ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Volume IV
CENTRAL ASIA
Kazakhstan
Kirgizistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Tadzhikistan
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CENTRAL ASIA

KAZAKHSTAN
KIRGIZISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TADZHIKISTAN

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KAZAKHSTAN AND THE KAZAKHS - Zev Katz
KIRGIZISTAN AND THE KIRGIS - Allen Hetmanek
TURKMENISTAN AND THE TURKISH - A. Berdi Murat
UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS - Don Carlisle
TADZHIKISTAN AND THE TADZHIKS - Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

The chapters are based on papers contributed by the above-named specialists. However, the chapters as presented here have been edited by the project staff and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final versions therefore rests with the project.

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UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS

PART A

General Information
I. Territory

The Uzbek SSR was created in 1925 as a result of the Moscow-initiated "national delimitation" of borders. This far-reaching measure divided the former tsarist colony of Russian Turkestan into a number of subunits with boundaries corresponding approximately to the distribution of the major Central Asian nationalities.\(^1\) These state boundaries have remained essentially unchanged, although there has been some transfer of territory between republics. The capital of Uzbekistan was originally the ancient city of Samarkand, but in 1930 Tashkent became the capital.

Uzbekistan is a landlocked area encompassing 173,000 square miles. It borders the Turkmen SSR to the west, the Kazakh SSR to the north, and the Kirgiz and Tadzhik republics on the east and southeast. Only on its southwest boundary does Uzbekistan border on non-Soviet territory, Afghanistan.\(^2\)

Uzbekistan has a hot and dry climate and little rainfall; large stretches of land are steppe or desert.\(^3\) The lack of water has drawn the settled population to cluster along the major rivers, and the bulk of the republic's population is concentrated in the Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukharan oases, and in the Ferghana valley.

Five major regions can be identified in Uzbekistan:\(^4\)

The northeast area includes the Tashkent oasis, as well as the valley of the Angara river, which has undergone major development in the Soviet period. The "Hungry Steppe," where extensive efforts have been made to irrigate and develop inhospitable land, is also part of this region.

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The main component of eastern Uzbekistan is the rich and fertile Ferghana valley which is the cotton-producing center and a major citrus and rice producing area.

The main focus of central Uzbekistan is the Zeravshan valley and river. The region includes the Samarkand and Bukharan oases, and there is intensive cotton cultivation.

Southern Uzbekistan, bordering Afghanistan, is the republic’s most backward and underdeveloped area. Brought into the Uzbek SSR in 1925 from the Bukharan State, this region shows the least effects of Soviet modernization efforts. This is the territory which has the strongest historical and cultural ties with the Tadzhiks and Iranians. Cattle-raising is important there.

The northwest region is also a backward and less-developed area. It includes the Khorezm oasis as well as territory bordering on the Aral Sea. This region was the center of the Khivan Khanate. It was absorbed into the Uzbek SSR from the short-lived Khorezm State in 1925. This area also includes the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, where cattle are as important as cotton.
II. Economy

Uzbekistan is the world's third largest producer of cotton after the United States and China, and is the USSR's chief source of that crop. As the Soviet academician Fersman observed during the 1930s:

Whoever has made many trips to Central Asia knows that practically the whole of its attention is focused throughout the year on cotton: on planting, watering or harvesting it. When cotton-picking begins in autumn, when state-farm workers and collective farmers scatter over the fields in bright, colourful groups, and when new harvesting machines glisten in the sun, you begin to realize Central Asia's tremendous importance for the light industries of our country and why everything in Central Asia must really centre around cotton.

The republic also holds first place in Soviet production of tractors for cotton sowing, cotton cleaning equipment, karakul fur, and rice.²

Growth has been impressive; in 1940 in the Uzbek SSR 2.3 million acres were sown to cotton, while by 1971 the figure had risen to nearly 4.2 million acres. Production of raw cotton was 1,386,000 tons in 1940 and 4,511,000 tons in 1971.³

About 148,000 acres are sown to rice today, double the 1960 acreage.⁴ Before the revolution 70% of the arable land in Uzbekistan was sown to cereals and 20.3% to technical crops. In 1965, cereals made up 37% and technical crops (mostly cotton) nearly half of sown acreage, while rice, grapes, and fruit comprised the remainder.⁵

¹Vitkovich, 1954: 12.
⁵Uzbekistan, 1967: 108.
The impact of the Soviet regime on the Uzbek economic system began to be felt only in the era of the Five Year Plans. The interval between 1926 and 1939 brought a major surge in the number of industrial and white-collar jobs (see Table A.1.). An additional thrust to Uzbekistan's development came with the onset of the Second World War; the evacuation of industry and personnel to the East during this period accelerated the modernization of Central Asia.\(^1\)

In 1971 some 469,000 persons in the labor force were classified as industrial workers. Of these, 139,000 were involved in light industry and an additional 132,000 were in machine building and metalworking associated with the growing, harvesting, transporting and transforming of the cotton crop.\(^2\) The overwhelming weight of the agricultural sector is still apparent, however; in 1970, 1,439,000 persons were employed on sovkhozy and kolkhozy.

Recent gas strikes in Uzbekistan have contributed to the increasing importance of Central Asia as a source of fuel and power. Prospects are good for the republic's petrochemical industry; both phosphorus and nitrogenous fertilizer industries are emerging. The Uzbek engineering industry produces 68% of all the spinning and 100% of the roving machines made in the USSR. However, prospects for heavy metallurgy there are poor because of the lack of iron ore in the region; iron must be imported from Kazakhstan.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Ekonomicheskaya istoriya, 1966; Rywkin, 1963: Ch. 4.


\(^3\) Conolly, 1967: 349.
Table A.1.

Changing Occupational Structure of the Uzbek SSR
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913a</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Employees:</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of these:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants in Kolkhoz and Cooperatives</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>40.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Peasants and Artisans</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistics for 1913 clearly apply to Russian Turkestan which was considerably larger than Uzbekistan today. The author, however, does not clarify the point.

III. History

Turkestan, from which the Uzbek SSR emerged in 1925, has an ancient history. It has felt the impact of successive waves of Turco-Mongolian peoples as they swept across its steppe and desert-oasis regions. Its inhabitants have been repeatedly exposed to alien influences while absorbing and transforming the cultural legacy left by the last wave of intruders. In the 8th and 9th centuries it fell under the influence of Muslim culture and religion. During the medieval period Arabic civilization flowered, and Tamerlane ruled his empire from his capital at Samarkand. Bukhara became a center of learning and the religious focus of the region. With the shift in trade routes in the 15th and 16th centuries, this Central Asian Islamic civilization entered a long period of decline and decay. The overall political order disintegrated, to be replaced by feuding local principalities. Subsequently, the Bukharan, Khivan, and Kokand Khanates crystallized as the major political units in constant competition and conflict. In the nineteenth century, Russia expanded into Turkestan.

Turkestan was mainly a water-poor, desert-oasis region. The eastern region, the center of the Kokand Khanate, was partly encircled by mountains and included the rich Ferghana valley. In Ferghana, rice fields were cultivated, grapes and citrus were abundant; in the surrounding foothills the nomads wandered through the seasons with their flocks. However, with the exception of Ferghana and the scattered oases watered by the major rivers and their tributaries, the land was ill-adapted to agriculture. Consequently it was along these waterways and in the surrounding villages [kishlaks] interlaced by the irrigation system that the bulk of the settled native population was concentrated then as it is today. This situation created what one scholar has called an "oasis psychology," which he contends facilitated the Russian conquest of the 19th century:

The isolated and scattered oases had caused the settled dekkhans [native peasants] to become fragmented into little-contested

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1Caroe, 1967: Chs. 2-4.
and often self-supporting districts, preventing the development of any "national" or regional unity. The fragile system of irrigation canals rendered agriculture, which formed the only substantial foundation for existence in the region, extremely vulnerable, voiding not only the possibility of active resistance, but even the willingness to engage in a struggle. Innumerable nomadic invasions during the millennium of Central Asian history had conditioned the sedentary inhabitants of the oasis region to the inevitability of conquest, resulting in their fatalistic acceptance of domination by alien usurpers.¹

Systematic Russian conquest took place between 1865 and 1884. On June 17, 1865, the city of Tashkent surrendered to the tsarist General Cherniayev and by 1868 the Khanate of Bukhara was defeated. On August 12, 1873, the Khivan Khan signed a peace treaty imposed by Russia. After several military encounters Russia conquered Kokand, and on February 19, 1876, the khanate was abolished. By 1884 the last resistance of the local tribes was overcome.²

The 19th-century tsarist conquest brought a visible Russian presence to the cities. "New towns," in which the Russians congregated, sprung up alongside the "old towns," the ancient native quarters. By the turn of the 20th century, Russian rule seemed secure. Railroad construction linked Russian Turkestan with central markets, and the expansion of the area sowed to cotton reflected the Russians' impact and their growing economic interest in the region. In fact Lenin in his critique of imperialism was to refer to Turkestan as Russia's colony and its "cotton appendix."

"Russification" was not pressed, and the tsars seemed tolerant of Moslem customs and religion. Nevertheless the immigration of Slavic peasants into the region, especially after 1906, did have a heavy impact. Many natives—in particular the nomadic Kirgiz and Kazakhs—had cause for resentment which was particularly strong in Turkestan's rural regions on the eve of the First World War. In 1916 the tensions exploded when tsarist officials ordered a native call-up to assist in the war effort. The 1916 native rebellion was labeled by one scholar "the most violent expression of popular dissatisfaction in the history of Russia between the revolution of 1905 and 1917."³

³ Pipes, 1964: 84.
Although the revolt was sustained mostly in Kazakh and Kirgiz areas, Samarkand, Tashkent and Ferghana also had their local revolts.1

The 1916 rebellion was more in the nature of a peasant *jacquerie* than a sustained revolt, and by early 1917 it appeared to be contained by Russian power. However, 1917 brought revolution to Petrograd and Moscow, and the Russian community in Tashkent, Samarkand, and other cities of Turkestan were drawn into its vortex. After a short period of rule by local moderates and Mensheviks who supported the Provisional Government, the more radical Russians staged a *coup._ Led by the railway workers and the soldiers garrisoned in Tashkent, the Bolsheviks and Social-Revolutionaries seized power in November 1917 and proclaimed a Soviet regime. The great mass of the local population appeared unaffected by, and unconcerned with, these events. Except for the ineffective efforts of the small native intelligentsia to seize the opportunity to increase local autonomy, and later to achieve national independence, the Moslems appeared "passive observers" of the unfolding revolutionary drama.2

But they were not to remain passive for long. There was a fierce native reaction to the direct intervention and the attack on the Moslem religion that followed the seizure of power by the Russian-dominated Tashkent Soviet. The excursions into the kishlaks by armed Soviet forces in search of food and booty triggered what was both a national conflict and a "holy war." In the aftermath of the Soviet military crushing of a native government that had emerged at Kokand, demanding autonomy at first and latter independence, native resistance gathered momentum. The insurrection was especially strong in Ferghana. Native recruits streamed to the anti-communist war operations of the "Basmachi," as the armed opponents of the Soviet regime were labeled.3

One Soviet writer observed:

> The fight against the Basmachi was a fight with an entirely new, distinct and unique opponent. The Basmachi were made up of partisan detachments, exclusively on horseback. They were elusive and often dissolved in the neighboring villages literally before the eyes of our troops, who would immediately

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1 Sokol, 1954: 72-166.
3 Caroe, 1967: Ch. 7.
undertake a general search of the villages but without any results.¹

Thus the Bolsheviks were confronted with the difficult task of suppressing what was to become a recurrent phenomenon in the 20th century: partisan war and guerilla tactics.

As Bolshevik fortunes in the Civil War improved, Moscow was able to pay greater attention to Turkestan and to dispatch troops to assist in crushing the native rebellion. In November 1919, a Turkestan Commission sent by Lenin arrived on the scene. Soon General Michael Frunze and Red Army forces also arrived, and in 1920–1921 the military tide was turned and the Basmachi in Ferghana essentially undermined. Frunze and the Red Army were essential in crushing the Basmachi and in securing Soviet rule. However, during the 1920s Moscow sought to shape a pattern of rule that rested on more than naked force. A version of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in Turkestan. The Bolsheviks sought to shape a nationality policy that reflected the NEP spirit. The policy approved was based on the norm that native culture within a socialist framework would be "national in form, socialist in content." Both "Great Russian chauvinism" and "bourgeois nationalism" were attacked by the regime as likely to alienate the population and to complicate Moscow's pattern of local control.² In 1924–1925 a "national delimitation" in Turkestan was declared. This entailed the disappearance of Turkestan as a unit and in its place the creation of separate national republics for the major ethnic groups, all still contained within a centralized Soviet state. It was a crucial step, enhancing Moscow's image on the local scene and partially neutralizing nationalist agitation for real independence. It also struck a blow against the Pan-Turkic movement which claimed that the various peoples of Central Asia were not separate nationalities, but essentially one, united by common Islamic and Turkic bonds.³

The era of the Five Year Plans brought an end to Soviet toleration of nationalist tendencies and terminated the limited compromise with the Moslem traditional society. The post-1928 industrialization-collectivization drive allotted to Uzbekistan the major role in assuring the USSR's "cotton independence"

²Park, 1957: 115-203.
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of foreign imports. This marked the end of the Uzbek NEP. Moscow's directives, Russian personnel, and Slavic ways became dominant in Uzbekistan. The Russian presence, and eventually the heavy hand of Stalin himself was felt in every sector of Uzbek life. The uneasy alliance of Moscow with the national communist native elite was abruptly terminated in the Great Purge of 1937-1938. Such key figures as Faizulla Khodzhayev, Chairman of the Uzbek Sovnarkom, and Akmal' Ikramov, First Secretary of the Uzbek CP, in fact were brought to Moscow to be tried publicly and sentenced alongside Bukharin in the show trial of March 1938.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, and in the postwar period, Uzbekistan built its canals, produced its cotton, unmasked its "nationalists," and glorified Stalin and the local Stalinists. In the person of Usman Yusupov, First Secretary of the Uzbek CP from 1937, and his associates, Moscow found the successors to those like Khodzhayev and Ikramov who were more nationally inclined and less subservient to Stalin. Uzbek history was rewritten, and Khodzhayev and Ikramov, who had been prominent in Uzbek life at least since 1925, disappeared from the historical record except as "enemies of the people."

Like other republics after 1953, the Uzbek SSR embarked on partial "de-Stalinization" during the Khrushchev era. Some of the victims of the "cult of the personality" such as Ikramov and Khodzhayev have since been rehabilitated. And the Uzbek SSR has continued to produce cotton. The most disastrous event in the recent period has been the Tashkent earthquake of 1966 which destroyed portions of that city. These have since been reconstructed.


2For a discussion of the rehabilitation of both men, see Kritika, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2 and 3.

3The earthquake occurred on April 26. On April 27 both L.I. Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin were in Tashkent. On May 9, 1966 there was another severe quake. For further information, see Pravda (May 15), 1966: 3. On May 31, Komsomelskaya pravda published the poem by A. Voenesensky, "Help Tashkent."

4For more recent developments in Uzbekistan's history, see Part C of this chapter, on national attitudes.
IV. Demography

Although Uzbekistan is somewhat smaller in area than neighboring Turkmenistan, it has nearly six times the population—close to 12 million. Among Soviet republics, only the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan have larger populations. Uzbekistan's decidedly agricultural character is reflected in the fact that after more than four decades of telescoped industrial development, only 36% of the population is classified as urban. However, the republic's capital, Tashkent, reflects the effects of that development. Its population in 1971 was estimated at almost one and one-half million. The 18 other large urban centers are of more moderate size; except for Samarkand (272,000), all have fewer than 200,000 inhabitants. Six cities are over 100,000 in population, while the remaining eleven fall below that figure.

a. National Composition of the Population

Census data allow us to construct a broad picture of the ethnic composition of Uzbekistan: Table A.2. shows how this has changed over more than three decades. In 1926 Uzbeks comprised 66% of the population and Russians only 4.7%. Indeed, if one excluded the Tadzhiks (the Tadzhik ASSR was a part of Uzbekistan at that time), the weight of the Uzbeks would be substantially greater. One Soviet source, using such a calculation, stated that the Uzbeks made up 76.1% of the population in 1930 and Russians, 5.6%.

The census figures for 1939 reflect the traumatic and far-reaching changes unleashed during the Five Year Plans. The table draws attention to the influx of Russians who helped direct and manage the modernization process in that period. By 1939 Russians made up 11.5% of the Uzbek SSR's population, and Uzbeks had fallen to 65%.

By 1959 the Russian share of the population in Uzbekistan had grown to 13.5% (over one million) and the Uzbeks had decreased to 61%. The 1970 census gives a figure of 1,496,000 Russians, 12.5% of the total. During 1959–1970,

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1 Pravda Vostoka (April 28), 1971: 2.
3 Gosudarstvennaya Planovaya komissiya UzSSR, Raiony UzSSR v Tisirakh (Samarkand, 1930): 43.
Table A.2.
National Composition of Uzbek SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1926a</th>
<th>1939b</th>
<th>1959c</th>
<th>1970c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>5,297,454</td>
<td>6,271,259</td>
<td>8,261,000</td>
<td>11,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>of these:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>3,475,340</td>
<td>4,081,096</td>
<td>5,044,000</td>
<td>7,734,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>246,521</td>
<td>727,331</td>
<td>1,114,000</td>
<td>1,496,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>28,401</td>
<td>147,157</td>
<td>448,000</td>
<td>578,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>106,980</td>
<td>305,416</td>
<td>407,000</td>
<td>549,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhi</td>
<td>976,728</td>
<td>317,560</td>
<td>314,000</td>
<td>457,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>37,834</td>
<td>50,676</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>90,743</td>
<td>89,044</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>25,945</td>
<td>46,543</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>70,577</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara-Kalpak</td>
<td>26,563</td>
<td>181,420</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>72,944</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

a W. Medlin, et. al., 1971: 255.


c Pravda Vostoka (April 28), 1971: 2.
the extraordinary rate of Uzbek population growth has raised the Uzbek component by 2.5 million, to 64% of the republic's population. Population statistics thus show that unlike the Kirgiz and Kazakhs, the Uzbeks remain "masters of their own house," at least in demographic terms. Like Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan does not appear to have been a target area for large-scale Slavic settlement. The climate and the general environment have made the Uzbek SSR less attractive for the influx of Slavs than the Kirgiz and Kazakh SSRs.

There has always been a substantial number of Tadzhiks and Kazakhs in Uzbekistan. Thus the substantial Tadzhik and Kazakh groupings in the Uzbek SSR are not unusual. Of particular note, however, is the large change in the Tatar population over the years. The increase from 28,000 in 1926 to 147,000 in 1939 would appear related to the influx of Volga Tatars during the Five Year Plans. They were the source of more skilled cadres and workers for accelerating economic development. However the subsequent rise to a population of 448,000 Tatars by 1959 indicates still another process. It is likely that the transfer of the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia and Stalin's liquidation of their republic accounts for this latter increase of Tatars in Uzbekistan. Table A.2. also shows a marked increase in Jews in Uzbekistan between 1939 and 1959. While there is an ancient Central Asian Jewish community, the 45,000 increase between 1939 and 1959 is probably due to the movement of European Jews during the Nazi-Soviet war and perhaps even after 1945.

Unfortunately Soviet statistical sources do not provide adequate information regarding the relative distribution of Russians, Uzbeks, and other ethnic groups in the labor force. Consequently it is not possible to judge with total accuracy the Russian-native composition among workers and employees, nor the ethnic breakdown of specific professional groups. However some information is available and a picture of the nationality composition in some areas can be obtained. Between 1939 and 1959 the working class in the Uzbek SSR grew from 526,645 to 1,218,221. In 1939 the native population comprised 36.5% of the working class and by 1959 it had grown to 43.1%. During this period Russian workers had increased from 188,591 to 308,425, while the number of Uzbeks grew from 200,997 to 525,519.¹ The role of Tatars in the Uzbek SSR

¹Senyavsky, 1971: 335-336.
is also evident from relevant statistics. Among the working class in Uzbekistan in 1939 there were 29,004 Tatars; in 1959 the figure rose to 110,239. The 1959 figure for Tadzhik workers was 37,872 and for Kazakh workers, 48,963.

The important role of Slavs, especially Russians, in the Uzbek economy is strongly suggested by statistics on those employed who had a secondary specialist education as of 1961. At that time 42% were Slavs while 37% of all specialists were Russians. Uzbeks made up only 32%.\(^2\)

b. Composition of the Uzbek Communist Party and Supreme Soviet

The Uzbek Communist Party has grown at a rapid rate since 1949. Table A.3. shows the growth pattern of the Party as well as its changing class composition based on social origins. As in the USSR as a whole, recruitment efforts in the 1950s and 1960s have produced a social class profile that is not at all congruent with the social structure of the Uzbek SSR as a whole. Table A.3. traces that profile through time and illustrates the essential nature of the Communist Party as an elite organization, overrepresenting the privileged and educated sectors of the population. In 1967, 41.4% of the Uzbek Party fell into the "employee" category, and only 29.9% could claim a worker status as social origin. Though Uzbekistan is still fundamentally an agricultural region, peasants comprise only 28.6% of the Uzbek Communist Party membership.

Table A.4. presents the nationality statistics. By 1961 Uzbeks made up a substantial portion of the Party (51.2%), and the figure rose to 53.3% as of January 1967. In 1961, 22.6% of the figure rose to 53.3% as of January 1967. In 1961, 22.6% of the Uzbek CP were Russians, and by 1967 the figure had declined to 21.5%. However, the weight of the Russians increases as one moves closer to the key centers of power. In 1949 Russians constituted 39% of the Uzbek Central Committee; in 1952 the figure was 36%, and by 1961 it had declined to 28%.\(^3\) In 1966 it rose again to 31%. Of the

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\(^1\)Senyavsky, 1971: 335-336.

\(^2\)Nar. khoz. 1961: 700.

\(^3\)Ethnic distribution calculated from Central Committee lists in Kommunisticheskaya partiya Uzbekistana, 1968: 714-736.
Table A.3.

Changing Size and Social Composition of the Uzbek Communist Party, 1949-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Size</th>
<th>Worker</th>
<th>Peasant</th>
<th>Employee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>132,918</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>142,654</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>173,104</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>223,937</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>314,279</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>353,841</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968a</td>
<td>392,749</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972b</td>
<td>438,335</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana i Uzbekistana v tsifrakh (sbornik statisticheskikh materialov 1918-1967), (Tashkent, 1968).
members of the Uzbek Central Committee chosen at the 1971 Uzbek Party Congress, 34% were Russians. ¹

There is some information on the number of Uzbeks among Party workers and secretaries at various levels. As of January 1969, among workers of the Uzbek Central Committee and the provincial, city and district committees [obkoms, gorkoms and raikoms], Uzbeks held slightly more than one half of the posts: 1381 out of a total of 2635 "party workers." Specific data are available on the number of Uzbek apparatchiks [full-time employees of the Party organization, or apparat]. As of January 1969 in the apparat of the Central Committee, Uzbeks held 69 out of 149 posts (46.3%). In the apparat of the obkoms, they held 230 out of 524 positions (43.4%). And of a total of 1962 apparatchiks of the gorkoms and obkoms, there were 1082 Uzbeks (55.1%).²

The most important decision-making center of the Communist Party, and of the Uzbek Republic, is the Bureau of the Central Committee. In 1949, of its 14 full members nine were Russians and five Uzbeks.³ In the 1952 Bureau the figures were nine and six. On the 1971 Uzbek Central Committee Bureau there were six Russians and five Uzbeks.⁴

The Central Party Secretariat is the mainspring of the Uzbek political system, and there is an overlap between its composition and that of the Bureau of the Central Committee. All five Uzbek Party Secretaries in 1971 were full members of the Bureau. The First Party Secretary was Sharaf Rashidov, an Uzbek (born 1917). Since 1929 all First Party Secretaries have been Uzbeks, (Ikramov, Yuspuov, Mukhitdinov, Rashidov), while the Second Party Secretary has been a Russian. In 1971 the latter post was held by F.G. Lomonosov. Of

¹Calculated from Central Committee listed in Pravda Vostoka (February 18), 1971: 1.
²Nishanov, 1970.
³Pravda Vostoka (March 6), 1949: 1.
⁴Calculated from the Bureau listing in Pravda Vostoka (February 18), 1971.
the remaining three Party Secretaries, two were Uzbeks, and one was a Russian.¹

While the Uzbek Supreme Soviet is much less of a key decision-making institution than the Central Party organs, it nonetheless is important, at least in a formal sense, as the major legislative body in the Uzbek SSR. At the minimum, it has a symbolic function and can be checked to ascertain what ethnic groups are represented in its membership. Table A.5. shows a breakdown of the changing national composition of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet between 1947 and 1967. During this period the percent of Uzbeks among deputies to the Supreme Soviet grew from 62% to almost 67% while the comparable figures for Russians decreased from 20.8% in 1947 to 15.7% in 1967. If one were to add the Ukrainian figure to the Russian figure for 1967, the percent of Slavs reached 19%.

A comparison of these figures with those presented in Table A.4. on ethnic representation in the Uzbek Communist Party shows that in 1967 Uzbeks were more poorly represented within Party ranks than within the Supreme Soviet. According to the 1970 census Uzbeks comprise 64% of the Uzbek SSR's population and Russians 12.4%. However, only 53.3% of the Uzbek CP were Uzbeks in 1967, while 21.5% were Russians.

c. Intermarriage

Intermarriage rates suggest that assimilation and "denationalization" appears to be a very slow process. Relevant data appear in Table A.6. Covering the period 1960 through 1965, the table shows that only 1.1% of all births to Uzbek women in 1960 involved a father of a different nationality. In 1965 the comparable figure was 1.5%. The same tendency against intermarriage is exhibited by the other Eastern nationalities in the Uzbek SSR, although it is less marked among the Tadzhiks and Kazakhs. It is in sharp contrast to the Slav population. As the table shows, Ukrainians and Belorussians have by far the highest rate of women marrying outside their group. During 1960, in 70% of the births to Belorussian women, the father was not a Belorussian; and the comparable figure for Ukrainians was 67%. In 1965 the Ukrainian and

Table A.4.
National Composition of the Uzbek Communist Party, 1949-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Karakalpaks</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Tatars</th>
<th>Kazakhs</th>
<th>Tadzhiks</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Kirgiz</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Turkmen</th>
<th>Belorussians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>58,035 (42.7)</td>
<td>2,121 (1.6)</td>
<td>36,094 (27.2)</td>
<td>6,345 (4.8)</td>
<td>6,285 (4.7)</td>
<td>3,380 (2.5)</td>
<td>4,036 (3.04)</td>
<td>683 (0.5)</td>
<td>4,901 (3.7)</td>
<td>444 (0.3)</td>
<td>488 (0.4)</td>
<td>10,106 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>66,246 (46.4)</td>
<td>2,980 (2.1)</td>
<td>36,287 (25.4)</td>
<td>8,308 (5.8)</td>
<td>6,264 (4.4)</td>
<td>3,768 (2.6)</td>
<td>4,691 (3.3)</td>
<td>484 (0.34)</td>
<td>4,759 (3.3)</td>
<td>470 (0.3)</td>
<td>494 (0.35)</td>
<td>7,903 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>114,680 (51.2)</td>
<td>4,477 (2.0)</td>
<td>50,702 (22.6)</td>
<td>12,145 (5.4)</td>
<td>8,807 (3.9)</td>
<td>6,706 (2.9)</td>
<td>5,884 (2.6)</td>
<td>1,498 (0.7)</td>
<td>6,642 (2.97)</td>
<td>898 (0.4)</td>
<td>726 (0.3)</td>
<td>10,772 (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>163,982 (52.2)</td>
<td>5,591 (1.8)</td>
<td>70,248 (22.3)</td>
<td>17,152 (5.4)</td>
<td>14,092 (4.6)</td>
<td>8,609 (2.7)</td>
<td>6,944 (2.2)</td>
<td>2,077 (0.7)</td>
<td>8,911 (2.8)</td>
<td>1,215 (0.4)</td>
<td>1,056 (0.3)</td>
<td>14,402 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>188,571 (53.3)</td>
<td>6,354 (1.8)</td>
<td>76,214 (21.5)</td>
<td>19,358 (5.5)</td>
<td>15,674 (4.4)</td>
<td>9,943 (2.8)</td>
<td>7,167 (2.0)</td>
<td>2,371 (0.7)</td>
<td>9,577 (2.7)</td>
<td>1,420 (0.4)</td>
<td>1,171 (0.4)</td>
<td>16,021 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.5.
Composition of the Deputies to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, by Nationality, 1947-1967
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>65.64</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>66.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21.66</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aara-Kalpaks</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uigurs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

``total %`` 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.

Total No.
Deputies  (400)  (412)  (424)  (444)  (458)  (458)

Belorussian figures were still extremely high. The figures for Russian women fluctuated between 18% and 23% during this same period. Probably there was considerable intermarriage among Slavs. While we do not have figures on Uzbek males, and it is not possible to say with assurance who they were marrying, it is clear the Uzbek women do not marry non-Uzbeks.
### Table A.6.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality of mother</th>
<th>1960 Percent of those born whose father was of a different nationality</th>
<th>1963 Percent of those born whose father was of a different nationality</th>
<th>1965 Percent of those born whose father was of a different nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara-Kalpak</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Culture

Islam and Islamic culture have deep roots in Uzbekistan. Not only as a religion but as a pattern for living, Islam shaped the lives of the Central Asian peoples for centuries before the coming of the Russians. Both Samarkand and Bukhara—especially the former—contain ancient monuments that bear witness to the Moslem civilization that once flourished in the region.¹ At the beginning of the 13th century, Samarkand was plundered and devastated by the hordes of Genghis Khan.

In the late 14th century, Tamerlane made Samarkand his capital and began to restore and beautify the city. It was in this period that the major mosques, medreses, and mausoleums were constructed. The city was also linked with the name of the great Eastern philosopher, Navoi. Samarkand was also the site of the observatory of Ulughbek, a descendant of Tamerlane, who was both a ruler and a famous astronomer.

By the 19th century, if not before, Islam was sustaining an insulated, self-oriented, culture, frozen in its past. It was on the defensive in the face of the tsarist conquest and the impact of the Russians. The mullahs and ishans [village religious leaders] who served Islam in Turkestan were fanatical devotees of the old ways and their narrow interpretation of the ancient culture. The age-old tradition of local poets still flourished in the 19th century, and the oral tradition remained strong in the literary realm.²

By the late 19th century there began to emerge a new reform-minded Moslem intelligentsia in Turkestan. The reformist movement, called dzhadidism, sought to change the educational system. It carried on a struggle to modernize education and to adopt from the West those modernizing features that would further the rebirth of a revitalized Islam.³

¹Aleskerov, 1967.
²Allworth, 1964: Ch. 3.
It was met with fierce resistance by the conservative religious elite. Many of the dzhadidist intellectuals, after efforts to modernize education and to create a literary language, also embarked on political activities. At the time of the revolution native political figures such as Bekbudi, Munvavar Kari, and Abdul Fitrat could claim both a political and literary reputation.¹

The dzhadidist nationalists fought for revitalized Moslem culture, rejecting the Russian influence and labeling the Russians imperialists and colonialists, especially in view of the suppression of the 1916 native revolt. During the Soviet period, some participated in anti-Soviet organizations. Soon, they were eased out of positions of influence, and by the late 1920s and early 1930s, they had been suppressed and silenced. Those who survived until 1937, like the writers Fitrat and Cholman, were purged in the years 1937-1938.

While there has been a limited toleration of Uzbek folklore and traditional music during the Soviet period, there has also been a steady and sustained effort to root out "past remnants." The major thrust from above has been to impose European, more especially Russian, norms in the realm of culture and literature.² The campaign for "women's liberation," directed at the Moslem practice of female seclusion—which took extreme forms in Turkestan—³ has had many positive consequences, although the cost in directly assaulting local mores has also been great. The efforts to ignore the region's ancient heritage, to disparage the "feudal period," has borne less fruit and is less rational from a modernization perspective. In literature also, Uzbekistan, no less than the rest of the USSR, had to conform to "socialist realist" standards. Russian writers like Gogol and Pushkin were imposed as the essential models. Raw realism as a literary norm sharply contrasted with the ancient Central Asian tradition of flowery poetic themes and images.⁴

¹Allworth, 1967: 13:
³The seclusion of women was widespread among the Uzbeks. Generally, the Tadzhiks did not engage in this practice.
Recent trends suggest some measure of toleration by the regime of efforts in the Uzbek SSR to search for cultural roots in an ancient past. The regime, however, must be acutely conscious of the possible political ramifications and anti-Russian implications of too deep a native commitment to a pre-Russian heritage; it is reluctant to sanction too strong an embracing of a cultural heritage that suggests all good things did not begin with the Russian conquest of the 19th century.

Regarding the purged dzhadidist reformists Fitrat and Bekbudi, the Soviet leadership has taken a clearly negative posture. There is no inclination to reinstate them as cultural and national heroes. Too deep an exploration of Uzbek cultural roots of either an ancient or national character by present-day intellectuals is not encouraged by Moscow or its local representatives in Uzbekistan.

In 1941 Friday was replaced by Sunday as the official day of rest in the Uzbek SSR; also "Bazaar Day" was officially shifted from Friday to Sunday. These moves had important implications for the cultural identification of the Uzbeks.

Today the Spiritual Directorate for the Sunni Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan has its headquarters at Tashkent. The Spiritual Directorate is authorized to publish a small number of works of a religious character. In 1947 it brought out a Quran in Arabic, and another edition was published at Tashkent in 1964. In addition, each year the Central Asian Directorate publishes 10,000 copies of a religious calendar which consists of 12 pages printed in Arabic characters.

In Bukhara is the Miri-i-Arab medrese, a religious school for training Moslem religious functionaries for all of the USSR. Originally founded in 1535, the school was closed after the revolution, but opened again in 1952.

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1 Pravda Vostoka (May 27 and June 24), 1941.
3 Ibid.
VI. External Relations

Turkestan was once the territory across which major caravans moved on the route between the Eastern and Western worlds. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Europe became a maritime civilization and Central Asia was subsequently bypassed. This shift in trade patterns was a major factor in Turkestan's isolation for centuries; it reinforced the decay of the magnificent Islamic civilization that once flourished there. Nevertheless, contact with the Middle Eastern world remained alive into the 19th century. It declined thereafter and ended altogether for a time following the Bolshevik Revolution.

During tsarist rule in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva carried on foreign relations even though their independence was compromised by Russian rule in the region. The process of closing off Russian Turkestan was completed by the absorption of these areas into the territorial pool from which the 1925 national delimitation produced Soviet republics. Since that time, no foreign relations have been carried on directly by the Central Asian peoples. Under Stalinism, and especially after the Second World War, Central Asia was effectively sealed off from the rest of the Moslem world. While during the tsarist period Russian Moslems had been able to perform the religious duty of a trip to Mecca, this option was no longer available during the Stalinist period.

In the post-Stalin period, the borders of Central Asia were partially opened to visitors from the outside world. The importance of the Uzbek SSR as a showcase increased as the Soviets, in the mid-1950s, began to court the Moslem states of the Middle East. As part of the effort to establish a new image in the Afro-Asian world, Soviet modernization accomplishments in Central Asia have been held up as a
relevant model. The "non-capitalist development path," pioneered in the Soviet Republics of Central Asia, is presented to these new states as an example of "building socialism." The republics of Soviet Central Asia have become a beacon of socialism in the East," wrote an Indian historian who studied in the Uzbek SSR, and he added:

...A study of the Soviet techniques and methods of social transformation, their results, and the reactions and responses of the people to them is certainly bound to be quite interesting and illuminating for all the newly-liberated Afro-Asian countries who are undertaking a vast process of social change in their march forward along the path of independent national development.

Hardly a volume is published in the Uzbek SSR that does not devote some attention to the role of the Central Asian Republics as development models. Indeed, some books are devoted solely to this theme. 2

Today Samarkand and Bukhara are major tourist attractions, drawing not only Moslems but Westerners. For the latter, Tashkent serves to illustrate the rapid industrial advance and the modernization achievements of the Soviet model. Tashkent is also an important center for international meetings and conferences where students from Middle Eastern countries such as Syria have been trained under the Soviet foreign aid program. Nehru, Ayub Khan, and African leaders have visited the Uzbek SSR, and in 1963 Castro also made a trip to the region. Of Tashkent's new role in external affairs, one writer noted:

...Quite a large number of young specialists from many Afro-Asian and Latin American countries are being trained at Tashkent. The city of Tashkent has become a meeting place of writers, orientalists, cinematographers, public health workers, plant breeders and co-operators of the whole world. Tashkent was host to the first conference of Afro-Asian writers held in October, 1958.

Here too, the international trade union seminar, symposium on sanitary education sponsored by the UN, the conference dealing with diseases in tropical countries, the session of the UNESCO Consultative Committee on the Study of Arid Zones and the international seminar of women of Asian and African countries on women's education were held.

In May 1972 Tashkent was the site for the Second International Music Festival for countries of the Afro-Asian world, and it was at Tashkent that an agreement was worked out between India and Pakistan after the war between these two countries.

Uzbek political leaders have also made an appearance on the international scene. In December 1955, Sharaf Rashidov—now Uzbek First Party Secretary and candidate member of the CPSU's Politburo—was a member of the USSR government delegation to India; and in May 1957 he accompanied Voroshilov on a tour of Asian countries. In 1957 Rashidov was a member of the Soviet delegation to the Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Conference in Cairo.

But while the window to the outside world has again been partially opened and Uzbekistan made an international showcase, and while Tashkent is the most important Soviet city in the East, control over foreign relations remains in the hands of Moscow. Access to and from the Uzbek SSR is in the hands not of Uzbeks but of Russians. The foreign role of the Uzbek SSR is determined many miles away in European Russia. Of course, the Uzbeks benefit from the USSR's concern with the Afro-Asian world. This has probably resulted in the investment of funds to restore monuments with the intention of impressing foreigners. Also, it has given the Uzbeks the opportunity to exchange views with their fellow Moslems from whom they have been isolated for more than a generation. It is still too early to judge what the political consequences of all this will be.

1Kaushik, 1970: 256.

2Pravda Vostoka (January 27), 1972: 3.
UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS

PART B

Media
I. Language Data

The Uzbek language is a member of the Turkic family of languages. Prior to the revolution various dialects were spoken in Turkestan; they were, however, branches of the same Turkic language tree. Students in the Moslem schools also learned to read or at least to recite in Arabic, as it was the language of the Koran. Its role seems to have been to serve as a lingua franca for religious purposes; it was not used for conversational purposes. One of the objectives of the dzhadidist reformers was to develop a common literary language, and for this purpose they sought to re-establish Chagatay, the court language and literary medium used in the time of Tamerlane. This was the principal project of the dzhadidist writer and political leader in Bukhara, Fitrat.

One of the major devices employed by the Soviets to integrate the Uzbeks into a broader socialist community was a series of language reforms, conducted in order to forward the "nationalizing" of language. First a Latin script was developed for the various Central Asian peoples, among them the Uzbeks, in the late 1920s. This had political as well as modernizing implications: opponents of the Soviet regime argued that this language reform, as well as the 1925 national delimitation, was in essence a "fragmentation" policy aimed at undermining the Pan-Islamic as well as the Pan-Turkic unity of the region. Providing the natives with a Latin alphabet tended to isolate them from Arabic culture and countries, and consequently, furthered the processes of assimilation into the Soviet community. In the late 1930s the Latin script was dropped in Uzbekistan. It was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet, adjusted to local speech patterns.

2Allworth, 1964: Ch. 4.
3Caroe, 1967: 143-149.
4Pravda Vostoka (March 28 and April 5), 1938. See also Pravda Vostoka (August 10 and October 17), 1939.
The process of assimilation and integration into the Soviet Russian sphere was thus given an added thrust. In addition, it was felt that the adoption of the Russian language by the Uzbeks would be facilitated by this intermediary Cyrillic-Uzbek alphabet.

It is clear that the process of linguistic assimilation in Uzbekistan has not moved at a very fast pace. Statistics indicate that Uzbeks are not inclined to renounce their native tongue for Russian. The findings of the 1959 and 1970 census show that after a period of 20 to 30 years, Uzbeks much prefer their own language. (The relevant data are presented in Table B.1.) In both 1959 and 1970 only a small number of Uzbeks listed anything but Uzbek as their mother tongue. In the 1970 census, respondents were asked to indicate their second language. It is striking that as late as 1970 only 13% were able to cite Russian as a second language. The statistics point to the importance of Russian for those Uzbeks living outside Uzbekistan. Of that group, 22% cited Russian as a second language. The evidence indicates that bilingualism is highest among urban Uzbeks, and one would surmise that the more prominent the individual the more likely the tendency and the necessity. It is very rare for rural Uzbeks to adopt Russian as a second language.

The language data indicate a very limited degree of Uzbek assimilation into Soviet Russian culture and serve to document the vitality of the native tongue. There is also evidence of efforts to "de-Russify" the native language. As James Critchlow observes:

- Russian vocabulary has been to some extent expunged from the national languages, reversing an earlier trend, and preferential treatment is now being given to the use of those languages for communications....
- De-Russification has become overt and official, implemented through such devices as conferences held in the Moslem republics to discuss "speech culture." Commenting on one such conference organized in 1969 in Uzbekistan, an Uzbek writer revealed that its purpose was to rectify linguistic injustices of an earlier period, when numerous native words were purged from the Uzbek language in favor of Russian ones.

Table B.1.

Native and Second Languages Spoken by Uzbeks
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>5,038 (100%)</td>
<td>7,725 (100%)</td>
<td>4,970 (98.6%)</td>
<td>7,639 (98.9%)</td>
<td>+ 0.3</td>
<td>18 (0.35%)</td>
<td>26 (0.34%)</td>
<td>- 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other Soviet Republics</td>
<td>977 (100%)</td>
<td>1,461 (100%)</td>
<td>952 (97.4%)</td>
<td>1,417 (97%)</td>
<td>- 0.4</td>
<td>13 (1.3%)</td>
<td>23 (1.6%)</td>
<td>+ 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,015 (100%)</td>
<td>9,195 (100%)</td>
<td>5,921 (98.4%)</td>
<td>9,071 (98.6%)</td>
<td>+ 0.3</td>
<td>30 (0.5%)</td>
<td>49 (0.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for 1959, Itogi Uzbekistana, 1959: Tables 53 and 54; Itogi 1959: Table 53;

aNo data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.
bIncluding Uzbek, if not native language.
II. Local Media

Given the backwardness of Turkestan and subsequently Uzbekistan, Soviet accomplishments in modernization cannot be gainsaid. At the minimum they are an impressive technical achievement, as attested by the development of communications media. (See Tables B.2. and B.3.) There are 27 museums and 24 theaters in the Uzbek SSR. In 1971 almost 3.5 million attended these theaters. Uzbekistan can boast of 5,820 public libraries with holdings of over 32 million books and magazines. Uzbekistan also has a flourishing publications network. In 1970, 225 newspapers were published in the Republic in all languages. Among them 70 were in Russian and 129 in Uzbek.

The major republican newspapers are Pravda Vostoka [Pravda of the East] in Russian and Soviet Uzbekistani in Uzbek, organs of the Uzbek Communist Party, which appear six times weekly in Tasukent. Komsomolets Uzbekistana in Russian and Yosh Leninchi [Young Leninist] in Uzbek, both Komsomol organs, are issued five times weekly.¹

As Table B.2. shows, 18 magazines were published in Russian in 1971 and the same number in Uzbek although with a much higher per-issue circulation. Among the most popular periodicals published in the Uzbek language are: Fan va Tarmush [Science and Life], the journal of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; Gulistan [Prosperous Country] a journal of the CC CP of Uzbekistan which offers fiction; Gulkhan [Bonfire], the Komsomol monthly for ages 10 to 14; Quncha [Small Bud], another Komsomol magazine, for ages 5 to 10; Munhtum [Fist], a satirical journal; Saodat [Happiness], a journal addressed to women; Shark Yulduzi [Star of the East], the journal

¹Europa Yearbook, 1972: 1321.
of the Uzbek Union of Writers, which offers fiction; and the Pedagogical journal Soviet Maktabi [Soviet School]. Partiya Turmushi [Party Life] and Uzbekistan Kommunisti, organs of the Uzbek CC CP, appear in both Uzbek and Russian. Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane [Social Sciences in Uzbekistan] is a valuable journal published by the Social Science Section of the Uzbek Academy of Science.\(^1\)

In 1970, 951 Russian books and brochures were published, amounting to a total volume of 7,371,000. Concomitantly, 898 titles were published in Uzbek, amounting to 23,060 books and brochures in that language.\(^2\)

As another index of modern status, Table B.3. shows the expansion of electronic media between 1960 and 1971. There were 13.6 wireless sets and 10.5 television sets per 100 population in the Uzbek SSR in 1971. While this is not a startling set of figures when compared with more developed countries, it certainly places Uzbekistan in the forefront when the comparison is with the more underdeveloped Afro-Asian countries. Given the large size of Uzbek families, many more people are being reached per unit of the electronic network than in a situation when a more nearly nuclear family unit is the norm. Radio Tashkent broadcasts in Uzbek, Persian, Urdu, Uygur, and English.

A curious sidelight on the role of electronic media in Uzbekistan was furnished in 1967 by the Tashkent newspaper Pravda Vostoka's claim that television was actually invented in Uzbekistan, when in 1928 an engineer named Gravosky "for the first time in the world cast a likeness of the human face on a screen."\(^3\)

1Ibid.
2See Table B.2. for 1971 data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th>Books &amp; Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek b</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Polish)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1,405</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3,715</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a1970 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.
bThis figure may include publication in non-Soviet languages.
cBook totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Uzbek SSR

| Year | Radio | | | Television | | | Movies |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|      | No. of wired sets (1000) | No. of wireless sets (1000) | | No. of sets/100 population | | | No. of sets/100 population | | | Seats/100 population |
|      | N.A. | 891<sup>a</sup> | 965<sup>a</sup> | | 10.1<sup>d</sup> | 10.9<sup>c</sup> | | N.A. | N.A. | 118<sup>a</sup> | 1.3<sup>c</sup> | 231<sup>b</sup> | 2.6<sup>d</sup> |
| 1970 | N.A. | 1,303<sup>a</sup> | 1,627<sup>a</sup> | | 10.7<sup>d</sup> | 13.2<sup>c</sup> | | N.A. | N.A. | 1,156<sup>a</sup> | 9.4<sup>c</sup> | 627<sup>b</sup> | 5.1<sup>d</sup> |
| 1971 | N.A. | 1,329<sup>d</sup> | 1,703<sup>d</sup> | | 10.6<sup>d</sup> | 13.6<sup>c</sup> | | N.A. | 3<sup>e</sup> | 1,315<sup>c</sup> | 10.5<sup>c</sup> | N.A. | N.A. |

<sup>a</sup>Source: *Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298.*
<sup>b</sup>Source: *Nar. obraz., 1971: 325.*
<sup>c</sup>Source: *Nar. khoz., 1971: 572, 578.*
<sup>d</sup>Computed from data cited above (b and c).
<sup>e</sup>Source: *Televizion i Radioveshchaniye: 1972: 12: 13.*
III. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Institutions

The accomplishments in the realm of education during the Soviet period have been impressive (see Table B.4.). In 1971 there were 1324 schools in the Uzbek SSR and a total student population of 3,407,000. There were 38 institutions of higher education with an enrollment of 234,300. Uzbekistan could also boast of two universities with a student body of 27,199; of these 12,205 (44.8%) were full-time students and the rest were enrolled in evening school or in correspondence courses.

There were 391,000 persons working in the areas of education and culture, as well as 64,000 in science and scientific services.

Soviet writers repeatedly draw attention to the creation of a new Uzbek intelligentsia under the regime's auspices and rightly take pride in this accomplishment. Table B.5. presents the nationality composition of students in higher and middle level specialist institutes as of 1960/1961 and 1970/1971. The tremendous expansion in the number of students between these years is striking. Equally if not more striking is the number of Uzbeks among this group. The total number of students in the higher teaching institutes doubled in the ten-year period; the Uzbek contingent tripled during the same time span. The Russian component kept pace among students in higher education, for as the table shows it almost doubled in this period. Specific focus on students in middle-range specialist institutes shows a 300% increase as a whole, a doubling in the number of Russians, and a threefold increase of Uzbeks.

One can also determine the number of Uzbeks in the higher reaches of the educational scientific establishment. An examination of the category "scientific workers," presented in Table B.6., illustrates a rapid

---

1For a volume devoted to this theme, see Valiev, 1966.
expansion in the ranks of the Uzbek intelligentsia. Between 1960 and 1970 the total number of scientific workers in the Uzbek SSR grew from 10,000 to over 25,000. Among this group, Uzbeks increased from an initial 3,500 to over 11,000. In this same period, the number of Russians rose from 3,900 to 7,700.

A further consideration regarding higher education in Uzbekistan should be noted. While a student can choose between two parallel tracks, in which the language of instruction is Uzbek in one program and Russian in the other, the separate "tracks" are apparently not considered equal. As one recent study of education in Uzbekistan notes:

An important qualification needs to be applied to the advanced training programs offered in Uzbekistan: differentiation has consistently been a factor in terms of two possible "tracks"—the "Russian program" and the "Uzbek program," denoting the language of instruction used in the majority of courses offered under the one or the other program. The Russian language program is reportedly the better of the two and sought after by aspiring young native students. This kind of differentiation reflects on the average native employee's ability to perform in the technical fields. It is also generally acknowledged, for example, that preference is usually given to a Russian or a Russian-trained person (from the so-called "Russian program").

¹Medlin, 1971: 130.
Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Uzbek SSR (1971)

Population: 12,526,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 554) All Schools</th>
<th>Per 1000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of schools</td>
<td>9,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of students</td>
<td>3,407,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of students</td>
<td>272.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 552) Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of student places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary special schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions of higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities (p. 438)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of correspondence students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newly admitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of correspondence students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.4. (continued)

Selected Data on Education in the Uzbek SSR (1971)

Universities (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graduate students

- total number of
- in scientific research institutions
- in universities

Number of persons with (in '70)
higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education

- per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older
- per 1000 individuals employed in national economy

Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972 (page references are given above).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Students in Higher Schools</th>
<th></th>
<th>Students in Middle-specialist Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>101,300</td>
<td>232,900</td>
<td>53,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by nationality:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekks</td>
<td>47,800</td>
<td>134,300</td>
<td>23,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>43,600</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara-Kalpaks</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B.6.

National Composition of Scientific Workers in Uzbek SSR, 1960 and 1970

(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Scientific Workers</th>
<th>Of these, having the following rank:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doctor of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of these:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>10,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>3,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara-Kalpaks</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS

PART C

National Attitudes
I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

The history of Turkestan and the first phase of the Uzbek SSR (until 1937) offers abundant evidence of local opposition first to Tsarist and later to Soviet rule. However, it would be inaccurate to label all native resistance and political opposition as "nationalist." Armed resistance to Russian expansion into Turkestan in the 19th century was led by traditional and feudal elites. The Ferghana rebellion of 1898 as well as the native dekkhan revolt of 1916 lacked a true nationalist direction, although they both had an ethnic dimension.

In the period 1917-1924, it was not the Turkestani nationalists, (i.e., the dzhadidist intelligentsia) who posed the major threat to Soviet rule in Turkestan. The nationalists themselves were not numerous and lacked a mass base. For that, one had to make an appeal on religious, not national, grounds. The main danger to communist rule stemmed from the Basmachi bands, led for the most part by traditional elites and sustained by Moslem religious agitation against infidels as well as by anti-Russian feeling. Again, in the late 1920s, although communist nationalists protested against collectivization in the Uzbek SSR, it was the reawakening of Basmachestvo that posed the real threat to the Bolshevik regime.¹

However, Uzbek nationalists--more narrowly defined as the modernist, secular, native intelligentsia, conscious of a "nation" and intent on national independence in some form--did pose a problem for Moscow and its local representatives. The modern native intelligentsia's own problem--and the major clue to their weakness--was that the traditional elite and the peasant masses seemed as fully ill-disposed toward them as they were toward the Russians. The Basmachi chiefs in fact had killed dzhadidists, and in 1929 the radical poet Khamza was murdered in an Uzbek village for carrying out anti-religious propaganda.² As Bennigsen writes, "before 1917

¹See Chugunov, 1972.
²Khamza, 1970: 40.
among the Moslem public there was not, and there could not be, a consciousness of belonging to a modern, well-defined nation. Their consciousness was pre-modern, of a purely religious type.¹

Unable to strike a responsive chord among their own uneducated and deeply religious people, the dzhadidist intellectuals had been forced to collaborate with the Russians, who seemed more attuned to their modernist and reformist aspirations. Within the Communist Party during the 1920s, these Uzbek nationalists carried on a struggle to enhance the scope of Uzbekistan's autonomy; simultaneously, they leaned on the Russians for backing in the conflict with their own obscurantist co-religionists. Moscow was also able to use the more radically-inclined Uzbek communists, although they were few, to check those Uzbek politicians who wanted to enhance local autonomy and to minimize dependence on the Russians.

When industrialization and collectivization drew the Uzbek SSR into a tighter economic embrace with the rest of the USSR, the national communists charged Moscow with making Uzbekistan a "cotton colony."² But a series of intra-Party factional struggles and public trials had made it clear by the 1930s that the formula "national in form, socialist in content," in the Stalinist view, precluded realization of the objectives usually associated with national independence from a colonial power.

Moscow's fear of nationalism led to the destruction in the Great Purge of even those Uzbek communists who seemed previously to have proved their loyalty to the Center. In the struggles of the 1920s and early 1930s these Uzbeks had vigorously attacked the more nationalist-inclined natives. Now Stalin used the same charge of "bourgeois nationalism"

¹Bennigsen, 1971: 176.

²From the speech of Ikramov, First Secretary of the Uzbek CP, quoting "bourgeois nationalists," Pravda Vostoka (January 16), 1934: 1.
against them.\footnote{For a discussion of the Uzbek leaders Khudzhnev and Ikramov, see Kritika, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2 and 3.} A generation of Uzbek communists were destroyed in 1937-38. Stalin then raised to positions of power in the republic Uzbeks who were unconnected with the dzhadidist generation and who were completely dependent on Moscow and beholden to him for their rapid upward mobility.\footnote{Such was Usman Yusupov, who replaced Ikramov as Uzbek First Secretary in September 1937. For his biography, see Pravda Vostoka (November 21), 1937: 1. Yusupov died on May 7, 1966; his obituary appeared in Pravda Vostoka (May 8), 1966: 3.}

Stalin and his associates appeared to consider as "bourgeois nationalist" any attachment to the past and to local Moslem culture. After the Second World War, they periodically embarked on campaigns to eradicate "bourgeois nationalism," "localism" and "past remnants" in Uzbekistan and Central Asia.\footnote{Caroe, 1967: Ch. 14.} When one scans the period from the Great Purge through the 1950s, one finds little evidence of any substantive nationalist expression in the Uzbek SSR posing any threat to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Uzbek Party leadership continued to warn of the danger of bourgeois nationalism. At the First Congress of the Intelligentsia of Uzbekistan in 1956, N.A. Mukhitdinov, Uzbek First Party Secretary, observed:

...With the liquidation of the exploiting classes in our country there was eliminated any soil for bourgeois nationalism. Socialist nations by their very nature are alien to chauvinism and nationalism. This does not mean that it is impossible to have sick localities and politically unhealthy attitudes, among them nationalism, with which it is necessary to carry on uninterrupted struggle.

It is known that there are tenacious manifestations of bourgeois ideology, particularly nationalist remnants. And it is possible to root them out only with profound political-educational work.
In connection with our discussion of the cult of the personality and the liquidation of its consequences in Uzbekistan, there began to be rumored that in Uzbekistan there was not in the past and that there is not now, nationalist remnants. This position at its roots is mistaken and dangerous.¹

His successor as First Party Secretary, Sharaf Rashidov, sounded the same note in 1963:

... There is no ground--either social or political or economic--for nationalism in our land. But we cannot forget that vestiges of it are still tenacious among a certain segment of politically immature people... and always ready to break out to the surface...²

In a 1955 pioneering study, Richard Pipes published his findings on local attitudes, based on interviews with refugee Central Asian Moslems.³ His conclusions have largely stood the test of time and most seem confirmed by reports of those who have recently visited Uzbekistan. Those interviewed by Pipes were mainly middle-level intelligentsia. He reported the weakness of formal religious identification among the group, and he underlined their strong commitment to secularism and Westernization. They projected a deep respect for modern science and a complete rejection of traditional religion. However, as their own replies indicated, the old customs lived on and traditional mores remained alive in Uzbekistan. Pipes concluded that:

... In clothes, as in other customs... the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what

¹§èzd, 1957: 54-55.
³Pipes, 1955: Chs. 1 and 2.
is more practical, i.e. Western. They do not discard traditions for other than utility.\(^1\)

They had not rejected the native language even when it was imperative to learn Russian, but rather had become bilingual; they used Russian on the job, but reverted to their native tongue in their private lives. As the "denationalizing influence" of the Russians was not compelling in the area of language, so too this proved true in the realm of intermarriage. Pipes reported:

\[\ldots\] The informants unanimously agree that in Central Asia marriage between a Moslem girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled the specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation.\(^2\)

Our recent data on language, based on the census of 1959 and 1970, confirm Pipes's observations regarding the vitality of the native tongue. So also do the statistics presented earlier in this chapter regarding recent rates of intermarriage.\(^3\)

The findings regarding Russian-native tensions "vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education," and this led Pipes to observe:

\[\ldots\] On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education:

\[^2\]Pipes, 1955: Part II: 300.
\[^3\]See the Section A-IV of this chapter, on demography.
the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees—despite their strong anti-Russian bias—agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both groups suffer from the same regime, that they are 'in the same boat'.

Travelers to Uzbekistan do not usually find overt national antagonism between members of the Uzbek and Russian intelligentsia expressed. Lower-class Uzbeks, however, do not seem to be as reconciled to Russian hegemony.

"Nowhere in the Soviet Union is the influence of religion stronger than in Central Asia," a young Soviet scientist told a recent visitor to Tashkent. "The Islamic influence is very powerful," he added. The same Western visitor also reported:

. . . When the director of Tashkent's large Pedagogical Institute died a couple of years ago, officials proposed to accord him the honor of burial in the Communist cemetery


2In 1963 at a hotel in Samarkand, an Uzbek worker—in the presence of a Russian official—asked this writer, "Are workers in America always drunk?" and when I answered "No," the Uzbek responded: "All Uzbek workers are drunk because the Russians pay us only enough to get drunk." When the Russian suggested the Uzbek end the conversation, the Uzbek replied: "You [the Russian] are a political man, I am a man of the people; I speak when I want to."

Shortly after, I watched, though unobserved, as this Uzbek was literally dragged out of the back of the hotel by four militia men. He was then stuffed into the rear of what seemed to be a police wagon.

3Smith, 1972.
reserved for outstanding figures. His family refused, insisting on burial in the Uzbek cemetery with a Moslem mullah chanting prayers.

At a restaurant in Bukhara the other evening a young man with a flair for modern fashion collapsed into a chair, impatiently ordered a beef dinner. He explained that during the day his family was observing the month-long Moslem fast of Ramadan. Other educated Uzbeks said the same.

Three teen-age boys on a park bench near the magnificent blue-domed Islamic monuments of Samarkand, in telling a foreigner that they were Moslems evinced none of the common Soviet hesitancy to acknowledge religious affiliation.

When the same Western reporter asked what was the most important local holiday, he expected the response to be that it was the approaching November anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Instead, he was told that the most important date was November 8, the celebration of the Islamic feast marking the end of Ramadan. A Soviet intellectual who had grown up in Uzbekistan told him:

... There are two quite different groups of Uzbeks. The modern, educated, Europeanized Uzbeks, and the traditional ones, among whom Moslem influence is very strong. They observe national holidays in traditional ways, have Moslem weddings and funerals, and do not let their children intermarry with Russians.

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid. An American student who studied at Tashkent noted social segregation even among urban youth: "In the student dormitory, social life was usually voluntarily separated along racial lines. The Europeans and the Turkic peoples kept with their respective groups." Quoted in Critchlow, 1972: 28.
II. Basic Views on National Attitudes

The official Soviet view of its nationalities is that they are firmly integrated—that these various ethnic groups harmoniously mesh together today, and will perhaps fully melt together at some future point in time. Typical of the orthodox Soviet version of Uzbek history is the following:

... With the fraternal assistance of other Soviet republics, the Russian Republic in the first place, the peoples of Central Asia have overcome their economic and cultural backwardness, a legacy of feudalism and colonialism, within a very brief historical period, i.e. within the lifetime of one generation. They owe these magnificent successes to the advantages of the socialist system, to planned economic development and friendship and the mutual assistance of Soviet peoples.¹

Or as the Uzbek historian, Kh. Inoyatov, stated it, the success of the Central Asian peoples in building socialism "in the fraternal family of Soviet peoples" was possible only as a result of the October Socialist Revolution. The victories were possible "only in the conditions of free development of the peoples, who had liberated themselves from oppression and exploitation, thanks to the implementation of the Leninist national policy and as a result of the disinterested aid of the great Russian people."² Sharaf Rashidov was even more explicit regarding the key role of Russians and the Russian language:

... Turkestan, like other national outlands, was from the first days of Soviet rule an object of special concern for Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the Communist Party. Basing itself on the generosity and selflessness of the Great Russian nation, the Leninist Party rendered comprehensive aid to Turkestan. ...

For the Uzbek people the Russian language has become a second native language. ... Everyone here considers it the

¹Kaushik, 1970: 250.
²Inoyatov, 1966: 150.
highest honor to learn how to speak in the language of the great Lenin, in the language of the people who are elder brothers and closest friends. . .1

Not all Western students of the nationality question are as convinced that the "nationality problem" has been resolved in the USSR. In 1971 Zbigniew Brzezinski was quoted as observing: "It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States."2 Most Western specialists who deal with Uzbekistan are somewhat more cautious in their projections, but most agree that difficulties for the Soviet regime are possible.

The attitude of Western scholars on the future of Uzbek nationalism depends to a large extent on the relative weight each places on Soviet modernization versus the costs and political consequences of that process. The cost factor is largely to be calculated in terms of transcending, or perhaps rather eradicating, the native heritage and traditional society.

The more negative the scholar's appraisal of the pre-Soviet period, and the greater the value he places on Soviet modernization successes, the less he seems to be inclined to credit national unrest and to anticipate an emergent national problem in the Uzbek SSR. One can reverse the process to account for the other major range of opinion: the greater the weight placed on the pre-Soviet heritage, and the greater the reservations regarding accomplishments during the Soviet period, the more likely the scholar is to credit reports of national differences at present, and to anticipate more in the future.

1Quoted in Pipes, 1964.

In the first category one might place the study by A. Nove and J. A. Newth. These authors contend that the Communist accomplishment in modernization is placed in better perspective when it is compared to the stage of development in neighboring non-communist countries of the Middle East. On every major index of modernization, the Uzbek SSR and other Central Asian Republics surpass these Middle Eastern peoples. Nor do the authors give much credit to the argument that the USSR operated solely, or mainly, as a colonial, imperialist power in this region, draining off raw materials and returning little of worth to these dependencies. Are they colonies? the authors ask. The answer they give is "yes and no"; for they observe that while the Central Asian Republics are "to a great extent ruled from the outside," it is also true that they "registered some notable economic and social gains and that the gains were partly paid for by the Russians." They do however grant that:

... It may therefore be that Central Asian nationalism is still in a somewhat dormant state but that it will manifest itself in future years especially if the Russians are tactless or oppressive...

Already now, as is clear from travellers reports, some natives deeply resent the existing situation and are willing to say so. The problem... is how to assess public opinion in the absence of reliable information, and how to distinguish grumbles and grievances from real disloyalty. It is therefore right to end with a question mark...

The classic statement stressing local unrest and disloyalty was presented by O. Caroe in the first edition (1953) of his study. He argued that "national delimitation," collectivization, the suppression

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1Nove and Newth, 1967: Ch. 8.
3Nove and Newth, 1967: 120.
of traditional culture, and creation of artificial languages provided a rich store of discontent which fueled and provoked local unrest. In the introduction to the new edition of his book, Caroe seems less inclined to weigh lightly the positive impact of these changes during the Soviet period.\(^1\) He also seems no longer as optimistic regarding the vitality of Pan-Turanian unity in the region as the basis for an anti-Russian movement. Caroe does imply that the international environment, especially the Sino-Soviet conflict, could have the consequence of stimulating a rebirth of the demand for local independence.\(^2\)

Geoffrey Wheeler is also impressed by the extent of Westernization in Central Asia. While noting the limits of this process, and the negative features of Soviet rule, he does not see any likelihood of a full-scale national independence movement emerging in the region.\(^3\) The Sino-Soviet conflict and the proliferation of new states in the Afro-Asian world may have an impact in the future. Wheeler notes the contradictory nature of the USSR's pressing for the creation of these new states when the Western Powers are concerned, while displaying no inclination to surrender its tutelary role vis a vis its own Moslem people. And he observes:

...Whatever the correct definition of the present political status of the Central Asian peoples—colonial, dominion, autonomous, or sovereign—their destinies have lain in Russian hands for upwards of a hundred years and are likely to remain so. For them, therefore, the Western impact has meant primarily that their way of life and work and their culture have become progressively more and more Russian, and that the means of national expression have dwindled correspondingly and now seem destined to disappear altogether.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Caroe, 1967: xv.
\(^3\)Wheeler, 1964: Epilogue.
A. Bennigsen is also cautious in his projections regarding the future of nationalism in Central Asia. He provides an extensive analysis of the evidence showing the persistence of older cultural themes and norms that have remained viable in the face of Soviet modernization. While not suggesting widespread national unrest, he draws our attention to the fact that the Soviet regime has provided the Moslem peoples with all the essentials of a national identity, and perhaps with the grounds for national antagonism toward the Russians. It is the growing new Moslem intelligentsia, created under Soviet auspices, that he suggests could provide the focal point for a national resurgence in the future.

In a study of emerging nationalism in the Uzbek SSR, Critchlow has gathered from recent Uzbek-language writings evidence of currents among the new native elites. These have taken such forms as an open campaign to expunge Russian words from Uzbek, pressures to replace Europeans with national cadres in key posts, glorification of the area's ancient pre-Russian and pre-revolutionary past, implicit calls for the strengthening of Uzbekistan's political and economic autonomy within the federal structure, and the forging of links with other peoples of Moslem tradition in the USSR and abroad. Critchlow makes a strong case for an already emergent national restiveness in Uzbekistan.

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3 Critchlow, 1972: 18-27.
III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

a. Nationalism in Historical Interpretation

If the term "Uzbek nationalists" is used to mean those who demand a fully independent state for an Uzbek or Turkic nation—complete sovereignty based on separation from the USSR—then Moscow has not had to confront Uzbek nationalists since the 1920s, certainly no later than the 1930s. Those directly connected with the dzhaddist generation were killed by 1938. If, however, we state the problem in narrower Marxist-Leninist—especially Stalinist—terms, then the situation is somewhat different. "Cultural nationalism" or even "localism" (in the sense of giving priority to the local and republic as opposed to the all-union level) is a continuing and, it seems, growing area of difficulty. The Stalinist tendency to view all local patriotism, religious customs, and cultural patterns rooted in anything but the Soviet order as dangerous and consequently "bourgeois nationalist" is no longer the sole motif in Uzbekistan. Preoccupation with the local heritage need not be a danger to the integrity of the Soviet State, as Stalinists apparently believed. Nor indeed is it necessarily in conflict with Soviet federalism. In a multinational state, this can be a social lubricant, sustaining and reinforcing the integration of the unit as a whole.

However, because of the extraordinary Soviet sensitivity to such national expressions, manifestations of Uzbek patriotism take on an unusual and indirect—one might even say subliminal—character. Native dress, music and art are in general tolerated by the regime as long as these national manifestations are formal and symbolic and are considered epiphenomenon. A vital area where tension, if not conflict, emerges between local Uzbek and the all-union and Russian themes is in the region of historiography. There one can perceive below the surface a struggle among interpretations of the Uzbek and Turkic past. In essence, what is at issue is the question of the role of the Russians and the Communist system vis a vis the native people and culture. Four areas where the historical role of the Russians vs the natives will continue to emerge in the future are the following:
(1) The Tsarist Conquest

There has been evidence of a changing Russian position on this question. The growing native preoccupation with the pre-Russian period and their cultural heritage is unlikely to lead them to the simplified conclusion that before the Russian conquest their ancestors were totally lost in the Dark Ages. It is arguable as to whether the tsarist conquest was "positive," "good," or even a "lesser evil," as Soviet historians contend.

(2) The Native Revolt of 1916

Soviet historians have sought to stress the class nature of this revolt and to downplay or ignore its anti-Russian dimension. This is not likely to survive vigorous historical investigation. There is already available the study by T. Ryskulov (who has been rehabilitated) which does not neglect this aspect of the revolt. Recent publications indicate Soviet historians have anticipated a re-evaluation by native historians. They have strongly restated the older interpretation, which was imposed as the norm in the 1930s and which minimizes the ethnic dimension.

(3) The Basmachi Movement

The portrayal of the Basmachi as bandits and nothing more than representatives of the exploiting classes is likely to be challenged by Uzbek historians in the future. The exploits of the Basmachi, against vastly superior Russian forces, and their historic persistence in the face of overwhelming odds is a natural subject for probing by Uzbeks in search of the true historical record.

(4) Uzbek National Communists

While Moscow has refused to return the dzhadidist nationalists to good favor, it has entered the risky area of rehabilitating the Uzbek communists killed by Stalin. The emergence of Akmal' Ikramov and Faizulla Khodzhaev as loyal communists seems part of an effort to give the Uzbeks

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1 Rywkin, 1963: 92-95.
2 Ryskulov, 1925.
4 See Shamagdayev, 1961; Chugunov, 1972.
safe national heroes who served the communist system. The difficulty, of course, with this step is in explaining why they were killed if they were loyal; and this raises questions on the nature of the communist system and the motives of the Russians in the Uzbek SSR. The solution to this dilemma now in vogue is simply to ignore the fact that in 1937/38 these two leaders and many other Uzbeks were eliminated by Stalin. Recent biographies are silent about their disappearance from the Uzbek scene and the story simply comes to an abrupt end in 1938.

While these historical questions are largely, but not totally on the agenda for the future and will provide a kind of index of growing national tension, Critchlow has provided evidence of recent indications that local Uzbek patriotism is already on the scene.

b. Overt Nationalism

But it is not just within the Uzbek governing system or through an indirect fashion expressed by Uzbek intellectuals that native-Russian antagonism has been manifested. In late April, 1969, the tension broke into the open when a riot took place in Tashkent outside the Pashkator football stadium. The Tashkent disturbance continued into early May, 1969 and involved fighting between Uzbeks and Russians. One source reported as follows:

In mid-May there were large-scale national disturbances in a number of places in Uzbekistan. They took the form of spontaneous meetings and rallies, under the slogan "Russians, get out of Uzbekistan!" The disturbances assumed such a violent character that troops were brought into Tashkent. About one

1 For a discussion of the Rehabilitation of Khodzhaev and Ikramov, see Kritika, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2 and 3.
hundred and fifty arrests were made in Tashkent and other towns. The majority were allowed to go free, but about thirty people were given fifteen days in prison for "petty hooliganism." According to unconfirmed rumours, one of those kept under arrest was Rashidova, daughter of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and another the son of one of the deputy chairmen of the Uzbek Council of Ministers.¹

Vivid evidence of nationality difficulties in the Uzbek SSR has concerned the Crimean Tatars, who were deported to Central Asia after World War II. Many apparently settled in Uzbekistan, and in 1968-1969 their efforts to obtain redress of grievances resulted in a trial at Tashkent in which some were sentenced.²

c. The Intelligentsia and Nationalism

One cannot help but be struck by the key role of non-Uzbeks in Uzbekistan's development. Even those impressed by modernization, and not inclined to stress national differences, grant the central role of "outsiders." However, Nove and Newth state:

The existence of political groups at the local level which were prepared to accept modernization as an ideal was a considerable asset to the Soviet authorities in this early phase; the conflict arose over the speed of modernization—the rate at which society was to be transformed, and the ideas and institutions which were to be jettisoned—rather than the direction in which society was to be moved.³

These conflicts were not unimportant areas of divergence, but rather essential questions determining the nature of the modernization process and the character of its outcome. Today in the ranks of the Party and the intelligentsia in the Uzbek SSR, Russians continue to play a large and key role. A characterization of this situation as "Russian imperialism" might

seem to some as not far off the mark; but one must agree with Nove and Newth that this is not a fully accurate description. It does not encompass the full power configuration including the native component; nor does it provide sufficient insight into the likely future course of a political dynamics. Russians do not rule alone and, although Moscow has a firm grip on key political posts, the local native intelligentsia has risen in the political and economic realm to occupy many important positions. As Bennigsen notes, a vital and growing Moslem intelligentsia has been created by Moscow.\(^1\) The key question concerns the local elite's attitudes, and the likelihood of the native intelligentsia rising to full control in its own republic.

This Soviet Uzbek intelligentsia, Pipes wrote, possesses "many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole," but also displays "certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia." Regarding these special conditions, he added:

\[\ldots\text{by origin, language, culture and family ties, it is connected to the Moslem population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population.}\]

An analysis, keyed to social class, highlights the intelligentsia's integration within the broader framework of Soviet society; but this may be a deceptive guide to attitudes and perhaps leads to minimizing the emergence of national and ethnic loyalties in a new guise. Critchlow has suggested as much in his article. The new elite's search for renewed native roots could take the form of "localism" and Uzbek patriotism. Having created a native Soviet intelligentsia in order to bypass nationalism and to cement all-union integration, Moscow may yet find that it has structured the basis for a series of new ethnic tension.

\(^1\) Bennigsen, 1967.

\(^2\) Pipes, 1955: II: 305.
The phenomenon may be linked to generational differences. As the second generation of the Soviet Uzbek intelligentsia emerges, one may find it less preoccupied with its debt to Moscow and more confident of its local status. One may find it contemplating the "colonial tie" as it seeks out its own cultural past. Perhaps there will also appear, as evidence already suggests, a search for symbols linking it with the masses and further differentiating it from other national branches of the Soviet intelligentsia. The new generation accepts the Soviet societal framework, but takes Moscow's largesse for granted. Broad industrial trends tend of themselves to socialize the engineers and technicians to accept integration within a multi-national Soviet system. But industrial society also breeds its own problems. To what degree, for instance, will ethnic tension unfold as Uzbeks emerge from the schools, armed with skills but confronted with Russians and Ukrainians blocking the channels for mobility and occupying key positions? Just as Western colonialism had its "white man's burden," so Moscow's modernization rationale revolved, implicitly if not explicitly, around a similar "Bolshevik burden." In the past the dominance of Slavs in Central Asia could be justified to some degree on a technical non-political basis, since the natives lacked the wherewithal to create and manage a complex modern society. But skill and education are no longer the monopoly of Europeans, and a recension of colonialism might well become the common currency explaining Russian dominance in elite positions in the Uzbek SSR. Moscow may yet be confronted with the dilemma of either granting full power to the native elite or risking growing native alienation by providing a very visible Russian presence as a concrete focus for local unrest.

Indeed, the March 1973 speech of Sh. R. Rashidov, First Secretary of the CP CC of Uzbekistan, reflected the difficulties implicit in this pattern of rule. While praising "the fraternal friendship" of the nationality groups as a "source of the Soviet State's insuperable strength," he stressed the need for the improvement of "the people's ideological-political moral education." In particular, he pointed to the lack of a well-directed atheistic education program, which he related to an "incorrect attitude toward women." His emphasis on religious survivals (i.e., illegal
mullahs) throughout the rather lengthy speech, is an indication of their current strength in Uzbekistan. Uzbek artists, writers, and musicians were also brought to task for their use of "[nationalistic] themes from the feudal past," "naked erotica," and "mysticism." It is evident that the Soviet leadership must constantly be on guard to maintain its dominance over Uzbek cultural institutions.

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PREFACE

This volume is a part of the five-volume study, "Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities," produced at the Center for International Studies, MIT. The study deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities—the fifteen which have their own Union Republics, plus the Tatars and the Jews. Each nationality is the subject of one chapter. The nationalities are grouped by geographical and/or cultural affinity in four of the volumes: The Slavs, The Baltics, The Transcauccasus, and Central Asia. The fifth volume, Other Nationalities, includes chapters on the Moldavians, the Tatars, and the Jews, as well as a set of comparative tables for all nationalities.

This volume includes chapters for the five republics in Central Asia as that area is defined in this study. (Some specialists would disagree with the inclusion of Kazakhstan, regarding it as a transitional area between Central Asia and Siberia rather than as a part of Central Asia in the strict sense of the word.) The five nationalities have much in common—the Islamic religion, many historical developments, the position of women, demographic and occupational patterns, and, except for the Tadzhiks (whose language is in the Iranian group), Turkic languages so that they are often able to understand each other's speech.
To help the non-specialist reader it may be of use to explain here some of the historical-geographic terms related to Central Asia.

**Turkestan**: Historically refers to the area of the republics of Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizstan. Often used also to include Kazakhstan.

**Bukhara** (also spelled Bokhara): The leading Central Asian city-state until modern times and seat of the Khanate of Bukhara, a major Central Asian political force in the past five centuries. In pre-revolutionary Russia, Bukhara was not administratively part of Turkestan. The label "Bukhara" applies to any area directly controlled by the Emir of the Bukharan Khanate.

**Khiva**: A Central Asian Khanate, a large oasis and environs, which rivaled Bukhara throughout the 17th-19th centuries and was also separate from Turkestan. It was much smaller, less diverse, and less populated than Bukhara, but kept its independence until 1920.

**Kokand**: One of the three Khanates in 19th century Central Asia. It has a much shorter history than Bukhara or Khiva and disappeared after 1875. The term now refers only to the city of Kokand.

**Kara-Kalpak**: An autonomous region of the Uzbek SSR populated by the Kara-Kalpaks, a distinct Turkish subgroup.

Since all chapters are written according to a uniform pattern, the chapter outline and note on references given at the beginning of the volume apply to all of them.
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CHAPTER OUTLINE FOR EACH NATIONALITY

Part A. General Information
   I. Territory
   II. Economy
   III. History
   IV. Demography
   V. Culture
   VI. External Relations

Part B. Media
   I. Language Data
   II. Local Media
   III. Educational Institutions
   IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Part C. National Attitudes
   I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes
   II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes
   III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism
NOTES ON REFERENCES

Where several quotations are taken from a single source, reference is provided at the end of the last quotation. Similarly, where information in a paragraph is from one source, the source is cited at the end of the paragraph.

Sources used more than once in a chapter are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. Full citations are given in the list of references at the end of each chapter. Sources containing only one page are cited without page numbers.

Except where noted, emphasis in quotations has been added.
Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE KAZAKHS

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KAZAKHSTAN AND THE KAZAKHS

PART A

General Information
I. Territory

Kazakhstan is second among the union republics in territorial size (1,048,305 sq. mi.). It is as large as all of Western Europe. From the mountainous Chinese border in the east, it stretches to the Caspian Sea and the Urals in the west. It extends from the Kirgizian steppe in the south, through the deserts of Central Asia, to the marshes and the vast forests of Siberia in the north.¹

Kazakhstan is generally thought of as a land of endless flat steppe. However, the country also has pine-wood-covered mountain ranges with peaks up to 16,000 feet high, rocky and hilly deserts, and huge, dry plateaus. It is crossed by major rivers like the Irtysh (which empties into the Arctic Ocean) and has landlocked basins with rivers disappearing into the deserts or into huge salt lakes (the Syr'-Dar'a, for example). The major rivers serve as important transportation routes; the others are navigable only in the spring.

The lowlands in the northwestern part of Kazakhstan stretch from the border with Siberia to the edge of the Caspian Sea. The lowest point in the USSR—the Batyr canyon, 433 feet below sea level—is here. North of the Caspian Sea, the Kazakh border passes just east of the lower Volga and Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad). Following south, along the Caspian coast, hilly areas jut out onto the Mangyshlak Peninsula. During the 1960s, large oil and gas deposits were discovered here, and the town of Shevchenko was developed. In the southern Urals region, the Kazakh border runs south of the industrial towns of Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk, in which immense deposits of iron and copper ores have been discovered. Open-pit mining is carried on in the vicinity of Sarba and Rudny.²

¹SSSR, 1967: 538-539; NER, 1959: 351. The area is given as 2,756,000 sq. km. (1,064,097 sq. mi.). There have been several minor territorial transfers between Kazakhstan and its neighbors. NER Yezhgodnik, 1971: 133.

To the east, the border follows along Western Siberia and passes south of Omsk, from which the vast Turgai plateau stretches southward. This is the "virgin lands," formerly steppe, with its center in Tselinograd (formerly Akmolinsk). Further, to the southeast, the Kazakhstan border passes through a plateau and cuts across the Altai Mountains where it becomes the Sino-Soviet frontier. In this plateau area there is a heavy concentration of coal mining and industry (mainly around Karaganda and Ust' Kamenogorsk).

In the south, Kazakhstan borders on the Turkmen, Uzhek and Kirgiz union republics. From east to west, the border passes south of the capital of Alma-Ata and north of Frunze, the capital of the Kirgiz SSR, and Tashkent, the capital of the Uzhek SSR. It then passes through the Kzyl-Kum desert and reaches the Aral Sea. From the west coast of the Aral Sea, the boundary extends in a southwesterly direction, along the Uzhek and Turkmen borders, to the Caspian Sea.

In general, the southeastern parts of the republic are mountainous plateaus; the northern and western parts are flatlands. The rivers of Kazakhstan supply hydroelectric power. About two-thirds of available land is used for pasturage. In the north, the black earth is suitable for intensive agriculture. Kazakhstan holds first place in the USSR for proven mineral resources such as chrome, lead, tin, silver, copper, and phosphorus. It also has large deposits of gold, nickel, bauxite, and many other minerals.

The climate of Kazakhstan is very extreme. In the south, the summers are very hot, and in the north along the Siberian border, the winters are cold and windy. Temperatures range from $-49^\circ F$ in the north to $+113^\circ F$ in the southern deserts. Average temperatures in January are $-4^\circ F$ in the north and $+23^\circ F$ in the south; in July, $+68^\circ F$.
and +86°F, respectively. In the "virgin lands" the growing season lasts for 110-140 days; it is even longer in the south. At Tselinograd, the annual rainfall is 12 inches, one-half of which falls during the summer months. At Kzyl-Orda, to the southwest, it is five inches.

The Kazakh republic is subdivided into 18 provinces, including the capital city, Alma-Ata, as a separate administrative unit. The provinces vary greatly in size and population--from more than 1.5 million persons in the province of Karaganda to 0.25 million in the recently established (1970)Turrai province.

1MSE, 1959: 351-353.
II. Economy

During the First Five Year Plan (1929-1933) Kazakhstan became the third republic in the USSR (after the RSFSR and the Ukraine) in overall production and it remains in this position today. It is first in the Soviet Union in the production of lead, electricity, and coal, and second in copper and tin. By 1970, its overall industrial production was 146 times higher than in 1913, whereas the ratio for the USSR as a whole was 92 times. Of the working age population, some 91% (up from 75% in 1959) were actually employed in the economy or studying. (This figure excludes housekeeping and private farming.) In 1970 the actual strength of the labor force was approximately 5.5 million. Of these, 4.7 million were workers and employees, and 0.8 million were collective farmers.

The major industries in Kazakhstan are related to the first-stage processing of the natural resources of the republic. The Sokolovsk-Sarbai ore-refining works (near Rudny), the Pavlodar aluminum plant, and the Karaganda metal works are typical examples. Kazakhstan is also a major producer of chemicals, especially fertilizers. However, the republic is basically a supplier of energy and raw materials for industries located outside of its borders. Kazakh coal and ores supply a major part of the needs of the heavy industry concentrated in the Russian Urals, for example. Kazakh chemicals supply the fertilizer factories in other Central Asian republics. Kazakh electricity, coal, ores, grain, and oil are exported to the burgeoning new industrial areas in Siberia. And, as is to be expected, Kazakhstan is a major supplier of such agricultural products as grain, meat, wool, cotton, and fruit to other parts of the USSR. At the same time, Kazakhstan depends on importing finished products from other republics. From the RSFSR alone it imports half of its needs in woolen and cotton goods, 87% of its watches, and so on.

In fact, trade between Kazakhstan and the rest of the Soviet Union fits the classic pattern of economic relations between colonial (or underdeveloped) countries and highly developed metropolitan countries. It also fits fully the classic Marxist (and Leninist) definition of colonial servitude. Most of the goods manufactured in Kazakhstan are neither owned nor produced by Kazakhs. A Soviet survey undertaken in a major newly developed mining town in northern Kazakhstan near the Russian Urals indicated that only 2% of the population of 100,000 were Kazakh. Similarly, only 2% of the people employed at the town's ore-concentration complex were Kazakh, but only 10% of the Kazakhs were unskilled. One-fourth of the enrollment in the local boarding schools was Kazakh. The author suggested that the low representation of Kazakhs was due to the fact that this was not a traditional area of Kazakh settlement and that people from all over the USSR were imported to work in the local mines. This does not explain, however, why non-Kazakhs occupied most of the important positions in the town. A similar pattern is typical of many of the new developments in northern Kazakhstan, including those in the "virgin lands" area.

The "virgin lands" fulfill a crucial role in the economy of the USSR and of the Kazakh SSR in particular. Until the beginning of the virgin lands campaign in 1954, grain harvests in Kazakhstan had been very small. In 1955 the republic produced over five million tons of grain, and in 1958 production shot up to 22 million tons, 40% of all marketed grain in the USSR. Most of Kazakhstan's grain is marketed, because the republic's sparsely settled sovkhozy do not withhold much of it for their own use, unlike kolkhozy, which traditionally have large peasant populations with large numbers of


livestock to feed.) Grain output has varied greatly; some years have yielded disastrously small harvests due to bad weather and grave mismanagement. Yet in 1972, a year of bad weather, the yield was the highest ever—an estimated 27 million tons, or nearly half as much grain as was marketed by all other regions of the USSR together.¹

During the ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) industrial production in Kazakhstan is scheduled to grow 59%, as compared with 47% for the USSR as a whole. Coal production is slated to increase from 61.5 million tons in 1970 to 90 million tons in 1975 (46%). The production of oil is scheduled to increase from 13 to 30 million tons (130%). Steel output in 1975 will be more than twice that of 1970, and shoe production will increase from 28 million pairs to 35 million (25%). Total production of grain, which stood at 2.5 million tons in 1940, grew to 22 million in 1970 and is to reach the yearly average of 25 million by 1975. This amounts to approximately one-ninth of the total Soviet grain needs. Electric energy production in 1970 amounted to about 35 billion kwh, more than the total for a developed country the size of Switzerland. Per-capita production was a little lower than in France but higher than in Italy.²

Kazakhstan's produced national income grew by 214% between 1960 and 1970, the 6th fastest growth rate in the Soviet Union. Indicators of the standard of living also grew significantly during the decade, but not enough to raise the country's ranking among the union republics. Savings per capita in 1970 were nearly four times as high as in 1960 (139.58 vs. 35.26 rubles per capita), but Kazakhstan slipped from seventh to ninth place, with a ratio less than half that of Estonia, the thriftiest republic. Trade turnover per capita in 1970 was 557 rubles, not quite half of that of Estonia (956


rubles) and almost 150 rubles less than that of the RSFSR. In both respects Kazakhstan ranked first among the Central Asian republics. In the ratio of useful urban living space per urban inhabitant, Kazakhstan's 12 square yards per person ranked tenth among the republics, but ahead of all of Central Asia except Turkmenia.

Traditionally, Kazakhs have tended to invest their wealth in personal and domestic ornamentation or in livestock rather than placing it in banks. *Nar. khoz.* 1970: 534, 536, 546, 564, 579.

III. History

The Kazakhs emerged in the 15th century, a mixture of Turkic tribes who had appeared there in the 8th century and Mongols settled in Central Asia since the 13th century. Consequently, they speak a Turkic language and are Moslem by religion but their facial features and much of their way of life are Mongolian. They were organized into tribal-feudal ordas [hordes]. Around 1456, a number of these tribes broke off from the declining Golden Horde and formed three distinct ordas, the Great, the Middle, and the Little, and occupied the territory of present-day Kazakhstan. These groups fought among themselves and with other Asian peoples.

Pressed by the dungans (Moslem Chinese), Khan Abulkhair, leader of the Little Horde, submitted in 1731 to the Russians, who by then were pressing eastward into Siberia and Central Asia. Fighting between the Kazakhs and Kalmyks (another nomadic group) weakened both groups and eased the extension of Russian control. However, from 1783 through 1797 the Little Horde rose against the Russians. In 1830 the Russians built a fort at Akmolinsk (now Tselinograd) and began to settle their own people in the area. The Kazakhs rebelled again under Kenesary Kasymov in 1835. The Russians suppressed this rebellion also, and Kasymov was killed in fighting with the Kirgiz in 1847. The Russian push continued, and in 1853 the Russians built the fortress Verny, the modern Alma-Ata.

By the turn of the century, modernization had begun in Kazakhstan. A nationalist movement began to develop, led by intellectuals such as Ali Bukeikhanov and Ahmed Baitursun. Although the great majority of the Kazakhs remained nomadic tribesmen, a considerable number had already begun to cultivate crops and settle on the land. Under the impact of Russian capital, spurred in turn by foreign investment and drive, the first modern workshops, factories, railways, and roads were built. In 1910, Avkan, the first Kazakh newspaper was published, followed in 1913

by Kazakh. In 1913 there were 36,000 workers in Kazakhstan. Few of these were Kazakhs, however; almost all modern institutions were operated by Europeans (e.g., Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Jews). Kazakhs for the most part continued to be ruled by their tribal-feudal nobility, to listen to the 'oslem mullahs, and to work as herdsmen and peasants. Nevertheless, the disintegration of the tribal system had begun. The Kazakh population actually diminished by 9% between 1902 and 1913. By 1914 the number of Russian and Ukrainian settlers in the Kazakh country reached more than one million. In some provinces one-third of the land was handed over by the tsarist government to the settlers.1

It seemed at first that the Kazakhs would escape World War I, for they were not conscripted into the tsarist army. Soon, however, they were caught up in war and disruption. In 1916 the tsarist government ordered a call-up of all Kazakh males for auxiliary army duty. The Kazakhs responded with a general rebellion under Amangeldy Imanov and Abdulghaffar, directed against the Slav settlers in the republic. Although the revolt was soon suppressed, it caused strong national feelings and a desire for liberation from Russian domination, which came into the open in 1917. After the February 1917 Revolution in Russia, Kazakhs led by Ali Bukeikhanov demanded full autonomy and created a national government, adopting the name of Alash Orda. In many cities and areas of Kazakhstan, pro-Bolshevik Revolutionary Committees and Soviets were created, but the Great-Russian Whites and the Orda became predominant. Much of the fighting was of an ethnic character, pitting the Kazakhs and Kirgiz against the Slavic settlers, both Whites and Bolsheviks. In 1919–1920 the Red Army defeated the Whites in Central Asia. Weakened by struggles with the Whites and faced with the growing strength of the Reds, the majority of the Alash Orda forces were compelled to recognize Soviet power.

Yet some remained active against the Reds into the early 1920s. Dzhangildin, a Kazakh chief who had allied himself with the Bolsheviks, and Ahmed Baitursun, a nationalist leader who had become a communist, were among the new Kazakh Soviet leaders.¹

On July 10, 1919, Lenin signed a decree creating a Revolutionary Committee for the "Kirgiz" (Kazakh) territories. On August 26, 1920, an "Autonomous Kirgiz" (Kazakh) Soviet Socialist Republic, within the framework of the RSFSR, was established.² It only became a union republic, i.e., a member of the Soviet Union formally equal to the RSFSR, with the acceptance of the Stalin constitution in 1936. From the beginning of its history the leading personnel of the Kazakhstan republic have been almost entirely foreign; Kazakh Bolsheviks were extremely rare. The capital was at first in Orenburg, in the Russian Urals. It was then moved to Kzyl Orda, and only in 1929 to Alma-Ata, the present site.

During the five years (1916-1920) of general fighting and of national and social upheaval, Kazakhstan suffered losses in both population and livestock. Many Kazakhs left with their herds for neighboring Chinese Sinkiang and Afghanistan. Of those who remained, having lost their cattle to the Slav settlers, then to the White forces and the Red Commissars, about one million died of starvation during the 1921-1922 famine.³

²SSSR, 1967:538; Pipes, 1964:172-174; for a record sympathetic to the Soviet version of events, including details on the role of Stalin, see Coates 1951: Ch. v.

In order to prevent confusion in their dealings with the Kazakhs and the Russian-Ukrainian Kozaks (Cossacks) living in the southeast of European Russia, the Russians referred to the Kazakhs as Kirgiz. They called the original Kirgiz tribes Kara-Kirgiz. The Kazakh republic was called Kirgiz until 1925.

In 1927, Soviet authorities began a series of major moves in Kazakhstan which completely changed its character. Large semi-feudal estates were abolished and their assets transferred to herdsmen and state farms. Collectivization began in 1929 and was completed by 1937, very late in comparison with other areas in the USSR. Forced collectivization caused the decimation of herds. The authorities had had to proceed cautiously in the outlying mountainous areas, and despite their efforts, Kazakhs continued to migrate abroad with their herds.

Since the end of the 1920s many new projects have been implemented in Kazakhstan in line with the Five Year Plans. From the beginning, the dual and contradictory character of Soviet modernization has been apparent. On the one hand, it meant economic development, cultural evolution, better health and communication services, and a higher standard of living—at least for part of the population. On the other, it meant further centralization of the life of the Kazakh people in Moscow's hands, loss of autonomy, forcible and sometimes bloody settlement of the Kazakh nomads on the land through collectivization, and a massive influx of European settlers. This series of events was ultimately responsible for completely changing the Kazakh way of life and for making the Kazakhs a minority in their own republic.

Some of the top Kazakh leaders tried to oppose this process and were purged by Moscow for "bourgeois nationalism." Baitursunov was removed in 1925. Ryskulov, who criticized Soviet power for not fulfilling its promises to the Moslems, and other Kazakh-Bolshevik leaders of the early period—even those who had been opponents of the Alash Orda—disappeared in 1927-1928. In the purges of 1937-1939, eighteen Kazakh leaders were executed, including Kulumbetov, Eskelev, and Dasvakazov (respectively, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Deputy Prime Minister, and Secretary of the Party in Alma-Ata).

1 Among the victims of the 1928 purge were also Seyfullin, Mendeshev, and Sadvakazov. See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967: 106-107,113, 137-160; Conquest, 1967: 95-96.
The dual process of modernization and colonization was very much speeded up during World War II, when major industrial enterprises, along with large groups of residents (Russians, Jews, Germans, Chechens, etc.), were evacuated (or, in some cases, exiled) from the western parts of the USSR to Kazakhstan. 1 During World War II, Z. Shavakhmetov, a Kazakh, was appointed First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party. But by 1954, a Russian, P. Ponomarenko, was appointed in his place, because the Kazakhs were again resisting such a large influx of foreigners, this time within the framework of the "virgin lands" campaign, which aimed at cultivating the immense steppe of the north. Kazakhstan was also chosen as the site for the Soviet equivalent of Cape Kennedy, a cosmodrome for Soviet space launchings. Due to great difficulties encountered with these development projects, Khrushchev sent L. Brezhnev to Kazakhstan (where he was Second Secretary of the Party in 1954 and First Secretary in 1955–1956). By now, whole areas in northern Kazakhstan are mainly inhabited by Slavs. 2

After the tensions connected with the virgin lands policy eased, Kazakhs were again appointed to important positions in the republic. The present First Secretary, D. Kunayev, is a Kazakh. He is also a member of the all-powerful Politburo of the CPSU, the first Kazakh to reach this level. 3

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1 On the mass deportations of entire Soviet nationalities, see, e.g., Conquest, 1967 and 1970.


IV. Demography

In population, Kazakhstan is a distant third among the republics of the USSR, after the RSFSR and the Ukraine. In 1971 it had more than 13 million inhabitants, 5.3% of the total population of the Soviet Union.\(^1\) Between 1913 and 1940 the population of Kazakhstan increased only by about 10% (from 5,565,000 to 6,054,000). Since many non-Kazakhs settled in the republic during that period, the Kazakh population itself must have diminished. During the next 30 years, 1940-1970, the population of the republic more than doubled. Urban population grew from 10% of the total (500,000) in 1913 to 51% in 1970 (500,000). (This compares favorably with the overall figures for the USSR: 18% in 1913 and 56% in 1970.)

Kazakhstan has several major cities. The capital, Alma-Ata, had a population of 753,000 in 1972.\(^2\) Karaganda, a major mining and heavy industry center, had more than half a million inhabitants. Semipalatinsk is now a city of a quarter of a million. Tselinograd, formerly called Akmolinsk) the capital of the virgin lands, a town of only 30,000 in 1939, had a population of 200,000 in 1971.\(^3\)

a. Ethnic Composition of the Population

Kazakhstan is unique among the republics in that the Kazakhs, the titular nationality, are neither a majority nor a plurality in their homeland. In 1970, out of a population of 4,161,000, they amounted to little more than 32% of the republic's total, while 5,500,000 Russians made up more than 42%. Kazakhstan ranks second to the Ukrainian SSR in the number of Russians living within its borders. In Kazakhstan, the Slavs (Russians plus Ukrainians (930,000 or 7.2%) and Belorussians (198,000 or 1.5%) made up an absolute majority of the population. Indeed, the Kazakhs view them as a single ethnic group: European and Slav.

\(^1\) BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971:133.
\(^2\) On Alma-Ata and the other cities, see Kazakhstan, 1970
Despite the development efforts of the 1930s, by 1940 only 177,000 persons worked in industry and communications in Kazakhstan. After World War II, however, a modern industrial population emerged in the republic; workers in industry and communications numbered 625,000 in 1960 and more than one million by 1970. Most of the growth in the urban population and in the industrial labor force was the result of the immigration of non-Kazakhs; most Kazakhs remained in the rural and agricultural sectors of the economy.¹

The large non-Kazakh immigration has been compensated somewhat by the high Kazakh natural population growth. In 1940, the rate of natural increase in Kazakhstan was 19.5 per 1000 population. In 1960, as a result of a sharp drop in the death rate (due to the wide introduction of modern medicine) it rose to 30.5 per 1000. In 1970 the rate was down to 17 per 1000 population, following an influx of foreigners and a drop in the birthrate of the Kazakhs themselves. Yet, it remained almost double the average for the Soviet Union (9 per 1000 population).² Between 1959 and 1970 alone, the total number of Kazakhs in the USSR (including those outside Kazakhstan) increased from 2,723,000 to 4,161,000. Their percentage of the republic's population rose from 29.8% to 32.4%, while the percentage of Russians dropped by 0.4%.

During 1959-1970, the number of Kazakhs outside of Kazakhstan also rose, from 899,000 to 1,138,000. Almost all of these Kazakhs live in two republics: the Russian SFSR (478,000) and Uzbekistan (549,000). Together, they make up about one-fifth of all Kazakhs.

The 840,000 Germans "resettled" from the Volga German Autonomous Republic in 1940-1941 are the largest exiled ethnic group in Kazakhstan.

¹Nar. khoz. 1970: 159; and see Section A-II of this chapter, on the Kazakh economy.
They comprise 6.3% of the population of Kazakhstan and almost half of all Germans in the USSR (1,846,000). The 284 Tatars who although officially rehabilitated, have not been allowed to return to the Crimea, are the second largest population-in-exile in the republic. There are also 35,000 Chechens and 22,700 Chuvash in Kazakhstan. ¹

During the skirmishes on the Sino-Soviet border many Uighurs from Sinkiang crossed into Kazakhstan, and their number has risen from 60,000 in 1959 to 121,000 in 1970. There are also 208,000 Uzbeks living in Kazakhstan. Some 80,000 Koreans, 60,000 Poles, 55,000 Azeris, and 27,000 Jews complete the picture. ²

By 1970 almost 40% of Kazakhstan's population was under 15 years old, and 60% under 30: a very young age structure, much younger than the average for the USSR. However, the 0-4 age bracket has decreased by 4% since 1959, due to a leveling off of the birthrate and an influx of European settlers. The above-55 age bracket has increased to 12% of the population. These trends will probably continue during the 1970s.

In 1970 48% of the total population of Kazakhstan were males. Females outnumbered males up to age 44, except in the age group 20-24. Above 45, women heavily outnumber men. This is to be expected in a generation which survived both the war and Stalin's purges (for the ages 50 to 70 there are almost two women for every man); the disproportion between the sexes is greater in most other parts of the USSR. In 1970 the ratio of married people in Kazakhstan was higher than in 1959. In 1970 the ratio of married women was higher in the republic than in the USSR as a whole (620 per 1000 population vs. 579 per 1000). But for men the Kazakh ratio is lower than that for the total USSR (608 per 1000 vs. 722 per 1000). This may be the

result of the better balance of the sexes in Kazakhstan than elsewhere. Also, marriages of young Kazakhs are made more difficult by traditional customs of bride payment (kalym) and arranged unions.¹

b. Distribution of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (1970)

The results of the 1970 Census corroborate the extreme differences in the ethnic make-up of various parts of Kazakhstan, as shown in Table A.1. The table indicates that as a consequence of settlement by Russians (Europeans) as well as of modernization and urbanization, Kazakhstan comprises three ethnically and economically distinct units: (A) the traditionally Kazakh south and west, (B) the predominately Slav settled and modernized northeast,² and (C) the industrial and administrative towns and cities, where Europeans are a great majority and the traditional Kazakh culture is very little in evidence.

Area A is composed of eight provinces, from Semipalatinsk in the southeast through Taldy-Kurpan, Dzhambul, Chimkent, and Kzyl-Orda provinces in the traditional Kazakh south and to the western provinces of Gur'yev, Uralsk and Aktyubinsk. In all these provinces the Kazakhs are a majority of the rural population (up to 93% in Kzyl-Orda) and between one-third and two-thirds of the total population.

Alma-Ata typifies the towns and cities included in area C. The Kazakhs are only 12.5% of its population, and they have the highest percentage of Russian speakers in the republic (88.5% as native and second language combined).

²See Table A.1. and Itogi 1970: 223-252.
Table A.1.

Kazakhs by Percentage in Population and Knowledge of Russian in the Provinces of the Kazakh SSR (1970 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Kazakhs in total population</th>
<th>Knowledge of Russian as a second language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kzyl-Orda</td>
<td>70.76</td>
<td>27.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92.74</td>
<td>19.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gur'yev</td>
<td>62.47</td>
<td>28.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91.72</td>
<td>16.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>49.33</td>
<td>40.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>37.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktyubinsk</td>
<td>47.52</td>
<td>42.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.03</td>
<td>35.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinkent</td>
<td>47.17</td>
<td>25.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.98</td>
<td>20.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semipalatinsk</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>43.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.83</td>
<td>35.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taldy-Kurgan</td>
<td>41.28</td>
<td>35.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.75</td>
<td>32.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzhambul</td>
<td>40.71</td>
<td>38.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.20</td>
<td>33.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alma Ata</td>
<td>35.59</td>
<td>36.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.97</td>
<td>34.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgai</td>
<td>32.47</td>
<td>39.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.21</td>
<td>35.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar</td>
<td>25.17</td>
<td>60.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.33</td>
<td>55.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kazakhstan</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>46.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.17</td>
<td>41.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokchetav</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>58.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.68</td>
<td>54.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is taken as an index of "Russification" since the percentage of Kazakhs who declared Russian as their native language is very small.

**A**: in total population; **B**: in rural population.
Table A.1. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Kazakhs in total population</th>
<th>Knowledge of Russian as a second Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Tselinograd A</td>
<td>18.68</td>
<td>62.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.99</td>
<td>55.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Karapanda A</td>
<td>18.59</td>
<td>58.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.15</td>
<td>45.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Kustanai A</td>
<td>15.47</td>
<td>61.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>59.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 North Kazakhstan A</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>61.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.77</td>
<td>59.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Alma Ata (city) A</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>80.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from *Itogi 1970*: 223-252.
So far there is no detailed breakdown by nationality of the population of other cities from the 1970 census. Fragmentary evidence from other sources upholds the non-Kazakh character of many of the cities in the republic.¹

The influence of the Russianized capital is also felt in the Alma Ata province. Alone among all southern areas, it has less than half Kazakh population in its rural areas. However, there is no total correlation between Slav majorities and modernization, since, for example, such areas as the Gur'yev province in which the recent oil and gas fields were developed still have a large Kazakh majority.²

c. Composition of the Communist Party

In 1924 only 8% of the CP membership in Kazakhstan was Kazakh, while the Russians and Ukrainians together made up 66%. Kazakh participation reached its height, 53%, in 1933-1936. Due to the influx of refugees during World War II it decreased to 32% in 1943, and by 1960 it had risen only slightly, to 36%.

In 1965 there were about 450,000 Party members in Kazakhstan, of whom about 40% were Kazakhs. By 1971 the Party had grown to 575,000 members, but data on the national breakdown for this year are not available. The Komsomol had 1220 members in 1971.³

Although the Kazakhs are a minority in the Party, their proportion is higher than their relative weight in the population of the republic (32.5%) in 1970. In 1965, there were 36 communists per 1000 population in Kazakhstan, less than the average for the USSR. The Kazakhs also

¹See Section A-II (Economy), p.2.
have more representation in the Kazakh Supreme Soviet than their proportion in the population would entitle them to have (about 40% to 32.5% respectively).

A study of the Kazakh Party in 1955-1964 showed that "Kazakhs were numerically overrepresented among the Party elite of the republic...half of all obkom, gorkom, and raikon [province, city, and district] secretaries were Kazakh, though they comprised only 36% of the Party membership and 30% of the population."¹

In 1933 38% of Kazakhstan Party members were workers; by 1941, only 28%. For the same periods, the percentages for agricultural workers decreased from 52% to 36%, while those for white-collar workers and specialists increased from 10% to 36% (and to 44% by 1946). Despite official demands to increase the proportion of workers and peasants in the Party, white-collar workers and members of the intelligentsia have remained in the majority.² Although Party and governmental organizations in Kazakhstan are usually headed by Kazakhs, they inevitably have Russian deputies. This appears to be a regular pattern in the republics of the USSR.³


³D. Kunayev, the Kazakh First Secretary of the Party, is assisted by V. Mesyats as his Second Secretary. In 1971 B. Ashimov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Slazhnev was one of his two first deputies. Miyazbekov was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and A. Chasovnikova was his deputy. Z. Kamalidinov was First Secretary of the Komsomol, and his Second Secretary was A. Semenchenko. BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971:133-134. For a discussion of problems arising in the work of the local Soviets, see Aimbetov, 1967, passim.
V. Culture

The Kazakhs are historically and culturally part of the larger group of Central Asian Moslems, which includes the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kirgiz peoples. Together they amount to 20 million people, out of the more than 30 million Moslems in the USSR. As a part of the Central Asian world, the Kazakh people share in a history of some 2500 years and a civilization which had reached heights long before the Russian state and culture had appeared. Soviet-Moslem historians, writers, and poets have stressed the links with the Moslem world. During the 1950s and 1960s, contacts with other Moslem peoples were encouraged by Soviet authorities.

Kazakhstan has a strong oral tradition. During the 18th century, akyns [folk poets] roamed throughout the land. By the 19th century both Russians and Kazakhs had begun collecting Kazakh folklore. The Kazakh poet and humanist Aham Kananbayev, generally regarded as the founder of modern Kazakh national literature and language and a "representative of realistic-democratic art," lived during this period. He translated many Russian literary works into Kazakh, a fact which his Soviet biographies stress. In 1913, S. Kobyev wrote the first Kazakh novel, Kalym, in which he condemned the system of bride payment. During the 20th century Kazakh akyns devoted their poems to the Kazakh national rebellion against tsarist Russia in 1916 and later to the victory of Soviet power in Central Asia.


3ISE, 1950: 357-358; Bennigesen and Lerercier-Ouelquejay, 1967: 37, 46-47; Coates, 1951: 139-140.
In the 1920s and 1930s Kazakh national art was modernized under Soviet direction. A number of poets, novelists, playwrights, and composers appeared. In 1925 the first professional theater was established in Kzyl-Orda; later, it was transferred to Alma Ata. Among the best known playwrights and writers were M. Auezov, S. Mukanoz, and C. Musrepov.

Kazakh music tradition began with folk melodies played on the dombra,⁠¹ the Kazakh national instrument, by the akyns during recitations of their poetry. The first Kazakh musical drama was created in 1934 by E. Brusilovsky, a Russian composer, who also wrote two major Kazakh operas and several symphonic pieces based on Kazakh melodies. Later, Kazakh composers such as A. Zhubanov and M. Tulebayev appeared.

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¹For a review of Central Asian music, see Allworth, 1967.
VI. External Relations

Kazakhstan's territorial position and size contribute to the amorphous quality of its external relations. To the south, understandably, the connections with the rest of the Moslem world remain strong. To the east, the situation in Kazakhstan is greatly influenced by China and developments in the Sino-Soviet rift. In the north, the impact of the European immigrants living in the new areas of settlement is important.

Identification with Islam is strong in Kazakhstan. Although Kazakh Moslems are unable to travel to Mecca, they often make journeys to the different Moslem shrines of Soviet Central Asia. The official Soviet attitude to Islam has varied since 1917, but in general Soviet-sponsored modernization has eroded the traditional social patterns of Islam (the extended family and seclusion of women, for example).¹

Until the Sino-Soviet confrontation on the Sinkiang border, Kazakhstan had no great strategic significance to the Soviet Union.² Now, however, it is strategically and militarily vital. Peking claims that approximately 20,000 square miles of territory in Eastern Kazakhstan is rightfully China's. (The Chinese nuclear complex in Sinkiang is not far from this frontier.) Because of rising Sino-Soviet tension Soviet military development in Kazakhstan has increased greatly in recent years. Soviet armed forces in Kazakhstan rose from 14 under-strength divisions in 1965 to 36 divisions in 1969, with short-distance (Frop) and long-distance (Scaleboard) nuclear missiles. (The total strength of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border now is one-half million. These troops are reported to face a total of up to one million Chinese military and paramilitary troops.)

¹Nevertheless, Islam was and is much stronger in the traditionally settled areas of Central Asia than in Kazakhstan.

²Traditionally, nomadic Kazakhs moved across the Chinese border and back to Russia. This was still the case during 1920-1940. See Allen S. Wittke, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1958).
Baikanur, in Kazakhstan, has become the major Soviet space center. The concentration of Soviet military and technological personnel in this area has enhanced the Russification of the republic.

The relations of Kazakhstan with the RSFSR, its giant neighbor, are colored by the great influx of Russians and by a tight web of economic relations. The "virgin lands" in the north of Kazakhstan are predominantly settled by Russians and other Europeans in large, highly mechanized state farms (sovkhозы). In Tselinograd province the proportion of Kazakhs to Slavs is 1:3. In Karaganda province, only one-fifth of the population are Kazakhs; three-fifths are Slavs. In Kustanai province the ratio is 2:7. Even the names of the towns and new settlements in these areas are Russian—for example, Rudny, Tselinograd, Pavlodar, Petropavlovsk, and Semipalatinsk. In the new settlements intermarriage of the Kazakh elite with Russians is also common. Precise data are not available on possible tensions between Kazakh and the Russians in these areas.


KAZAKHSTAN AND THE KAZAKHS

PART B

Media
I. Language Data

The Kazakh language belongs to the family of Turkic languages, as do the languages of three of the four other Central Asian republics, namely, Kirgiz, Turkmen, and Uzbek. (Tadzhik is a member of the Iranian branch of Indo-European). Kazakh was written in Arabic script until the early 1930s, when the Arabic was supplanted by the Latin alphabet. A decade later, as part of the effort of Sovietization, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic (i.e., Russian) alphabet, which is now the script of all but five of the official languages of the fifteen union republics. The Cyrillic alphabet is used throughout the Central Asian republics.

Table B.1 shows that out of the 5,299,000 Kazakhs living in the USSR in 1970, a full 98% considered Kazakh their native language. The percentage is especially high—98.8%—for the Kazakhs living on their own territory; for the Kazakhs living outside their own republic (mostly in the RSFSR and the Uzbek SSR) it was 95.1%. A comparison with data from the 1959 census shows that this percentage has been declining somewhat.

The 1959 data show that members of the Kazakh nationality for whom Kazakh is not the native language are overwhelmingly native speakers of Russian. There is little assimilation to other languages, even for the Kazakhs residing outside their own republic. Parallel data for 1970 are not as yet available, but there is no reason to expect a change in this pattern.

1See Table B.1 and sources cited there.
Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Kazakhs
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Kazakhs residing:</th>
<th>Speaking as their Native Language</th>
<th>Speaking as a Second Language&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>2,795 4,234 (100%) (100%)</td>
<td>2,773 4,186 (99.2%) (98.9%) -0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other Soviet republics</td>
<td>827 1,065 (100%) (100%)</td>
<td>790 1,007 (95.6%) (94.6%) -1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,622 5,299 (100%) (100%)</td>
<td>3,563 5,193 (98.4%) (98.0%) -0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.
Data on bilingualism have become available only with the 1970 census. They show that over 2 million, or fully two-fifths of the Kazakhs, speak Russian as a second language. Bilingualism with "other languages of the peoples of the USSR" includes command of Kazakh as a second language.

There is a clear positive correlation between the Kazakh-Russians ratio and the language indicators for Kazakhs. Naturally, the higher the percentage of Russians (European) in an area, the higher the knowledge of Russian by Kazakhs. (In Alma Ata, 6.7% of Kazakhs declared Russian as native and 80.8% knew Russian as a second language--by far the highest percentage in the republic. In Tselinograd, the "virgin lands" area, where the Kazakhs are less than 19% of the population, almost two-thirds (62.7%) know Russian as a second language; the same is true of Kustanai province (62%). In Chimkent province, traditionally settled by Kazakhs, only 1 in 4 Kazakhs knew Russian. In this matter there are significant differences between urban and rural Kazakhs; the latter have less knowledge of Russian and are more rooted in the Kazakh language. In the same Chimkent area, only 1 out of 5 rural Kazakhs knows Russian.1

Two more points, not shown in Table B.1., should be mentioned. One is that only a negligible number of non-Kazakh nationals are native speakers of Kazakh. In 1999, the total number of people speaking Kazakh natively anywhere in the Soviet Union was 3,579,633; a comparison with Table B.1. shows that only 16,401 of these were not of Kazakh nationality. In 1970, only 13,691 non-Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan spoke Kazakh natively.2

The 1970 data on bilingualism in Kazakhstan show that command of Kazakh as a second language is, similarly, low among non-Kazakh nationalities: only 100,033 non-Kazakhs spoke Kazakh as a second language in 1970, while fluent knowledge of Russian as a second language was reported by 3,416,119.

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1 See Table B.1. and Itogi 1970: IV: 223-252.
people living in Kazakhstan (including 1,739,367 Kazakhs). Thus it is clear that the non-Kazakh, non-Russian nationality groups opt overwhelmingly for Russian as a second language. When there is a shift to another language, it is also to Russian.¹

Secondly, there is a sizeable group of Kazakhs living outside the borders of the USSR, in the neighboring Sinkiang province of the People's Republic of China. A figure given for this group in the early sixties was 500,000.²

¹See sources in Table B.1.
II. Local Media

The Kazakhs, like other Central Asian peoples, did not achieve mass literacy or a press of their own until the 20th century. Given this backwardness, their achievements in communications media have been striking. Even so, in comparison with the other nationalities of the Soviet Union they are still far behind.¹

In 1970–71 there were 354 newspapers published in Kazakhstan, 130 in Kazakh. Twelve of the 25 magazines published in the republic were in Kazakh. Thus, the Kazakh share in these types of printing media was higher than their percentage of the total population. 627 out of 2022 book titles published were in Kazakh. However, in terms of circulation more than half of the books printed were Kazakh. In print media per 100 population, the Kazakhs scored very low (see Table B.2.), approximately half as well as Latvia, for example.

Of the republican newspapers the most influential and widely read is Kazakhstanskaya pravda published in Russian in Alma-Ata. Its Kazakh counterpart is Sotsialistik Kazakstan. Both are official organs of the Party and government. Two-thirds of all newspapers are raion [county] publications and usually appear in both Russian and Kazakh. Among the most important and popular periodicals are the literary journals Zhuldyz [Star] in Kazakh and Prostor [Spaciousness] in Russian, both published by the Union of Writers. Journals published in Kazakhstan are highly diversified and include Russkii yazyk v Kazakhskoi shkole [Russian Language in the Kazakh School] and Zhurnal mod [Fashion Magazine], both in Russian. The local Comsomol papers are Leninskaya smena [The Leninist Rising Generation], in Russian, and Leninshit zhas [Leninist Youth], in Kazakh. The party monthlies are Kazakstan kommunist (in Kazakh) and Partiinaya zhizn' Kazakhstana [Party Life of Kazakhstan] in Russian. For the Germans resident in Kazakhstan a daily newspaper Freundschaft [Friendship] is published in Tselinograd.

¹See Nar. khoz. 1972: 556 and see Section Α−ΣΤΤΙ, on Kazakh history.
Table B.2.
Publications in the Kazakh SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th>Books and Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>(2)b,c</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>/total nolp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>19.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>360b,c</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSome of these may be in non-Soviet languages.
b2 newspapers, 1970, not accounted for—may be foreign language.
cTotals as given in Pechat sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

The usual pairs of local newspapers in Russian and (in this case) Kazakh are also published in the provinces. Kaztag is the Kazakh news agency. Among the Kazakh publishing houses are Zhazhushy [Writer] and Kainar [Spring], the latter specializing in agricultural subjects. The major Soviet publishing houses also have branches in Kazakhstan. (For example, Nauka [Science], which publishes on scientific topics in Moscow, has a subdivision in Alma-Ata.)

Kazakhstan does not rank high in electronic media. In 1971 there were 18 wireless sets and 12 television sets per 100 population (see Table B.3.); in Latvia, there were 36 and 20 respectively. Forty percent of all radio outlets in the republic are wired. Still, for a Central Asian republic, one wireless for every five persons and one television set for every eight may be regarded as high, especially since the average Kazakh family is much larger than the average Latvian family, for example.

Television channels include Central Television, a channel relayed by satellite, and one program from Alma-Ata. Roughly half of the Alma-Ata broadcasts are in Kazakh. The rest, and all programming on the other channels, is in Russian.

In 1965 Kazakhstan had 15 committees and regional editorial boards for radio and television broadcasting, occupying fourth place in the USSR. There were 45.7 hours of television broadcasting per day (third in the USSR) including 40 hours of local programs (a very high rate), of which 11 hours were locally produced. The Alma-Ata area had 13 hours of broadcasting per day, Tselinograd 3 hours, the Seripalatinsk area 1 hour, and the Pavlodar area, 0.2 hours. Broadcasting was in Russian.

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2. See Table B.3, and the sources there.
and Kazakh; comprehensive and detailed breakdowns are presently unavailable.

In assessing the effect of media in Kazakhstan, exposure to Russian media from the neighboring European areas of the RSFSR and from Siberia must be taken into consideration. Since Kazakh is a Turkic language, Kazakhs may be able to make out broadcasts in other languages of the same family from the neighboring Soviet and foreign areas. *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* publishes the schedule of Frunze radio in Kirgizistan, indicating a significant audience in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has a film studio which has produced such films as "The Songs of Ahai," "Dzhambul," and "Botagoz," as well as documentary films on Kazakhstan. Together with the RSFSR, Kazakhstan holds first place in the union for cinema attendance per capita (22 per year), and first place for cinema attendance in the countryside (23 per year).\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (1000)</th>
<th>Seats (1000)</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electronic Media and Films in the Kazakh SSR

Table 1.3.
III. Educational Institutions

Kazakhstan has a modern network of cultural and educational facilities including more than 10,000 schools with 3.3 million pupils. By 1970 there were some 44 institutions of higher learning in the republic with about 200,000 students. Half of this enrollment figure represents part-time study. In Alma-Ata 12 institutions of higher learning are functioning, among them the Kazakh State University with 10,000 students. In college students per 1000 population--19-- the Kazakhs rank 5th as an ethnic group in the USSR. As a republic, the Kazakhs rank 12th (15.5/1000) among the union republics.

In 1970, while the Kazakh ethnic group amounted to 4.35% of the total Soviet population, the percentage of Kazakh graduate students was only 1.7%. The number of Kazakh specialists with a higher education was 1.4%, and those with secondary education even less (1%). Among Soviet scientists only 0.8% were Kazakh, and among those with the doctoral degree, 0.7%. At the advanced levels the Kazakhs were very far from their appropriate proportion in the USSR as a whole or even in their own republic; though at the undergraduate level the position of Kazakhs as an ethnic group is higher than that of Kazakhstan as a republic, as noted above.

In 1970 Kazakhstan had 738,000 specialists with higher and/or specialized secondary education (professionals and semi-professionals). In ratio of such specialists to population (57.5/1000), Kazakhstan dropped from eighth place in 1960 to ninth in 1970 among the union republics. About 100,000 of these specialists were Kazakh professionals.

---

Kazakhstan - Educational Institutions - 2

(with higher education). Kazakhs occupied 10th place among the union republican nationalities in the number of specialists per thousand of their own ethnic group.¹

The general standard of education of the population rose after the Second World War as a result of the educational progress in the republic as well as the immigration of a more educated population from the European USSR. In 1939 only 83 per 1000 population had had more than a six-year education. By 1970, this number had risen to 470, almost equal to the USSR average.²

Major effort in the educational system in Kazakhstan has been devoted to implementing general secondary education. Both Russian and Kazakh are used in the schools. At the primary level in the rural areas mainly settled by Kazakhs, the language of instruction is Kazakh, while in urban areas Russian predominates in the schools, partly because the majority of the population is non-Kazakh and partly because the study of Russian is seen by Kazakh parents as a means of upward social mobility for their children.

At the higher levels (college and secondary special schools), the language of instruction is Russian, unless there is a special reason to use Kazakh. For example, Kazakh is used in Kazakh language and literature departments or at schools of education which train teachers for Kazakh-speaking schools. According to reports from recent expatriates from Kazakhstan, there has been some pressure from the Kazakh intelligentsia for more instruction in the Kazakh language, especially at technical and medical colleges.³

¹Nar. obraz., 1971: 233-234.
³Author's personal experience in Kazakhstan and talks with recent emigres. See also Russkii vazyk v Kazalhskoi shkole (Moscow, periodical), passim; Vestnik statistiki, 1972, no. 6, article by G. Naksimov, pp. 16-23.
Table P.4.
Selected Data on Education in the Kazakh SSR (1971)
Population: 13,470,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 567)</th>
<th>All schools</th>
<th>Per 100 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of schools</td>
<td>10,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of students</td>
<td>3,296,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 565)</th>
<th>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of student places</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 567)</th>
<th>Secondary special schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 567)</th>
<th>Institutions of higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 438)</th>
<th>Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 10,082 | .075 |
| day students | 5,240 | .039 | 54.0% |
| evening students | 1,281 | .01 | 17.7% |
| correspondence students | 3,561 | .026 | 35.3% |

- newly admitted

| Total | 2,066 | .015 |
| day students | 1,193 | .009 | 57.8% |
| evening students | 246 | .0018 | 11.9% |
| correspondence students | 522 | .0046 | 30.3% |
### Universities (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>per 100</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total day students</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening students</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence students</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 108) **Graduate students**

- Total number of
  - 2,551
- in scientific research institutions
  - 1,079
- in universities
  - 1,472

(p. 556) **Number of persons with (in 1970)**

- **higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education**
  - per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older
    - 468
  - per 1000 individuals employed in national economy
    - 654

**Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools**

- 116,900

**Source:** Nar. khoz. 1972. (Page references given above.)
IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Kazakhstan has a network of 36 research institutes organized within the Kazakh Academy of Sciences (established in 1945). In 1970 there were 7,905 Kazakh scientific workers, more than 1.5 per 1,000 Kazaks. Although this is a considerable achievement for the Kazaks in view of their recent degree of illiteracy, it is lower than the USSR average and about one-third of the ratio for Georgians or Armenians.¹

There are 25 theaters in the republic. The most prominent among them are in Alma-Ata: the Abai Opera and Ballet Theater, the Auezov Drama Theater (Kazakh), the Lermontov Drama theater (Russian), the Dzhambul Philharmonic Hall, and the Youth Theater. There are also provincial theaters in such cities as Tselinograd, Dzhambul, and Kustanai. The rate of theater attendance, however, at 251 per 1,000 population per year is the lowest in the USSR.²

In 1971 about half a million people were working in cultural and educational institutions in Kazakhstan. Approximately 125,000 were employed in science-related work in the republic. The major institution of culture and entertainment in the republic is the Ministry of Culture which operates regional and urban houses of culture, various cultural centers, and village clubs and reading rooms. The trade unions operate a network of cultural institutions and holiday houses of their own. Apart from this, there are branches of the creative-arts organizations (Writers' Union, Theater Performers' Union, etc.) and of the voluntary cultural organizations such as Znaniye [Knowledge]. These arrange lecture series, exhibitions, and symposia. Other administrative agencies (apart from

¹ Nar. obraz., 1971: 196.
the Ministry of Culture) as well as collective farms and local agencies operate cultural institutions of their own. In 1970 the Kazakh Znaniiye Society organized 730,000 lectures, which were attended by 38 million people. The trade unions in Kazakhstan operated 10,581 groups for arts and crafts, including amateur choirs, drama circles, musical groups, ballet circles, and special children's groups.¹

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in
the Kazakh SSR (1971)

Population: 13,470,000

Academy of Science:
- number of members: 109
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy: 36
- total number of scientific workers in these: 3,172

Museums:
- number of museums: 30
- attendance: 1,167,000
- attendance per 1000 population: 86.6

Theaters:
- number of theaters: 25
- attendance: 3,382,000
- attendance per 1000 population: 251

Number of persons working in education and culture:
- total: 498,000
- no. per 1000 population: 36

Number of persons working in science and scientific services:
- total: 124,000
- number per 1000 population: 9

Number of public libraries: 7,903

- number of books and magazines in public libraries: 69,798,000

Number of clubs: 7,288

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972
KAZAKHSTAN AND THE KAZAKHS

PART C

National Attitudes
I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

Removed at some distance from the political pressures that China had exerted on the Mongols to the east and the Russians had exerted on the Golden Horde to the west, and only partly exposed to the cultural influences of the oases to the south, the Kazakhs retained their nomadic way of life longer than most of the pastoral tribes of Central Asia. But in the 1960s the Russian conquest of Central Asia began. It had several causes, principally the need for cotton to replace the supply cut off by the American Civil War, the desire to protect Russian settlers and trade in Central Asia from nomadic raids, and competition with British expansion in the area (especially after the first Afghan war (1839-1840)). The Russian colonization and modernization which followed led to attempts by the Russian authorities to Russianize the Central Asians, including the Kazakhs.

The Russian system of administration disrupted traditional Kazakh culture in several important ways. The imposition of a money tax pushed the Kazakhs further away from family self-sufficiency and barter toward dependence on external markets. Russian-instituted registration in a single county interfered with yearly migration patterns, necessary to obtain good pasturage. Also, new Russian settlements blocked immigration routes. The Russian administrative system was totally foreign to Kazakh culture; it furthered the breakdown of the tribal system as well as of the traditional political structure. This, together with a change from communal to personal land tenure, led to the partial adoption of Russian values and to the weakening of kinship responsibilities. Many poor Kazakhs were forced out of the pastoral way of life and into the settlements. From the late 19th century on, conflict between Russian settlers and the Kazakh nomads


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became the most characteristic feature of life on the steppe.

The Kazakhs were accorded the full status of a union republic in 1936. Agricultural collectivization, under the direction of zealous Russian officials, was very traumatic for the Kazakh nomadic families, thousands of whom were forced into collective farms. Those who resisted were either killed or deported, and tribal leaders were impoverished, exiled, or killed. At the same time mining and industry were developed in regions that had previously been pasture lands or winter quarters for the tribes. Before and during World War II, many thousands of Ukrainians, Volga Germans, Poles, Crimean Tatars, and other nationality groups were deported to Kazakhstan. There was also an influx of Russian administrators, agitators, technicians, and "fraternal helpers" during this period.

As a consequence of these and other ongoing social processes (e.g., modernization, urbanization), there have developed three demographically and culturally distinct "Kazakhstans":

1. The traditional Kazakh areas where the extended families (now organized into brigades) and village culture still flourish;
2. The "virgin lands" to the north and east, inhabited mainly by Russian and other European settlers, living on large mechanized state farms where Slav peasant culture is predominant;
3. The industrial and administrative towns and cities, where Russians and other Europeans are in the majority and where a modern city culture is the norm.

The strongest traditional force in Kazakhstan is Islam. It is responsible for two major non-Soviet features of Kazakh life—patriarchal rule and the inferior status of women. Among Soviet Moslems these traditions affect their life style, not the religious dogma and practice.

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1See Section A-IV, on demography.

2See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Ouelquejav, 1967:184-192. Kazakh and Kirgiz women have traditionally higher status in their societies than women of other Central Asian nationalities. See Bacon, 1966:204-205.
known to the Central Asian south, to which they are indifferent. Islam remains one of the major inhibitors to Sovietization, for it hinders intermarriage and other forms of social interaction. ¹

¹ Cf. Lit. gaz. (January 24), 1973:11.
II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

The attitudes of the Kazakhs vary among the groupings within the Kazakh population: the older, traditional, mostly rural Kazakh perceives things differently from the Soviet-educated young worker or from a member of one of the new Kazakh elites. In turn, there may be a subdivision in attitudes within the latter, depending on whether the Kazakh is a professional, a nachalnik (in a position of authority), a scientist, etc.

Western and Soviet scholars have developed theories and views which pertain to Central Asia or to Islamic peoples in the USSR, rather than to the Kazakhs in particular. Since such views center mainly around the Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kirgiz, and Tadzhiks, who are regarded as the core people of Islamic Central Asia, they will be reviewed in the sections devoted to these nationalities. For the Kazakhs, following the theories of the Western writer Geoffrey Wheeler,\(^1\) it may be useful to differentiate between (a) national (ethnic) consciousness and (b) nationalism (aimed at separation and independence). The former develops with education, and, one may add, with modernization in general. The latter also develops but remains latent in the absence of proper pre-conditions, i.e., effective nationalist leaders and slackening of Soviet anti-nationalist repression.

Wheeler points out several specific factors which influence Central Asian attitudes. The Central Asian republics are landlocked and contiguous to the core Russian territories. The Soviet authorities developed Central Asia to a level much higher than that achieved in the former Asian and African colonies of European countries. Artificially induced concepts of nationhood were administered by the Soviets in small dosages in order to replace clan and tribal loyalties. Massive European colonization created at the same time a strong demographic base for the Soviet system.

Wheeler concludes that it is reasonable to assume that there is an undercurrent of resentment against continued alien rule and regimentation; but also that the people would not be able, and would be most unlikely to attempt, to break free from the political, economic and cultural straightjacket in which they are at present confined, unless there were some prospect of its deliberate or involuntary loosening by Moscow as a result of internal or external pressure.¹

However, one may question some of the other conclusions reached by Wheeler. He argues that "no coherent desire for separation was ever expressed by the Moslems of Central Asia," a statement which hardly squares with the events of 1916-1921 or later in the 1920s in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Central Asia. He also denies that there is "direct evidence of the existence of Uzbek or other particularist national consciousness in Central Asia." But in Uzbek and Kazakh literature, for example, there is ample evidence of such national consciousness.²

According to recent emigres from the USSR,³ some of the young elite in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, argue that the optimal solution would be independence. When confronted with arguments questioning the viability of an independent Kazakhstan or Kirgizia, for example, they point to the existence of small states such as Luxemburg or Upper Volta. Some of them quote "Benelux" as an example of a confederation of small independent states. However, the great majority of the Kazakh intelligentsia argue that they should utilize to the full the existing rights and opportunities within the framework of the USSR. In their opinion, this has so far not yet been done. Yet their full utilization would give the local nationals (the Kazakhs in this case) a real measure of autonomy as

¹Ibid. See also Bacon, 1966; Togan A. Zaki Velidi, Turkestan Today (unpublished English translation, Houghton Library, Harvard University). Views of other Western theorists (Kolarz, Bennigsen and Ouelquejaj, Nove and Newth, Rakowska-Harmstone, etc.) about the situation in Central Asia are discussed in the other chapters dealing with Moslem nationalities.


³Based on the authors' talks with emigres in 1970-73 in Austria, Israel, Germany, and the U.S.A.
a union republic.  

Soviet views on Kazakh relations with Russia (the USSR) have fluctuated as can be seen from the way in which Kazakh history has been treated. Initially Soviet historians presented the extension of Russian domination over the Kazaks as a conquest. The version that Khan Abulkhair asked for Russian protection was dismissed, and any suggestion that the Kazakhs themselves had willingly accepted Russian rule was rejected. Soviet historians argued that the Kazakh working people suffered from a "double yoke" of the Kazakh feudal rulers and of the tsarist imperial domination. In 1937, however, the official Soviet version changed to the "lesser evil" theory. The Russian tsarist yoke was a lesser evil compared to British imperialism's attempts to expand into Central Asia. Soon, however, the version was again changed to another, according to which the Kazakhs accepted Russian rule willingly. Abulkhair was presented as a wise statesman who had fulfilled the will of the people.  

Similarly, Kenesary Kasymov, the leader of the anti-Russian revolt of 1835-45, was at first presented by Soviet historians as a great legendary fighter for national liberation. Since the 1940s, however, he has been portrayed as the leader of a reactionary struggle for the restoration of feudalism and for leading the Kazakh people astray from the inevitable progress resulting from association with Russia. Only certain minor peasant uprisings of the Kazakhs against the Russians are now treated as progressive.  

Until the 1940s, Soviet historians wrote that the Kazakhs were worse off as a result of the Russian tsarist conquest, for they suffered both from their own feudal lords and from the Russian economic exploitation.

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and suppression of their culture. Since then, however, the stress has been on the progressive economic development and the positive influence of the Russian intelligentsia on the Kazakhs resulting from the incorporation of Kazakhstan into Russia.

Initially, the Soviet historians depicted the relations between the Kazakhs and Russians as typical of those between an oppressed people and imperialist colonialists. The Kazakhs, who had lost their independence and been subjugated by foreigners, hated them and during their rebellions they killed all the Russians they could. Later, Soviet historians wrote that the hatred of the Kazakhs was reserved for tsarism only. The Kazakhs and the Russian working people, they maintained, had always been firendly and fought together against tsarism.¹

According to current official Soviet theories, the Kazakhs were originally only an ethnic group (narodnost'). A recent authoritative book stresses that only "with the victory of the October Revolution were conditions created for the consolidation of the Kazakh ethnic group into a socialist nation." This became possible largely "as a result of the help provided to the Kazakh people by the developed nations, first and foremost by the Russian people." The usual Soviet thesis of "the worker-peasant alliance" was given an interesting twist in regard to the Kazakhs. The same source explains that "the development of economic, political, and cultural ties with the more highly developed Russian nation was a condition for involving the Kazakh people in the Russian proletarian movement... [and] facilitated the creation of an alliance of the working class of Russia with the Kazakh peasantry."²

²Kulichenko, 1972:227-230. The alliance had to be that of the Russian working class with the Kazakh peasantry, since there was no Kazakh working class to speak of. Whatever workers there were in Kazakhstan were mostly Russian.
III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

The situation in Kazakhstan must be creating serious national tensions. Though the direct evidence of this is limited, there is evidence that other ethnic groups in the USSR react with anger at the sight of Russians settling en masse in new towns in their areas and running things there as if at home.¹ A partial explanation for the lack of expression of nationalist tensions can perhaps be found in the relatively small size of the Kazakh intelligentsia, the source for most written expressions of dissent, and its limited weight in the republic's cultural organizations.²

Recently there have in fact been some indications of nationalist dissatisfaction. A 1972 session of the Kazakhstan Writers' Union demanded that "a timely and firm rebuff should be given to any nationalist epidemics, no matter in what form they appear and from whom they derive." The works of "some literary and art figures" were criticized for "enthusiasm and distortion in the direction of long past events and history" which at times lacks "thorough class and party reference points."³ These are frequent code-phrases for criticizing national or ethnically centered works. Sotsialistik Kazakhstan has published a letter criticizing the use of bad spelling on Kazakh-language signs in Alma-Ata,⁴ literal translations from Russian, and even Russian words when Kazakh equivalents were available.

Of dissent in Kazakhstan, only some isolated cases are known, and those involved in them were non-Kazakhs. In October 1971 Nahum Shafer, a Candidate of Science and professor at the Pavlodar Teachers College, was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for writing and distributing "anti-Soviet materials." Five other faculty members were also accused as

¹Mowat, 1970, passim. See also Fedoseyev, 1972:232-235 who gives a list of "nationalist manifestations".
²See Section B-III, on educational institutions.
³Isinâlichev, in Pravda (October 8), 1972:2.
⁴Radio Liberty Dispatch (January 7), 1971.
"cooperators." A descendent of a Russian revolutionary family, M. Yakubovich, who spent many years in camps near Karaganda and lived after his release in an invalid home in that city, undertook a long campaign to clear his name. He denounced the political trials under Stalin and secured a personal interview with Mikovan in May 1967. In April 1968 the Karaganda KGB attempted to prepare a case against him but charges were cropped on an instruction from Moscow.

Kazakhstan has also been the scene of nationalist dissent among the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetians, as well as of Christian religious dissent. Among the recent Jewish and German emigres there are also former residents of Kazakhstan.

The bulk of the Kazakh population has not been drawn into the cities where they could have become involved in such manifestations of dissent. In rural areas, however, ethnocentrism has been expressed through the maintenance of traditional customs and attitudes, even by Party members and local officials. In November 1972, Kazakhstanskaya pravda criticized widespread misappropriation and even stealing of kolkhoz or state livestock for personal gain. Of the 17 names mentioned in the article, all but four were clearly Kazakh. This cattle-raiding activity on the part of the Kazakhs is a strong part of their traditional pastoral culture, as is the Moslem religion and the seclusion of women. These customs have forestalled official attempts at Russification—in particular, socialization of the Kazakh population in Party doctrine. A survey conducted by the sociological group at the Lenin District Party committee in Alma-Ata indicated that among many of the 490 respondents (who were students in the Party system of education), "interest is going down." Some 25% in the lower Party schools and 13% in other schools were found to have

1Chronicle of Current Events 22:22.
2Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972); see the Chronical of Current Events, passim.
3Kaz. pravda (August 27), 1972 attacked a dissident Lithuanian priest resident in Kazakhstan.
4Kaz. pravda (November 10), 1972:2.
already studied the material presented. They were bored and felt their time was being wasted. About 5% of the students had not had enough education to even absorb the material. Many of the 129 instructors in the system were considered unfit for their work.  

As elsewhere in the USSR, malfunctioning of services is a major problem and constant source of dissatisfaction in Kazakhstan. The author's perusal of Kazakhstanskaya pravda for one day chosen at random brought to light several examples. Workers at the Pavlodar tractor factory were complaining about heavy traffic jams which resulted in late arrivals and broken-down motor vehicles. Their many complaints to the public transportation agency had been of no avail. A mining town in north Kazakhstan had not been able to obtain local mail service, medical services, or any cultural facilities, because of jurisdictional differences between two district authorities. In Semipalatinsk a number of ships were unable to leave the river port because of the lack of spare parts or because "the grain supply agency refused to release grain from the elevators." Despite urgent directives from Moscow, irrigation facilities in Kazakhstan were not mechanized, and yields from these areas were low. (This remains the case.) Specialists in this field were working in head offices in the cities instead of on the farms where the work needed to be done. Many tenants in state-owned flats had not paid their rent for years. The housing agency did nothing about it, however, since the local mayor, some police chiefs, and other officials were themselves in arrears. As a result, a large public debt had accumulated which made it impossible to go on with maintenance expenses.

This type of dissatisfaction is reflected in a controversial Russian-language novel set in northern Kazakhstan, Other Dawns [Drugiye zori]. Its main character is an inefficient, ruthless careerist who mismanages a mining complex, causing unnecessary hardships for the miners and other

1Kaz. pravda (May 11), 1972:2, the article "V zerkale sotsiologicheskogo analiza," by T. Dautov, chief of the sociological group and head of the philosophy department at the local medical school and M. Voyevodina district Party secretary.

2Kaz. pravda (May 11), 1972.
workers. His inadequacy is not recognized by the Soviet authorities, who
do not suffer from its consequences. First published in Prostor, the novel
was praised by the authorities. Eventually it was criticized by the
nachalniks and "labor aristocrats" of the Rudny mining and refining complex,
who were by no means disinterested parties. Later the novel was condemned
by the Deputy Minister for Ferrous Metallurgy and the Kazakh Writers' Union.1

Nationalism and Stalinism have been prime problems in the cultural
scene of Kazakhstan. Much of Kazakh literature during the first period
of Soviet power was devoted to Stalin. The exaggerated and slavish poems
by Dzhambul, who was for decades presented as "the Kazakh national bard,"
and after whom one of the main cities in the republic is named, are a
well-known example. As a result, much of his poetry can hardly be popular
today. Also, the Kazakhs have not such a strong classical literature to
fall back on as have the Russians.2

Another unsettled cultural issue relates to those personalities who
were oppressed during Stalin's regime. One such person was the late E.
Bekmakanov, a major Kazakh historian who refused to accept the arbitrary
twists of Soviet historiography and failed—in the words of a Central
Committee decision of 1951—"to reveal the deeply progressive significance
of the annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia." He had also insisted on a
progressive interpretation of the 19th century Kenesary rebellion against
Russian rule, after the Party had changed its opinion and regarded the
uprising as reactionary. He was duly purged but reappeared in 1956 and
again became the highest ranking Kazakh historian until his death in 1966.3

1"Komu svetyat 'Druguye zori,'; Kaz. pravda (May 11 and October 17),
1971:3; Mizan 2:104 (1971).
2Coates, 1951:140.
3Tillet, 1967:43-45; cf. BSE, 1953; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay,
1967:218-222; in Bennigsen, see also pp. 215-217 on the denigration of the
national epics of the Central Asian peoples in 1951-1954 and their oppo-
sition to it.
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KIRGIZISTAN AND THE KIRGIZ

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KIRGIZISTAN AND THE KIRGIZ

PART A

General Information
I. Territory

The Kirgiz SSR, created as a separate administrative-territorial unit in 1924, is located in the northeastern portion of Soviet Central Asia. In the east, it borders on the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region of China, in the west on the Uzbek SSR, in the south on the Tajik SSR, and in the north on the Kazakh SSR. The area of Kirgizistan is 76,100 square miles, roughly the size of South Dakota. The capital of the republic is Frunze, the 1970 population of which was 430,618.

Kirgizistan is a land of high mountains, primarily the Tien Shan and Pamir-Alay chains. The climate is extremely continental. In the Hissar Range, precipitation reaches 60 inches a year, but at Rybachy on Lake Issyk Kul the average annual rate is but four inches. Natural resources include water power, minerals, and forests.

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2 Shabad, 1951: 371.
II. Economy

Kirgizistan is one of the industrially underdeveloped republics of the Soviet Union. Its per-capita industrial production in 1965 was only 968 rubles or less than that of any other union republic except for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.\(^1\) Personal consumption per capita in the Kirgiz SSR was 516 rubles in 1969 or 75 per cent of the USSR figure of 691 rubles.\(^2\)

At present, somewhat more than 40 branches of industry are represented in the republic. They include the non-ferrous metallurgical, machine-building, power, construction materials, wood-working, textile, sugar, and meat-canning industries.\(^3\)

Mining has long been an important branch of Kirgizistan's economy. The republic ranks first in the USSR in the production of antimony and mercury. Other minerals produced are lead, uranium, tungsten, and molybdenum. Energy resources include coal and petroleum.\(^4\)

Agriculture plays a vital role in the economy of the Kirgiz SSR. Livestock breeding, particularly sheep and goats, is of primary importance. However, the raising of technical crops, like cotton, sugar beets, fiber plants, and opium, and of food crops, such as grain, has also become significant.\(^5\)

The roles of the ethnic Kirgiz in the economy of Kirgizistan differ substantially from those of the predominantly European non-Kirgiz population.\(^6\)

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6. While predominantly European, the non-Kirgiz population includes non-Kirgiz Moslem groups such as the Uzbeks and Tatars.
Thus, of the total agricultural labor force in 1959, 75% were Kirgiz and only 25% non-Kirgiz. In the more highly skilled agricultural occupations such as tractor driver, combine operator and machinist, Kirgiz formed only a minority of the workers, while in the unskilled category of "occupations in agriculture with no designation of speciality," they were the great majority. Among industrial and other non-agricultural workers, the non-Kirgiz predominated, numbering 81.7% of the total. The Kirgiz, on the other hand, made up only 19.3% of the non-agricultural labor force. The Kirgiz constituted only 20.2% of those in the managerial and technical professions in Kirgizistan although their proportion of the total work force was almost twice that.¹

III. History

A people called the Kik-Kun or Kirgiz lived in the area of the Yenisei River in Siberia as early as 201 B.C. The historian Barthold, moreover, writes of a Great Kirgiz State centered in Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan in the 9th and 10th centuries. Historians and ethnographers disagree, however, about the connection between these Kirgiz of the distant past and those living in Central Asia today.\(^1\) The first historical records establishing a predominant Kirgiz position in present-day Kirgizistan date back only to the early 16th century.

A tragic era in the history of the Kirgiz opened in the late 17th century with the conquest of their homeland by the Oirot people from the Balkhash-Altai area. During the course of the Oirot incursion the Kirgiz were forced to flee the Tien Shan mountains into the Pamir and Alay Ranges, the Fergana Valley, and Kashgar, whence they returned only after the defeat of the Oirot Federation in the 1750s.\(^2\)

Kirgiz independence was shortlived, however, for in the early decade of the 19th century, their lands were taken by the forces of the Kokand Khanate. Although they were allowed considerable autonomy, the Kirgiz were taxed heavily by Kokand, and alien Sarts were settled on their lands.\(^3\)

Russia began to extend its control over the Kirgiz in the middle of the 19th century when the termination of the Crimean War once again permitted the diversion of Russian forces for the conquest of Central Asia. Initial Russian penetration into the area was achieved in 1855 when the chief manap\(^4\) of the Bugu clan confederation offered to accept Russian rule in exchange for

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\(^{1}\) Barthold, 1963: 475 and 489-500.
\(^{2}\) Abramzon, 1963: 165.
\(^{3}\) Barthold, 1963: 535.
\(^{4}\) Manap was a term used in the 19th and early 20th centuries in northern Kirgizistan to denote the local Kirgiz leaders. They were referred to as great [aga] middle [orto], or minor [chala] manaps depending upon their position in the hierarchical leadership structure. See Abramzon, 1971: 158-159.
assistance against his enemies. In 1862, Pishpek, an important Kokand fortress, was taken by Russian forces. The conquest was completed with the final defeat of Kokand in 1876.

Following its conquest by Russia, Kirgizistan became an area of Slavic agricultural re-settlement. The movement began in 1866, and by 1911-12 there were 87,000 migrants in present day Kirgizistan and neighboring areas to the north. The Slavic colonization of Kirgiz territory led to a significant constriction of grazing land, a reduction in the size of the nomads' flocks and a marked lowering of their standard of living. Kirgiz resentment over the alienation of their land and over wartime labor mobilization burst forth in a major revolt in 1916 during which thousands of Russian settlers and Kirgiz were killed and perhaps 150,000 nomads fled for safety into China.

The Bolsheviks established control over Kirgizistan in early 1918 after first seizing power in Tashkent, the administrative center of Turkestan. Initially no separate administrative unit was established for the Kirgiz; their land was distributed among various oblasty or provinces, of the Turkestan Soviet Republic.

Soviet policy in this early period was openly colonialist. Virtually the entire administration was made up of Russians. Political parties constituted from among the indigenous population, such as the Alash Orda which advocated the creation of an autonomous Kazakh-Kirgiz republic and the Shuro-i-Islam which had supported Kokand autonomy, were dissolved. As in the period before the revolution, Kirgiz lands were expropriated and handed over to Russian settlers.

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1Barthold, 1963: 532.
2Ibid.: 535.
3Barthold, 1963: 323.
7Pravda (June 20), 1950.
Confronted by the popular revolt of the Basmachi, the regime after 1919 turned to a more conciliatory policy in Turkestan. In Kirgizistan a land reform, introduced in 1920-1921, returned Kirgiz lands that had been taken from them. As part of the delimitation of Central Asia in 1924, a Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast was created and leading figures from the nationalist intelligentsia such as Qasim Tinistan-uulu were eventually brought into the administration. Traditional Kirgiz culture with its nomadic economy, clan-oriented society and manap leadership was left substantially intact.

Despite some concessions by the Soviet regime, sharp differences between the central authorities and the Kirgiz intelligentsia remained and conflict recurred at frequent intervals. In 1920, for example, when native Communists from Kirgizistan and other portions of Turkestan sought to establish a separate Turkic Communist Party and a Turkic Republic with its own armed forces, Lenin objected and the plan had to be dropped. An attempt by Abdukarim Sidik-uulu, Chairman of the Semirech'ye Executive Committee, and other Kirgiz leaders to form a Kirgiz Mountain Oblast from those regions of the Turkestan ASSR inhabited by Kirgiz was also rejected in 1922 by higher Party authorities. The interests of the regime clashed with those of the Kirgiz intelligentsia again in 1925 when a group of Kirgiz leaders called the Thirty submitted a formal bill of grievances to the KP(b) Central Committee concerning conditions in Kirgizistan. The Thirty criticized the conduct of official business in the Russian

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1 The Basmachi Revolt began in early 1918 when Irgash, the commander of the Kokand Autonomous Government's vanquished military forces, formed a guerilla band to conduct military operations against the Bolsheviks. The insurrection suffered a severe setback in June 1922 when Enver Pasha, who had for a time united the movement into a single coordinated force, was killed. After this the Basmachi movement continued to exist but had a purely local character. It en'oved somewhat of a revival after 1929 when the unpopular collectivization campaign swelled its ranks once again. See Vakhabov, 1961: 288-289 and Ryvkin, 1961: 51-61.

2 This policy was not entirely successful, because many Kirgiz nomads remained on their land allotments only during the winter and when spring came abandoned the land and left for summer pastures with their flocks.


5 Zenkovsky, 1960: 244-248.

language, complained that insufficient native cadres were being trained to handle the affairs of the oblast, advocated the bringing of all educated Kirgiz into the government regardless of social origin, opposed all measures of repression, and demanded the ousting of Russian Communists from leading posts in Kirgizistan. The response of the regime was to remove the Thirty from their official posts and exclude them from the Party. Their leader, Abdukarim Sidik-uulu, was exiled from Kirgizistan. ¹

Another native faction within Kirgizistan's leadership which clashed with Moscow's authority in this period was the so-called Ur-tokmok group, headed by K. Khudaykulov, the head of the Kirgiz Koshchi (Poor Peasants') Union, and D. Babakhanov, second secretary of the Kirgiz party organization. This faction apparently supported the traditional leadership of the Kirgiz against Soviet attempts to displace and repress them. In February 1926, however, the Ur-tokmok leadership was excluded from the Party and a year later Khudaykulov and Babakhanov were put on trial and sentenced to prison. ²

After 1928 one of the primary goals of Stalin's program for Kirgizistan was the de-nomadization and collectivization of the indigenous herdsmen. This agrarian revolution, initiated in 1927-1928, immediately met with widespread opposition. Many Kirgiz slaughtered their livestock or drove them across the border into China to escape turning them over to collective farms. The Basmachi movement, which had subsided, appeared once again as a movement of armed opposition to collectivization. ³ It was even alleged by regime spokesmen that Abdukarim Sidik-uulu, who had by now returned to Kirgizistan and was a director of the Kirgiz State Planning Commission, organized a conspirational organization to oppose collectivization and overthrow the Communist regime in Kirgizistan with arms obtained from China and other foreign powers. ⁴ This opposition notwithstanding, the collec-

³Ibid.: 371-74, 393-94.
A second aspect of the drive for revolutionary goals in Kirgizistan was the replacement of the political and intellectual elite of the republic by persons deemed more responsive to and ideologically compatible with the Stalinist leadership. Among the state and party functionaries purged between 1933 and 1938 were three chairmen of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers, Abdrakhmanov, Irakayev, and Salikhov; three first secretaries of the Kirgiz Party organization, Shakhray, Belotskiy and Ammosov; and the Chairman of the Kirgiz Central Executive Committee, Urazbekov. The leading individual in the Kirgiz intelligentsia to be purged was Tinistan-uulu, a dominant figure in the republic's cultural and intellectual life. Also arrested were the writers Qarach-uulu, Kenesarin, Namatov, and Dzhamgirchinov. The ranks of the new Kirgiz intelligentsia were decimated in the 1934-39 period, while Party membership declined by nearly 51 percent.

Along with the negative aspects of Stalinist policy in Kirgizistan certain positive gains can be noted. Some industrialization was achieved and substantial progress was made in the development of education and health care in the republic. In 1936 the Kirgiz achieved formal equality with the other Central Asian peoples and a higher status within the USSR when their autonomous republic was elevated to union republic status.

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1 Malabieyev, 1969: 401.
3 Ibid.: 97.
4 For more recent developments see Section C-III.
IV. Demography

The population of Kirgizistan according to the 1970 Soviet Census was 2,933,000.¹ This represents an increase of 42% for the 1959-1970 intercensal period, a higher rate of growth than for any other Soviet republic, except the Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen SSRs.

The primary factor in Kirgizistan's rapid rate of population growth between 1959 and 1970 was natural increase. The birthrate of the ethnic Kirgiz was approximately 40 per 1000 in 1969 with an even higher rate obtaining in the earlier portion of the intercensal period.² Their death rate, moreover, was low by Asian standards. Their resulting rate of natural increase averaged 35-40 per 1000 during the intercensal period.³ The birth and natural increase rates of Kirgizistan's sizeable Slavic population were moderate to low, bringing down the average natural increase for the republic.⁴ Nevertheless, the latter was much higher than that of the European USSR, amounting to 30.8 per 1000 in 1960 and 23.1 per 1000 in 1970.

Together with natural increase, in-migration from other republics of the USSR and immigration from China also contributed to Kirgizistan's rapid rate of population growth during 1959-1970.⁵ Indeed, the Kirgiz SSR received

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¹ Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (May 5), 1971.
³ The Kirgiz population of the Kirgiz SSR increased by 53.5 percent between 1959 and 1970, or at a rate of 4 percent per annum. See Newth, 1972: 218. Although nearly all of this growth was natural increase, assimilation was a marginal factor.
⁴ The birthrate of the Russians in Kirgizistan was 24 per 1000 in 1959 and probably declined thereafter. See Yesipov, 1964: 116.
⁵ Estimates of net in-migration to Kirgizistan in 1959-1970 range from 100,000 (Sheehy, 1971: 10) to 210,000 (the sum of Pokhshevsky's estimate for 1959-1967 and Newth's for 1968-1969; see Pokhshevsky, 1969: 70 and Newth 1972: 206). The latter figure is probably too high, while the former is for ethnic Russians only, thus omitting the Uigurs who immigrated from China's Sinkiang Autonomous Region largely in 1962; the Germans who came in from other regions of the Soviet East; and Belorussians and other groups.
a larger volume of migrants during these years than any other Central Asian republic, save Uzbekistan. The other areas of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Ural Region, and Western Siberia supplied the great majority of the internal migrants into Kirgizistan in at least the first few years of the period.

Urbanization has continued in Kirgizistan during the recent intercensal period, resulting in a 58% growth in the urban population to a 1970 figure of 1,098,000 (37.4% of the total population of the republic). Unlike the situation in the USSR as a whole, however, this urban growth has not resulted in a decline of the rural population, which increased by 34% to 1,835,000 between 1959 and 1970.

There were significant changes in the ethnic composition of the Kirgiz SSR between 1959 and 1970 (See Table A.1.). While the proportion of Kirgiz had been declining steadily heretofore, it increased during this period, rising from 40.5% to 43.8%. Meanwhile, the proportion of Russians declined, marking a reversal in the long-term trend. From 1926 to 1959, the proportion of Russians in the population had grown from 11.7 to 30.2% but between 1959 and 1970, it declined from 30.2 to 29.2%. Russians remain predominant in

1Pokshishevsky: 1969: 70.
3Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (May 5), 1971.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., and Mulabayev, 1969: 255.
the cities of Kirgizistan, and especially in Frunze, the capital, as shown in Table A.2.

The overall Communist Party membership of 103,208 in Kirgizistan (1970), the numbers of Kirgiz and Russians are approximately equal, 38,881 (37.7%) for the former as compared with 38,847 (37.6%) for the latter.¹

Table A.1.
Ethnic Composition of the Kirgiz SSR, 1959 and 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>1959 Number (in 000s)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
<th>1970 Number (in 000s)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,933</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uigurs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Kirgizii, 1971: 11.
Table A.2.

Urban-Rural Distribution of Major Nationalities
In the Kirgiz SSR, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Frunze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number (in 000s)</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
<td>Number (in 000s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>1099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1097</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1835</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Itogi 1970:IV:286-290*

In 1959 the Kirgiz population, according to the official classification, were predominantly collective farmers. This class included 70% of the total number of Kirgiz within the Kirgiz SSR (see Table A.3.).

Table A.3.

Social Structure of the Kirgiz in the Kirgiz SSR, 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>251,049</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>(184,103)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66,946)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Farmers, et al.</td>
<td>585,782</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>836,831</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1The social class statistics in this section were computed from percentages presented in Arutyunyan (1971: 84). The collective farmer category includes a small number of private farmers and non-cooperative artisans.
By comparison, only 23% of the predominantly European non-Kirgiz population of Kirgizistán was made up of collective farmers and their families.¹

The second largest social group among the Kirgiz in 1959 were the workers and employees (wage and salary earners) who, with their families, made up 30% of the Kirgiz population of Kirgizistán, as compared with 77% of the non-Kirgiz. The figures for employees or white-collar workers alone were 8% and 25% respectively.

Comparable data from the 1970 census are not yet available. Data on the structure of the labor force, without breakdown by nationality and without information on the families of the workers, indicates that the number of workers and employees in the republic in 1970 was nearly twice that of 1959, while the number of kolkhozniks declined only marginally.²

¹The social class statistics for the non-Kirgiz of the Kirgiz SSR are residuals, arrived at by subtracting the data for the Kirgiz from that for the Kirgiz SSR for each category. The Kirgiz SSR social class data was presented in Itogi Kirgizskaya SSR, 1959: 38.

V. Culture

a. Literature

Prior to the 1920s, Kirgiz literature was entirely oral. The great literary monument of this era was the epic trilogy Manas, which has been referred to as the Iliad of the Steppe.\(^1\) A prominent theme in Kirgiz oral literature in the nineteenth century was the elegiac zar zaman [bad times] motif, exemplified in the poem Zar Zaman by Aristanbek-ulu. This motif bewailed the unfortunate effects of Russian colonization on the Kirgiz.\(^2\)

The first published works by Kirgiz authors were the Poem about an Earthquake by Moldo Kilich Mamirkan-ulu, published in 1911, and The History of the Kirgiz and The History of the Kirgiz Shadman by Osmanali Sidik-ulu, published in 1913 and 1914, respectively.\(^3\) Sidik-ulu and Mamirkan-ulu were representatives of the Dzhadid period of Central Asian literature which emphasized education, technical progress, and the need for a national awakening.\(^4\)

The leading figures of the early Soviet period of Kirgiz literature were Qasim Tinistan-ulu, Sidik Qarach-ulu, and Sidik-ulu. The poet and dramatist, Tinistan-ulu, who is considered by some prominent Kirgiz literati to be the founder of Kirgiz Soviet literature, was a transitional figure. Although one of his early poems To the Alash was dedicated to the Kazakh and Kirgiz nationalist party, the Alash-Orda, in 1930 he also co-authored a panegyric epistle to Stalin.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Abramzon, 1971: 344-73.
\(^3\) Toichinov, 1931: 211.
\(^4\) Bogdanova, 1957: 12.
Poetry has remained the primary genre in Kirgiz literature. Ali Tokombayev, author of the _Bloody Years_, a leading Kirgiz poet since the 1920s, has also written plays and novels. Other prominent Kirgiz poets are Qurbanichbek Malikov and Temirqul Umetaliyev. The first work of prose (fiction) by a Kirgiz writer was the novella _Adzhar_ written in 1928 by Qasimali Bayalinov. Tugelbay Sydykbekov has written several novels, two of them _Ken-Suu_ and _Temir_, dealing with collectivization. The most widely known Kirgiz writer of prose in the contemporary period, however, is Chingiz Aitmatov who has written realistic, contemporary novellas, but has recently turned to folkloric and historical themes.

b. Religion

The believers among the Kirgiz are Moslems, but many have also retained elements of shamanistic, totemistic, and other of their pre-Islamic beliefs. In a recent survey conducted in rural Kirgizistan, 46.4% of the indigenous population questioned responded that they were believers. On the other hand, only 29% of a sample of 487 Kirgiz polled in the urban center of Kok Yangak stated that they had retained their religious faith. It is probable, however, that in neither case do these figures fully represent the extent of religious commitment, since data from another region of Central Asia reveal that many Moslems are reluctant to reveal that they are religious to interviewers who are unbelievers or who have official status.

The institutional structure of Islam in Kirgizstan consists of a small "official Mosque" and a much larger "unofficial Mosque," which functions

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illegally but is partially tolerated. The legal organization has 33 mosques, each with its own registered iman-khatib and, in some cases, another functionary, all headed by the Kazi of Kirgizistan, Maksud Al. Nazarbekov.\(^1\) The "unofficial Mosque" is made up of unregistered Moslem congregations existing in almost every city, town, and village of Kirgizistan (an estimated 300 in the late 1950s), served by over 300 unregistered "itinerant" mullahs.\(^2\) It also includes unlawful Moslem schools, Sufi ishans with their murids, or followers, various shrines of Moslem saints staffed by sheikhs, and a religious samizdat.\(^3\)

c. Ethnology

Kirgiz culture has undergone significant changes during the Soviet period, but many of the old mores retain deep roots. Although nomadism has been suppressed, many Kirgiz are still transhumant shepherds taking their flocks to the mountains in the summertime and bringing them back in the winter to permanent kolkhozy or sovkhozy where their families reside.\(^4\) Clan and other kinship ties have weakened, but they still play a role in the conduct of funerals, memorial rites, and other ceremonials, in mutual aid practices, social organization, residential patterns, and even popular attitudes toward officials.\(^5\) Many Islamic and pre-Islamic customs persist as illustrated by the results of a recent survey at the Kirgiz State University showing that despite official condemnation of the practice, traditional funeral rites, generally conducted by a mullah, are considered a national custom by 68% of the students.\(^6\) Kirgiz no longer live in portable tent-like yurts, having exchanged them for clay or adobe houses.\(^7\) Their home furnishings, clothing and especially their cuisine, however, retain many traditional elements in addition to those introduced from other cultures.\(^8\)

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\(^1\)International Department, 1972: 16; and Koyzumanov, 1969: 341.

\(^2\)Ibid. The estimate of 300 congregations assumes that of the 400 unregistered congregations in Kirgizistan of all faiths (Altmyshbayev, 1958: 34) three quarters, or the same proportion as among registered congregations, are Moslem.

\(^3\)Carrere d’Encausse, 1960: 21; Altmyshbayev, 1958: 34, 38; and Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (October 21), 1959.


\(^7\)Yurts are still used by shepherds when herding their flocks in the mountains, as auxiliary summer residences, and for ceremonial purpose, such as weddings and funerals.

VI. External Relations

The Kirgiz SSR has a foreign ministry, which is restricted largely to petty bureaucratic and ceremonial functions, the substantive conduct of foreign affairs being vested in the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. The Foreign Minister, S. Begmatova, is also deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirgiz SSR.

Only a few Kirgiz are known to have served in Soviet diplomatic posts abroad. The Foreign Minister was a member of the Soviet Delegation at the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Z. Turdukulov was on the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Iraq, and T. Sarbanov served on the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

Insofar as Kirgizistan is a Moslem, Asian, and underdeveloped republic, certain ready-made affinities exist with the Third World, and these have been utilized in Soviet cultural diplomacy. Organizationally this has often been handled through the Kirgiz Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Kirgiz Republican Committee for Solidarity with Countries of Asia and Africa, both parts of All-Union mother organizations. Kirgiz, e.g., Chingiz Aitmatov, G. Aytiyev, T.V. Usubaliyev, and B.M. Mambetov, have served on Soviet delegations abroad, as Soviet representatives at international conferences and exhibitions, and in other similar roles.¹ Delegations from Asian, African, and other nations have visited Kirgizistan, and in 1971 an international seminar, The Experience of Agrarian Reform in the Republics of Central Asia and its Significance for the Liberated Countries, was held in Frunze under Soviet sponsorship with representatives of 29 Asian, African, and Latin American countries in attendance.²

¹Turgunbekov, 1969: 138-141.

²Usubaliyev, 1971: 36.
KIRGIZISTAN AND THE KIRGIZ

PART B

Media
I. Language Data

The Kirgiz language is classified by Baskakov as belonging to the Kirgiz-Kypchak group of the Eastern Hunish branch of the Turkic languages. \(^1\) It is written in the Cyrillic script. According to the 1970 census, Kirgiz is spoken as their native language by 1,435,000 Kirgiz or 98.8% of the total number of the nationality (See Table B.1.). This is a slightly higher proportion than in 1959. Most of the remaining Kirgiz consider Russian to be their native tongue. Virtually all of the Kirgiz (99.7%) who reside in the Kirgiz SSR consider Kirgiz to be their native language as do 92.1% of those living in other republics of the USSR (See Table B.1.). Russian is spoken as a second language by 276,000 Kirgiz or 19.1% of their total number.

Outside of the boundaries of the Soviet Union the Kirgiz language is spoken by 80,000 Kirgiz in China and 25,000 Kirgiz in Afghanistan. \(^2\)

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\(^1\) Baskakov, 1969: 340.

\(^2\) Ibid.
Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by the Kirgiz
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Kirgiz residing</th>
<th>Speaking as their Native Language</th>
<th>Speaking as a Second Language a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the Kirgiz SSR</td>
<td>836.8 (100%)</td>
<td>1,285 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other Soviet Republics</td>
<td>132 (100%)</td>
<td>167 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>968.7 (100%)</td>
<td>1,452 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

b Including Kirgiz, if not the native language.
The press of Kirgizistan in 1970 consisted of 71 newspapers of which 41 were published in Kirgiz or in both Kirgiz and Russian, 28 in Russian and 2 in other languages (see Table B.2.). The total circulation of these newspapers was 872,000. The circulation of the Kirgiz and mixed Kirgiz and Russian press was 555,000, or 43.3 copies per 100 Kirgiz-language native speakers, while that of the local Russian-language press was only 281,000, or 28.5 copies per 100 Russian-language native speakers (see Table B.2.). Many Russian-language papers, moreover, are mailed into the republic from outside.\(^1\)

Although the number of newspapers published in Kirgizistan declined between 1959 and 1970 from 98 to 71, their overall circulation rose substantially. The circulation of the Russian-language press grew by half during this period, while that of the Kirgiz press soared to nearly three times its 1959 level (see Table B.2.).

The most authoritative newspapers of the republic are Sovetskaya Kirgiziya and Sovetnik Kyrgyzstan, the Russian and Kirgiz-language organs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizistan and of the Council of Ministers of the Kirgiz SSR. Other leading press organs are Kyrgyzstan Madaniyati, a newspaper devoted to cultural and literary matters, and Komsomolets Kirgizii and Leninchil Zhash, the Russian and Kirgiz-language organs of the Komsomol organization of Kirgizistan.

There are 12 magazines published in the Kirgiz SSR, with a total circulation of 344,000 (see Table B.2.). This is more than a threefold increase over the 1959 circulation of 104,000. Seven Kirgiz-language magazines with a circulation of 326,000 are published in the republic, as well as five Russian-language magazines with a circulation of 18,000. The number of copies of local magazines published per 100 persons of the appropriate language group is much higher for the Kirgiz-language than for the Russian-language publications (see Table B.2.), but it should be kept in mind that many Russian-language maga-

\(^1\)There were 1,378,000 subscriptions to central newspapers in Kirgizistan in January 1973. This figure is one and a half times the press runs of all republic papers in Kirgizistan. Kiosk sales are not included here. Foreign newspapers and journals may also be received by subscription. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (January 28), 1973: 4.
Table B.2.
Publications in the Kirgiz SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspapers*</th>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th>Books &amp; Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1971 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.

This figure may include publication in non-Soviet languages.

Book totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

Includes all native speakers of the language.

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 130, 165.

zines published outside the republic are read by the residents of Kirgizistan, while no Kirgiz-language magazines originate outside the republic. Among the leading magazines published in Kirgizistan are Kommunist, the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kirgiz SSR; Ala Too, the Kirgiz-language organ of the Union of Writers and the Ministry of Culture of Kirgizistan; and Literaturnyy Kirgizistan, the Russian-language organs of the Writers' Union of Kirgizistan and of the republic Komsomol organization. Other magazines are the youth publication Zhash Leninchi [Young Leninist] and the very popular women's publication Kyrgyzstan Ayaldary [Women of Kirgizistan].

Only a handful of books were published by Kirgiz authors prior to the Revolution, and the few works that did appear were published in Ufa and elsewhere outside Kirgizistan in languages other than Kirgiz. By 1959, 738 different titles in 4,125,000 copies were published in the republic, and by 1970, this number had grown to 855 titles in 5,066,000 copies (see Table B.2). Approximately the same number of titles appeared in Kirgiz and Russian, but the total number of copies of Kirgiz books published substantially exceeded that of Russian-language books. Among the leading publishing houses of the republic are the Ala Too, Kyrgyzstan, Ilim, and Kirgiz State Publishing Houses.

The availability of early literary classics of Kirgiz literature and of religious literature depends on the character of the specific work. The first detailed transcription of the Kirgiz oral epic Manas appeared in the Soviet period and is generally available to, and read by, the Kirgiz. Much of the other oral literature of the Kirgiz has been published during the Soviet period and is fully sanctioned. On the other hand, the works of many anti-Russian and nationalistic writers of the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet period, such as Tinistan-uulu and Sidik-uulu were confiscated in the 1930s and have not been republished. Moslem religious works, such as the Koran and religious calendars have been published in the Soviet Union, but the number of copies printed does not satisfy the demand. Religious samizdat is produced in Kirgizistan and elsewhere to help fill the gap.

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1 Abramzon, 1958: 278.
2 Abramzon, 1971: 344.
5 Altmyshbayev, 1958: 38.
Electronic media are well developed in Kirgizistan. The population receives radio transmissions from the Central Broadcasting Station (Radio Moscow) as well as from local stations. Broadcasts can be heard both in Russian and the native languages of the area. Radio programs include news, music, literary programs, lectures and broadcasts for children and schools.\(^1\) Total radio sets numbered 678,000 in 1971; these included 325,000 wired sets or 10.6 per 100 inhabitants and 353,000 wireless sets or 11.5 per 100 inhabitants (see Table B.3.).

Telecasts are received in Kirgizistan from Moscow, Frunze, Tashkent, and Alma-Ata.\(^2\) In 1966 there were only one television station and 10 relay transmitters in the republic.\(^3\) Telecasts can be heard in the Kirgiz, Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek languages.\(^4\)

In 1966, only 35% of the total population and 16% of the area of the republic could receive television transmissions,\(^5\) a situation that clearly changed sharply in the following five years, for television sets in Kirgizistan in 1971 numbered 364,000 or 11.8 per 100 inhabitants (see Table B.3.). Telecasts included films and dramatic productions, news, children's programs, educational and cultural programs, opera, concerts, ballet and sports events.\(^6\) Since a set usually serves about five people, it can be assumed that up to 60% of the population were able to watch television by 1971.

Kirgizistan has its own movie studio, Kirgizfilm.\(^7\) There were 1039 movie theaters and movie installations (1968) with 193,000 seats (1970) in the republic.\(^8\) They display locally made films as well as films produced in the other republics of the USSR and foreign films.

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\(^1\) UNESCO, 1964: 367.
\(^2\) Karakleyev, 1972: 343.
\(^3\) Psurtsev, 1967: 442.
\(^4\) Karakleyev, 1972: 343.
\(^7\) Otorbayev, 1970, 255.
### Table B.3.

**Electronic Media and Films in the "Kirgiz SSR"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Stations</th>
<th>No. of Wired Sets (1000)</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>No. of Wireless Sets (1000)</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>No. of Stations</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>No. of Stations</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>No. of Stations</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>No. of Sets (1000)</th>
<th>Sets/100 Population</th>
<th>Seats (1000)</th>
<th>Seats/100 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>202^a</td>
<td>9.1^d</td>
<td>157^a</td>
<td>7.1^c</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1^e</td>
<td>15^a</td>
<td>.7^c</td>
<td>101^b</td>
<td>4.5^d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>306^a</td>
<td>10.1^d</td>
<td>328^a</td>
<td>10.9^c</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>11^f</td>
<td>318^a</td>
<td>10.6^c</td>
<td>193^b</td>
<td>6.4^d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>325^d</td>
<td>10.6^d</td>
<td>353^d</td>
<td>11.5^c</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^b Source: *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, kul'tura i nauka v SSR*, 1971, p. 325.  
^d Computed from data cited above (b and c).  
^e 1966. See text.
III. Educational Institutions

Educational advancement has been one of the major achievements of the Soviet regime in Kirghizistan where the pre-revolutionary level of education was extremely low. In 1971, there were 1810 schools of all types in the republic with 999,000 students, or 259.9 students per 1000 inhabitants (see Table 8.4.).

The elementary and secondary school system is extensive. There were approximately 1700 general educational schools at these levels in the republic in 1971 of which about 1000 offered instruction in the Kirghiz language. The number of pupils in such schools (1972) was 822,000, while the teaching staff numbered 41,800 (1971). There were also 36 specialized schools at the secondary level with 41,500 students (1971). These secondary schools trained specialists in 101 fields. Although eight-year education is now compulsory and the Ninth Five-Year Plan calls for universal ten-year education in the USSR by 1976, many Kirghiz pupils, particularly girls, leave school before completing the eighth grade.

The system of higher education in Kirghizistan consists of the Kirghiz State University (13,370 students) and eight specialized institutes, the Frunze Agricultural Institute, the Frunze Medical Institute, the Frunze Polytechnical Institute, the Frunze Institute of Physical Culture and Sport, the Frunze Women's Pedagogical Institute, the Osh Pedagogical Institute, and the Osh Branch of the Frunze Polytechnical Institute. These institutions train students in 78 different specialties and graduated a total

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1 Nar. khoz. 1972: 642.
2 Lit. gaz. (May 1), 1972 and Usubaliyef, 1971: 35.
3 Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (Feb. 2), 1973 and Lit. gaz. (May 1), 1972.
5 Otorbayev, 1970: 132, 177, 220.
of 7000 students in 1972. The total enrollment in higher education in 1971 was 48,900. The language of matriculation is primarily Russian.
### Table B.4.
**Selected Data on Education in the Kirgiz SSR (1971)**

Population: 3,074,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Per 1000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All schools</strong></td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>999,000</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary special schools</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41,500</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions of higher education</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48,900</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universities</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13,370</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,268</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,048</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newly admitted</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selected Data on Education in the Kirgiz SSR (1971)

Universities (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Per 1000 Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day students</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening students</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence students</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 108) Graduate students

- Total number of
  - 750
  - 0.24
- In scientific research institutions
  - 517
- In universities
  - 233

(p. 631) Number of persons with (in 1970) higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education

- Per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older
  - 452
- Per 1000 individuals employed in national economy
  - 643

Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools

- 18,600
  - 6.1

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

The primary center of scientific research in Kirgizistan is the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, which was established in 1954. In 1971 there were 18 scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy, in which a total of 1232 scientific workers were engaged in various research activities. In addition there are a number of other research institutes, laboratories, and research stations not affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. In all, 30,000 persons or 9.7 per 1000 of the population are employed in science and scientific services in Kirgizistan.

Among the cultural institutions located in the Kirgiz SSR are 6 museums, 6 theatres, 1378 libraries and 1,039 clubs. A total of 95,000 persons are employed in culture and education in the republic, or 30 per 1000 of the population.

1 Nar. khoz. 1972: 106.
2 Ibid.
3 Vestnik statistiki, 1972: 12: 84-86.
Table B.5.
Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in Kirgiz SSR (1971)

Population: 3,074,000

**Academy of Science**
- number of members 42
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy 18
- total number of scientific workers in these 1,232

**Museums**
- number of museums 6
- attendance 543,000
- attendance per 1000 population 176.6

**Theaters**
- number of theaters 6
- attendance 1,301,000
- attendance per 1000 population 423

**Number of persons working in education and culture**
- total 95,000
- no. per 1000 population 30

**Number of persons working in science and scientific services**
- total 30,000
- number per 1000 population 9.7

**Number of public libraries**
- total 1,378
- number of books and magazines in public libraries 11,853,000

**Number of clubs**
- total 1,039

KIRGIZISTAN AND THE KIRGIZ

PART C

National Attitudes
I. Review of Factors Forming Kirgiz National Attitudes

Among the factors which have shaped the national attitudes of the Kirgiz are the century-old Russian presence in Kirghizistan, the rise of national consciousness among the Kirgiz, their Islamic heritage, and regional ties. Perhaps the most significant of these, however, has been the Russian presence. Among the most relevant aspects of this presence, particularly in southern Kirghizistan, is that it was established by force and that force was required at various intervals to maintain it. During the tsarist period the Russian presence had the character of colonialism, and, although authorities differ about the applicability of this term to the period of Soviet rule in Central Asia, at least some of the marks of colonialism have been characteristic of this later period as well. 1

While significant progress in the economic, educational, and health fields has been attendant upon the Russian presence in Kirghizistan during the Soviet period, this progress has been made at the price of arbitrary rule from Moscow, the movement of tens of thousands of Slavic migrants into the republic, and the infiltration of Russian influence into the Kirgiz language and culture.

A second formative factor affecting national attitudes among the Kirgiz is the modernization of loyalty patterns. Formerly, Kirgiz society, like other traditional societies, was atomized. Loyalty was directed to the extended family, the clan subdivision, the clan, and the clan confederation. 2 National consciousness was weak. This was true to the extent that the Bugu, for example, were willing to submit to Russian rule in 1855 to gain Russian support against their enemies of the Sarybagysh confederation. 3 Even as late as the 1930s, clan loyalties were so firm that the Soviet regime was forced to compromise, initially creating soviets and collective farms on a clan basis. 4 Such kinship and regional loyalties

1The case for and against the applicability of the term colonialist to the period of Soviet rule in Central Asia is discussed in Nove, 1967: 113ff.
tend to be transcended as the processes of modernization take hold and transform traditional societies and national consciousness develops. Kirgiz society has been no exception. It would be an exaggeration to say that the Kirgiz are no longer conscious of their clan affiliations or that this consciousness no longer influences social behavior. National consciousness and loyalty to the nation have become more significant than clan affiliation, however, and today it is more important to a native of Kirgizistan that he is a Kirgiz and a Moslem than that he is affiliated with one or another clan or clan confederation.

The third factor determining the national attitudes of the Kirgiz is their allegiance to Islam. Although somewhat less than half of the Kirgiz openly admit to being believing Moslems, it is probable that many others privately adhere to Islam. It would appear, moreover, that many Kirgiz who are not believers feel that they are a part of the Moslem community and of a Moslem culture.

The significance of the Islamic affiliation of the Kirgiz is manifold. First of all it tends to separate the Kirgiz and other Moslem peoples from non-Moslem peoples, most importantly the Russians. In Islamic tradition non-Moslems are categorized as kafirs or unbelievers, a term with negative connotations. Marriage between Moslem girls and non-believing males, moreover, is not permitted. But Islam is not only a divisive force; it is a unifying force as well. A bond exists between Islamic peoples to the extent that at one time many adherents of Islam in Russia felt that all Moslems belonged to a single Moslem nation. To what extent this situation exists today is impossible to ascertain. Some scholars believe, however, that it is probable that centripetal forces will dominate within the Soviet Moslem community.

If Islamic ties have been important to the Kirgiz and have had a role in their national attitudes, so have certain regional and ethnic ties within the broad Islamic community. There has long been a special relationship between the Kirgiz and the Kazakhs. Linguistic and cultural linkages are

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1Smith, 1971: 94-95, 112.  
2Dorzhennov, 1968: 87.  
significant and in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period they cooperated together in such political movements as the Iliatiya and the Alash-Orda. Even though divided into separate union republics during the greater part of the Soviet period, the two groups remain closely allied.

The Kirgiz also have had special relationships with the other peoples of Central Asia, or Turkestan generally. Here again linguistic and cultural ties and common historical experiences play a role. The pan-Turkestan Shuro-i-Islamiya Party had many adherents in Kirgizistan, and when the Turkestan Autonomous government was formed in Kokand in 1917 there was a demonstration of support in Osh. Despite the national delimitation of Central Asia and the long separate existence of the Central Asian republics, these ties have not disappeared.


2 Lit. gaz. (July 8), 1970.
II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

The leading Western authorities on the Soviet Moslems have written very little on Kirgiz national attitudes specifically, although they have discussed the problem as it relates to Central Asia or Soviet Islam generally. Two aspects of the question seem most relevant here: the relations between the Moslems and the Russians and national consciousness and nationalism among the Soviet Moslem peoples.

There would seem to be substantial agreement among Western scholars in the field that tensions exist between the Moslems and Russians in Central Asia. Thus Geoffrey Wheeler in one of his more recent articles stated that the great mass of the Central Asian Moslems would like to see the Russians leave their republics.\(^1\) Bennigsen also sees friction existing between the two groups but feels that it is limited primarily to Moslem resistance against what they view as detrimental Russian influences on their literary heritage, their history, and the purity of their languages. He sees the possibility of more serious problems developing in the future but at the same time maintains that the Moslems have a sense of satisfaction at having achieved a higher level of material well-being thanks to the Russians.\(^2\)

When the Central Asian specialists move from the problem of ethnic relations to that of national consciousness and nationalism, problems of definition become formidable. Both Wheeler and Bennigsen maintain in some of their later writings that the Central Asian peoples have developed a national consciousness. Neither is certain, however, about the precise character of this national consciousness. Bennigsen believes that it is problematical whether centrifugal or centripetal trends will prevail among the Soviet Moslems but thinks it most likely that either a regional Turkestan national consciousness or a broader pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic

\(^1\)Wheeler, 1968: 169.

feeling is emerging. ¹ Wheeler sees the possibility of a Turkic or a Turkeystan nation developing but also feels that new nations might form on the basis of the present Soviet union republics or that there may be a reversion to the pre-revolutionary groupings. ²

On the question of nationalism in Central Asia, Rywkin is quite correct when he maintains that most of the scholars in the field—and he specifically mentions Bennigsen, Pipes, Monteil, Kolarz, Carrere d’Encausse and Laqueur—acknowledge its existence. He might well have added such names as Caroe, Hayit and Rakowska-Harmstone. ³ Geoffrey Wheeler, however, is a notable exception. While recognizing the existence of national consciousness in Central Asia he sees none of the "characteristic signs of nationalism." ⁴ Paradoxical as it may seem, the views of Wheeler and the other scholars mentioned are not necessarily in conflict. This is true because their concepts of nationalism differ. Wheeler sees nationalism as a movement "having the positive aim of creating a nation-state enjoying a government exclusively its own," i.e., the most restrictive concept utilized. ⁵ Rakowska-Harmstone, however, defines it in a broader sense: a striving for political self-determination through the movement of national elites into leading roles in their republics and participation in the all union decision-making process. ⁶ Bennigsen, in his Islam in the USSR, emphasizes what might be referred to as defensive nationalism, i.e., a defense of the Moslems’ national integrity. Although he also writes of a desire for a greater political role in the USSR among Soviet Moslems, the French scholar feels that "the storm which will burst when the Moslem intelligentsia claims real independence

¹ Bennigsen, 1971: 180-182.
² These pre-revolutionary groupings are apparently the Uzbek-Tadzhik, Kazakh-Kirgiz-Karakalpak, and Turkmen groups which Wheeler felt were beginning to form in the later Tsarist period. See Wheeler, 1966: 41 and 115.
³ Rywkin, 1963: 158.
⁵ Ibid.: 115.
These latter two scholars and seemingly others as well do not feel that nationalism necessarily involves a movement for independence. Therefore, there is not necessarily a conflict between their affirmation of the existence of nationalism in Central Asia and Wheeler's denial of its existence.

In the literature examined on Central Asian national feeling, only two scholars have singled out the Kirgiz for special treatment. Elizabeth Bacon feels that they have traditionally placed a high value on independence and are the most prone to voice their disapproval of unpopular policies of the Soviet regime. Kolarz shared this view at least in part. He has written that Kirgiz national opposition has been particularly vocal and attributes this to the heavy in-migration into the republic making Russian predominance a definite possibility.

Soviet scholars have also investigated various aspects of national relations in the Kirgiz SSR. Most of this work has been carried out by a small group of sociologists at the Kirgiz State University in Frunze. The results of these studies reveal that "negative national attitudes"—as the term is used by Soviet sociologists—are held by a significant portion of the population of the Kirgiz SSR or of key elements in that population. Attitudes favoring intermarriage, for example, are viewed as positive by these sociologists, yet in a sample of 750 workers of various nationalities in Frunze, 27.5% did not favor the children and relatives entering into mixed marriages, while 40% were indifferent; only 28.5% favored them.

Although having friends of another nationality is considered a positive national attitude by Soviet sociologists, 22.7% of the sample

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3 Kolarz, 1958: 64.
polled in Kirgizistan revealed they had no such friends, a higher proportion than in three out of four other union and autonomous republics where similar studies were conducted. Atitudes toward working with other nationalities were also studied. Only partial results of the poll conducted on this question were published, however. Of 440 workers on the predominantly Kirgiz Ala-Too Kolkhoz, 72% stated either that they preferred working in a collective of one nationality or refused to answer, while only 28% preferred working with other nationalities. On the Druzhba Kolhoz, which has an ethnically mixed labor force, 39% favored working with other nationalities, 54% had no preference, and only 7% preferred working with one nationality alone. Perhaps most significant of all the polls on nationality attitudes, in view of the current drive being conducted against "outmoded" customs, was that taken among Kirgiz University students on attitudes toward traditional burial rites usually conducted by a mullah. A total of 68% of the students queried stated that they considered these traditional rites to be a national custom of their people, revealing a marked divergence in views on this important question between the Party and the future Kirgiz elite. The findings of this poll are congruent with those of the Kirgiz scholar Altmoyshbayev that "nationalistic attitudes" are a vital force among the "backward portion of the intelligentsia of Kirgizistan" and particularly among the "backward portion of the youth."

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4 Altmoyshbayev, 1958: 64.
III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

Despite the broad sweep of the Great Purge, which only preceded the outbreak of World War II by a few years, nationalism surfaced again among the Kirgiz during the war. At the Eighth Kirgiz Party Plenum, which met in Frunze on September 7th and 8th, 1942, it was revealed that anti-Soviet nationalistic activity had recently been uncovered in the republic and that those involved were Party members and, in some instances, former State and Party Officials.¹ Some Kirgiz, moreover, were associated with the nationalistic, anti-soviet Turkestan National Committee, which supported the Germans during World War II, and fought in the Turkic Legion which was organized among Soviet Moslem prisoners-of-war to assist the Wehrmacht against the Red Army.²

In the immediate postwar period, the Kirgiz press presented evidence of continued tensions between the native population of Kirgizistan and the Russians. Professor G. Nurov, for example, wrote in 1950 that there was a desire among the Kirgiz intellectuals to represent the Russians "as the oppressors of the Kirgiz people."³ In the same year the leading Kirgiz writer Aaly Tokombayev was criticized for incorporating "pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic nationalist and anti-Russian ideas" in his newly published work The Years of Bloodshed. It was even charged that one Kirgiz writer had idealized the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi guerrillas.⁴

With de-Stalinization and the moderation of some of the excesses of Stalinist nationality policy, there was greater possibility for the articulation of national feeling among the Kirgiz. It even found expression in the implementation of state policy in Kirgizistan. In 1958, for example, the Kirgiz language was made compulsory in the Russian schools of Kirgizistan. A definite quota was established for Kirgiz in the higher educational institutions of the republic.⁵ Finally the history of Kirgizistan was in-

¹Partiva Kirgizii, 1968: 201.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Razzakov, 1960: 43.
introduced into the schools. Except for the last-named measure, these innovations were soon declared to be "an infringement upon the rights of other nationalities" and revoked. The removal of First Party Secretary I.C. Razzakov in May 1961 may have been connected in part with his approval of these measures.

Even with the setbacks involved in the revocation of these educational reforms, the nationally minded creative intelligentsia pressed for further concessions in the area of Kirgiz national rights. They strove particularly for freedom of expression for the Kirgiz culture. The young Kirgiz poet Ramys Ryskulov even dared raise the demand for complete cultural freedom. In seeking the right to publish the works of the great Kirgiz writer of the 1920s, Tinistan-uulu, Ryskulov called for a "pure art, free from the influence of Party policy." His stand, moreover, was supported by the Kirgiz language newspaper Leninchil Zhash [Leninist Youth]. In his article, "On the Crags of the Free Mountains," another Kirgiz poet, K. Mailikov, represented Qasim Tinistan-uulu and Sidik Qarach-uulu, both adherents of the Alash-Orda nationalist party, as founders of Kirgiz Soviet literature, despite an official ban against the publication of their works. Another Kirgiz literary figure whose rehabilitation was sought in this period of accentuated cultural nationalism was Moldo Kilich Mamirkan-uulu. The works of this writer of the pre-revolutionary epoch had been banned by the Soviets because they idealized the life of the Kirgiz prior to Russian rule, expressed fatalism and faith in the God of Islam, and in some instances praised the manaps. In 1957 the literary historian M.K. Bodanova urged at least the partial rehabilitation of Mamirkan-uulu's works on the grounds that his philosophy included not only the "negative trend" described above but also a positive trend in that he praised innovation and encouraged the Kirgiz people to master new crafts and industries.

Long an issue among the Kirgiz, restrictions on the free exercise of

2 Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (September 19), 1961.
3 Adamovich, 1963: 143.
4 Malenov, 1960: 82.
5 Bogdanova, 1957: 12.
their national and religious traditions again became acute in 1970-71, apparently as a result of a special resolution of the Central Committee of the Kirgiz Communist Party condemning "obsolete customs" and of an official campaign to replace them with new "ideologically correct" ceremonies and rituals. Among the customs which came under attack were the elaborate festivities accompanying funerals, memorial rites, circumcisions, weddings, etc. Insofar as many Kirgiz, even from among the intelligentsia and students, viewed these practices not as "obsolete customs," but quite to the contrary as part of their national patrimony, official action against them was bound to arouse a nationalistic reaction, as even Kirgiz First Party Secretary Usubaliyev was forced to admit.

Foremost in Usubaliyev's mind when he wrote of this nationalistic reaction was undoubtedly the publication of the novella *The White Ship* by Chingiz Aitmatov. This work not only took a sympathetic view of those who fostered the "outworn" traditions of the Kirgiz people, but might well be interpreted as a protest against Party and State policy toward them. The fact that Aitmatov had taken a stand in favor of these traditions could not but concern Usubaliyev, for Aitmatov not only was the best known Central Asian writer, but was a recipient of the Lenin Prize and had a national reputation.

A second issue in the national rights area which has continued to concern the Kirgiz is the preservation and purification of their language. In recent years the regime has encouraged the spread of Russian and has widely employed the slogan that Russian is the second native language of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. The eminent Kirgiz academician K.K. Yudakhin at a general meeting of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences in 1972, however, publically expressed doubt as to the correctness of this concept. The Party organ *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, moreover, has found it necessary to

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2Ibid., and Gardanov et al., 1961: 20.

3The White Ship was published in *Novy Mir*, 1970: 1.
argue against the allegation "of bourgeois writers" that Russian is an "enforced second language" in Kirgizistan. Some Kirgiz, however, are not satisfied with limiting the spread of the Russian language in Kirgizistan but wish to reduce those Russian influences that already exist. It has been revealed for example that the prominent writer T. Sydykbekov feels that the Kirgiz language is "contaminated with foreign terms," and that he is fighting for its "purification."  

While the struggle of the Kirgiz to preserve their cultural heritage has been a salient aspect of the nationality problem in Kirgizistan in recent years, another national initiative deserves attention. This involves the assertion of far-reaching constitutional rights by native constitutional lawyers for the Kirgiz people and Kirgiz republic. One of these claims is that by the Kirgiz doctor of juridical sciences K. Nurbekov to the effect that the Soviet State does not have the right to prosecute or take punitive action against one who advocates the separation of a union republic from the Soviet Union.  

A second claim asserted by the same Nurbekov is that the territory of the Kirgiz SSR is inviolable and can only be changed with the consent of the Kirgiz people. Any forcible change against the will of the population in his mind is tantamount to annexation, constitutes an aggressive act, and violates the principle of self-determination.  

A final claim made both by Nurbekov and a second Kirgiz constitutional lawyer, Rafik Turgunbekov, asserts that the attempt by Kirgiz leaders to form a Kirgiz Mountain Oblast in 1922 constituted the sovereign will of the Kirgiz people, thereby implying that the refusal of the Soviet state to accede to this initiative in effect contravened the sovereign will. These concepts that

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5. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (December 7), 1972.
the Kirgiz people have a sovereign will independent of and in some instances contrary to that of the Soviet state, that the population of Kirgizistan has sovereign rights such as territorial inviolability which cannot be legally alienated by the Soviet state, and that the advocacy of separation from the Soviet Union should not be punishable by law are of much greater significance potentially than the movement to protect the integrity of the Kirgiz culture from State intervention and Russification. Unlike this latter movement, however, there is little evidence to indicate how widespread is the support for these legal positions.
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TURKMENISTAN AND THE TURKMEN

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.
TURKMENISTAN AND THE TURKMEN

PART A

General Information
I. Territory

With 187,200 square miles (2.2% of the entire USSR), the Turkmen SSR is the USSR's fourth largest union republic. Only the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine are larger. Turkmenistan exceeds the combined areas of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Situated between latitudes comparable to those of Chicago, Illinois, and Little Rock, Arkansas, Turkmenistan is the southernmost Soviet republic. It borders on Iran to the south, Afghanistan to the southeast, Uzbekistan to the northeast, and Kazakhstan to the northwest. In the west, its nearly 500-mile coastline on the Caspian Sea includes the port city of Krasnovodsk called "the Gateway to Central Asia." Ashkhabad is the capital of the republic.

Far from any ocean, Turkmenistan has a continental climate with an abundance of light and warmth. Summers are long, dry, and hot; average temperatures in July often exceed 90°F. Winters are short but intense, with temperatures occasionally falling below -25°F.

Turkmenistan is the driest region in the Soviet Union. Average annual rainfall is only 3 to 4 inches. Four-fifths of the total area is covered by the Kara Kum desert, the fourth largest in the world. The republic has nearly 300 days of sunshine per year, a fact which has a restricting effect on the life-cycle and on man's activity. In no other republic is the problem of water, or the lack of it, as crucial.

The few rivers and small streams flowing from neighboring Iran and Afghanistan into Turkmenistan include the Murgab (220 miles) and the Tedzen (186.4 miles). They are used extensively for irrigation.


2There are also uplands and mountain ranges in the south, reaching a maximum elevation of 10,000 feet.
mainly for cotton growing. The Atrek River, which flows along or inside the Turkmen border for 87 miles, is the only one reaching the basin of the Caspian Sea. The longest Central Asian river, the Amu Darya, flows through Turkmen territory for 620 miles along the eastern portions of the Kara Kum Desert and constitutes the most important irrigation source. The man-made Kara Kum Canal runs 534 miles from the Amu Darya in the southeast to just west of Ashkhabad. With its extension, the Kara Kum Canal is navigable for approximately 250 of its entire 534-mile course. It is expected to further ease the acute water shortage of the republic, to benefit the planned agricultural and industrial expansion in the western parts of Turkmenistan, and to link the republic with the principal waterways of the Soviet Union via the Caspian Sea.

Turkmenistan is rich in natural resources. The Kara Kum Desert appears to be a treasure-store of oil, gas, sulphur, potassium, coal, lead, barite, viterite, magnesium, bromine, iodine, and other minerals. Oil and gas are first, both in the magnitude of their deposits and in their importance for the national economy. In explored oil and gas deposits, Turkmenistan takes the second place in the USSR (in oil after the Tatar ASSR; in gas after West Siberia).
II. Economy

As a part of Russian Turkestan, Turkmenistan was one of the least developed areas of Tsarist Russia. It supplied raw materials, primarily cotton, for expanding Russian industry. Today, Turkmenistan remains above all a source of raw materials, but oil, gas, and minerals now play a major part in this production. In 1967 Turkmenistan ranked third among Soviet republics in the production of both gas and oil.¹ The growth of Turkmenistan's industrial production in 1940-1950 and 1960-1970, however, was the slowest of any union republic except Azerbaidzhan.² More recently, the growth rate has risen: in 1965-1970 it equaled the USSR average. Expanded exploitation of the country's large oil and mineral deposits and major efforts at increasing irrigation promise continued future growth.

In 1970 Turkmenistan, with 2.2% of the territory and 0.9% of the population of the USSR, produced 4.1% of its oil, 6.5% of its gas, 10.5% of its cotton fiber and 1.3% of its vegetable oils.³ Some processing of Turkmenia's resources is done in the republic, notably petrochemicals at Krasnovodsk, chemical fertilizers at Chardzhou, and sulphur at Kara Bogaz-Gol. Other than oil machinery and chemical manufacture, there is relatively little heavy industry in the republic, but significant amounts of cotton, wool, and silk fabrics, furniture, cement, and glass are produced. The Ninth Five Year Plan includes the construction of a new oil-machinery plant at Ashkhabad and several light industry combines.⁴

Increased irrigation and reclamation, agricultural mechanization, and the growth in the production of mineral fertilizers have brought a major expansion in the output of Turkmen agriculture since 1966. Cotton

¹Turkmenistan, 1969: 94-95.
²Nar. khoz. 1970: 139-140.
³Ibid.: 70-73.
remains by far the most important crop; in 1970 60% of the irrigated land area was devoted to it, including major areas opened for irrigation by the Kara Kum Canal. Lesser but still significant crops include grains, silk, fruits, and vegetables.

Livestock accounts for two-fifths of the gross output of Turkmen agriculture. Sheep and goats constitute the bulk of the herds; of these, the most important variety is the Karakul, from which "Persian lamb" fur is obtained.

The occupational structure of Turkmenistan is given in Table A.1. Industrial workers in Turkmenistan constitute one of the smallest percentages of the labor force of any Soviet republic. It is also of interest to note that Uzbekistan is the only other republic in which the number of kolkhozniki increased between 1965 and 1971.

Table A.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers and employees</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>498,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in agriculture</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in construction</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in industry</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>254,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. History

Tradition traces Turkmen origins from the Oguz group of Turkic peoples, though other peoples have also been assimilated into the modern Turkmen nation.¹ Beginning in the 7th and 8th centuries, the Oguz Turks migrated from their ancient homelands in eastern Asia into western Asia and the Middle East, where different branches later established the vast Seljukid and Ottoman Empires. Linguistically, the Turkmen remain more closely related to the Turks of Anatolia, Azerbaidzhan, and the Crimea than to their neighbors in Soviet Central Asia.²

The vast migration of the Turks was occasioned primarily by Chinese and Mongolian pressures and by the collapse of the Turkut Empire in the 8th century. Oguz-Turkmen tribes apparently settled to the north of the Syr-Darya and the Aral Sea about this time. In the 10th and 11th centuries, following the Arab conquest of Central Asia and the subsequent conversion of many of the peoples there to Islam, the Oguz pressed south against Iranian frontiers and into the Middle East. Two brothers, Chagri and Togril Bek, established the Seljukid Empire in the southern part of modern Turkmenia in 1040 A.D. In 1055 Togril entered Baghdad and established his line as Protectors to the Caliphate, with the concomitant right to conquer all Moslem territories in the Caliph's name. Alp Arslan, a nephew of Togrul, defeated a Byzantine army at Malazgird in 1071, opening the way into Anatolia.³ Oman, leader of another tribe of Oguz Turks, succeeded the Seljukids as head of the Turks in Anatolia in 1299. His dynasty, the Ottomans, proceeded with the conquest of Asia Minor. Another successor state moved into the Caucasus in the 14th and 15th centuries, laying the basis for the modern Azerbaidzhani nation.⁴

²Krader, 1963: 34.
In the 11th and 12th centuries, Oguz tribes remaining in Central Asia established themselves in Khorasan and Khorezm. Merv, the ancient capital of the Seljukids (Mary in modern Turkmenistan), grew as an important political, economic, and cultural center.

During the Mongolian invasion and conquest, the northern Turkmen in the area of the Mangyshlak peninsula and in Khorezm fell under Batu and the Golden Horde. Southern Turkmenistan became a part of the Timurid Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries and was later divided among the successor-states of Khiva, Bukhara and Persia. Many Turkmen retained their independence by playing these states against each other and hiring themselves out as mercenaries to one or another of the conflicting parties. Their military skills and pastoral culture contributed greatly to their independence, but they did not succeed in forming a lasting state of their own. Tribal clan and family loyalties predominated. From the 16th century onward, their territories began to take on a clearly definable shape in the vast desert areas of modern Turkmenistan and on the northern edges of Iran and Afghanistan. However, the political situation remained unstable up to the period of the Russian advance into Central Asia in the 19th century. British concern over the increasing Russian power in the region added to its instability.

The Russians, throughout their penetration into Central Asia, encountered the stiffest resistance and suffered their biggest losses at the hands of the Turkmen. During the reign of Peter the Great, the first Russian military expedition from the Caspian toward Khiva was annihilated by Turkmen cavalry in 1717. The defeat effectively delayed the Russian advance by over a century. The final assault on Turkmen territories began only after the conquests of Tashkent, Bukhara, and Khiva (1865-1878) and

was not completed until 1884-1885. Turkmenistan was thus the last Central Asian territory to come under Russian control. The greatest battle of the campaign was the Turkmen defense of the fortress of Coektpe in 1881, which resulted in a Russian massacre of the garrison. General Kuropatkin completed the conquest by occupying Merv and the Tedzhen and Murgab river valleys in 1884-1885. An Anglo-Russian border treaty of 1895 established the present border between Russian Turkmenistan and Iran and Afghanistan; it left a considerable Turkmen population in the latter two countries.

The "Provisional Status" decree of the Tsarist government in 1890 placed all of the Transcaspian Oblast (Turkmenistan) under the sole authority of the military governor and the territory was governed separately from other Central Asian lands. Tsarist policies encouraged Russian settlement, resulting in the impoverishment of the natives and loss of many of their pastures and farm lands to the colonists. Like other Central Asians, Turkmen were allowed no representation in the Dumas created after the 1905 Revolution; unlike the others, they did have some limited access to the military service. The Tsarist era did bring the beginnings of modernity; a railroad was built through the territory, and Ashkhabad was first established as a Tsarist fortress.

Turkmen participated in the general uprising of 1916 in Central Asia. Led by Dzhunaid Khan, Turkmen overthrew the Khanate in Khiva and established themselves in power in 1917. Nationalist dissatisfactions were a strong force in this movement. Tsarist and later Soviet authorities responded with harsh military action to quell the rebelling populace.

The collapse of Tsarist authority in 1917 and the October Revolution left a power vacuum in Turkmenistan. Several different groups and factions contended for ascendancy. Among the Turkmen them-

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
\[2\text{Krader, 1963: 104.}\]
selves, there were tradition-oriented raiders such as Dzhunaid Khan, who again attacked the settled Uzbek population of Khiva in early 1918, and representatives of a nascent nationalist intelligentsia such as Oral Serdar, Hadji Murat, and Ovezbayev, who formed a Provisional Turkmen Congress in Ashkhabad. Among the Russian settlers in the area, three major divisions formed: the "Whites," primarily former Tsarist administrators and military officials; a revolutionary group centered primarily around the workers and employees of the Central Asian Railway and led at first by Social-Revolutionaries; and a small group of Bolsheviks who acted on the basis of instructions from the Tashkent Soviet.

The "Whites" formed a Provisional Government of Transcaspia (Turkmenistan) in mid-1917 and resisted any concessions to the nationalist Turkmen until Bolshevik pressure forced them into a loose alliance in the summer of 1918. The railroad workers formed a Soviet in Ashkhabad soon after the news of the October Revolution arrived; Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining the leadership of the Soviet by the end of the year. The Bolsheviks made overtures to the Turkmen, but refused to give them a strong voice in the leadership. When in February 1918 the Turkmen Congress sought to form an army from the Turkmen cavalry units of the old Tsarist army, the Tashkent Soviet dispatched Red Army units to suppress them. The Bolsheviks maintained an uneasy dictatorship in Ashkhabad until June 1918, when it collapsed under opposition from the Turkmen, the Provisional Government, and Social-Revolutionaries in the Soviet. The Whites and the Turkmen Congress then came together to form a Transcaspian Government, which, with limited British assistance, held off the Bolsheviks until July 1919. In Khiva, the "Young Khivans," a liberal, modernist group, appealed to Tashkent for assistance against

1Wheeler, 1964: 111.

2Turkestan, including Turkmenia, was virtually cut off from Petrograd and Moscow from December 1917 until late 1919 by the Dutov rebellion in the southern Urals. See Zenkovsky, 1967: 231.


Dzhunaid Khan. A Red Army detachment drove him into the desert in January 1920, thus establishing Bolshevik control over the populated areas of Turkmenistan. Dzhunaid Khan and Oraz Serdar fought on in the desert for some years, as a part of the Basmachi movement.¹

The Soviets recognized "People's Republics" in Khiva and Bukhara, with control over most of Turkistan. By 1923-24, they had succeeded in infiltrating and removing the "Young Khivan" and "Young Bukharan" native cadres and reorganized the states into "Socialist Republics." In 1924 the Bukhara and Khorezm (Khiva) republics agreed to their own dismemberment and to the establishment of the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's on their territory. An All-Turkmen Constituent Congress of Soviets was held in Ashkhabad in February, 1925; an embryonic Turkmen Communist Party was organized, and the Turkmen SSR was formally accepted into the USSR on May 13, 1925.²

Soviet sources have admitted the continued existence and activity of nationalist organizations in Turkmenistan through the 1920s and 1930s. Collectivization was especially traumatic, meaning as it did the forced settlement of nomads onto collective farms. Soviet policies resulted in open rebellion in 1928-1932; two ministers of the Turkmenistan government were charged with supporting the rebels and with seeking the establishment of an independent Turkmenian State under British protection.³ The 1930s saw the emergence of a national and religious opposition movement, "Turkmen Azatlygi" [Turkmen Freedom]; Aitakov, Chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet, and Atabayev, Chairman of the Turkmen Soviet Government, were accused of protecting the group


and were executed in 1936. The purges which followed took a heavy
toll of Turkmen Party and government leaders and creative intelligentsia.¹

As late as 1948, the First Secretary of the Turkmen Party, Batyrov,
indicated that Communism was not yet completely accepted among the natives.²

¹Hughes, 1964 (reprinted). This book by the American Negro poet
contains a section on travels in Turkmenistan at the time of the purges.
Hughes attributes the initial disillusionment with communism of his traveling
companion, Arthur Koestler, to the Turkmen purges. Otherwise, the book is
replete with the poet's first-hand observations of Turkmen society.

IV. Demography

Central Asia has the highest rate of population growth in the Soviet Union, and Turkmenistan is typical of the pattern. The population of the republic grew from 1,516,375 in 1959 to 2,158,880 in 1970, or 42.4%. Among Soviet republics, only Tadzhikistan (46.4%) and Uzbekistan (44.8%) had higher growth rates for the period. The great bulk of the increase is attributable to natural growth rather than immigration; in 1969, Turkmenistan's birth rate was 34.3 per 1000 inhabitants (second only to Tadzhikistan), and its death rate was one of the lowest; as a result, the republic's net natural growth rate in 1969 was 27.3 per 1000. One reason for this is that the republic has a youthful population: according to the 1970 census, nearly half of the population (46.4%) are under 15 years of age, and nearly two-thirds (65.5%) are 29-years-old or less.

The great majority of the inhabitants added to the republic during 1959-1970—roughly three out of four—were Turkmen. The total Slavic element in the population (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians) fell to 16.3% in 1970.

Table A.2. Population of Turkmenistan 1959-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number 1959</th>
<th>Number 1970</th>
<th>% of total 1959</th>
<th>% of total 1970</th>
<th>Increase % 1959-1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>1,516,375</td>
<td>2,158,880</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>923,724</td>
<td>1,416,700</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>262,701</td>
<td>313,079</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>125,231</td>
<td>179,498</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>69,552</td>
<td>68,519</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>29,946</td>
<td>36,457</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Turkmenistan is home for only about half of the ethnic Turkmen population. Significant minorities live elsewhere in the USSR (primarily in Central Asia) and in neighboring Middle Eastern countries. 1970 data for the USSR and 1967 estimates for other countries giving an overview of the distribution of ethnic Turkmen are shown in Table A.3.

Data in this section are from Itogi Turkmenskoi SSR, 1959; and Itogi 1970: IV: 308-309.
Urbanization in Turkmenistan has historically been high in comparison to other Central Asian republics. This has been due in part to the extensive desert areas and the consequent oasis culture of the region, as well as to the tendency of Slavic settlers to locate in the cities. The rate of urbanization in 1959-1970, however, did not keep pace with that of the rest of the USSR. The urban portion of Turkmenistan's population increased only from 46% to 48%, and the republic dropped from sixth to eleventh place in urbanization among Soviet republics. The other Central Asian republics all showed a greater percentage gain in urban population than did Turkmenistan.

However, the urbanization of the indigenous nationality proceeded at a higher rate in 1959-1970. In Turkmenistan this also means that ethnic Turkmen are settling down beside the Uzbeks, who have long represented a major part of the urban population. In 1970, 31.7% of the ethnic Turkmen in Turkmenistan were urbanized, as opposed to 26.3% in 1959. Turkmen constituted 43% of the total urban population of the republic, versus 34.7% in 1959, whereas the Russian share decreased from 35.4% to 29%. In Ashkhabad, the capital of the republic, the percentage of Turkmen grew from 30% to 38%; although the city is still 42.8% Russian, non-Slavic ethnic groups now compose the majority of the population. The trend is clearly toward the end of the Russian domination of this Asian city and a marked strengthening of the native element there.

Table A.3.
Geographical Distribution of Ethnic Turkmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen SSR</td>
<td>1,416,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in USSR (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Azerbaidzhan, Armenia)</td>
<td>108,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries (Jordan, Syria, Tibet)</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong> (approximate)</td>
<td><strong>2,800,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Culture

Turkmenistan is a region of ancient settlement. Archeological discoveries in the area date from both ancient and medieval times. A rich discovery at Anau, five miles east of Ashkhabad, dates back to the 3rd and 4th centuries B.C.; Nisa, the ancient capital of the Parthian Empire, lies buried in ruins on the western outskirts of Ashkhabad. The Turkmen themselves, as part of the vast Turkic migration, entered the area in the 6th-8th centuries. Their dominance of the region can be dated from their adoption of Islam and from the end of the Iranian Samanid rule in the 10th century.

The expansion of the Oguz Turkmen into Persia, Transcaucasia, and Anatolia in the 11th century and the contact with Islamic culture in Baghdad inspired a major advance of Oguz-Turkmen culture and literature. The Turkmen share this heritage with the Turks of Anatolia and Azerbaidzhan, which gives the achievements of Oguz literature a distinct place among Turkic peoples and the Islamic world.

To this common heritage belong such major epics of the 11th-16th centuries as Oguz-Nama, an epic about the legendary Oguz Khan, the mythical predecessor of all Turks, and Korkut Ata, an 11th century Turkmen epic. Important pieces of romantic folklore such as Kor Ogli, Kissa-i-Yusuf, and Sevid Battal are also a part of this heritage, although they originated in places outside the present habitat of the Turkmen. The Oguz were in close contact with Iranian culture throughout their history; many of their literati wrote in Persian, which was the official language of Bukhara until 1920. The modern Turkmen literary language dates from the 18th century. The most outstanding name in classical Turkmen literature is that of the poet-philosopher Makhtumkuli (1733-1782).

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Up until the time of the Revolution, a great many of the Turkmen were pastoral nomads, although some groups had turned to a more settled agricultural existence in the oases. Those who did tended to keep to the portable yurt of the nomads rather than building more permanent housing. Tribal organizations and loyalties remained very strong. The Turkmen were a warlike people in the past, often hiring out as mercenaries to the different principalities of the region. When they were not so engaged, raids on their more settled neighbors, especially "unbelievers" such as the Shiite Persians, played an important part in their economy.¹

The establishment of the Turkmen SSR and of the Soviet system there brought a greater unity to the Turkmen tribes, and had a positive effect on the consolidation of a sense of nationhood and on the modernization of their culture and literature. The Arabic alphabet used by the Turks for a millennium was replaced by the Latin in 1928-1929 and by Cyrillic in 1940. A major purpose of these changes was to enhance the distinctions between the Turkmen and other Turkic peoples and to increase the influence of Russian culture.²

The modernization of Turkmenistan brought difficult and troubled times but has by now taken hold. As elsewhere in Central Asia, the introduction of a Western system of general and higher education, the advance of the Turkmen literary language, the emancipation of women, the formation of a national intelligentsia, and the adoption of Western art have not displaced the traditional culture, but have been absorbed into it. Turkmen culture has retained much of its earlier form and characteristic values. Islam in particular has traditionally been stronger among the Turkmen than among such other Soviet Moslems as the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, and there is evidence that the practice of Moslem observances has

widened since the Revolution.\textsuperscript{1} Despite the great progress of Westernization, Islam and more strictly national traditions continue to be vital forces among the Turkmen.

\textsuperscript{1}Bacon, 1966: 143.
VI. External Relations

The most important of Turkmenistan's external relations are its relations (1) with other Central Asian peoples; (2) with the Soviet Union as a whole; and (3) with those foreign countries which have Turkmen diasporas, especially Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey.

During the Stalinist period direct cultural relations among the Central Asian peoples were restricted and inhibited by accusations of "Pan-Turkism" or "Pan-Islamism." At the same time, Russian cultural domination and influence on Turkmen culture was greatly favored.

In the post-Stalin era, both the Party line and the advances in communication and mass media have encouraged the drawing closer [abližheniye] of peoples and increased cultural interchange. As a result the Turkmen have improved their awareness of other Central Asian and Turkic peoples—with whom they share a common past, cultural heritage and Islamic religion—as well as of other Soviet peoples. Although this development has been subject to strict regulation, it is nonetheless significant. The establishment of a Central Asian economic region in 1922-1934 and 1963-1965, recent discussions of its revival, the advance of general education, the jointly conducted Central Asian research on history and culture, and joint literary conferences and art events have all contributed to growing inter-relationships and a sense of common identity among Central Asian peoples. Furthermore, in recent years, cultural and scholarly conferences of Turkic-speaking peoples of the USSR have contributed to the revival of cultural relations among Turkic peoples which had been disrupted during the Stalin era. Noteworthy in this connection is the All-Union Conference of Soviet Turkologists held in Baku in 1966 in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the First Baku Congress of Turkologists. The conference resumed the joint planning of the cultural and linguistic development of Turkic peoples and began publication of a joint bimonthly, Sovetskaya Turkologiya.
Recent years have also witnessed a growing Turkmen interest in friendly relations with neighboring Middle Eastern countries and with Turkmen diasporas inhabiting those countries. Nearly half of the ethnic Turkmen live in the Middle East, of whom close to one million are in Iran and Afghanistan, just south of the borders of the TSSR. Many Turkmen crossed the border to escape the Tsarist Conquest and later the harsh Soviet rule in Turkmenistan. Until recently Turkmenistan was one of the most restricted areas of the Soviet Union. Not only were foreign tourists barred from entering the Turkmen SSR, but Turkmen themselves, on both sides of the border, could not cross it. Communication with Turkmen abroad is still largely confined to an occasional exchange of letters and visits between relatives and to listening to radio broadcasts in Turkmen from across the border. However, recently, Soviet Turkmen writers, journalists, and occasionally official Soviet delegations have been able to visit the countries on the other side of the border. Berdi Kerbabayev, the best-known Turkmen writer, reported on his journey to Turkey in successive articles in the Soviet Turkmen press. His conversations with Turkish writers and intellectual circles and his re-discovery of monuments and proofs of the common Turkmen-Turkish past were of great interest to Turkmen society.

Radio Liberty beams programs to Soviet Central Asia in the Turkmen language. Because of the great distance involved, weak transmitters, and Soviet jamming, these programs reach their intended listeners only on a relatively weak second hop. A 30-minute program is transmitted four times a week, giving news, news analysis, and comments on internal Turkmen problems.

Foreign printed media are not available to the general public and are limited in use to persons with special permission in the Turkmen State Library and Libraries of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Party, and other institutions. Turkmen books and other printed media are available in the West. In recent years a number of foreign books, mostly novels from the Third World have been printed in Turkmen translation. There is a limited exchange of books between the Turkmen State Library in Ashkhabad and the Columbia University Library. Similar exchanges exist with other American universities and libraries.
TURKMENISTAN AND THE TURKMEN

PART B

Media
I. Language Data

The Turkmen language belongs to the southwestern group of Turkic languages, as do Azerbaidzhani, Kashgai (Southern Iran), Anatolian Turkish, Balkan Turkish, and Crimean Tatar. In the fourteenth century the Turkmen used a literary language which soon came under the influence of the Central Asian literary Turkish, Chagatai, which is related to the modern Uzbek and Kazakh languages. In the 18th and 19th centuries the Turkmen literary language again came into use and persisted until after the formation of the Turkmen SSR. The Soviets have sought to create a new variant of the language, which is based on living Turkmen dialects and is more distinct from Anatolian.¹

Turkmen employed the Arabic alphabet until 1928–1929, when a Latin alphabet more closely adapted to Turkmen phonemes was introduced. This alphabet in turn was arbitrarily replaced by a modified form of the Cyrillic alphabet in 1940.²

As indicated in Table B.1., Turkmen display the typical Central Asian pattern of very high retention of the native language. 98.9% of all Turkmen in the USSR, and 99.3% of all those in the Turkmen SSR, consider Turkmen as their native language. In the republic, those who cite Russian as the native tongue are heavily concentrated in the cities, as are those who give Russian as a second language of fluency. The former group includes roughly equal numbers of men and women, but those citing Russian as a second language are predominantly male.³ But even in the cities, 97.9% of the Turkmen gave the national language as their own.

Turkmen is the native language of 65.5% of the population of Turkmenistan, and Russian is the first language of 17.1% of the republic. Of the members of other nationalities in the republic, 46,999 gave Russian as their tongue, and only 6100 the Turkmen language. However, Uzbeks, Baluchis and

Kurds cited Turkmen more often than Russian. Baluchis, Kurds and Iranians in the Turkmen SSR listed Turkmen as their second language more often than Russian, which may indicate a tendency among these groups to assimilate with the Turkmen.
Table E.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Turkmen
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen SSR</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(99.45%)</td>
<td>(99.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.51%)</td>
<td>(.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other Soviet Republics</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(92%)</td>
<td>(93.4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
<td>(2.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(25.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+0.15</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(98.9%)</td>
<td>(98.9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.65%)</td>
<td>(.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1970 census.

b Including Turkmen, if not native language.
II. Local Media

a. Print Media

Mass media in Turkmenistan showed a considerable growth in the 1960s. Per issue circulation of both newspapers and magazines more than doubled between 1959 and 1971. This growth can be attributed, in part, to the growth of the Turkmen intelligentsia and the continued spread of education in the republic, to the growing number of immigrants, especially those coming to work in Turkmenistan's booming oil and gas industries, to the end of the paper shortage, and to the official policy of promoting the use of Russian.

The most important daily newspapers in Turkmenistan are Sovet Turkmenistani (in Turkmen) and Turkmenskaya Iskra [Turkmen Spark], in Russian, the official organs of the Communist Party and government of the republic. Munallimlar Gazeti [Teachers' Gazette], with a 1972 circulation of over 21,000, and its Russian equivalent, Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, appear three times a week. Both are pedagogical papers aimed at teachers and educators. The Turkmen literary bi-weekly Edebiyat & Sungat [Literature and Art] is widely read among Turkmen intellectual circles. It reflects current literary politics, popularizes both classic and modern works, and discusses problems of Turkmen literature and language. This newspaper initiated a heated argument concerning language in the early 1960s, only to have it cut short by executive order.

Other newspapers include Yash Kommunist [Young Communist] and Komsomolets Turkmenistana, the organs of the Young Communist League, and the Turkmen language organ of the Young Pioneers, Mydam Tayyar [Always Ready]. There are more than forty local newspapers in the cities and raions of the republic. The two minority language papers are in Kazakh and Uzbek.

The quality of the Turkmen press is evidently not high by Soviet standards. At a 1971 conference of republic ideological workers the media were criticized as not meeting the aesthetic demands of readers, not informing them properly, and being dry and uninteresting. ¹

¹Sovet Turkmenistani and Turkmenskaya Iskra (June 29), 1971.
Of the magazines published in Turkmenistan, the following are among the most significant:

*Sovet Edebiyati* [Soviet Literature], in Turkmen, a monthly, with a 1973 circulation of 20,670 and *Ashkhabad*, in Russian, a bi-monthly, with a 1973 circulation of 4900. These literary and socio-political journals are published by the Writers' Union and are widely read among the Turkmen intelligentsia.

*Sovet Turkmenistaninin Ayallari*, [Women of Soviet Turkmenistan], in Turkmen, a monthly, with a 1973 circulation of 91,000. This is a political and literary magazine published by the Communist Party.

*Tokmak* [The Beetle], in Turkmen, a monthly with a 1972 circulation of 106,000, is a popular satirical journal.

*Kommunist Turkmenistana*, in Russian, the monthly theoretical and political organs of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party.

Book publishing was almost non-existent in pre-revolutionary Turkmenistan. Today the republic boasts two publishing houses with modern printing facilities and trained personnel. Over 118,000,000 books have been published in the republic since 1923, 5,015,000 in 1971 alone. A broad range of works are included: textbooks, scholarly works, propaganda brochures, atheistic works, and classics of Turkmen literature and Communist ideology. For example, a 45-volume edition of Lenin's collected works has been published in Turkmen translation. The first volume of the Turkmen Encyclopedia is in print.

But the state of publishing in Turkmenistan is far from satisfactory. The Turkmenistan publishing house fails annually to fulfill its plan both in the number of books and in volumes. At the Second Congress of Turkmen Cultural workers in May 1969, the house was criticized for achieving only 69.3% of its 1968 plan.¹ Frequent complaints of shortages of paper and

¹*Sovet Turkmenistani* and *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (June 29), 1971.
### Table B.2. Publications in the Turkmen SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspapers&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th>Books &amp; Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>1971 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.

<sup>b</sup>This figure may include publication in non-Soviet languages.

<sup>c</sup>Book totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 58, 130, 165;
Pechat' 1970: 97, 160, 189;
trained personnel are aired. Readers also complain that works of classical Turkmen literature and folk epics are not obtainable in book-shops. The demand for books dealing with the Turkmen heritage is rapidly growing; nearly half of the novels published in 1967-1972 in Turkmenistan dealt with historic and historic-revolutionary themes.

b. Electronic Media and Films

Radio and television broadcasting has also developed rapidly in Turkmenistan during the past decade, and the number of receiving sets has reached a point at which most Turkmen have access to them. Radio broadcasts from Ashkhabad cover the entire territory of the republic; television can as yet be received in only about 80% of the populated areas, but the Ninth Five Year Plan (1970-1975) foresees the construction of additional relay lines to reach areas near the Afghan border. At present, TV studios exist in Krasnovodsk, Nebit-Dagh, and Chardzhou, as well as in the capital.

The central studios in Ashkhabad broadcast three radio and three TV programs daily, including the programs delivered by the "Orbita" and "Vostok" satellite systems. The Turkmen language is extensively used and predominates in programs of local origin. The goal is basic communication with the audience. According to one Soviet Central Asian author, "Daily information on the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet government...intended for every section of the population must be presented in their mother tongue, in that language in which the propaganda is most understandable and intelligible to them."

Turkmenistan's only film studio "Turkmenfilm" produces a few films and news chronicles of indifferent quality every year. In 1971-1972 it was criticized for not producing films glorifying the working class and contemporary Turkmen life. The most popular foreign films available to the Turkmen audience originate in India or other Near Eastern countries.

1Knipa, 1965: 1.
3Khanazarov, 1963.
Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Turkmen SSR

| Year | Radio | | | Television | | | Movies |
|------|------|------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|      | No. of Sets | No. of Sets | No. of Sets | No. of Sets | No. of Sets | No. of Sets | No. of Sets |
|      | Wired /100 population (1000) | wireless sets /100 population (1000) | Sets /100 population | Stations originating programming | Sets /100 population | Sets /100 population | Seats /100 population |
| 1960 | N.A. | 150<sup>a</sup> | 9.2<sup>d</sup> | 182<sup>a</sup> | 11.2<sup>c</sup> | 6<sup>a</sup> | 0.4<sup>c</sup> | 82<sup>b</sup> | 5.0<sup>d</sup> |
| 1970 | N.A. | 247<sup>a</sup> | 11.1<sup>d</sup> | 347<sup>a</sup> | 15.6<sup>c</sup> | 186<sup>a</sup> | 8.4<sup>c</sup> | 143<sup>b</sup> | 6.4<sup>d</sup> |
| 1971 | N.A. | 260<sup>d</sup> | 11.3<sup>d</sup> | 376<sup>d</sup> | 16.4<sup>c</sup> | 4<sup>e</sup> | 230<sup>c</sup> | 10.0<sup>c</sup> | N.A. | N.A. |

<sup>a</sup>Source: Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972: 296-298
<sup>b</sup>Source: Nar. obraz., 1971: 325.
<sup>c</sup>Source: Nar. khoz. 1972: 572. 578.
<sup>d</sup>Computed from data cited above (b and c).
III. Educational Institutions

As elsewhere in Soviet Central Asia, education has made tremendous progress in the past half-century in the Turkmen SSR. Literacy is now universal. ¹ Although still somewhat low in comparison with other parts of the Soviet Union, education indicators in Turkmenistan are far above those in other Middle Eastern countries. Within Soviet Central Asia, Turkmenistan compares favorably with the other republics. It is first in the ratio of people with higher and secondary education to the adult population of the republic and Turkmen trail only the Azerbaidzhanis and Tatars, among Soviet Moslems, in the ratio of scientific workers to population. ²

Turkmenistan has five higher educational institutions, including the state university and specialized schools for agriculture, medicine, pedagogy and polytechnical studies. Four of these are located in Ashkhabad. ³ The 28,000 students in these institutions in 1969-1970 amounted to 135 students per 10,000 inhabitants of the republic, a lower rate than for the Soviet Union as a whole. The rate for students in specialized secondary schools, 130 per 10,000, however, was near the mean for Central Asia. ⁴

² See the Comparative Tables, Nos. 5 and 7.
Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Turkmen SSR (1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population:</td>
<td>2,293,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>2,293,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>255.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of student places</td>
<td>35,800</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary special schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
<td>28,900</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions of higher education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of institutions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
<td>29,200</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of universities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,124</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
<td>5,298</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
<td>3,777</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selected Data on Education in the Turkmen SSR (1971) (continued)

Universities (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 108) Graduate students

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total number of</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in scientific research</td>
<td>385</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in universities</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 669) Number of persons with (in 1970) higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>per 1000 individuals,</td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years and older</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1000 individuals</td>
<td>682</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employed in national economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 676) Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools

|                               | 7,800               | 3.4        |

Source: Nar. khoz., 1972. (Page references given above,)
IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

The Turkmen Academy of Sciences was established in 1951. Centered in Ashkhabad, it now has 20 research institutes and many laboratories, experimental stations, and museums. Its work has been especially related to studies of the desert and to oil and gas technology. Turkmenistan has a total of some 56 scientific institutions with over 3,000 workers. Over half of these are said to be Turkmen.¹

Four of the republic's six theaters are located in Ashkhabad. These include the Academic Drama Theater, the Russian Drama Theater, the Opera and Ballet Theater and the State Philharmonic.²

¹Turkmenistan, 1969: 89.
²Ibid.: 173; Europa Yearbook 1970: 1314.
Table B.5.
Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in
the Turkmen SSR (1971)
Population: 2,293,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academy of Science</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of members</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of scientific workers in these</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Museums</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of museums</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>438,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance per 1000 population</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theaters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of theaters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>749,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance per 1000 population</td>
<td>326.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons working in education and culture</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. per 1000 population</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons working in science and scientific services</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number per 1000 population</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of public libraries</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of books and magazines in public libraries | 6,666,000 |

| Number of clubs | 733 |

TURKMENISTAN AND THE TURKMEN

PART C

National Attitudes
I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

Turkmen national attitudes have been powerfully affected by the great transformation and modernization of Turkmen society in the past half-century. The Soviet regime has wrought radical changes in the political, economic, socio-cultural and intellectual life of the republic and its people. These changes have brought tensions and problems as well as the benefits of modernization. In a short half-century, the Turkmen have overcome their inherited backwardness and consolidated a modern nationality. The political reality of the Turkmen SSR serves as an expression of that nationhood. The growing industrialization of the republic and the formation of a Turkmen working class, the reorganization and expansion of irrigated agriculture, and the emergence of a Turkmen national intelligentsia have all played a part in the formulation and expression of Turkmen attitudes.¹

Turkmen writings and official statements issued during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR (1972) underlined the sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR, especially in regard to its right to establish direct relationships and to conclude agreements with foreign countries.² They also stressed the voluntary membership and the equality of the union republics of the USSR, and equality in the sharing of responsibility and power in overall planning and budget allocations. All this implies a sense of dissatisfaction with the degree of centralized USSR control. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Turkmen authorities demanded that priority in funding be given to industrial projects which satisfy the republic's own economic needs, in opposition to the prevailing line that stresses the overall division of labor. There is apparently considerable resentment over the fact that the bulk of Turkmenistan's large cotton production is shipped as raw material to Russian textile industries, and that Turkmen gas and oil is piped to other areas in disregard of Turkmenistan's own demands. There are clear manifestations that the Turkmen intelligentsia

¹Ocherki, 1970: 469.
Turkmenistan - Attitudinal Factors - 2

is seeking a return to the 1920s' policy of "korenizatsiya," or Turkmenization, of the Party and government apparat, and for a broadening of the social functions of the Turkmen language.¹

Throughout history, the advance of culture in Central Asia has depended above all on irrigated agriculture. In this way, the Soviet achievements in the reconstruction and expansion of irrigated lands, and particularly the construction of the Kara-Kum Canal, have profoundly affected the life of the rural Turkmen population. No other single Soviet measure has found such a wide degree of support and appreciation among the Turkmen. At the same time, the utilization of much of the newly opened lands for cash-crop cotton production has raised new economic problems and increased the importance of Turkmenistan in the overall economy of the USSR. This may well be a factor in the Turkmen demands for greater economic diversification.

The Turkmen experience with the Central Asian Economic Region (1962-1965) fostered closer economic and cultural cooperation with the other Central Asian republics and peoples. Revival of the region, now under consideration, would serve as an organizational basis for coordination and common planning and for the formulation of common attitudes. In combination with the existing trend toward increased cultural interchange and joint scholarly research, such a move could increase the regional particularism of Central Asia, reinforcing the bonds of their shared Islamic culture.

Effectively sealed off from the outside world during the past half-century, the Turkmen have shown a strong interest in renewing outside contacts, especially with the Turkmen minorities in Iran and Afghanistan. These governments have been reluctant to allow such contacts, but the exchange of letters, publications, radio broadcasts, and occasional visits has been growing.

¹Durdiyev, 1971: 10-17.
Among Turkmen dissidents the case of Annasoltan Kekilova stands out. It is the first of its kind in Central Asia to become known in the West. A poet, daughter of the renowned Turkmen writer and scholar Aman Kekilov and niece of the writer Shali Kekilov, she was committed to a mental hospital as a result of her criticisms of conditions in Turkmenistan. The case came to light through a petition sent by her mother to the Central Committee vouching for her sanity and pleading for her release. A copy of the petition was made available to Western newsmen and reported in The New York Times and other newspapers.¹

According to these reports (confirmed by personal sources), the poet criticized shortcomings in her republic in a 56-page illustrated report, addressed to the CC CPSU in Moscow, and in a letter to the Party’s 24th Congress (April, 1971). Harassed by Party officials, she lost her job, and her works were banned from publication and circulation.² Kekilova then decided to renounce her Soviet citizenship and emigrate. The embarrassed Soviet authorities in Turkmenistan committed her to a hospital in an attempt to force her to sign a statement saying that she had forwarded her report to the CC CPSU "while under nervous tension."

As the recent drive against nationalism in Turkmenistan shows, this is only one illustration of the widespread national discontent and self-assertion in the republic.

¹ See The New York Times (September 28), 1971; The Economist (October 9), 1971; and the Turkish newspaper published in Ankara, Devlet (December 27), 1971.

² Her poetry had been published in the Russian-language periodical, Ashkhabad (1971: 2).
II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

There is basic agreement among both Soviet and non-Soviet scholars that the modernization of Soviet Central Asia during the past half-century has had a major effect on the lives and attitudes of its inhabitants. However, there is less agreement on the nature of this effect. Soviet scholars have generally stressed the "flourishing" of the republics and have given little attention to negative aspects or to results that are not consistent with the Party line.

Most Western scholars have dealt with Turkmenistan only in the larger Central Asian context. As such, many have seen evidence of a general concern for native cultural values and a resistance to Russification that, while lacking an organizational context and limited in written expression, is nonetheless persistent and pervasive. The French scholars Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, for example, have written:

Soviet authors describe as 'nationalism' the various manifestations of the resistance of the Moslems to Russian influence. This resistance is certainly an expression of discontent, but as far as is known it never takes the form of systematic opposition to communism or of demand for greater freedom. For the present, it is mainly a question of the negative reaction of self-defence—of defence of their literary heritage, of their history, of the purity of their language...

Yet there is every reason to believe that the 'nationalism' of the Moslems, from being purely defensive, could become insistent. Certain signs in the behaviour of Moslem intellectuals afford ground for supposing that demands of this kind are in the air. Administratively, Moslems are stipulating larger representation for their nations, to be followed by a greater and more real share of responsibility and power.¹

Elizabeth Bacon, writing in 1966, has argued that traditional culture in Central Asia has shown considerable tenacity even as it has adapted to new conditions and borrowed some foreign elements. "...the Central Asian peoples have not lost their sense of ethnic identity, nor are they likely to become merged with the Russian people."² She observed the persistence

of old patterns in occupations and in social organization, and the continuing strength of religious belief. Further, she notes that the new intelligentsia acts as a buffer against Russianization rather than an agent of it:

Soviet leaders appear doomed to disappointment in their hope that the intelligentsia they had educated would lead the masses toward Russianization. The most highly educated Central Asians are also the most skilled in communicating the cultural values of their own ethnic group to those around them. Party members and administrators are inclined to react according to the values of their own culture rather than work toward Russianization...¹

Jan Myrdal, son of the famed Swedish sociologist, has provided a highly informative and personal account of his travels in Turkmenistan in 1960 and 1965. He also saw a potential conflict between native demands for continued social and political growth and centralist insistence on maintaining controls:

...The conflict is not—as in Soviet propaganda it sometimes seems to be—a conflict between socialists and "bourgeois nationalists." I don't even think it is a conflict which has yet attained any clear organizational form, though it is already finding its reactive ideological expressions and in the future can find its organizational. Nor is it a conflict which necessarily imperils the Union. Rather it is a conflict between those groups which for their own technological and privilege-preserving reasons pursue a policy which is making the Union into a formal shell around a centralized "Russian" state, and those who want to see the Union realized. But if official policy continues to follow the same course as at present, then its result will be centrifugal and separatist movements.²

¹Ban: m, 1966: 202.
III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

The Turkmen actively resisted the imposition of tsarist and later Soviet rule. The last Turkmen uprising took place in 1931 in the Kara Kum, as a response to the collectivization policy. It was suppressed by Soviet power; the rebelling herdsmen were forcibly resettled on cotton-growing kolkhozy. During the 1930s a large number of Turkmen Party, government, and cultural leaders were accused of nationalism, "Pan-Turkism," or assisting the Basmachi and were purged. Among them were the Premier of the TSSR government, Gaygysiz Atabay, and the President of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Nedirbay Aytakov. Their posthumous rehabilitation included the erection of memorials to them in the center of Ashkhabad. In his documentary novel Gaygisiz Atabay, Berdi Kerbabayev, a leading writer of Soviet Turkmenistan, noted that in those years "not hundreds, but thousands fell as victims of lawlessness," and that "although Atabay disappeared from the eyes, he always lived forth in the hearts of his people."\(^1\)

Another group of Turkmen intellectuals was accused of nationalism after 1948, including the historian Gayip Nepesov, criticized for his book *The Victory of Soviet Rule in Northern Turkmenistan 1917-1936.*\(^2\) The book depicted Dzhunayd Khan and other leaders of the Turkmen resistance in too positive a fashion for Soviet authorities. Nepesov was forced to rewrite the work and publish under a different title.

Since that time, manifestations of Turkmen nationalism have primarily been restricted to activities within the established institutions of the Turkmen SSR. The so-called "Babayev affair" in 1958-1959 is a prominent example. At that time, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan's Communist Party, Suhan Babayev, and the Secretary of the Central Committee for Ideological-cultural Affairs, Nurdzemal Durdiyeva, together with other Turkmen leaders argued that all leading posts in Turkmenistan should be occupied by the Turkmen themselves, and that officials of other nationalities should be appointed only in the event that no candidates for the posts could be found among Turkmen cadres. The then Second Secretary of the CC CPT, Grishayenkov, and other Russians, supported by the CC CPSU, opposed this demand. Consequently, the Turkmen leaders were de-

\(^1\)Kerbabayev, 1965: 454-455.

\(^2\)Nepesov, 1950.
posed and the entire Party and government apparatus reshuffled. Babayev and his supporters were expelled from the Party.\(^1\)

The problem underlying this conflict remains unresolved. Turkmen intellectuals are now demanding greater self-government and an increased role for Turkmen in political, economic and cultural life. Official Soviet propaganda has sought to discredit these aspirations as manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" and as a result of Western "bourgeois propaganda."

The present First Secretary of the Turkmenistan Party, Muhammetnazar Gapurov condemned the rise of nationalism among Turkmen students and intellectuals in his speech at the 24th Party congress in Moscow April 1971, and again in the 11th Plenum of the CC CP Turkmenia in March 1973. Referring to events at the Polytechnical Institute, "There have been shortcomings and neglect in the international education work among students and professorial-teaching personnel of the institute. Under the influence of various concoctions of bourgeois propaganda...individual teachers and students at institutions of higher learning permit the occurrence of unhealthy, politically unsound statements."\(^2\)

Gapurov also noted "shortcomings" in atheistic propaganda. The survival of Islam as a way of life and the connection of Islamic customs and traditions of Turkmen with Central Asian culture is a special concern of Party officials. Gapurov in his speech in a Turkmen CC March Plenum in 1973 stated "The steady and persistent struggle against the bearers of survivals of the past is a necessity. Due to its peculiarity and specific role, the Islamic cult cannot be seen by us without anxiety. Islam, as is the case with all religions, often poses in the role as the 'preserver' of reactionary national customs and traditions, it awakens feelings of national exclusiveness, and serves as a refuge for nationalism."\(^3\) In accord with the recent Party decisions, the Soviet Turkmen press has called editorially for reinforcement of the "internationalist education" of youth and for struggle "against the remnants of nationalism."\(^4\)

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\(^1\) For more on the Babayev case, see the Soviet Turkmen papers, Soviet Turkmenistani and Turkmenskaya iskra (December 16), 1958 and subsequent issues.

\(^2\) The speech by M. Gapurov was reported in Soviet Turkmenistani and Turkmenskaya iskra (March 4), 1973.

\(^3\) Soviet Turkmenistani and Turkmenskaya iskra (March 4), 1973.

\(^4\) See the editorials in Soviet Turkmenistani (April 6 and May 16), 1973.
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UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
June 1973
TADZHIKISTAN AND THE TADZHIKS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.
TADZHUKISTAN AND TADZHIKS

PART A

General Information
I. Territory

The Tadzhik SSR, with an area of 54,900 square miles, is one of the smaller union republics, the smallest in Soviet Central Asia. It is situated in the southeastern corner of the Soviet Union and is the southernmost Soviet republic except for Turkmenistan. Located between 36°40' and 41°05' north latitude, Tadzhikistan borders in the south on Afghanistan, with only the narrow "panhandle" separating it from Pakistan and India, and in the east on Chinese Sinkiang. The republic's internal boundaries are with Uzbekistan to the northwest, and with Kirgizia to the north.

Mountains cover 90% of the surface of the republic. Its topography is dominated by three major mountain systems: the Tyan-Shan chain in the north, the Hissar-Alai chain in the central part of the republic, and the Pamirs, in the southeast. Tadzhikistan has the highest mountain ranges in the Soviet Union, comparable to the neighboring Himalayas. The Union's highest mountain, Peak Communism (24,733.5 feet) is in Tadzhikistan. This is also the most earthquake-prone of the Soviet areas.

The climate varies with topography, temperatures ranging from subtropical highs in southwestern valleys (with extremes of up to 115° F), to arctic lows in the eastern Pamirs (with extremes down to minus 58° F). In addition to variability the climate is characterized by aridity, with average annual precipitation of less than eight inches. According to topography and climate, vegetation ranges from tropical crops in the southwest to Alpine meadow grasses in the mountains.

Human settlement clusters along river valleys. Tadzhikistan's rivers flow from the center southwestward (Kafirnigan and Vakhsh), westward (Zeravshan) to the Amu-Darya river, and to the northwest (Ferghana valley of the Syr-Darya river).

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1 Based on Chumichev, 1968; Narzikulov and Riazantsev, 1956; Sovetskii Soyuz series; and Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970.
Tadzhikistan lacks geographic and economic unity, as it divides into four distinct regions. In the north the Tadzhik part of the Ferghana valley (the eastern part of which belongs to Kirgizia, the western to Uzbekistan), connects to the rest of the republic by a narrow corridor between the two neighbor republics. Central Tadzhikistan surrounds the Zeravshan river valley, the lower reaches of which descend into Uzbekistan; southern Tadzhikistan, with the capital Dushanbe and most of the other important cities, centers on the southwestward-sloping valleys which open into Afghanistan. The Pamir region, which includes the whole of eastern Tadzhikistan, is a self-contained mountain area extending eastward and southward beyond the Soviet boundaries.

Mountains have traditionally favored isolation, with valleys as connecting links, crossroads and, given the necessary irrigation, bases for fertile agricultural economy. Under the Soviet rule much of the traditional mountain isolation has been overcome through mountain-to-valley resettlement, development of a railroad and air transportation network, and increased exploitation of industrial resources and power potential of the mountain rivers.

Tadzhikistan has many known natural resources, even though much of its area is still unexplored. The Ferghana valley has polymetallic ores, cadmium, molybdenum, wolfram, copper silver, gold, and some natural gas, petroleum, and coal. In the Hissar-Alai mountains are such non-ferrous metal ores as wolfram, antimony, mercury, and fluorspar. The region is also reported to have some of the largest coal deposits in Central Asia in Fan-Iagnob. The Pamir region has been little surveyed, but has known deposits of rock crystal, gold, molybdenum, wolfram, asbestos, mica, lazurite and coal. Natural gas and extensive rock salt deposits are found in the southwestern regions. In the republic as a whole there is an extensive raw materials base for the construction materials industry and an impressive fuel and energy potential.

The territorial-administrative division of the Tadzhik SSR includes two oblasts, one of which, Gorno-Badakhshan, is autonomous and coincides with the Pamir geographic region; 40 rural raions, 17 cities (of which 10 are directly under republic jurisdiction; one only, Dushanbe, has three urban raions), 40 urban-type settlements, and 274 rural Soviets. ¹

II. Economy

Upon incorporation into the Soviet Union, Tadzhikistan presented a classic case of economic backwardness. Its economy was based on primitive agriculture; crafts (such as silk-weaving, pottery, and leather work) were highly developed, and there was a lively trade exchange of agricultural for craft products. With the collectivization of agriculture and the new emphasis on cotton cultivation, the development of the new socialist economy began in the 1930s. Industrialization began in the 1940s and progressed significantly in the 1960s. Nevertheless, Tadzhikistan's primary economic role in the Soviet economy has been that of a producer and lately also a processor of cotton.

The economic growth index for Tadzhikistan has been extremely high (see Table A.1.), but the image it projects tends to be misleading because of the relatively small absolute base. By the early 1970s Tadzhikistan was still at the lowest end of the Soviet development scale. It had the lowest per-capita income of all the union republics, and its budget allocations, its share in long- and short-term bank loans, and its portion of all-union investment funds all fell below the proportionate share of its population in the Union total. This seemed to indicate that the gap between the republic and the more developed parts of the USSR was actually widening.

As reflected in the production of specific commodities, the republic's weight in the USSR national economy is generally lower than the Tadzhik area or population share in the Union total (0.6% and 1.2% respectively) (See Table A.2.). The few exceptions reflect Tadzhikistan's cotton

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2 1.0% in 1972. See Pravda (November 27), 1971.
3 In 1971, short-term, 0.9%; long-term, 0.4%. See "Data on the Development of the State Bank, USSR," Dengi i Kredit, 1971: 1.
4 For the 1960s, 0.6%; see Holubnychy, in Erich Goldhagen, Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1968).
specialization and the continuation of some of the traditional economic pursuits such as sericulture and sheep-breeding. The republic is second in the USSR in the production of raw cotton, fourth in the production of silk textiles, and sixth in the production of cotton textiles. It carries or exceeds its economic weight in production of only a few other commodities such as hosiery, vegetable fats, refrigerators, canned goods and wine. Light industry is more developed than heavy industry, but significant increases in absolute output figures in some branches of certain industries took place in the last decade: particularly in petroleum and natural gas extraction and in production of mineral fertilizers. Neither the fuel base nor hydroelectric potential of the republic is developed, however. (See Table A.3.).

For transportation, roads and truck freight are far more important than railroads and rail freight: in 1971 the length of the rail network in the Tadzhik SSR was approximately 160 miles and the length of hard-surface roads, 5270 miles, with rail freight of 4.1 million tons and truck

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>876</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
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<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>8700</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional economic development in Tadzhikistan has been very uneven. The Northern Ferghana valley constitutes the economic heartland of the republic, and industry has been concentrated in the two major cities: Dunshanbe, the capital, and Leninabad. Agricultural production is centered in the valleys, with cotton cultivated in the subtropical southern regions, particularly Bakhsh and Kafirnigan, and grain in the northern valleys and piedmont areas. In the post-1945 period the agricultural trend has been toward an increase in the area under cash crops (e.g., cotton) and in irrigated areas, with a proportional decrease in the area sown to grains. Area under fodder has also increased substantially.

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Table A.2.
Tadzhik SSR: Weight in the USSR National Economy, 1970
(percent of total USSR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Indicators:</th>
<th>Agricultural Indicators:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>electrical energy</td>
<td>no. of collective farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>petroleum</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural gas</td>
<td>no. of state farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coal</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fertilizers</td>
<td>no. of tractors</td>
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<tr>
<td>metal working lathes</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural machinery</td>
<td>sown area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cement</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>bricks</td>
<td>gross grain crop</td>
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<tr>
<td>cotton yarn</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>cotton textiles</td>
<td>gross cotton crop</td>
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<tr>
<td>silk textiles</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>knitted goods</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td>leather shoes</td>
<td>sown area</td>
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<td>home refrigerators</td>
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<td>furniture</td>
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<td>animal fats</td>
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<td>wine</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<td>meat production</td>
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<td>wool production</td>
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<th>Socio-Cultural Indicators:</th>
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<td>manpower</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>students in general schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>of all kinds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students in VUZ'Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientific workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doctors (all kinds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movie facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>books (total issue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newspapers (one issue)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tadzhik SSR - Population 0.6
Tadzhik SSR - Area 1.2

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1 Nar. khoz. 1972: 647.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrical energy (bill. kwh.)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum (1000 T.)</td>
<td>30.</td>
<td>20.</td>
<td>17.</td>
<td>181.0&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>192.</td>
<td>190.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas (mill. m&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>388.0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Fertilizers (1000 T.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>252.0&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>261.</td>
<td>308.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement (1000 T.)</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>134.2</td>
<td>287.4</td>
<td>371.0&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>941.</td>
<td>936.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks (mill. T.)</td>
<td>258.</td>
<td>371.0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Textiles (mill. M.)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>99.9&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk Textiles</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>6,037</td>
<td>25,747</td>
<td>43,193.0&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>44,500.</td>
<td>44,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiber Cotton (1000 T.)</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>235.0&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>252.</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Silk (T.)</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>233.</td>
<td>292.</td>
<td>322.0&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>355.</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosiery (mill. pairs)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>25.5&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Shoes (mill. pairs)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.1&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat (1000 T.)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>32.9&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Fats (1000 T.)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Fats (1000 T.)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>68.8&lt;sup&gt;o&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Turkmenia and Latvia.
<sup>b</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Georgia.
<sup>c</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Kirgizia.
<sup>d</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Latvia, where none are produced. In TSSR production started in 1969.
<sup>e</sup> Fourth republic from the bottom.
<sup>f</sup> Lowest in the USSR.
<sup>g</sup> Sixth place in the USSR after RSFSR, Ukraine, UzSSR, Estonia, Azerbaidzhan.
<sup>h</sup> Fourth place in the USSR after RSFSR, Ukraine, UzSSR.
<sup>i</sup> Second place in the USSR after Uzbekistan.
<sup>j</sup> Fourth place in the USSR after Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan.
<sup>k</sup> Ninth place in the USSR.
<sup>l</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Turkmenia.
<sup>m</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Turkmenia, Armenia and Georgia.
<sup>n</sup> Lowest in the USSR except for Turkmenia, Armenia and Georgia.
<sup>o</sup> Fifth in the USSR after RSFSR, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldavia.

The acreage under cotton in Tadzhikistan in 1970 was less than that for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but the Tadzhik cotton yield per acre was the highest in the USSR.\(^1\) Some of the Tadzhik cotton crop was of the fine long-fibre (Egyptian) variety.

Kolkhozy have been the main units of agricultural production,\(^2\) but the number of sovkhоз and sovkhoz acreage have been increasing.\(^3\) In 1970 there were 282 kolkhozy and 89 sovkhoz in the Tadzhik SSR.\(^4\) Since 1940, there has been a trend towards consolidation of kolkhozy into larger and more economically efficient entities.\(^5\) The total of mechanized power in agriculture in 1970, in thousands of horsepower, was 2858, with 1771 in kolkhozy.\(^6\) Mechanization of work in 1969 ranged from 74% in cotton, 50% in vegetable cultivation, to 22% in cotton picking. Livestock work, (except for sheep shearing, 89% mechanized) was 90% non-mechanized.\(^7\) Livestock figures have shown a steady increase since 1940, with a 1970 total of 973,000 heads of cattle, 2,500,000 heads of sheep and goats, 43,500 horses and 61,600 pigs.\(^8\) Still, these totals were below the combined numbers of sheep and goats, cattle and horses in 1928, prior to collectivization.\(^9\)

---

1\(^{\text{Nar. khoz. 1970: 304, 319.}}\)
2\(^{\text{In 1969 the total kolkhoz area was 18,294,542 acres (of which 1,376,594 were sown), the total sovkhоз area, 4,629,665 acres (of which 333,585 acres were sown). Nar. khoz. TSSR 1969: 96, 99, 110.}}\)
3\(^{\text{From 21 in 1940 to 78 in 1969. Nar. khoz. TSSR 1969: 110.}}\)
4\(^{\text{Nar. khoz. 1970: 388, 396.}}\)
5\(^{\text{From 3093 kolkhozy with an average of 64 households, 612 acres sown area, and 348 heads of livestock (208 sheep and goats), per kolkhoz in 1940, to 302 kolkhozy with an average of 771 households, 4562 acres sown area, and 5247 heads of livestock (3897 sheep and goats), per kolkhoz in 1969. (Nar. khoz. TSSR 1961: 107-108). The USSR average of households per kolkhoz in the same year was 427 (i.e., almost half of the Tadzhik figure), but average acreage was almost double the Tadzhik figure (413 acres). Nar. khoz. 1970: 388, 396.}}\)
6\(^{\text{Nar. khoz. 1970: 373. Statistics in Nar. khoz. TSSR, 1969 reveal average figures. In 1969 there was an average of 47 tractors, 23 trucks and 7 cotton combines per kolkhoz (pp. 107-108), and an average of 55 tractors, 26 trucks and 3 grain combines per sovkhoz (p. 110).}}\)
7\(^{\text{Nar. khoz. TSSR, 1969: 126.}}\)
8\(^{\text{Ibid.: 111. There were no pigs in Tadzhikistan prior to collectivization.}}\)
9\(^{\text{Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 58.}}\)
The 1971 "average annual number of workers and employees" (including state farm workers and workers in agricultural enterprises, but not kolkhozniki) in Tadzhikistan constituted 20.6% of the total population.\(^1\) The average annual number of working kolkhozniki constituted 8.8% of the population. Women constituted 38% of the total for the workers and employees category, and 50% of working-age kolkhozniki. The share of women in the former category was the lowest in the USSR; the Union average was 51%.\(^2\)

### Table A.4.

#### Tadzhik SSR: Labor Force 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Workers and Employees</th>
<th>620,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of these:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>422,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women in workers/employees category</td>
<td>238,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the average annual number of kolkhozniki</td>
<td>264,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of these, women</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Workers and Employees</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of these:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industry</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communications</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal economy</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>health and social security</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education and culture</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science and services</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credit and social insurance</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state and social organizations</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\)38% of the total  
\(^{b}\)Only Turkmenia had lower numbers of industrial production personnel. Nar. khoz. 1970: 159.  

\(^{1}\)Calculated on the basis of the population of 3,000,000 as per Nar. khoz. 1972: 644, as compared with 14% in 1956 (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 59).  
The labor force constitutes a major problem area in Tadzhikistan as it does throughout Central Asia. The republic has lower labor participation rates, lower mobility, lower levels of urbanization, and a lower share in non-agricultural state sector employment than most other Soviet republics. Labor surpluses are rapidly building up among the Asian population of the republic (see Section A-IV); most Asian labor remains in the countryside and few people emigrated outside the republic, because of lack of knowledge of the Russian language and lack of skills. The overall labor picture in the republic is further complicated by poor organization of work, high shares of manual labor, high labor turnover, low productivity, and the immigration of skilled Russian workers. Speaking at a 1969 plenum of the Tadzhik Party CC, First Secretary Rasulov complained that there were surpluses of labor at the countryside, while sharp shortage of labor existed in industry and construction.

Industrial labor productivity statistics for Tadzhikistan during 1940-1970 reveal that it had the lowest productivity increase of all Soviet republics during that period. Using 100 as the index for 1940, Tadzhikistan was 257 in 1970, as compared to an average of 492 for the USSR as a whole. It remained the lowest with 1960 as the base year, but moved up to third place from the bottom (ahead of Moldavia and Uzbekistan) with 1965 as the base year. No corresponding data was available for kolkhoz labor productivity, but its failure to improve was criticised at successive Tadzhik Party congresses in 1966 and 1971.

While no national breakdown is available on urban-rural distribution of the labor force, ample evidence exists that Asian labor was significantly underrepresented in urban and industrial employment. The CC CPSU Resolution

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1 See Feschbach, 1973.
2 Pravda (Feb. 13) 1969.
on the work of the Tadzhik Party in 1969 revealed that "there are notably few
Tadzhiks among the industrial production personnel at enterprises in the
chemical industry, machine building and metal processing", Tadzhiks and
Uzbeks constituted only 30% of the labor force at the construction of the
Nurek Hydroelectric Station (Tadzhiks 25%) and 25% of the labor force in
the Dushanbe Integrated Textile Mills (Tadzhiks 15%). The central problem
of the need to "form qualified labor cadres ... among the indigenous population",
was restated in almost identical words in the CC Resolution, quoted above, the
Tadzhik Party Plenum following it, and by First Secretary Rasulov at the 17th

1_{Partiinaia zhizn} (January), 1969: 4.
3_{Pravda} (February 13), 1969; _Kommunist Tadzhikistana_ (February 19), 1971.
Tadzhikistan - Economy - 9

Table A.5.
Selected Standard of Living Indicators for the Tadzhik SSR, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>social investment per inhabitant</td>
<td>172.8 rubles a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average work week in industry</td>
<td>40.81 hours b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average monthly wage of workers and employees</td>
<td>112.9 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>money income per kolkhoz household per year</td>
<td>1,830 rubles c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of doctors</td>
<td>4,559 d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of middle-level medical personnel</td>
<td>14,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of hospitals</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of hospital beds</td>
<td>27,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of doctors per 10,000 people</td>
<td>15.7 e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of middle-level medical personnel per 10,000 people</td>
<td>50.9 f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of hospital beds per 10,000 people</td>
<td>95.4 g</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b Compared with 116.9 rubles, the average in the USSR national economy. Nar. khoz. 1970: 19.
c USSR average money income was 1870 rubles/household. Nar. khoz. 1970: 384.
d 60% were women.
e Lowest in the USSR. The next lowest (19) was in Uzbekistan and Moldavia. The USSR average was 26/10,000. Nar. khoz. 1970: 690.
f Lowest in the USSR. USSR average 84/10,000. Nar. khoz 1970: 694.
g USSR average was 106.2/10,000. Ibid.

Tadzhikistan did not exist as a national unit prior to 1924, but the Tadzhiks—the only Iranian group in Soviet Central Asia—share an ancient history with other people in an area that for many centuries has been the crossroad of cultures, with irrigation and trade as the hallmarks of its prosperity. Archaeology dates settlements there to 3000 B.C., but Bactria and Sogd (6th–4th centuries B.C.) provide the first recorded history of the Tadzhiks' Iranian ancestors. The history of the Tadzhiks has been vitally affected by the three milestones in the pre-1917 history of Central Asia: the 7th century Arab conquest; the 13th century Mongol invasion; and the 19th century Russian conquest.

The political power of Arab caliphates was ephemeral, but the Islam they brought with them is still today the dominant unifying cultural and social force in the area. Under the impact of Islamic culture and the Pax Arabiā local dynasties flourished. Of these the most important was the Samanid Dynasty (903–999), the rule of which ushered in a high period of prosperity, power and culture in medieval Central Asia. Bukhara, the Samanid capital, became a great center of learning in the Arab world. In the Tadzhik historiography the Samanid period is the period when the Tadzhik nation and the Tadzhik (Farsi) language were first formed, the Samanid Empire is the one expression of the Tadzhik political statehood prior to the Soviet period. The great medieval Persian literature developed there in the ninth and tenth centuries (as represented by poets Rudaki and Firdousi), and the scientific discoveries of Avicenna are regarded as the Tadzhik heritage; Eastern Iranians (the Tadzhiks) are regarded as the leading and generating influence in the subsequent development of Persian culture.

The 13th-century Mongol invasion destroyed the great Perso-Arabic civilization in Central Asia and for the next five centuries cut the area off from Western influences. The Iranians dispersed and mixed with successive waves of Turkic invaders from the East; the Uzbeks, an offshoot of the Golden Horde, came into their present area in the fifteenth century. By the 18th century the settlement area of Central Asia was divided
between independent and warring Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, Hissar and Badakhshan.

The Russian eastward expansion reached Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, meeting British expansion from India and Afghanistan. As a result of conquest and treaty-making, Russian Turkestan (under direct Russian military administration) was established in 1867; a Russian Protectorate was established over Bukhara in 1868 and over Khiva in 1873; Kokand became the Ferghana Province of Turkestan in 1876; and the Turkmen were subdued in 1884. The demarcation of the Russian and British spheres of influence left the Panmirs west of the Sarykol range and north of the river Panj to the Russians. Tadzhik historiography of the 1970s considers the extension of Russian influence into Central Asia a progressive phenomenon, as it brought people there in contact with the historically superior capitalist system and eventually with the progressive influence of the Russian proletariat.

Under Russian rule Turkestan began to develop economically and acquired a dynamic and politically privileged minority of Russian settlers. Moslem masses, living within a traditional and by then largely ossified social system, had little contact with the Russians and were little touched by the growing Russian revolutionary fervor of the early 20th century. The only Moslem reformers (known as dzhadidists, or, in Bukhara, "young Bukharans", were equally unwelcome to the Russians as to the Moslem establishment. The outbreak of the First World War was marked in Turkestan by sporadic Moslem resistance to labor conscription in 1916 (see in Soviet historiography as a major uprising). When the revolution came in 1917, its various stages were fought out by the Russians among themselves, with the Tashkent Soviet gaining ascendancy in October 1917. The Soviet was hostile to Moslem requests for autonomy, put forth first by a group of liberal Moslems and subsequently by a conservative-dominated Kokand government (which fell in 1918). The Soviets' "colonial" attitude towards Moslems and suppressive policies generated a conservative reaction and armed resistance, which became known as the Basmachi movement. In Bukhara an abortive coup by Young Bukharans in 1918 was followed by an armed conquest from Tashkent in 1920; the Emir fled to Eastern Bukhara (present-day

1The history of the Basmachi movement is summarized briefly in the chapter on the Kirgiz in this volume: Section A-III. p. 3, footnote 1.
central Tadzhikistan), which then became the center of Basmachi resistance for another year, until a Red Army pacification campaign came to a successful completion in 1921.

Following the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Bolshevik policy in Turkestan became conciliatory towards the Moslems, and much of the traditional way of life was resumed, including land tenure, operation of religious courts [Shariat], and free trade exchange. The influx of Russian cadres was accompanied by a genuine effort on the part of the Party to educate indigenous cadres (the so-called korenizatsia). Nevertheless it took the following five years to finally overcome guerilla resistance in Tadzhikistan (there were two subsequent unsuccessful short-lived efforts in 1929 and 1931), and another five years after that to overcome peasant resistance to the new social and economic policies. Pacification was carried out by the Red Army and Russian-dominated militia units; collectivization, largely by Russian officials, workers, brigades, etc., all of which left a legacy of lasting bitterness.

The Tadzhik ASSR was established in 1924 within Uzbekistan, as a part of the process of national delimitation of Turkestan. At the same time the Basmachi movement in Tadzhikistan revived. It was finally subdued in 1926, as a result of strong punitive measures combined with economic concessions to the peasants. First elections to the Soviets took place in 1926, and formal governmental structure replaced a temporary network of revolutionary committees formed in 1925. Following 1926 the Party's efforts were directed at fostering social change (through the spread of mass education and the liberation of women and the poor from their traditional bondage), and collectivization including large-scale cultivation of cotton. Peasant resistance made it impossible, however, to implement land and water nationalization decrees until the early 1930s. In 1929 the Tadzhik ASSR was transformed into a union republic.

Changes at the all-union level, the consolidation of power by Stalin, and forced collectivization and industrialization caused an increase in
resistance to these policies on the part of the local cadres in Central Asia. In Tadzhikistan the resistance resulted in a number of purges. There was a purge of the state apparatus in 1927-1928, and of the Party apparatus in 1930-1931. The bitterly resisted collectivization campaign completed in 1934 ended with a major purge of the so-called "bourgeois-nationalist elements" in the Tadzhik political apparatus. The 1934 purge affected 66% of the total Tadzhik Party membership, inclusive of the top leaders. The Tadzhik leadership group purged in 1934 has never been rehabilitated and it is still referred to as bourgeois-nationalist. The post-1956 rehabilitation did, however, exonerate the successive Tadzhik leaders removed for "bourgeois-nationalism" in the second major wave of purges in 1937-1938, this time a part of the all-union purge of the "Right Opposition." By the end of the 1930s the Tadzhik political apparatus was virtually denuded of local cadres and was run outright by the Russians sent out by the central Party and state authorities.

Economically, the period was dominated by efforts to develop large scale cultivation of cotton, and to build a cotton processing and light industry base in the republic. Direct control by the Russian cadres continued throughout the war years, when the Tadzhik economy was redirected towards the war effort and waves of deportees (including large contingents of Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans) were resettled in the republics. New settlement policy also affected mountain Tadzhiks, many of whom were resettled in cotton-growing valleys, a policy which has been continued through the post-1945 period.

The end of World War II marked a new period of economic development, (this time with greater relative emphasis on the development of an industrial base) and cultural Sovietization. Soviet-educated Tadzhik cadres were again promoted within the apparatus and assumed formal directive posts, with the Russian cadres relegated to behind-the-scene, control positions. It is interesting to note the relative stability of tenure of the Tadzhik Party first secretaries since 1937; the average length of tenure

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2 See Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: Ch. 4.
Tadzhikistan - History - 5

is 9 years, and the current First Secretary, Dhabar Rasulov, has already been in office for 12 years, as has the current Chairman of the Council of Ministers. (The Party's Second Secretary, however, was replaced in December 1970.) The Tadzhik political administration is frequently a target of all-union criticism for economic shortcomings, as well as failures in implementation of social and cultural policies. A major scandal rocked Tadzhikistan in 1961, with the Tadzhik first secretary, the Russian second secretary and a number of other leaders removed for alleged abuses of power in cadres policy, economic theft, falsification of economic reports, and efforts at by-passing central controls. The Tadzhik Party was the one republican party singled out for special criticism following the 23rd Congress of CPSU, in a December 1968 Central Committee CPSU Resolution which castigated the Tadzhiks for economic shortcomings and poor educational policies.4

1Protopopov (Russian), 1937-1945; Gafurov (Tadzhik), 1945-1956; Ul'dahabaev (Tadzhik), 1956-1961; Rasulov (Tadzhik), 1961 to the present.
2Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: Ch. 5.
3"O rabote TsK Kompartii Tadhikistana po vypolneniiu reshenii XXIII s"ezda KPSS," Partiiinaya zhizn (January), 1969: 1: 3-8.
IV. Demography

Between the 1959 and 1970 population censuses, the total population of the Tadzhik republic increased from 1,980,547 to 2,899,602. Tadzhikistan is still one of the least urbanized republic in the USSR, although the percentage of urban population has grown considerably under the Soviet rule. It is interesting to note that it increased only slightly between 1959 and 1970. The increase in the percentage of urban population in the total has been as follows:

- 1913 - 9%
- 1939 - 17%
- 1959 - 33%
- 1970 - 37%
- 1971 - 38%

The increase in urban population between 1959 and 1969 was mainly due to natural increase, the reorganization of villages into urban-type settlements, and migration to the cities of "rural dwellers of the republic and other regions of the country." No distinction is made between migration from within the republic and from without. Exact immigration statistics are not readily available from Soviet sources. Estimates compiled by Soviet and Western demographers, however, indicate that almost all urban immigration in Tadzhikistan in the 1959-1970 period came from outside the republic.

Soviet demographer V.V. Pokshishevskii estimated that between January 15, 1959 and January 1, 1968 net in-migration into the Tadzhik SSR was 161,000 people; a Western demographer's estimate for the 1959-1970 period came to 129,000.

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1 Narkhoz TSSR 1970: 286.
4 For methods of calculation and more detail, see Leedy, 1973: 32-33.
Tadzhikistan - Demography - 2

The rural population in the Tadzhik SSR is predominantly Asian in ethnic composition (Tadzhik and Uzbek and others) while the urban population is dominated by the European migrants into the republic.¹

The general urban population distribution is as follows:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1970 as a percentage of 1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total urban population</td>
<td>646,178</td>
<td>1,076,700</td>
<td>166.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Dushanbe</td>
<td>227,137</td>
<td>373,885</td>
<td>164.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raions under republic's jurisdiction</td>
<td>162,156</td>
<td>334,685</td>
<td>206.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leninabad Oblast</td>
<td>246,892</td>
<td>353,976</td>
<td>143.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBAO (Khorog city)</td>
<td>8,218</td>
<td>12,295</td>
<td>149.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Dushanbe the Tadzhiks were only 24.2% of the population, compared with 42% for the Russians (1970).³

Leninabad Oblast (the Ferghana valley part of the republic) and the city of Dushanbe have comprised the bulk of the urban areas of the republic. It should be noted, however, that the weight of these two units in the total of the republic's urban population decreased from 73% to 67% in the last intercensal period. The largest increase in the urban population was shown in the raions under republican jurisdiction. These trends indicate acceleration in the industrialization and industrial construction in the area of central Tadzhikistan. Still, the distribution of urban population has remained extremely uneven. Average population density in the republic per square mile (in 1971), was 54.1. It ranged, however, from 95.6 in Leninabad Oblast to 4.15 in the GBAO.⁴

Along with other Central Asian republics the Tadzhik SSR has a much higher birth rate than the national average. In 1971 the republic had the highest crude birth rate in the Soviet Union, 36.8 per 1000 population. Unlike birth rates for all the other Soviet republics, the Tadzhik rate did not

decline between 1960 and 1971. With the high birth rates and low and steady death rate, the natural increase rate in the republic increased from 28.4 per 1000 in 1960 to 31.1 per 1000 in 1971, the highest of all the union republics. The average annual rate of natural increase in the republic between 1959 and 1970 was 3.9% (as compared with the average annual rate for the USSR as a whole of 1.3%). Another Western source reported that the average number of children per woman in Tadzhikistan in 1970 was 5.3.

The extremely high birth rate was reflected in the age structure of the republic; more than one half of the population in 1970 was below 20 years of age, and people below 45 years of age constituted 84% of the population. The general picture was as follows (age groups as percent of total):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-19 years of age</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-44 years of age</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-69 years of age</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 70 years of age</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High birth rates were characteristic of the indigenous population and were felt predominantly in the rural areas, creating huge labor surpluses, the major impact of which will be felt in the next decade. Given the so-far negligible rural-urban flow of the Asian population, and the concentration of non-Asian population in urban areas, Asian labor surplus and the increasing numbers of the younger indigenous population in the republic—one which is not immediately absorbed into the socio-occupational structure—promises to become a major problem.

The problem has already been reflected in the occupational distribution of the population, shown below for 1970 (as percent of total population):

1Leedy, 1973: 25.
2Ibid.
4Nar. khoz. TSSR 1970: 289. The third column does not add up to 100 in the source.
Employed (except those in private subsidiary agriculture)\(^1\) 34.6\(^2\)

Pensioners 7.8

Stipend holders 1.3

Dependents (including children, those in domestic work and families of kolkhoz members, workers and employees engaged in private subsidiary agriculture) 56.0

Other means of subsistence 0.3

The largest ethnic group in the republic in 1970 were the Tadzhiks (56.2% of the total), followed by the Uzbeks and then the Russians. It should be noted here that during 1959-1970 the high Tadzhik birth rate has been reflected in a reversal of the trend of the preceding 30 years for the Tadzhiks to decline as a percentage of the republic population. Correspondingly, the former steady increase in the weight of the Russian group has been reversed. The fourth and fifth largest groups in the population (the Tatars and the Germans) were World War II deportees.

No ethnic statistics are published as a rule for the Party and government bodies, except occasionally for the membership of the Party as a whole and for the general membership of the Soviets. After 1945, general membership in the Soviets on the whole reflected the ethnic composition in the population; in the Party the Asian groups were underrepresented and the European groups overrepresented. The ethnic breakdown of the Party membership for 1962 was Tadzhiks, 45% of the total; Uzbeks, 16%; and Russians, 25%.

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\(^1\) Those employed in a domestic capacity or in private subsidiary agriculture constituted 11% of the total.

\(^2\) This category included 78% of all those of working age (86.8% of those of working age if students were added).

\(^3\) Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 100.
It should be noted here that the highest percentage of Russians in the total Party membership in Tadzhikistan occurred during the final period of the Stalinist era; between 1948 and 1953 Russians constituted 29-30% of total membership (approximately triple their weight in the total population), a higher percentage than in the period immediately following the two great purges in the 1930s. By 1954 the percentage had declined, and Russians constituted about a quarter of the membership from 1954 through 1962. In 1966 the total Party membership was 73,283,1 and in 1971, 86,732 (i.e., 3% of the population), but no ethnic breakdown data were given.2

No direct information is available on the ethnic composition of the governing bodies of the Party or state apparatus, but differences between the European and Asian names allow for for an approximate calculation of the distribution of the indigenous and European cadres. In the late Stalinist period a pattern of distribution was clearly visible; the weight of the European cadres was considerably higher and that of that local cadres considerably lower than their respective weight in the population. The Russian weight rose with the importance of a given body. At the same time all the representative positions (such as heads of Party and government bodies) were staffed by indigenous communists), the control positions (e.g., second in command in both bodies, control of cadres distribution, security heads and heads of certain key ministries) were in the hands of Europeans.3 During 1948-1956 the distribution of cadres in the Central Committee was Europeans, 28%; Asians, 72%. In the Bureau of the Central Committee, the average distribution was 50:50.4 Following 1956 the ratio of Europeans in the Central Committee declined somewhat, stabilizing at about one-fourth of the membership (24% of the total in 1961 and 1963, increasing to 27% in 1971).5 In the Central Committee Bureau, the European share in the membership (including members and candidate members) fluctuated from 28% in 1958 to 35% in 1961, 25% in 1963

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1 Partii aya zhizn' (March), 1966: 6: 55.
2 First Secretary Rasulov gave these figures at the 17th Congress of the Tadzhik Party. Kommunist Tadzhikistana (February 19), 1971.
3 See Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: chs. 4 and 5.
4 Ibid.
5 Kommunist Tadzhikistana (September 24), 1961, (December 27) 1963, and (February 20) 1971.
28% in 1958, to 35% in 1961, 25% in 1963 (and 58% under Kruschev's bifurcation scheme),¹ and 38% in 1971.²

Since 1945 the Tadzhik Party First Secretary has always been a Tadzhik and the second secretary a Russian or an Ukrainian. Similarly, the Chairman of the republic's Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers have always been Tadzhiks and their first deputies invariably Europeans. During 1948-1956, most heads of ministries were of local origin, while most of their deputies were European. While no similar information was available for 1971, it was reported that Slavs constituted 31.9% of the ministries' staffs and of committees attached to the Council of Ministers, including the senior post in the Committee of State Security.³

Though no ethnic breakdowns for the Tadzhik CP are available, the Soviets published data about the Tadzhiks in the CPSU: 46,593 in 1967, 0.4% of the total membership (up from 0.3% in 1961). The Tadzhiks' representation in the CPSU was less than half their weight in the Soviet population (0.88%).⁴

²Kommunist Tadzhikistana (February 19), 1971.
An Ethnic Breakdown of the Population of Tadzhikistan (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>absolute number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>absolute number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>620.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>901.4</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>883.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>353.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>353.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Within 1926 boundaries.

Sources: For 1926-1959, Rakowska-Hamamoto, 1970: 42.
V. Culture

The Tadzhiks now claim a distinct and ancient cultural heritage from the 10th century Perso-Arabic Samanid Empire. The crystallization of the claim took place as a result of the development of the Soviet nationality policy after 1929; the heritage, nevertheless, forms a part of the general Central Asian heritage which, in recent times, survived in the Emirate of Bukhara.

Most authorities agree that centuries of common historical development and religion resulted in the development of a Central Asian cultural heritage which combined Persian, Arabic and Turkic elements, and that there was no cultural differentiation between the Tadzhiks and the Uzbeks of the plains, except that Tadzhiks spoke Farsi, and the Uzbeks, Central Asian Turkic. The elite of the Emirate spoke both languages and were also familiar with literary Arabic. This is not to say that differences did not exist between the settlers of the populous valleys (Uzbeks and Tadzhiks) and the Iranian groups in the mountains, such as the Galcha of the mountains of central Tadzhikistan and the Western Pamir groups (Iagnob, Iazgulem, Rushan, Shugnan, Vakhan, and Vanch), who led an isolated existence and spoke Iranian dialects, some of which were significantly different from the Farsi of the plains. While most plains Tadzhiks considered themselves indistinguishable from the Uzbeks, mountain Tadzhiks harbored a degree of antagonism against their Uzbek overlords in the principalities of Western Bukhara. Mountain Tadzhik differences did not seem significant in the development of the culture of the Emirate as they were marginal to the mainstream of cultural developments. Tadzhiks, like the Uzbeks, are Sunni Moslem (unlike the Iranians who are Shia Moslem); some of the Pamir Tadzhiks were Ismailites.

Contrary to official Soviet claims, a significant cultural revival took place in Central Asia in the second part of the 19th century (inclusive of the Bukhara Emirate, despite the repressive attitude of its Emir and its conservative clergy), which produced an important intellectual elite, conversant with Persian, Arabic and Turkic literary languages and the poetry, theology, philosophy, history and geography of the Moslem world. This cultural elite was interested in moderniza-

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1See works by Alexandre Bennigsen, Edward Allworth, Geoffrey Wheeler, and V.V. Barthol'd.
tion and emphasized the need to educate the youth. The dzhadidist reform movement formed a part of this elite. Some of its members, such as Sadriddin Aini (officially regarded as the founder of the "Soviet Tadzhik literature") made a successful transition into the Soviet period. The present day cultural elite of Tadzhikistan traces direct roots to this group.

The 1924/25 national delimitation of Soviet Central Asia following ethnic boundaries made it necessary to differentiate among the particular national-cultural heritages of major ethnic groups. For the Tadzhiks this resulted in the revival of the Samanid heritage and in the differentiation between their Persian roots and the Turkic heritage of the Uzbeks.

The three sources of modern Tadzhik literature are the classic literature, oral poetic tradition, and Russian and Soviet literature.

The classic literature included the poetry of the first classical period (10th through 15th century) including the works of famous Persian poets: Abulkhasan Rudaki (d. 941), Abu'l-Qawim Firdousi (934-1025) and his epic poem Shkah Name [The Book of Kings]; Omar Khayyam (1040-1123), Hafiz (d. 1389) and others. Present cultural policy permits only the progressive elements of classical literature (atheism, anti-despotism, humanism, praise of labor, struggle with oppressors, etc.) to be revived, while "reactionary" elements (feudalism, religious elements, erotica, etc.) are suppressed. Oral poetic tradition includes the Iranian version of the ancient Central-Asian-Middle Eastern epos, Gurguli, and also folk songs, proverbs, and satirical plays, transmitted by itinerant professional singers called hafiz. These are promoted, subject to the same constraints as the promotion of classical literature. Russian models include both Russian literature (Gogol, Pushkin, Tolstoy, Chernyshevsky, etc.) and Soviet literature; in the latter the two models which Tadzhik writers are particularly asked to imitate are Maxim Gorkii and Vladimir Maiakovskii.

Traditional Central Asian literature was synonymous with poetry. Modern Tadzhik literature places great stress on the development of prose, particularly dramaturgy, literary criticism, and children's literature.

1 Sadridden Murad Khaja Zada Ayniy, 1878-1954.
3 See section A-III on history and Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: Ch. 7.
The two major representatives of the new Tadzhik literature in the 1920s were Aini and a Persian revolutionary, AbulQasim Lahuti (1887-1957). Numerous other writers were found too nationalistic by the Party and were purged; the development of the new Soviet literature began in the 1930s. In the current period literati represent a large group, including poets and prose writers, among whom the most prominent are Mirzo Tursun-zade (b. 1911), long-time chariman of the Union of Tadzhik Writers (since 1946) and the major spokesman in the republic on cultural matters, as well as its representative in contacts with other republics and foreign countries, and Mirsaid Mirshakar (b. 1912).

As reflected in the Party press major shortcomings of the Soviet Tadzhik literature have been: idealization of and escapism into the past, failure to depict properly the "Soviet reality" and to develop themes of the new life, reluctance to develop new genres not employed in traditional literature, and the promotion of cultural isolationism.

It appears that the Tadzhik and Uzbek masses, still largely confined to rural areas, have responded little to the development of new cultural themes, and largely continue to live life circumscribed by traditional customs. This is attested to by the continuous and repeated criticism in the press of the survival of old customs and attitudes, particularly in reference to religious observance and attitude toward women. The elite's reaction (the size of which has been growing rapidly because of demographic factors as well as the spread of educational opportunities) has been selective, accepting modernization and accompanying opportunities, but also emphasizing the traditional heritage as means of new national legitimization. Even among the elite the survival of the customary way of life is high, and a distinction is made between "public" life, which is modern, and "private" life which still conforms significantly to traditional norms. All data available indicate, that the Tadzhiks (and other Asians) tend to live as a totally separate community from, and have little contact with, the Russians and other European elements in the republic.1

The latest cultural policy in Tadzhikistan has centered on efforts to develop a new historiography, selectively to revive classical Persian literature, to develop and modernize the Farsi language, and to promote national literature and arts. One aim of this policy is to endow the Tadzhiks with new legitimacy as bearers of the ancient Samanid leading political and cultural role in the Persian-speaking world. Another is to legitimize the Russian conquest as the means through which Tadzhiks were able to progress directly from feudalism to socialism and to assume a modern national existence within the Soviet family of nations.

The Tadzhiks' reaction appears to have been ambivalent: on the one hand they have embraced the revival and development of the ancient heritage as means of developing a separate national identity; on the other they have resisted the Soviet and Russian elements which, under the Party policy, are an integral part of this revival.
VI. External Relations

The Tadzhiks belong to the group of Soviet nationalities which can be characterized as the "stay-at-homes," not only in terms of moving among the union republics (let alone abroad), but also in terms of moving among localities within the republic. This lack of geographical mobility is due to several factors: compactness of settlement; strong identification with traditional cultural patterns of life which make Tadzhiks feel uncomfortable in different cultural environments, and by and large, lack of the knowledge of the Russian language and of marketable skills. As a group the Tadzhiks tend to cluster in rural areas; while their settlement in the cities has increased, even there it tends to cluster. Numerous data in local papers indicate that when coming for employment into a modern environment they tend to feel uncomfortable and eventually return to their original localities. Language and education data (see Sections B-I and B-III of this chapter) confirm the lack of skills and of Russian language facility.

a. Contacts with Other Ethnic Groups Within USSR

By and large, the Tadzhik masses have little, if any, contacts with other national groups, except with the Uzbeks, and other Asians such as the Turkmen and Kirgiz (depending on locality). As far as can be determined there is no movement of Tadzhik labor outside the republic's boundaries. There is ethnic intermixture within the republic at construction sites and industrial centers, but, apparently, little cultural exchange.

The Tadzhik elite also tends to stay within the republic, with a few notable exceptions such as Bobodzhan Gafurovich Gafurov, ex-First Secretary of the Tadzhik Party, 1946-1956, a historian and a member of the AN SSSR, and Mirzo Tursun-zade. This lack of mobility of the Tadzhik elite is in part a result of the past nationality policy which encouraged the development of each nationality within its own area and culture (particularly in Central Asia after 1924 where the aim was to break the pan-Islamic unity of Turkestan), and in part their preoccupation with building their own identity (a by-product of that policy). The elite, however, maintain numerous inter-ethnic contacts both within the republic, and within
Central Asia as a whole and, to a lesser degree, with the other Soviet republics. In the 1950s and 1960s there has been official encouragement of "exchange of experiences" among the elites of the various republics. This, however, takes the largely ritualized form of meetings between groups from the republics, such as meetings of cultural groups (exchanges of cultural delegations, fairs of one republic in another, etc.), in which the Tadzhik delegates participate. The same applies to the exchange of Komsomol delegations, not only among the republics, but among the localities of different republics. In the case of Tadzhikistan, most exchanges take place with the Uzbek republic. As far as can be determined, very few Tadzhik Party and government cadres ever serve outside the republic, although Uzbek cadres are sometimes posted in Tadzhikistan, in addition to numerous European cadres.

b. Contacts with Foreign Countries

There was virtually no exchange with foreign countries prior to 1956 and the inauguration of the policy of "peaceful coexistence." However, in line with the policy of the Tadzhiks pursuing their ancient "leading role," some cultural activists visited neighboring countries. For example, Mirzo Tursun-zade, standard-bearer of the new Tadzhik culture, visited British India in 1947 (or early 1948), and Pakistan in 1949.

Since 1956, however, there has been an inauguration of contacts with the Third World, and particularly with Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Iran. These took the shape primarily of exchanges of delegations - of all kinds, but mostly cultural. While not on a major foreign circuit like Tashkent, Dushanbe has been visited by numerous foreign delegations. Members of the Tadzhik political and cultural elite also go abroad; here again the two most prominent individuals are Gafurov (who no longer lives in the republic) and Mirzo Tursun-zade. Some Tadzhiks also are included in foreign aid missions to foreign countries, some are allowed to go on pilgrimages to the holy places of Islam. In addition to delegations' exchanges, Tadzhiks can listen to foreign broadcasts in Persian, and neighboring countries can receive Tadzhik broadcasts (if in Persian or Uzbek).

It is impossible to determine the existence and/or frequency of illegal border crossing, although some undoubtedly exist, especially in the mountainous areas. Some early information indicates that gold for the Agha Khan has been
collected in the Pamir; some references also were made to the crossing of the Panj on inflated goat skins. Illegal contacts are made difficult by the Party policy of systematic resettlement of mountain kishlaks into the valleys (started in the 1930s, this continued in the 1950s and 1960s) and the activities of the border guards. Numerous refugees from the old Bukhara live in Afghanistan, and some contacts are undoubtedly continued.

Contacts with Third World countries, and particularly those of the Middle East and southwest Asia, have been important in the light of Soviet foreign policy and also in view of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the Chinese attitude as the champion of the rights of Soviet Asians. It appears, however, that the frequency of contacts may have diminished in the early 1970s.
TADZHIKISTAN AND THE TADZHIKS

PART B

Media
I. Language Data

The Tadzhik (Farsi) language is unlike any other major language spoken in the Soviet Union; it is an Iranian language and very close to Persian. There are basically three official languages in Tadzhikistan: Tadzhik, the titular language, Uzbek, the language of the second major group, and Russian, the common Soviet language. For all practical purposes (as can be seen from the statistics below), Russian is the language of political, administrative, and economic activity, except at the local (i.e., rural) level. In localities with concentrations of other indigenous minorities, such as Kirgiz and Turkmen, their languages are also used locally for official purposes. The Tadzhik language, originally written in the Arabic alphabet, has been written in the Cyrillic alphabet since 1940 (as are all other languages used in the republic).

The multilingual character of the republic and its people is illustrated by the language statistics provided by the two population censuses (see Table B.1.). Each of the major Asian indigenous groups (Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Kirgiz) showed extremely high adherence to its national language as its native language (above 98% of the total), and correspondingly very low fluency in Russian (only 16% of the Tadzhiks spoke Russian, and fewer of the other three groups). It is interesting to note that in each case, the percentage of members of each group who used their national language increased between 1959 and 1970. No information was available on the change in the percentage in each group who spoke Russian, but it is unlikely that this percentage has increased.

The other two Asian groups, not native to the area—Kazakhs and the deported Tatars—showed a higher degree of assimilation into the Russian language. With the Kazakhs, the assimilation was high only in comparison
Table B.1.

Languages Spoken by Major Ethnic Groups in the Tadzhik SSR

1959 and 1970
(in percentage of the total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population in Tadzhik SSR:</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regard own national language as native language</strong></td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of this:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Nar. khoz. TSSR 1970: 293.*
with indigenous groups. The Tatars on the other hand, showed the second highest degree of fluency in Russian among the non-Russian ethnic groups (71% of the total). For both groups, the percentage of those who regard their national language as their native language decreased between the two censuses; their fluency in Russian was also likely to have increased in this period.

Virtually all the Russians in the Tadzhik republic regarded Russian as their native language, and there was no change in the intercensal period. Only 4% of the Russian population knew any other Soviet language fluently. Thus, Russian was the only language of communication for the Russians in the republic. Therefore, they virtually could not communicate with at least 85% of the members of indigenous ethnic groups, including the titular nationality, except through interpreters. Given the high concentration of Russians in the political, administrative, and economic hierarchy and among professionals, specialists, and skilled labor, the Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and others who did not know Russian (a substantial majority), could not, in fact, enter and/or ascend within the socio-economic and political structure of the republic. Language data also indicate that the modern Tadzhik political and cultural elite in the early 1970s could not have been larger than approximately 15% of their national group, as the membership in the elite (even cultural) was predicated on their knowledge of the Russian language.

Other European groups in the Tadzhik population showed a relatively high degree of assimilation into the Russian language, especially the Jews, among whom only 20% regarded a Jewish language as their native language in 1970 (a decline of 3% from 1959); only 50% of the Jewish group were fluent in Russian, indicating assimilation also into other languages. (It is puzzling that data indicate that only 10% of the Jewish group was fluent in other Soviet languages, leaving some 20% unaccounted for in terms of fluency in any language.)
The Germans (war deportees), showed a decline in the percentage of those who regarded German as their native language, and the highest fluency in Russian among all the groups. Only 50% of Ukrainians regarded Ukrainian as their first language, but only 46% were listed as fluent in Russian, indicating an existence, side by side, of Russified and non-Russified Ukrainian groups in the republic. It is interesting to note that Ukrainians were the only non-Russian, non-indigenous group which showed an increase in the number of affiliations to the national language in the intercensal period.

The absence, basically, of a common language of communications in Tadzhikistan poses a major problem in economic-administrative work and in political education work, for at least three languages (and frequently more) have to be used in order to reach the mass of the people. This is particularly important to the effectiveness of printed and electronic media. The need to increase the ratio of Russian speakers among the non-Russian groups was stressed particularly in the Central Committee CPSU special Resolution of January 1969 censuring the work of the Tadzhik Communist Party.¹

Modernization of the Tadzhik, or Farsi, language under the Soviets included two alphabet reforms (Latinization in 1928-1930 and introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet in 1940), the expurgation of "alien" elements (Arabisms and "archaisms"), and introduction of "internationalist" elements (Russian-derived modern scientific-technical and socio-political vocabulary) and modern grammatical constructions, also borrowed from the Russian. A linguistic conference in Stalinabad (Dushanbe) in 1938 marked the victory of "internationalists" over "bourgeois-nationalists" in the Tadzhik linguistic policy.

Tadzhikistan - Language Data - 5

With de-Stalinization some reversal of the Russification of the Tadzhik language has taken place, with strong pressures exercised by the Tadzhik cultural elite to purify the language of unnecessary Russicisms (as for example at the Tashkent 1969 language conference). One major problem in the formation of the modern Tadzhik has been the significant differences between the literary Farsi (which has been taken as the base of modern Tadzhik) and the spoken language, and between Tadzhik and Iranian dialects spoken by numerous groups of the population. The Tadzhik press has repeatedly reported on problems encountered by Tadzhik children in the study of their native language.

Another aspect of the linguistic policy, as in all the other republics, has been the promotion of the study of Russian and its use as the common Soviet language. Here the problem has been the scarcity of Russian teachers and the quality of teaching of Russian; this disqualifies substantial numbers of young Tadzhiks from progressing on the socio-economic and political ladder which requires a mastery of the Russian language.
Table 8.2.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Tadzhiks
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Tadzhiks residing:</th>
<th>Speaking as their Native Language</th>
<th>Speaking as a Second Language(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the Tadzhik SSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>1,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other Soviet Republics</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>2,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\)No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding a command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

\(^b\)Including Tadzhik, if not native language.
II. Local Media

a. Print Media

In Tadzhikistan in 1970, 52% of all books published and 36% of all periodicals (including periodically issued collections and bulletins) were published in the Tadzhik language. Both of these percentages are below the weight of the titular nationality in the total population. Eighty-four percent of all newspapers (including kolkhoz newspapers), were published in Tadzhik. Of all the books published in national languages in the Soviet Union in 1970, 0.5% were published in Tadzhik (see Table B.3.). The weight of the Tadzhik national group in the total Soviet population was 0.9%.¹

The first Tadzhik language newspaper in the republic was published in 1925; the first Russian language newspaper in 1929. The numbers and circulation figures of newspapers and magazines tend to be misleading, as only a few of these have a general circulation. Many raion and city newspapers are published irregularly and have limited circulation. Circulation figures also are not necessarily reflective of actual readership, because of language and, in the villages, literacy problems, and also because of problems of distribution. No information is available for the 1960s but in the 1950s there were stoppages and delays in delivery, so that a paper arrived days, sometimes weeks late.²

The major newspapers in the republic are the two organs of the Party, Kommunist Tadzhikistana in Russian and Tochikistoni Sovieti in Tadzhik and the two Komsonol papers, Komsomoleta Tadzhikistana in Russian


and Komsonol Tochikiston in Tadzhik. The major periodicals appear to be all published in Tadzhik. They include Khochgi kishloki Tochikuton (Agriculture of Tadzhikistan), the journal of the Ministry of Agriculture; Khorpushtak (Hedgehog), a satirical journal published by the Party; Kommunisti Tochikuton, a party journal dealing with political theory; Maktabi Soveti (Soviet School), a journal of pedagogical science; Nashal (Torch), a Komsonol magazine for 10 to 15-year-olds; Sadon Shark (The Voice of the East), the journal of the Tadzhik SSR Union of Writers; and Zanoni Tochikuton (Women of Tadzhikistan), a popular magazine published by the Party.

Many of the books published in Tadzhik are translations from the Russian, although there is a shortage of qualified translators. The Marxist-Leninist classics were translated and published only after 1945; most translations are economic and technical manuals and "how to" pamphlets. Translations of Russian literary works (pre-revolutionary and Soviet) and of masterpieces of Western literature are generally done by members of the Tadzhik literary elite. (In the 1950s this was for many an escape from the prescribed themes for creative writing and allowed them to maintain their "productivity" quotas.) Russian and Western literature usually appears in multilingual editions.

The aesthetic quality of many of the books published in Tadzhikistan (and especially of the classical Persian literature) has been high in decorations and setting, but paper and print are poor.

There has been a decline in the share of books printed in Central Asian languages within the USSR total, from 3.7% in 1960 to 3.3% in 1970. In 1970 377 items were published in Tadzhik (0.4% of the total) as compared with 60,240 items published in Russian (76.3% of the total). Total circulation in Tadzhik amounted to 4,118 (0.3% of the Soviet total); Russian, 1,086,133 (79.7%).

1 In the 1950s the fiction journal of the writers' union was listed under the title Sharki Surkh (The Red East) which was criticized repeatedly in the 1950s for its nationalistic leanings. See Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 255, 262-267.

2 Europa Yearbook, 1972: 1311.
In the Tadzhik republic in 1971, 53 items were published, with a printing of 5,391,000.¹

Classical literature is available in Tadzhikistan in Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Russian translations, but in the Cyrillic alphabet and in selective editions (i.e., passages which are considered "reactionary" are expurgated) for mass consumption. Access to mass editions of the original is precluded by the lack of knowledge of the original alphabets and of Arabic, except among scholars. The State Public Library in Dushanbe has a collection of more than 20,000 ancient manuscripts in eastern languages.²

"Uncritical" treatment of classical literature by the Tadzhik cultural elite was the subject of reiterated criticism in the 1950s. Since 1956, however, greater freedom to publish and to read some of the previously proscribed works has been evident. One example would be the current availability of The Adventures of the Four Dervishes, attributed to Amir Hisrou Dehlevi. The publication of this work by the Tadzhik State Publishing House in 1951 caused a major scandal.³

¹Pechat', 1971: 97.
²Kommunist Tadzhikistana (January 25), 1946.
### Table B.3.
Publications in the Tadzhik SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newspapers a</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Books &amp; Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per Issue Circulation (1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Volume (1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Copies/100 in Language Group</td>
<td>No. of Titles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Books &amp; Brochures/100 in Language Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik b</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6 d</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages (Polish)</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>(2) c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>(7) c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Languages</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>632 c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>718 c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

a 1970 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.
b Some of these come out in both Russian and Tadzhik languages; 14 of these came out in Tadzhik and Uzbek.
c Book totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.
d This figure may include newspapers in non-Soviet languages.

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 58, 130, 165.
b. **Electronic Media and Films**

There are three TV channels in Dushanbe: Dushanbe, Moscow, and Tashkent. Dushanbe and Tashkent programs were bilingual (Tadzhik and Russian and Uzbek and Russian, respectively), with the language of a given program indicated in the listing. In both cases there are a substantial number of programs which have no language designation. These include a major portion of musical offerings, but also spoken programs. In each case titles listed were in Russian, so it would be reasonable to assume that a large part of these programs are also in Russian; they can also be bilingual. Moscow programs are all in Russian.

A sample of weekly programs in June 1973 revealed that the total number of TV broadcast hours in Dushanbe on all the three channels was 222 hours and 35 minutes, the longest number of hours on the Moscow program, the shortest on the Tashkent program. Analysis of the programs by language indicates that two-thirds of all programs seen in the city were in Russian; 20% had no language designation, 8% were in the Tadzhik language; and 5% in the Uzbek language. Dushanbe channel broadcasted 46% of its program in Russian and only 22% in Tadzhik; for the Tashkent channel, 51% of the programs were in Russian and 18% in Uzbek.\(^1\)

A rough analysis of the program of the Dushanbe channel by content indicates that in one week program items were distributed as follows: music, 21; literary programs, 18; educational programs, 13; 15-minute news broadcasts (half in Russian and half in Tadzhik), 11; movies, 14; agitation-propaganda programs, 8; special youth programs, 6; theater programs, 2; sport events, 3; a repeat program called "Times," 3; and three separate editions of TV journal: for the family, newspaper journal and health journal. Music programs included symphonic as well as local (Tadzhik and Uzbek) folk music and songs, a concert from Hindu movies, also dance music and music to go to sleep by. Education programs (mostly in Tadzhik) included classroom science presentations and education for housewives in cleanliness, etc; the "agit/prop" items included two broadcasts

---

\(^1\)Kommunist Tadzhikistana (June 1-3, 5-8), 1973.
on the "friendship of the people," both in Tadzhik. Literary programs included story-telling and poetry, both Russian and Tadzhik; one story was from Estonia.

Many of the mountain localities and Pamir are outside the range of either of the TV stations. The Ninth Five Year Plan envisaged building relay lines Dushanbe-Pendzhikent-Aini (Zeravshan valley westward), and Leninabad-Istar. A planned satellite will make relay possible for the Pamirs and other mountain regions.¹

Dushanbe also has three radio programs. Only the "first" program is listed in the paper; the other two are simply referred to as "musical and artistic" programs. Program One in June 1973 had a weekly total of 108 hours and 40 minutes broadcast time; 25% of the broadcasts were in Russian, 29% in Tadzhik, 3% in Uzbek, and 43% had no language designation. Program content distribution was similar to that on TV.

A spot sampling of three issues of Kommunist Tadzhikistana² revealed a substantial number of movie theaters in Dushanbe, many more playing in the summer than in the winter. All movie titles were listed in Russian and, except for some recognizable Western movies such as the "Snows of Kilimanjaro," and "Lady Hamilton," most appeared to have been Russian movies. Only once was a movie listed with the special designation "in the Tadzhik language." Some titles were obviously on local themes, some (very few) appeared to have been transliterated from local languages. Most appeared to have largely an entertainment value, although many were obviously on the "approved" themes. The September 1972 issue listed four visits from abroad in the space of a month: an Indian artistic group; an orchestra from the GDR; an artistic group from Turkey; and a song and dance ensemble from Afghanistan.

Many rural areas appear to have few movie facilities and are not serviced well by mobile movie vans. Subject to repeated criticism in the 1940s and 1950s, the problem apparently still continues. At the 16th Congress of the Tadzhik CP, First Secretary Rasulov complained that movies are rarely if ever shown in far-away kishlaks.¹

Table B.4.
Electronic Media and Films in the Tadzhik SSR

| Year | Radio | | | Television | | | Movies |
|------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|      | No. of | Sets | No. of | Sets | No. of | Sets | Seat | Seat |
|      | Stations | wired | wireless | /100 | sets | /100 | /100 | /100 |
|      | (1000) | sets | /100 | population | (1000) | population | points | sets | population |
| 1960 | N.A. | 168a | 6.9d | 168a | 7.9c | N.A. | N.A. | 8a | 0.4c | 81b | 3.8d |
| 1970 | N.A. | 267a | 8.9d | 390a | 13.1c | N.A. | N.A. | 216a | 7.2c | 183b | 6.1d |
| 1971 | N.A. | 277d | 8.9d | 415d | 13.4c | N.A. | N.A. | 265c | 8.6c | N.A. | N.A. |


Source: *Nar. obraz.*, 1971: 325.


Source: Computed from data cited above (b and c).
III. Educational Institutions

a. **Level of Education**

The literacy rate in Tadzhikistan, as published in official statistics, compares favorably with any country in the world. During the Soviet era, it increased from 3.8% in 1926 (6.4% for men, 0.9% for women) to 99.6% (for the age group from 9 to 49) in 1970 (see Table B.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population</td>
<td>95.5(^a)</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The ratio was higher in rural areas mostly because more older women who are less literate live in the cities (as noted in the Source).


The data in Table B.5. do not show any significant difference between rural and urban literacy; as the footnote in the table points out, however, they do not distinguish separately the older (and less literate) generation in either type of area. Also no distinction is made for the literacy of different national groups. Numerous other indicators (see below) reveal, however, that the degree of literacy is lower among the Asian groups than among Europeans. Edward Allworth concludes for Central Asia in general that despite the great real increases in literacy rate, large numbers of local people still receive little or no education.\(^1\)

Data for education per 1000 people, although among the lowest in the USSR, also compare favorably with other countries and especially with neighboring Asian countries such as Afghanistan. (See Table B.6. and below.)

\(^1\)Allworth, 1973: 393.
Table B.6.
Selected Data on Education in the Tadzhik SSR (1971)

Population: 3,096,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 654) All Schools</th>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
<td>3,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
<td>810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>261.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 652) Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of student places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 654) Secondary special schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- number of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 654) Institutions of higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- number of institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p. 439) Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- number of universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- newly admitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B.6. (Continued)

**Selected Data on Education in the Tadzhik SSR (1971)**

**Universities (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day students</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evening students</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence students</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 108) **Graduate students**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per 1000 population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total number of</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in scientific research institutions</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in universities</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(p. 644) **Number of persons with (in 1970)**

higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education

| Per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older | 420 |
| per 1000 individuals employed in national economy | 602 |

(p. 651) **Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools**

| 12,900 | 4.2 |
### Table B.6. (Continued)

**Addendum (1969/1970 data):**

| Schools of working and rural youth (including correspondence students) |
|---|---|
| no. of schools |                     |
| no. of students | -29,400 (p. 227)    |

| Professional, technical schools and FZU |
|---|---|
| no. of schools |                   |
| no. of students | -16,500 (p. 227) |

| Students improving qualifications at work or special courses and in other ways (excluding the political education network) |
|---|---|
| no. of schools |                   |
| no. of students | -86,500 (p. 227) |

| Elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary |
|---|---|
| no. of schools | - 2,827 (p. 228) |
| no. of students | -710,400 (p. 227) |

**Sources:** Nar. khoz. 1972 and (for Addendum) Nar. khoz. TSSR 1969.

(Please refer to the page numbers given above.)
### Table B.7.

Tadzhik SSR, Education per 1000 people of 10 years of age and above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>People with higher and middle-level education</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average ratio</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with completed higher</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with incomplete higher</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with special middle</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with general middle</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with incomplete middle</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Language Policy in Education**

The republic generally has a trilingual school system with Russian, Tadzhik, and Uzbek as languages of instruction. There are also some Kirgiz language schools in Kirgiz settlement areas, and, possibly, some Turkmen language schools in Turkmen areas, although no hard information is available for the latter. The non-indigenous groups do not have their own language schools, and, as far as is known, generally attend the Russian language schools. In the 1950s (no information is available for the 1960s) there also were multilingual schools, where parallel classes were offered in the major republican languages. Russian instruction is offered in local language schools, but, by all accounts, it was and is very poor. Numerous complaints are voiced about the quality of Russian language instruction, particularly in the rural areas, and statistics on the Asian groups' knowledge of the Russian language bear this out. This is primarily because of the shortage of qualified teachers and textbooks. Since 1958 the Tadzhik SSR has basically adopted unchanged Thesis 19 of the 1958 Education Act, which provides that parents have an option to educate children in either Russian or local language schools, but along with other Central Asian republics, it is pledged to improve the study of the Russian language.

Instruction in most of the specialized technical and professional schools has generally been in the Russian language, largely because of the shortage of qualified teachers and because Russian is essential in occupations for which these schools prepare. Entry to these schools, until 1971, was predicated on an examination which included a test (oral or written, depending on the school) in the Russian language. In view of the poor preparation in the language of most of the Tadzhik/Uzbek students who completed the 8th, 10th, or 11th grades (different entry points are required by different schools), most of them were de facto barred from receiving professional-technical education which in turn contributed to the largely unskilled character of the Asian component of the Tadzhik labor force, affected the ethnic composition of urban and industrial employment, and contributed to underemployment in rural areas. The language admission policy began to change in 1971, presumably because of the Asian population explosion, the increase in numbers of Asian secondary school graduates, and the growing numbers of youth in the labor force, combined with the linguistics facts of life.
A decree adopted in May 1971 provided that a qualified Tadzhik or Uzbek student may follow any area of specialization at a higher educational establishment in the republic without being fluent in, or even acquainted with, the Russian language.¹

A selected sample of school admission ads in Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 1973, indicates the beginnings of change in accordance with the decree, although the Russian language is still a prerequisite in some schools.

Admission requirements for the schools which train for the Security Services (MVD schools) provide for an entry examination in the Russian language and literature (written and oral), in USSR history (oral), and in a foreign language (oral), the latter only for the higher (4 years) school.²

Admissions to librarians' schools require examinations in both the Russian and the Tadzhik languages, and to club managers' schools, in the Tadzhik language for the Tadzhik language courses (both types of schools are run by the Ministry of Culture). Admission to agricultural teknikum require an examination in all three languages (it is not specified whether only one language is required, depending on the language of instruction, or all three in each case). The Finance-Economic Tekhnikum (in Dushanbe) offers instruction in different languages, depending on the program to be pursued. A Physical Education Tekhnikum admits graduates of 8-year schools on the basis of a Russian language dictation and an oral mathematics exam, and graduates of 10-year schools on the basis of a written essay in Russian language and literature and an oral examination in Soviet history.³

General school admission rules, published in Kommunist Tadzhikistana for 1973, provide that admission to middle medical schools for applicants

²Kommunist Tadzhikistana (June 1), 1973.
³Kommunist Tadzhikistana (June 2), 1973.
with the 8-year base require a Russian language dictation and an oral mathematics examination; for applicants with the 10-year base, an essay in Russian language and literature and an oral chemistry examination.

The rules also provide that an applicant who did not attend secondary schools in the language of instruction of the tekhnikum where he is applying may, on request, take a written entry examination in Russian (after 8 years' education) or in Russian language and literature (after 10 years' education); such an applicant is also interviewed besides, to ascertain his/her practical facility in the language of instruction. A curious wording of this provision seems to indicate either that Russian is still the predominant language of instruction in tekhnikums or that tekhnikum students, regardless of the language of instruction, are expected to have a degree of facility in Russian.

Another announcement of general rules of admission to specialized middle-level schools, provides that on entering schools with language of instruction other than Russian, an entry examination in the given language may be substituted for the entry examination in the Russian language. 1

What these announcements seem to indicate is that in line with the new policy an applicant may now enter technical/professional schools without a knowledge of Russian, but that it is by far preferable and sometimes required (in medical schools and others) that he have an acquaintance with the language.

c. Nationality and Education

The national breakdown of the student body in higher and specialized middle-level schools indicates that the three indigenous nationalities are still underrepresented, and that the European groups are

1Kommunist Tadzhikistana (May 23), 1973.
overrepresented. Curiously enough, the ratio of Tadzhiks and Uzbeks among students of higher educational institutions is higher than their ratio in specialized middle-level schools. This probably indicates that the bulk of the Asian students in higher educational institutions attend faculties of humanities—with local language predominant—rather than the sciences or professional schools. It also points out the shortage of local people in the professional/technical strata (see Table B.8.).

The academic selectivity index of the Tadzhiks (i.e., the comparative ratio of the group's access to educational opportunities (see the note in Table B.8.) in the early 1930s was the lowest among the Central Asian nationalities, and the lowest of all the 18 major national groups in the Soviet Union: it was 7.1 in 1928 and 14.2 in 1931 and 1933. By 1959 it had increased substantially. Still, in the 1960s Tadzhiks remained in the lowest place in Central Asia, even though in Tadzhikistan itself their index was higher than that of the Uzbeks and the Kirgiz. It was much lower, however, than the index for these latter two groups between 1963/64 and 1969/70, reflecting the decline in their proportion of the total population. The selectivity index for the Asian groups is undoubtedly inflated, as it has been calculated on the basis of the total groups' proportion in the population, rather than the proportion of the appropriate age group. Fertility rates for the Tadzhiks and the Uzbeks have been much higher than those for the Russians and the Ukrainians; thus their proportion in the students' group is undoubtedly larger than the weight of their groups as a whole in the population.

The academic selectivity index for the Tadzhiks in the higher educational establishments in the Soviet Union as a whole declined from 71% to 68% between 1959 and 1970. (Turkmen were the only other group which showed a decline.) Considering the higher net growth rate in their group the decline may have been caused by a decrease in the number of Tadzhiks who study outside their republic.

1Shorish, 1973: 87-89.
Table B.8.
The Nationality of Students in Higher and Special Middle-Level Schools in the Tadzhik SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Higher Schools</th>
<th></th>
<th>Special Middle Schools</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% of Group in the republic population 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963/64&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Total&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>S.I.</td>
<td>Total&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>S.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>21,051</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>13,370</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>7,835</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>5,370</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>8,901</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>166.6</td>
<td>9,793</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>241.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>238.5</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>273.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>128.0</td>
<td>3,797</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>4,330</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>185.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>42,604</td>
<td>33,966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S.I.: Selectivity Index. A ratio normally derived by dividing the proportion of an age cohort of an ethnic group within the total number of students in an educational establishment, by its proportion in the population; in this case by dividing the proportion of students in higher (and secondary middle) education by the proportion of their nationality in the population.

Sources:<sup>a</sup> Shorish, 1973: 89 (also the definition of selectivity index), based on 1959 population.
<sup>b</sup>Nar. khoz. TSSR. 1969: 241.

Note: In the 1970/71 school year, the number of Tadzhik students in higher educational establishments in Tadzhikistan was 28,100, in special middle-level schools, 17,700. Nar. khoz., 1970: 651.
d. Women and Education

Asian women's attendance at specialized and higher schools has been notoriously low. In the statistical data it has been reflected in a lower proportion of girls in school than in the USSR as a whole, although no information is available on the national breakdown of girls in school. Most of the specialized schools and higher schools are located in urban areas, however, and the attendance of non-Asian girls brings the statistics up.

The virtual absence of Tadzhik and Uzbek girls in secondary and higher educational institutions was the subject of repeated criticism in the republican press during the 1940s and 1950s, as was the extremely high drop-out rate of Asian girls between the 4th and 10th grades. In 1953 the Tadzhik minister of Education revealed that while Asian girls constituted 45% of the enrollment through the 4th grade of primary school, they accounted for only 19% of the enrollment in grades eight through ten, and very few of them graduated.\(^1\) By the end of the sixties a change was visible; girls (of all nationalities) accounted for 48% of the enrollment in grades 9-11, and the proportion of Asian girls must have been much higher than the previous 19% (see Table B.10.). Some of the drop-out rate is reflected in student statistics in the primary and secondary grades (see Table B.9.). Official statistics, however, do not reflect any differential in the percentage of girls in grades 1 through 11 in 1969/70 (see Table B.10.). The relatively low percentage of women in higher educational institutions (see Table B.11.), and overall low selectivity index of women in higher schools—70.4% in 1969/70 as compared to the men's index of 130.6%—is the result primarily of the Asian women's low participation. The low academic selectivity index of women has probably pulled down the index for the Tadzhik, Uzbek and Kirgiz groups as a whole.

The proportion of women among teachers in the Tadzhik republic is also very low, especially among directors of primary and incomplete middle-level schools. (See Table B.12.)

\(^1\) Kommunist Tadzhikistana (August 26), 1953.
### Table B.9.

**Student Enrollment in Primary and Middle-Level Schools in the Tadzhik SSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>1950/51</th>
<th>1969/70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4 grades</td>
<td>263,300</td>
<td>376,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8 grades</td>
<td>80,800</td>
<td>275,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 grades</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th grade</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>5,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table B.10.

**Enrollment of Girls in Primary and Middle-Level Schools in the Tadzhik SSR, 1969/70**

(\textit{in percentage of total})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-11th grade</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of this:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4th</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8th</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11th</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note in the source: for data for 1940/41 (but not for subsequent years), it was specified that the relatively high percentage of girls in the 9th-11th grades reflected the fact that there were more schools with higher grades in the urban than in the rural areas.


### Table B.11.

**Women Students in Higher Educational Establishments in the Tadzhik SSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women in</th>
<th>Selectivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.12.

Women Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools in the Tadzhik SSR, 1969/70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools and functions</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All schools</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers in 1-4th grades</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers in 5-10th grades</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors, primary schools</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors, 8 years schools</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors, middle schools</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Despite a well-developed network of cultural and mass enlightenment institutions, complaints about their failure to reach the masses have been voiced at every Party Congress (and in the press) during the 1950s and the 1960s, including the 17th Congress in 1971, and the 1969 CC CPSU Resolution censuring the work of the Tadzhik Party. A part of this failure is usually ascribed to the poor work of these institutions and to the shortage of technical facilities and their breakdown, including means of transportation (Tadzhik topography compounds the usual Soviet transportation problems). Another part of the failure seems to be a combination of linguistic problems with the unresponsiveness of the still largely traditional Asian population in rural areas to the content of the message conveyed by the cultural enlightenment network. This includes artistic offerings which do not include at least some traditional content. Another part of the problem has been the absence of cultural facilities in many areas. The 1969 CC CPSU Resolution stated that "a significant part of large kishlaks [villages] to this day do not have clubs, libraries and cinema facilities."

Theaters in Tadzhikistan are located in urban centers, while numerous "folk art circles" reportedly serve the countryside. From time to time theater collectives go "on the road" to various localities (and outside the republic).

As far as is known Dushanbe has four permanent theaters: the Aini Theater of the Opera and Ballet (the only opera and ballet theater in the republic); the Mavakovksy Russian drama theater, the Lakhuti Tadzhik drama theater, and a recently (1971) established State Theater for Youth. Drama collectives from other republics and from abroad frequently visit the capital.

1Partiinaya zhizn', 1969: 1:5.
In 1969 the total number of scientific workers in Tadzhikistan was listed as 4725, of whom 2001 were employed by scientific enterprises, and 2651 by higher educational institutions (see Table B.13.). Among them, 1851 were Tadzhiks (39% of the total). This compares with the figure of 2206 for all Tadzhik scientific workers in the USSR in the same year (and 2358 in 1970), which indicates that 345 worked outside the Tadzhik republic.¹ The number of Tadzhik scientific workers increased substantially from 1950 (when their total in the USSR was 168) and from 1960 (866).²

The combined share of Tadzhiks and Uzbeks among scientific workers in the republic was 47%, to 39% of Russians and Ukrainians, and 14% of "others." The differential in the selectivity index of the Asian and the European groups was even greater than in the case of students in higher education and middle-level schools, indicating once more that the scientific elite of the republic was dominated by the immigrant groups (see Table B.13.).

Table B.13.  
Scientific Workers in the Tadzhik SSR by Nationality, 1969  
(end of the year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Absolute Figure</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Group % in Population</th>
<th>Selectivity Index¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,725</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>291.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>368.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>175.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹Calculated as described in Table B.8.

²Ibid.
Scientists and other specialists constituted only 2.75% of all Tadzhiks in the USSR in 1970, with scientists accounting for only 0.11% of Tadzhiks.¹

Table B.14.

The Ethnic Tadzhik Scientific Elite in the USSR Total, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific Workers</th>
<th>Absolute Numbers</th>
<th>Tadzhik Specialists as % of All Tadzhiks in USSR</th>
<th>% of Tadzhiks in USSR Total for Fach Category of Specialists²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Scientists</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors of Science</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates of Science</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirants</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Specialists with unfinished higher education</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>1.38%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Specialists with Intermediate Education</td>
<td>26,800</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL of 1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>58,758</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²The Tadzhik population total in the USSR constituted 9% (2,136,000) of the USSR population.

There were 1755 women scientific workers in Tadzhikistan (no ethnic breakdown available), of whom 6 were academicians and professors, 61 were doctors, 49 senior scientific workers, and 369 junior scientific workers and assistants.²

¹Nar. obraz., 1971: 240, 270, 278.
In 1971 there were in Tadzhikistan more than 119,000 certified specialists working in the national economy, and every third worker in the republic had a middle-level or higher education.¹

¹First Secretary Rasulov at the 17th Congress of the Tadzhik CP. 
Kommunist Tadzhikistana (February 19), 1971.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Academy of Science</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of members</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of scientific workers in these</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Museums</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of museums</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>357,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance per 1000 population</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Theaters</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of theaters</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>1,201,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance per 1000 population</td>
<td>388</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Number of persons working in education and culture</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. per 1000 population</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Number of persons working in science and scientific services</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number per 1000 population</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Number of public libraries</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Number of books and magazines in public libraries</strong></th>
<th>7,712,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Number of clubs</strong></th>
<th>980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Source:** *Nar. khoz. 1972: 106,431,650.*
TADZHIKISTAN: AND THE TADZHIKS

PART C

National Attitudes
I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

The geographical position of the country and its difficult topography has had a significant influence on national attitudes in Tadzhikistan. Historically, the location at the crossroads of nomadic and agricultural settlement has brought successive waves of culturally and ethnically different people. At the same time, the remoteness and isolation of the country as a whole, and internally between the mountains and the valleys has made for fragmentation and difficult communications. To this day the three major parts of the country are linked to other regions: the Tadzhik part of Ferghana valley with other parts of that area; the Zeravshan valley extends westward into Uzbekistan; the southern valleys southward. To this day Pamir remains a self-contained and isolated entity, with its northeastern parts shading into Kirgizia and inhabited by Kirgiz shepherds.

The sense of Tadzhik unity on the part of the modern elite is a new phenomenon as it embraces the country as a whole (but not as it traces its roots to pre-1920 Bukhara). The sense of cultural unity among the people has its source in Islam and the survival of traditional patterns of life, and extends beyond the Tadzhik borders. It has gained cohesiveness in response to the alien cultural influence of the Russians. There is no agreement among scholars as to whether or not the new sense of Tadzhik identity transcends the Islamic bonds of the old Turkestan. There seems no doubt that the bonds are felt when dealing with the Russian element, the all-union demands, and Sovietization. There are also indications however, that national priorities exist when dealing with other Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan, the strongest and most important republic in the region, and that the cultural elite has evolved its own identity based in the Persian heritage.\(^1\)

The Tadzhik economy is still basically a one-crop (cotton) colonial type economy, geared to all-union requirements. The development of subsidiary industry and, in the 1960s, the beginnings of heavy industry do not necessarily reflect the needs of the republic. Material benefits are unevenly

distributed, and despite significant increase in overall standards of living, that part of the countryside inhabited by Tadzhiks (and Uzbeks) lags far behind the predominantly European urban areas. In addition, there is still a strong legacy of bitterness in the countryside left over from collectivization, and, as far as can be gauged, there is bitterness over the forcible resettlement of mountain villages into cotton-growing valleys.

The lack of commitment to economic goals, on the part of the elite as well as on the part of workers and peasants, can be gauged by the persistence of shortfalls in their fulfillment. The criticism of Tadzhik economic performance has been persistent, with no apparent improvement -- in 1961, when First and Second Tadzhik Party Secretaries were removed along with many other members of political elite; at the 16th Congress of the Tadzhik Party in 1966; in a special resolution of the CC CPSU censuring the work of the Tadzhik Party in January 1969; at a subsequent February plenum of the Tadzhik CC; and at the 17th Congress of the Tadzhik Party in February 1971. 1

In agriculture, criticism centers on low labor productivity, failure to improve mechanization and to develop the specialization of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, to sow irrigated areas and to fulfill irrigation plans. In cotton growing there are complaints about uneven yields. Similarly, livestock growing has not met planned goals. Livestock problems are frequently blamed on traditional attitudes. Sheep losses are connected with Moslem festivals; Moslems are still unwilling to raise pigs.

The attitudes of the Asian population (in the sense of their unwillingness to move into urban-industrial employment because of cultural alienation) contribute to the growing surplus of labor in the countryside and the continuation of Asian youth educated in local language schools in traditional roles. On the other hand, the poor instruction in the Russian language in rural schools has constituted an objective barrier to acquiring skills and moving into the industrial labor market. This cannot but influence their attitude towards the Russians, especially in view of the obvious preference

1Kommunist Tadzhikistana (April 14), 1961 and (February 19) 1971; Pravda (February 13), 1969; Partiinaya zhizn' (March 6), 1966: 54-56, and (January 1) 1969: 3-8.
II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

Western observers agree that the new generation in Tadzhikistan will effect far-reaching changes in national attitudes. Edward Allworth writes that these basic and important changes will be largely independent of politicians. The major catalyst involved will be the emerging elite, the Tadzhik intellectuals, who:

blend the typical young person's involvement in his immediate environment and disinterest in the recent, toilsome past, with an invulnerability among the educated to stereotypes provided by patriotic slogans about zealous internationalism, official "friendship" between ethnic groups, or insistent claims of older generations about the felicity of regional bilingualism, classless comradeship, and the unslavatable union of nationalities.¹

According to Allworth, Central Asians (presumably including Tadzhiks) are downgrading the nationality concentrations coming from Moscow.

... The new view deemphasizes administrative or political nationality by widening the distance in the USSR between the old (conservative, Russian?) and young (innovative, Central Asian) generations into the primary social and intellectual cleavage affecting the region, giving local preeminence to personal identity once again.²

Robert Barrett emphasizes the new ties of Central Asians with Third World countries which support their resistance to Russification.

... those Central Asian writers and other intellectuals concerned for their future ethnic identity continue with the limited means available to them to ward off their complete absorption into the diluting stream of a colorless, conformist, multinational culture. They surely recognize that in such a potpourri the prevailing hue must come from the dominant ingredient, the Soviet

²Ibid.
Russian culture. Their desire to avoid this eventuality is enhanced daily by the developments in the former colonial areas outside the Soviet Union where nationalism is holding sway.\(^1\)

It is Barrett's contention that if Central Asians gain cultural hegemony the apparent balance in present nationality arrangements will be greatly disrupted.

Harry Rosen claims that, for the Tadzhiks, there is a tendency to diverge both from other Central Asians and the Russians. He attributes this tendency to:

1. the dichotomy created by separate urban Russian and rural Tadzhik societies;
2. the Tadzhik political-administrative leadership which assumes a token representative role but does not negate traditional cultural patterns; and
3. the cultural policy of "national form and socialist content," in Central Asia," Rosen writes:

In an article entitled "An Awareness of Traditional Tadzhik Identity in Central Asia," Rosen writes:

In terms of the nationality question Tadzhikistan represents a situation that is equally noticeable in much of Central Asia: the general deficit, so far as the indigenous ethnic groups are concerned, of rewards, representation, and recognition in the Soviet system. This situation encourages and insulates the local cultures, helps to maintain the rural nature of the region's population, and to a certain extent puts demands on the dominant group, the Russians, to narrow the distinctions between themselves and these Central Asians.\(^3\)

Soviet authorities are, as a result, left with a dilemma—if they grant the responsibility (i.e., autonomy) necessary to correct the deficiencies, they will invite not only cultural but "political divergence based upon distinctly ethnic grounds."

\(^1\)Barrett, 1973: 33-34.
\(^3\)Ibid.: 72.
shown to immigrant skilled workers in industrial hiring.

The pre-Soviet historical period left the Tadzhiks fragmented, with the sense of cultural identity within the broader Islamic unity of the area as a whole, but with the surviving—if largely inchoate—sense of a separate Iranian heritage. The sense of separate national identity, still within broader Islamic traditions but in its unique Tadzhik variant, has crystallized in the period of Soviet Tadzhik history, largely as the result of two factors: resentment against Russian political ascendancy, and the rediscovery of the Persian heritage, promoted, paradoxically, by the Soviet nationality policy. The resentment of Russian hegemony has been successively reinforced in the period of Soviet history by the "colonial" attitude of Russian settlers after the outbreak of the revolution, the civil war and Red Army pacification campaign of 1921, forcible subversion of the traditional society in 1920-1921 and 1930-31, the collectivization campaign and the purges of the 1930s, the "Big Brother" syndrome of the 1940s and early 1950s, and continuation of the Russian ascendancy in the socio-political and economic structure of the republic.

The resistance to Russian models and the search for, and return to, the indigenous heritage has been reflected strongly in the field of cultural activity by the Soviet-educated Tadzhik elite. This is apparent in historiography, and especially in the evaluation of the Russian role in the history of Central Asia and that of the national movements in resistance to Russian encroachments, and in the insistence on treating the national history as a unified whole rather than from the Leninist class viewpoint of division between the "progressive" and "reactionary" streams. In linguistics this resistance is manifested in an effort to preserve Arabic and Persian roots and to resist "internationalization." In literature it is seen in resistance to Russian/Soviet models in form as well as content, and preservation of form and content of traditional forms.
Conscious adherence to the traditional heritage on the part not only of the new elite, but also of the rural masses is illustrated by several cases of kolkhozniki responding favorably to quotes from Firdousi poems and not only being familiar with poetry of the classical period, but being able to quote from it at length.\(^1\) The search for ancient roots among the intelligentsia, on the other hand, has resulted in the formation of a new conception of the motherland, a Tadzhik-Moslem Vatan, which is contrasted with the Soviet Union.\(^2\) For both groups the classical literature has become a source of inspiration and the identifying mark of a separate national identity.

The cultural alienation of the Tadzhik community is reflected in the urban-rural dichotomy and the de facto separation of the urban (Russian) and the rural (Tadzhik) communities and in the differential in fertility rates.

The 1970 census data indicate an extremely high level of adherence to the national language and widespread ignorance of Russian. While this is in part the result of objective factors (poor facilities for teaching Russian) it is also the result of unwillingness on the part of Tadzhiks and Uzbeks to learn Russian. As noted earlier, ignorance of Russian has also been a significant factor in the underrepresentation of the Tadzhik and other Asian groups in professional and higher education, and recent changes in admission policies of the educational institutions, allowing access to Asians who do not know Russian, appear to be poorly implemented. (See Section B-III.) At the same time, the need of the indigenous population to master the Russian language has been referred to as the pivotal question at all major Party gatherings and in the CC CPSU censuring the Resolution.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Procyk, 1973: 128-129.


\(^3\) Rasulov, 1972: 5.
The crystallization of the Tadzhik national identity within the traditional mold and the rejection of Soviet models and, by extension, of many aspects of modernization is best illustrated by the list of complaints heard in the Party's discussion of shortcomings in its political education work among the masses, the elite, and youth. Through the 1960s, these have included general exhortation on: the need to improve efforts to foster the formation of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook among all the strata of the population in the republic, inclusive of Party membership; the need to combat the survivals of feudal ways of life and family relations, especially as expressed in attitudes towards women and in the survivals of religious superstition; and the need to combat bourgeois ideology. The need to work with youth came to the forefront in the late 1960s, not only in terms of fostering Marxist-Leninist outlook, but also to combat "hooliganism" and instill a "proper" attitude towards work.

In this connection it has been revealed that weakening of atheistic propaganda has contributed to religious survivals,¹ that nationalism and religion are connected,² that there has been a decline of women in the Party membership in general. Traditional child marriages have continued as has the payment of bride price [kalym].³ Serious problems in ideological work with young people have also been reported (16th Congress CPT and February 1969 Plenum), not only in the villages (many of which are never reached), but also in the urban areas and within the Komsomol organization.⁴

The complaints also refer directly to "national survivals." The keynote here is the exhortation to propagate "the Leninist ideas of friendship of the people and proletarian internationalism," which "should be in the center of attention of the Party, Soviet and Komsomol organs," and the "strengthening of brotherly ties of the working people of the republic with all Soviet people," (February 1969 plenum CC CPT), all frequently repeated phrases.⁵

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¹At the (February) 1969 CC CPT Plenum.
²Rasulov, 1972: 5.
⁴From the 16th Congress of the CPT and the February 1969 Plenum.
⁵Ibid.
It is important to point out, that despite the vociferous repetition of the list of complaints no improvement appears to have taken place, but rather a backsliding on the road of "survivals." It is also significant, that no penalties seem to have been meted out on the current Tadzhik Party leadership, which has, so far shown longevity of tenure as well as little more than lip service towards combatting nationalist manifestations.
III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

A review of the developments in Tadzhikistan during the last decade reveals a failure of attempts to integrate the Tadzhiks into the Soviet body politic. It offers evidence of their cultural alienation from the Soviet (i.e., Russian) models, non-assimilation to all-union systemic goals, and substitution of local goals—couched frequently in traditional terms—whenever possible. At the same time, the new sense of separate national identity which began with the revival of classical Persian heritage is in a process of transformation into a modern nationalism.

Three factors seem crucial in these developments: the formation of a new Tadzhik intellectual elite; the persistence of the traditional way of life and attitudes and of Islam among the rural-based Tadzhik masses, and the presence of an alien (Russian) community, which has appropriated political power, acted as an agent of forcible change, and has thus become a foil for the emergent nationalism.

The growth of the new elite has been the result of the establishment of a broadly-based educational system. It has made it possible for the Tadzhiks to study in their own language and to become conscious of their heritage within the parameters of the Soviet nationality policy. In competition with the traditional socializing agents the Soviet system has failed. In search of legitimacy vis-à-vis the Russian fact the elite has turned to the traditional values which provided the necessary bond with the peasant rural community. Their unequal political and economic positions in their own republic have served to reinforce that bond, to foster the negative attitude on the part of the Tadzhiks towards the Russian model of modernization, and to create an urban-rural dichotomy based on ethnic as well as social distinctions.

Demographic trends, the spread of education, and the economic requirements of the 1960s have made the preservation of this dichotomy and the existence of a separate (but unequal) traditional Tadzhik community increasingly untenable. The Tadzhik intellectual elite, still small in numbers, is steadily growing and is being exposed to contacts not only with the other Soviet national elites but also with national elites of the Third World countries.
The rapidly growing numbers of the Tadzhik rural youth are educated in local language schools, but are unable to make a transition into urban-industrial employment because of the partially self-imposed culture gap. As a result, they are forced to continue in traditional roles and are creating huge labor surpluses in the countryside, while European migration continues into urban and industrial areas short of skilled labor.

Combined with the unequal distribution of material and cultural benefits between the urban (largely Russian) and the rural (Tadzhik) areas, with the Tadzhik subordinate status in the power structure, and with their new sense of national identity, the setting carries with it the seeds of a classically explosive political situation, comparable to that of French Quebec in the 1930s or pre-independence India.

Given the Tadzhik unwillingness to close the culture gap and to assimilate into the Soviet model, and their increasingly stronger and self-assured pressure for a greater share of autonomy and benefits, the all-union leadership finds itself in an uneasy dilemma. It can either give in and risk the danger of political demands following the cultural and economic ones, or it can accelerate the pressure for integration on the lines of the sblizheniye-sliyanie [a coming together and eventual fusion] formula, while at the same time attempting to alleviate economic problems.

There are signs that some accommodations are being made on the cultural front largely to facilitate the relief of economic pressure. However, there are also signs of increased insistence on the assimilation into the Soviet model, inclusive, by the early 1970s of an apparent reinforcement of the Russian group within the Tadzhik republic political hierarchy.
A further question which Rosen poses relates to the predominantly rural character of Tadzhikistan. It may be true that the Tadzhiks look upon the rural existence as the ideal way of life and naturally resist the (Russian) industrialization of their country.

... At present, the Tadzhiks precisely fit the pattern of a society that rejects urbanization and thus opens the nationality question for reevaluation by frustrating the process of amalgamation that draws people together from diverse ethnic groups. This precludes mixing in the modern sense of the word.1

1Ibid: 72.
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