THE POLITICS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CUBA, 1959-1976

by

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CUBA, 1959-1976

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A revolution destroys the political system of the ancien regime, confronting victorious revolutionaries with the immediate task of erecting a new political structure through which to govern the nation. One measure of a revolution's success is the strength of the new institutional structure it brings forth, yet little attention has been paid to this aspect of revolution by political scientists. This paper argues that the most important determinant of how this institution-building process proceeds is the character of the revolutionary struggle which preceded it.

The paper examines the process of building a new political system in revolutionary Cuba, as reflected in the shifting relationship between the armed forces and the communist party. The institution-building process in Cuba was prolonged and difficult, lasting over a decade; this was the result of the unique way in which the Cuban insurrection developed. The Cuban revolution was the first socialist revolution to succeed without a Leninist party in the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle. Instead, the armed forces fulfilled the vanguard role usually played by the communist party. A new party was not inaugurated until 1965, and even then it remained so weak during the 1960's that it was incapable of assuming the directive role in the political process from the armed forces. The paper summarizes the building of the new party, examines the party's weaknesses, and details its relationship to the armed forces during the 1960's. It is argued that the military was not only impervious to party control, but that it wielded considerable influence in the party as a whole.

In the late 1960's, civilian institutions proved incapable of administering the massive effort to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970, so the revolutionary leadership turned to the military as the only institution capable of undertaking this task. The result was the "militarization" of Cuban economic administration. The failure to produce ten million tons of sugar was attributed, in part, to the weakness of political institutions. A process of institutionalization was begun, resulting in a dramatic strengthening of the party and a restriction of the military to national defense affairs. The paper reviews the institutionalization process since 1970, with particular attention to the differentiation of civilian and military political roles, and the assertion of party control over the armed forces. It concludes by examining several theories of civil-military relations in communist and non-communist societies for their relevance to the Cuban experiences.
A revolution destroys the political system of the ancien regime, confronting the victorious revolutionaries with the immediate task of erecting a new political structure through which to govern the nation. This new political order may be built around a revolutionary party, as in Russia; a guerrilla army, as in China; or even a "revolutionary family," as in Mexico. The process may proceed rapidly, or it may be prolonged; but until a new institutional matrix has coalesced, one of the foremost tasks of the revolution remains incomplete. "The measure of how successful a revolution is," Huntington notes, "is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth."2

This paper examines the process of building a new political system in revolutionary Cuba. The process was extremely prolonged in the Cuban case, lasting over a decade. This is highly unusual for a communist political system, and offers interesting insights into not only institutional-building in communist politics, but into the wider process of political development in non-revolutionary polities as well. We shall find, however, that the most important determinant of the institution-building process in Cuba was the character of the revolutionary struggle which preceded it.

Huntington argues that the development of a one-party political system can be most clearly traced in the shifting relationships between the party and other political actors contending with the party for control over the political process.3 In Cuba, the dynamics of institution-building were most clearly reflected (for reasons that will become apparent) in the sphere of civil-military relations, particularly relations between the armed forces and the party.4 It is on this aspect of the process that we focus our attention.
The 'Politico-Military Vanguard' of the Revolution

The central role in politics played by the Cuban armed forces during the 1960's was, in large measure, a heritage of the predominance of the Rebel Army in the struggle against Batista. While the guerrilla war in the Sierra was by no means the only arena of struggle, it had become, by 1958, the focal point of the insurrection. Prior to the landing of the Granma on December 2, 1956, active opposition to the dictatorship was concentrated in the cities: both the Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario—DR) led by José Antonio Echeverría, and the urban wing of the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento de 26 de julio—M-26-7) led by Frank País, conducted armed actions against the government during 1955 and 1956. From 1957 onward, however, the Rebel Army gained strength while the urban movements were progressively debilitated by repression. In 1957, the DR lost virtually its entire leadership (including Echeverría) and many of its most militant cadres in the March attack on the Presidential Palace. It never fully recovered from the debacle. In July of the same year, the urban wing of the M-26-7 lost its most skilled organizer when País was assassinated by the police in Santiago. Throughout 1957 and 1958, the urban movements were decimated by intensifying repression and by a series of unsuccessful actions: the Palace attack, the Cienfuegos uprising in September 1957, and the general strike of April 1958. With these defeats in the cities, popular attention shifted to the Sierra, and to the Rebel Army as the instrument by which the old regime would be deposed.5

This shift was clearly evident in the internal politics of the anti-Batista movement. In late 1957, Fidel Castro, commanding the Rebel Army in the Sierra, rejected the Pact of Miami negotiated by urban representatives of the M-26-7 with other elements of the insurrectionary movement. The subsequent withdrawal of the M-26-7 from the Pact established the predominance of the guerrillas within the M-26-7, and it established the predominance of
their commander, Fidel Castro. In May 1958, the National Directorate of the M-26-7 relocated from the cities to the Sierra.6

The final collapse of the Batista regime was the direct result of the regular army's inability to defeat the Rebels in the summer offensive of 1958. With that failure, the Rebels moved down out of the mountains for the final assault on the island's cities, and Batista's army simply disintegrated in the face of their advance. On January 2, 1959, when the Cuban Military Camp outside Havana surrendered to Camilo Cienfuegos' guerrilla column, the Rebel Army, though only 1500 strong, was the dominant force in the revolutionary movement. It held a monopoly of arms and, in the person of its commander-in-chief, a monopoly of popular support.

When the dictatorship collapsed, administrative control of the island passed to the guerrilla army. The Council of Ministers of the Revolutionary Government was composed almost entirely of civilians and was broadly representative of the various groups which had opposed Batista (except for the Popular Socialist Party—the communists—which was excluded), but it had no administrative apparatus through which to govern. Despite the wholesale dismissal of batistas from the old bureaucracy, the guerrilla commandantes remained deeply suspicious of it. Rather than allow a continuation of the bureaucracy's authority, they simply replaced it with the command structure of the Rebel Army.

Before Batista's defeat, the Rebel Army had already established an embryonic administrative apparatus to govern the liberated territory in the Sierra. After January 1959, this apparatus, still within the armed forces, expanded, becoming the "defacto executive" of the island.7 In each province, the military governor was the highest authority, and was responsible for the implementation of national policy in the area under his jurisdiction. It was the Rebel Army that created the Revolutionary Tribunals and conducted the trials of Batista's henchmen; it was the army, through its Department
of Information, that organized political education classes to build mass support for the revolution; and it was the army that ordered and carried out the early surge of public works projects—building schools, health clinics, rural housing, and roads. With effective political control firmly in the hands of the Rebel Army, the center of national policy-making gradually shifted out of the Council of Ministers and into the army's upper echelons. The Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959, by far the most important legislation of the revolution's first year, was drafted and discussed in the army and presented to the Council of Ministers as a fait accompli.

The Rebel Army was also the instrument through which the Agrarian Reform was carried out. Troops occupied the expropriated lands on behalf of the newly created National Institute of Agrarian Reform, which was itself closely linked to the Army. The INRA began by dividing the island into 28 Agricultural Development Zones each headed by a zone chief charged with directing the implementation of agrarian reform in his zone. Almost all the zone chiefs were army officers, and their authority was extremely broad; they were to do whatever was necessary to carry out the reform. In practice, their power even went beyond that because the authority of the INRA itself rapidly expanded into other administrative fields. In addition to directing the expropriation of land and its redistribution into state, co-operative, and small private farms, the INRA set up a network of People's Stores (selling commodities to the rural population at reduced prices); organized health services; extended agricultural credits; directed public works construction; and even assumed control over the import of goods essential to the agricultural economy—fertilizers, tractors, bulldozers, livestock, insecticides, etc. As the only functioning administrative body in the rural areas, the INRA was the government there. When the industrial sector of the economy was nationalized in 1960, it was placed in trusted hands—under the authority of the INRA. Thus the INRA became not merely the rural government.
administration, but the administration throughout the island. From this nucleus emerged many of the most important agencies of the socialist government.

The groups which participated in the insurrection were united only by their opposition to Batista; when faced with the question of how political power should be wielded to change Cuban society, the revolutionary coalition disintegrated rapidly. The concentration of the radicals in the Rebel Army was a key advantage for the left since effective control of the island had passed to the army. As the reforms of the new regime became increasingly radical in 1959 and 1960, the conservatives in the revolutionary coalition had no effective political instrument through which to mobilize support for their position or challenge the hegemony of the Rebel Army. Batista's dictatorship had not simply weakened the old political parties; with the exception of the communists, it had destroyed them. Neither the Auténticos nor Ortodoxos had the resiliency to survive and re-emerge as functioning organizations. In addition to its monopoly of army and of popular support, the Rebel Army was the only group with an organizational apparatus capable of administering policy. This, together with the overwhelming popularity and personal authority of Fidel Castro, ensured the political impotence and isolation of the conservatives.

Despite the command positions of such eminent radicals as Che Quevura and Raúl Castro, the Rebel Army was not wholly immune to the political differences that split the anti-Batista coalition. One of the most prominent opponents of the revolution's radicalization came from among the ranks of the comandantes. Major Hubert Matos, commander in Camagüey province, was an outspoken anti-communist and his opposition to radical reform, coming as it did from within the ranks of the Rebel Army, posed the most serious challenge to the left's leadership of the revolution. When Raúl Castro was appointed Minister of the Revolutionary Army Forces (FAR) in October 1959, Matos and
fourteen other officers resigned their commissions in protest. The government moved quickly to prevent the conservative opposition from coalescing around Matos; Castro himself went to Camaguey and personally placed Matos under arrest. Though other veterans of the struggle against Batista eventually went into opposition as the revolution moved leftward, the Matos resignation was the only breach of unity within the armed forces that was of any political consequence. Since 1959, the basic loyalty of the armed forces to the socialist course of the revolution has never been in doubt.

During the first two years of revolutionary government, the armed forces acted as the vanguard of the Cuban revolution, performing precisely the functions ordinarily performed by the communist party in the initial phase of a socialist revolution. They took effective control of the nation away from the old state bureaucracy, they seized the means of production, they mobilized popular support for the new regime, and they constituted the organizational core around which the foundations of a new political system were laid.

The left-wing of the anti-Batista coalition saw the role of the Rebel Army in these terms from the outset. Guevara, discussing the need for radical social change in January 1959, wrote, "What tools do we possess to carry out a program of this sort? We have the Rebel Army, and it must be our most vigorous and positive weapon...The Rebel Army is the vanguard of the Cuban people..." Nearly seventeen years later, looking back on this period, Fidel Castro made a similar observation:

"In the days before the integration of the revolutionary forces, before the emergence of the Party, the Army was the factor of cohesion and unity of the entire people, and guaranteed power for the working people..."

The example of the Cuban revolution inspired Regis Debray's new theory of revolution in which the revolutionary party would grow out of, and be subordinate to, the guerrilla army.

The pivotal role played by the military in Cuba's transition to socialism
makes it unique among communist political systems, and the effects of this unusual beginning on civil-military relations were visible for at least a decade.

The Creation of a New Communist Party

By April 1961, the only three groups remaining in the political arena—the M-26-7 minus its right-wing, the DR, and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)—had reached a general consensus on the socialist goals of the revolution. This consensus was to be reflected in Cuba's new political system by the creation of a new vanguard party. Formed by a merger of the three groups, the new party would provide a single forum for policy formation and a single infrastructure for mobilizing resources, both human and material, in the pursuit of chosen policy. Moreover, it would play the leading, directive role in the political process, thus relieving the armed forces of this responsibility.13

The decision to create a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party represented the first major attempt to institutionalize the new political system. In theory, this institutional realignment should have resulted in a much clearer demarcation of military and non-military roles, and a much narrower range of functions for the armed forces. With directive, mobilizational, and ideological functions in the hands of the party, the military would become subject to party supervision and control. In practice, the differentiation of functions between the party and the military remained incomplete through the 1960's. The military never quite surrendered the vanguard role it had played during the revolution's early years, and the party never attained the strength to assume it.

An attempt to transfer the central role in the political system from one institution to another might well have been expected to generate serious
intra-elite conflict between party and military leaders, each seeking to
defend and advance the prerogatives of their respective institutions. That
there was virtually no such conflict requires some explanation. At its high-
est echelons, the revolutionary leadership was not really divided between
military men and civilians. Most of the revolution's leaders came from a
military background; they had fought in the Sierra and often still held mili-
tary rank, whether or not they were still working in the armed forces. The
creation of a new party did not constitute an attack on the political influ-
ence of the PAR or its senior officers; it did not represent a shift of polit-
cal power from one sub-elite (military) to another (civilian). There was
no such internal differentiation of the political elite; military and civilian
roles were still fused, a legacy of the unique way in which the struggle
against Batista had developed.14 After victory, some of the revolutionary
soldiers took on tasks of civil administration, and some did not, but all per-
formed as the exigencies of the times required. The distinctions between
civilian and military roles characteristic of a highly structured, institu-
tionalized political system simply did not exist. The decision to create a
new party thus involved a division of labor within the political elite rather
than a transfer of influence from one elite group to another; it was an at-
tempt to begin differentiating between civilian and military roles.

In early 1961, the creation of a new party began with the merger of the
M-26-7, the DR, and the PSP in the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations
(Organizaciones Integradas Revolucionarias— ORI). Initially, the leadership
of the ORI was dominated by former members of the PSP since only they had the
organizational skill and experience required to build a new party.15 Aníbal
Escalante, formerly Organizational Secretary of the PSP, became Organizational
Secretary of the ORI, and in that capacity he directed the construction of
the new party throughout 1961. As the ORI grew, it became clear that Escalante
was using his powerful position to pack the emerging party apparatus with PSP
veterans to the virtual exclusion of those who had fought with the M-26-7 or the DR. The ORI was fast becoming the PSP under a new name. Not only did M-26-7 and DR veterans have difficulty getting into the new party, the ORI even ordered the removal of such veterans from their posts in the government and the armed forces on the grounds that they had a "low political level."16

Castro became aware of complaints about Escalante's conduct sometime in late 1961; in January 1962 he began travelling around the island to investigate personally how the ORI was being constructed. At one point, he met with over a hundred former FAR commanders who had been removed at the direction of the ORI. In March 1961, shortly after construction of the party in the FAR was to begin, Castro publicly denounced the ORI and Escalante's attempt to dominate the new party through bureaucratic machinations.17 Escalante left for exile in Czechoslovakia, and within a few months the ORI had been totally dismantled.

The episode of the ORI, though it involved the armed forces only marginally, had a profound impact on the evolution of civil-military relations. The political aftershocks of this initial attempt to institutionalize the political process reverberated through the Cuban political system long after the ORI's dissolution. Its most significant effect was to severely retard the development of a party apparatus capable of assuming the central, leading role in politics. Building the ORI was the first major attempt at institutionalization, and its disastrous failure engendered a marked reluctance on the part of the revolutionary leadership to resume the institutionalization process. This left the armed forces to continue as the regime's foremost organizational instrument.

A second attempt to build a new party began in the summer of 1962 after the dismantling of the ORI, but this attempt proceeded much more slowly than had the construction of the ORI. Members in the new United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista—PURS)
were to be selected by the "mass method." The revolutionary leadership dispatched party-building commissions to the nation's work centers to solicit from the workers nominations for party membership. Nominees elected by these work center meetings were investigated and interviewed by the commission, which then decided whether to accept them as party members. This decision had to be ratified by 70% of the nominee's co-workers for the nominee to enter the party. In cases where a nominee was rejected by the commission, his/her co-workers could mandate reconsideration of the case, but the final decision remained with the commission.

By 1965, this method of selecting party members was far enough advanced for the PUFs to begin operations on a national scale. The new party was formally inaugurated in October 1965, at which time its name was changed to the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC). However, throughout the 1960's, the PCC remained an extremely weak organization.

The most compelling evidence of the PCC's weakness was its small size (Table 1), with the resultant shortage of competent cadres and disorganization of operations. Throughout the 1960's, the PCC was the smallest ruling communist party by a wide margin. Its membership comprised only 0.7% of the population in 1969, whereas the next smallest ruling party (Albania) comprised 3.0%. For all ruling parties, the average size in 1969 was 7.0%—ten times the size of the Cuban party. Consequently, many Cuban work centers had no party organization at all.

Another symptom of the PCC's low level of institutional development was the emergence of serious organizational difficulties when the party began nation-wide operations in 1965. "Our party organization," observed Organizational Secretary Armando Hart in 1966, "is extraordinarily weak in relation to the national and international duties that confront us." Party cadres were overworked, isolated from one another, and poorly educated. In 1967, only 21% of party members had a sixth grade education. In Matanzas province,
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Nuclei of Population</th>
<th>Members as a % of Population</th>
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<td>1962 (Sept.)</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 (Nov.)</td>
<td>5,414</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>.08%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1963 (Mar.)</td>
<td>16,002</td>
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<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 (Feb.)</td>
<td>32,537</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 (Oct.)</td>
<td>35,558</td>
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<td>.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>202,807</td>
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Sources: "El estado de la reestructuración en el país," Cuba Socialista, No. 14 (October 1962), 121; "Resumen nacional de la reestructuración," Cuba Socialista, No. 16 (December 1962), 117.

a senior PCC official acknowledged that poor organizational work had left many work centers without a party organization. In some factories, he continued, party members were not even functioning together as a unit because things were so disorganized; but even if they had been, they would have been overwhelmed because there was vastly more work to be done than there were party members to do it.22

Complicating these difficulties was the absence of any clear boundaries between party and state functions. In the years after the party's inauguration in 1965, the PCC interfered increasingly in the administrative tasks of the government bureaucracy, generating both friction and inefficiency.

These weaknesses, taken together, prevented the PCC from operating effectively. Through the 1960's, the party never really coalesced as an institution; it had no statutes, no program, no effective apparatus, and no clear sphere of authority relative to other institutions in the political system. The failure of the revolutionary leadership to construct an effective party organization is traceable to their experience with the OHL. That experience slowed the process of institutionalization immeasurably; after 1962, the revolutionary leadership was clearly unwilling to move too rapidly in building new political institutions for fear these might later become "strait-jackets" hindering the revolution's advance.23

Building the Party in the Revolutionary Armed Forces

One of the clearest indications of the PCC's weakness during the 1960's was its relationship with the armed forces. The new party's inability to assume the directive role in the political process meant that the well-organized military retained its position as the vanguard of the revolution by default. The party apparatus created within the armed forces, though better organized than its civilian counterpart, was never fully differentiated from the command
structure. To the extent that any role differentiation was introduced, the party was clearly subordinate to the military hierarchy. The party in the FAR did not supervise or direct the armed forces; rather, it served as a mobilizational adjunct to assist the officers corps in carrying out its command responsibilities. The military sector of the party, however, was a very influential component of the party as a whole.

The process of building the party in the FAR differed markedly from the process in the civilian sector. The contrasts indicate that the revolutionary leadership had two specific aims with regard to the party in the armed forces: (1) the party-building process and the party structure that emerged from it were to be much more highly centralized and much more closely reviewed by senior officials than the civilian party organization; and (2) neither the construction of the PCC nor its subsequent operations were to interfere in the slightest with the authority of individual commanders or with the efficient operation of the command structure as a whole. These two aims were not unrelated; strict supervision and central control of the party in the FAR would prevent, or at least quickly detect and remedy, any conflicts between party apparatus and the military command.

Construction of the party in the armed forces began in December 1963 and took three years to complete. The process was conducted meticulously and with much greater scrutiny by the national leadership than the party-building process in the civilian sector received. As in the civilian sector, the party was built by commissions formed especially for this purpose (Commissions for the Construction of the Party in the FAR), these being composed of political instructors selected from within the FAR. The preparation for their task was much more extensive than that received by the civilian cadres. The FAR instructors went through a training course, consulted with experts on political work within the armed forces from other socialist countries, and then garnered practical experience by directing party-building in the
Finally, as a pilot project, party branches were formed in one unit of the Western Army, and then meetings of the political instructors were held to evaluate the results of the project. Even when the process of building the PUN in the armed forces got fully under way, it was conducted in one army at a time, thus allowing both for an accumulation of experience and for maximum supervision by the national leadership.

The "mass method" of having co-workers elect nominees to party membership was also used in the Far, though instead of electing "exemplary workers," the soldiers elected "exemplary fighters." The assemblies for doing this, however, were stratified by rank so that the criticism of nominees would not undermine the authority of military superiors. Thus, in each unit, separate meetings were held for soldiers, corporals, and sergeants. No meetings were held for officers; their rank carried with it the presumption that they possessed the qualities of a good communist, and so all officers were automatically considered for party membership. When officers did assemble at a later stage in the process, there were four categories based on rank, each of which met separately. After investigating and interviewing nominees, the Commission reached a preliminary decision on each case, but before these decisions became final they had to be reviewed not once but twice by higher commissions overseeing the construction process. In each case, the final decision lay with the High Commission, composed of the senior party officials in the Far—the Ministry's Political Direction and the Political Sections of the three armies. Such detailed review of the decisions of the party-building commissions had no equivalent in the civilian sector; there, the original commission's decision was not subject to routine review by higher levels.

One final difference in the party-building procedure within the Far concerned the final ratification of commission decisions by the co-workers of nominees. Such ratification was required in the civilian sector before
an individual could enter the party, and co-workers could force a commission
to reconsider a negative decision on a nominee. In the FAR, the assembly of
a nominee's co-workers was simply informed of the commission's decision; they
were not asked to ratify it and they could not force a reconsideration.

The practice of stratifying party-building meetings by rank was explicitly
aimed at safeguarding the integrity of the command structure. If each meeting
involved only people of approximately equal rank, the criticism of nominees
could inflict minimal damage on military discipline. Carefully training com-
mmission members and subjecting their decisions to a multi-stage review process
left virtually no chance that the fiasco of the ORT could be repeated within
the armed forces. Since every party member in the FAR had to be ultimately
approved by the political leadership of the Ministry, control over the party-
building process was lodged firmly in the hands of senior officers.

Just as the procedure for creating the PURS in the armed forces differed
from the procedures used in the civilian sector, so too did the structure and
operation of the party organization in the FAR differ from those of the civilian
party. The differences once again were aimed at maximizing central control
and minimizing party interference with the military command structure. The
base level party organization in the FAR was the nucleus, just as in the
civilian sector. All party members in a military unit, whatever their rank,
worked together in the same nucleus. At the Battalion (or equivalent unit)
level, a Party Bureau coordinated and directed the work of the nuclei in this
larger unit. Members of the Party Bureau were elected by direct secret ballot
of all party members in the Battalion.

Above the Party Bureaus were the Political Sections of the major mili-
tary units (Brigades, Divisions, Armies). They comprised the main directive
organs of the party within the FAR. Their members were not elected but were
appointed from above by the National Commission of the PURS-FAR (after 1965,
Committee of the FCC). In contrast, within the civilian party, all officials were, at least in principle, elected. Taken together, the party organization in the armed forces constituted the Political Department of the Ministry, and it was headed by the Chief of the Political Direction.

A particularly significant difference between the party structure in the military and civilian sectors was the existence of Party Commissions (not to be confused with the Commissions for the Construction of the Party) at every level of the party in the FAR. They were explicitly not leadership bodies, but constituted, in essence, a control apparatus parallel to the regular party organization, somewhat analogous to the Control Commissions within the Soviet Communist Party. Their function was to oversee the "purity" of the party's ranks; they were empowered to review the selection of new members by nuclei, to review sanctions against party members, and to resolve, "in the last instance" problems concerning the conduct of party members. Such a control mechanism was not established in the civilian sector of the party until 1976. During the 1960's, in fact, central supervision and direction over party operations in the civilian sector was severely deficient.

The functional relationship between the party organization in the FAR and the military command structure was also arranged so as to minimize the possibility of conflict arising between the two. At every juncture, this was accomplished by subordinating the party organization within the FAR to the military hierarchy. As Raúl Castro explained, every statute of the party in the FAR was written so as to preserve the authority and prestige of commanders, guided by the principle: "The order of a Chief is Law which embodies the will and command of the Fatherland." The statutes specifically prohibit any criticism or discussion of military commands in party meetings. When the party organizations were first formed, no criticism of any aspect of a commander's performance was allowed by the party organization within the unit he commanded. All criticisms of officers by party members had to be referred
to higher party authorities, who could then hold the officer accountable for his political work only. Officers were held accountable for their command decisions only by their superior officers. 28

Despite this nearly total prohibition on the criticism of officers, the creation of the party in the FAR produced friction nonetheless. Some party officials complained that the limits on criticism prevented the correction of officers' shortcomings. Some officers, on the other hand, viewed party criticism of any aspect of their unit's operation as reflecting negatively on their performance. Responding to these problems in 1966, Raúl Castro tried to strike a balance between the conflicting views. He defended the party's right to criticize the general operations of a unit, so long as this was done in a constructive, comradely fashion, but he reaffirmed the limits on criticizing commanding officers. He justified this reaffirmation on the grounds that, before the formation of the party, it was the FAR which had been the vanguard of the revolution. 29

The party's role in the FAR was by no means a supervisory one; rather, it was defined almost exclusively in mobilizational terms:

The essential objective of the Party organizations in the FAR cannot be other than contributing with all their energy to our armed forces being able to capably fulfill their sacred mission of defending the integrity of our territory, protecting the creative work of the people, and the conquests of the socialist revolution. 30

Individual party branches in the FAR were to carry out this task by assisting commanders to accomplish the duties assigned to the unit by the military hierarchy. Pursuant to this, commanders could suggest to the party how it might best assist them, although they could not direct party work. Of course, the party could not give orders to commanding officers. As José N. Causse, Chief of the Political Direction of the FAR, explained, the "leading role" of the party was not the same in the armed forces as in civilian institutions. The party directed the armed forces through the Military Commission of the National Directorate of PURS (after 1965, the Military Commission of the Central
Committee of the PCC), not through the operations of the party apparatus within the FAR.  

There can be little doubt that the functioning of the party apparatus in the FAR was subordinate to the military hierarchy. The preference given to officers in the selection of party members resulted in the nearly 70% of all PCC members in the armed forces being officers. At the same time, a majority of the officers corps belonged to the party. Above the level of party nuclei, commanding officers who were party members were "by right," members of the Party Bureau (although, to avoid an "accumulation of functions" they could not be party General Secretary or Organizational Secretary). The prohibition on criticisms, the party's task of aiding commanders in carrying out military directives, and the right of commanders to "suggest" how the party might do this, reduced the party to the role of a mobilizational instrument at the disposal of the command hierarchy. Indeed, this was the main advantage of having a party in the FAR, as it was described to the officers.  

These structural and operational safeguards against party infringement on the command hierarchy's authority were so extensive that they proscribed any autonomous activity by the party in the FAR. The function of the Political Department was clearly not to supervise the FAR or ensure its loyalty. The loyalty of the armed forces was ensured by the military elite's personal loyalty to Fidel and Raúl Castro, who had led them through the guerrilla war. Rather than acting as an independent control mechanism, the party in the FAR was basically a mobilizational instrument. The lack of autonomy from the military hierarchy which characterized the party in the FAR was so severe, in fact, that to describe the party as subordinate may not be quite accurate. Despite the formal differentiation between the two institutions, and despite the individual cases of friction between commanders and party organizations, the boundaries between the command structure and the party apparatus in the FAR were not clearly drawn and tended
to disappear in practice. That is, the military hierarchy and the party apparatus within the FAR were, to a large degree, fused, and this fusion was at least partially recognized and sanctioned. The Political Department (i.e., the party apparatus) was part of both the party and the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. It formed part of the regular command structure (the Chief of the Political Direction is a Vice-Minister and sits on the General Staff) and as such was charged with directing political education for all FAR members. Finally, since the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of the FAR (the two highest ranking officers) were also First and Second Secretaries of the party, all party members in the FAR were advised to regard military orders as having the force of party directives. This is the logic of fused institutions; not only is conflict between the hierarchies to be minimized, it is rendered impossible by definition.

While a high degree of fusion characterized the relationship between the military and the party in the FAR (with the military hierarchy clearly in the dominant position), there are indications that the party in the FAR was relatively autonomous of the party in the civilian sector. Party organizations in the FAR were, of course, responsible only to superior organs of the party within the armed forces, except at the national level. The National Commission of the PUSA-FAR was purportedly the mechanism through which the PCC directed the armed forces from 1963 to 1955. This Commission was subordinate to the National Directorate of the PUSA, but all its members were military officers on active assignment in the FAR. In 1965, when the National Directorate of PUSA was replaced by the Central Committee of the PCC, the National Commission of the PUSA-FAR was replaced by the Central Committee's Military Commission. It, too, was composed entirely of active military officers: Maj. Raúl Castro (Minister of the MINFAR); Maj. Ramiro Valdés (Minister of MININT); and Maj. Sergio del Valle (Vice-Minister of the MINFAR). In addition, the process of building the party in the armed forces was directed by the
FAR itself; the political instructors who carried out the process were all FAR members.

Not only did the military basically control the party within the FAR, it also exercised substantial influence in the party as a whole. While no civilians sat on party committees in the FAR, party members from the armed forces were to be found on committees at every level of the wider party organization. The influence of the FAR was clearest in the national leadership of the party (Table 2). Eight of the 25 (32.0%) members of the 1962 National Directorate of the PUFs were active military officers, and when the 100 member Central Committee of the PCC was unveiled in 1965, 56% of the seats were held by officers. Five of the 8 members of the Political Bureau of the PCC (excluding Fidel himself) were officers: Raúl Castro (Minister, FAR); Ramiro Valdés (Minister, Interior); Juan Almeida (First Vice-Minister, FAR); Sergio del Valle (Vice-Minister, FAR); and Guillermo García (Commander, Western Army). According to Raúl Castro, this large number of military officers was "no accident" in view of the FAR's vanguard role in the revolution's early years.⁷

Comparing the military representation on the 1965 Central Committee to central committees in other socialist countries, the difference is striking. From 1952 to 1961, military personnel comprised, on the average, only 9.3% of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union; among Eastern European parties, the post-war average is about 11%.⁸ Even in China, where the party and the armed forces were highly fused during the guerrilla war (thus making the Chinese case more similar to the Cuban), the military held no comparable predominance after liberation. At the Eighth Congress of the CCP, the last before the Cultural Revolution, only 22.9% of those elected to the Central Committee held military posts. Only the Central Committee elected at the CPC's Ninth Congress, held in 1969,⁹ produced a Central Committee with military representation comparable to that of Cuba's 1965 Central Committee. The Ninth Congress produced a Central Committee with a military
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=1975 Central Committee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<tr>
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<td>40.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
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Table 2: Institutional representation in the Cuban political elite, 1962-1975.
contingent comprising between two-fifths and three-fourths of its membership, thus reflecting the pivotal role played by the People's Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution.40

The high degree of military influence in the PCC as a whole indicates that the absence of adequate role differentiation was a system-wide problem. The fusion of civilian and military roles persisted at both the individual and institutional levels, and the directive role in the political system did not pass to the new party. Instead, it continued to be played by a revolutionary leadership composed of people who often held, at the same time, high military rank, high party position, and high governmental office. Areas of responsibility between these three institutions were no more clearly drawn than were the roles of their leaders; the institutions performed whatever tasks the revolutionary leadership set for them.

The Militarization of the Economy, 1968-1970

Faced with unrelenting hostility from the United States, the Cuban armed forces were, of necessity, well organized, well staffed, and well trained. No other Cuban political institution could compare with the FAR in these respects. The party and the government bureaucracy, in contrast, were plagued with organizational difficulties throughout the 1960's. The massive administrative requirements of the drive to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970 proved to be beyond the capabilities of these institutions, and so the revolutionary leadership turned to the armed forces to provide the necessary expertise. From 1968 through the end of the 1970 sugar harvest, the administration of the Cuban economy became increasingly "militarized."41 As Castro commented in November 1969:

...the army, the Armed Forces, is a disciplined institution par excellence; they have more experience in organization and have more discipline. It is necessary that the positive influences of such organizational spirit, of discipline, of experience, be constantly
This militarization had several dimensions: (1) a militarization of the symbolism of the revolution, represented by the use of military terminology to describe economic tasks; (2) an increase in the use of military units as a labor pool; (3) a surge of transfers of military officers into high civilian governmental posts; and (4) the introduction of military administrative and organizational methods in the production process.

The use of military symbolism was an attempt to stimulate production by creating a crisis or wartime atmosphere. Castro repeatedly complained that while the people had proven themselves capable of great bursts of determination and energy, they seemed to lack the discipline required for sustained efforts.

We are still a people characterized by great enthusiasm and decision at decisive moments, a people capable of giving up life itself at any hour, on any day, capable of heroism at any moment, but a people that still lack the virtues of tenacity, the demonstration of courage and heroism not only in the dramatic moments but on each and every day. 43

The use of military terminology was aimed at creating a sense of urgency, a "decisive moment," and the spirit of past decisive moments was invoked:

"Our country is passing through a period of revolutionary fervor that can be compared with the heroic days of Ciro and the October crisis."44 Press reports spoke of the party's "war plans" for production, of "invading" various economic fronts. Castro's comments on September 28, 1968 were typical:

Today I can see an immense army, an army of a highly organized, disciplined, and enthusiastic nation, ready to fulfill whatever task it sets, ready to give battle to all those who stand in the way... We can say that loafing and absenteeism are beating a retreat. We must cut off that retreat, do as the guerrillas do who surround the retreating enemy and wipe him out." 45

Cuba was at war with underdevelopment, and the production of ten million tons of sugar in 1970 would be its decisive victory.

The use of military personnel as a supplement to the civilian labor force began early in the revolution; it represented an important part of the militarization because of its rapid expansion in the late 1960's. The
Rebel Army and the FAR both undertook extensive public works projects in the revolution's early years. Throughout the 1960's, troops assisted in the agricultural harvests, especially in provinces with low population density and a consequent labor shortage. Along with volunteer workers, the soldiers replaced the reserve army of the unemployed which had migrated from place to place looking for work before the revolution. The compulsory military service law of 1963 was openly acknowledged to be a means of increasing the mobile, low cost labor force which the FAR provided. One commentator has estimated that 25-33% of the average recruit's time was spent on civic action projects.

By 1968, declining labor productivity had greatly intensified the need for additional manpower, and the FAR was increasingly pressed into service to make up the shortage. From November 1969 to mid-1970 (the ten million ton harvest), 100,000 troops were engaged in agricultural work. These troops representing nearly half the FAR's total manpower, harvested 20% of the sugar crop. The participation of the military was so important that Cuban exiles staged several attacks on the island during this time with the intention of drawing troops away from their work, thus damaging the harvest.

In the years between 1968 and 1970, a large number of military officers migrated from the FAR into civilian administrative posts at all levels, especially into offices dealing directly with the administration of the economy. The Ministry of the Armed Forces became a "superagency" supplying trained personnel to the rest of the government. The reason for this influx of military officers into non-military posts was fairly simple; they were among the best educated Cuban leaders, and they had the most organizational and administrative skill and experience. Officers spent up to four years in preparatory schools before entering the 3.5 year course of study at one of Cuba's military academies, and many went on to receive further education in technical specialties. The education of other leaders was much inferior; the majority of party members did not have a sixth grade education, and most
plant administrators had no better.\textsuperscript{51}

One straight-forward way of introducing the efficiency of the FAR into the administration of the economy was to simply place FAR officers in charge of it. The transfer of personnel was so extensive that when the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers was formed in the early 1970's, the six of its eleven members responsible for all the economic and social service ministries had all been FAR commanders as late as 1966.

A comparison of the 1965 and 1975 Central Committees of the PCC offers another indicator of the circulation of military officers into non-military posts. Of the 77 people who have been members of both Central Committees, 32 held posts in a different institution in 1975 than they had in 1965. Personnel circulation between the party and the government bureaucracy has been relatively balanced, with 3 people shifting from the party to the government and 5 shifting in the opposite direction. Circulation between the armed forces and the other institutions, however, has been wholly undirectional. Eighteen officers left the FAR, 7 for party posts and 11 for governmental posts. Many of these former officers took over extremely important posts: 6 became Deputy Prime Ministers, 2 became Ministers, and 2 became members of the PCC Secretariat.

As these personnel transfers were occurring, the island's administrative system, particularly its economic administration, was being remodelled along military lines. Two major experiments in the militarization of the economy preceded the nationwide change-over to military methods of organization. In late 1966, "agricultural brigades" were organized in some rural areas; it was hoped that their quasi-military command structure would improve poor organization and low productivity in agricultural work. The agricultural brigade par excellence was the Che Guevarra Trailblazers Brigade. Inaugurated in 1967, commanded by military officers, and comprised mostly of soldiers, the Trailblazers cleared agricultural land for cultivation. A great success in terms
of productivity, they received much laudatory publicity and were held up as an example of what could be accomplished with the proper organizational methods.52

The second experiment was actually a trial run for the general militarization of the economy. Every year since 1961 the Cubans have celebrated their victory at Playa Giron with a week or several weeks of intensified productive efforts and voluntary labor campaigns (during the 1961 invasion, despite the fact that many workers left their jobs when the militia was mobilized, production increased dramatically). During the 1968 Work Rally, the objective set in Oriente province was to test a recently devised plan for the "organization and planning of all the non-military resources of the country with a view toward military struggle in the event of war." Specifically, the Oriente experiment was intended to "stimulate the economy and prepare the masses militarily and create conditions for the switch-over to a war economy."53

Under this "Civil Defense" plan, all political and administrative institutions (i.e., the PCC, the government, and all the mass organizations) were brought under the unified command of Civil Defense Councils which came to be known as Mobilization General Staffs ("from now on we use military terminology"). In the rural areas, the work force was organized into battalions, companies, platoons, and squads each with their own commanders and general staffs. The battalion level commanders were PCC officials (many of whom were also FAR officers) and the seconds-in-command were FAR reserve officers. This new administrative structure had dual hierarchies—one for the agricultural economy and one for the urban economy. The authority of the rural commanders was predominant; at the provincial level, the commander of the "front-line command post" (in the countryside) was the General Secretary of the provincial PCC while the "rear-echelon command post" (in an urban area) was under the command of the PCC's Second Secretary for the province.54

In reporting the 1968 Giron Work Rally in Oriente, Granma hinted that the outcome of the experiment was being viewed favorably. "This report is highly
interesting because it shows how the experience of military organization based upon the Civil Defense set-up can be applied to the productive effort. This experience in Oriente contains a valuable lesson for the rest of the country. 55

In 1969 and 1970 the entire sugar sector and most of the rest of the economy was run on this military model under the command of FAR officers at almost all administrative levels. The reason for this change-over to a "war economy" was the need to alleviate administrative deficiencies and to raise labor discipline. "In a real sense," wrote Malloy, "all Cubans are now considered to be soldiers in a vast producing army... The image of the army has become the image of society." 56 The militarization of the economy involved, in essence, the transfer of military concepts of organization and discipline (along with the people schooled in them) to the civilian economy. Describing a voluntary labor mobilization in 1969, Granma commented, "Doing a job such as this quickly and correctly calls for organization and discipline similar to that of an army in combat, and that is precisely what we have here: an army of the people engaged in the battle of agriculture." 57

Not surprisingly, the militarization greatly increased the prestige and influence of the Armed Forces relative to other political institutions. In 1968, the Council of Ministers designated December 2 (the anniversary of the landing of the Granma and therefore the birth of the Rebel Army) "Armed Forces Day"—a national holiday set aside to honor the FAR. The editorial in Granma celebrating Armed Forces Day, 1969 made clear that military defense was by no means the FAR's only contribution to the Revolution:

Our Armed Forces...today constitute a fundamental force for the realization of our country's all-important plans for economic development. ... The discipline, organization, habits of precision and exactitude of our Revolutionary Army Forces will be placed at the service of our sugar harvest and their influence will be felt throughout the entire process.

It was also at this time that the press began reminding the people that in
the early years of the Revolution, the armed forces alone had constituted the "politico-military vanguard."

Overall, the militarization of economic administration in Cuba during the late 1960's must be adjudged to have been a failure. Whether economic management was more efficient under military command than it otherwise would have been is, of course, impossible to assess. The armed forces did not succeed, however, in improving labor productivity or resource allocation enough to reach the goal of ten million tons of sugar. Moreover, the regime paid an important political price for the militarization in the aggravation of popular discontent.

The De-militarization of the Revolution: Differentiating Civilian and Military Roles

On May 19, 1970, Fidel Castro announced to the Cuban people that the most intense effort ever organized by the Revolution would end in failure; the goal upon which he had staked his personal prestige and the prestige of the revolution— the production of ten million tons of sugar in 1970— could not be achieved. Even though a record 8.5 million tons was eventually produced, the defeat was made more bitter still by the damage done to the rest of the economy. During the harvest, the sugar sector was given absolute priority in resource allocation; the result was massive dislocation in virtually every other economic sector. Nor was the damage solely economic. Production declines meant still greater austerity for a population already pushed beyond its tolerance; the response was not favorable. "Our enemies say we have problems, and in reality, our enemies are right," Castro admitted on July 26, "They say there is discontent...they say there is irritation, and in reality, our enemies are right." 60

The immediate task facing the revolutionary leadership in late 1970 was
to begin economic recovery, and priority was given to the consumer goods industry in order to ease the shortages that had been worsening since 1966. The real problem revealed by the failure of the ten million ton harvest was political, however, and it is to the credit of the leaders of the Cuban revolution that they were able to recognize and willing to admit that the root of their difficulties had to be sought in the political structure they themselves had created over the previous decade.

Shortly after the announcement that ten million tons of sugar could not be produced, the PCC advanced the slogan, "Turn the Setback to a Victory." If the failure of the harvest became the occasion for a forthright examination of the revolution's errors and weaknesses, it could become a victory nonetheless. As a result of this reassessment, the Cuban revolution entered a "new phase" in which "institutionalization" and "democratization" became the watchwords of a far-reaching reorganization of the entire political system.

The institutionalization of Cuban politics since 1970 has had a profound effect on civil-military relations. Within both the party and the government, internal coordination and control were systematized, institutional functions were specified, and individual roles were codified. Moreover, the functional boundaries between institutions were, for the first time, clearly delineated and enforced. As institutionalization progressed, the party apparatus and the government bureaucracy gained strength dramatically, thus reducing the advantage of organizational efficiency held by the FAR during the 1960's. This produced a clear differentiation of civilian and military roles, with a consequent restriction of the armed forces to national defense affairs.

This was first noticeable in the plaudits accorded to the FAR on Armed Forces Day. After 1970, editorials ceased mentioning the FAR's contribution to developing the national economy and concentrated instead only upon the FAR's defense of the nation from military threat. In December 1976, this role differentiation was formalized in the Law on the Organization of Central
State Agencies. Article 73 defines the functions of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces:

The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces is the agency in charge of directing and carrying out the policy of the state and government regarding the defense of the sovereignty and independence of the country and the principles of the socialist Revolution...

Seven specific functions are elaborated in the Article: (1) to command the armed forces; (2) to present the government with proposals concerning the FAR's organization and development; (3) to implement laws concerning the FAR; (4) to regulate the activities of the troops; (5) to improve combat readiness; (6) to improve technical and military training; and (7) to direct the Popular Defense militia. All these duties are strictly military affairs; there is no mention of any wider role for the FAR. Similarly, the Program of the PCC adopted at the First Congress in December 1975, defines the military's role as strictly one of national defense.

The growing militarization of the economy during the late 1960's has been reversed since 1970. The use of military symbolism has disappeared; the flow of military officers into non-military posts has virtually ceased; and the militarization of production conducted under the auspices of the Civil Defense plan has not been used since 1970. The use of troops as a labor pool has been considerably reduced, though not ended since troops still constitute an essential supplement to the agricultural labor force during harvests. In August 1973, the production units of the PAR ("Permanent Infantry Divisions") merged with the Centennial Youth Column (a group of quasi-military agricultural brigades begun in 1968 by the Union of Young Communists) to form the Army of Working Youth. This new unit remains a part of the FAR (its Chief is a Deputy Minister of the FAR), but its formation marks a clear differentiation within the FAR of military units from production units. Regular troops are no longer routinely used for agricultural labor, as was the case in the 1960's.

In December 1973 the rank structure of the FAR was revised to bring it
more into line with those of other socialist countries. The new rank system also served, however, to emphasize and reinforce the increasing differentiation between civilian and military roles. Officers no longer working in the Ministry of the Armed Forces or the Ministry of the Interior were not given new ranks, and the press ceased identifying them by their former ranks. 65

The growing strength and autonomy of the party and the government was also reflected in the composition of the political elite within those institutions. While active military officers dominated the highest echelons of both these institutions during the 1960's, the number of such officers in high party and government posts has been greatly reduced since 1970 (Table 3).

In the PCC as a whole, the proportion of total party membership concentrated in the FAR has remained fairly constant at about 20%. However, in the new Central Committee elected at the first Congress of the PCC, military officers constitute only 29.8% of the membership. This represents a substantial decline from the 56% of the 1965 Central Committee who were active military officers. The composition of the Political Bureau of the party reflects a similar decline in military influence. Whereas 5 of the 8 members of the 1965 Political Bureau held military posts (excluding Fidel), only 2 of the 13 members in the new Political Bureau are officers, and this includes Raúl Castro, who also holds the second highest posts in both the party and the government.

The role of military officers in the PCC's provincial executive committee is especially revealing because it indicates the degree to which the party apparatus has been effectively differentiated from the armed forces. During the late 1960's, virtually every provincial executive committee contained several military officers, and some were led by officers. In 1975, no provincial executive committee had more than a single military member, and some contained no officers at all. Overall, FAR officers constituted less than 6% of the approximately 90 provincial executive committee members, indicating
Table 3: Participation of FAR Personnel in the Party and Government, 1965-1976 (as percentage of total participants)

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<tr>
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<th>1965</th>
<th>1975-76</th>
<th>% Change, 1965-1976 (negative)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total membership</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of State</td>
<td>—</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Sources: FAR membership in the PCC in 1965 is estimated from data contained in José N. Causse Pérez, "La construcción del Partido en La Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Cuba," Cuba Socialista, No. 47 (July 1965), 51-67. FAR membership in the PCC in 1975 is based upon the percentage of delegates to the First Party Congress who were from the FAR, since the delegates were said to reflect the composition of the party as a whole. For a profile of the delegates, see Carlos Del Toro, "Cronica Abreviada del Primer Congreso," Verde Olivo, February 1976, pp. 28-33. Sources of Central Committee and Political Bureau data are cited in Table 2. The proportion of the voting population which is in the FAR is estimated from the total voting population ("The Election is a Great Achievement..." Gramma Weekly Review, October 24, 1976, p. 11) and the current strength of the FAR (Fidel Castro, "Report of the Central Committee of the PCC to the First Congress," in First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Collection of Documents (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 16-279). FAR members in the National Assembly of People's Power is reported in "National Assembly of People's Power Set up," Gramma Weekly Review, December 12, 1976, p. 4. Membership of the Council of State is listed in "Council of State," Gramma Weekly Review, December 12, 1976, p. 5, and the institutional affiliations of Council members were compiled from Cuban press sources.
that the differentiation of the civilian party apparatus from the military has advanced considerably.\textsuperscript{66}

Since there were no governmental assemblies in Cuba prior to the creation of People's Power in 1976, we cannot compare the number of military officers on such bodies now with comparable data from the late 1960's. Nevertheless, the 1976 election data corroborates the evidence from our examination of the PCC. The government is now headed by the National Assembly of People's Power and its executive committee, the Council of State. These bodies are analogous to the USSR's Supreme Soviet and Presidium, respectively. Of the 481 deputies in the National Assembly, only 7.3\% are members of the armed forces. The Council of State has 31 members, among which there are 5 military officers (excluding Fidel). Clearly, the prominence of military officers in state administration has declined substantially since the late 1960's.

The basic structure and operational precepts established for the party organization within the armed forces when it was being built appear to still be in force, and they are still significantly different from the structure and operations of the civilian party organization. The Statutes adopted for the entire party at its First Congress specify in detail the functions of civilian party organizations, but the party in the MINPAC and MININT is to be "guided by its own special regulations and instructions, as ratified by the Central Committee."\textsuperscript{67} There are also some indications that the democratization of inner party operations which occurred in the civilian party during the 1970's has been less effective in the party organizations within the armed forces.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, the primary tasks of the party in the armed forces are also the same as they were in the 1960's: assisting commanders to fulfill their missions, increasing combat readiness, and conducting political education.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, the changes in party-military relations since 1970 have apparently had only minimal impact on the party within the military.

There are, however, some indications that the PCC, having established
its institutional autonomy from the armed forces, is beginning to assert its right, as the leading political institution, to supervise the operations of the military.

Formally, control over the armed forces has been vested in both the government bureaucracy and the party, and the legal structure of authority has changed little since 1965 (Figure 1). The ministers of both the MINPAR and MININT are members of the Council of Ministers; they are thus subject to its directives, and through it, to directives from the Council of State. Party control is formally exercised through the Military Department of the Central Committee, on behalf of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. Internally, neither the MINPAR nor MININT are in any way subject to direction by the party organizations within the ministries.

It is doubtful, however, that either the Council of Ministers or the Military Department of the Central Committee have ever exercised much control over the armed forces in practice. In all probability, military policy is debated in the PCC's Political Bureau and communicated directly to the ministries, since the ministers of both the MINPAR and MININT have always been Political Bureau members. If this is in fact the case, then the Council of Ministers probably handles routine matters of coordination between the armed forces and other ministries, and the Central Committee's Military Department probably deals with party work in the armed forces rather than with military policy.

Nevertheless, the PCC's Program, adopted at the First Congress, calls for the party to be "zealously vigilant" in promoting the "best possible functioning of its mechanisms of direction over the work of the FAR and MININT." In doing this, "the strengthening of the role and influence of the party organizations" in these ministries is to be regarded as a "task of great importance." This may indicate an intention to increase the supervisory role of the party apparatus within the armed forces. Further, the Military Department,
Figure 1: Cuban Military Structure

- President
  - Council of State
    - Council of Ministers
      - Ministry of the Interior (MININT)
      - Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR)
        - General Staff
          - Service and Army General Staffs
            - Division and Brigade General Staffs
              - Battalion General Staffs
                - Companies
        - MINFAR Political Direction
          - Political Sections
            - Party Commissions
              - Party Bureaus
                - Nuclei
Figure 1: Notes


Explanatory Notes:

The structure of the PCC in the MININT, and the ministry's relationship to the party as a whole, are analogous to the MINPFA.

At present, the General Staff consists of the Minister, the First Deputy Minister (Chief of the General Staff), and seven Deputy Ministers (the chiefs of logistics, combat training, the navy (MGR), the air and air defense force (DAAFAR), the army of working youth (EJT), the militia (Defensa Popular), and the Political Direction. There are three regular combat services: the army, the navy, and the air and air defense force. The army is divided into three military regions: the Eastern, Central, and Western Armies. In addition there are several Independent Army Corps and other units not attached to the main Armies.

Unlike the Political Direction and the Political Sections, neither the Party Bureaus nor the nuclei are part of the actual command structure of the FAR. Therefore, in principle, they are not subject to direction by the military hierarchy.
despite its somewhat restricted role, now appears to be more independent of
the FAR than it was previously. The head of the Military Department, Calixto
García, does not have any operational responsibilities within the FAR, as did
all the members of the earlier bodies, the National Commission of the PURS-FAR
and the Military Commission of the PCC. These changes may indicate a trend
toward greater PCC control over the armed forces, but the evidence thus far
is much too sparse to warrant more than very tentative conclusions. There is
no doubt, however, that since 1970 the Communist Party of Cuba has successfully
assumed from the armed forces the leading role in politics which is character-
istically the prerogative of ruling communist parties.

Clientelist Politics in Cuba: A Fractional Model of Civil-Military Relations

The explanation advanced thus far for the evolution of civil-military
relations in revolutionary Cuba has been a structural one; i.e., it is based
upon the roles of civilian and military institutions in the political system,
and upon their relative strengths. Before proceeding to consider the Cuban
case in light of more general models of civil-military relations which are
likewise structural in orientation, we must first consider a wholly different
approach.

A number of commentators have suggested that a division exists in the
Cuban revolutionary leadership between the personal followers of Fidel (fidel-
istas) and those of Raúl Castro (raulistas). During most of 1958, the
guerrilla war was fought on two major fronts, the first in the Sierra Maestra
commanded by Fidel, the second in the Sierra Cristal commanded by Raúl. This
strategic division of the guerrilla forces, it is argued, gave rise to dif-
ferences in personal loyalties among the guerrillas that fought on the two
fronts, and who now constitute informal but potentially conflicting groups
within the political elite.
The consensus among adherents of this argument is that the militarization of the late 1960's indicated, or was the occasion for, a significant rise in the influence of the raulistas, who tend to be concentrated in (and indeed, control) the armed forces. In view of the important implications such a division could have, not only for civil military relations but for the Cuban political system as a whole, this hypothesized division requires closer scrutiny.

This, in essence, is a clientelist explanation of Cuban civil-military relations in particular, and of Cuban politics in general. Clientelist models attempt to explain political behavior on the basis of informal networks (factions) of political actors, held together by patron-client relationships among faction members. Lemarchand and Legg define this clientelist relationship as "a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a superior, commanding unequal resources..." Such a relationship is, in essence, a "lopsided friendship." The significance of the clientelist model is its assertion that political factions cross-cut institutional and interest group affiliations and transcend these other alignments in their significance for the political process.

Important contributions to the study of both Soviet and Chinese politics have been made by scholars utilizing a clientelist perspective, and thus the application of this approach to Cuba, while not as well developed analytically as other applications, deserves serious consideration. This is particularly so since the low level of institutional development in Cuba during the 1960's provided a climate that would not discourage factional politics, and because there is strong evidence of factions other than fidelistas and raulistas in Cuban politics during this period.

Factions based upon the pre-revolutionary organizational affiliations of elite members played an extremely important role in Cuban politics during
based upon developing a clientelist network of old PSP members under the rubric of the new party. This network was destroyed in 1962 when the ORU was dismantled, and denounced as a "nest of privilege, toleration, of favoritism, a system of immunities and favors." Escalante and his followers were described as "dispensers of patronage," who had created a party the authority of which derived from the fact that "from it, one might receive or expect a favor, a dispensation, or some harm or good." The dissolution of the ORU did not end the division in the revolutionary leadership between veterans of the PSP and veterans of the M-26-7 and DR. It persisted at least until the 1970's, and the composition of the Cuban political elite clearly indicates the inferior position accorded to veterans of the PSP.

Assessing the argument for the existence of fidelista and raúlista factions is more difficult, since there has been no open political conflict to confirm their operation. The following brief analysis examines a population of 49 Rebel Army officers who fought either in the Sierra Maestra with Fidel (N=20), or in the Sierra Cristal with Raúl (N=29), and who currently hold leadership positions in the regime. By examining where these officers are located in the current power structure, and how their location has changed over time, we should be able to detect any significant differences between these informal groups and thus judge whether their existence has any important implications for Cuban politics.

The data in Table 4 indicates that there are few significant differences between fidelista and raúlista representation in key leadership positions, and that this situation has changed only marginally since 1965. Both groups have virtually equal representation in every key institution, with the exception of the Political Bureau of the PCC, which has consistently been dominated by fidelistas.

The argument that raúlistas have become increasingly dominant in the armed forces is simply not confirmed by the data. The composition of the
Table 4: "Fidelistas" and "Raulistas" in the Cuban Political Elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
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<th>1975-76</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fidelistas</td>
<td>Raulistas</td>
<td>Fidelistas</td>
<td>Raulistas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N= 20</td>
<td>N= 29</td>
<td>N= 20</td>
<td>N= 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Bureau</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee</td>
<td>12 (60%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
<td>15 (75%)</td>
<td>22 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of State</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff &amp; Army Commanders</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Membership of individuals in the fidelista or raulista groups are based upon data contained in Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (New Brunswick; Transaction Press, 1974), pp. 332-338. Membership on party, government, and military bodies was drawn from a variety of Cuban press sources.
FAR's top leadership shows a balance between *fidelistas* and *raulistas* that has been stable for a decade. Considering the whole membership of each of the two groups, we find a nearly equal proportion of each presently serves in the armed forces: 8 of 20 *fidelistas* (40.0%); and 13 of 29 *raulistas* (44.8%). It is not the case that *raulistas* tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the FAR, or that they dominate the leadership positions of the military.

Vellinga's study of 110 members of the Cuban military elite also attempts to identify individuals as either *fidelistas* or *raulistas*. At the highest echelons of the FAR, Vellinga found, as we have, an even balance between the two groups. Among middle echelon FAR officers, however, a majority could not be identified as belonging to either faction. This may be due to a paucity of information, or it may indicate that the hypothesized factional networks do not exist.

No doubt the personal friendships and loyalties forged in the hardships of guerrilla combat have played an important role in Cuban politics since 1959. It does not follow from this, however, that such loyalties have developed into contending political factions. There is virtually no evidence that *fidelistas* and *raulistas* constitute such factions, that there has been any serious political conflict between the two groups, that either has come to dominate particular institutions, that one is significantly more influential overall than the other, or that their relative influence has shifted dramatically in the past decade. In short, an application of the clientelist model to Cuban politics helps us explain very little.
Cuban Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective

Cuba is an underdeveloped nation that has embarked upon a socialist path of development. These characteristics suggest the potential applicability of two very different models of civil-military relations to the Cuban experience. The first is a model of civil-military relations in underdeveloped nations; the second, a model of civil-military relations in communist political systems. These are both structural models in that the relationships between political institutions and their relative strengths are a central concern to both. Cuba fits neither perfectly, but each provides insight to the changes in Cuban civil-military relations over the past 18 years of revolutionary government.

As a communist political system, Cuba has a revolutionary history that makes it very different from most of the Third World. Nevertheless, Cuba is still an underdeveloped (albeit, developing) nation, and is subject to many of the same sorts of difficulties that are the heritage of underdevelopment. The most striking feature of civil-military relations in the Third World is the frequency with which the military intervenes in politics, and the factor most often identified by political scientists as a major predisposing condition for such intervention is the weakness of civilian political institutions.77 When civilian institutions have a low capacity for effective policy-making and policy implementation, and when they suffer from low legitimacy—both typical problems in underdeveloped nations—the polity is especially vulnerable to military intervention.78 The modernization process aggravates these weaknesses by placing unusual stress on the political system, and the result is often what Huntington calls "political decay"—the progressive erosion of the ability of civilian political institutions to govern effectively. The military is often the strongest institution in the political system of an underdeveloped nation, and the military may well come to see itself as the only agent capable of rescuing the nation from the incompetence of civilian
politicians. Without effective and legitimate civilian institutions, there is no obstacle to military intervention. Such are the conditions of "Praetorian politics" in which the armed forces become regularly and actively involved in the political process as its most important political actor.79

The Cuban case does fit one of the major premises of the Praetorian model; the model implicitly assumes the existence of a clear differentiation between civilian and military roles which is violated by the intervention of the military into civilian politics. There has been no military "intervention" in Cuba since 1959, no displacement of the civilian political elite by a military one. As we have noted repeatedly, there was very little differentiation of civilian and military roles.

Yet the militarization of the Cuban economy in the late 1960's clearly did involve a rapid expansion of military participation in economic administration. The reasons for the militarization in Cuba fit very closely the Praetorian model's explanation of military intervention. The weakness of civilian institutions was such that they were incapable of effective governing. Cuba's military leadership did not act on their own; rather, the revolutionary leadership as a whole came to view the military as the most capable institution, and at the time, they were no doubt correct. Thus, the inability of the PCC and the government bureaucracy to effectively administer the effort to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970 resulted in the increased participation of the armed forces.

In addition to their organizational weaknesses, both the party and the government also suffered from a lack of legitimacy as institutions. This is not to say that the regime was faced with a legitimacy crisis; for the most part, it was not. The legitimacy of the regime, however, was vested in its líder máximo, Fidel Castro. It was legitimate because he was its jefe, not vice versa. While Castro's charismatic authority ensured the overall legitimacy of the political system, individual institutions were not legitimate in
and of themselves. Various political structures were erected, modified, and abolished throughout the 1960's with no discernable erosion of the regime's popular support. Thus the eclipse of the PCC and the government bureaucracy by the armed forces in the late 1960's did not adversely affect the legitimacy of the regime; or, put another way, the legitimacy of these two institutions was so low that it did not provide an effective obstacle to a vast expansion of military participation in politics.

While the Praetorian model of civil-military relations is useful in understanding Cuba's situation during the 1960's, the de-militarization of the 1970's and the rapid strengthening of civilian institutions during that period has reduced its applicability to contemporary Cuba. For more recent years, a general model of civil-military relations in communist political systems is more useful.

Most studies of civil-military relations in communist political systems center on the tension between the armed forces and the communist party which stems from the party's directive role in the political system. This tension has two main focal points: the relative influence of the party and the armed forces over military policy, and the extent of party authority within the military institution. The latter of these tends to generate the most friction since it involves a civilian institution in the actual, day to day operations of the armed forces— an area which the military tends to regard as properly a military matter. Civil-military relations in communist political systems are thus generally viewed as a conflict of two institutional interest groups— the party and the military bureaucracy— each vying to defend and extend its own prerogatives. This differs radically from the Praetorian model in that it presupposes an extremely well developed civilian institution (the party), which not only restricts the military to national defense affairs, but challenges its hegemony even in that sphere. Under normal (i.e., non-succession) circumstances, the possibility of civilian intervention in politics is extremely
This institutional interest group model also presumes that civil-military roles are well differentiated. The Chinese case is an interesting one since civilian and military roles were initially fused in China, as they were in Cuba. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), like the Cuban FAR, grew out of the army that had won the guerrilla war. In theory, the Chinese Communist Party commanded the gun, but during the civil war there was, in practice, little distinction between the party and the army.

In the reconstruction period following 1949, the PLA took on administrative responsibilities in large areas of the country, just as the Cuban Rebel Army did a decade later. At this point, however, the Chinese experience diverges sharply from the Cuban. The institutional framework of the People's Republic, modelled as it was upon the Soviet political system, quickly established a differentiation of civilian and military roles, with the party in the dominant position. The party organization within the PLA was independent of the military command structure and functioned not only as a supervisory body within the armed forces, but was a key instrument of party control and direction over the military.

The history of Chinese civil-military relations indicates that the fusion of civilian and military roles in Cuba did not persist throughout the 1960's simply because the insurrection was won by a guerrilla army. Unlike Cuba, China experienced no serious delay in the creation of a new institutional matrix for the polity, and the differentiation of civilian and military roles which was a part of this institutionalization was accomplished fairly quickly. The difference between these two cases is that China had a vanguard party to direct the institution-building process; Cuba did not.

Party supremacy in China was severely disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, when Mao's "proletarian headquarters" had to rely upon the PLA to defeat his opponents in the party and government bureaucracy. The destruction of these two institutions resulted in the PLA assuming administrative control of...
of the country during the late 1960's, a result not unlike the militarization of Cuban economic administration during the same period.\textsuperscript{82} These events arose, of course, out of wholly different circumstances; in China, intra-elite conflict catalyzed mass political violence which destroyed the existing political system; in Cuba, new political institutions were not yet sufficiently developed to perform the administrative tasks at hand. In both cases, however, the result was the same—a major increase of military participation in civilian politics.

While the administrative roles of the PLA and FAR were similar in the late 1960's, their involvement in elite conflict could hardly have been more disparate. Since the Cultural Revolution, the PLA has played a pivotal role in China's intra-elite conflicts, whereas the FAR has not been involved in such conflict since the socialist course of the Cuban revolution was consolidated in 1961. This difference stems primarily from the absence in Cuba of intra-elite conflict even approaching the intensity of that in China. This is not to say there has been no conflict; rather, Fidel Castro's preeminence has been unassailable, allowing him to arbitrate conflicts and prevent them from escalating to the point of jeopardizing political stability.\textsuperscript{83} Since Fidel is, by himself, a minimum winning coalition, intra-elite conflicts never end in stalemate, and there is no recourse to every polity's ultimate arbiter, the military.

The Soviet experience offers important contrasts to both the Cuban and Chinese cases, contrasts which are largely traceable to very different character of the revolutionary seizure of power in Russia.\textsuperscript{84} The Bolsheviks came to power in an uprising led by the party and carried out by armed workers and defecting units from the regular army. The Red Army was created to defend the new government in the face of White Russian attack and allied intervention. Unlike a guerrilla force, the Red Army had no time to test itself in limited engagements, identify politically reliable and competent officers...
build a solid force of highly committed and motivated troops. The Bolsheviks were forced by circumstances to rely upon Tsarist officers of questionable loyalty and conscripted peasant troops of dubious enthusiasm. If such a fighting force was to have any prospect of successfully defending the revolutionary government, the Bolsheviks needed to maintain unequivocal control over it. The mechanism created for this purpose was the dual command system of Political Commissars, a system which lasted until WWII. These early characteristics of Soviet civil-military relations (i.e., high differentiation of civilian and military roles, and strong party control over the military) have persisted to the present, albeit with some changes in their particulars. 85

In all three of these cases—the Cuban, Chinese, and Soviet—one factor stands out as being most important for understanding the pattern of civil-military relations: the relative strength or weakness of civilian institutions. When they are weak, military involvement in civilian politics tends to be high; when they are strong, civil-military relations tend to correspond to an institutional interest group model. The Praetorian model, with its premise of weak civilian institutions, is valuable for understanding Cuban civil-military relations during the 1960's. Since 1970, however, the institutionalization process has so strengthened civilian institutions that the Cuban case now corresponds much more closely to the Soviet case, making the institutional interest group model the more useful.

Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations in an Institutionalized Polity

The Cuban revolution was the first socialist revolution to succeed without a Leninist party in the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle. The unique way in which the Cuban insurrection developed thrust the military to the forefront as the leading institutional force in the new polity, and thus the process of building a new political system in Cuba hinged upon the
relationship between civilian and military institutions. The institution-building process proceeded very slowly; civilian institutions, particularly the new communist party, remained extremely weak throughout the 1960's. Consequently, the party organization was never capable of assuming from the armed forces the directive role in the political process. This situation apparently provoked little intra-elite conflict, however, since civilian and military roles were highly fused—a legacy of the struggle against Batista that persisted even after the creation of the PCC.

The relative weakness of civilian institutions was most clearly reflected in the militarization of economic administration during the drive to produce ten million tons of sugar in the late 1960's. The failure to reach this goal prompted a far-reaching reevaluation of the political process, and the revolutionary leadership concluded that institutionalization could no longer be postponed. Since 1970, civilian institutions—particularly the party and the government bureaucracy—have been greatly strengthened: the distinction between civilian and military roles has been clearly drawn, and the military has been largely restricted to national defense affairs.

Seventeen years after the victory of the insurrection, the victorious revolutionaries have finally completed the process of building a new political system. Cuban civil-military relations during the 1960's were, at least in part, comprehensible in terms of the Praetorian model of civil-military relations in underdeveloped nations, with its emphasis on the weakness of civilian institutions. Today, however, Cuban civil-military relations are best understood with the institutional interest group model typically used to analyze such relations in communist political systems.

Nevertheless, the legacy of military influence which the new political system inherited from the guerrilla war experience may still be of some relevance to civil-military relations, even in the newly institutionalized system. While the PCC has unquestionably assumed the directive role in the
institutionalized political system, the FAR's influence during the 1960's has left the party with a relatively weak system of party control over the armed forces. This appears to be virtually the only area in which party dominance has not been fully established in the years since 1970.

When civilian and military roles were highly fused and the revolutionary leadership was composed of "civic soldiers," the lack of party control over the FAR posed no serious political problem. However, now that the differentiation of civilian and military roles has progressed far enough to speak of the demise of the civic soldier, institutional control mechanisms assume much greater importance. A key issue of civil-military relations in both the USSR and China has been the question of "professionalism" (i.e., the degree of party influence that should be exerted over the internal operations of the armed forces). As the differentiation of civilian and military roles progresses, this issue seems to emerge and grow in importance. In both the Soviet Union and in China before the Cultural Revolution, party influence has been maintained through well-developed mechanisms of party control. In Cuba, despite the increase in the overall influence of the PCC, its mechanisms of control over the FAR remain underdeveloped. When younger officers (who did not fight in the Sierra shoulder to shoulder with their civilian counterparts, and who have not had the experience of being civic soldiers) begin to enter the upper echelons of the Cuban armed forces, the issue of professionalism could well emerge as a crucial one. Nevertheless, the fact that this issue looms as the most probable content of Cuban civil-military relations in the future demonstrates how far the institution-building process has progressed since the 1960's.
Notes

1. The concept of revolution, as it is used herein, is narrowly construed and closely approximates what are often termed "social revolutions." A revolution is a process which begins with the emergence of a political opposition to the existing regime, proceeds through the capture of the state authority and the destruction of the old political system by this opposition, and concludes with the consolidation of a new political system and the completion of major structural changes in the social system.


4. The Cuban armed forces is composed of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINPAR), and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). The military role of the former is essentially to defend the nation against large scale armed attack. The MININT is responsible for internal police functions (National Revolutionary Police and the Department of State Security), intelligence (the Department of General Intelligence), defense against coastal raids (Frontier Battalions), and defense against internal guerrilla operations (Mountain Militia). Co-ordination between the two ministries appears to be both close and extensive, but the MINPAR has historically been the more important and influential of the two.


8. Ibid., p. 1213.


17. Ibid.

18. The "mass method" of selecting PUS members is described in detail in "La selección del trabajador ejemplar," Cuba Socialista, No. 9 (May 1962), 129-132.


22. José Machado, "In the face of all difficulties, we will not forget the fundamental factor, which is capacity, will and determination of man," Granma Weekly Review, June 29, 1969, p. 5.


26. Chapter IV of the statutes adopted at the First Congress of the PCC in December 1975 provide for a National Committee of Control and Review, and similar committees at the provincial level of the party as a whole. Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Cuba: Tesis y Resolución (La Habana: Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria del Comité Central de PCC, 1976).

27. Raúl Castro, p. 53.
28. Statutes of the PURS-FAR, as cited in Ibid., pp. 50-53.
29. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
30. Causse Pérez, p. 54.
31. Ibid., p. 62.
33. Causse Pérez, pp. 63-64, 66.
34. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
35. Ibid., p. 62, defines the membership of the National Commission of the PURS-FAR as those members of the National Directorate on active service in the FAR, plus the Chief of the Political Direction of the ministry.
36. Members of the 1965 Central Committee and its leading bodies are listed in "Nueva etapa en el desarrollo del Partido marxista-leninista cubano," Cuba Socialista, No. 51 (November 1965), 8-12.
37. Raúl Castro, p. 49.
42. Fidel Castro, "Our Revolutionary Armed Forces have mobilized for the ten million ton sugar harvest as they would for war," Granma Weekly Review, November 16, 1969, pp. 2-4.


49. Suchlicki, p. 10.


51. Fidel Castro, "The levels of development that this country will reach may be measured only by the percentage of young people carrying on advanced studies," Granma Weekly Review, March 16, 1969, pp. 2-5.

52. See, for example, José A. Benitez, "Che Guevara Trailblazers Brigade," Granma Weekly Review, January 14, 1968, p. 12.


54. "The Revolutionary Offensive in Oriente."

55. Ibid.


59. Fidel Castro, "The country was willing to do whatever was necessary to get the fishermen back safe and sound," Granma Weekly Review, May 31, 1970, pp. 1-5.


61. See, for example, the coverage of Armed Forces Day in 1971, 1972, and 1973: "Major Raúl Castro delivers opening address...to mark the 15th anniversary of the Revolutionary Armed Forces," Granma Weekly Review, December 12, 1971, p. 15; "Our Revolutionary Armed Forces constitute a small part of the great army of the people..." Granma Weekly Review, December 10, 1972, p. 1; "Always ready to defend the flag, the sky, and the land of our socialist nation!" Granma Weekly Review, December 9, 1973, p. 1.


66. Data on provincial party executive committees is drawn from a series of reports on provincial party meetings in the October and November 1975 issues of Verde Olivo.


75. See Bonachea and San Martín, pp. 332-338.

76. Vellinga, p. 255.
77. The other major predisposing factor most frequently mentioned is social conflict (e.g., class conflict, ethnic conflict, center-periphery conflict, etc.) which generates intense political strife preventing the formation of the minimal political consensus necessary for governing effectively.


82. For an excellent empirical study of PLA control, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The PLA and Political Control in China's Provinces: A Structural Analysis," Comparative Politics, 9, No.1 (October 1976),1-20.

83. The Marcos Rodriguez affair is a case in point. Antagonism between veterans of the PSP and DR were inflamed by the trial of Marcos Rodriguez, a former PSP member who had betrayed four DR leaders to Batista's police in 1957. When Rodriguez came to trial in 1964, DR veterans launched a public campaign demanding that the PSP as an organization be held responsible for the betrayal; they were, in essence, calling for a purge of PSP veterans from the revolutionary leadership. Only Castro's demand for unity prevented the collapse of the fragile revolutionary coalition. One of the best accounts of this affair is Hugh Thomas, "Murder in Havana," New Statesman, May 29, 1964, pp. 838-840.