COUP AND CONSCIENCE: APPROACHING AN AMERICAN THRESHOLD. (U)

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COUP AND CONSCIENCE: APPROACHING
AN AMERICAN THRESHOLD

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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This study examines conditions which are influencing the American military to approach a behavioral threshold in civil-military relations. This threshold is a point of departure from traditional subordinated behavior. At the threshold a divergence is forecast toward either: (1) direct intervention into government (coup d'état), or (2) institutional autonomy within government (substantive behavior). The central issue is an unresolved relationship between temporary partisan civilian regimes and enduring military professionalism. Research is focused on the influences of a professional heritage and on contemporary environmental stress upon military behavior in American civil-military relations.

Research reveals that perceptions of regime legitimacy significantly affect the likelihood of crossing the American threshold. Key variables in the contemporary environment are found to be: (1) a definition of professionalism weighted with national vs. regime loyalty, and (2) a perception by the military of an accelerating external threat to national survival which is not perceived by the society it serves.
Coup and Conscience: Approaching an American Threshold

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ABSTRACT

COUP AND CONSCIENCE: APPROACHING AN AMERICAN THRESHOLD, by Major Theodore M. Moscheau, Jr., USAF, 48 pages

This study examines conditions which are influencing the American military to approach a behavioral threshold in civil-military relations. This threshold is a point of departure from traditional subordinated behavior. At the threshold a divergence is forecast toward either: (1) direct intervention into government (coup d'etat), or (2) institutional autonomy within government (substantive behavior). The central issue is an unresolved relationship between temporary partisan civilian regimes and enduring military professionalism. Research is focused on the influences of a professional heritage and on contemporary environmental stress upon military behavior in American civil-military relations.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous." Douglas MacArthur

This thesis contends that the relationship between temporary civilian regimes and military professionalism which MacArthur found dangerous remains unresolved in the United States.

The purpose of this study is to examine the social philosophy underlying American civil-military relations; that is, the influences of heritage, and then to examine the contemporary influences of environment upon the role of the military.

The hypothesis proposed is that, as a result of heritage and environment, there are conditions which could cause the American military to perceive a legitimate necessity to assume a substantive role in government.

Resolution of the problem of how to introduce the military's professional assessment into the political equilibrium of government remains unanswered to the detriment of the nation, as Bayne points out:

"It is regrettable that in an otherwise free and open society, we deprive ourselves of the advice, professionalism, and influence of the segment of our society that is most knowledgeable about the reality of military conflict, its development, its prevention, its needs if encountered. I doubt that those who gave birth
to our constitution foresaw the degree to which this attitudinal separation has now developed.

How the attitude of separation from militarily significant political decisions became set in American military tradition will be examined. The impact of such an exclusion will be measured against selected and limited contemporary trends in the environment.

A discussion of the legal framework for civil-military relations in the United States is of merit for consideration. The question not only applies to civil-military relations in the United States, but has application for comparison the world around. This question is: Can the obedience of the military and its subordination to civilian authority be compelled?

Law may set standards of behavior and prescribe punishments, limit discretion, or codify selections of individuals to positions in the elite; but law is dependent upon individuals or groups internalizing its purposes, unless overwhelming coercion is applied. Government possesses no adequate form of coercion other than the military.

The military, therefore, accepts subordination freely as any group in society accepts another's rule in the absence of coercive threat. The crucial concept in civil-military relations becomes the threshold at which the military perceives its civilian ruling regime as a distinct "other", and ceases to identify military purposes and interests with the purposes and interests of the regime. That is, at what threshold is there a perception of illegitimacy. This matter is examined in the concluding chapter.
Throughout the development of this paper one recognition has been paramount. The success of the American military internalizing the intent of the legal framework of civilian supremacy or control has not been shared by many states around the world, as evidenced by Welch: "Despite extensive efforts to subordinate the military to civilian control, the failures have been more pronounced than the successes." This is a point to remember when examining the peculiar framework of American civil-military relations. From a formal-legalistic perspective, the problem in civil-military relations lies primarily in the threat posed by a military establishment (especially a standing, peacetime army) to popular control of government and to individual liberty.

The solution to the problem is perceived to lie in the maintenance of civil control of the military established through a series of constitutional checks and balances. Literature dealing with civil-military relations, alluding to the formal-legalistic framework without considering the underlying social philosophy, provides comments such as Lovell's: "... it is an accurate criticism ... to observe that the 'man on horseback' threat is of little significance to civil-military relations in the United States." How did the legal framework capture the social philosophy so that we have a military with an internalized tradition of not threatening civil government or individual liberty? This will be examined in the following chapter. Additional chapters will examine contemporary environmental influences which act upon the American military and offer a model of behavioral roles, given its heritage and environment.
As assumption made in the development of the study is this: a substantive role for the American military in government is not an impossibility. Additionally, because a coup d'etat has not occurred in the United States does not mean it too remains an impossibility.

The final service of this paper is to induce skepticism and motivate further examination of the proposition surfaced by MacArthur and found so dangerous.


5. In the context of this study, "substantive" will mean (1) an independent institution as regards its professional responsibility, and (2) having an enduring or permanent autonomy in the definition of its mission.
American civil-military relations, that is the roles which
the military plays in society, are partially the product of its
heritage -- the social philosophy which underlies how any segment
of society shall interrelate with the remainder of society. This
chapter will not deal in depth with the growth of the social philo-
sophy or explain in detail how it came about; rather, what will be
acknowledged is how this social philosophy affected military and civil
relationships.

Concept Development. The military, we are reminded by Huntington, has
as its professional responsibility the military security of the
state. Perpetuated in the American definition of how the military
shall perform its mission is the concept that the military will be
directed by civilian representatives of the society which it serves. Whatever the characteristics of the relationships between the military
and civilian direction, the security of the nation has been presumed
to be above political interpretation for partisan gain. Accommodating
civil direction of the military, usually characterized as civil control
or supremacy, to the realities of national security requirements has
developed from a shared social philosophy emphasizing shared res-
ponsibilities for security. Bender points out that recently, even,
"...it is well nigh unthinkable to the average citizen that national security should represent less than the national interest or that it should in any way be the plaything of parochial interests." 3

One item, however, which must be used as a mirror constantly reminding the investigator that he is dealing with a particular application of social philosophy is the realization that the principle of civilian supremacy is uniquely Western in origin. Development of the concept for proper relationships between the American military and civil segments of the government grew out of the realities of the times in which this nation was born. An understanding of the principles by which significant actors of that period ordered their values and hence structured the formal relationships is needed. One must, therefore, begin with the heritage of political experience and ideas which did so much to shape the final outcome or structure of government.

The general concept of American civil-military relations is based upon a philosophical perception of the proper place for the military in society. This place (or role) becomes clear when examining the intent of establishing civilian supremacy over the military, a principle which appears from investigation to be deeply rooted in the nation's traditions. "The Founding Fathers' distrust of the armed forces is manifested clearly in various provisions of the Constitution..." 4, contends Mahoney. He also alleges:

"The principle of civil supremacy is not based on sentiment, accident, or the intuitive genius of the founding Fathers. It simply reflects history's bitter lesson that civilian control of the military is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society." 5
The above comment typifies the literature concerning the concept of American civil-military relationships, with few exceptions. However, what is seldom acknowledged is the underlying social philosophy which generates or sustains such a perception.

A corollary to civilian control is addressed by Lasswell, for example, who links loss of civil control with the loss of democracy. A slow slide from democracy to a garrison state is cautioned against. Huntington critiques such a non sequitur: "...he assumed that military control is incompatible with democracy, identifying a form of civil-military relations with a form of government." The underlying social philosophy, upon examination, appears to be that the values of the military (somehow suspect) might eventually expand and become practically coextensive with society. What is unsubstantiated is whether such a potential is inherently disadvantageous for society in all conditions.

**Sphere of Autonomy.** What needs to be examined in light of this presumption is how did the concept develop in which the military should be a suspect force, necessarily quarantined from the political life of society. Such a notion may derive from the liberal-conservative struggles of 19th century Europe. In these struggles the military was viewed as a reactionary bastion of conservative support. For liberalism to triumph, the conservatives' ally had to be removed from the system which made political decisions. Transposed to America, this philosophical framework led to an imperfect diminution of the military political influence to that of an important interest group.
Additionally, in America the social philosophy did not logically begin to seek ways to keep the military out of politics; rather, the point was to keep politics out of the military functions provided by government. The Founders "were more afraid of military power in the hands of political officials than of political power in the hands of military officers." The Constitution was carefully constructed and worded regarding the military, consistent with the Founders' basic philosophy of dividing authority as a deterrent to the establishment of despotic government. Controls over the armed forces were divided so that no one instrument of government could gain sole domination of the military. Dividing authority was one of the means of civil control, however, its purpose was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force rather than to control the military themselves.

Cochran also supports the preceding interpretation:

"...it is suggested that the abuse of military force in American history has resulted more frequently from military decisions made by civilians than those made by the military."

The Founders also struggled to devise a system in which the words chosen would convey two distinct balanced authorities over military forces. The awesome power of changing society from a condition of peace to a state of war was given to the legislature; the supplementary power of commanding the armed forces in the use of the implements of war was assigned to the executive. Examination of the intent in this distinction is important for understanding the legal framework which grew from the underlying social philosophy.
During the process of composing Article I, Section 8, the representatives of the various states gave the power to Congress to declare war by first draft, writing the phase "... to make war." (emphasis added)

"The delegates changed this wording because they saw a difference between "declaring war" (altering from a state of peace to a state of war); and prosecuting the war, i.e., 'make war' which they believed should be reserved to the executive."

Conversely, when the Constitution was presented for ratification, Alexander Hamilton defended the propriety of making the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces by predicting that the executive's constitutional assignment would amount "...to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy."

To preclude tyranny or despotic licence, the Founders took the precaution of checking power with power among political officials, by designing a system that diffuses control and responsibility and access to military power among several organs of government. Among the various arrangements of the Constitution are those designed to keep power over the military divided and subordinate to the total civil authority of government, not a particular instrument nor particular regime.

For the Founders, the question of civil-military relationships was of clear parameters. They had the intent of making laws which would prevent the misuse of military power in the hands of political authority; not the misuse of political power in the hands of military authority.
Internalized Subordination. This question can be examined after first acknowledging that throughout its history the United States has been uniquely free of any supportable reason to fear a coup d'etat by its military. With varying degrees of influence from the military, key national military security decisions have been made by responsible civilians. But under the cloak of presumed subordination to designated civil authority, American military leaders voluntarily and traditionally isolate themselves from full and normal participation in the policy formulation process of politics to which, it might be argued, their professional training and expertise entitles them. The argument begins to emerge from this study that the subordination of the military to civilian control is not the result of formal-legalistic arrangements, but rather the result of something from within the military itself. That something is the application of the predominant social philosophy which the military shares with the society it serves. As Welch points out:

"... the sine qua non of effective checks on the military's political strength remains the acceptance by the officers themselves of the principle of civilian supremacy."

Many formal-legal-structural-mechanistic controls have been designed and implemented as the means to keep military autonomy at a minimum; e.g., civilian commander in chief, legislative control of appropriations and power of investigation. The threat of militarism is thought to emerge when these control mechanisms are subverted or fall into disuse. Kronenberg's position is:
"The civilian supremacist's solution is to increase the procedural checks and balances and to enlarge the formal authority of the controlling institutions over the military institution that is to be controlled." 12

What requires further research, and has been lacking in the literature, is consideration about the military having an image of themselves that reinforces a belief of the American citizen-soldier, its leaders drawn from the society and in service to the state - applying the same social philosophy as the society which it serves.

There is evidence, though, that the leaders of the military brought to their elite positions the same values, attitudes, and interests regarding national military security as the society. What has been codified in American civil-military relations has been the deep-seated skepticism in the American ethos concerning the political role of the military establishment in national life. Crabb's study of national character identifies:

"The American historical tradition runs counter to the idea that military elements ought to play anything approaching an autonomous role in policymaking." 13

Therefore, the argument is made in this study that the military has been subordinated to civilian authority because the military itself has believed subordination to be a proper role for itself, having continued in this role voluntarily.

Equilibrium Applied. Any system, however, in which the military establishment plays a particular role involves a complex equilibrium between authority, influence, and ideology of the military on one hand, and the authority, influence, and ideology of nonmilitary groups on the other. In analyzing this equilibrium appreciation
can be derived of the dilemma about civilian control and MacArthur's perception of the dangerous proposition. How the military defines its mission, both as an institution and for its leaders, defines the place and participation of the military in government and society.

Using heritage as a starting point, analysis should also view the extent to which the system of civil-military relations in the society tends to enhance or detract from the military security of that society. Remembering that the military security of the state was the mission of the military forces, it might be argued that detraction from this mission by identification with temporary regimes contributes to a desire for military autonomy. However, the differentiation of mission between service to the regime and service to some higher and abstract professional standard is the direct antithesis of the principle of civilian supremacy and direction.

The question of how to present military variance with regime policy does not necessarily need to distract from an underlying interpretation of loyalty to the regime or the profession's mission. This point appears to be a central problem for civil-military relation in the view of some authors. There should be some answer to the problem of how to balance the overall judgment of partisan civilian officials against the detailed judgments of military professionals. However, what is most often focused upon and treated as a threat is autonomous political behavior and interpretation of mission by the military.

An internalized definition of autonomous mission is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the military's participation
in politics. A continued argument of this study will be that military's political role is not a question of whether, but of how much and of what kind. Huntington offers:

"A totally apolitical military does not, and cannot, exist. Armed forces are created by states to carry out coercion; pressing for recognition, responsibility and recompense brings members of the military into the political arena." 15

A contrasting opinion, however, is offered by General George Brown, then Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):

"... a tremendous tribute to the country and to the military sector of our society - and I consider this point one of the great strengths of the military establishment - is that the military does not seek to influence this country in any inappropriate manner. It is not a political force and it never will be, I hope." 16 (emphasis added)

The American military has been a follower rather than a leader in political expression, congruent with one facet of its voluntarily accepted definition of professionalism. However, the substance of Welch's studies tend to confirm that the level of military professionalism (that quality so central to Huntington and Janowitz) is not appreciably related to the political neutralization of the armed forces. Acquisition of internalized professionalism is assumed to increase the probability of another desirous quality: civilian control of the military. The point can be countered by stating that the legitimacy enjoyed by a particular regime affects the political participation of armed forces far more than any other internal factor within the society. 17

Equilibrium Misapplied. In most societies the relation among power, professionalism, and ideology is a dynamic one, reflecting shifts
in the relative power of groups, changing currents of opinion and thought, and most germane: varying levels of military threat to national security. In estimating the security threat, the military man looks at the capabilities of other states rather than at intentions because, it is asserted by Huntington, intentions are political in nature and therefore outside the competence of the military. However, this study and the experience of the author does not find any evidence to support such a narrow expectation of competence.

Keeping in mind the subtle distinctions drawn in the intent of the Founders when they were struggling with the wording of the war-making powers, the difficulty of resolving the definition has continued until present. For example, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 attempted to spell out a dividing line to control the application of military competence. It points out the problem involved with formal-legalistic methods. Specifically:

"A short, nonlegal summary of the issue is that, at any given moment, the relative powers of the President and Congress are what either feels it can get away with. In any event, the problem addressed by the War Powers Resolution is at least as much political as it is constitutional and will most likely be settled, if at all, through political rather than judicial processes." 19

Into this context it must be reminded that the pervading social philosophy contends it is natural for the military to be isolated from the political process. Perhaps the nation has been fortunate to have been free of vital threats to its military security if this is the heritage of civil direction of military forces.
The ambiguity of civil-military relations often resides in the separation of permission to use violence (a legal-social function) from the actual conduct of violence (a military function). The executive and his political officials are the actual policy-makers for how the military is to conduct violence, while the legislative branch and its political officials are the actual policy-makers in when to grant permission for the use of violence and what tools are available for employment. They both, however, depend upon coordination and cohesion in purpose; and depend upon the legitimacy of the regime being accepted by the "professionals" of the military. Strong civilian control over the armed forces emerges gradually through complex historical processes founded on a shared social philosophy. Control reaches its fullest expression in the military's voluntary acceptance of subordination. This acceptance can be fostered by the growth of civilian political institutions that enjoy wide popular support, by recognition of agreed-upon spheres of military autonomy in technical decisions, and by successful and peaceful transfer of political power among contending civilian groups in ways that enhance regime legitimacy.

Civilian control, according to the development of this paper, is not simply a matter of levels of social and economic development in the institutions of government; nor of maximizing the professional narrowness of the military; nor even of distribution of political power overwhelmingly favorable to civilian groups. Neither is civilian control the direct result of the formal-legalistic mechanisms which
have been the object of executive orders and legislative enactment. Civilian control exists, simply, if the officer corps has internalized or continues to internalize, the value and legitimacy of civilian supremacy in making decisions affecting national military security.

Summary. The institution which has been created and which has assumed the normative characteristics of a subordinated military has, upon examination, internalized an ethic of public service and national identity instead of private corporate interest and class or partisan identity. The ethic appears to have been an expectable evolution from the social philosophy predominant in the society from which the military leadership has been drawn. The legal framework which has been constructed also facilitated the legitimizing of the ethic precluding political activity. The external environment, that is a threat to national military security, has also contributed to development of non-substantive political involvement by the military - there has not existed an overwhelming potential for military collapse in the face of a threat.

What will be examined in the next chapter is how the environment in which the military leadership operates can have an influence on its political and social perception, and thus ultimately an effect on the policies and programs endorsed by the military for the interest of the society which it serves. If the design for American civilian control has been valid in application, evolving from its heritage of social philosophy, and valid in concept - then what can the environment tell us about the future of civil-military relations.
END NOTES
Chapter 2


5. Ibid., p. 51.


7. Ibid., p. 168.


14. See also Adam Yarmolinsky comments in Seawell, op. cit., p. 16.


"Until recent years it was difficult for many Americans to believe that other countries might plan and carry out aggression, exploit weaker nations, willfully violate treaties, and embark upon programs of aggrandizement..."

"To a degree unprecedented in the postwar period, the solution of urgent domestic problems is likely to take priority over most foreign policy concerns."

Examination of the environment in which the military interacts with its parent society can provide a descriptive reflection of the role which the military may play in that society. What is sought in this chapter is a reflection of both domestic and international realities. In such a context, a potential for changing or evolving civil-military relations may be forecast.

Historically, American civil-military relations have been successfully compartmented. However, we have never had a distinctly isolated military caste in our society because, as the previous chapter illustrated, the military shared the predominant social philosophy. The role of the military in society, which the environment demanded, permitted compartmented civil-military relations.

Bureaucratic Stress. Whether such an environment will persist is questionable, and therefore so is the role played by the military and its mission. Mahoney comments on the limits to roles and missions:

"...keeping the military within constitutional bounds is harder than ever, because there is no longer a clear demarcation between official military and civilian conduct."
Strictly military and civilian realms have ceased to exist even in theory. Recognition of this reality spurred Maxwell Taylor to become an outspoken advocate of the military's incorporating into its thought processes considerations previously held to be non-military. The effect, however, of the military acquiring sophistication in civilian orientation may impact upon how the military interprets its role in society.

In conditions where the environment places stress upon traditional civil-military relations, the degree that the military acquires civilian-type orientations may contribute also to acquiring civilian-type skills in pursuing goals. That is, skill in pursuing goals through influence is an acquired behavior in response to environmental need. In conditions of stress caused by preparation for hostilities, accompanied by prevailing economic deterioration (therefore scarce budget resources), civilian-type skills applied to competitive influence gain in utility.

Skills acquired in such competition, that is skill in exercising influence, are precisely political skills. In conditions of continual stress a new norm of orientation for the military would therefore be institutionalized. A limited political skill would be acquired. Introduce an added stress to traditional civil-military relations, such as a social crisis, and it becomes probable that armed forces would quickly expand their previously limited political role. This is Welch's estimation:

"The likelihood of military intervention rises with a perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially if
accompanied by a belief that the government cannot resolve, or is responsible for, this deterioration." 5

At issue in such an environmental condition of stress is regime legitimacy, interpreted by Thompson in terms of civil effectiveness:

"In essence, a basic point is asserted again and again: governmental institutions and leadership in those systems subject to 'domestic military intervention' are weak and therefore vulnerable to such intervention." 6

Of importance in analysis of the environment for civil-military relations, and thus the perceived reality in which the equilibrium functions, is examination of how influence is exercised below the threshold of overt intervention by the military. How is influence measured so the observer can judge a point of departure?

One measure may be thought of as the degree of inter-penetration between the officer corps and other influential actors in the society. Military influence is increased if members of the officer corps assume or are appointed to positions of authority in traditionally nonmilitary power structures. Conversely, military influence is decreased to the extent that non-military individuals penetrate into positions within the formerly defined officer corps.

Hamilton illustrates the penetration model using the Bay of Pigs experience and its resultant reallocation of influence:

"Having dismissed the advice of the JCS as unreliable, the President felt it necessary to search elsewhere for military counsel." 7 (emphasis added) The counsel which Kennedy thereafter relied upon was his Secretary of Defense to the exclusion of his JCS, thereby profoundly changing the relationship between the office of the executive and his former principal military advisors. The content
of what Kennedy henceforth wanted from the JCS was to: "... base their advice not on narrow military considerations alone but on broad-gauged political and economic factors as well." 8 In other words, if Kennedy's JCS was to have any influence with him, new skills and orientation would have to be acquired.

Growth out of a traditional insularity of thought and toward an orientation attempting consonance with the parent society can sensitize the military to political and social consequences of its actions. According to this paper's extrapolation of the model sketched above, the greater the opportunities of the military to demonstrate their new skills, the greater the responsibilities which such skills prepare the military to assume, therefore the more insistent will be institutional pressures on the military to attempt influence through politics. This becomes substantial politicization responding to environmental requirements.

However, politicization does not mean attempts to exercise influence will be initially successful. The JCS which Johnson inherited from his predecessor was ready to offer advice that was broad-gauged. According to Moyer's accounts though, "President Johnson (relied) less on military advice than any President since Wilson." 9 The political reality of the environment for the JCS during Kennedy and Johnson's terms was a loss of influence and penetration by non-military officials into traditionally military autonomy. 10

The effect was an induced tension in the civil-military equilibrium, recognized but unappreciated by the political officials:
"Your staff is in revolt! ... when you refute with
generalities the technical recommendations of military
officers ... it is extremely risky business, no matter
what the management motives."

Thus, an interpretation indicates autonomous groups competing
within the executive institution, with consensus being dictated
rather than sustained.

Recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
indicates the diminution of influence in traditionally autonomous
military assessments. The Committee expressed a conviction that
President Carter had overridden recommendations of the JCS on major
defense questions without allowing Congress to share in the assess-
ment. The significance of the testimony was to show that the JCS
is told rather than asked about the nation's military requirements. 12
This perception of political environmental reality is of consequence
because perceptions shape the exchanges of influence.

Esteem-limiting Stress. Another perception of reality, hence legitimate
influence, impacting upon civil-military relations is the effect
of unsuccessful war. Fixing the blame for loss heightens tensions
between civilian and military leaders, and brings recriminations
within the armed forces themselves. These tensions and recrimina-
tions increase political awareness within the military, according
to Welch. 13 The direction which such awareness takes depends
upon the underlying perception of legitimacy in civil-military
relations:

"... defeat in war, particularly if accompanied by
the belief on the part of the armed forces that the
government failed to give them sufficient support,
often increases the likelihood of military inter-
vention." 14
An overt military intervention into government would arise primarily from the perceived limited or declining legitimacy of civilian operated political institutions and would be particularly likely during periods of rapidly changing norms and rising political expectancy within the military itself. Especially if the military's perception of reality is isolated to itself. Kronenberg amplifies: "...antimilitary and amilitary attitudes of many Americans, may further reinforce the isolation and alienation of the military from the larger society." An apathetic view towards all things connected with the military has already been forecasted for the 1980s by Rosser. Future histories will chronicle what constancy will be generated by events in Iran and Afghanistan. This study interprets the perceived apathy and perceived isolation as symptomatic of otherwise undiagnosed legitimacy problems; an encroaching interpretation of reality by the military that government is failing to perform its function.

Indifference to those factors in the environment which are properly the professional focus of the military is nothing novel in the character of America. However, indifference can be shaken when outside reality confronts policymakers with a crisis requiring the use of armed forces. What is questionable is the permanence of commitment to the reality which caused the use of the military.

The tendency of policy change to wait on crises is reinforced whenever the required consensus necessitates participation of the general public. Being normally ignorant and indifferent to policy shaping events, the public can be spurred to action (that is
to part with their blood, money, or votes) only when political officials confront them with what seem to be the gravest of problems. But once aroused, since the public's response is emotional rather than intellectual in content, its participation may produce such policy symptoms as apprehension or belligerence greater than appropriate. Especially significant, the arousal is short in duration; i.e., the public sense of crisis disappears before the problem is actually resolved.

A crisis dependent regime might, therefore, be characterized as reactive, not leading nor making long-range policy, thus being perceived as failing to perform a function regarding national military security. Then, when the crisis-reactive policies employing the military prove abortive, the military is the object of public and political recrimination. The military in such an environment, having had its isolation reinforced by antimilitary and amilitary society, may begin to question the legitimacy of its role in a society unconcerned with its own survival.

This is not to say that American civil-military relations have reached the threshold wherein regime legitimacy has been rejected. However, some analysts describe significant differences between the realities perceived by civilians and realities perceived by the military. Crabb, for example, believes the American public does not share a psychological frame of reference with the military in approaching the international environment. 19 Policy-makers who fail to secure an identity of perception from the public must be forced to prosecute policy in the face of a non-legitimating
populace. The effect in such a situation can accentuate a potential for civil recrimination toward the military, especially when a perceived illegitimate policy fails.

Probert contends that the experience in Vietnam served to sensitize the American military institution to the problem of regime legitimacy: "...how to square traditional professional ethics with the new requirements of implementing (popularly unsupported) national security policy...". Huntington thought Korea to be a particularly significant threshold in American civil-military relations:

"For the first time in American history the common soldier fought a major war solely and simply because he was ordered to fight it and not because he shared any identification with the political goals for which the war was being fought." Vietnam and Korea only reestablished the argument that since 1945 the unarticulated premises and unconscious viewpoints of the public toward the international environment were disconnected from the reality with which the military had to deal.

Obligation Stress. What has occurred, perhaps, is not a change in the responsibilities of the military but rather that a new dimension has been added to the environment in which the military must discharge its obligations. This study argues that the military has acquired an overt political role, yet unrecognized by itself, in the formulation and execution of national military security policy. This role has created a dilemma between the nonpartisan tenets of the military's professional heritage and the necessity to participate effectively in the contemporary political process of
defining national military policy. Stress is being introduced to the traditionally nonpartisan perception of civil-military relations when, as Paone points out:

"The recommendations and reactions of military leaders are being sought by the President and Congressional leaders for their respective advantages. Quite naturally, this new position has accentuated the politicization of the military." 22

Because of disconnected perceptions of national security needs, i.e., between the popular mass and the civilian policy-makers, the military has been used as both advocate and executor. Levering explains: "...all of the Presidents who have served during the four major wars in which America has become involved in this century have faced constraints from the public." 23 Attempts to overcome such constraints have made the military part of the political process. An uninformed electorate dealing with external threats to its security is more likely to accept the positions articulated by the military, even if such positions support policies which the military had no share in creating. Placing the military in a position where it must publicly adjudicate contending partisan policies further accentuates politicization of the military. The threshold of regime legitimacy, regarding civil-military relations, is approached in conditions "...where civilian consensus is weak and the armed forces are also alienated from the political system." 24

Mollifying such a legitimacy rejection is the professional socialization or education of the military, for the purpose of narrowing its political awareness. A contention supporting this viewpoint is offered by Welch:
"The likelihood of military intervention rises as the content of officer education is expanded to encompass political issues customarily resolved by civilians." interestingly, a recent content analysis of US Army professional journals over a fifty year period indicates that American Army officers have become more politicized, rather than apolitical in orientation. Political awareness, or recognition of the environmental reality in which national military policy decisions are made, and competence in articulating judgments for the benefit of the nation is directly opposed to Huntington's objective of professionalism. It appears he would have a profession with no "national mission":

"The military professional becomes the technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the state. In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military - isolated from the larger, more liberal society - becomes a necessity." 27

However, this study contends such a "professional" is thoroughly detached from the contemporary reality of the environment in which the military exists. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine political power which society thrusts upon them with traditional nonpartisan professionalism. Whenever significant questions of military policy arise, the military leadership is drawn into legislative - executive struggles on one side or the other, further eroding any autonomous mission outside of political accountability. To regain, or redefine the military's role in society, requires a congruent perception of political reality. The price which society pays for the military ascending in influence or power depends upon the gap between the military's perception of reality and the prevailing perception in the society.
Summary. The importance of defining a rational role for the military in politics, is to prevent a reliance upon the broadest possible interpretation; i.e., a role as defenders of the 'nation', thereby assuming the sole responsibility to protect the society against threats from any quarter - including those resulting from perceived malfeasance, corruption, and incompetence of civilian politicians. In light of the assertion that the world leadership position of the United States has expanded the scope of military policy, Mahoney highlights "...there is no longer a clear-cut cleavage between military and civilian spheres of activity." 28

The consequences of an environmental reality containing a politicized military, isolated by narrowly defined professional responsibilities, further isolated by an antimilitary or amilitary society, and under stress to execute a military policy which does not provide sufficient resources are extreme. Luttwak is most specific:

"The political structures of most developed countries ... are too resilient to make them suitable targets (for coup d'état), unless certain temporary factors weaken the system and obscure its basic soundness." 29

These "temporary factors" are: (1) severe and prolonged economic crisis with runaway unemployment and inflation previously unexperienced by the society; and (2) long and unsuccessful war, or continuous preparation for war with a recent single major defeat or a series of smaller scale defeats; and (3) chronic instability under a multi-party system whose political officials are perceived by both populace and armed forces to be oligarchic.
Thus, it is an endemic instability resulting from perceived general weakness in civilian directed institutions, exacerbated by an unresolved threat of war, that tends to draw or motivate the military into overt forms of action encompassed by the term "military political intervention." Is there, however, a level of military intervention or inclusion in politics that is below the threshold of coup d'état? Entering the 1970s, Gard characterized the environment to require "...circumspect political activity on the part of the military." This role might have been a sufficient behavior in the past.

A role for the American military in the next decade and beyond, which optimizes expected behavior given its heritage and environment, will be synthesized in the following chapter.


3. For a deeper commentary on dissolving compartments in civil-military relations see Vought and Binkley, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite? The US Army Enters the 1980s", Parameters, Vol VIII, No. 2.


14. Ibid., p. 244.


18. American society has never really grasped the concept of national power or explicitly accepted its central role in international relations. This is the argument of Fulbright in *The Arrogance of Power*, NY: Random House, 1966.


CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS

The American military needs to recognize an opportunity, perhaps even a responsibility, to articulate publicly its institutional assessment of military security policy. In doing so, speaking as a nonpartisan servant to the nation and not for a particular regime, the military leadership can clearly focus for the public the alternatives and risks which have been formulated by partisan political decisions. There is no naivete in recognizing that such a substantive role or behavior by the military will benefit some partisan position and embarrass or unmask another. Is this not a preferable role to imprudently supporting by silence the partisan opinions of nonprofessional politicians regarding military security policy? Would such a role be expectable behavior in light of the preceding chapters on heritage and environment?

This question is the crux of contemporary civil-military relations. It is not a question of whether the military will follow the orders of its civilian commander in chief in war; not whether the military will honorably use the resources which the people provide for their security; not whether the military will intervene domestically to deprive the citizenry of control of their national government. The question becomes: Is a threshold being approached in the provision of military security where the military, by its professional assessment, perceives that it must participate in the
public formulation and examination of the political decisions being made by partisan officials and appointees?

The threshold at which the American military chooses to play a substantive role is, to this author's logic, below the threshold of intervention or coup d'état. However, it must be admitted that both substantive behavior and coup-making are motivated by perceptions of problems in regime legitimacy. In the former case, political officials are not defining or providing choices for military security policy as effectively as possible to the nation's detriment. In the latter case, political officials have thoroughly failed and the nation faces collapse.

It is necessary to recognize the possibility of approaching the substantive threshold so that, in the absence of such behavior, the environment does not motivate cascading perceptions of regime illegitimacy and failure.

Substantive behavior by the military does not necessarily require ascendancy in defining reality. Substantive behavior, however, does require willingness by the military to define autonomously the reality for which it serves the nation - preservation of military security by being ready to fight and win war.

Substantive behavior is not the militarization of society as Cortese argues. 1 Substantive behavior is, however, recognition by the military that it has become a player in the politicization of military security policy.

An indicator of approaching the threshold for substantive behavior is distinctly the topic of professionalism. Finer points out:
"In the first place, the military’s consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power."

This study finds that professionalism is an accepted tenet for the American military. Further, it is a professionalism with perceptions of an environmental reality in conflict with the perception of its contemporary society. Also, the professional assessments of military security requirements have been increasingly at odds with the determinations made by political officials appointed to supremacy in the defense establishment. The American military is approaching the threshold for substantive behavior to the extent that a clear dichotomy exists between what the society requires for military security (as perceived by the military), and what the society is willing to provide for military security (as perceived and articulated by political officials).

Substantive behavior by the military could be considered a furtherance of democratization - an effort to add knowledge and understanding on matters pertaining to military security, clarifying issues from its professional perspective, acting as an impetus for responsible decisions by politicians accountable to the people. An ideal substantive profession would be able to place some constraints on the definition of reality regarding military security, otherwise the profession is liable to degenerate into a partisan tool of the regime in power. When this situation occurs, generals and admirals are no longer professional military officers, but rather themselves have become political appointees in a regime.
seeking legitimacy. Substantive military behavior reopens a process of public exposition of the issues of military security. It reverses the attitudinal isolation of the profession and rescues itself from being a narrow technical vocation.

The threshold for substantive behavior has been crossed at the point where unification of the professionals has occurred, speaking as responsible and accountable experts without regard for partisan gain or careerist advantage, presenting for public examination the state of preparedness which political officials (executive and legislative) have provided. Decision to approach this threshold is motivated by the military's perception of itself as the most qualified profession in matters pertaining to national military security. Public articulation of advice regarding what constitutes the best military force for security and the impact upon security of not having such a force would, indeed, be a new and substantive role for the American military.

Participation in the decision formulation process is, admittedly, a political role. Therefore, a substantive role for the military would be an engagement in politics. Does this necessarily mean that civil control of the military has been abrogated, or does this necessarily pose a threat to democratic values and institutions? Civil control of the military has been held up as the one unassailable virtue to justify any act which reduces the involvement, autonomy, or access of the armed forces to decision formulation and exposition of issues - despite the effect upon national military security. There is a counterbalancing
right of the people, who make military capabilities possible and who are so affected by them, to know the most that can be said which does not aid a possible enemy.

A substantive role by the military has been adopted when conflicting issues are keenly and sincerely perceived by professionals in service for the nation, above the regime of the moment, who offer to the ultimate democratic authority - the people - the opportunity to study the matters in question. Substantive behavior is not a threat to democratic regimes, but rather a reminder to the regime to govern responsibly. A public issue can receive more sober unbiased analysis if professional judgment is available; i.e., an honest synthesis of objective thought and study promulgated to surface reality.

Precisely because regimes fail to maintain legitimacy or fail to defend their people, these are the reasons why the military has characteristically intervened overtly through coup d'état to preserve the society. This author finds a substantive role for the American military to be a rational contemporary requirement to prevent enclosure or isolation of the military from participation in political decisions affecting military security. Participation would involve the military in sustaining a legitimately governing regime.

In summary, a substantive role or model of behavior appears to be expectable in terms of: (1) the heritage of American civil-military relations, affected by (2) the contemporary environment, internally (professionalism defined as national loyalty) and
externally (an accelerating vital threat). Conversely, if a substantive role is not allowed as a potential behavior, an acceleration past that threshold toward overt intervention due to a perception of illegitimacy or collapse must be admitted as a possibility. This, too, would be due to having an increasingly politicized military and an increasingly disparate ability to successfully engage a military attack upon the nation and society which the military is sworn to defend. There are, then, conditions which could cause the American military to perceive a legitimate necessity to assume a substantive role in government. The threshold has not yet been reached and more research is required for prediction where the threshold lies ahead.
END NOTES

Chapter 4


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