BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS
EAST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA
"Kalashnikoffs, not Coca Cola
Bring Self-determination to Angola"
Volksarmee, 1978
by
Shannon R. Butler
June 1980

Thesis Advisor: Jiri Valenta

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During the decade of the 1970's, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a major Communist bloc actor on the African continent. While neither as visible nor as numerous as Soviet and Cuban personnel, East German activity in Africa has steadily increased. Yet, Western analysts have been slow to recognize, or acknowledge, the expanding East German presence in Africa. The purpose of this study, which is not meant to be all-inclusive...
is essentially three-fold:
1) to explore the reasons behind past and present East German involvement in Africa;
2) To examine the types of activities the GDR has been and continues to be engaged in;
3) To hypothesize about future trends in East German foreign policy in Africa and the Third World.
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ABSTRACT

During the decade of the 1970's, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a major Communist bloc actor on the African continent. While neither as visible nor as numerous as Soviet and Cuban personnel, East German activity in Africa has steadily increased. Yet, Western analysts have been slow to recognize, or acknowledge, the expanding East German presence in Africa. The purpose of this study, which is not meant to be all-inclusive, is essentially three-fold:

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I. INTRODUCTION

Communist bloc involvement in Africa is both intensive and widespread; with the exception of the Soviet Union and Cuba, no other Communist nation has pursued a more assertive African policy than the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While the GDR follows a policy that is harmonious with Moscow's, it is at the same time pursuing an aim of its own - one that stems from the long-held position not as a sovereign state, but as the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany. Rejected so long by the Western world, East Berlin used its African ties first as a means to establish a national identity and then to foster its prestige and reputation as a medium-sized state committed to supporting progressive forces of change. Owing to its unique and unenviable position, the GDR was not fully accepted by African nations until the late 1960's, even though it had been active on the continent since the late 1950's. Once Sudan, the first to establish formal diplomatic relations with East Germany, had broken the ice, others quickly followed its lead. The result was a rapid, even spectacular, rise to prominence.

Current East German involvement in Africa is perhaps most notably marked by the increased emphasis on military and security matters (the GDR's economic policies are of basically the same nature as other Eastern European nations). This role has, in fact, become so extensive and open that it has begun
to rival the Cuban presence. While Cuba's military involvement has apparently stabilized, the GDR's seems still to be increasing.

Chapter II deals with early East German initiatives in Africa, particularly as they relate to the GDR's search for international legitimacy and its competition with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This chapter is intended to highlight the motivations behind East Germany's initial thrust in Africa and to underscore the unique position which the GDR occupied as a result of its early pariah statehood.

Chapter III examines in depth the GDR-Soviet relationship. Any discussion of East German foreign policy must underscore, initially, the inseparability of the policies of these two countries. A concerted effort at the international level is, in reality, a reflection of the closeness of the Soviet Union and East Germany at the regional (i.e. Warsaw Pact/CMEA) level. The interlocking aspects of the GDR-Soviet Union alliance necessarily place restraints upon East German activities abroad. At the same time, however, close integration makes the GDR a reliable and highly valued asset of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

Chapter IV discusses those significant factors, both internal and external, which combined to form the enabling framework for a more assertive East Germany. Without the particular set of motivating circumstances which coalesced in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the ways and means for
an expanding foreign policy would have been lacking.

Chapter V investigates specific activities carried out by East Germany in its recent African endeavors. It depicts both a generalized picture of the East German role and discusses specific case studies which more fully illustrate the GDR’s missions and functions within the broader framework of a Soviet-led African policy.

Chapter VI deals, somewhat hypothetically, with those factors which may limit any further expansion of East German activities in Africa. While the foreign policy successes enjoyed by the GDR in the 1970’s were considerable, events on the domestic front, as well as in Africa itself, may circumscribe future successes.

Finally, Chapter VII attempts to determine what might be expected from East German foreign policy initiatives in the current decade. Recent international events of significance are examined in order to assess their influence upon the direction of future GDR policies. In light of a possible tempering of conflict in Africa (e.g. the Zimbabwe settlement and the positive effect that may have on other areas of conflict in Africa) and increasing instability in other areas of the strategic Third World, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the Soviet Union may refocus its efforts. East Berlin, in turn, may have to adjust its own policies to coincide with those of the Kremlin.

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II. EARLY GDR INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

A. CONCEPTUALIZATION

When the GDR became initially involved in Africa in the late 1950's, it was part of an overall effort for achieving international legitimacy and, coincidental with this objective, to use Africa as an arena for countering the Hallstein Doctrine. These efforts were notably non-military in nature, instead involving the formation of commercial and cultural ties with various nations to be used as stepping stones for expanded diplomatic relations and, ultimately, full diplomatic recognition.

East Germany became gradually involved in Guinea and Ghana, in the late 1950's, and in other countries (most notably Egypt, Algeria, Mali and Tanzania) in the 1960's. East Germany did manage to conclude several agreements in various fields which opened the door for subsequent moves into the continent (Table I). By 1968, the GDR had a number of varied relations and agreements with thirteen African nations; these are portrayed in Table II.

Despite these "advances," the GDR encountered the Hallstein Doctrine at every bend in the road. For example, when Zanzibar (which had recognized East Germany prior to the union with Tanganika) merged with Tanganika in the mid-1960's, the Tanzanian government immediately announced that the East German mission in Zanzibar had ceased to hold
ambassy status and that the decision to accept the establishment of an East German consulate-general in Dar-es-Salaam was not intended to give nor to imply diplomatic recognition.\(^2\)

Other African countries with whom the GDR had agreements were also quick to make it clear to Bonn that these agreements, as well as the establishment of trade missions, in no way meant diplomatic relations had been established.

Perhaps the case of Guinea and Ghana best illustrate not only the type of activity the GDR engaged in, in its early African ventures, but also the diplomatic complications it encountered as it sought to gain international recognition.

B. CASE STUDIES

1. Guinea

   East Germany sought its first opportunity for recognition after Guinea's independence in 1958. Guinea was initially ignored by the Western world which left the door open for Communist inroads into the country, first by official recognition of the new government and subsequently by various trade and cultural agreements.

   On November 17, 1958, Guinea signed its first ever international treaty with the GDR. The provisions of the treaty were largely commerce-oriented and included, most importantly for the GDR, the authorization to establish a trade mission, with consular privileges, in Conakry. The mission opened with a great deal of fanfare in early 1959, and while the consul general was officially entitled the
Trade Representative of the GDR, he enjoyed a quasi-
ambassadorial status. In fact, he was listed as the GDR
ambassador in the telephone book.\(^3\)

Meanwhile, the FRG, which like other Western
countries had been slow to recognize the new government,
finally established a trade mission in the summer of 1959,
preparatory to full diplomatic recognition which occurred
later that same year. While the East Germans had arrived
first and maintained a large staff at their trade mission
(in comparison to a very small FRG embassy staff), West
Germany was soon to experience several blows to its own
African policy which in turn would impact negatively on the
GDR.

The first jolt to the FRG came in early March 1960
when, using the United Nations as the forum, the Guinean
government charged West Germany with aiding France, both
technically and financially, in the production of the Sahara
atom bomb; at the same time, the FRG was charged with pro-
viding troops to fight alongside the French Foreign Legion
in Algeria. Although Bonn denied both charges, it barely
had time to recoup its diplomatic losses when the East Germans
announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations
with Guinea. It was time for the FRG to act, but instead of
immediate application of the Hallstein Doctrine, the Bonn
government decided to make sure that the facts, as presented
by East Germany, realistically described the situation.
In retrospect, this delaying tactic on the part of the West German government was probably the best solution to a situation which could prove highly embarrassing to itself and the Guinean government. First of all, it gave Sekou Toure time to work out a suitable game plan which would not alienate the FRG and which, at the same time, would paint the situation as a mere misunderstanding. The FRG, rather than employing highly visible, blackmail-like actions in the form of the Hallstein Doctrine, was able to exert more subtle and less visible diplomatic pressures on the Guinean government.

The outcome, then was favorable to the FRG, but coincidentally, did no serious damage to the government of Guinea. Toure explained that East German officials had created the false impression that diplomatic relations had been established between Guinea and the GDR. All that was intended was that the East German trade representative in Conakry be given the privileges of ambassadorial rank to facilitate his tasks in the trade sphere. If Guinea had thought that Bonn would be angered by this situation, the West Germans would have been consulted before any action was taken. Soon after this Toure pronouncement, the West German special envoy to Guinea returned to Bonn with the news that had been feverishly awaited - diplomatic relations did not exist between Guinea and East Germany.

For the GDR, the solution resulted not only in public embarrassment, but also in a significant setback in
its search for recognition. While the GDR continued its commercial agreements with Guinea, and in fact, even expanded them, the political setback far outweighed the other accomplishments. East Berlin had once again failed in its efforts to break out of international political isolation and to achieve a political victory over the Federal Republic in Africa. It wasn't until late 1970 that Guinea and the GDR finally established formal diplomatic relations.

2. Ghana

East Germany's relationship with Ghana dates back to early 1959 when it signed the first of many agreements on aid, trade and cultural cooperation with the Nkrumah government; subsequently, a trade mission was established in Accra. During the years of fruitful relationships between the two (1959-1966), the GDR granted Ghana the equivalent of $24 million for the construction of industrial plants (the largest GDR grant to any sub-Saharan country), negotiated a long-term trade and payments agreement, and signed, in August 1960, a cultural exchange agreement calling for an increase in East German educational assistance as well as the establishment of a 'friendship center' in Accra.4

While these events were occurring, Bonn was not idle. In September 1960, the Ghanian government had negotiated a technical assistance agreement with a consortium of West German engineering firms, calling for cooperation in
the economic development of the African nation, West German financial assistance to Ghana, and for the training of Ghanian technicians in the FRG with a view to preparing them for leading positions in Ghana's industry. Bonn's generous economic assistance to Ghana, however, failed to curtail GDR-Ghana relationships. In this connection, the Ghana Times had published an editorial in March 1960, stressing that Ghana did not wish to take sides in the political and diplomatic contests between the two German governments, and that it insisted on its right to maintain good relations with both.\(^5\)

Relations between the GDR and Ghana might, then, have continued to prosper had not East Germany been involved in clashes with Nkrumah's military successor - the National Liberation Council (NLC).

Deterioration in relations began with the "Krueger Affair" named after Major Juergen Krueger, an East German officer, reportedly of the GDR Security Services, who had trained Nkrumah's personal security force and other persons in the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, "in the techniques of espionage and covert activities."\(^6\) Krueger was arrested in March 1966, but was subsequently exchanged for an official of the Ghanian trade mission in East Berlin who had been held as hostage for Major Krueger.

This incident set off a series of retaliatory moves by both countries, culminating in the closure of each's trade missions in December 1966. Thus, the GDR's
foothold in the country was lost, and it was only in mid-1970 that Ghana again permitted the GDR to reopen its trade mission.

C. SUMMARY

While the East Germans did not disengage from the African continent as a result of their early setbacks, they were forced by events essentially beyond their control to follow a go-slow strategy. It wasn't until the early 1970's that the GDR was able to assert itself on the African scene. This new policy was brought about by changing international conditions, as well as by factors within the GDR itself. The second stage of East German initiatives in Africa, which began in the early 1970's, has witnessed a shift both in the types of involvement and the geographic area to which attention is focused. The on-going East German policy has placed primary emphasis on military and security matters, and the African national liberation movements, as well as Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia (all three Marxist-Leninist espousing countries), have received the most attention.

Before discussing these new trends in GDR-African relations, however, it is necessary to review the GDR-Soviet connection. Whatever East Germany's policies and goals are on the African continent, they are, of necessity, harmonious with those of its Kremlin mentors. And while Africa may offer new and unique opportunities for the East German regime, the GDR would not be undertaking such an active role without the
explicit consent of, and within the guidelines laid down by,
Moscow.
III. THE GDR SOVIET FRATERNAL ALLIANCE

The unbreakable friendship and cooperation with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people have always been and will continue to be, the source of strength and the basis for the development of the socialist German Democratic Republic.

With these words from the program of the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), held in East Berlin in May 1976, the GDR reaffirmed its close alignment with the Soviet Union. Walter Ulbricht had normally maintained such a course, but his dispute with the Kremlin in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the Moscow-Bonn rapprochment, which ultimately led to his downfall in 1971, had strained the relationship. Since his ouster, however, the GDR-Soviet alliance has drawn ever closer under the leadership of Erich Honecker, a pro-Moscow hardliner.

The closeness of the two countries is manifested in intensive cooperation at all levels of inter-state relationships: military/security, economic and politico-ideological. This "cooperation" has, in fact, an air of East German subordination. It is essential to keep this latter aspect in mind, particularly when discussing East German activities at the international level. Whatever the GDR’s activities are in that arena, they are in essence a reflection of the closeness of integration with the Soviet Union at the regional level. Hermann Axen, SED Politburo member, put it this way:
The present stage of development in relations between the GDR and the USSR is marked by their drawing together in every sphere... Now we can, and will increasingly contribute to implementing the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist countries... The GDR's stronger international position has increased its responsibility for implementing the common line of the socialist community.

A. MILITARY/SECURITY INTEGRATION

Although this aspect of GDR-Soviet relations is universally accepted, the actual nature and extent of the subordination of the East German National People's Army (NVA) to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) is not that well documented. There are some features, however, which stand out and instantly catch the eye. For example:

1) the NVA, alone among Eastern bloc armed forces, is directly subordinated to the Supreme Command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization;

2) The 1957 bi-lateral military agreement between the GDR and the Soviet Union, which still governs the stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany, provides for more latitude for GSFG individual actions than any other comparable agreement between the Soviets and other Eastern European countries. In effect, the agreement stipulates that the GSFG high command may deal "with any threat to its security at will, subject only to 'appropriate consultations' with the East German authorities;"

3) Since 1973, East German combat training has been patterned after the Soviet model and cooperation between the NVA and GSFG now reaches to the company level.
For example, Neues Deutschland reported joint GDR-GSFG training at the "small unit level" in February 1980:

On Thursday [14 February] the motorized riflemen of the Hans Kahl National People's Army unit and of the Soviet "regiment nearby" displayed their military skill in a joint combat exercise...the units of Captain Juergen Tonai and Lieutenant Sergei Shatrin scored very good and good results, under difficult conditions.10

Even the paramilitary training of the Pioneer Organization, the GDR youth group for ages 6 to 14 years, is reportedly supervised by Soviet "advisors."11 As Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman so aptly noted, "We cannot learn enough about intensive training from the Soviet comrades."12

Yet, it appears the Soviets have not been insensitive to the position of their East German brothers-in-arms. General Hoffman, alone among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact National commanders, has had the distinction of commanding three major Pact military exercises.13 And, the Soviet Union has tended to supply the NVA with modern military equipment ahead of the other Pact military forces. For instance, the GDR is now receiving the T-72 tank. While these actions can be seen as a measure of the degree of confidence the Soviet Army places in the capability and reliability of the NVA, at the same time it can be viewed as an overt Soviet attempt to maintain morale at an acceptable level.

Despite such signs of Soviet favor, however, other factors tend to reinforce a continued subordination of the NVA. The NVA, though well-equipped and well trained, is relatively small: six divisions (two tank and four

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motorized), with an air arm of about 350 fighter aircraft, plus a small navy operating in the Baltic. Withdrawal of Soviet forces (or a substantial number thereof) would require a build-up of the NVA, a situation which the Soviet Union has not yet judged (and probably will never judge) propitious. Further, were the Soviets to assign new responsibilities to the NVA, without relinquishing its nuclear monopoly, renewed pressures from the GDR for nuclear-sharing would seem likely to ensue. Finally, any proposal to boost the size (and it follows, the status) of the NVA would not only expose the Soviet Union to charges from the West of encouraging the revival of German militarism, but also would probably have equally sensitive implications for the GDR's Eastern European neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Thus, the NVA's position vis à vis the GSFG is not likely to improve.

In the field of security matters, while details are lacking, it can probably be assumed that the GDR's State Security Service (SSD) is closely interlocked with the KGB. It can probably also be reasonably assumed that the SSD takes its cues from the KGB as was probably the case when the Zaire-OTRAG treaty (see pages 52 - 56) was stolen from Zaire's West German embassy. Under any circumstances it is difficult to imagine an absence of security cooperation in the GDR-Soviet alliance when the intelligence function plays such an important role in the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy.
B. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

To simply state that the Soviet Union is the principal trading partner of the GDR does not do justice to the fullness of integration at this level of inter-state relations. Behind the closeness of the economic ties that bind lies not only the fact of East Germany's early pariah statehood but also the truly remarkable economic recovery of the GDR in the early 1960s which, in its own right, can be termed an economic miracle. This miracle placed the GDR at the developmental pinnacle of the Soviet-East European bloc. While the GDR actively sought closer economic ties with the Soviet Union, the latter most certainly welcomed not only the fruits of a modernized East Germany industry, but also the GDR as a major recipient of Soviet products, especially in light of the terms of trade which were heavily biased towards the Soviet Union.

The economic aspects of Soviet-East German relations date to the year 1945 when the Soviet zone of occupation was subjected to the Soviet reparations program. Originally reparations were to come from both its own zone and a small percentage from the other zones. In exchange, the Soviets were to supply food to the Western occupying power. This arrangement quickly disintegrated and the Soviet Union stepped up its reparations in its own zone, dismantling and carrying off entire factories and converting numerous industrial operations into Soviet stock corporations with all production from these corporations going to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets also nationalized banks, what was left of the large industrial enterprises, former Nazi holdings and the property of people who had fled westward. All land holdings over 100 hectares were seized and distributed to landless farmers, agricultural laborers and German refugees from Eastern Europe, setting the stage for later collectivization.

The GDR's first five-year plan, following the Soviet model, was initiated in 1951 but after the riots of 1953 was scaled down several times. The second five-year plan (1956-1960) was coordinated with the newly established Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in which the GDR was to play an increasingly important role. This second plan was largely unsuccessful and was abandoned in 1958 in favor of a seven-year plan designed to harmonize with the rhythm and demands of Soviet long-term planning. The seven-year plan assured the increasing GDR dependence on the Soviet Union, since it and its predecessors emphasized heavy industry which called for increased imports of raw materials from the Soviet Union.

The GDR proclaimed a "New Economic System" (NES) in 1963 at the Sixth SED Congress, modifying important aspects of their previous central planning system. Most notably, the NES called for decentralized management and economic incentives. The work of factory managers was now judged by standards of profitability, turnover and cost effectiveness (within, of course, a planned framework). These shifts in the economy were in accordance with the theories of the Soviet economist Yevsei Liberman.
The NES succeeded in bringing substantial growth to the East German economy, but the almost total commitment to a few special industries - instrumentation, electronics and chemicals - whose products the GDR exported to CMEA members, primarily the Soviet Union, led to a relatively weak infrastructure. The NES was revised and finally abandoned in 1970.

It was in the 1970s that the Soviet Union and East German economies, although always close, reached the apex of coordination; this trend will apparently continue into the 1980s. Gone was the thorn in the Soviet's side, Walter Ulbricht, and in his place was an even more pro-Soviet hard-liner, Erich Honecker, whose main emphases lay in a return to the basics of Marxism-Leninism and to closer ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The course set by Honecker in 1971 has been steadfastly followed and was underscored during the Ninth Congress of the SED in 1976. Commenting upon the results of that conference, A. Ivanov noted:

The GDR's relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have made further headway toward reaching a new and higher level. For example, it is with the aid of the USSR...that the GDR has solved a historically important problem of eliminating the immense disproportions in the national economy caused by Germany's split...the recent period, specifically the last five years, have shown that the Republic's economy is now mainly oriented toward cooperating with the Soviet Union....

In 1975, and again in 1980, the five-year plans of the Soviet Union and East Germany were very closely coordinated.
The protocol on the 1981-1985 cooperation was signed into effect in early February 1980, and among other things, serves once again to underscore the dependence of the GDR on Soviet exports of raw materials. An East German economist stated:

As far as we are concerned, this is an event of paramount, even vital importance. We have the insurance that the Soviet Union will supply us with the most important raw materials for the forthcoming five-year plan...During these five years the Soviet Union will deliver to us very large quantities of important fuels, mineral raw materials, metals, basic chemical substances and a lot of other materials for the support of the national economy. The deliveries...will also include 95 million tons of crude oil and 32.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas.16

The protocol also calls for increased specialization and cooperation of production between the two states up to 1990, and for the further pooling of material resources and scientific-technical potentials of both countries throughout the 1980s.

This heavy emphasis upon raw materials, particularly the spelling out of the volumes of oil and natural gas, reflects the deep concern of the GDR over the continued accessibility of these resources, and at a price, which while high, is still below world prices.

C. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION

The close, comprehensive cooperation between the SED and the CPSU, "constitutes the vital core of relations between the GDR and USSR. (The two parties together) direct and coordinate the entire multifaceted and interlocking system of
relations between both states and assure its functioning as a unified whole on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism." This statement on Soviet-GDR party relationships is not entirely polemical. It is, in fact, supported by hard evidence of close interlocking through the proliferation of bi-lateral exchanges found in the top echelons and siphoning down through the various party organs to at least the district level. This interlocking is made all the more feasible by the close similarity of the SED and CPSU organizational structure. Party organization and the specific interlocking aspects of the Soviet-GDR superstructure have been well described by Dr. Melvin Croan and will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that these interlocking relationships are well on the way to becoming an institutionalized pattern of SED and CPSU inter-party relationships. Further, the unity manifested in the political realm has been used by East Germany to reassert, regionally, the importance of Soviet leadership of the East European Communist bloc, specifically, and the World Communist Movement in general. Robert Livingston notes that:

Politically, the Kremlin has been able to count upon the consistent and outspoken support of East Berlin against polycentric tendencies in the Communist Movement, whether of the Maoist, West European (especially Italian Communist), and East European revisionist, or Yugoslav and Romanian nationalist varieties. In both the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the GDR acts as a centripetal force reinforcing alliance cohesion...Diminished Soviet political and ideological authority in the Communist world has served to confer a special role upon the GDR as a staunch supporter of Soviet policies.
In the ideological sphere, the GDR has set itself up, in line with Soviet thinking, as the 'model' of socialist internationalism, defined (by the Soviet Union) as:

The existence of alleged general regular patterns in the development towards socialism (patterns taken from Soviet development), the subordination of each Marxist party to a 'united world movement' (under Soviet leadership), and the observance of an 'international general line' (determined by the Soviet leadership).19

The revised 1968 constitution (amended in October, 1974) of the GDR includes the concept of socialist internationalism and makes it the constitutional duty for the GDR to develop all-around friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states in accordance with this concept. Both domestically and in foreign relations, socialist internationalism has guided East German actions, and the closeness of the GDR and the Soviet Union in economic, military and political matters has its roots in East German subordination to the Soviet lead in ideological matters.

D. THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALIST DIVISION OF LABOR

While the scope and depth of GDR integration with the Soviet Union (as well as the concomitant dependence on and subordination to the Soviet lead in all matters) places constraints upon its foreign policy, the very closeness of the relationship makes the GDR a valuable asset to the Soviet Union's foreign policy in the Third World. East German know-how and expertise in management, in military and civil and secret police matters, as well as a long tradition of efficiency, are all useful tools which can be easily
translated from the regional context (i.e. Warsaw Pact/CMEA) into the international environment. Given these skills, what then are the tasks assigned to the GDR within the parameters of a Soviet-led African policy? Broadly stated, the GDR's tasks are focused on the practice of "applied pro-Leninism," defined as:

something apart from, and potentially more significant than, the technical advice and material aid rendered by the GDR to particular military and/or guerrilla operations. Rather, it encompasses all those activities pertaining to the consolidation of power, the exercise of control, and the inauguration of socioeconomic change that comprise the prerequisites for the distinctly Leninist version of 'political development'.

The socialist internationalist "division of labor" has often been superficially described as the Soviets providing the basic wherewithal and direction, the Cubans the bodies, and the East Germans the brains. The policies of each, and their mutual relationships, are, however, much more complicated. East Germany's assigned tasks in Africa, illustrated by way of case studies, is the subject of succeeding sections. The on-going GDR role in Africa is perhaps most visibly distinguished from early East German involvement there by a bold assertiveness. This new ambitiousness is the result of several internal and external changes which occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970's and which provided the enabling framework for East Germany's zealous African foreign policy in recent years.
IV. EAST GERMANY AS AN ASSERTIVE ACTOR IN AFRICA

A. INTERNAL FACTORS

1. The East German Inferiority Complex

The East German regime still suffers from a chronic identity crisis. The ambitious policies in Africa in the 1970's are, at least in part, motivated by this persistent inferiority complex. There are at least three reasons for the domestically highly publicized policy of the GDR in Africa:

1) it serves to increase the public's awareness and acceptance of a national political identity, thus reinforcing the regime's efforts to differentiate itself from West Germany;

2) Africa provides the means for continuing the rivalry with the Federal Republic, offering East German propagandists ample opportunity to attack the neo-colonialism of the capitalist West German state;

3) East Germany's aid to selected African nations and national liberation movements serves to enhance the regime's prestige which in turn could contribute to an increased, popularly based legitimacy. In combination, all three might bolster regime stability and diminish the attraction the East German public still feels for its "other half."
2. Economic Needs as a Factor

The recent signing of an economic protocol with the Soviet Union will guarantee continued deliveries of energy-related materials to the GDR, at least until 1985. While the GDR can pay for some of these imports by exporting its products to the Soviet Union, the price of oil has increased to such an extent that the GDR's terms of trade with the Soviet Union, which began worsening in 1975, are expected to continue to do so unless compensatory measures can be taken. Adding to this dilemma is the high net hard currency debt of the GDR ($5.9 billion in 1977 - second only to Poland in the non-Soviet Eastern bloc) and the high debt-service ratio (in 1977, for example, the GDR's debt-service ratio was listed as 40, meaning that unless it were to re-finance, it would have to devote 40% of its hard currency export earnings just to service its outstanding debts.)

With these serious economic problems, then, the East German regime is faced with answering the problem of how it will obtain the additional resources to pay the USSR for the increasing costs of oil. (The Soviet Union has, since 1975, changed its own policies with regard to intra-CMEA price changes, particularly in oil, permitting it to readjust prices of its exports based on world prices for the preceding five years rather than adhering to a fixed-price policy as previously practised).

There are, of course, ways to generate currency. One is to export arms to Third World countries on a cash,
rather than aid/grant basis. This is precisely what the Soviet Union has done; but the GDR's indigenous arms industry is small, so that arms transfers is not a viable option. Offering one's services to the Soviet Union in military-related matters (inter alia) is, however, an option open to the GDR. In this context, it is interesting to note that Article 8 of the 1875 Soviet Union-GDR treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance alludes to the fact that in case of attack, assistance is no longer limited to Europe and that therefore the GDR could presumably be expected to render aid to the USSR in other areas, for example, the Third World and, of course, Africa. The treaty was signed in the same year that the price of Soviet oil exports to CMEA members was adjusted upwards, causing the GDR's terms of trade to deteriorate substantially.

There are some other feasible and important economic reasons. East Germany is probably also interested in building potential markets for its manufactured goods which are not sophisticated enough for West European markets. Additionally, East Germany has cultivated relations with non-socialist oil-producing nations in Africa, most notably Algeria, Libya and, to some degree, Nigeria. The explanation for these inter-state connections lies most plausibly in the GDR's search for new sources of oil. This aspect of GDR-African relations is more clearly understood when one considers that although the USSR will supply East Germany with oil (and other energy-related products) through 1985,
the amount will not meet the GDR's increasing needs; the Soviet Union has urged all its Eastern European neighbors to seek supplementary sources.

Finally, over recent years the Soviet Union has been pressing its Warsaw Pact allies to increase their annual monetary contributions to the alliance budget. It can be speculated that the GDR's increased military and security activities in Africa have been undertaken in partial compensation for direct financial contributions which would be difficult to make given the GDR's hard currency and foreign debt problems.22

While it cannot be firmly established that East Germany is pursuing its new assertive policies in Africa as a sort of payoff for continued Soviet oil supplies and as a partial fulfillment of its Warsaw Pact obligations, economic factors, as in the case of Cuban involvement in Africa, cannot be discounted as a motivating factor.23 Add to this the requirement for supplementary oil sources, and economic reasons assume certain importance (albeit the level of importance is difficult to determine) in East Germany's African policies. The Cuban involvement is mentioned here because there are some striking similarities between GDR and Cuban motivational factors. Specifically, the East Germans may be impressed with the economic benefits Cuba has derived from the Soviet Union as payment for Cuba's African activities.
3. The NVA and SSD

In light of the NVA's total subordination to the GSFG, there appears to be little room for professional military cadres to establish an identity of their own. Croan has noted that, "the matter of identity figures in a number of different ways. One involves the...National People's Army (NVA). As an institution, its status is not particularly imposing at home." Perhaps the bottomline to the whole process of subordination is that the National People's Army is only "national" in that it does not consist of members of other nations. Yet, some high officers of the NVA have Soviet citizenship and some wear, next to Soviet decorations, the foreign order Victory over Fascist Germany. All this reflects the character of the NVA which appears to be more a German contingent of the Soviet Army than an autonomous "national" army. Furthermore, the designation as a "people's" army applies only in so far as all men living in East Germany can be conscripted.

The NVA's subordinate position apparently led to a morale problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While this is difficult to prove, one can piece together some evidence which suggests that the NVA has indeed experienced this problem. For example, in the early 1970's, East German military publications, most notably Volksarmee, noted a resurgence of "nationalist tendencies" among the officer corps, particularly among the officer cadets. These tendencies were manifested most visibly in criticism over
the common use of the Russian language in the military, which
all officers were required to learn. Responding to the
apparent traditional nationalist feeling that the German
language is a basis for German unity, Volksarmee insisted that
people are united not by common expressions for formulating
thoughts and feelings but by a common class affiliation.26
The former obviously draws the East Germans towards the
Federal Republic thus impeding further GDR-Soviet military
integration, while the latter serves to unite them with the
U.S.S.R.

Further, detente and rapprochement with West Germany
apparently had a negative effect upon the NVA. From the
SED's viewpoint (and one might also assume, the CPSU) the
movement towards detente and rapprochement adversely affected
the NVA, both in terms of combat preparedness and ideological
purity. There was apparently a feeling among members of the
NVA that since war was becoming less of a danger, then perhaps
the NATO allies were not so much of a threat. If this was so,
the need for continued preparedness seemed less urgent than
in the past.27 To ensure a continued high degree of loyalty
in the face of relaxation of tensions, then, the party has
sought to reemphasize the importance of the ideological purity
of the NVA officer. Political indoctrination takes many forms,
but most decidedly it underscores the glories and greatness of
Soviet-led socialist (or proletarian) internationalism and an
East German commitment to the same. Combat preparedness, on
the other hand, was increased through greater integration with, and subordination to, the GSFG.

The above discussion suggests that, if the NVA were ever to improve its prestige and mission, it would have to look beyond its domestic frontiers. It ultimately did so, under the dynamic leadership of General Hoffman who, coincidentally, was elevated to full Politburo membership in 1973. With this rise in status, General Hoffman's presence in the Politburo might have served as a factor in upgrading the NVA's institutional position in the decision-making process.

Moreover, there appear to be some parallels between the late 19th/early 20th century German exploits in Africa and the NVA's current role there, as two authors explain:

The German colonial officer formed a corps d'elite. Service in the colonies was highly sought after at a time when the long peace in Europe seemed endless and when the only shots heard by the average soldier were those discharged on a firing range...Africa...had its compensations... It was an excellent school for real war, especially guerrilla operations; there were plenty of opportunities for initiative.28

A high proportion of these officers...came from eastern Germany... Silesia, West and East Prussia, Pomerania or the Province Sachsen of the Prussian Kingdom.29

German officers had professional reasons for service abroad in the past, and African military experience was predominantly a Prussian affair. In a similar matter perhaps some reasons for late twentieth century East German military operations in Africa can be viewed in the same light. As in the past, Africa offered again in the 1970's a unique opportunity to enivgorate the morale of the armed forces.
It cannot be unequivocally stated that the military provided an institutional motivating force leading to the GDR's new role in Africa. There is enough evidence, however, to suggest that it has at least been one factor. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the Cuban military establishment has encouraged Cuba's own African experience.\(^{30}\)

While more difficult to discuss substantively, the SSD, under Paul Verner, the GDR Secretary for State Security, probably also has institutional interests in mind for an assertive security role in Africa, and perhaps elsewhere in the Third World. Western analysts of East German foreign policy, in fact, attribute a role in the decision-making process to the military/security interest group. Then too, Africa provides the SSD with abundant opportunites to undermine West German influence and prestige on the continent, as may have been the case in the exposé on OTRAG operations in Zaire's Shaba province.

B. EXTERNAL FACTORS

1. International Recognition

Perhaps no other factor had as great an impact on the GDR's new military assertiveness in Africa than its formal recognition, in the early 1970s, by the nations of the world, as a legitimate state in the global environment. This recognition came after nearly a quarter century of pariah statehood which severely curtailed East German activities throughout the world. The Hallstein Doctrine died a natural death, and the GDR, in concert with the Soviet Union,
was finally more able to employ its political and military prowess in new foreign policy endeavors.

2. The Soviet Union as a Mature Super-power

Having had its hands burned badly while practising premature globalism in Cuba in 1962, the Soviet Union undertook a gradual military buildup which culminated in nuclear parity with the United States in the early 1970's. The changed correlation of forces was related not only to the spectacular rise in Soviet military might, but also to the perceived unwillingness of the United States to counter Soviet moves into the Third World (in the wake of Vietnam). Additionally, Soviet conventional might, particularly its airlift and sealift capabilities, was greatly enhanced, as was illustrated by Soviet-Cuban intervention during the Angolan civil war in 1975-76 and during the battle for the Ogaden in 1977-78.

All these factors contributed to a more ambitious foreign policy, specifically in the military and security sphere, by the Soviet Union and its comrades-in-arms, particularly Cuba and the GDR.

3. Increased Opportunities in Africa in the 1970's

The early years of the 1970's witnessed an intensification of independence struggles by African National Liberation Movements. The decline of the Portuguese empire in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the continued racist policies of the white bastions in Rhodesia and South Africa (including Namibia), sparked increasing violence
from indigenous forces. In Zaire, increased instability as a result of economic depression and political corruption gave renewed vigor to the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), then operating from bases in Angola. Without exception, all of these groups desired and needed more intensive military and security aid and were willing to accept that aid from any nation offering it.

4. **Eastern Bloc Stability**

Following World War II and continuing throughout the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Eastern European bloc witnessed many de-stabilizing crises. Yugoslavia's 1948 defection, East German rioting in 1953, the Polish and Hungarian events of 1956, the downfall of Krushchev in 1964, the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet rifts with Albania, China and some of the Western Communist parties, Romania's maverick policy within the Warsaw Pact and CMEA (to name some of the more spectacular events) all combined to place priority on greater unity and integration of the Soviet-Eastern Europe alliance. Greater cohesion and coordination of national policies were not merely ends in themselves, but also the means (or at least a set of conditions) that were perhaps perceived as necessary to launch a drive outward, one which would increase the presence and influence of the socialist community in the international arena.
5. East Germany's Post-1968 Overshadowing of Czechoslovakia

In the 1950's and 60's, Czechoslovakia played the major role, next to the Soviet Union, in both Eastern European matters and Third World foreign policy. Czechoslovakia had a substantial indigenous arms industry and was able to provide developing countries with considerable numbers, and varieties, of military equipment. Further, they also acted as a "go-between" for the Soviet Union in arms deals when the situation was deemed sensitive enough to warrant such a scheme. (To wit: The Czech-Egyptian Arms deal of 1955).

Czechoslovakia's front-running position began to decline in 1968, and it is justifiable to say (at least in terms of defense budgetary matters, see Table III) that since that time, although it still supplies arms to certain African nations, it has been surpassed by the GDR in a variety of military and security-related ways.

Also adding to East Germany's ascendancy over Czechoslovakia was the decreased confidence the Soviets had in the country and its armed forces. Coincidentally, the GDR's policy of close political/ideological alignment with the Soviet Union paid off in terms of Soviet confidence in the reliability of the NVA. Western observers, noting this change, have subjectively evaluated the overall utility of Warsaw Pact forces to the Soviets in a confrontation with NATO forces, and have given the GDR (along with Bulgaria) top ratings, while Czechoslovakia is rated at the bottom. It can be hypothesized that the Eastern European reliability of
the NVA can be translated into a concomitant reliability of its forces in the Third World.

C. CONCLUSION

Starting in 1968 with the decreasing role of Czechoslovakia, a continuing series of regional and global events have coalesced to present new opportunities for increased East German activities in Africa. In combination with domestic determinants of East German foreign policy, these forces propelled East Germany into the African arena in a way which was as dramatic as it was unexpected. While Communist-bloc activity in Africa in the 1970s was both intensive and widespread, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Cuba, no other Communist nation has pursued a more assertive policy, at all levels of involvement (i.e. military/security, political, and economic) than the GDR. The extent of this involvement is the focus of the next section.
V. THE SCOPE OF EAST GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

A. OVERVIEW

Any overall view of the GDR's role in Africa must be pieced together from fragmentary information, from visits of high-ranking East German delegations to Africa and of African delegations to the GDR, and from public statements (East German and African) on the subject. Because of the type of activities the GDR is most highly involved in, for example military and security training and organizing state political parties along the same lines as the SED (and the CPSU), the East Berlin government is not particularly forthcoming about the specifics of its activity. In fact, it wasn't until the summer of 1978, following General Hoffman's African sojourn, that the GDR admitted to providing military assistance. This admission also came after Mengistu Haile Marian frankly stated in a speech given just prior to the Eritrean offensive in the spring of 1978:

Among our friends are the Soviet Union, Cuba, the Republic of Yemen, East Germany and other truly socialist countries, which actively support us. These comrades, after having travelled several thousand kilometers, live, die and fight with us and stand side by side with the Ethiopians and their revolution.31

Seemingly, the state chief had talked too much, because this passage of the speech, given in Amharic, was missing in the English version which was later broadcast by Radio
Addis Ababa and printed in the Ethiopian press. When asked
to comment upon whether the East Germans were fighting in
Eritrea, East Berlin issued a "no comment" statement.\textsuperscript{32}

After General Hoffman's visit and Mengistu's slip of the
tongue, it apparently became clear to East Berlin that it
could no longer claim that its African efforts were solely in
the economic and educational fields, as previously espoused
by the regime. Lieutenant General Ernst Hampf, Chief of the
Main Political Administration of the NVA (and who had accom-
panied General Hoffman to Africa during the previous month)
admitted in an article in \textit{Volksarmee} that the GDR was indeed
providing military assistance to Soviet and East German allies
in Africa, and that these relations were on the increase.\textsuperscript{33}
The East Berlin weekly \textit{Horizont} (a popular journal on foreign
policy) also picked up on this new line and defended the
presence of military representatives in Africa by noting that,
"Experts and military representatives of socialist countries
were temporarily in some African countries only by virtue of
treaties and agreements of the sovereign governments of these
countries..."\textsuperscript{34}

The national liberation movements, as well as selected,
"Communist-oriented" countries, have also been the objects
of East German attention. The GDR's involvement with various
national liberation movements began in 1973 when it granted
permission for the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) to open
an office in East Berlin. Following that event, notable in
that Moscow did not grant similar permission (an act which
could have restrained its foreign policy in the Middle East
and elsewhere), contacts were established between the GDR and three African liberation movements - the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

In December 1977, Mr. Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, signed a two-year cooperation agreement with the GDR while on a visit to East Berlin. The agreement reportedly would provide "a solid basis for friendship and anti-imperialist solidarity." In May 1978, a similar two-year agreement was concluded with the ANC which provided for the intensification of cooperation between the GDR and ANC in 1978 and 1979. This agreement was signed by the ANC's chairman, Oliver Tambo, during his 15-22 May 1978 visit to East Berlin. A statement issued at the conclusion of his visit stressed that:

Both sides evaluate the visit of the ANC delegation to the GDR as useful for the further intensification of traditional cooperation and solidarity in the joint, anti-imperialist struggle. Concrete measures for this were also laid down in the agreement signed.

Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU was not overlooked in the GDR-National Liberation Movement solidarity campaigns. He made several visits to the GDR and consulted with both Erich Honecker and General Hoffman during their southern Africa sojourns. While in East Berlin in July 1979, Nkomo held meetings with both of these gentlemen. Upon departure, he noted that "this visit confirmed the GDR's support for the front-line states and the liberation movements. We are convinced that our friendly relations will become even stronger in the future."
All three national liberation movements have opened offices in East Berlin and have been granted, in the least, quasi-diplomatic status. In fact, the GDR often refers to national liberation movement representatives in East Berlin as chargé d'affaires.

Support to these three national liberation movements can be summarized as follows:

1. "Solidarity" aid in the form of medical and educational supplies and assistance, clothing, food, and non-military training. As of late 1979, ADN reported that 750 members of ZAPU, SWAPO and the ANC were in the GDR for "vocational" training;38

2. Military assistance in the form of treating wounded soldiers both in Africa and the GDR, e.g. in July 1978, ADN reported that 40 wounded SWAPO soldiers had arrived in East Berlin by a special Interflug Aircraft;39 training, and advisory assistance. With regard to this latter aspect, unidentified West German sources reported that 100 East German military advisors trained Nkomo's ZAPU forces and South African sources reported that East German forces in Southern Angola were being built up "virtually every week", with an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 along South Africa's borders.40 Although these GDR forces were thought to be

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* ZAPU opened its office in 1978, as did the ANC. SWAPO's office opened officially in early 1979, although representatives of the movement had been present in East Berlin in 1978.
augmenting Cuban forces in the struggle against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces, the South Africans now believe the East Germans are preparing to adopt a more offensive role and involve themselves in SWAPO's war against South African troops along the Angola-Namibia border. Mr. H.J. Coetzee, South Africa's Deputy Minister of Defense, stated in a television interview in September 1979 that the East Germans are a greater threat to South Africa than the 20,000 Cubans in Angola. The East Germans superior knowledge of sophisticated armaments had been important in the Angolan and Mozambican struggles and the similarity of their language to Afrikaaner was another advantage the East Germans had over the Cubans in regard to SWAPO and Namibia. Although these South African reports are probably exaggerated, they do illustrate an increasing concern with East German support for SWAPO, at least from the South African perspective.

Finally, East Germany has made no secret of its sympathies for Africa's liberation movements. It has been estimated that the GDR is supporting these movements by as much as 200,000,000 marks annually. A rhyme, originally printed in the GDR armed forces weekly, Volksarmee, in 1978 perhaps best describes what these marks are being used for:

Kalashnikoffs, not Coca Cola, bring self-determination to Angola.42

Table IV provides a five-year listing of high-level GDR visits to African countries and gives a general indication of:

1. the types of agreements the GDR has and with which countries;
2. the increasing emphasis over the past two years on military and security matters, as suggested by the visits of Werner Lamberz and later (after Lamberz' death in Libya in March 1978 under still unclear circumstances, i.e., there are some suspicions that Lamberz' helicopter was sabotaged by General Hoffmann. The contention that Lamberz' trips were at least quasi-military/security in nature is made because those countries which captured most of his attention, namely Mozambique and Ethiopia, soon had East German-trained elite guards (Mozambique) and internal security forces (both countries). In fact, Le Figaro reported in May 1976 that Lamberz had played his African card well. "In June 1975, he had examined the possibility of adding military aid to the technical and economic aid supplied to fighting states." 

Tables V and VI provide a listing of the number of Soviet, Cuban and East German military and economic personnel, respectively, in selected African countries. The numbers presented are best estimates only, based on sources of information that are, in some cases, three years old. The particular countries listed were selected because they represent the most significant areas of concentration of East German civilian and military personnel. These tables illustrate that while Cuba, with its high number of combat troops, far outpaces both the Soviet Union and East Germany in total numbers (both military and economic), the GDR's presence is not insignificant. This is particularly illustrated when contrasted with the Soviet numbers. The population of the Soviet Union is 15.3 times
greater than the population of the GDR (261,300,000 to 17,000,000). Yet, in total numbers for the countries selected, the Soviet presence is only about 2.5 times as great as the East German presence.

The purpose of this section is not to examine in minute detail the whole realm of relations which the GDR maintains with Africa, but rather to focus on the military and security aspects of East Germany's foreign policy with selected African countries. This will be done through a case study approach.

B. CASE STUDIES

1. Angola, 1973-79

The GDR reportedly signed a military agreement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1973 (the same year as the military agreement with the Congo-Brassaville) which provided for East German training of MPLA forces, as well as for GDR military assistance to wounded personnel evacuated from Angola to the Congo and thence to East Berlin for the more serious cases.

During the Angolan civil war, there were unsubstantiated reports on the presence of at least 700 East German military advisors; there were also unconfirmed reports of East Germans flying MiG-21s.

Since the MPLA victory, while available, confirmed information is still limited about the exact nature of GDR activities in Angola, it is generally agreed that the East Germans are involved in organizing both civil and secret
police forces, in the setting up of a country-wide communications system, in port modernization (Luanda, Lopito and Mocamedes), in educational, cultural and health services and in piloting ships into the harbors at Luanda and Lopito. With regard to this last item, Neues Deutschland reported in 1978 that:

Nine GDR pilots have safely guided some 3,300 ships from almost 50 countries into the Angolan ports of Luanda and Lobito since 1976...at the same time, young Angolans are being trained in this task.47

"Solidarity goods" shipments continue to arrive in Luanda, usually transported by special Interflug flights and the GDR has sent a total of 6,000 four-wheel drive vehicles (mostly W-50 type trucks) to the country. The exact nature of the solidarity goods is unknown (but usually reported by the East German press as food, educational and medical supplies), but could include military-related items such as small weapons, communications gear, etc; the military applications of the vehicles are obvious. That the GDR continues to provide direct military assistance, particularly in the form of advisors, and perhaps even a small number of combat troops, can only be ascertained by unsubstantiated reports originating largely from South Africa (see, for example, the discussion of support for national liberation movements in the earlier part of this section) and from occasional communiques from the Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC), which continues to fight against the MPLA. This group issued a communique in August 1979 which alleged that three Cuban and two East German soldiers, identified as missile launcher and
heavy arms technicians had been killed in Cabinda. These reports are highly suspect, however, and subject to exaggeration.

Whatever the exact extent and nature of GDR military operations in Angola, its own highly publicized statements of solidarity donations, and other economic, cultural and educational assistance rendered, illustrates not only a considerable East German interest in the country but also a considerable presence. And, the types of aid and assistance given, including perhaps most importantly the training of security and police forces and organizational work with party cadre, are all consistent with GDR tasks in the division of labor on the African continent.


Washington Post columnist David Ottaway, writing in the International Herald Tribune, has said that Shaba II was, without a doubt, one of the best planned and executed operations seen anywhere in Africa for years. "The rebels were tough, determined and tenacious as if they had long been training for the assault." He went on to state that this is the greatest evidence, although only circumstantial, of foreign involvement.

Implicated in the second Shaba invasion in May 1978 (14 months after Shaba I which failed, largely due to Western military action - as was the case in Shaba II) were first and foremost, the Soviet Union and Cuba; but the GDR also had Western allegations directed at it. There is enough available
evidence from open-source literature to suggest that the GDR was involved if not in the planning of Shaba II, then certainly in the training of the rebel forces.

It is not the purpose of this section to give a detailed account of the military actions of opposing forces in the Shaba incidents. Rather, the intent is to review the evidence which points to a GDR role in the invasions, as another indicator of an expanding East German military role in Africa.

Following the return of the defeated Shaba I FLNC forces to Angola, fighting erupted between the various factions of the movement. Cuban forces were sent into the area, in northeastern Angola, to quell the disturbances, but once the fighting subsided, the Cubans were withdrawn and East German military advisors were sent in to train the FLNC forces.50

The East Germans were reportedly assigned the task of destabilizing the Mobutu regime in 1976. The main points of the plan to accomplish this objective were:

1. To provide military equipment to the FLNC, based in Angola and under the leadership of General Nathaniel Mbumba. The military aid reportedly included surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to provide a strike capacity, should that be needed, against Zaire's air force. SAM’s were used on the first day of the March 1977 Shaba I invasion, according to Colin Legum of the London Observer.
2. To create 45 pockets of continuing resistance inside Shaba province, which would be supplied from the main FLNC bases at Luso, Texeira de Sousa and Henrique de Carvalho. A large number of Czech heavy duty personnel transporters were also reportedly delivered to the FLNC.\(^5\)

A 100-man contingent, under the direct control of Lieutenant General Helmut Poppo, General Hoffman's right-hand man in African affairs, was assigned responsibility for training the FLNC but under no conditions was the contingent to become involved in actual combat, even at the price of failure of their assignment.

While none of the above-discussed evidence can be verified, there is additional "circumstantial" evidence which tends to implicate the GDR in the Shaba invasions:

1. East German and Soviet propaganda had flowed freely over the presence of the West German Orbital Launch and Rocket Firm (OTRAG) in the Shaba province after the OTRAG-Zaïre treaty was stolen from Zaïre's embassy in Bonn.\(^5\) One of Dr. Luts Kayser's (the founding father of OTRAG) prime reasons for picking Shaba as the site for his rocket development was the relative security provided by the isolated, sparsely populated area west of Lake Tanganika. Any instability in the area would, of necessity, interfere with rocket testings; Shabas I and II provided that instability (and eventually forced OTRAG out of the country in early 1979).\(^5\) The East German-Soviet campaign against OTRAG was probably aimed not only at West Germany (although East
German propagandist must have appreciated the opportunity to undermine West German prestige and influence and to, perhaps, get some revenge from its earlier African failures due to the FRG's Hallstein Doctrine), but also at the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was interested in purchasing OTRAG's launching services after its own satellite testing program ran into difficulties. Thus, the Soviet's payoff was to be a blow delivered to a main rival in Africa.

2. General Heinz Hoffman, accompanied by LTGEN Poppe, visited Angola from 8 to 12 May 1978. The two were accompanied by Angola's Defense Minister, Henrique Teles Carreira, throughout their Angolan sojourn, and this group reportedly paid a side-trip to the bases at Luso, Texeira de Sousa and Henrique de Carvalho on 8 May. It is interesting to note that Neues Deutschland, which extensively covered General Hoffman's Angola visit, failed to report these 8 May activities. This leaves the impression that he either didn't make the visit as reported by The Observer and Radio Free Europe, or that the sensitivity of the visit three days before Shaba II precluded their inclusion in East German news coverage of General Hoffman's visit.

3. During the weeks before the attack on Shaba in May 1978, the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland bought all the available cobalt on the world market. The price tripled within a few days, and it would seem that these three
countries knew exactly what they were doing and what was about to transpire in the cobalt-rich Shaba province.

3. The Horn of Africa and South Yemen, 1977-1979

East Germany shifted in lock step with the Soviet Union from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977. Werner Lamberz' three visits to that country in 1977 (see Table IV) would appear to indicate an increasing awareness of and commitment to the "Ethiopian revolution." South Yemen, which has close ties with the GDR, was included in the last two (June and December 1977) of these trips, while Somalia was visited in the first trip (February 1977) but not in the succeeding two, a good indicator as to where the GDR's interests lay (in conjunction, of course, with the Soviet's interests). The South Yemeni forces which fought in the Ogaden were reportedly trained by the GDR, and East Germans may have actually been involved in combat in the Eritrean offensive in the spring of 1979.\textsuperscript{55} The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), complaining to the OAU in July 1979, stated in part that the massive offensive was launched by 50,000 troops from Ethiopia, while East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman announced the dispatch of 1,500 military experts to help Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{56}

GDR-Ethiopian military relations were solidified by a military cooperation agreement signed in Ethiopia in May 1979 (during General Hoffman's visit). Calling for the creation of a close relationship between the Ethiopian and
GDR armed forces, General Hoffman witnessed the signing of the treaty by Werner Fleischer, head of technology and armaments in the GDR Defense Ministry and Colonel Abebe Wolde Mariam, Chief of Supply in the Ethiopian Defense Ministry. Upon his return home, General Hoffman stated, in an interview with horizon, that he had watched "thousands of the sons of former slaves and landless peasants practising assaults with GDR machine guns and helmets," in the "Tatek" training base of the Ethiopian People's Militia. He also noted that, "The memory of Comrade Werner Lamberz is cherished... and his name is indelibly linked with the friendship and revolutionary combat community of our peoples." General Hoffman's allusion to Lamberz tends to confirm that the latter's African missions were also of a military nature.

Like Angola, Ethiopia is also the recipient of quantities of East German solidarity goods. In essence, the GDR provides Ethiopia with essentially the same services as it does for Angola, including port modernization. GDR engineers are reportedly responsible for removal of the war damage in Massawa and for building a dry dock which will be capable of accommodating ships up to cruiser size. The latter, of course, would benefit the Soviet Navy in a great way by providing close-by repair and maintenance facilities for its Indian Ocean units.
C. CONCLUSION

While the GDR appears to have cemented its relationships with both Angola and Ethiopia (it has treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with both, as well as with Mozambique), and its support for liberation movements seems to set it in good stead there (with the exception of ZAPU which is in the minority in Robert Mugabe's new Zimbabwe government), the dynamics of the region are such that today's solid friends can quickly become tomorrow's foes. The Soviet Union has been the victim of the uneven political scene in Africa, and the GDR experienced the same roller-coaster effects of foreign policy in Africa during its early involvement there. Then too, recent events in the area, most notably the Zimbabwe settlement, which could have some positive effects upon Nambia and perhaps even South Africa, serve to place constraints upon further East German inroads on the continent. It is these constraints to which we now turn.
VI. LIMITS OF EAST GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

A. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

East Germany's potential for influence in Zimbabwe was delivered a blow when Robert Mugabe's faction of the Patriotic Front won the majority of seats in the recent election. In fact, the GDR's support for Nkomo's ZAPU minority faction appears to have already come back to haunt the East Germans. They (as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland) were omitted from the list of invitees for Zimbabwe's independence day celebrations, a severe diplomatic setback. Although the Soviet Union was invited, because of its support for Nkomo, Soviet representation in Zimbabwe will also be limited, according to Zimbabwean government officials. Whatever, the course of state relations between the GDR and Zimbabwe in the future, the end of fighting spelled the end of East Germany's providing the guerrillas with solidarity and military assistance. While Zimbabwe and East Germany may at some point enjoy normal diplomatic relations, the GDR and its Soviet comrades, but not the Cubans apparently, have essentially been excluded from the main stream of Zimbabwe's political life.

Elsewhere, the resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe may give impetus to further attempts at a peaceful settlement in Namibia. In this case, however, the GDR's lengthy support for SWAPO could portend a continuing East German influence in Namibia. But as has been the case in many countries, once
the fighting stops, economic development seems to take priority over ideology, and economic development implies seeking help from those most capable of giving it, i.e., the Western nations. This is now the case in Mozambique, for example, where Samora Machel has taken measures to improve the investment climate in his country. While not denying Mozambique's continued commitment to socialism, President Machel has noted that "there is a place in our economic development effort for the participation of international firms and foreign capital." An irony of the Mozambican situation is that the GDR's port modernization efforts (Maputu) are being used by Mozambique to improve conditions for Western investments in the country.

There is, of course, still the question of the continuation of conflict in Namibia. But the Zimbabwe situation has demonstrated that enough pressure, from the right sources, applied in the right direction can bring a favorable conclusion to a seemingly hopeless situation. The Zimbabwe lesson cannot be lost in the minds of the parties to the Namibia conflict.

East German involvement with the FLNC could present opportunities for a continued role in the destabilizing of the Mobutu regime in Zaire. But, to a great extent that situation appears to be holding up, and the FLNC rebels who were not repatriated to Zaire are currently reported to have taken refuge in Guinea-Bissau, having been expelled from Angola, and there is no information to suggest that the GDR
continues its involvement with the FLNC. The problem is, of course, that Zaire's internal problems contribute to regime instability and offer opportunities for renewed violence, perhaps with external assistance, in that country.

Fighting in Angola continues unabated providing many opportunities for East German involvement. But here again, there exists the possibility that the Zimbabwe settlement could positively affect the resolution of conflict between the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces.

Perhaps the greatest potential area for heightened conflict is in the Republic of South Africa where the government's cosmetic concessions to the Black populace have not quelled either dissent or violence. The exiled ANC may view the coming to power of a Black majority government in Zimbabwe as a boon to its own power and prestige. At the least, Black South Africa must perceive that it was only through a long, intense war that Zimbabwe was able to emerge from the crumbling foundations of the White-ruled Rhodesia. If this latter assessment is correct, then a scaling up of civil warfare in South Africa could be expected, and East Germany, with a history of support for the ANC, would be expected to take an active role in the military operations. Admittedly, this scenario is highly speculative; perhaps another scenario (though not as likely) might be one in which the South African government, having witnessed the turmoil of its neighbor to the north, will move more positively towards racial equality and, perhaps, circumvent warfare on its own territory.
While this is all speculative, it does suggest that the potential exists for a tempering of conflicts in southern Africa. If such a situation were to occur, the GDR's activities (as well as the Soviets) could be constrained and its influence diminished. The ultimate irony would be that after years of increasing effort and expense, it would find itself in no better position than it did in its original African experience.

B. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

East Germany is not without domestic problems which could militate against an expanding foreign policy in Africa. While Erich Honecker had hoped to achieve at least an economically based legitimacy by raising standards of living, the progress the GDR has made (its per capita GNP is the highest in the Eastern bloc and surpasses even some Western nations) has not eliminated continuing shortages of consumer goods. Furthermore, the new relative open-door policy with the FRG constantly focuses the East German population's attention upon its more affluent neighbor. To alleviate this situation (and also to obtain hard currency), the regime has presided over an expanding network of Inter-shops (termed internal exports by some) which offer Western goods not normally available elsewhere, in exchange for hard currency (usually obtained from relatives in the West). Despite the regime's efforts to satisfy growing consumer discontent, the basic flaws in the economic system make for a very uncomfortable situation and could presage increasing
domestic social unrest. Further, Croan has noted that:

As East Germany enters its fourth decade, its prospects are anything but bright. It seems clear that the economic goals planned for 1979 will not be attained and that the annual growth rate of the GDR economy will have fallen yet again...the cost of the state's subsidization of consumer prices has risen sharply, almost assuring that once the thirtieth anniversary celebrations are over, selected price rises, if not indeed an across-the-board increase, will soon follow.62

Domestic discontent has, in turn, led to a number of measures designed to control both its own population and visitors (particularly newsmen) from the West, signifying that the inherent lack of legitimacy continues to plague the regime. In April 1979, following West German television interviews with disgruntled East Berlin shoppers, severe new restrictions were placed on foreign reporters' movements and access to East German citizens. Then, in August 1979 the regime revised the penal code providing for prison sentences for such offenses as denigration of the state and disturbing the socialist way of life.63 Richard von Weizäcker, Bundestag Vice-Speaker, notes the conflict between West Germany's Ostpolitik to obtain more openness and freedom of movement of ideas and information - and the East German aim of getting Western money and economic assistance. Both have succeeded to some extent, but the political price has been much higher for East Germans than for West Germans in terms of challenging their entire closed system.64

Because of its virtual complete control over its populace, a major challenge to the regime's authority is not likely under present conditions. However, other variables could intervene which could affect the regime's ability to
control its people -- a change in Soviet leadership (following Brezhnev's death when that occurs), for example. There is, of course, a precedent for such a thing. Following the insecurity felt in Eastern Europe after Stalin's death in 1953, and combined with a depressed economy, East German workers rioted in East Berlin and elsewhere, and Soviet troops and tanks had to be called in to quell the disturbances. 65

While this is, perhaps, an extreme example of what might happen, there is no denying the current domestic unrest in the GDR. Whether or not it might have an effect upon the regime's ability to continue its expanding activities in Africa (and perhaps elsewhere in the strategic Third World) is debatable. Yet, some things are certain. The regime needs to take measures at home, particularly in the economy, to quell social unrest or run the risk of exacerbating the problem of its own stability, and opportunities afield seem to be narrowing - at least in Africa. In combination, these two sets of conditions might cause the regime to rethink its foreign policy and perhaps place more emphasis on domestic policy and/or to become involved more deeply in the areas of the Third World which offer new opportunities: in the Caribbean basin (Jamaica, Grenada and Nicaragua) or in Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia and Afghanistan).
VII. NET ASSESSMENT

1979 witnessed several major events which could portend a change in which areas of the world receive international attention in the current decade. The first was the disposal of the Shah of Iran which quickly brought instability to the Middle East. In July 1979 Marxist-leaning Sandinista guerrillas toppled the 43-year old Somoza family dynasty in Nicaragua. Equally unsettling is the near civil war in El Salvador, the events in Grenada where the first coup in the history of the English-speaking Caribbean brought a pro-Cuba Marxist government to power, and the ouster of conservative governments in favor of leftist regimes elsewhere. Then, in late 1979 came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, now evolving into what could be a long, drawn-out war.

All these events could spell great changes in the foreign policies of East Germany's brothers-in-arms (i.e. the USSR and Cuba) in Africa. The resurgence of religious fundamentalism on the Soviet Union's borders must, of necessity, carry great weight in the Kremlin decision-making organs. The invasion of Afghanistan can probably be most accurately viewed in the context of the need to stabilize the area and to prevent the fervor of Islam from spilling over into the Soviet Central Asian Republics with their high proportion of Muslims. In a broader context, Afghanistan (and Iran) are only two nations constituting the whole "Arc of Crisis" which
sweeps across the Soviet Union's exposed southern flank, from European Turkey to Pakistan. Continued instability in this area could have serious repercussions on the Soviet's ability to further extend themselves in far-off southern Africa.

Cuba too, is not without constraints in its African foreign policy. Domestic turmoil at home has recently reached the boiling point, a sign that many Cubans are not happy with Mr. Castro's failures to deliver the fruits of the revolution which he promised would happen during the 1970s. Multiplying these woes has been the dispatch and stationing of soldiers to fight in African wars - as well as the depletion of Cuba's reserve of professionals and technicians by the sending of civilian advisors to many African countries. Taken together, all these factors have produced a formidable undercurrent which finally surfaced in April 1980, with literally thousands of Cubans seeking to leave the island, any way they could and as fast as they could. Mr. Castro, then, may well have his hands full at home. Adding to the impetus to look to his own backyard is the revolutionary wave now sweeping the Caribbean. It is this area which once was Castro's great hope for exporting revolution. Having failed at his own doorstep, he took to Africa; now, however, he may see renewed opportunities and has, in fact, inter alia, sent construction workers, a handful of doctors, and reportedly military advisors to Grenada. Of particular significance, Cuban engineers are building an airport in Grenada which will increase not only the size of civilian aircraft that can fly
into the country, but also military aircraft (the airfield could, for example, handle the Soviet Backfire bomber).

These events, in toto, may portend a refocussing of both the Soviet Union's and Cuba's foreign policy. This is not to imply that Africa will be abandoned, only that it may receive lesser attention in the 1980s than the 1970s as the Soviet Union seeks to stabilize the Arc of Crisis and as Cuba increasingly exploits new opportunities in the Caribbean basin.

What does all this mean for the foreign policy of the GDR? There are several scenarios which could be envisioned.

1. If the Soviet Union were to place decreasing emphasis on Africa, the GDR as a politically reliable, enthusiastic and competent ally in the coordinated socialist foreign policy could possibly assume a greater role on the continent, in part compensating for a decreasing Soviet role. More weight might be added to the likelihood of this scenario if Cuba were to reorient itself towards the Caribbean. As long as East Germany remains loyal to Soviet objectives and is willing to carry out a closely coordinated policy with the USSR, this may be a viable option for the Soviet Union. East Germans are reportedly more acceptable to many Africans than their Soviet (and even Cuban) counterparts, and their long-term support for both the national liberation movements and socialist-leaning countries has earned them prestige and status that could be usefully employed in furthering Soviet objectives in Africa.68

2. Another scenario might be for the Soviet Union to increasingly employ East Germany in the Arc of Instability.
Specifically, Afghanistan, South Yemen and even Iran could become the focus of GDR attentions in the current decade. East Germany has in fact been extensively involved in military and security matters in South Yemen and has recently concluded agreements in the economic sphere with Iran. Afghanistan offers several interesting possibilities. East Germany has been quick to offer solidarity aid to Babrak Karmal's government and has been flying wounded Afghan soldiers to East Berlin for medical treatment. Perhaps even more interesting was the visit to Moscow in early December (just prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) of Willi Stoph and General Hoffman, during which they reportedly held discussions with Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, General A.I. Gribkov, the Pact ground forces commander, General I. Pavlovskii, and the military commanders of the Soviet Central Asian Republics bordering on Afghanistan. Then, in early April 1980, General A. Epishev, head of the Soviet Main Political Administration, suggested in Pravda that the Soviet Union might be calling upon its Warsaw Pact allies to send troops to Afghanistan. While East Germany may not be overly enthusiastic about this latter possibility, particularly about the stress it might put on GDR-FRG relations, its choice in the matter may be limited by the leverage Moscow maintains over it.

3. Increased East German activity in the Caribbean basin cannot be overlooked as a possible future scenario. Since Somoza's ouster (perhaps even before), the GDR has provided
the Sandinist government with economic and medical assistance (Nicaraguan soldiers, like the Afghanis, are flown to East Berlin for treatment). A high-level GDR delegation, led by Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, has visited Managua, and an equally high-level Nicaraguan delegation, including the Minister of National Defense, has visited East Berlin. During this latter visit, which occurred in late March - early April 1980, trade, economic, cultural and "other" unspecified agreements were signed. Continuing instability in the region could open up new doors and provide ample opportunities for a bold East German policy aimed at fostering its image as a firm supporter of progressive forces. In light of East German activities in Latin America, it is interesting to note that the GDR and Cuba recently signed a 25 year friendship agreement in which both countries pledged to support "the struggles of peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism." 71

At this point in time, even the decision makers in East Berlin may not know the exact direction of their foreign policy in the 1980's; much is dependent upon the direction their Kremlin comrades take. What can probably be reasonably assumed however, is that, as was the case in Africa, the GDR will prove useful to Soviet opportunistic endeavors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>African Country</th>
<th>Type of Accord</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November, 1958</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Commercial treaty, authorizing the establishment of a GDR trade mission, with consular privileges, in Conakry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 1959</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Agreement on aid, trade and cultural cooperation. (The first of a long series of such agreements, lasting until the ouster of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1964</td>
<td>United Republic of Tangania and Zanzibar</td>
<td>Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and extension of cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1964</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Cultural agreements relating to cultural and scientific cooperation, the exchange of students, and exchanges in matters of public health, broadcasting and art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1966</td>
<td>United Arab Republic (Egypt)</td>
<td>Television cooperation agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1966</td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>Friendship agreement between the Berlin College of Planned Economy and the UAR National Planning Institute.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE II
EAST GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA IN 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Consular Relations</th>
<th>Resident Trade Missions</th>
<th>General Economic</th>
<th>COOPERATION AGREEMENTS</th>
<th>General Cultural</th>
<th>Education, Training</th>
<th>Trade and Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>X&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>“Government level,” by mutual agreement

<sup>2</sup>Raised to “mission level,” but without diplomatic status, in January 1969; to embassy status in mid-1969.

### TABLE III

**WARSAW PACT MILITARY EXPENDITURES*/ MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>156/3.7%</td>
<td>222/2.4%</td>
<td>238/2.3%</td>
<td>504/2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1089/4.5%</td>
<td>1232/4.5%</td>
<td>1322/4.1%</td>
<td>1885/3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>521/2.3%</td>
<td>1137/3.3%</td>
<td>1521/4.2%</td>
<td>2636/4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>275/2.1%</td>
<td>338/2.4%</td>
<td>548/2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>602/3.0%</td>
<td>1345/3.8%</td>
<td>1517/4.0%</td>
<td>2339/2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>288/3.1%</td>
<td>412/1.9%</td>
<td>460/2.0%</td>
<td>904/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars at 1973 exchange rates and prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Delegation Head</th>
<th>Countries Visited</th>
<th>Purpose/Salient Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1975</td>
<td>Horst Soelle, Minister for Foreign Trade</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Talks with Algerian officials on economic and scientific-technological cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1975</td>
<td>Klaus Willerding, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>South Yemen/Egypt, Egypt</td>
<td>Talks on further development of bilateral relations. Also met with Muhud Riyad, Arab League General Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1975</td>
<td>Bernhard Quandt, Central Committee and State Council Member</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Independence day celebrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1975</td>
<td>Werner Dorden, Special Ambassador</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Independence day celebrations; FRG was not invited to this or to Mozambique's celebrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1976</td>
<td>Guenther Kleiber, Politburo Member and Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Agreements signed on cooperation for 1976 - 1977 in the fields of culture, science, technology and trade, and on air transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1976</td>
<td>Willi Stoph, Premier; Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
<td>South Yemen/Somalia</td>
<td>Talks on expanding all-around cooperation: Siad Barre paid tribute to the training of small &quot;cadres&quot; in the GDR, the sending of GDR experts to Somalia, and the work of the FDJ (Free German Youth Brigade).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Although no high-level GDR delegation visited Angola prior to its independence on 11 November 1975, an Angolan delegation, led by Iko Carreira, MPLA Politburo member and subsequently Angolan Minister for Defense, visited the GDR from 21 - 26 August 1975. The MPLA delegation thanked the GDR for the political, moral and material support rendered to the MPLA's struggle from the beginning. Discussions between the two sides centered around the further development and deepening of MPLA/SED relations. The MPLA delegation also met with Kurt Krueger, General Secretary of the Solidarity Committee, and discussed future GDR solidarity support for Angola.

**Following Mr. Kleiber's return to the GDR, he was questioned by HORIZONT about the agreements. He responded by noting that the GDR would dispatch to Angola primarily advisors and experts in "various" fields, and that the GDR would continue to train cadres of superior and professional schools as well as specialists of Angola - a training program which, he stated, was initiated several years ago.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Delegation Head</th>
<th>Countries Visited</th>
<th>Purpose/Salient Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1976</td>
<td>Oskar Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>South Yemen/Mozambique/Tanzania, Madagascar/Kenya, Ethiopia/Egypt</td>
<td>Mozambique: Cultural treaty and &quot;other&quot; agreements signed; Zamora &quot;vividly noted that through this visit the GDR was again proving its militant solidarity with Mozambique. Ethiopia: Trade and Cultural agreement signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1977</td>
<td>Werner Lamberz, Politburo Member, bique/Ethiopia Secretary, SED Central Committee; also in charge of agitation and propaganda</td>
<td>Somalia/Mozambique/Sudan/South Yemen/South Africa/South Africa</td>
<td>Somalia: Agreement in cooperation undefined. Nigeria for 1977 - 1979. Mozambique: Attendance at 3rd PAREL Congress. SA: with Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU); Robert Mugabe (ZANU); Silvester Tambo (ANC), and Ian Nkoma (ZAPC). Ethiopia: Talks on the further developing of relationships; visited a &quot;political school&quot; in Addis Ababa where revolutionary cadres are trained; talks on ideological orientation of the masses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1977</td>
<td>Werner Lamberz</td>
<td>South Yemen/Ethiopia/Annala, Congo, Nigeria/Zambia</td>
<td>Ethiopia: A number of agreements signed, aimed at the all-around strengthening of cooperation; visited training camps of the People's Militia; handed over M60,000 of a solidarity donation; signed a protocol on long-term development of economic relations. Zambia: Signed protocol on cooperation which provides, inter alia, for developing the exchange of experiences between parties, for promoting the expansion of relations at the state level as well as between trade unions, women's and youth organizations, and for granting support in training cadres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Delegation Head</td>
<td>Countries Visited</td>
<td>Purpose/Salient Activities</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1977</td>
<td>Hermann Axen, Politburo Member</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Several cooperation agreements signed. Upon his return to the GDR, Axen noted that the GDR population's solidarity with Libya had practically opened the door in Libya, giving the GDR prestige and status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1977</td>
<td>Konrad Naumann, Politburo Member</td>
<td>Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands</td>
<td>Attendance at 3rd Congress, PAIGC; brief stopover in Algeria en route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1977</td>
<td>Wolfgang Rauchfuss, Minister for Material Management</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Talks on economic, communications, land and marine transport cooperation and assistance; talks in progress of the Ethiopian revolution with political-military affairs officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1977</td>
<td>Horst Sindermann, Politburo Member; and Principe President, President, Presidium of the People's Chamber</td>
<td>Angola, Sao Tome, Principe</td>
<td>Angola: Addressed the 1st Congress of the MLF, Sao Tome and Principe; Economic agreement signed; agreement on cooperation for 1978 - 1980 signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1977</td>
<td>Werner Lamberz</td>
<td>South Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya</td>
<td>Ethiopia: More discussions on the deepening of relations; Libya: Working agreement signed which reportedly laid down the next steps for further development of bilateral relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>Werner Lamberz</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Further discussions on bilateral relations; W. Lamberz killed in a helicopter crash on 6 March.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE IV (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Delegation Head</th>
<th>Countries Visited</th>
<th>Purpose/Salient Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1979</td>
<td>Erich Honecker (first visit by the Head of state/head of party to Africa)</td>
<td>Libya/Angola/Mozambique/Zambia</td>
<td>Treaties of friendship and cooperation signed with Angola and Mozambique—the latter containing a military clause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1979</td>
<td>General Hoffman</td>
<td>Zambia/Mozambique/Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopia: Military agreement signed. Zambia: In Lusaka, General Hoffman stated that the DDR would arm the front-line states to the teeth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>Friedmar Clausnitzer, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade and Industry</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Negotiations concerning the deepening of cooperation in foreign trade and industry; agreements signed on cooperation in the construction of “important” projects as well as on long-term economic cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1979</td>
<td>Willi Stopf</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Attended funeral of President Antonio Agostinho Neto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1979</td>
<td>Horst Dobrus, Politibüro Candidate Member</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Attended 5th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1979</td>
<td>Erich Honecker</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Signed treaty of friendship and cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Perhaps connected with this statement by General Hoffman, the government of Zambia announced in early 1980 that it was purchasing twelve MIG-21s from the Soviet Union. It can be speculated (but not verified) that General Hoffman and Kenneth Kaunda discussed this arms transfer deal and that Zambian pilots may be trained by East Germans.*
### TABLE V

**MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>CUBA*</th>
<th>GDR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>4,965</td>
<td>36,855</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes troops.

** There are unconfirmed reports that at least 1,500 East German military technicians may be in Ethiopia. The figure listed here was provided by the West German Ministry for Intra-German Relations on 28 April 1980.

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978.


Interview with Dr. Siegfried Georg, Ministry for Intra-German Relations, 28 April 1980.

### TABLE VI

**ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
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<th>GDR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>50-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,835</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,085</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,250-3,300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978.


Interview with Dr. Siegfried Georg, Ministry for Intra-German Relations, 28 April 1980.

Cuban figures are derived from various sources (inter alia): L'Express (Paris), September 1, 1978.
El Nacional (Caracas), Interview with Fidel Castro, July 8, 1978.
The Hallstein Doctrine, named after its originator, Dr. Walter Hallstein (a former Common Market president and Konrad Adenauer's first secretary for foreign affairs), was formulated in the late 1950s and proscribed diplomatic ties with any country that recognized East Germany. Implied in the doctrine was the idea that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was the sole legitimate authority capable of speaking and acting for the German nation. Withdrawal of diplomatic ties carried with it withdrawal of all economic ties, a condition which few developing African nations were prepared to accept. Thus, the doctrine served the FRG well in its actions against GDR initiatives in Africa.


3 Franz von Nesselrode, Germany's Other Half, (New York: Abelard-Schuman, Ltd., 1963), p. 188.


5 Von Nesselrode, Germany's Other Half, p. 188.


8 L. Klepatsky, review of Socialism and the World Revolutionary Process, by Herman Axen in International Affairs 3 (March 1977): 136-137.


12 Ibid., p. 102.


15 Ivanov, "The GDR's Attainments in Socialist Development," p. 82.


17 Aussenpolitik der DDR, 1974-89, quoted in Croan, East Germany: The Soviet Connection, p. 46.


22 Interview with Dr. Siegfried Georg, Ministry for Intra-German Relations, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, 28 April 1978.

23 Dr. Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and Future Prospects in the Third World," Cuban Studies (forthcoming in August 1980). Dr. Valenta states in part, "In the aftermath of the invasion of Angola in 1975 and again after the intervention in Ethiopia in 1979, the Cubans obtained favorable agreements from the USSR which ensured continuation into the 1980's of subsidies for Cuban sugar and nickel production and prices paid for petroleum, as well as providing sophisticated weaponry for the modernization of Cuba's armed forces."


29 Ibid., p. 112.

and 2, Spring/Summer 1978, p. 60. Dr. Gonzales argues that, "This 'military mission tendency' has in fact been one of the principal forces behind Cuban foreign policy in this decade."

32 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 5423.

43 Ibid. The police force of the People's Republic of Yemen was also trained by the East Germans; coincidentally, the most frequent country in the Arab world visited by Lamberz was South Yemen, followed by Libya. General Hoffman himself also made one visit to South Yemen in October 1977, sandwiched between two of Lamberz' visits.


45 Elizabeth Pond, "East Germany's 'Afrika Korps'," Christian Science Monitor, 28 June 1978, p. 28. The signing of this agreement between Angola and the GDR could not be verified by any other source currently available, but it is well-known that the GDR was involved in medical assistance to MPLA forces and that they were indeed flown to East Berlin. Training of MPLA forces is less well-documented. However, since the NVA was training Congolese forces following the GDR's military agreement with that country, it is feasible that MPLA forces may have also received some training, even prior to the large influx of Soviet military assistance in 1975. It is interesting to note that the GDR-Angolan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (February 1979) does not contain a military clause, while that with Mozambique does (also February 1979). Specifically, Articles 5 and 10 of the latter state, respectively, "In the interest of strengthening the defense capability of the high contracting parties they will arrange the cooperation in the military sphere through bilateral agreements," and, "Should a situation arise which threatens or violates peace, the high contracting parties will immediately establish mutual contacts in order to coordinate their positions in order to eliminate the danger that has emerged or to restore peace." ("Friendship, Cooperation Treaty," Neues Deutschland, 26 February 1979, in FBIS-EEU, 1 March 1979, p. E-13.) In Ethiopia, a military treaty was signed separately, and prior to the treaty of friendship and cooperation (November 1979). Thus, the lack of any military clause in the Angolan-GDR treaty lends credence to Pond's allegation that a military treaty had already been signed.


52 Ibid.

53 OTRAG has been much maligned by Western, Soviet bloc and African observers. However, the facts speak for themselves. The Kayser rockets are not suitable for military purposes (as charged) because: 1) their fuel is highly explosive and cannot be stored in the rocket (also refuelling takes eight hours); 2) continuing problems in the guidance and combustion systems make the rockets hazardous for launching anything, let alone expensive missiles, as has been charged; 3) the great weight of the standard (vice specialized) engineering components limits the size of the payload even the larger rockets can carry.


55 Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" p. 29.


63. Ibid, p. 158.

64. Elizabeth Pond, "West German TV Sours East Germany on Detente," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 July, 1979, p. 11.


In 28 April 1980 interviews at the Ministry for Intra-German Relations, Dr. Hansjurgen Schierbaum indicated that Africans, in general, more readily accepted East Germans than Cubans because the former were better disciplined, better trained, and more willing to work "with" Africans rather than merely "directing" the Africans.


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