to examine the broad declaratory policies of the United States and the USSR to see how they square with local reality. For example, while Western and Eastern Europe remain firmly encamped, Third World nations might choose to be wary of adopting such close relationships with either the United States or the USSR. Adoption can be painful if the adopted individual later finds that ethnic, ideological, commercial, or even religious differences are insurmountable. The viability and growth of many other nations may depend not on the proxy parentage of the United States or the USSR, but solely on the ability to nurture and negotiate their own survival.

THE IMPETUS FOR WAR

Only the poor can afford to engage in war.

Francis T. Underhill

Wars among groups, tribes, and nations have been analyzed, rationalized, and even romanticized by myriad writers since man recorded his presence. Yet, human conflict has progressed from cave and field to undersea and sky with hardly an historical footnote emphasizing the specific peculiarities in weaponry and demography which have accompanied the change in scenario during the past century.

First, consideration has to be given to the fact that a quantum leap in weaponry may not have taken place until the end of World War II, despite the inventions of the long bow, gunpowder, and dynamite. The shocking change in tempo is more readily apparent in a time continuum when noting that Napoleon launched his armies through Europe not one tick faster than Caesar advanced, more than a millennium earlier, through Gaul. Conversely, the speed of intercontinental missiles, together with the explosive power of their nuclear warheads, high-speed computers, electronic miniaturization, and laser guidance is as far removed from earlier advancements in group lethality as natal surgeons are from witch doctors in infant mortality.

To portray mankind's current metamorphosis more dramatically, the earth's population only increased from about one-half billion in the year A.D. 1000 to one billion as we approached the 20th century. Today, the effects of the industrial revolution, the medical revolution, the communication revolution, the educational revolution, and the agricultural revolution are being transmitted to and through almost six billion people worldwide. China alone has about one billion people today—the entire population of the earth only a relatively few years ago.²

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Soon, the United States, USSR, and Western Europe will each have about one-half billion people, all imbedded in their own cultures. Any dream of conquest to overcome and control such masses, as well as those of China, might prove illusive.

Taking the above factors into consideration, it is most impressive that mankind has been able to structure any stable governments—democratic, socialistic, communistic, or dictatorial—to supervise reasonably well the recent sociological and technological forces which have been unleashed by these hyperbolic changes in mankind's growth in numbers and in knowledge. That a positive control of nuclear weapon explosions has existed for over 30 years without epic disaster is a phenomenon twinned with fantasy.

Though many less traumatic clashes, police actions, revolts, insurgencies, revolutions, skirmishes, and minor wars continue to occur, the two World Wars required considerable national sacrifices. This fact, above all else, should have convinced world leaders that the high-stakes game is not worth the candle. Nevertheless, the premise that the spoils of war no longer match the costs of conflict has not been accepted by those who choose to justify war as a righteous deforciant.

What, then, were the previous justifications for war, either real or imagined? And, is there still validity to Plato's lament that "Only the dead have seen the end of war?"

To examine Klaus Knorr's presumption that "the usability and usefulness of military force in interstate relations, compared with previous historical periods, has been diminished by several changes in underlying conditions,"³ it is necessary to review briefly those underlying conditions, both real and illusory, which led to war, and to analyze if those conditions have, at least for some nations, changed significantly.

Historically, wars have been waged for reasons ranging from trivial presumptions of personal affront to megalomaniac obsessions of world conquest. War, in itself an illogical form of human

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endeavor, cannot be characterized as a rational act or analyzed ethically for standard form and substance. However, except for self-defense, a few of the more commonly declared justifications for wars, included *religion*, *economics*, *idealism*, *adventurism*, and *suppression*. These reasons, of course, are not all encompassing since nationalistic fervor, accidental involvement, the restoration of a power balance, allied support, and inflammatory acts all have led nations to war. There are no acceptable methods of pigeonholing chaos.

Religious wars, ostensibly based on theological differences or spiritual fervor, but often with ethnic and cultural overtones as well, have permeated history. The three most recent area conflicts which can be attributed partially to this factor occurred in Iran, Ireland, and Israel. Religious wars are being forever waged in God's name, both between those who espouse different beliefs—and among those who merely choose varied interpretations of form. In the latter case, and as early examples of historical bigotry, many wars occurred only because zealots, who had little compassion themselves, found that the presence of conflicting beliefs was ample justification for cruelty.

Economic wars, though profitable on past occasions, have not been particularly successful in the 20th century. Neither Germany's drive for "living room," nor Japan's intent to form a "co-prosperity sphere" were concluded with favorable balance sheets for the authors. More to the point today is that the cost of modern arms, mortality rates, industrial destruction, and contamination of the land itself would seem to far surpass the economic gain which can be achieved through war. This scenario may not be applicable to a future world when resources become scarce, or to smaller boundary skirmishes among Third World nations, but for either of the superpowers mutual confrontation should consider first balancing pyrrhic victory with profit.

There are those who would rate *idealism*, or at least national dedication to an ideal, as the only real justification for war. To most Marxists the girdle of communism must encircle the world; to many Americans the world must be made safe for democracy; and, of

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course, theoretical socialists, utopianists, anarchists, et al., each have their own splendid view of perfection, as well as the panacea for the world's illnesses. Idealism is an excellent rallying point for the populace once a nation becomes engaged in conflict. Even Stalin discarded communist dogma temporarily in favor of ringing the church bells and using Mother Russia as a slogan when Soviet fortunes ebbed during World War II. Idealism, however, would not seem to be a launch point from which the United States or the USSR would initiate war on a worldwide scale.

Adventurism, which had its heyday from the first of man's recorded history until the end of the 19th century, is now passe. The joy of striking off to explore new lands and to conquer distant peoples just for the sake of a nation's prestige will no longer be tolerated internationally. The rewards of exploration are minimal, the claims of manifest destiny absurd, and the discovery of new frontiers only spatially applicable. There may be considerable reorientation of geographic boundaries and further cartographic adjustments in the Third World, but the leaders of most nations would take disproportionate risks if they attempted forcefully to reserve large areas of foreign real estate unto themselves.

Finally, *suppression* of others, whether next-door neighbors or remote natives, was once a popular pastime. Imperialism, suzerainty, hegemony, enslavement, and conquest were all suppressive means which helped a nation to improve its economic stability, control smaller kingdoms, extract agreements, obtain cheap labor, and enlarge its boundaries. The reasons one nation suppressed another were varied, but the increase of power for the victorious country was immense. It enriched the monarch's coffers, extended the nation's military base, created buffer zones, produced a leisure class, and projected a world position to discourage challengers. Today, imperialism and the other subsidiary elements of suppression evoke the wrath of other nations, create revolts, agitate an already apoplectic world, involve unacceptable risks, require excessive expenditures, and escalate the possibility of confrontation by the superpowers.

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This escalation is the paramount reason why the value of war for the superpowers has diminished. Any flagrant action by the United States or USSR which might lead to mutual confrontation would demonstrate not only a lack of governmental responsibility, but a maniacal leadership decision to plunge both nations into a nuclear abyss. The recipe for a US/USSR war is no longer a matter of measuring all ingredients carefully, as it sometimes has been in the past, but a certainty that the dish will not turn out well. Despite this certainty, Henry Kissinger has observed that:

The superpowers often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other, whom he assumes to have perfect vision.—Of course, over time, two armed blind men in a room can do enormous damage to each other, not to speak of the room.⁴

The Soviet Union, while seeming to accept and understand the tenuous base upon which co-survival is built, continues to nibble adventurously on the edges of the Third World. More exactly, the USSR often seems to be exploring every means to extend its power and influence throughout the earth as forcefully as it can, short of a confrontation with the United States—a confrontation which neither nation seeks nor desires.

Is the USSR still determined to achieve its goals, perhaps not by publicly abandoning an *anti-religious* stance, Marxist *economics*, Communist *idealism*, *adventurous* use of military forces or *suppressive* policies, but by minor incursions across the Soviet borders or by inciting others to adopt such pseudo justifications for war? One possible answer which encourages Soviet ventures is that as long as the goals of the USSR can be attained at a low-intensity level or by proxy, the United States and its allies may be reluctant to become involved in some of the lesser disputations within the Third World.

The USSR, in accomplishing its purposes, seems to recognize that its new methodology, consisting of more insinuating elements than direct military combat with the United States, is the better way to insert its influence into other nations and, as President Carter

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has stated, "disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves."⁵ But has the USSR abandoned war as a means to achieve national goals, or merely assigned the tasks to others?

USSR GAMBITS

Short cuts are always tempting when one feels his cause is just.

William O. Douglas

The USSR has found that wars of national liberation, waged by proxies, have exceptional attraction. This technique, used as a short-cut to achieve Soviet goals, has been partially successful in that it has not yet escalated events into Soviet territory nor ensnared USSR military forces in overseas ventures.

As Justice Douglas reminded us, "Short cuts, however, are dangerous. If they can be taken against one person or group, they can be taken against another."⁶ They also can have economic, political, or military repercussions in the international echo chamber which, if considered cogently, should deter enthusiasts. As an example, since mercenaries from a client state are rented and not purchased, their employment is fraught with exceptionally hazardous problems. The mercenaries may become so well trained in combat that they become enamored of their own competence. This could lead to challenges to the client state government once the expeditionary force returns home. Specifically, the group's loyalty and controllability may become questionable—not only to their homeland but also to their Soviet sponsors.

The USSR, however, seems to need the support, commitment, and even adulation of client states. More than any collegiate team, the members of the Soviet hierarchy want to be recognized as number one. But, as the recent Afghanistan incursion indicates, there is a distinct danger that they could become careless in the methods they are adopting to achieve their goal, and their adventurous dreams could disintegrate with nightmarish results.

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In addition to using client states as proxies, the Soviets also favor two other naive gambits: "detente-expand," and "coexist-challenge."

Detente-expand is, from a Soviet viewpoint, a logical dialectical progression. Each new agreement in the military, economic, or political realm can become a detente position from which to swing toward a more expansive departure site. The concept of status quo is alien to Soviet thought, and nations must always recognize this factor in negotiations. Soviet signatories frequently imprint documents with a "here we go" rather than from a "here we stand" attitude. To communists, agreements are often launch points rather than fixed-policy positions.

Similarly, coexist-challenge is a recent gambit born of necessity. Recognizing the inconsequence of war with the United States, the USSR continues to increase its influence throughout the world in every way short of direct confrontation. Soviet economic, political, and military roads into Asia, Africa, and Latin America will continue to be built, destroyed, repaved, bypassed, widened, or deserted temporarily, depending on the momentary successes or failures encountered figuratively by the Marxist construction crews. But all Soviet projects, even when some are postponed, will seldom be abandoned.

Detente and coexistence, then, are policies which may be adopted for the convenience of the USSR, and for the deception of the United States and other nations. They merely endorse the practical decision to co-survive, and confirm the inconsequence of war.

Of course, within the bounds of co-survival, the USSR will continue to seek trade agreements, grain purchases, technological improvements, most favored nation status, and arms control concessions from the United States. And the United States will frequently acquiesce in these requests for reasons as varied as the economic realities which face US farmers and businessmen to the political illusions which incline the United States toward a graceful exit rather than an unpleasant encounter.

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Many of these issues are often settled in a way which sanctifies Soviet greed without achieving any US purpose; and, frequently, documents are proposed concerning military issues such as test bans, balanced forces, and strategic arms limitations which are often annals of ambiguity to the general public. Yet, since these agreements at least commit both nations to a modicum of goodwill, they remain valuable as initiatives. Conversely, there is a discouraging logic to the argument that they are, in reality, all based on mutual distrust in the first place. The hope is that they will make accusatory declarations more subdued and military intervention less epileptic.

The United States also seems to pursue government-to-government agreements and treaties with the USSR with the firm belief that, as President Carter observed, "The greatest danger to all nations of the world is the breakdown of a common (US/USSR) effort to preserve the peace and the ultimate threat of nuclear war."⁷ The USSR, while also espousing this policy, may already have adopted the position that this is not the real danger, if only because the Soviets may believe that they have the singular option of initiating nuclear war, and they do not choose to exercise it.

Additionally, the American people, who may become more inclined to wage war over oil than oratory, seem to display no anxiety about a preemptive Soviet nuclear attack. Neither civil defense nor antiballistic missile system expenditures have received enthusiastic national support. And the Western Europeans appear to interpret USSR threats as that style of bravado which is typically crude, occasionally serious, and always Russian.

Nevertheless, according to Richard Perle, "the Soviets and their Cuban proxies have intervened militarily and politically throughout the Third World, exploiting ethnic and racial tensions and the fragility of new nations and weak governments."⁸ This policy, with the exception of occasional major setbacks, has been generally successful and it can be expected to continue, for the Soviets understand that success is the base for further ventures.

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Of course, there are not only "ethnic and racial tensions," but local dissatisfactions with geographic boundaries in Africa; ideological, religious, and political differences in the Middle East, South America, and Asia; and economic discouragement throughout most of the world. Such opportunities beckon to Communist disciples everywhere; and, since the USSR has the ability to intervene with advisors, funds, and proxy troops, it is unlikely that Soviet leaders will forego the opportunity to spread their gospel, either by bread or bullet.

The USSR tends to arouse angry feelings to a state of conflict among all of those who are dissatisfied, discontented and, in many cases, almost disenfranchised from the human race. This gives the USSR extraordinary areas of the world to mold on their potter's wheel. Careless expansionism, however, could lead not to the spread of communism, but to confrontation with US interests.

Prophetically, Admiral Mahan wrote, "The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to war."⁹ Whenever Communist imperialism emulates the greed exhibited by earlier expansionists or challenges the security and economic stability of free world nations, that "clash of interests" is inevitable.

The USSR, then, should weigh its Marxist obsession against its own national survival more exactly to assure that events do not lead to war. Although there is no indication that Soviet initiatives have not failed to take free world positions into account, there is always the danger that when the interests of others are considered, they may be grossly misinterpreted.

To illustrate one possible misinterpretation, has the reluctance of the United States to confront the USSR been recognized partially as an offshoot of inherent isolationist and righteous characteristics of America—not a weakness that can be counted on under circumstances of imperative US concern?

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Though the United States may, in many instances, appear to wear the mantle of power less imperiously than the USSR, the military strength of both superpowers should be recognized mutually as a factor which should diminish the probability of mortal combat between these two nations. But will the USSR, as it probes and pokes its way about the earth, even be able to accept the premise that the superpower options available in today's world to attain national goals do not seem to include nuclear conflict?

THE LOST OPTION

What in God's name is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?

Henry Kissinger

Since President McKinley prayed for guidance before he annexed the Philippines, the United States has seemed to stumble with engaging naivety toward its appointment as a world leader. This vacillation might be attributed to optimism, territorial disinterest, economic confidence, new-world detachment, diplomatic indecision or, more simply, the remnant of Puritan faith that expects others to act reasonably because they should. From this latter viewpoint, "others" are always the guilty party. This American presumption of an adversary's guilt seems to be derived from self-righteous vision that, as Sidney Dell maintains, has always been "the vision of freedom and democracy. These are great principles, hallowed by centuries of struggles and untold heroism. But they will not put a single calorie into the belly of a beggar in the streets of Calcutta."¹⁰ From the vantage point of ethical America, that is India's fault.

It could be alleged, at least partially, that it is this lack of guilt by association that has led the United States to engage in two World Wars late and reluctantly, as well as the explanation for the native indifference that permits most American citizens to dismiss international concerns. Thus, despite scholarly dissertations, inciting editorials, governmental pronouncements, and congressional debates, national security is not viewed widely as a cause for paranoia; and, although Stanley Hoffman believes "playing the

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role of a superpower also means permanent insecurity,"¹¹ in reality Americans seem to believe that the role played need not lead to a confrontation on stage which endangers the audience and other players as well.

However, in playing their roles as superpowers, the United States and the USSR must recognize that the resultant destruction of both nations is the most likely consequence of nuclear conflict, and neither reasonable comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaties, successful strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), nor agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) will soon alter this result. Yet, while knowing this, the USSR often seems to proceed as if it were freed from the bounds of caution. That nation has not fully analyzed the postulate that war between the United States and the USSR is, perhaps, a lost option.

Because of their everlasting haggling, with minimal agreement, it often appears that international diplomacy for the United States and the USSR has become an ill-defined and sometimes immobile art. Hypothetically, both nations might pursue their interests either to the brink of war or to the brink of barbarism, as they so choose. They would need to be mindful only of each other's tolerance levels. Yet, Henry Kissinger suggests, it is ever more obvious as the world becomes more complex that "Both nations must not undertake military enterprises or diplomatic initiatives that they are not willing to see through";¹² and, as their options continue to expire, each of these two superpowers is becoming, in some areas, increasingly vulnerable. If they, even unwittingly, pursue a policy which leads to worldwide combat, the subsequent decimation of nations, economic bases, political systems, industrial technologies, and urban populations will be unrivaled in the history of warfare. For them, a mutual declaration of war becomes a suicide pact.

To understand this plainly, it is necessary for the USSR to recognize that while the United States has neither reason nor inclination to initiate war against the Soviet Union, the United States has both the commitment and the ability to confront the USSR if national or allied security interests are involved. It is important that

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this message be transmitted clearly, without diplomatic static. Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated,

The perception held by a potential adversary as to the will and determination of the people of the United States and their government can carry more weight than simply a comparison of inventories or similar military hardware.¹³

Therefore, the cost factors in USSR expansionist plans need more attentive care than they have been receiving in the past, and it is precisely such cost versus benefit factors—those considerations which are so analytically valued in management methodology—which seem to suggest that neither the United States nor the USSR can infringe meaningfully upon the national security of the other. There is, between these nations, a surety that there could be no victor. It is suggested that they have achieved, through armaments, a *mutual inconsequence of war*.

The effect of this unique paradigm is that both nations may be endangered by proxy. It is more probable that the actions of their client states, or even non-affiliated Third World nations, not the threat to their own geographic boundaries, is likely to generate a US/USSR confrontation. Therefore, all nations must more seriously consider how the United States and the USSR will weigh their own national interests against the security, or even the survival, of other states.

The United States and the USSR also have pursued some policies to achieve their goals, without relying on either the assurances of each other or the absolute support of their allies. This has occasionally led to intoxication from verbal overindulgence. For example, do politically conceived words such as "linkage, containment, deterrence, coexistence, or detente" reflect reality, or are they only discordant notes played on an international scale to dull the aural senses?

For the sake of argument, it is proposed that if linkage actually existed in its purist form, not one crisp grain of free world wheat would grace a Communist table; containment should have

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discouraged the continuing introduction of massive land forces in Europe or the use of proxy troops in Africa by the USSR; deterrence would not have nurtured the growth of pre-potency offensive power which now serves as a testimonial to the health of the US and USSR arsenals; coexistence would not have become a synonym for a co-survival haven where the USSR continues to maneuver expansively; and, detente would not merely reflect that the United States and the USSR have publicly confessed their inability to devise an appropriate strategy for dealing with one another.

Thus, declaratory policies often seem semantically meaningless. They really may signify only that both nations have become aware that (1) the appeal of using their own military forces to attain traditional goals is not always an attractive option; (2) the possession of numerous nuclear weapons and the upkeep of large peacetime forces, while expensive, are desirable methods to gain and maintain economic, political, and psychological advantages worldwide; (3) the threat of actual military power, though never unleashed, is absolutely necessary; and, (4) an acceptable balance of men and hardware, as envisioned by either nation, may never be achieved. Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, "There has been an asymmetry in the number of men and arms in favor of the East. We want equality so there can be stability." This pronouncement came in response to a Tass news agency statement which declared, "Much depends on whether the West meets Soviet (disarmament) initiatives—to achieve military detente in Europe."¹⁴ Is this merely international posturing in its most blatant bilateral form?

The result of this posturing is that each nation seems impelled to build bigger and more potent weapons and maintain, together with their allies and client states, large standing forces. Additionally, both the United States and the USSR perennially wield psychological whips in an attempt to convince their citizens that the danger of overwhelming invasion forces or nuclear holocaust is imminent unless ever-increasing expenditures are committed to defense. The USSR, since World War II, has advertised the spectre of the United States as an external enemy to congeal its theoretical Communist gelatin into palatable pap to nourish its populace. This

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is not a meal which will forever satisfy the rising expectations of the Soviet people, and the USSR leadership must soon determine how much longer their nation will continue to digest it without demanding additional sustenance.

The rising expectations of Third World nations must also be considered, for they are concerned not only with national security, but often survival. Can they continue to anticipate support from the United States or the USSR? A partial answer, according to Henry Kissinger, is that

impulses to lurch toward either isolationism or global intervention had to be curbed by making judgments according to some more permanent conception of (US) national interest. We would have to reconcile ourselves to imperfect choices, partial fulfillment, the unsatisfying tasks of balance and maneuver.¹⁵

This "balance and maneuver" can become precarious for Third World nations seated on the unweighted end of the see-saw. These nations face many dilemmas and, for some, their survival may become questionable. When the existence of their boundaries, the mortality of their citizens and the economic stability of their states all hang by perilous threads, any theoretical examination of *their* real interests often seems futile.

Since Graham Vernon maintains that "it is fair to conclude that given the current balance of forces, the Soviet Union will not undertake a war against NATO unless the leadership perceives that crucial national interests are at stake,"¹⁶ it also may be fair for Third World nations to conclude that neither the United States nor the USSR will undertake a war on behalf of a client just because the client states' crucial national interests are at stake.

THE PROPORTIONATE ODDS

War involves in its progress such a train of unforeseen and unsuspected circumstances that no human wisdom can calculate the end.

Thomas Paine

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If war is to be initiated and waged for an anticipated gain—even when the gain appears substantive—other factors than client or allied interests must be calculated: the loss ratio must be reasonable, the populace supportive, the defeated nation controllable, and total submission assured. None of these conditions seem to exist for the United States or the USSR for the remainder of the 20th century.

Negative factors which relate to the above calculations are that both nations would suffer irreparable damages and unacceptable death rates; their citizenries abhor war; occupational forces would be impractical; and, victory would be ephemeral. Additionally, it is apparent that neither nation covets the territory of the other.

This analysis elicits the questions, "What would induce either nation to declare war on the other?" and, "What would incite the people, and convince them that war was inevitable? Against each other, presumptively, American and Soviet citizens would support a war of self-defense—and little else!

While the United States would consider an attack on Western Europe as ample a justification for a war of self-defense as the USSR would any assault on Eastern Europe, these high-intensity events are unlikely as long as the nations allied to both powers do not possess exceptional military capabilities or gain reputations as international gunslingers. Theoretically, a low profile in Europe could be validated by removing American and Soviet troops and weapons from the European area—an event unwelcomed by all parties. Both the United States and the USSR may prefer to maintain their own forces in Europe, perhaps believing that the odds for mutual stability are better when they are participating in European policies, rather than reacting to them. In effect, both nations may want to retain control over the risk of war in order to avoid it.

Of course, the risk of war is proportionate. In remote areas, lesser nations present lesser risks of war for both the United States and the USSR; other countries are situated in the "rimland" and the superpowers are more subject to their plagues; while in

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Europe, the absolute prevention of disease is the paramount concern. That is why both nations strive for essential equivalence and strategic stability—as they each see it “through a glass, darkly.”

Parenthetically, as dice throwers are aware, there is always a time when the odds are even. Yet, every gambler strives for an “edge.” Today, in the European arena, according to Seyom Brown, this edge is envisioned as

new defense programs to keep the Soviets from achieving military dominance at any level and an active diplomacy to counter Kremlin attempts to project Soviet power and presence beyond the Warsaw Pact area.¹⁷

Substituting “Americans, White House and NATO,” where applicable, provides just as valid an insight into the recommendations which are probably received by the Soviet hierarchy. Equality is a margin which tends to expand forever as each nation moves toward it expectantly.

Nevertheless, once the inconsequence of war is considered as a possible premise for mutual relations, it is permissible to imagine *under what conditions war may occur*. First, it seems unrealistic to construct a scenario wherein either the United States or the USSR would preemptively attack the other for *religious, economic, idealistic, adventurous, or suppressive* reasons. Neither could either nation easily plan and logistically prepare for a full-scale conventional war in Europe for whatever reason, without causing the other to position counter forces. A short nuclear war also beggars credulity, since the premise for a short war is that someone is going to quit.

Is it more likely that Third World nations would be candidates to precipitate war between the United States and the USSR because of miscalculation, human error, indirect aggression, unanticipated escalation, or even nuclear initiation through the use of atomic weapons not under American or Soviet control? Leon Sigel stated, “To stable balancers, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear war has invalidated any distinction between winning and losing,”¹⁸ but the “stable balancers,” if the United States and the USSR can be so

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categorized, may be whipsawed by actions that they did not initiate.

Therefore, it seems that the prevention of a worldwide conflagration sparked by smaller states, allied nations, or client satellites is the issue that demands the most attention, for although the historic reasons for war may not be applicable to the United States or the USSR, they will remain as temptations to some countries that view their neighbors acquisitively.

Thus, the long-term prevention of war between the United States and the USSR seems to depend not wholly on their mutual nuclear capabilities, conventional forces, technological balance, European stalemate, or weapons limitations, but also on the degree of discretion displayed by other nations that may or may not be subject to superpower guidance. The fact that there may be an inconsequence of war for the United States and the Soviet Union means little if some other nation determines that war is meaningful to *them*, or if they can visualize a situation where a US/USSR confrontation would, in the long run, redound to their benefit. This latter, *purposeful* incitement of the United States and USSR bears looking into microscopically.

As an example, during the Quemoy-Matsu unpleasantness, Admiral Arleigh Burke, US Navy, stated that, "It did not matter whether we thought the offshore islands were important. What mattered was that Chiang thought they were important."¹⁹ Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can really afford to support such nationalistic fervor as forcefully as they have in the past. This is not to predict that both superpowers will not continue to be involved in territorial or governmental changes on behalf of other nations, but only that a much sounder rationale than that expressed by Admiral Burke (or by Mr. Brezhnev for Soviet troops in Afghanistan) will be needed to quench the flames of distrust.

Of course, the premise that there is no profit for either nation in a war between the United States and the Soviet Union is based on the assumption that both superpowers will maintain extraordinary military capabilities, including improved nuclear weapons, large

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conventional forces, and new maritime combatants. Each nation recognizes that huge annual expenditures are the price of power—and failure to appropriate adequate sums to these ends is an abdication of leadership.

It can be maintained, in fact, that a nation's most fundamental social-welfare obligation to its citizens is to defend them against attack. The responsibility for this is entrusted to the armed forces.²⁰

Eventually, however, both the United States and USSR will have to confront not only the rising expectations of their own people, the competition of other countries, and the possibility of conflict escalation by Third World nations, but also the inflationary devastation which might occur as ever more sophisticated and expensive weaponry is introduced into the arsenals of war.

In considering these factors, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union must ask themselves the following questions, and then review the answers pragmatically from their own—and each other's—perspective:

- a. What advantages could accrue to either the United States or the Soviet Union as a result of war between these two nations?
- b. Have the uses of semantics, dialectics, posturing, and dialogue, together with massive arsenals and large peacetime forces, been tacitly accepted by both countries as exploratory alternatives to war?
- c. Have sociological and weapons changes produced a condition among some nations where the advantage to be gained by war may be inversely proportional to the power to conduct it?
- d. Which Third World nations foreseeably might attempt to coax the United States and the Soviet Union into a military confrontation to gain an advantage for themselves in the international area?
- e. Is there a condition which could be described as an inconsequence of war now existing for the United States and the Soviet Union?

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In considering the answers, the superpowers must be alert to the basic premise that, "With modern technology there are no longer any isolated areas. Any diplomatic or military move immediately involves worldwide consequences."²¹ These words, written by Henry Kissinger more than two decades ago, remain timelessly applicable as the twenty-first century approaches.

As the proliferation of weapons encompasses the world, then it follows that these weapons often will be used to rectify real or imagined injustices, not against the superpowers, but across boundaries. The United States and the Soviet Union must become more introspective, for someday their existence could become threatened indirectly by someone else's splendid little war.

Conversely, the superpowers must maintain their leadership positions, despite the exorbitant cost of weapons modernization, in order to assure that they can respond adequately to the challenges of other nations, as well as those of each other. Ironically, this mutual drive for supremacy assures the stability of some nations and encourages the aggressiveness of others.

In sum, barring economic collapse, the superpower roles of the United States and the Soviet Union seem to confirm that there is a state of superabundant military capability where war between two specific nations becomes inconsequential. The cost of achieving and maintaining such a position will remain financially appalling—but, for the United States and the Soviet Union, it is the amount both nations seem willing to pay to answer George Bernard Shaw's sphinx-like question, "What Price Salvation?"

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2. QUARANTINE

“It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt

A STATE OF ISOLATION

In keeping with collective security agreements, naval forces provide the potential for rapid reaction to crises and limited conflicts.

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

An international legal custom often seems to develop metamorphically—its eventual status and subsequent historical form unrecognized at birth. If it later appears attractive, it is usually because, with maturity, it eclipsed the lights of circumstance which illuminated its natal imperfections.

Since the Cuban confrontation in October 1962, the "collective security" operation called "quarantine" has been examined critically. In retrospect, was the Cuban Quarantine really a lawful *regional* action? Could it be justified under international law? Is the procedure disassociated, at least partially, from the concept of *unilateral* naval blockades? And, can such an operation now be condoned as a legitimate military response under *regional* alliance auspices within the accepted doctrine of self-defense?

The sources of international law often are slow of growth, but one function of publicists (international legal experts) is to advocate the acceptability of concepts and to help stabilize the world platform on which irenic customs are set. Under international law, the legal test of *general recognition* is not yet applicable to quarantine; but, since the contesting states involved in the Cuban Quarantine seemed to accept the rules with relative amity, a certain shy reluctance to recognize quarantine may be bubbling in the international cauldron.

In an attempt to determine whether quarantine is a unique factor in world affairs, consideration should be given to the following legal elements:

1. International law, as defined in the United Nations Charter.

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2. The established rights of *regional* agencies.
3. Publicist's opinions concerning the Cuban Quarantine.
4. The legitimacy of quarantine as a *regional* agency operation.
5. The illegality of *unilateral* military action.
6. Proposed rules for quarantine operations.

In sum, quarantine must be defined before it can have substance—it must have substance before it can be judged—it must be judged before it can be lawfully applied—it must be applied before it can be effective—and, it must be effective if nations are to adopt it as a regional shield against acts of aggression which demand at least a limited military response.

In earlier years, the development, recognition, and eventual demise of *belligerent blockades* followed an historical pattern. First advocated within the tenets of international law, the use of unilateral belligerent blockades, which were imposed usually after a state of war was declared, later became hazardous because the rights of neutrals often became submerged in the whirlpool of war. Neutral merchant trade with warring nations seemed to be a most certain method for noncombatant states to be drowned in the conflict.

Later, when military leaders in many nations were encouraged to join forces with diplomats, statesmen, and international affairs specialists in their arduous efforts to maintain world peace, it was to be expected that naval professionals might propose alternate means for justifying unilateral blockades without the requisite obligation of declaring them belligerent.

One of the alternatives which evolved was the concept of *peaceful blockades*, but the "lawful" aspects of such military operations, which were imposed without a declaration of war, soon raised quixotic contradictions which charged fully armed into a

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windmill of legal verbiage. The most recent excursion into this contentious field of international law, by some publicists, was their attempted justification of the Cuban Quarantine as a pacific blockade.

Reading through the mesh of opinions of noted international lawyers after October 1962, there are learned discussions of Cold War Blockades, Pacific Contraband, Selective Blockades, Strict Quarantine, Lawful Intervention, Regional Blockades and Limited Interdiction.

Basically, almost all of the legal writers agreed that the members of the United Nations, rather than the members of the Organization of American States, could have embarked on a comparable quarantine course and, possibly, have established a new presumption under international law within the precepts of the UN Charter. If the Cuban quarantine had been directed by the members of the UN, they could have underwritten a policy which might have become recognized. Oppenheim, a noted international jurist, states that *pacific blockade*, for example, can be used today by the members of the United Nations and, though it may take large forces,

... might nevertheless find application with success against a powerful naval state if exercised by the united navies of several powers. It is in this connection that it constitutes a proper instrument of collective action for enforcing the obligations of the Charter. As such it can legitimately be used by or on behalf of the United Nations, not only against the offending state but also in relation to the shipping of third State Members of the United Nations.¹

This is not a momentous pronouncement, but it does lead to conjecture concerning instruments of collective action when the members of *regional agencies*, defined in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, attempt to act legitimately on behalf of the members of the United Nations within the purposes and principles of that parent organization. There is, of course, a divergence of legal opinion concerning the right of the UN members, or anyone

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else, to restrict the rights of "Third State Members" during a blockade or a quarantine. The President of the United States would have been reluctant to accept this restriction in 1962, since the Soviet Union was within that third state category during the Cuban crisis.

The Cuban Quarantine has, however, shed a brief glimmer on some dark pages of nineteenth century international law, although it did not usher *unilateral* operations into the spotlight. If anything, unilateral naval blockades were again presented as an unhealthy image of imperialism.

There is, nevertheless, a need to examine the applicability of blockades in the modern world if they are to be compared to, or differentiated from, the doctrine of quarantine. Specifically, is quarantine only a new form of blockade? Can unilateral interdictions even be justified today? Are either pacific or belligerent blockades still rational military responses, or are they only the sea flanks of war?

BLOCKADES

Short cuts have always been justified on the ground that the end being worthy, the means of reaching it are not important.

William Douglas

Unilateral pacific blockades are a resort to economic pressures to force solutions. Any blockade is instant coercion—a short cut for the nautically strong. An obvious weakness of a pacific blockade is that it may antagonize the state under blockade to the point where a declaration of war soon abolishes the "pacific" portion of the whole affair. Enforced pacificism and declared virtue somehow seem to generate doubts.

About twenty blockade cases, both pacific and belligerent, were enforced effectively before the days of modern multinational and regional agencies. In 1827 the naval units of Russia, France,

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and Great Britain, acting in concert, blockaded the Morea to prevent the Turkish fleet from coming out of Navarino during one of the many Turkish-Greek disputes. Again, in 1833, French and British forces blockaded the Netherlands until the Dutch government carried out an 1831 treaty which provided for the independence of Belgium.

From 1845-1850 the French and the British navies blockaded Uruguay to cut off Argentine supplies to the Oribe forces (in spite of the Monroe Doctrine) and, in 1877, Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Italy and Russia blockaded Crete to prevent other nations from delivering weapons to Greek insurgents. These blockades were effective and, in the 1897 incident, demonstrated how joint action could prevent the demise of the government in power.²

It is interesting to note that many of these blockades often were defined as pacific by the nation or nations which established them. Quite understandably, the states subjected to these actions did not agree. This problem of interpretation became even more apparent during the British Navy's blockade of Zanzibar, in 1889; and, in 1905, pacific interdiction by naval forces had occurred with some regularity.

A century earlier, Napoleon published a Berlin decree hinting that a concept of *limited blockades* should be recognized. This would have allowed merchant trade to flourish "pacifically" in time of war if contraband weapons were not carried into the country. At that time, British leaders were not about to abide Napoleon's suggestions.

By World War I, however, British strategists had an extra hundred years to contemplate this principle; so, with the momentum gained from their nineteenth century successes, they gravitated toward a complex consideration of both blockades and contraband. As a result of their efforts, Clearance Certificates and Posted Contraband rules evolved. This experience, if nothing else, should have placed the world in Great Britain's debt, for the regulations concerning blockades and the list of conditional and absolute contraband were expanded so extensively that the legal concepts

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became muddled forever. Since British naval leaders realized that the horseshoe nail was indeed relevant, they stretched their list of contraband items to include it.³ For a neutral merchant ship's captain the rule of contraband was finally sculpted in crystalline form. If he didn't sail through a wartime zone to a combatant country, he could receive a Clearance Certificate to proceed. Thus, *belligerent blockades* became a permanent and hazardous extension of the combat area.

Nevertheless, the exodus of *blockade theories* from the international scene has not been abrupt. Some adherents of *pacific blockades* cling tenaciously to that lodge of international lawyers who attempt to balance deterrence with justice. However, any nation's leaders who impose a unilateral pacific blockade against another state openly invite contemporary disapproval, international disfavor and, more importantly, a possible escalation of the event beyond the boundaries of the disputants. Moreover, such unilateral action is often based on the premise that the state under blockade will remain subdued, as it's representatives quietly beg for a remission of whatever sins they may be charged. On the contrary; today a blockaded nation's leaders are more likely to respond both vocally in the United Nation's chambers, and physically with armed force.

The theory of pacific blockade still has exceptional attraction, however. It is theoretically bloodless, which appeals to the humane; it is done with a minimum of military force, which has an attraction for economists and politicians; and it is imposed on the sea, away from the sovereign territory of the offending state, which results in an irresistible charm that soon ensnares statesmen and naval advocates alike. Admiral Powers, a US Navy strategist, has written:

Although it has been stated that unilateral pacific blockade is no longer permissible for an individual member of the United Nations, the possibility of one should not be dismissed. A unilateral declaration of pacific blockade which was stated to be in the interest of world peace, which was justified by the action of the nation blockaded, and which was accepted by the world, should be upheld.⁴

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Admiral Powers may have been led into the inevitable trap of semantically qualifying the international conditions which he believed may exist today before a unilateral pacific blockade can be established. The ramifications of phrases: "interest of world peace" "justified," and "accepted by the world," defy simple analysis. If effected by one state against another, a modern unilateral pacific blockade could create a world pool of political treacle.

In addition, an effective pacific blockade against a state must, of necessity, interdict ships of third states. Can it be subsumed that neutral nations have merchant fleets which would view the blockade with genial affability? This is most unlikely, for a pacific blockade is bound to tread on some tender neutral hull, especially with the registration system which now exists for merchant vessels. It is common for nation X to have some of its merchantmen under the flag of nation Y. Nevertheless, Professor Wilson stated his legal thoughts on pacific blockade as follows:

Although it may not take vessels of third states as a prize, it may prevent their entrance; and for such detention the blockading state assumes no liability, though notice must be given the vessel of the third state at the line of blockade or in an unquestionable manner.⁵

Professor Wilson, in trying to clarify the guidelines for pacific blockade, may have been attempting to state rules not as they were, but as a great naval power would like them to be. Today, however, unilateral pacific blockades are fraught with exceptionally hazardous international problems which might render the concept impractical and, perhaps, irrelevant. For example, some of the poorest nations now have submarines and air power; the smallest states have United Nations representation and fraternal adherents to their sovereign aspirations; the members of regional agencies tend to abhor unilateral enforcement action; and, the world's merchants resent any infringement on their mobility.

These considerations, which have social, economic, political, and military repercussions in the international echo chamber of our modern world, should be sufficient to deter unilateral pacific

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blockade enthusiasts. In addition, a military response by the blockaded nation would certainly convince the enforcing state that such a flagrant violation of the rules could not be accepted demurely. Therefore, it might be expected that the foreseeable results of this doctrine would be universal distrust, regional discredit, individual aggravation and the unwarranted escalation of a problem which could have been better resolved by other methods.

Unilateral blockade theories probably will be brought forward for consideration again and again, for they make up an attractive legal package. Too often, however, they also open a Pandora's box of international interpretations which seem to sustain themselves wingless in flight by their sheer will to fly.

REGIONAL QUARANTINE

It is often in time of gravest crisis, when law and order are most challenged and tested, that new techniques in law are invented or applied and the rule of law is thereby strengthened. It is strengthened, that is, if the challenges are met.

Christian Herter

One area of initial conflict in differentiating a quarantine operation from a blockade is defining its parameters. For example, if a quarantine is applied as a *unilateral* action then it loses its legal identity in a dismal swamp of stunning dimensions under the UN Charter. In addition, if quarantine should resort to a plea of regional security, which is recognized in the UN Charter, then there really is a need to examine it within this stringent criterion. Finally, if it is tacitly legal, what are the acceptable regional guidelines for judging it?

If the doctrine of quarantine can be allowed some stature as a regional operation, rather than a unilateral blockade, there is also a succeeding requirement to give it some backbone if it is to be adopted as a way to resolve disputes. The United Nations members could lawfully provide this firm support; yet, there must be some recourse when this august body is stymied. Currently, the only legitimate operational alliances which can collectively enforce

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their will in the interest of peace and security are those regional agencies milled within the tolerances of Article 52, 53, and 54 of the UN Charter (see the Appendix). Can their members impose quarantine? And, is there a need, or possibly an obligation, for them to act in their regional interests whenever the members of the United Nations are paralyzed?

These problems require an examination of each regional agency's charter, an analysis of the dual responsibilities of the member states as both regional affiliates and subordinate units of the United Nations, and the legal acceptability of any regional agency's actions within its area. These are the nether lands of international law, for there are no rules other than the UN Charter which apply so specifically to regional agencies. It does no good to insist pedantically that regional agencies cannot act as little UNs. Their charters often provide their members with power which individual government leaders would not dare to assume; yet, the legality of these regional charters, especially when they are enforced with military power, remains questionable.

If members of regional agencies are clearly subject to the dictates of the members of the United Nations, then it follows that their combined actions should not violate the precepts of the United Nations Charter. In this context the imposition of quarantine by regional accord should be compared carefully to the regional actions permitted by articles of the United Nations Charter in order to determine its legitimacy. Since superseding authority does not exist for regional agencies, this necessity to corral collective operations within the precepts of the United Nations Charter is paramount.

In sum, it appears that *unilateral* military actions expressly contradict the intent of those who drafted the United Nations Charter. Self-defense, of course, is an exception to this rule, but self-defense is a right which does not readily lend itself to agreeable analysis. It is suggested that quarantine, therefore, should not be addressed as a unilateral action.

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Neither is there an attempt to specify when a quarantine should be imposed or where quarantine would be most geographically appropriate. Obviously the termination of all seaborne shipments to any state such as medical supplies would not be desirable, but most nations would surely suffer if a regional muffler were applied to selected imports and exports. Thus invoked, the quarantine of one state within a region might bring about a more moderate political atmosphere, and dampen enthusiasm for aggravating political wounds within a specific region.

Of course, there are practical limitations which could obviate the use of quarantine as an effective regional response. First, the members of a regional organization would have to possess a preponderance of sea power to counteract the naval might of any quarantined state; secondly, a regional organization of minor nations would have to rely on United Nation's assistance if the leaders of the quarantined nation attempted to challenge the quarantine; thirdly, regional pacts would have to be examined by the members in order to ascertain whether the agreements coincided with the UN Charter and authorized joint military action; and, fourthly, the actual application of quarantine would have to be critically examined—for it could be as easily invoked in error against the saintly as in honor against the sinful.

These problems are not necessarily fatal if the formation of effective regional organizations and the administration of quarantines were adopted as long-range programs by United Nations members.

This proposal that the members of regional organizations could lawfully use the moderate incline of quarantine as a wedge against acts of aggression or to resolve disputes is, admittedly, a tedious and somewhat idealistic proposition. Offended national leaders cannot always abide procrastination, and the delays often related to regional cooperation are not chronologically acceptable to many. Therefore, individual retaliation might often be expected to preempt the more patient responses of either peaceful bilateral negotiation or regional quarantine.

SELF-DEFENSE AND QUARANTINE

To say that democracy has been awakened by the events of the last few weeks is not enough. Any person will awaken when the house is burning down. What is needed is an armed guard that will wake up when the fire first starts, or better yet, one that will not permit the fire to start at all.

John F. Kennedy—1940

The United Nations representatives at San Francisco defined self-defense as a basic right; but at what time and under what conditions? Article 51 of the Charter states, in part, "if an armed attack occurs."⁶

They could, however, have said, "when the threat of an armed attack occurs" to add a positivist approach. The word "attack" is also questionable. It can't mean a raid, a single strike, an internal rebellion, a border clash, or a shooting episode across a disputed boundary. Or can it? Even the time is not fixed—it "occurs." Must one wait until the beach is crossed or the first shell explodes?

The report of the committee which drafted Article 51 stated, in part, that "the *unilateral* use of force or similar coercive measures, is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired."⁷ *Unilateral* force and *unilateral* blockades were thus discouraged. Legitimate self-defense was recognized, but not defined.

However, no nation can afford to wait in the halls while its survival is debated, nor should it be expected to. The members of the Security Council may help to suppress wars and bestow peace, but no nation is going to abdicate its basic rights on that frail premise.

The members of the United Nations did not delegate to the Council primary responsibility for their survival as a gesture of courtesy. If the leaders of nations had willfully left a mere

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vacuum in the event of the Council's failure to discharge its primary responsibility, they would have betrayed the vital interests of their people.⁸

Self-defense, then, is personal, although each state does assume the onus of justifying the actions it takes as a measure of self-defense. The expository declaration that self-defense is applicable "if an armed attack occurs," is an infringement on that right. Is it a deterrent to those who would falsely claim self defense? Probably not. Is it valuable as a temporizing guide? Not very, since this world of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons defies analysis of the word "occurs." Was self-defense applicable during the Cuban Quarantine? The President of the United States did not think so.

The Cuban action in 1962 was not defined as an act of unilateral self-defense because it was *regionally* applied, internationally imposed against ships of third states, particularly limited in maritime area, and accepted by some publicists as a unique operation on the high seas. The proposition that the Cuban Quarantine could have been effected under Article 51 and justified as self-defense is irrelevant. It is not as inapplicable as the contention that the United States Congress should have declared war in order to meet the technical requirements of belligerent blockade under international law, but it is as professionally unsound.⁹ The major fallacy of each post-mortem dissertation is that every justifiable aspect of the Cuban Quarantine is based on some unrelated divagation of international law which was force fitted to the occasion, most probably because publicists viewed the affair from a back azimuth. For example, various interpretations of the United Nations Charter were welded onto old postulates of blockade to preserve the structure of argument, and the ancient cliches of self-defense and pacific blockade, which normally wed only by shotgun, were remolded by some publicists into forms of pop international law. The treatises expounded on one of two major themes: What quarantine wasn't, or what it might be. No one seemed overly concerned about declaring what it was! Mr. Quincy Wright, a noted author in the international law field, did suggest that it wasn't anything, but this burst of candor failed to clarify the situation.¹⁰

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So, the Cuban Quarantine wasn't self-defense, according to America's declaration, since it was regionally applied; it shouldn't be pacific blockade, because the United States is committed to the rights of third parties (such as the Soviet Union) in that regard;¹¹ and, as no state of war existed which could justify the tidy concept of belligerent blockade, there was a problem of definition. The possibility that quarantine could be a new doctrine was at least as novel as it was unacceptable.

Yet the doctrine was at least unique, for it was a restrained and moderate *regional action* with *combined forces* within *UN Charter rules* which demanded careful and considerate seamanship and diplomatic confrontation from the naval commanders at the scene. Every anticipated interception was first massaged in the Pentagon and, if a deliberate encounter could not have been avoided, then the mission was clearly defined—"Disable; don't sink!"¹²

THE NEED FOR REGIONAL ACTION

International organizations provide means by which a number of vexing problems in world affairs may be tackled.

Andrew M. Scott

When the President of the United States rang the alarm by issuing Proclamation 3504 which established the Cuban Quarantine, he twice referred to the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, but failed to mention the United Nations. The members of the United Nations, of course, could have sanctioned the quarantine, directed the members of the Organization of American States to take action, or disapproved of the whole affair.

The fact that the members of the United Nations did none of these things is indeed significant, for their failure to take action in time of crisis lends credence to the argument that, when this paramount organization remains inert, regional agencies might be usefully activated to solve "vexing problems."

The view, however, is far from receiving popular acceptance. There is a more parochial attitude that recognizes the affirmative

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direction and approval of the UN members as the only frame of reference within which regional operations can function when directed toward maintaining world peace and security. This Utopian school seems to stress that if harmony is to exist, everyone must adhere to the written word, and not interpret the principles. The paradox is that often the principles would have to be sacrificed when the literal results of a Security Council veto guarantee international stagnation. It is hard to convince many small states that what is morally right cannot always be passively gained. An inclination to vegetate righteously is a tragic weakness which the world cannot afford.

What is plain today, however, is that the members of regional agencies may choose to react within the general confines of the UN Charter whenever necessary and, unless the United Nations members forcefully and positively move toward the solution of a problem, the members of regional agencies may choose to pilot their own way out of international storms.

Since the United States leadership has been so openly committed to regional alignments since World War II, the shock of the Cuban Quarantine under OAS auspices should have been cushioned. Subsequently, many unaffiliated national representatives privately condoned the manner in which the members of the OAS handled the affair, even when they did not agree with their international legal position. This inconsistency, in itself, reflects that if reasonable response, general unanimity, and pacific intent conflict with certain strict interpretations of the United Nations Charter, there are still those who prefer personal paralysis to progressive international rehabilitation.

The gist of most arguments was whether the Organ of Consultation could invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), without first complying with the United Nations Charter. By "complying," a most stringent interpretation was presented.

Article 6 of the Rio Treaty provides that:

If the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.¹³

Article 6 clearly bestows on the Organ of Consultation the right to determine, and even define, the "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America," and to decide "the measures which should be taken . . . for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent."

The Rio Treaty was not a clandestine agreement quickly unraveled to meet the threat of Cuban missiles. Therefore, the fact that the quarantine was invoked under Articles 6 and 8 (the latter provides for the use of armed forces) could not be considered a diplomatic subterfuge. Was the only excuse for scholarly tension perhaps the fact that the quarantine would not glide into any convenient academic niche?

The Organ of Consultation of the OAS has unequivocal authority to direct whatever regional restrictive measures that its members deem necessary, and to call for the voluntary military aid of member nations. The members must, by implication, subordinate their actions to the United Nations membership, but it is illogical and unimaginative to equate this subordinate position to one of watchful waiting. There also must be a recognition of affirmative duties by United Nations members if they hope to preserve the peace and security that they are so fond of vocally embracing. The members of the Organization of American States recognized this responsibility and appeared to have conscientiously acted in a

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moderate and reasonable manner. Another international lawyer, Mr. Chayes, states:

We remember that war in this century has twice engulfed us all, willy-nilly. Paper commitments to right conduct did not stop it. Above all we are burdened with the knowledge and the power to destroy the world. The international landscape today, too, looks quite different than it did a century ago. It is peopled with permanent organizations of states—some more comprehensive, some less, some purely for defense, and some with broader purposes. It is through these organizations that we hope to give reality to our pledges to maintain the peace.¹⁴

In response to Mr. Chayes, it can be argued that you can only work through these organizations within rigid tolerances if you abide by the UN Charter. For example, two of the more impractical specifications are that the United Nations members must *direct* all regional action and that the Security Council members must *affirmatively approve* any regional operation prior to its initiation. Thus, vacillation or veto by members of the Security Council would prohibit regional response.

The morality of the Cuban Quarantine was not widely debated. This was due, in part, to the moderate use of force. The Rio Treaty also has not been in contention and, in this case, the world society seems to have applauded or at least acquiesced. In addition, it was a modest success at advancing regional peace and resolving a dispute in a restrained manner. But was it, in spite of its fairly reasonable stature, a new chapter in international law?

Modern international law is usually related to conventions, treaties, general recognition, judicial reason, international custom and the world's acceptance of the practices of states. Although the Cuban Quarantine contained a considerable number of these active elements it seems that publicists might prefer to let the doctrine of quarantine marinate. Today's pace, however, may not be able to tolerate this pedantic affection for lolling in limbo.

British Prime Minister MacMillan stated that the regional measures used in the Cuban Quarantine were "studiously

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moderate."¹⁵ Perhaps they can become studiously acceptable. Since some benefits accrued from the Cuban Quarantine, then the joint interests of nations might look to it again.

QUARANTINE—A NEW LEGAL ENTITY?

There is, among all mankind, the burden of the valley of vision.

Isaiah

The need for progressive and creative reappraisal of international law must be inherent in the world community or a future challenge may remain unanswered. The Cuban Quarantine seemed to be an example of how the "valley of vision" may remain obscured by a semantical fogbank.

New concepts were applicable to the Cuban Quarantine and, if they had been formidably projected, they might have enhanced arguments that a delicate legal norm for regional agencies had been born. One publicist did write that, "The quarantine-interdiction clearly meets the requirements of reasonable necessity in its most stringent form. In the same way, the proportionality requirements, in most extreme form, is met easily."¹⁶ The word "interdiction" throws a small blot on his discussion of the quarantine's validity under international law merely because it hints at equating quarantine with something else. This tendency to drive in reverse, usually toward the safe haven of unilateral pacific blockade, weakens the analytical foundation of most quarantine arguments.

Simply stated a quarantine might be considered to contain the following *proposed* elements:

- Effected by a regional agency
- Implemented by "combined" naval forces
- Submitted for Security Council approval
- Based on reasonable necessity
- Directed to use proportional measures

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- Controlled by a "regional" commander
- Activated only within a specific region
- Restricted to the high seas
- Warranted for exact materials
- Confined to a definite operational area

There are puddles of significant depth in these ten propositions, but at least an attempt can be made to wade through them toward a new doctrine.

Effected by a Regional Agency. A regional agency which has authority to act under Chapter VIII of the Charter should be one which, upon application, is so recognized by the members of the United Nations. Its charter should be on file with members of the General Assembly who, in turn, should set up strict criteria for the recognition of regional agencies. The United Nations members also could take a positive position and forbid action under Chapter VIII of the Charter by any regional agency which was not legally recognized by the world organization.

Implemented by "Combined" Naval Forces. If quarantine is to be an effective doctrine, the operation must be strictly enforced by the naval units of the participating member nations away from the sovereign territory of the quarantined state. Such impartial and remote application would require combined naval power, applied under a regional agency's auspices.

Submitted for Security Council Approval. The members of a regional agency should submit their proposed quarantine plan to the members of the Security Council prior to taking action. This plan should conform to the guidelines of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Security Council stagnation should not delay the implementation of the quarantine.

Based on Reasonable Necessity. It should be made clear to the members of the United Nations that a quarantine would not be imposed without substantial justification. In addition, the rational purpose of the quarantine must be made apparent, through the

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submission of direct evidence to the members of the United Nations, chiefly to allay the anticipated fears, tensions, and distrust of smaller nations toward powerful actions directed by the members of regional agencies.

Directed to Use Proportional Measures. A quarantine must, of necessity, announce its intended purpose to use moderate military measures directed toward its success—as long as strict adherence to the rules is accepted. Quarantine should be enforced with as much courtesy, decorum, consideration, or conflict as the occasion demands. Peaceful coercion is, at best, about as logical a concept as limited sanity. However, only a minimum of options can be allowed to naval unit commanders. Carefully programmed procedures should be formulated and made explicit in order to provide for all reasonably foreseen contingencies.

Controlled by a "Regional" Commander. Regardless of the nationality of the officer directly responsible for the implementation of the quarantine, regional representation should be a requirement of the command staff. This facet of the operation should be planned within regional organizations well in advance. Multi-lingual staff members should be identified so that they can be moved from their regularly assigned naval billets in a reasonable time. In addition, each regional commander should be pre-selected by member nations. Specific units can be subsequently placed under his command at the discretion of the member states, since preassignment of ships and aircraft usually would be impractical.

Activated Only Within a Specific Region. Once a regional charter is recognized by the members of the United Nations, the members should expect and demand that the regional agency's military operations remain limited, and actively conform to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In this regard the members of the United Nations should have authority to revoke a regional agency charter, or at least disavow their sanction of the quarantine operation. It should be noted that a regional agency's members may have prime national interests in a relatively remote geographic area; e.g., the members of NATO in the Persian Gulf or

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Indian Ocean. Quarantine, therefore should be interpreted as a matter of interest, not regional geography.

Restricted to the High Seas. A temporary and special use of the high seas to prohibit the flow of certain materials does not implant its principles on a nation's soil. In addition, it need not contravene the freedom of the high seas since "these freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all states with *reasonable regard* to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."¹⁷ In addition, the partial interruption of the offending state's sea communications is recognized by articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. Air interception should not be considered, since it requires too hazardous a component of quarantine operations.

Warranted for Exact Materials. A quarantine often must address itself to a logical list of the weapons and materials which are subject to quarantine. This list must be promulgated well in advance in order to apprise world merchantmen of the risks they may reasonably expect. All consuls of regional member nations, with the exception of the state under quarantine, should have the authority to grant Clearance Certification to ships carrying authorized cargo. If a ship's captain chooses to ignore the quarantine, he must be made to accept visit and search. In the event certain quarantined items are discovered, he should be escorted out of the area and into a port of a member nation.

Confined to a Definite Operational Area. Simply because the members of a regional agency have a wide area of interest, it does not follow that a quarantine must be established worldwide. Similarly, members of a regional agencies cannot allow their naval unit commanders to dash about as uncontained as picnic ants. The operational plan presented to the Security Council members should delineate a minimum high seas area wherein a quarantine force can operate effectively. Notices to Mariners should be issued, special signal requirements promulgated, Clearance Certificate procedures published, the circumstances surrounding visit and search explicitly outlined, and prohibited and restricted areas

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designated. These are, admittedly, bothersome details, but if the relatively peaceful intent of a quarantine is to merit acclaim, solid administrative effort must be directed toward the considerate and restrained manner in which a quarantine is initiated.

No attempt can be made to fit quarantine to all of the foregoing rules in every instance. The pure and the perfect standards of theory are usually attenuated in practice. Yet, corollaries do contribute to new solutions and if quarantine can be equated to a relatively peaceful regional action then publicists should strive to dismiss archaic principles of belligerent or pacific blockades in favor of the emerging rules of international peace and collective security.

Unfortunately, according to Edward Carr, practicality often escapes legal literati and, "If every prospective writer on international affairs in the past twenty years had taken a compulsory course in elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained unwritten."¹⁸

There are certain obstacles to the doctrine of quarantine, but as long as the procedure, even once, has deterred conflict, international law specialists should examine the maxims as a possible pattern of universal reason. The practical consequences of adopting quarantine as a regional response also should be weighed carefully by all nations, for they may find that it is not too extraordinary a tactic for future application in their own areas.

In summary, quarantine may be too valuable to discard, too powerful to dismiss, too controversial to disappear, and too unprecedented to equate easily. Yet, it could remain a dominant theme in world affairs if viewed by international law experts as a unique legal entity which might be used to resolve disputes in the interest of world peace.

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APPENDIX

EXTRACTS FROM ARTICLES 52, 53, AND 54 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 52 (In part)

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

Article 53 (In part)

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

Article 54 (In part)

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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3. THE QUAGMIRE OF SELF-DEFENSE

“Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs.”

Article 51, Charter of the United Nations

WHAT IS SELF-DEFENSE?

The general purpose forces of the United States are intended to deter conflict and to provide for defense should deterrence fail.

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

The right of a nation to defend itself against foreign invaders is unquestioned. The United Nations Charter, as well as the many multilateral pacts which blossomed after World War II, are committed adamantly to the precept of self-defense—although there are extensive differences of opinion about how such articles should be applied—or whether self-defense is even definable.

For example, how forcefully can a nation act preemptively with military, economic, or political weapons in the name of self-defense to assure that a threat to its sovereignty never develops? What constitutes a threat? It seems syntactically, that the limits of self-defense are never quantifiable? In practice some nations have stocked arsenals in the name of self-defense with weapons that have become so offensive in character that they tend to trigger military responses among neighbors, and increase the possibility of war. Are the *elements of national security* in such instances confused with the *doctrine of self-defense*?

National security, of course, consists of other elements than just military power, such as the size and loyalty of the populace, the health and education of the citizenry, the agricultural and industrial base, the stability of the government, the mass and geographic location of the state's territory, and the relative capabilities of potential adversaries. This potpourri, though not all encompassing, contains some determinants for more accurately evaluating the ability of a nation to survive.

Therefore, despite the fact that the right of *self-defense* is engraved indelibly on the tablets of international law, the degree of force a state may project either inside or outside of its own boundaries in the name of *national security* is indefinable. This semantical conflict is most apparent when a nation projects military force

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beyond its borders—ostensibly to deter others from threatening its existence—and then demands that its actions be blessed in the name of self-defense.

Parenthetically, as more and more nations become recognized as independent entities, each new state may eventually be expected to determine the manpower, funding, weapons and allied commitments which it interprets as necessary to survive. It is often during the process of analyzing these needs that the doctrine of self-defense becomes inextricably tangled with national security.

In sum, national security is a vibrant, ever-changing concept which should not be confused with the doctrine of self-defense. In fact, the forces required for national security, both internal and external, may or may not be sufficient to defend a nation.

An additional analytical point is that self-defense is often proclaimed by leaders as a political ploy to retain government control, rather than to guard geographic borders. Therefore, if self-defense frequently becomes a battle cry of governments soliciting support against their *own* people solely to stay in power—rather than a legitimate call for help to repel invaders—the members of the United Nations really should insist that the doctrine of self-defense as now defined in the UN Charter receive a more detailed scrutiny.

With regard to this last supposition, one might suspect that government leaders are more inclined to raise the legally vague issue of self-defense today than in the past as a gambit to retain political control simply because it exists in nebulous form in the UN Charter. Therefore, the proposition that the right of self-defense for each nation is not the same as the right of self-defense for those in control of the government should be addressed as a formidable concern by publicists—if only because the internal and internecine conflicts which may arise within and between many of the 150 or more nations pose unique challenges in interpreting the doctrine of self-defense. Nations tend to grope belatedly for such stable doctrinal handholds of international law after conflicts occur, and the claim of self-defense tends to cloak egregious acts.

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Each self-defense plea must then be analyzed more critically it seems, for if the menace proclaimed by a government's leaders is not externally precipitated, the doctrine of self-defense really may not be applicable. All national leaders should, therefore, weigh the degree of their involvement in foreign controversies much more carefully than they have in the past, for intervention—purportedly in defensive support of a friendly government in peril—can escalate to a confrontation with others who are in sympathy with anti-government forces, and who do not recognize self-defense as a legitimate claim.

The doctrine of self-defense, then, appears to be a fluid principle, since it relates not only to the right of a nation to survive, but also to a determination by political leaders to take whatever actions they believe necessary to survive—and such actions may be wholly contradictory to the concept of self-defense when viewed by others. Therefore, all nations should ask: What are the bounds of self-defense? Are the elements of self-defense and national security fungible? What self-defense options are available to smaller nations? And, is a concept of "supportive" self-defense applicable to third states during a nation's internal strife?

The doctrine of self-defense as presented in the UN Charter is an important element in international relations today because it now is so often used, misused and abused, particularly by the Soviet leadership. It is in this context that it should be examined.

THE SELF-DEFENSE THRESHOLD

But war's game which, were their subjects wise, kings
would not play at.

William Cowper

Despite the expressed value of the United Nations as an arbiter of disputes, it is often alleged that this organization has become a pedestal for pronouncements, rather than a purveyor of peace. How did this occur?

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The United Nations representatives at San Francisco laid down moral principles no less admirable than those contained in the Holy Alliance. Unfortunately, neither provided winding keys for their ideological mechanisms. As a result, Elmer Plischke has noted that,

The purest interpretations of the United Nations Charter often were the ones supported most adamantly regardless of their practicality.¹

For example, self-defense is recognized by the members of the UN as a universal basic right; but at what time and under what conditions? Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states, in part, "if an armed attack occurs." Does this mean an offensive stance, or an overt act—a sailing toward, or the amphibious landing—a missile launching, or the explosive impact? Defensive response may not be able to await a legal interpretation. Sir Winston Churchill stated:

The discretion of the (Security) Council was unfettered by definitions of "aggression" and rules about when force could be used and when sanctions could be applied.²

During the rainbow days, when the UN Charter was in embryo, many pious platitudes meandered into the finished product. Article 51 was an exception, however; it was considered objectively and composed carefully. Unilateral force was discouraged. Legitimate self-defense was recognized but, wisely, not defined.

Although self-defense still is unfettered by definition, numerous legal writers do not recognize this as a barrier. For example, Article 51 of the UN Charter was not the United States Secretary of State's posture in October 1962; yet, some publicists insisted on justifying the Cuban Quarantine strictly as an act of self-defense, and all of them discussed it within this vague parameter. Many other writers in the international law arena leaned lightly on the self-defense theory; and, one publicist stated that if it was not self-defense, it was illegal; and, if it was self-defense, it was unjustified.³ It is apparent that some international lawyers, in this instance, climbed to the self-defense crest only because Article 51,

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like Mount Everest, was there. It always will be! Self-defense is clutched fondly as a legitimate international offspring when it is, too often, only a political bastard.

Can a self-defensive action by any nation, for example, ever be anticipatory? Can it be related to actions on the high seas? Can it involve third states? Can it justify an invasion of another state's territory? Can it be covert? Can it be effected by the joint action of strong states against a weak one? Historically, self-defense has been used in all these instances. As with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile may remain, but it can reappear bodily at will.

Legitimate self-defense is, therefore, in the eyes of the beholder. The offenses which have been committed in the name of self-defense are no less gross than sins committed under religious banners. Similarly, it is difficult to find a nation which did not go to war as a proclaimed matter of self-defense. The phrase has such a pure ring of justice that it peals throughout history.

The United Nations usually has avoided the responsibility for determining the defender and the aggressor in any conflict. Self-defense may be beyond their ken. This doesn't add stature to the organization, but it reflects reality. Another publicist, Arnold Wolfers, observed that:

Even in the era in which a country's expansion would usually take the form of an armed attack across international boundaries, it was often uncertain which of the belligerents had first attacked or which could be held responsible for the hostilities.⁴

Of course, all United Nations members are well aware of their right of self-defense—as they see it. It is doubtful if they would ever ask fellow delegates if a specific incident, actively encountered, would justify self-defense. They would, instead, react individually and debate the right at some later date. Self-defense, by definition, defies deliberation. The memory of Haile Selassie's tragic, unanswered appeal to the members of the League of Nations for defensive help during the Ethiopian crisis is a sad reminder of the line of demarcation which exists between idealism and politics.

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When recalling the fall of Ethiopia to Fascism over a half century ago, emerging nations might be cautioned to remain acutely aware of the fact that Marxism also does not nurture the humanities, and Soviet Communists have not renounced their goal of world domination. Since this doctrine includes communistically inspired wars of national liberation, internal as well as external self-defense should be addressed concurrently. And, since there seems to be a reservoir of economic and political instability welled up in some smaller nations which are striving to survive in a great power world, many may already be in the tremulous position that Sir Winston Churchill described as a man in a tiger's cage, hoping not to provoke him while steadily dinner time approaches.

In the past, many governments have depended partially on foreign aid or on multilateral pacts to supplement their own self-defensive efforts. However, the realities of tighter worldwide economies have required many nations to accept the fact that their security cannot forever be guaranteed by others. In view of the population explosion, the growing shortages of natural resources, increased environmental concerns, unfulfilled human expectations (most noticeably among the educated and unemployed generations both at home and abroad), new countries may question whether even the superpowers will ever again be able to inject sufficient aid to affect their economic goals, their political stability or even their survival as nation-states, to any degree at all.

Today there is a decided need for combined defensive efforts on a more local basis among new nations which will dispel many Pollyanna attitudes toward survivability. The failure of underdeveloped countries to forge their defenses vigorously can result in a plague of euphoria that they can ill afford to contract. Perhaps some degree of joint security and regional cooperation can be achieved through new local alliances which, in many areas, are more likely to deter potential enemies than expensive, solitary efforts—often generated in the past in the name of self-defense at the cost of improved living standards.

THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THREATS

Most government behavior is lagging behind changes in underlying realities.

Klaus Knorr

Government behavior, at least when cloaked in the livery of self-defense, seems to have been worn threadbare, and the "changes in underlying realities" which have occurred in international relations through interlocking cultural, economic, and military agreements since World War II may have made today's interpretations of self-defense more phantasmal than real. The most recent example is Afghanistan's nebulous call for Soviet help to defend it from some supposed threat.

Historically, a breaching of geographic borders, the blockading of maritime ports, the bombarding of territory, or an invasion across beachheads provided the subjected state with a clear cut call to arms. Under such circumstances, the banner of self-defense could be unfurled to favorable winds of world opinion and waved valiantly to incite the citizenry. Confronting such flagrant offensive deeds was considered an honorable and gallant action; so much so that, by design, nations reserved their obvious right of self-defense in international accords. The threat of attack was fixed on precise bearings.

But, as twentieth century relations became more complex, the definition of "a threat" and the doctrine of self-defense gained new interpretations. Specifically, the threats which a nation perceived as real were often either imaginary or exaggerated as dangers to national survival—and the doctrine of self-defense was quite apt to be invoked to justify the use of military force against other nations. The philosophy of responding only "if an armed attack occurs" became muddled.

As recent examples of relatively significant events when the Kremlin's leaders chose to use military force, which did not appear to be self-defensive in character nor threatening in context,

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the cry to save Afghanistan or, earlier, to defend Czechoslovakia in 1968, mostly reflected the panic of Soviet authorities.

Even America's entry into World War I, while directed toward ultimate US interests, German threats, and the national security concerns of European allies, was technically off key when tuned to the pure chord of self-defense. Making the world safe for democracy, while noble, seems remote from a pitched battle for the control of Providence, Rhode Island. Pearl Harbor provided a more classic rationale for self-defense since "an armed attack occurred" and the threat was real.

Subsequently, the United States has been presented with more politically complex rebus puzzles, portrayed for the public on television in living (or livid) color. Did an armed attack on American ships (Tonkin Gulf, Pueblo, or Mayaguez), against American embassies overseas (Iran, Pakistan and Libya), or against nations in which the United States had an interest (South Korea, Dominican Republic, and South Vietnam) justify the use of military force by the United States on the grounds of either direct or indirect self-defense? What *threat* was posed?

In such cases, the *a priori* propositions of self-defense existed, or at least were so presented, but no threat to the survival of the United States was apparent. In some ways, this brought the doctrine of self-defense full circle. Earlier parallel ventures against the Barbary pirates, the forced march to relieve the embassy at Peking during the Boxer Rebellion, and numerous military excursions into Latin America during the 1920's also resulted because of an armed attack against individuals or property under the protection of the US flag.

Were these early and more recent escapades somewhat credible as requisite responses under the doctrine of self-defense, or only actions sparked by varying degrees of nationalistic fervor? It appears that although the coercive measures taken abroad against others in all of these instances related to specific threats, and also to the broader concept of national security, the narrower

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guidelines of self-defense—even after “an armed attack occurs”—may not have been applicable.

Such past experiences seem to indicate that a threat will often be exaggerated to kindle a military conflagration unless a nation's leadership acts to prevent fire. In the Pueblo and Iranian Embassy incidents, for example, the United States could have selected either a patient or a pugilistic stance. It chose patience. Conversely, the capture of the Mayaguez triggered armed response. In each case, an armed attack occurred, a real threat to individuals existed, and the prestige of the nation was an issue. However, in the first instance, the threat was viewed partly as a relational problem and, in the second, wholly as an operational one. In threat situations, this choice often exists. In *The Dynamics of International Politics*, the authors stated:

The concept of power is employed in both relational and operational context: relational in terms of how the initiator evaluates his comparative power and how certain other states estimate it; operational in the sense of how much and what kinds of strength, and what means of employment are necessary to achieve national objectives.⁵

To this might be added—and whether the means should be employed at all. Threats, both real and imagined, besiege national leaders. Either precipitous reaction, or reluctance to challenge, are contradictory dangers which can affect political stability, national prestige, world power balance, third state relationships, and economic plans. The security of a nation requires self-defense, but self-defense is such a very specific doctrine that it may not be very applicable as a response to threats alone; and, many intangible threats might only fester if they were not treated with massive doses of military force as open wounds.

Some of the wounds which advanced nations might expect to suffer today include: kidnapping, hijacking aircraft, capturing ships, holding hostages, terrorizing citizens, increasing raw material prices, assaulting embassies, withholding exports of needed resources, and political assassinations. When would the

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intensity of such acts justify the use of force in the name of self-defense? Does the safety of citizens, economic strangulation, or acts which may unseat the government in power permit the subjected nation's leaders to take up arms against the perpetrators as a self-defensive operation?

Once again, the charm of the doctrine of self-defense is in its chameleon characteristics. It can look in almost every direction, and change color at will. If a threat is self-interpreted as endangering any of the many factors which comprise national security, a nation's leaders are likely to select armed force as the preferred action to remove it. This should not be interpreted to mean that the doctrine of self-defense is technically applicable; only that it is diplomatically attractive, and convenient to invoke.

By aggrandizing the threat, propagandizing the populace, and militarizing the response, government leadership—in the name of self-defense—often hopes to mold national will into a more decisive form. Patience and negotiation usually can be employed “relationally,” by advanced nations, but this peaceful method is not apt to incite the citizenry to join together as one voice. A self-defensive action by military forces, however, cries for consensus. More pointedly, it also cries for caution, for armed conflict is the ultimate “operational” choice of a nation—ultimate because it has to consider war as an escalational consequence of its commitment.

In contrast to those wounds which afflict advanced nations, lesser threats to smaller countries might be diagnosed literally as cancerous. Some African and Asian nations have already suffered sub-division since gaining independence, and instabilities in Latin America evoke pessimistic forecasts for political tranquility or economic convalescence in the Western Hemisphere. According to William Epstein:

Any solution to the problem of developing countries can be found only in achieving a more equitable sharing of the world's wealth, which is a euphemistic way of describing a lowering of the standard of living in the rich countries in order to help raise the standard of living in the poor countries.⁶

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When can we expect the leaders of the richer countries to respond to this oft declared but simplistic solution? If not at all, then it can be anticipated that the instability which appears in the political and economic areas of many nations will be exacerbated, governments will collapse, and people will live on the brink of starvation. At some time, however, the more frustrated nations may break into the world forcefully in order to guarantee their own survival; and, if the great power world sometimes treats its own minor afflictions with the military balm of self-defense, it is likely that some young countries will similarly adopt a self-defensive stance. The threshold of threat is much narrower for those nation states whose very existence is tenuous than it is for the major powers which have the luxury of determining when and if they should order their military forces to cross the sill. As a result, the justification of aggression in the name of self-defense may, at future times, be proclaimed by lesser developed countries for unique economic or political reasons.

GLOBAL VERSUS REGIONAL DEFENSE

It is simply that the sheer mass of humanity in today's world swallows aid without digesting it.

Quincy Wright

Defining the security interests of Third World nations has often seemed to be only a political, academic, and editorial pastime. And, despite the fact that this complex exercise is as inexact a science as charting paths for either the stock market or migrating whales, many editorialists have no qualms about spouting the same sort of nonsense proclaimed by financial and fish experts.

For young nations, the problem lies not in the semantics of national security versus self-defense, but in pursuing survival successfully. Each country considers its self-defense forces essential; but, should such forces be structured by designing nuclear weapons, conscripting standing armies, seeking superpower alliances, manning intelligence networks, building warships, buying bombers, or training mobile attack forces?

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Each year national leaders make such military decisions to provide for their defense; yet, whatever force mix they choose frequently dissatisfies someone—often the United States or the USSR. Perhaps this is because designing a nation's military structure is like community theater—it seems always so over-directed that it plays to no one's complete satisfaction. There is no alternative, however, for self-defense forces must remain as a priority in a nation's budget. James Brierly maintains that:

In the last resort almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinate to the right of self-preservation.⁷

Unfortunately the "right of self-preservation," as events revealed in Afghanistan, also can be as nebulous as the claim of self-defense. Once again, the clear and rational light of national survival was shadowed by a penumbra of political claims. The Afghan leadership alleged that it was threatened (by whom?), it required assistance (why Soviet?), and the doctrine of self-defense was applicable (to protect Soviet surrogates?) While the guidelines for the use of force in self-defense are not always distinct, the imaginative claims of Afghan and Soviet leaders seem to have strained the elastic margins of belief for even the broadest expansion of the doctrine of self-defense.

As the Afghanistan incursion also proved, many nations place themselves near the Soviet abyss without constructing a policy bridge to carry them over. To span such ideological entrapment many young countries have depended for their survival on the support of the United States armed forces, or even upon the ethics and reason of others—two rare commodities in the foreign affairs marketplace.

From a military standpoint, which may be an unstable platform for new nations, global pacts do not seem to have aided emerging countries at all. In some instances, the primary motive of banding nations together for a common defense may have been diluted by the presence of either the United States or the USSR, for as long as the superpowers supported an organization, the smaller members appeared disinclined to make sacrificial efforts or substantial contributions. As James Reston has noted, somewhat cynically,

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Nations will never face up to what they can afford for defense so long as they feel reasonably sure that the United States will maintain a global police force for action.⁸

Today, however, there are over 150 nations, and multipact enthusiasm seems to have diminished. In addition, most of the young states are now outside the two major power blocs, and these blocs often parry for position without any practical consideration for the rest of the earth's sovereigns. The United States and the USSR are, in a universal sense, the big minions.

Some mind-boggling defensive alliances previously formed under the auspices of the United States and the USSR included former colonialists and noncolonialists, aggressors and defenders, the safe and the endangered, World War allies and their enemies, democracies and dictatorships, Communists and professed anti-Communists, and the atomic "haves" and "have nots." These superpower alliances accepted *joint self-defense* as a global tenet; and, since they often treated international relations as a self-designed science, they could buffet imperfect winds and emerge intact from political straits. Initially, most new nations now need to test their sails in calmer local waters.

New nations might consider that, in the future, the USSR may not wade into troubled waters, despite its urge to fish. There also is the possibility that major arbiters, including the leaders of the United States and USSR, will manifest supreme disinterest in local disputations simply because the winner and the loser both look good (or bad) to them. There is the added consideration that the geographic giants may not wish to be branded as external aggressors or military interventionists on some future date because their image might be shining in another area at the time, and avoiding tarnish would be a politically polished maneuver.

As previously noted, the United Nations—once the greatest hope for small nations—now also is, at most, a restorer rather than a keeper of the peace. The United Nations cannot gain credibility in its drive to become a world authority which enforces the law upon others, at least when it relies only on moral pontifications. Its dissociation with either economic warfare or military response dur-

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ing many past rebellions and disputes is a flat denial of its intended responsibility—but an honest appraisal of reality. So, while the members of the United Nations keep singing the psalm that collective security belongs to a different and presumably better world, this heartening hymn for future generations does nothing to sponsor their existence.

If neither the United Nations members nor the superpowers will respond to future pleas for defensive aid against direct or indirect aggression or internal rebellion, then who will?

There seems to be no panacea which will assure the viability of the new nations, with or without foreign aid and protective promises. And, since history records that neighborhood wars are frequent, the Third World may be expected to have boundary disputes, wars of national liberation, coup d'etats, revolutions, and revolts just as surely as their arsenals are expanding, unless nations intermarry locally to eliminate some causes of the internal feuds and then bind their families together defensively to thwart external attacks. It is no longer a question of whether changes will be made, but when, and by whom? Many incidents trigger the world's nervous system, and the prospect of military escalation ulcerates international stomachs every time a new nation picks up a pike. John Moore wrote that:

The culmination of the threat of international war really cannot be expected until the world has ceased to see the recurrence of local wars and thus, for the future, local disputations will be the paramount international issues.⁹

Recognizing the problem, however, often has been the finite goal of the few regional organizations which have been formed for defensive purposes among smaller nations to date. Is this because their ultimate dependence on the forces of the United States or the USSR has made them spectators rather than players? Would the concept of *joint self-defense*, when locally initiated, be a reasonable solution for them in the future?

Is there some merit in proposing that smaller contiguous republics should align their defenses regionally, without super-

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power sponsorship, since they should at least understand each other's motives? In any negotiations, if one side offers nothing, it will most likely get nothing; and, since new states suspect that the United States or the USSR will extract an inordinate amount of profit in exchange for an umbrella of security, they may recognize that it is better to be rained on than raped.

With regard to this hypothesis, young nations also might question whether there is—or could be—a condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under such a condition each country's survival might become partially dependent on its joint defensive agreement with its neighbors. This could be particularly true in the face of external threats, since the coercive measures which could be brought to bear by the Soviet Union might destroy or at least endanger the burgeoning economy or the political stability of an underdeveloped country.

Therefore, if smaller nations fail jointly to handle their aggressive neighbors, if they refuse to form new regional alliances, if they ignore the secure prospects of applying the lawful doctrine of self-defense, if they continue to look over the horizon for supporting forces, or if they will not respond to threats of invasion, then their tolerance may summon the greedy.

Perhaps only a personal experience with aggression will convince them that their regional responsibility to themselves and their neighbors is to unite effectively through determination, organization, and cooperative defensive effort. Their future policies might become more dynamic if they deemphasized what the United States or the Soviet Union can do in favor of what they themselves must do to survive.

EQUATING NATIONAL SECURITY AND APPLYING SELF-DEFENSE

We are not unhappy about the same things. In goodly measure what we are unhappy about is one another.

Daniel Moynihan

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If weapons purchases can be considered as a criterion, most national leaders never seem to be satisfied with their ability to defend themselves—which is to say that they are unhappy with the power which other nations may have to control their destinies. Perhaps national security is a cat's paw which will always dupe decisionmakers into believing that such elusive goals as absolute defensive capability, regional stability, and geographic power balance are achievable. And yet, despite these halcyon objectives, national security is a task which cannot equate to anything else in importance for a nation's leaders. Nor, as previously mentioned, should it be confused with the more limited concept of self-defense.

This is not to argue that another nation, particularly an aggressive neighbor, may not have achieved a military superiority which causes apprehension, but only that arsenals are only one factor to consider when the will to survive is analyzed. Of course, national security requires constant attention to many components of a nation's structure, including self-defense forces. Inaction often encourages asymmetry wherein a potential enemy can increase its capacity to threaten, and thus gain economic, psychological and political advantages, as well as military ones.

Specifically, vacillation often seems to stimulate Communist expansion. This may be because Marxist ideology, at least in its purist sense, encourages its advocates to proselytize wherever potential problems congregate. In many ways, Marxism seems much more evangelical in concept than organized religion. More pointedly, there is a singular tenet which is admirably absent from Christian fervor in that Marxists may embrace violence with enthusiastic candor. This has been apparent in the Soviet Union's involvement in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, not to mention the use of Cuban troops in African nations.

Should young nations, then, view the doctrine of self-defense, as well as their many other national security interests, from two distinct philosophical levels? For most new countries, the involvement of their military forces would seem to be ultimately *acceptable* only in a self-defensive capacity. For Communists, however,

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conflict often is offensively *desirable*. New nations should acknowledge this reality and analyze Soviet activities in their areas more objectively, especially since the national security of some nations may depend, in part, on future Soviet hegemonic policies. Each nation might ask, for example, is Soviet involvement in this region probable and, if so, is it likely to be internally or externally initiated? Additionally, can Soviet proxy troops be expected to intervene in local conflicts?

Except in Afghanistan, the Soviet armed forces usually have retained a relatively low military profile in the Third World, and Kremlin leaders purposely may have kept their participation at a reasonably discreet and manageable level. But could the future insertion of Communist agitators, or the integration of proxy forces where political instability exists, help to induce impotency in some government leaders? If such a danger becomes apparent, what alternatives are available to young countries in the face of Soviet hegemony?

Interestingly, the Chinese conviction is that the countries of the second and third worlds can be brought together in a united front to thwart the hegemonic aspirations of the superpowers.

Perhaps this is the *joint defensive* policy which some nations may choose to adopt as their counterpoise to wars of national liberation sponsored by the Soviet Union. The irony of forging a Chinese style "united front" for such a purpose should appeal to anti-Communists. But, is this really a practical defense policy for young countries? It seems to consist of a worldwide constituency which even the most enthusiastic global advocates have long abandoned. Today, it is probable that this option would not be as attractive to many nations as policies of either neutralism or nonalignment.

Additionally, the united front concept, even when implemented in the past on a modest regional basis, does not seem to have provided a shield against Communist hegemony. Former organizational efforts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America often appeared to be composed only of tiny political time capsules which were ques-

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tionably useful in curing minor regional colds—and totally ineffective in preventing major geographic plagues. The changes in governments, and the continuing confrontations which continue to inhabit these three areas, may be an indication that broad-based organizations are not suited to a type of united front which can guarantee national security, or even contribute to the self-defense forces of each member nation.

Of course, distortions in resource allocations also may cause internal dissension within former regional organizations. Funds for national security often seemed to be budgeted solely on the basis of each member's individual perceptions, rather than joint decisions. In the future, smaller nations might be inclined to examine the sanctity of their own military budgets more critically to determine if their arms purchases are either endangering or contributing to regional security. The result of their analyses may lead to a determination that joint defensive forces are a preferable alternative to regional chaos.

As previously mentioned, another factor which will continue to contribute to regional chaos is the dedicated commitment to world revolution espoused by Marxist fanatics who may be expected to take advantage of the instability which often exists in young governments. Lin Piao stated:

In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples.¹⁰

If such revolutions are to be avoided, many national leaders must address deterrents other than solitary self-defense or even regional alliances. For example, political and economic stability, when pursued as emphatic goals, might become more tangible assets than regional arsenals in countering revolutions. This is not to suggest that the financial burden for propping up either the economies or the leaders of new nations should be attempted wholly by outside powers. It might even be argued cogently that, in some cases, the expectations of young countries were too optimistically encouraged through foreign aid.

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However, a modest amount of regional aid might be applicable as a self-defensive measure to help confront the forces of revolution, when used to improve economic and political stability within underdeveloped areas. While regional aid could not be expected to approach the massive contributions often provided by the developed countries, such local financial support would convey a spirit of camaraderie that might be enough to discourage some internal revolts. By demonstrating neighborly concern and affecting living standards favorably, albeit gradually, this type of regional assistance, combined with modest military forces, might be a more practical method for young nations to adopt—both in their internal and external self-defensive interests. Such actions would be visible signs of determination to nearby countries that by standing together the region might remain secure.

What else might a young nation do to immunize itself from the disease of world revolution if it is not politically or economically stable, and lacks regional allies?

If there is some logic to Lin Piao's pronouncement, then it is worthwhile to theorize that some governments in underdeveloped areas, which do not choose to align regionally and which are politically or economically unstable, may only be able to remain in power forcefully. The question then arises, what degree of force may a government use to retain political control if it does not address the issues of regional security or economic and political stability more formidably? Such a nation is likely to quench revolutionary sparks and quell rebellious groups with military power, wholly in the professed interests of national security—and under the aegis of self-defense. But, in these instances, is the doctrine of self-defense really applicable?

From a Machiavellian viewpoint, the leadership of a country may use every degree of force imaginable to remain in power. Many often do. Even suppression, terror and torture have been historically effective in maintaining internal security and, quite frequently, have been justified as measures of self-defense.

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Should another nation, however, knowing or suspecting that such methods are employed, ever support that type of government when a plea for assistance is received on the grounds of self-defense?

It is important to recognize that, under such circumstances, there are many issues for a third state to consider in addition to the moral question. For example, in this extreme case, does it appear that the revolutionaries would be more or less humane than the inhumane government already in power? What national interests are involved for the third state, and how would the outcome affect them? Is there really a revolution, or only substantive acts of organized terrorism? Is the event wholly internal or, at least to some degree, externally sponsored? Does the conflict really threaten the existence of the nation involved, or merely the survival of the government in power? Are mutual defense treaties or bilateral agreements applicable? What is the anticipated outcome if the third state does not intervene? Does the third state really care which side wins? Would another nation or nations be inclined to join anti-government forces in opposition to the third state's intervention? And, finally, is the doctrine of self-defense actually appropriate for third states?

If, in the matrix of answers, the third state determines that it cares who wins, then it must decide: (1) whether it should intervene; (2) on which side, (3) for what purpose; (4) overtly or covertly; (5) for what period of time; and, (6) with what degree of military, economic, and political force.

Parenthetically, the third state usually can be expected to justify its intervention on the grounds of "supportive" self-defense if it becomes involved in response to a plea for help from the government in power. The Soviet Union frequently has adopted this semantical technique. For example, on 21 August 1968, the Soviet Press announced that:

Together with the troops of other fraternal armies, Soviet Forces went to the assistance of the Czechoslovak people in *defense* of the achievements of socialism against the *threat* of

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internal and external counterrevolutions.¹¹ (author's emphasis)

Recently, the same profession of defensive aid was announced following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Is the fact that the third state's national security was never threatened relevant? While invoking the doctrine of self-defense by a third state is viewed dubiously by publicists, the concept may be comparable to the designation of war criminals—there seems to be no question of justification in the minds of victors.

It seems, then, that the amount of force a government employs—whether from its own or third state resources—will be used on occasion solely to maintain control; and, regardless of the source of the threat, either internal or external, the force will be employed frequently under the banner of self-defense.

In practice, then, national security and self-defense seem to be integrated so intricately that governments tend to structure their internal and external *national security* policies—which consist of numerous factors other than military force—under the shibboleth of *self-defense*—which should be addressed as a far more limited concept. How should this idioglossia be translated?

National security, in part, relates to the many factors previously mentioned which affect the political and economic stability of a nation, its regional and worldwide trade relations and alliances, its internal and external security capabilities, and its viability within the family of nations. *Self-defense* is more appropriately directed toward the degree of force a nation must use to survive as a geographic, ethnic, social, and cultural entity when confronted by an external enemy which threatens its existence or its freedom of action. The difference is real, but the application is diffused and the interpretation vague.

Self-defense is, in today's world, a quagmire from which each nation dredges rationale for the use of military force to justify actions in its own national interests. It is, in sum, the phoenix of inter-

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national relations which can be expected to rise at the bidding of its political masters.

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