THESIS
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT
by
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Iran has had a long history of relations with Czarist and Soviet Russia, one which has often been characterized by highly opportunistic attempts by Russian leaders to dominate Iran. The development and success of the Islamic Revolt which toppled Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in 1979 had a profound effect on the Soviet-Iranian relationship. Unsure of the eventual outcome, Moscow's leaders reacted cautiously and at the same time...
opportunistically. The Soviet aim was to avoid committing its support before the revolution's outcome was clear; to protect Soviet interests which could be affected by the instability in Iran; and yet to be in a position to take advantage of whatever situation developed as a result of the conflict. Despite its best efforts, however, the Kremlin has been unable to exploit to any significant degree the advantages thought to be inherent in the overthrow of the Shah and the demise of American influence in Iran, and finds itself instead confronted with a number of issues which hinder its ability to do so.
ABSTRACT

Iran has had a long history of relations with Czarist and Soviet Russia, one which has often been characterized by highly opportunistic attempts by Russian leaders to dominate Iran. The development and success of the Islamic Revolt which toppled Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in 1979 had a profound effect on the Soviet-Iranian relationship. Unsure of the eventual outcome, Moscow's leaders reacted cautiously and at the same time opportunistically. The Soviet aim was to avoid committing its support before the revolution's outcome was clear; to protect Soviet interests which could be affected by the instability in Iran; and yet to be in a position to take advantage of whatever situation developed as a result of the conflict. Despite its best efforts, however, the Kremlin has been unable to exploit to any significant degree the advantages thought to be inherent in the overthrow of the Shah and the demise of American influence in Iran, and finds itself instead confronted with a number of issues which hinder its ability to do so.
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A. SUMMARY

B. CONCLUSIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

In January 1979, after a 37-year reign which had survived great power interference, internal challenges and assassination attempts, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was overthrown by domestic turbulence and revolution. This development, with all of its domestic and international implications for Iran, was characterized by much confusion and misunderstanding on the part of western leaders, the press and the general public. It is, moreover, safe to say that confusion was not confined to foreigners alone, but was also evidenced to a significant degree in the activities of the participants themselves, from the demonstrator in the street, through the opposition leadership, to the person of the Shah himself.

In the United States, there appeared to be no clear understanding of the sources of the crisis or of why events in Iran had taken such a course. No better illustration of this confusion exists than misperceptions which prevailed concerning possible Soviet involvement in the movement against the Shah and Moscow's response to the events in Iran. To an American public conditioned to what is, at a minimum, a more active and forward Soviet foreign policy in a global sense, and in particular to Moscow's activities since 1975 in that region of the world - "adventurism in the Horn of Africa," an involvement
in Afghanistan which was eventually to lead to the Soviet invasion of that country in December 1979, etc., - the coincidence of unrest in Iran in 1978 raised suspicions of further Soviet instigation and exploitation in what has come to be termed the "arc of instability."

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Moscow's reaction to Iran's revolution and the impact of events in Iran on the future of Soviet-Iranian relations. This study is divided into three parts.

The first of these, undertaken in Chapters II and III is an examination of the development of Iran's relationship with the USSR. Iran has a long history of relations with Czarist and Soviet Russia, one which was characterized by highly opportunistic attempts by Russian leaders to dominate Iran, and Iranian efforts to resist penetration and maintain its territorial integrity. The history of the relationship has played an important role in the perceptions of Soviet and Iranian policy-makers alike, and is relevant to its future course as well.

The second portion of the thesis will deal with domestic and external factors which influenced the development of the anti-Shah movement in Iran. Of particular interest is the question of U.S. responsibility for the circumstances leading to the revolution and the response of American policy-makers to the threat to a "pillar" of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region.
Also considered in this part of the study will be the phases through which the revolution in Iran progressed. Critical dates and events will be highlighted, with the objective of demonstrating that there were specific points at which the regime might have succeeded in defusing the situation had it undertaken specific measures. This examination will further establish a frame of reference for analyzing the Soviet reaction to the "Islamic Revolt" in Iran.

The primary focus of the thesis, Moscow's actual response to the crisis and the prospects for the future Soviet-Iranian relations, is examined in Chapter V. This study contends that the Iranian revolution was not a totally welcome development in Moscow. Indeed, it presented the Kremlin with a situation in which the advantages of the demise of the Shah were at least balanced by uncertainties and risks, and indeed, a dilemma of opportunism for the Soviet leadership. Through an examination of those publications available in English, primarily, but not necessarily limited to Foreign Broadcast Information Service, reasons for the nature and form of the Soviet reaction will be offered. Specifically, this involves scrutinization of the Kremlin's treatment of certain aspects of the revolt; Moscow's official position, "anti-imperialism" and religion are among these. The discussion will then be carried forward into an analysis of
the issues which are certain to be involved in determining the future course of Soviet-Iranian relations, and conclusions will be offered.
II. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE CZARIST LEGACY

Iran's national history can be traced backwards in time some 2,500 years to the Persio-Median Empire. In 539 B.C., Cyrus the Great asserted his independence from the Medes and established the first Persian Dynasty — the Achaemenid — which lasted from 539-330 B.C. A second great Persian Dynasty, the Sassanid, emerged in 224 A.D. and was finally overcome by the Moslem conquest in 651 A.D. The demise of this second Dynasty left Iran divided and nominally subject to foreign rule, although several lesser Persian dynasties asserted their independence intermittently during the 9th through 14th centuries. In the 10th century, for example, the Samanid Dynasty dominated the eastern portion of Iran, "arousing and reestablishing Iranian national spirit."¹

This Iranian national spirit also continued to find expression in Persian literature, history and art, and a religious interpretation which led to what Wilber has termed an "Islamic Iran with a character quite different from that of any of the other Moslem countries."²

By the time the Safavids arose under Shah Ismail circa 1500, the Ottoman Turks were already firmly established in Southeast Europe and Nearer Asia. During most of the next three centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the most important foreign power of concern to Iranian rulers. Thereafter, as
will be discussed below, Russian power gradually supplanted the threat from the Ottomans, as Russian interests in expansion, commerce and security found expression in increased pressure on both the Turks and Persians.

In 1512, the new Ottoman Sultan, Selim the Grim, turned east against Ismail, who had proclaimed Shi'ism as the religion of Iran. Moreover, Selim suspected that Ismail was "being used by the crowned heads of Europe, jealous of the new Ottoman power, to make trouble for him..." The first Ottoman-Safavid encounter ended in an Iranian defeat, and set off an intermittent struggle between the two dynasties which continued throughout the following two centuries. Despite that defeat, however, for the first time since the reign of the Sassanids, parts of Iran were ruled by native Iranian dynasties (e.g., the Buwayids, Saffavids, etc.).

Under Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), Iran successfully blunted Ottoman expansion and recovered Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which had been lost to the Turks by Ismail and Tahmasp. At its height, the Safavid Empire stretched from the Black and Caspian Seas to the Gulf of Oman and included portions of present-day Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republics.

It was also during Abbas' rule that development of relations with European countries was first actively pursued. Great Britain was the most important of these, and numerous English travelers made their way to Abbas' court. Trade and
commerce also flourished, and in 1622 a military alliance-of-sorts between Iran and the British was forged to expel the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf.  

A. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

Among the other places in Europe to which Abbas dispatched emissaries was the Tsardom of Muscovy. Moscow at this time could not yet be termed a "state" in the modern sense of the word, but was more a "personal feifdom" of the Tsar of Moscow. Nevertheless, as Richard Pipes, for example, has noted, the growth of Moscow was already the cause of concern in Europe:

In 1600, Muscovy was as large as the rest of Europe... Having been eminently successful in acquiring power through the accumulation of real estate, (Moscow's tsars) tended to identify political power with the growth of territory, and the growth of territory with absolute, dominal authority. The idea of an international state system, with its corollary, balance of power, formulated in the west in the seventeenth century, remained foreign to their way of thinking. So did the idea of reciprocal relations between state and society.

By the time Abbas dispatched his representatives to Moscow in the 17th Century, early Russian interests in the lands to the east and southeast had already manifested themselves. Ever since the early 14th Century, when the Golden Horde had ruled vast regions of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, Russian merchants had traded with the Crimea and northern Iran. Muscovy, because of its geographic location and the legacy of commercial ties established under Mongol rule, remained oriented "towards the east even after the
Golden Horde had dissolved and Moscow entered into regular commercial relations with western Europe. The conquest in the 1550's of Kazan and Astrakhan, both of them important entrepots of oriental and Middle Eastern goods, increased Russian involvement with eastern markets. Until the eighteenth century, Russia's foreign trade was directed primarily towards the Middle East, especially Iran; of the three bazaars in Moscow in the second half of the seventeenth century, one dealt exclusively with Persian merchandise."

Another factor which drew Moscow's attention in the direction of Persia was settlement. For several centuries, Russian migration and settlement had been restricted to regions immediately around Moscow. In the north and west, powerful European neighbors (e.g., Poland and Sweden) confronted the Russians. To the east and south, powerful Turkic tribes at first resisted Russian settlement and cultivation of the fertile "Black Earth Belt", which ran from Kiev to the Urals. As Richard Pipes has noted, however,

A dramatic change in the history of Russian colonization occurred after the conquest in 1552-1556 of the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Russian settlers immediately began to pour towards the mid-Volga, ejecting the indigenous Turks from the best lands; others pushed beyond...the main migratory push then and subsequently proceeded in the southern and southeastern direction..."

The elimination of the Turkic opposition was to have important implications for subsequent developments in Russian relations with Iran and her neighbors - it removed a
significant buffer between growing Muscovite power and the Muslim Empires of Persia and the Ottomans. Thereafter, it was but a matter of time until Russian expansion gradually filled this void and brought them to the very doorsteps of these empires.

When he acceded to the throne in 1642, Shah Abbas II (1641-1667) undertook to expand Persian involvement with Europe. Trade and commerce were the central interests involved. An examination of this period reveals two important factors which deepened these relationships. First was the lure of Eastern trade for European countries. Second was the declining ability of the Persian rulers to prevent European encroachments. The Persian need for British aid in 1622 to expel Portuguese traders who refused to pay the customary tribute to the Shah was but one example of the disadvantages Iran found herself in vis-a-vis the European powers. The price the British exacted for their assistance in this case was a guarantee of a pre-eminent role in Gulf affairs, one which they held and protected for over three centuries.

It was trade that also brought about the first recorded instance of Russian aggression against Persia during the reign of Abbas II. The Grand Duke of Muscovy had dispatched a delegation of over 800 men to Isfahan, the Safavid capital. Abbas soon discovered that the Russians were not diplomats, but merchants seeking to avert payment of Iranian customs duties. Abbas expelled the delegation and, in retaliation,
cossacks from southern Russian overran the province of Mazanderan and burned the provincial capital, Farrahabad. Following Abbas' death, there was a lapse in formal relations between Persia and Russia for more than four decades.

Throughout the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the stage was being set for the difficulties in which Persia would find herself in the 1800's. Due in part to a lack of effective leadership, Safavid power was rapidly declining and, in many parts of the Empire, the Shah's rule was nominal at best. This process was occurring at the same time that Russia, which was to become a key actor in Iranian affairs in the 19th Century, came under the rule of the visionary Czar, Peter the Great (1682-1725). It was during Peter's reign that Russian interests in trade, commerce and settlement were transformed and molded into more definite, related economic-political-military goals. It was also the period during which the opportunism which eventually came to characterize Russian behavior towards its neighbors first developed.

Peter's ultimate goal was to transform Russia into a European and world power. He recognized that this task could not be accomplished unless Russia engaged in large-scale commercial and trade activities in the manner of the British and others. Furthermore, Russia's land power would be insufficient to safeguard these activities from foreign encroachments. Rather, Russia must have access to the open sea and develop
the naval power to maintain that access and protect her commerce. Russian military defeats between 1687 and 1695 against Tatars allied to Turkey and supported in part by naval re-supply at Azov confirmed Peter's estimation of the importance of sea power.10

Peter's quest for outlets to the sea and naval power, although initially concentrated in the Baltic (at Sweden's expense), and in the Black Sea (against the Turks), ultimately involved Persia. Early in his reign, Peter had planned to extend Russian influence to the Caspian region. In 1713, "an interest in India as well as a desire to outflank and defeat the Turks prompted him to construct a large flotilla at Astrakhan on the Volga with a view to sending an expedition to the Caspian Sea, then somewhat weakly held by the Shah of Persia."11 Nor did the rationale for such an expedition stop with Persia and the Caspian. From the Caspian, the way would be open for an invasion of India. Percy Sykes, in his noted work on Persia, quotes the alleged "will" of Peter the Great:

Article IX...approach as near as possible...Constantinople and India - whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world...excite continued wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia...in the decadence of Persia, penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf, (and) reestablish...the ancient commerce with the Levant, advance as far as India, which is the depot of the world. Arrived at this point, we shall have no longer need of England's gold.12

In 1716 and 1717, Peter dispatched representatives to explore commercial possibilities in Persia and to explore
and map the Caspian region. The second mission resulted in a trade agreement with the Shah, Sultan Hussein, and a report to Peter concerning the situation in Persia and the Shah's fears of a Russian attack. In 1721, a Persian attack on Russian merchants provided Peter with an excuse to launch a combined land and naval attack along the Caspian, which ultimately resulted in Persia's ceding Baku, Derbent and territory along the south shore of the Caspian to Russia.

The steady decline of the Safavids climaxed in 1722 with the Afghan conquest of Persia. The new Afghan rulers, however, had neither the interest nor power to control the nominal Safavid domains. This afforded Russia and the Ottomans the opportunity to partition the western provinces of Persia between them. Czarist Russia now occupied the western and southern shores of the Caspian Sea. Without Peter's firm hand, however, the Russians were unable and generally uninterested in further exploitation of this foothold. Until Catherine the Great took the Russian throne some 31 years after Peter's death, the Russians temporarily abandoned further pressures against the Turks and Persians.

Persia, meanwhile, had come under the rule of an Afshar tribesman, Nadir Quli, who had served as a military commander for Shah Tahmasp. Having successfully defeated the Afghans in 1729, Nadir deposed Tahmasp, declared himself regent for Tahmasp's son Abbas III, and upon the death of Abbas in 1736, proclaimed himself Nadir Shah. Under the reign of Nadir Shah
(1736-1747), the degeneration of the Persian Empire temporarily abated. Afghanistan and India were overrun, while the Russians had in the meantime evacuated the Persian side of the Caspian Sea. This resurgence, however, was not destined to outlive Nadir. The half-century following Nadir's death was one of anarchy in Persia as rival dynasties struggled for power.

By the time the fourth great Persian Dynasty - the Qajar - emerged just prior to the turn of the century, Persia was ill-prepared to meet the challenge of what was to become a century of European intrigue and political and economic competition in the Near East. As one observer has noted,

In the final years of the eighteenth century, the factors which seem to have permitted Iran's survival were external rather than internal. Rivalry between the Russians and the Ottomans, domestic tumults on their own hearths, and fear of other powers in addition to each other reduced their threats to Iran at this time. Other than at every opportunity contributing to the possibility that the Ottomans and Russians would eventually devour each other, no other foreign policy was actively pursued by Iran as the eighteenth century drew towards its end.

B. PERSIAN RELATIONS WITH 19TH CENTURY EUROPE AND RUSSIA

When the 19th Century opened, Iran found itself imperiled by two gigantic empires, Russian and British. Russian power was poised at the Ottoman and Persian doorstep. Britain had clearly established interests in India and its adjacent areas. Iran stood at the crossroads of East and West, astride the routes upon which the rising industrial strength of these
two Empires was dependent for raw materials, markets and commerce.

As Joseph Upton has observed, the 19th Century was "the period when the (Persian) rulers discovered that their military strength was totally inadequate to defend the national territory from foreign invasion... (and there emerged) a national policy of balancing off irresistible foreign pressures... in an endeavor to achieve a sense of personal security." 16

This national policy of balancing off foreign pressures underwent its first test in the early part of the nineteenth century with Napoleonic France. Napoleon, who even as a youth had dreamed of invading India, now sought to involve Persia in his scheme for an overland invasion of India. It will be remembered that Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. He soon approached Czar Paul I of Russia with a proposal for a joint Franco-Russian invasion of India, which would, in Czar Paul's words, "liberate India from the tyrannical and barbarous yoke of the English." 17

With the failure of the Egyptian venture, however, Napoleon withdrew from the plan and sought instead to neutralize Russia by enlisting the aid of Fath Ali Shah. Napoleon proposed "to restore to Iran her territories in the Caucasus in return for: (1) a Turko-Persian alliance to harass Russia from the rear, and (2) an overland route to the rich subcontinent of India to enable Napoleon to drive out the British." 18
For his own part, Fath Ali was content to obtain French support and assistance to bolster Iran against Russia and Britain.

Although quick British diplomatic action forestalled a Franco-Persian alliance in 1800, Fath Ali again turned to France when the British failed to assist Persia against Russian attacks on Ervian and Enzeli. In 1807, the Treaty of Finkenstein was signed, in which the Shah agreed to join France in an attack on Russia and to aid in an invasion of India.\(^\text{19}\)

While the threat of a French invasion of India quickly passed, Russian interest in the possibility of capturing the sub-continent persisted. Great Britain had long considered Russian expansion as a threat to India, and viewed the main threat as coming through Iran.\(^\text{20}\) As the 19th Century progressed, Persia therefore came to figure prominently both in Russian designs to at least pressure the British position in India, as well as in British determination to thwart Russian moves as far as possible from India. According to Schuster, The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned...(When) the ambitions of France were the main source of apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck and that an invasion of India was planned...It is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance in relation to British India...which is indisputably great when it is remembered that closely upon Persia and upon Afghanistan is the evergrowing momentum of a power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own...\(^\text{21}\)
Russian interest in India and the aggressive nature of their activities against Persia in the 19th Century was a product of an admixture of continuing concerns and objectives. There was, as was previously mentioned, Russian expansionism, in part a function of the "transient" nature of the Russian frontier. Until the 19th Century, given the lack of clearly defined geographical boundaries, "the presence of Russian settlers and soldiers determined to a large extent the borders of the Russian Empire." In the Middle East and South-Central Asia by the early 1800's, Russian expansion was approaching the point at which any further territorial gains must be at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, or the British.

A related concern was security, the "enormous steppes and plains - vast areas without natural barriers which allowed the penetration of nomads from the east and south. The defense of such an area and the establishment of secure frontiers...(required)...acquiring control over the entire plain, the main entrances to it and the mountains around it." To these motivations might also be added Russian commercial interests, military strategies, and Russia's "civilizing mission" as the "most pious Christian Kingdom" in the world, the "Third Rome". Finally, there was the idea of "Pan-Slavism", which played its role in the intellectual rationale for the expansion of the Russian state. The latter two concepts
were, of course, inter-related and resulted in a somewhat idealized vision of Russia as the country destined to solve mankind's problems.24

Beginning in 1804, there ensued a ten-year period of Russo-Persian clashes over Georgia, an area important to the control of Persia's northern provinces and strategically located on the flank of the Ottoman Empire. The use of overt Russian military force against Persia was accompanied by attempts to, as Peter had "directed" a century earlier, "excite continued wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia."25

As Yodfat and Abir have noted, the Russians "examined existing local separatist movements, as well as the possibility of encouraging the growth of such movements specifically supporting Russian policy," including in 1809, an attempt to convince the Pasha of Baghdad to move toward a "complete separation from the Porte" and "to act against Persia", with a promise of Russian protection.26

In 1813, the Russians started another in the series of clashes with Persia and defeated the Persian forces at Aslandoz. This defeat compelled the Shah to sign the Treaty of Gulistan later that same year, in which Persia ceded to Russia Georgia, areas in the Caucasus, Daghestan, Shirvan, Ganjeg, Karabagh and all territory between the Caucasus and Caspian Seas. Additionally, Persia ceded to Russia the exclusive right to sail ships of war on the Caspian Sea.27

In 1814, Great Britain and Persia signed the Treaty of Tehran, a treaty of defensive alliance which provided for
mutual assistance in case of aggression against either party and stipulated that the as-yet unsettled boundary between Russia and Persia would be determined by negotiation between Persia, Russia and Great Britain. Nevertheless, when conflict between Russia and Persia again erupted in 1825, Britain failed to come to Persia's aid. The military defeat of Persia in this conflict resulted in the Treaty of Turkomanchai, which was signed in 1828. According to the terms imposed by this Treaty, Persia ceded to Russia portions of Armenia and was forced to pay a war indemnity. More importantly, however, was the loss of internal political sovereignty Persia suffered under other provisions of the Treaty, which gave the Russians jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases involving Russian subjects and granted the Russians a special role in internal affairs as the "protector" of the Qajar dynasty. By this treaty, the Russians thus "secured the obedience of a weak and degenerate Iranian monarchy" and began the economic and political penetration of the country, which was eventually exploited by other powers as well.

C. INTENSIFICATION OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY

With the Treaty of Turkomanchai, the Russo-Persian border in the Caucasus was generally stabilized. From this time into the Twentieth Century, Iran was to be torn between the conflicting interests of Russia and Great Britain. Russian plans for expansion and the establishment of spheres of influence, which, in contrast to those of other European
powers, generally involved areas adjacent to existing holdings, were now focused on Central Asia. The Russians also explored the possibilities of securing a warm water port on the Persian Gulf, to challenge the British position there.

In the 1830's Russia sought to improve relations with Persia in order to gain time to consolidate its hold in its newly-won territories. Due to the internal situation in Iran, however, such Russian concerns were probably unfounded. Fath Ali Shah died in 1834, setting off a struggle for power between several factions. It was only with the support of the Russians and British that Muhammed Shah, the grandson and rightful heir to the throne, was crowned Shah in 1835.

This condition of internal weakness and chaos typified 19th Century Iran. As Professor Nikki R. Keddie has observed:

> If one accepts Max Weber's acute definition of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,' the Qajars had no state, since tribes, city factions, local governors, and even members of the Ulama class had private armies and engaged in battles without the central government's being able to intervene.

This situation had serious implications for both Iranian domestic and foreign policy. Internally, it meant that the monarchy, only one among several powerful groups vying for power within the country, relied on external powers for its continued existence and predominance. Such dependence, in turn, meant that the foreign policy of Iran was more vulnerable to the whims of these same powers.
Such was the case in the Persian attempts to compensate for its losses in the Caucasus-Caspian region at the expense of Afghanistan, the all-important buffer between Russian and British India. The Russians encouraged Persian attacks on Afghanistan in 1836. These attacks led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and withdrawal of the British military mission to Iran. In 1837, the Russians further instigated an alliance between Persia and the Barakzai Amirs of Kabul and Kandahar to attack Herat, then an independent Afghan amirite under a prince of the previous Saddozai Dynasty.

Similar Russian encouragement was provided to Persia under Nasir al-Din Shah in the 1850's. Nasir al'Din's reign was marked by generally friendly relations with Russia and the entrenchment of Russian influence throughout the country. The Iranian attack on Afghanistan in 1856, timed to take advantage of Britain's preoccupation with Russia in the Crimean War, prompted a British declaration of war against Persia following termination of hostilities in the Crimea. Nasir Shah was forced to seek peace when Russian military support failed to manifest itself and the British seized Kharah and Bushire. Great Britain and Persia signed the Treaty of Paris in 1857, but Russo-Persian relations remained intact.

Among the reasons for Russian encouragement of Persian efforts against the Afghan buffer to British India (and the
ultimate cause of the Crimean War as well) was Russian concern over the Ottoman Empire. During the first half of the 19th Century, Russian policy-makers feared that the Ottoman Empire might disintegrate and they determined to keep it intact. Such a disintegration, they thought, would surely result in a partition of the Empire by European powers—a partition from which Russia would be excluded. Such a development would bring strong neighbors to Russia's southern frontier and result in the decrease of Russia's influence in the area, and the emergence of a new "balance of power." 

By the 1850's, however, the Russians had come to feel that they were in a powerful enough position to participate in such a division of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, they mistakenly perceived that other European powers would acquiesce to a partition. The decisive defeat of Russian forces in the Crimean War, however, confirmed British determination to maintain the Ottoman Empire intact and resulted in the decline of Russian influence in that area. The implications of the Russian defeat also extended to Iran, where a "semblance of balance was restored" between Russia and Britain. A further result was the intensification of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, which was to deepen, particularly in the latter part of the century. By 1873, Russia had conquered territories both to the west and east of the Caspian and the common frontier between Russia and Persia was thus established.
With the arrival of Russian power close to settled Persian territory west of the Caspian in the 1870's, Russian tactics towards Persia changed. Heretofore, the Russians had relied primarily on military force to gain their objectives. Beginning in the 1870's, however, the Russians began to emphasize "penetration by peaceful means" in their dealings with Iran. Accordingly, Russia sought "to preserve the integrity and inviolability of the Shah's domains, not seeking territorial increases...and not permitting the dominance of a third power, (but) gradually to subject Persia to (Russian) domination without violation...of either the external signs of Persia's independence or her internal structure."\(^4\) (Emphasis added.)

The outstanding features of the Russian penetration of Iran between the 1880's and 1907, when Britain and Russia formalized what were, in fact, the de facto "spheres of influence" they had developed, were as follows:

1. Economic penetration, which came to be the central aspect of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran. The demand for economic concessions accelerated after Nasir Shah granted the de Reuter concession in 1872. Despite the subsequent cancellation of that concession in 1873, Nasir granted a new concession which resulted in the establishment of the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. The Russians countered by obtaining the right to found the Russo-Persian Bank in 1890. Through this institution, controlled after 1897 by the Russian
Ministry of Finance itself, the Russians came, by 1900, to control the finances of Persia. 42

2. Complementing the effort to obtain control of Persia's financial affairs was the endeavor to obtain commercial advantages for Russian merchants, embodied primarily in the 1901 Commerical Treaty and the Russo-Persian Customs Treaty of 1903. Additionally, the Russians undertook to secure further concessions for its nationals, and to sabotage efforts by others, particularly Britain to gain similar concessions. 43

3. A third form of penetration was Russian control over the Persian military. In 1878, Nasir al-Din Shah requested and received Russian aid in organizing, equipping and training a Persian cossack regiment. This regiment, officered and commanded by Russians, soon became a tool of Russian diplomacy, unresponsive to the Shah's needs, and Persian in name only. The Commander of the Russian Brigade, a Russian named Kasagovsky, was directly responsible to the Minister of War in St. Petersburg. Financial support for the Brigade came from the Russian legation. 44

The net effect of these, and a variety of other activities, including control of railway and transportation construction, was that northern Persia was totally under Russian control. 45 The Russians had thus made significant strides in achieving their goal of subjecting Persia to Russian domination.

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D. IRAN BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS: 1906 - 1917

The extent of Persian discontent with foreign exploitation of the country, as well as exploitation of the people by the Shah, was demonstrated by two events just prior to the end of the 19th Century. In 1891, the religious leaders and people forced the Shah to revoke the Tobacco Concession which had been granted to Britain. Then, in 1896, Nasir al-Din Shah, whose policies and personal extravagances had virtually bankrupted Iran, was assassinated. He was replaced by Muzaffaru'd-Din, who was neither respected, nor feared, to any great extent by the populace.

Thus, as the twentieth century opened, Persia was in a state of near anarchy, with little internal cohesion, and held together in reality by external forces whose interests were served by the perpetuation of the facade of a united Persia. Under these circumstances, given the failure of the Qajars to furnish Iran with either "a reasonably efficient administration; a strong and loyal army," or to isolate the country from outside influence, Persian discontent was an overdue, if not foreseeable, development.46

The Revolution of 1906 in Iran was an outcome of this situation, as well as other external influences. The single most important factor was the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. This defeat "had a profound psychological effect on the Persians in their relations with Russia. Russia had been defeated by an Asiatic Power; Russia had been
publicly humiliated in the eyes of the world; Russia was no longer all-powerful."\textsuperscript{47}

Impetus for the Persian Revolution of 1906 was also furnished by Russia's own Revolution in 1905, which nearly succeeded in toppling the Tsar. Even though the Russian Revolution of 1905 ultimately failed, the symbolic granting of a Duma and other constitutional rights in Russia, the most conservative of the monarchies, had a profound intellectual impact in Persia. The influence of this revolution "seeped into Iran through the Caucasus; for after the failure of their attempt in Russia, some of the leaders of the revolution in Transcaucasia migrated to Iran, where they founded newspapers and agitated for liberal revolution."\textsuperscript{48}

Following open agitation and anti-government riots and demonstrations in 1905 and 1906, and a series of broken promises by the Shah for administrative reform, a new round of disturbances occurred in June-July 1906. As a result, Muzaffaru'd Din Shah granted a Constitution and an elected National Assembly. With his death in 1907, however, the Crown Prince, Muhammed Ali Mirza came to the throne. Despite his pledges to respect the rights granted by his father, the new Shah immediately set out to undermine the Constitution, which set off a renewed struggle between the Royalists and Constitutionalists.\textsuperscript{49}

Meanwhile, external pressures were again beginning to shape events in Iran. Russia's revolution and her defeat
against Japan had accelerated a Russian foreign policy reevaluation. Prior to 1905, Russia had generally demonstrated little interest in a partition of Persia, fearing that such a division would unnecessarily jeopardize their predominance in the north, while it would formally limit the potential for further advances into southern Persia.  

After 1905, however, the Russians, pressured internally, and reacting to the alliance of the Central Powers in Europe, began to reassess their foreign policy, including their policies in the Near East and their relationship with Great Britain. Sergei Witte, the Russian Prime Minister after 1905, recognized that "Russia could only lose by an overambitious and expansionist policy...Foreign adventures and wars were bound to aggravate (Russia's) internal sores..."  

Of particular import to Russia, and to Great Britain as well, was the menace of Germany's growing influence in the Ottoman Empire. Negotiations between the two powers, originally begun in 1905, resumed in 1906 and resulted in the now famous (or infamous) Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

The Anglo-Russian rapprochement had far-reaching implications. First of all, through its partition of Persia and other provisions concerning Afghanistan and Tibet, it sought to preserve the status quo, in which Russian dominance in the north was now shed of its cloak and took more direct forms. Secondly, the Russians explicitly stated that they "did not
deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. An unforeseen result of this stipulation was that the British found themselves in control of the area in which oil was to be discovered only a year later, making Iran more than just an outpost for the defense of India.

For the Iranian people, the Anglo-Russian Convention was a disillusioning experience. In the continued struggle between the Constitutionalists and Royalists in Iran, the balances had decidedly shifted in favor of the Royalists, who relied on Russian assistance. British accommodation with Russia, in the eyes of the Constitutionalists, who had looked to Britain for support, amounted to a betrayal.

The impact of the Convention was thus almost immediately felt in the Constitutional struggle. By early December 1907, Muhammed Ali-Shah had apparently decided to destroy the Majlis and overthrow the Constitution. The constitutionalists were fragmented; the merchants were reluctant to supply continued funding for the Majlis, and the clergy, having failed to win control of the new government, now took up a position of opposition to it. An abortive attempt was made to disband the Majlis with the help of the Cossack Brigade in December, and an uneasy truce was arranged. Only the intervention of the Russians and British saved Muhammed Ali from being deposed.

The following year, Russia forcibly interfered on the side of the Shah to dissolve the Majlis. This set off a
year-long revolt, which was combatted in part by Russian troops in northern Iran, but which ultimately resulted in military defeat of the Shah's forces and deposition of the Shah.56

Russian intrigues in Persia nevertheless continued through 1910-1912, as attempts were made to provoke a new civil war and they conspired to return Muhammed Ali Shah to the throne. Russian troops continued to operate within the country, interfering with Iranian attempts to restore order. In 1912, the Russians sabotaged W. Morgan Schuster's financial mission to that country, which had threatened the Czarist economic stranglehold on the country.57 Such was the condition of Iran when World War I broke out. The government of Iran was powerless, disorganized and bankrupt; northern Iran was under Russian military occupation; Iran's independence never more in danger.
CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., Wilber, Iran, p. 37.


8 For further discussion, see Harold Lamb, The March of the Barbarians, (Garden City, N.Y.: Country Life Press, 1940), pp. 341-356; also, John A. Morrison, "Russia and Warm Water," in Ibid., Harcave, ed., Readings, pp. 46-64.


10 See Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Seapower, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974), p. 18; Several historians have attempted to explain Russian expansion and, indeed, present-day Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean solely in terms of the so-called Russian "urge to the sea" and the "desire for warm-water ports," first expressed by Peter. In doing so, many have left the impression that these interests have occupied the foremost positions in Russian and Soviet policies, when in actuality
these factors were significantly less important than others, such as security and the efforts to keep potential invaders as far distant from the Russian periphery as possible. See op. cit., Morrison "Russian and Warm Water," in Harcave, ed., Readings pp. 46-64.


12 The text of Peter's "will" is cited in Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. I, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1915), p. 15. Recent historical investigation has revealed that the "will" was probably not actually authored by Peter. Nevertheless, subsequent Russian rulers at least considered its dictum, despite the general lack of resources to accomplish its goals.

13 Article 4 of the Russo-Ottoman Treaty for the Partition of Persia's Northwest Provinces (13/24 June 1724) also provided that, "... if Tahmasp should... refuse to surrender the provinces already conquered by the Sublime Porte from the Persian Empire, as well as those on the Caspian Sea which he has granted to the Tsar of Russia under the treaties concluded between His Tsarist Majesty and Tahmasp, the Tsar and the Sublime Porte will take common action to place the Persian Empire, apart from the provinces already partitioned between themselves, under one ruler who shall possess it in perpetuity... but if Persia should undertake hostile action against any of the above named provinces which the two Empires have conquered, the two Empires will unit to obtain redress with their combined forces." Cited in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956), Vol. I, pp. 42-45.

14 This was accomplished in accordance with the Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce concluded between Persia and Russia in February, 1732, while Nadir was still Regent. Text of the agreement in, ibid., Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 45-47.

15 Hafez F. Farmayan, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Historical Analysis, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The Middle East Center, 1971), p. 15.


17 George N. Curzon, Russian in Central Asia, (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1889), pp. 323-324. Czar Paul has written,
The sufferings under which the population of India groans have inspired France and Russia with the liveliest interest; and the two governments have resolved to unite their forces in order to liberate India from the tyrannical and barbarous yoke of the English. Accordingly, the princes and peoples through which the combined armies will pass have no fear; on the contrary, it behooves them to help with all their strength...the object of this campaign being in every respect...just.

An excellent discussion of the motives which prompted Napoleon to suggest the invasion, including his own "messianic" inclinations, is found in John S.C. Abbott's, *The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1883), Vol. I, Chapter 3.


21 Morgan W. Schuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, (New York: The Century Company, 1912), p. 260. Of the possible invasion routes into India once outlined by Lord Curzon, virtually all involved Persia, the Gulf and/or Afghanistan. See op. cit., Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, pp. 297, 341-345. It should also be noted at this point that disagreement between historians exists concerning Russian intentions regarding an invasion of India. Yodfat and Abir, for example, have asserted that, despite the fears of British statesmen that Russian expansion in Central Asia constituted a threat to British India, "no evidence exists of any serious Russian intent to invade India." A. Yodfat and M. Abir, *In the Direction of the Persian Gulf*, (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1977), p. 22. Others have nevertheless noted that the Russians realized that the best way for Russia to improve its position in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere vis-a-vis Great Britain was to apply increased pressure on India. Further discussion is available in H. Hensel, *Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1968-1975*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Int., 1978), pp. 8-27.

23 Op. cit., Yodfat and Abir, In the Direction, p. 21. Morrison also agrees that Russian expansion into Central Asia was motivated primarily by the need to "put a stop to the constant raids against the Russian borderlands and... trade caravans by the nomads" and also notes "the desire of the individual commanders to attain glory (and promotion) by military victories at amazingly small cost." Op. cit., Morrison in Harcave, ed., Readings, Vol. I, p. 52.

24 Op. cit., Pipes, Russia, pp. 232-233 and 265-268. Pipes' discussion of the Intelligentsia in 19th-century Russia includes the following rather pessimistic appraisal of Russia's historic mission by a writer of the period named Chaadaev:

Talking about Russian one always imagines that one is talking about a country like all others; in reality, this is not so at all. Russia is a whole separate world, submissive to the will, caprice, fantasy of a single man, whether his name be Peter or Ivan, no matter - in all instances the common element is the embodiment of arbitrariness. Contrary to all the laws of human community, Russia moves only in direction of her own enslavement and the enslavement of all the neighboring peoples. (p. 266)


39

31 Op. cit., Wilber, Iran, p. 76.


36 The Russians had, in 1833, signed a treaty of defensive alliance, the Treaty of Unkiaar Iskelessi, with Turkey. This treaty guaranteed Russia freedom of navigation of the Turkish Straits in time of peace and war, while the Ottomans agreed to close the Straits to other powers in the event of a war with Russia. See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 15-19.


38 Op. cit., Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 18-19. Russian participation in the London Conference of 1840 and the resulting agreement led Tsar Nicholas to believe that the European powers were ready to divide the Ottoman Empire. His misreading of this conference was compounded by his underestimation of the importance the British attached to the Ottoman Empire as a link to India, as well as the active role the British and others were prepared to take to preserve the identity of the Ottoman Empire.

This was due to the strategic location of Persia and to continued British apprehension over Russian advances. Persia in the latter part of the 19th century occupied a significant place in British policy. "She constituted a substantial outlook in Indian defense, and a barrier to the Russians' southward drive." Rose L. Greaves, Persia and the Defense of India: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third Marquis of Salisbury, (London: University of London, Athlove Press, 1959), p. 82.

Marvin L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations: 1828-1914, (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1965), p. 41. Entner cites the instruction given by St. Petersburg to the Minister to Persia in 1904, in which the stated Russian goal was "politically to make Persia obedient and useful; that is sufficiently strong to be a tool in our hands economically, to preserve for ourselves the major share of the Persian market for free and exclusive exploitation by Russian efforts and capital."

In 1900, Iran procured a loan of 22 million rubles at 5% interest from Russia. "Under the terms of the loan, part of the sum was to be used to pay off all other debts to foreigners and until the loan was repaid Iran could not borrow elsewhere without Russian consent. Payment was guaranteed by Iranian customs receipts. At the same time Iran renewed an earlier secret agreement not to grant any railway concession to foreigners without Russia's consent." Donald Wilber, Iran: Past and Present, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958, p. 86. For an exhaustive study of this subject, ibid., Marvin L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, pp. 41-48.

Firuz Kazemzadeh, A Study in Imperialism: Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia, 1864-1914, (New Haven: Yale Press, 1968), pp. 100-147. Russian merchants, who came unequipped to deal in the competitive market place, generally relied on their government to eliminate their opposition for them. For this and other reasons, including the lack of a coherent economic policy for Persia, the Russian government came to realize, by 1905, that political control of Persia through economic penetration was perhaps beyond their reach. This evidently influenced them in favor of the Treaty of Partition with Britain in 1907.

The Russians endeavored to control construction of railways in and around Persia as a means of advancing their interests and access to Persia and Afghanistan, while limiting the possibilities of British penetration north and west from India. See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role*, (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1973), p. 20.


Ibid., Marlowe, p. 31.


Morgan Schuster characterized the new Shah as "perhaps the most perverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the throne of Persia in many generations. He hated and despised his subjects from the beginning of his career, and from having a scoundrel for a Russian tutor, he easily became the avowed tool and satrap of the Russian government and its agent in Persia for stamping out the rights of the people...He intrigued with Russian emissaries against his own people, and actually contracted with Russia and England for a secret loan of L 400,000 to be squandered by himself..." Op. cit., Schuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, p. xxi.


Indeed, as Ulam notes, "each of Russia's wars and defeats (defeat in the Crimea, a meaningless war with Turkey, the Balkan War of 1877-78, the Russo-Japanese War), minor though they were by our contemporary standards, was followed by the heightening of internal tensions." Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973*, (New York, Praeger, 1976), pp. 8-9.

Persia was neither consulted, nor asked to sign the Agreement, which partitioned the country into Russian and British spheres, and a "neutral zone." Persian officials were not even notified of the agreement until nearly a week after its conclusion. Portion of the text of the Convention pertaining to Persia cited in op. cit., Hurewitz, pp. 265-267.


Ibid., Schuster, The Strangling of Persia, Chapter VI-VIII.
III. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE MODERN PERIOD

Iran's political and economic relations with the Soviet Union began at a time when both countries were struggling against foreign military intervention and insurmountable domestic problems. At the war's outset, Persia attempted to avoid being swept up in the conflict by declaring its neutrality. Nevertheless, northern Persia became a battle-ground for the Turks and Russians, while the British launched land operations against the Turks in southern Persia.  

In 1915, Great Britain and Russia concluded the Constantinople Agreement, which recognized Russian aspirations to possess Constantinople in exchange for British incorporation of the "neutral zone" in Iran into their sphere of influence. This treaty was destined never to reach fruition, as the Czarist regime was overthrown by the 1917 Russian Revolution.

A. THE EARLY SOVIET PERIOD

The successive June and October Revolutions in Russia and the Bolshevik seizure of power seemed to offer the possibility of significant change in the course of Russian-Iranian relations. In June, Kerensky had ordered Russian troops to withdraw from Iran. Following the Bolshevik uprising, the Russian front rapidly disintegrated, placing the burden of holding the northeastern front against Turkey on Great Britain.
alone. Britain occupied all of Iran, which was also to become a base for Allied operations against the Bolshevik regime at war's end.  

Primarily because of the problems of consolidation it now faced, but also because of the prominent position the countries of the Near East occupied in Bolshevik policy and doctrine, the new Soviet regime immediately made an effort to convince Iran, as well as Turkey, that it would be a friend in the future.  

In December 1917, the "Soviet Appeal to Muslim workers in Russia and the East," with regard to Persia, declared,  

...that the treaty for the division of Persia is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military activities troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of free self-determination.  

In March 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided for withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia. More explicit Soviet guarantees came in the form of a note from Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin to the Persian government in June 1918. In this note, the Soviet government formally denounced Tsarist Russian privileges in Persia, and annulled all Persian debts, and divested itself of all Czarist bank and commercial holdings, and railways, telegraph and postal property.  

These moves were motivated by both short and long-term Soviet interests. In the short-term, the Soviets hoped to win Persian sympathy and thereby undermine British ability to use Persia as a base for intervention in the Russian Civil
War. Ultimately, however, the main Soviet objective in Iran, and Afghanistan as well, may have been "to eliminate British influence and create a buffer zone of the two states between Soviet territory and British India, hoping to make them dependent on Soviet Russia and use them as springboards for further Soviet advancement." 65

To a degree, these hopes were not totally unfounded. Many Persian nationalists saw, in these initial Soviet acts, the hope that British influence might also be removed and Persia would be left alone to arrange her own affairs. As Joseph Upton has noted, however, there existed within Persia "great differences in the conception of what an ideal arrangement might be." 66

On the basis of the Chicherin note, and in reaction to Britain's attempt to establish a virtual protectorate in Persia via the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, negotiations between Persia and Russia began in 1920. Meanwhile, Soviet forces in Azerbaijan pursued White Russian troops into Iran, and, within a short time, occupied the entire province of Gilan. There they supported a local rebel, Kuchek Khan, and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan was proclaimed. 67

The continued Soviet occupation and the rebellion in Gilan contributed to the overthrow of the Shah on February 21, 1921 by a coup d'etat led by Sayed Zia Tabataba-i and Reza Khan. The Persian government, hardly an effective organization under the best of circumstances, had been further weakened by a series of cabinet crises in late 1920 and early
1921. The government was unable to secure either withdrawal of Soviet forces from northern Iran or British assistance to suppress the rebellion.

One of Sayed Zia's first steps was to have the newly-formed Majlis formally repudiate the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, which opened the way for signature of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of Friendship on February 26, 1921. This treaty normalized relations between Russia and Persia, formally repudiated all Tsarist treaties and rights, recognized the 1881 delineation of the Russo-Iranian border, and promised non-intervention by Russia in Iran's internal affairs. However, Articles V and VI of the Treaty, which were to remain a point of contention, provided that "if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as its base of operation against Russia...and if the Persian government should not be able to put a stop to such a menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russian troops shall have the right to advance into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operation necessary for defense. Russia, however, shall withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed."68

This treaty is important, if for no other reason, because it symbolized in many ways the efforts of the Soviet leadership to deal with the post-World War I international situation, and the role of the Soviet state in it. Prior to
the revolution, Lenin had predicted that Russia would prevail in the war with Germany, but that even if it did not, the Russian revolution would trigger a world socialist revolution by a proletariat unwilling to allow the undoing of the new Socialist Society. When that world revolution failed to materialize in Europe, he was compelled to seek peace rather than risk continued war and the probable destruction of the fledgling Soviet state. The survival of the state was thus of paramount importance if it was to inspire a world socialist revolution at the proper time.

Until 1920, the Soviets had expected the world revolution to begin in Europe. After that, they gradually came to view the colonies and other areas of imperialist exploitation and oppression (a category into which Persia was placed) as the most-likely location of at least nationalist bourgeois revolutions. These would generate, in turn, the proletarian revolution led by the USSR. The Soviet Union would, meanwhile, befriend these areas and provide the guidance and encouragement necessary to undermine the imperialist powers and to advance revolutionary socialist aims.

Each of these concepts found expression in the liberal treatment accorded Persia in the Treaty of Friendship. The Treaty itself demonstrated the sensitivity of the early Soviet leaders to the presence of major powers along the littoral of a Russia significantly weakened by foreign and civil war. The Soviet state occupied, more or less, the same geographical space as its Czarist predecessor; hence, the traditional
territorial and psychological security problems of Russia were still operative. These were only compounded by the Allies' use of Persia and other areas as bases of operations for the anti-Bolshevik effort after World War I and resulted in Soviet insistence on the inclusion of Articles V and VI in the Treaty.

Early Soviet policy thus endeavored to deny these areas to the European powers. As J.C. Hurewitz has emphasized, "The treaty with Iran represented the first of a cluster of treaties that the USSR framed in the interwar years with its nextdoor Muslim neighbors to reconstruct, on the relic of an earlier century, a buffer separating the Russian and British empires," and, in this case, the insulating of the socialist state from the "encircling capitalists." The treaty also served Communist propaganda purposes well. "It was widely published and distributed in the Near East and Asia as an example of Russia's anti-imperialist position and her good intentions and generosity." From this point until the eve of World War II, Soviet influence in the Middle East was, for all practical purposes, at low ebb. The problem of succession in the Soviet Union, Stalin's shift to "socialism in one country," and his own personal (and not totally unwarranted) paranoia, effectively occupied much of Moscow's attention during the inter-war period. After 1920, therefore, the Soviet leadership increasingly tended to divide the Middle East into two regions; Iran and
Turkey, whose geographical proximity dictated the continued application of pressure and efforts to maintain influence; and the Arab world, whose importance was confined to its potential as a breeding ground for anti-imperialist, pro-Communist revolution. The task of inspiring such activity was entrusted to the Communist International, and these efforts met with only mixed results. 74

Even along its littoral, when the predicted world revolution failed to materialize, Moscow found itself unable to gain a position of predominant influence. In Persia, which had been viewed by early Bolshevik leaders as the key to an oriental revolution, 75 the rise of Reza Khan signalled the beginning of a more positive Persian foreign policy, more resistant to external pressures and less susceptible to foreign manipulation. Reza's consolidation of power as Minister of War (1921–1923) and Prime Minister (1923–1925) had been facilitated in part by Moscow's internal preoccupations and by the relatively low-profile approach adopted by the British. His formal assumption of power as the first Pahlavi Shah in 1925, and his reforms, including suppression of Iranian Communist party activities, 76 caused the Soviet leadership much concern. These developments reinforced Soviet fears that the British might strengthen their position along Russia's borders and frustrated Soviet expectations that Persia would trigger the oriental revolt. One Soviet writer's assessment of Persia under the revitalized monarchy noted,
The main problem of Persia's development turns out to be the question whether it can skip the phase of a gradual ripening of capitalism and the period of absolute monarchy, and go directly to the democracy of her working classes. The theses on the national and colonial question of the Second Congress of the Comintern foresee the possibility of skipping if the popular masses of the backward countries are given help by the enlightened proletariat of advanced countries. Persia, no doubt, presents a typical picture of a delayed development caused by imperialism, and it remains to diagnose how much the existing international situation favors the solution of the Persian problem by way of such a jump.77

Reza, meanwhile, sought to involve other European countries in his programs of modernization to demonstrate Iran's independence and to offset British and Russian influence. In particular, he cultivated Germany as a "third force," which quickened the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations in the late 1920's. If, as his supporters maintain, the Shah intended to use German assistance to his own advantage without being subjected to German domination,78 then it must be said that, were it not for the outbreak of the Second World War, he might have succeeded. As it was, however, Reza overestimated his own ability to play off Russian, British and German interests in Iran once Hitler attacked his former ally in 1941. Conversely, he may have also underestimated the desperate situation the allies were in with regard to maintaining the Soviet War effort.79

Consequently, Reza's declaration of neutrality was seen as an opening for German subversion and a threat to the Allied effort. Iran was invaded and occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate.80
B. WORLD WAR II AND IRAN

Prior to Hitler's attack on his former ally in 1941, Moscow and Berlin had formulated a plan for the prospective establishment of spheres of influence in the post-war world. Negotiations carried on between Molotov and Ribbentrop in November 1940, following conclusion of a four-power mutual assistance pact between Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan (September 1940), resulted in the draft of a Secret Protocol to the Treaty in which "the Soviet Union (declared) that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." This provision was the consequence both of Hitler's desire to focus Soviet attention outside of Europe, where Hitler wanted a free hand, as well as Soviet desires to reserve for themselves this strategic area, heretofore dominated by the British.

The German attack on the USSR overthrew these plans. As a result, it was Soviet-British cooperation, rather than Soviet-German concurrence, which furnished Moscow with an opening in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Both Allies cited the threat of a German takeover of Iran, the Russians relying on the provisions of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship for justification of their occupation of the northern provinces.

The Anglo-Russian invasion and occupation, the abdication of Reza Shah and collapse of the Iranian military; all had a disintegrating effect on the political stability which Reza
Shah had endeavored to bring to his country. With Iran again divided between these powers, as it had been after the 1907 partition, the authority of the central government under the new, inexperienced Shah was negligible.

Soviet activities in Iran during and after the War are significant for a number of reasons. In the first place, Russian efforts to undermine the authority of the central government posed the clearest and most imminent danger to Iran's independence. Moscow's political and military representatives controlled virtually every aspect of economic and political life in their zone of occupation, and sought to influence policies throughout the country.

It is also important to note that the various tactics employed by the Soviets in Iran were precisely the same tools Moscow used, albeit with greater success, to secure its hold on eastern Europe at the close of World War II. Despite disclaimers that "the Soviet government (had) no designs affecting the territorial integrity and independence of the Iranian state" and that, in Stalin's own words, "We have not nor can we have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories or the conquest of other peoples...including Iran," the measures undertaken by the Soviets were intended to do just that. These included a massive Soviet propaganda effort controlled by the Russian Embassy in Tehran, and carried out after 1943 by the "Irano-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations." In the northern provinces, the Soviets
restricted travel of other westerners, caused a crisis over oil concessions in 1944-45, censored the Iranian and western press, confiscated property and arrested and deported opponents of Soviet-inspired activities. Soviet representatives exercised virtual veto power over the Iranian government's appointment of provincial governors within the Soviet zone and they furnished increasing support to the Tudeh Party. At the close of the war, the Soviets refused to remove their troops, in violation of the pledges of the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration of 1943 to respect Iran's territorial integrity, and actively backed the establishment of the separatist regimes in Azerbaijan and the "Kurdish Republic." This included disarming Iranian forces and actively preventing the restoration of the central government authority.

The net effect of these developments was, as George Lenczowski has observed, that,

Iran served as a catalyst which changed the American perspective of the nature of Soviet policies in the post-war period and provided the first stimulus for a radical reorientation of United States foreign policy and strategy.

C. THE COLD WAR

The Soviet decision to withdraw from Iran in 1946 followed an Iranian protest to the United Nations over continued Soviet occupation, and negotiations between the Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam os-Saltaneh and Molotov. As Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi later recounted,
Qavam, dealing from a position of weakness, ... agreed to recommend to Parliament the establishment of a joint Russian-Iranian oil company (the Soviets to hold 51 percent of the stock) to exploit the oil resources of northern Iran; to grant three cabinet posts to Tudeh party members; to recognize the rebel Azerbaijan Government; and, finally, to withdraw Iran's complaint against Russia before the United Nations. 88

Although the Soviets have never published the reasons for their withdrawal from Iran, there were probably two primary causes. Given Qavam's apparent concessions, the Soviets were confident that they achieved their goal of an Azerbaijan separated from Iran and subservient to their wishes, as well as the promise, through Tudeh participation in the government, of continued influence in Iranian policy-making. At this particular juncture, unless Stalin had intended to seize additional Iranian territory, there was nothing further to be gained by the continued occupation. On the contrary, given growing US and British impatience over the Soviet troop issue, Stalin risked arousing even greater opposition which might cost him his as yet unconsolidated gains in Eastern Europe. 89 Winston Churchill was one of those who in fact strongly advocated applying just such pressure to gain a satisfactory solution for the future of Eastern Europe. In a speech given in October 1948, for example, he urged:

The question is asked: What will happen when the (the Soviets) get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store?...We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up...The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too. 90
As a result of some rather delicate diplomatic moves, encouraged no doubt by the stiffening of the American attitude towards Russian designs in Iran, the central government gradually overcame the concessions wrested from Qavam by the Soviets. The first step was taken in December 1946, over protests from Moscow and the Soviet Embassy, when government troops entered Azerbaijan and overcame separatist resistance. The Kurdish revolt was also suppressed. In the autumn of 1947, another blow was struck when the Majlis refused to ratify the oil agreement which would have given the Russians a 25-year controlling interest in northern Iranian oil.

In a sense, the events of 1945-1947 in Iran both ended one era and began another for the Soviet Union and Iran. The latter had survived, albeit just barely, a significant Soviet threat to divide and dominate the country. Iran experienced a resurgence of nationalism and the determination to resist in the future all forms of domination. But the Iranian regime was unsure of its capability for dealing with Moscow in the future, and had not yet determined the best means for insuring the country's security. Almost immediately, the national leadership split over these issues, until matters were ultimately brought to a head in the confrontation between the Shah and the Mossaddegh in 1953.

Meanwhile, Stalin had clearly realized that the opportunity for the imposition of military solutions in Iran and elsewhere had passed. The survival of the Soviet Union
dictated greater attention to the USSR's desperate post-war domestic situation, as well as the avoidance of an outright confrontation with the US, which might risk Soviet security. Stalin sought, therefore, to consolidate his gains in Europe and to unify the "Communist bloc." After 1947, this meant increasing isolation from the West, as the Kremlin revived Lenin's thesis of the capitalist menace and the irreconcilable antagonism between capitalism and communism. In Stalin's mind, this rigid categorization meant that any non-Communist country was capitalist or capitalist-controlled. As Professor Ben-Cion Pinchuk has observed, this "attitude prevented the Kremlin from exploiting the opportunities arising from the disintegration of the Western empires" and, until Stalin's death, "made it difficult for the Soviet Union to cooperate with the countries that had only recently acquired independence from their Western masters."

The alternative Soviet strategy came to be a reliance on Communist parties around the world to achieve Moscow's aims. In Europe, this became almost immediately apparent as the Soviet-inspired Communist coup brought Czechoslovakia behind the "Iron Curtain" in 1948. In Iran, increasing support was furnished to the Tudeh, which, it was hoped, might eventually win control of the government. And indeed, the rise of Mohammed Mossaddegh seemed, for a time, to hold out that promise, as the Tudeh contributed important support to his movement.
Of Mossaddegh himself, however, the Soviets were less sure and the dilemma of Stalinist policy towards non-Communist nationalists in the Third World was clearly demonstrated in Moscow's general ambivalence towards him. Predictably, the Kremlin saw Mossaddegh's oil nationalization efforts as "anti-imperialist," while they termed his renewal of the US military advisorship of Iran's armed forces, in 1952, as "incompatible with principles of good neighborly relations."97

In March of 1953, Stalin died. The Kremlin's new leadership was quick to realize that Stalin's policies had been a mistake, although new policy implementations evolved slowly, and did not fully take form until after Khrushchev's emergence in 1956. This revised thinking held that Soviet interests would best be served through gaining influence in the "Third World", promoting the "historical process" of world socialism while continuing to avoid nuclear war.98

The Kremlin would have to involve itself with non-communist nationalists, and encourage local communist parties to work with the nationalists in the establishment of "national democratic regimes," friendly to Moscow.99

In the case of Iran, the Kremlin had taken some initial steps to improve relations soon after Stalin died. The new, Soviet leadership chose to ignore Mossaddegh's growing rejection of leftist support of his premiership, which, at times, nearly achieved control of the National Front Movement.100

In a review of world affairs conducted in August, 1953, G.M.
Malenkov spoke about Soviet-Iranian mutual interests, claiming that, "the experience of thirty-five years has shown that the Soviet Union and Persia are interested in mutual friendship and collaboration," and offered to hold talks on border issues and outstanding financial claims.  

This process was interrupted by the final confrontation between Mossaddegh and the Shah. At first, Mossaddegh's refusal to step down as Prime Minister was strongly supported by the Tudeh, which planned to take over from him. However, alarmed by their growing strength, the Prime Minister ordered nationalist supporters to quell Tudeh demonstrations. In the midst of the Tudeh-nationalist clashes, the pro-Shah coup occurred on August 19, 1953, resulting in the defeat of both factions.

In retrospect, as will be discussed, the Soviet reaction to this crisis paralleled, in many ways, its response to the 1978 crisis in Iran. (As Firuz Kazemzadeh has noted, "...the Soviet Union remained on the sidelines. The press, of course, hailed the 'anti-imperialist struggle of the Iranian people'.") Indeed, at the crucial moment in the struggle, when the Tudeh, which was the best organized faction involved, had the chance to seize control of the government, Moscow remained mysteriously aloof and furnished no encouragement. As a result, the Tudeh made no attempt to resort to arms following a government plea to resist the Royalist coup, "even though they had
long prepared for it and had carefully infiltrated the military for that purpose."105

One effect of the Royalist success was that it was the Shah's view of Iran's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the West which prevailed. To be sure, the Shah accepted Soviet overtures when they were offered, but as he consolidated and strengthened his position, he moved Iran into alliance with the West.106

The only negative gestures made by the Soviet Union for over a year after the return of the Shah were directed at Iran's prospective adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani Treaty of 1954 and discussions related to the formation of a new consortium of oil companies.107

The Shah's decision to include Iran in the Baghdad Pact in October 1955 marked a significant break with traditional Iranian foreign policy. Iran's foreign policy had previously sought to maintain a neutralist stance between stronger powers, with the occasional incorporation of a "third force" when one was available. But World War II had undermined one of the traditional Iranian powers - Great Britain - and the Shah saw US power as the best guarantee of Iran's security against the Soviet Union. The US, for its part, given the rigid bi-polarity of the international system at the time, seemed prepared to support Iran only if it abandoned its neutrality.

Moscow was now confronted with what it saw as the possibility of the establishment of American military and strategic
bomber bases along the USSR's southern border. This fear would be compounded by the end of the decade by US deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Turkey and Italy, the strategic implications of which would eventually lead to Khrushchev's Cuban missile gamble. The chief Soviet aim throughout the 1955-1962 period with regard to Iran was therefore to detach Iran from the West and persuade it to readopt its traditional neutralist policies. Ultimately, the Soviets would have liked to have attained a position where they might exercise "the right of veto or the right to dictate or prevent a particular foreign policy orientation" by Iran. 108

Although the methodology employed to accomplish these ends varied, it is not an overstatement to say that hostility and disapproval characterized the Soviet reaction during this period. The Soviets irately protested Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact as "incompatible with the interests of strengthening peace and security in the area of the Near and Middle East and is incompatible with Iran's good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union and the known treaty obligations of Iran." 109 This same theme was repeatedly pressed during the remainder of 1955 in press and diplomatic channels. In November, a Soviet note charged that the Baghdad Pact was an aggressive military pact (clearly it was not), and warned:

The situation which is being created by Iran's accession to the aggressive Baghdad bloc is fraught with dangers to the frontier of the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet government cannot remain
indifferent to Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact...
(The Soviet Union places) on the Iranian Government the entire responsibility for the probable consequences of the Iranian government's decision to join the Baghdad military bloc. 110

Another tactic employed by the Soviets was an attempt to portray treaty participation not so much as a threat to the USSR, but as a threat to the members themselves. A 1956 Pravda article noted,

The establishment of American military bases on foreign territories does not pursue any other objective but the preparation of an aggressive war and imperialist expansion of the USA... American bases represent a serious threat to the peoples on whose territories they are located.111

Having failed to deter the Shah with threats, Moscow was not ashamed to attempt a "softer" approach, and in 1955 an invitation to visit Moscow was extended to the Shah. That visit was undertaken, in 1956, and the Shah later recalled his meetings with Khrushchev,

The Russians claimed that their policy was one of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Then why, they asked, had we joined the Baghdad Pact? I told them that they could find the answer to that question in the history of relations between our two countries... Khrushchev and his colleagues replied that they were not responsible for these aggressions, which had been committed before they assumed leadership... Khrushchev spoke of what he considered to be the aggressive and militaristic implications of the Baghdad Pact... (He) agreed that Iran had no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, but he suggested that some big power might compel us against our will to make our territory available for an attack on Russia...112

One of the Shah's hopes in visiting Moscow was to demonstrate that aid which the US had been slow to provide could be attained elsewhere. Following the Shah's visit, during
which he had assured Khrushchev that "Iran would not in any way countenance or take part in any aggressive schemes against his country," relations between Moscow and Tehran underwent cosmetic improvement. New agreements were negotiated on questions of transit, frontiers, water utilization from the Aras and Atrah Rivers, and hydroelectric power development. Soviet propaganda attacks, although they continued to target the Baghdad Pact, tended to ignore Iran's membership. It should be noted, however, that although the agreements were negotiated in the 1955-1957 period, many were not implemented until after 1962.

The most violent Soviet protestations, however, were yet to come. Prompted by the violent 1958 Iraqi coup, and the death of King Faisal, the Shah pressed the United States for greater assurances of support. Along with Pakistan and Turkey, Iran had again urged the US to formally join the Baghdad Pact, or as it came to be known, CENTO. The US response was to offer to sign bilateral, defensive agreements with these countries.

Learning of the Shah's readiness to commit Iran to a bilateral agreement with, what Moscow termed, "a country that makes no secret of its insane plans to wipe the Soviet Union off the face of the earth," the Kremlin acted immediately to forestall such an eventuality. Moscow, either with or without the Shah's encouragement (the Shah, by his own testimony, was dissatisfied with the first US proposal for an agreement), attempted to prevail upon the Shah to sign
a non-aggression pact in place of a defensive agreement with the US. The failure of this effort signalled the beginning of what one observer has termed a period of "unprecedented hostility in Iran's postwar relations with the Soviet Union." 117

Moscow's failures to "neutralize" Iran contrasted with early apparent successes elsewhere in the Middle East region. The Kremlin had, by this time, long since recognized that its southern neighbors viewed the USSR with suspicion and hostility. In line with Khrushchev's concept of seeking influence with "anti-imperialist nationalists," Moscow had therefore focused its efforts on the "Arab half" of the Middle East. In that region the Soviets had the advantage of not being confronted with the legacy of Russian imperialism and Soviet intrigues. At the same time, they hoped to exploit Arab anti-western sentiments evoked by the history of European involvement in the region, and western sponsorship of the state of Israel. The achievement of Soviet influence in Nasser's Egypt thus represented a base for further penetration of the Arab Middle East, as well as a first step in the circumvention, or outflanking, of the carefully constructed US treaty system. 118 There was thus a marked contrast in Soviet-Iranian (or Soviet-Turkish) relations at this time and, for example, Soviet-Egyptian, relations. Iran and Turkey bore the brunt of Soviet threats and pressure.

The central theme of the Soviet campaign of intimidation against Iran between 1959 and 1962 was the perceived threat,
on the Kremlin's part, that Iran would permit the stationing of US IRBM's on Iranian soil. As has been mentioned, this fear was accentuated in 1959 when Ankara had joined Italy and Great Britain in agreeing to permit the deployment of Jupiter and Thor missiles on its territory, and by the signature of the Iranian-American Agreement, which Moscow saw as a step towards the establishment of IRBM bases in Iran. Typical of the charges levelled by the Soviet Union was its claim that Iran was "allowing the U.S. to build a missile base in the Zagros Mountains."\textsuperscript{119}

Despite occasional signs of easing tension between Iran and the USSR after 1959, such as the return of the Soviet ambassador to Tehran in 1960 after an eight month absence, and a decline in propaganda attacks at about the same time,\textsuperscript{120} it was not until the Shah's December 1962 pledge not to allow the erection of any rocket bases on Iranian soil and that Iran would not be a party to any act of aggression against the USSR that Moscow proved ready to "agree to a Soviet-Iranian detente without Iran having to abandon her alignment with the United States."\textsuperscript{121}

D. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE "ERA OF DETENTE"

The Shah's pledge to the Kremlin leadership concerning the stationing of strategic missiles in Iran came at a time when both Iran and the USSR were faced with changing domestic and international environments. These new realities required some adjustment of their respective foreign policies in
general, and with regard to one another. This is not to imply that an immediate, or for that matter, permanent transformation of relations occurred; rather, both Moscow and Tehran sought to take advantage of opportunities for change as they developed.

The single most important factor in this regard was the evolution of what came to be termed "Super-power Detente." The changing American-Soviet relationship, from one of total hostility, toward a "limited adversary" relationship, characterized both by conflict and cooperation, altered the framework of the international system to a significant degree. With Soviet-American recognition of a "balance of terror" requiring restraint and a lowering of tension, weaker allied states gained a greater degree of independence in foreign policy areas previously thought of only in Cold War terms.122

Thus, in contrast to Iran's strict adherence to the west in the "bi-polar" post-WW II period, the Shah now felt able to chart a more "independent foreign policy." For Iran, the gradual erosion of "strict bi-polarity" permitted more flexibility in dealing with the Soviets, without giving the appearance of abandoning her western orientation.123 There were other considerations as well. The Shah viewed "detente" as both a danger and an opportunity. As one study notes, it was a danger because it could mean that matters involving what (the Shah) saw as Iran's vital interests would be settled by a Soviet-United States double hegemonie, over his head and without his being consulted. It was an opportunity because it meant that the immediate Soviet threat to Iranian security would
decline and that therefore Iran would become more secure and need not have such close ties with the United States.\textsuperscript{124}

The framework established by the changing superpower relationship both coincided with, and caused, other important changes in domestic and foreign policy areas in Iran and the Soviet Union. Detente was, as has been stated, important, but it was not the only development which influenced the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement.

1. The Iranian Perspective

The Shah's decision to seek some form of reconciliation with Moscow in the mid-1960's was very much related to Iran's domestic situation. The Shah, had by the early 1960's largely succeeded in consolidating his personal power. Additionally, some social progress had been achieved and Iran's economy was entering a stage of impressive growth.\textsuperscript{125} Nevertheless, the Shah's land reform program had engendered significant opposition, which required even greater attention to domestic matters. Rapprochement with the USSR was thus, at one and the same time, facilitated by the somewhat improved domestic conditions in Iran, and a result of the necessity for devoting more attention to those conditions.\textsuperscript{126}

Externally, the impact of the changing super-power relationship has already been mentioned. A related development which facilitated a new Iranian approach to Moscow was the emergence of a serious Sino-Soviet dispute. The Shah had, early in
the 1960's, come to share General de Gaulle's opinion that differences between the USSR and China would result in greater Russian willingness to reach an understanding with the noncommunist powers, including those along the southern border of the USSR.127

At the same time, there were, however, adequate reasons for apprehension over regional political developments. The first of these was the increasing appeal in the Arab world of "Nasserism," with its anti-monarchist overtones. Across the Persian Gulf, Egyptian forces were actively engaged in support of an anti-royalist regime in Yemen. The Shah's perception of himself as a prime target for such radical revolts contributed to his desire to seek greater freedom to concentrate Iranian resources on countering regional threats to the country and his position. To accomplish such a shift in emphasis, rapprochement with the USSR was a necessary ingredient.

The regional event which most convinced the Shah of the need for a new approach for Iran's foreign relations was the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The Shah's early reservations concerning CENTO's usefulness, and even the limits of bilateral agreements with the US, seemed confirmed by US refusal to aid Pakistan, another nominal ally.128 In contrast to the Shah's disappointment over what he viewed as the US failure to stand by Pakistan the Shah found reason for encouragement in the Soviet role in settling the conflict.
The emergence of the Soviet Union as a chief intermediary for the termination of this war...lent weight to the impression that the Soviet Union had (been) transformed into a regional status quo power, which far from seeking to exploit national and social conflicts on its periphery, utilized its power and influence in the opposite direction.129

Not totally unrelated to this problem was the continued debate over arms for Iran. In the 1960's, the US did not share the Shah's appreciation of the Arab threat to Iran, nor did it, at that time, envision for Iran the special role in regional stability which later evolved. US policy was very much tied to British primacy in the area, and the Kennedy Administration was making yeoman efforts to achieve reconciliation with President Nasser, who was opposed to the Iranian monarchy. A personal appeal by the Shah to President Kennedy during his 1962 visit to the US failed to influence US thinking on the subject. It was only under the Johnson Administration that a regular military aid program was established for Iran. When the Indo-Pakistani conflict broke in 1965, and the Shah was unable to use his American-provided weaponry to aid Pakistan, he concluded that diversified sources of arms were not only desirable, but necessary.130

All of these developments were taken into account in the shift in Iranian policy from "positive nationalism" to what the Shah termed "independent foreign policy." This new policy reflected continuity as well as change. The contrast in the two policies was seen in the shift from a somewhat ill-defined position of alignment with the US to a position
in which Iran would seek to "maintain friendly or neutral relations with all powers, big or small irrespective of their Eastern or Western bloc affiliations." The continuous theme was the "national interest." The Shah committed Iran to a greater preparedness to protect its own vital national interests. He nevertheless carefully preserved Iran's membership in CENTO and other ties to the West, including requests for economic and military support. Thus, the Shah's proclamation of Iran's "independent national policy" was a logical development in light of the changing domestic Iranian and international scenes.

2. **Soviet Considerations**

Just as the early 1960's marked the emergence of "new leadership" in Iran (in the person and institution of the Shah), so too did the USSR find itself under new leadership, as Khrushchev was ousted by Brezhnev and Kosygin. The immediate concern of the new regime was the establishment of its power at home and "the need to liquidate the dangerous consequences of Khrushchev's adventurism. Internal, mainly economic difficulties compelled the USSR to seek a reduction in its expenditures on armaments, to procure food from abroad, and to give a boost to the declining rate of Soviet industrial growth through wider commercial and technological intercourse with the West." Perhaps the most important foreign policy concern the Kremlin faced was coming to grips with the growing permanency of the Sino-Soviet split. The long-standing national,
ideological and policy differences between the two were complicated by increased tensions over the Soviet position on Vietnam. Moscow's new attempts to begin a rapprochement with Peking in 1964-1965, including Kosygin's February 1965 visit, did not succeed. And the onset of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966 must surely have convinced any remaining optimists in the Kremlin that a reconciliation with China was not imminent.

In the immediate post-Khrushchev era, Soviet policy in the Middle East remained concentrated on Egypt and Syria, where significant applications of aid, trade and arms had won the Soviets a special role and influence. The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean were important, but as yet secondary, areas of interest in these terms. Moscow was concerned primarily with neutralizing states along the southern Soviet periphery and maintaining regional stability. The Kremlin strategy to "contain" and "encircle" the PRC by developing close relations with the states of the south and southeast was, in the mid-1960's, only just emerging.

The first tangible manifestation of Soviet concerns over the area was Moscow's reaction to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Viewing Chinese support of Pakistan as contrary to Soviet interests in the area, the Kremlin endeavored to play the role of "peacemaker," lest a larger Asian war develop. The result, facilitated no doubt by the previously-discussed US attitude, was a Soviet diplomatic success, as Kosygin
mediated the Indo-Pakistani talks at Tashkent in January 1966.

Other demonstrations of the Soviet concern for stability to the south was the easing of Soviet pressure over Iran's membership in CENTO and the Regional Coopera-
tive Development (RCD). Previous efforts to move Iran away from these arrangements had served only to strengthen Iran's resolve to adhere to her membership. The priority accorded to Iran in Moscow's policy towards the area dictated a more subtle approach. Additionally, Moscow may have privately come to share the Shah's opinion that CENTO credibility, and thereby its usefulness (particularly as a tool of American policy), was on shaky ground.\textsuperscript{138}

3. Improved Relations (1965-1971): The Economic Sphere

The result of these developments was a much improved environment for the "normalization" of Irano-Soviet relations. It is important to stress, though, that in this period, as in all others, Soviet political and strategic objectives out-weighed economic relations between the two countries. The basic Soviet aim remained the neutralization of key actors in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region, while the methodology employed substituted accommodation and even flattery for intimidation.\textsuperscript{139} In this respect, Soviet policy lacked a positive thrust, i.e., it was still characterized, as it had been under Khrushchev, by improvisation and opportunism, stressing the denial function of Soviet policy in the
area—that of reducing or minimizing western influence along the Soviet periphery.

"Aid and trade" had become tools of Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev in the mid-1950's, but the political returns were often less than the Kremlin had hoped for.  

The expansion of economic ties between the USSR and Iran in the mid-1960's, however, reflected a more conservative application of these tools, both in planning and emphasis.  

In contrast to the extravagant optimism which characterized Soviet aid thinking in earlier years, the Kosygin-Brezhnev regime seemed disposed to assess more realistically just what it (could) expect from its economic aid commitments abroad. It...evidenced a more cautious and businesslike approach to aid-giving...(and) placed greater emphasis on trade rather than aid by committing a larger share of its new aid as commercial credits designed primarily to promote Soviet exports.  

The development of Soviet-Iranian trade and commercial relations since the mid-1960's has been well documented elsewhere and need not be replicated in this paper. Mention of a few key agreements is sufficient, however, to illustrate the growth of the Irano-Soviet commercial relations. These included the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (July 27, 1963), pertaining to dam construction, fish and sturgeon breeding, and grain storage, and the October 1965 and January 1966 Trade Agreements, which provided Soviet technical and economic assistance for construction of a steel mill, hydroelectric facilities and a natural gas pipeline from Iran to the USSR.  

In March 1967, a 5-year trade agreement was concluded, and subsequently renewed, and was followed by agreements for
low-interest economic credit from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries for industrial and agricultural products.

Perhaps the most controversial agreement was the Iranian agreement, in February 1967, to purchase $110 million worth of military equipment (vehicles, trucks, anti-aircraft guns, etc.) from the Soviet Union. This development was a direct result of the US prohibition on Iran's using US military aid items to assist Pakistan in 1965 and the Shah's determination to diversify Iran's sources of arms, in light of US reluctance to meet his requests.144

In the 1970's, despite a noticeable cooling of Irano-Soviet relations, Iran secured aid credits from the USSR for development of Caspian Sea ports and finally, on October 12, 1972, the Soviet Union and Iran signed a fifteen-year treaty on economic and technical cooperation. Such was the scope of Soviet involvement in economic relations with Iran that by 1973, Moscow could claim to have assisted in over 90 major construction projects in Iran, of which 39 were said to have been completed. Economic ties between the two countries had thus come to be the main feature of their relations.145

Nor did alarming Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean in 1977, or the rising spectre of internal revolt in Iran in 1978 affect continuing economic cooperation.146

There is no doubt that these and other agreements were mutually beneficial. The Soviet Union, during a time of domestic economic difficulty, found a new market for her
products and access to external energy. Iran received critical assistance in key industrial and agricultural spheres. But, there were other benefits as well. George Lenczowski, for example, contends that Iran's modified posture during the late 1960's presented "distinct advantages" for the USSR.

It legitimized the Soviet Union as a partner in Iranian development...gave her an opportunity to publicize herself as a builder of a spectacular and prestigious project - the steel plant...provided opportunities for Soviet representatives to establish direct contacts with the Iranian labor force, technocrats and military. They also generated a political situation in which certain Soviet expectations and requests would have to be met on a day-to-day basis to avoid irritations likely to delay the completion of various economic projects.147

Likewise, Chubin and Zabih observed that the Soviet Union's gains included "security to its frontiers while it dealt with the other more pressing problems in Asia...the possibility of the continued supply of cheap accessible fuel for its central Asian republics," and the anticipation of a future "need to import oil."148

From the Iranian perspective, rapprochement with the Soviets had a beneficial impact in both domestic and foreign policy areas. Chubin and Zabih, for example, note:

The movement toward reconciliation substantially decreased the type and frequency of Soviet attacks on the regime, and criticism of the Shah...virtually disappeared.149

Furthermore, the Kremlin maintained a "neutral" position regarding Iran's claims to Bahrain, and generally refrained from taking sides in other regional issues of importance to

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the Shah, such as the Shatt al-Arab question in the late 1960's and the controversy over the federation of the Arab Emirates in 1971.150

Indeed, Soviet behavior towards Iran during the period seemed to justify the Shah's belief

...that the economic element, the dependence of the USSR on imported oil, the desire for secure frontiers, its commitments and preoccupations elsewhere, and the desire not to revive NATO and the cold war, or to antagonize the (Indian Ocean) region, (would) adequately deter the Soviets from aggressive designs on Iran or any other Gulf oil producing state in the near future.151


Beginning in the late 1960's and continuing into the 1970's, a complex of events had the effect of causing Iran's reassessment of Soviet foreign policy behavior. A real shift was taking place in Soviet policy, one aspect of which was a new focus on an area of vital interest to Iran and the West - the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

As previously noted, Soviet Middle Eastern policy in the immediate post-Khruschev era had a primarily negative thrust to it.

No clear Soviet policy or conceptions existed for the Middle East - much less for the Persian Gulf... the Soviets had general ideas of what they wanted: to remove the West and Western influence from the area and hopefully to replace it, to establish friendly regimes and further relations with those regimes on a strategic as well as an ideological basis. How to achieve these goals and what to do until they transpired was not entirely clear to them.152

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By the early 1970's, many of these ambiguities showed evidence of having been cleared up. A new drive in Soviet policy toward the Middle and Near East occurred, and a changed Iranian policy resulted.

1. **The Six-Day War**

   Earlier in the discussion it was mentioned that Soviet Middle East policy in the late 1960's was primarily "Mediterranean-oriented," concentrating on Egypt and Syria. There was, nevertheless, a growing interest in the Indian Ocean, particularly as the Sino-Soviet rift "pulled" the Kremlin's attention to the east.

   The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to its regional impact, served to hasten what was to be a major shift of focus in Soviet policy. The Arab defeat had a catastrophic effect on Soviet policy, which had been intimately tied to the image of Nasser, the call to Pan-Arabism and the "Arab cause" versus Israel. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's outright complicity - and possible duplicity - in instigating Egyptian and Syrian military activity brought the Soviets at least their fair share of the blame for the Arab defeat.\(^\text{153}\) Egypt's post-war abandonment of revolutionary activity, exemplified in the evacuation of Egyptian forces in Yemen in December 1967, as well as Egypt's moderate reconciliation with conservative Arab regimes - Saudi Arabia, and later Iran, necessitated a new Soviet approach. The net result was a gradual shift in focus of Soviet efforts.
farther to the east in the Arab world, particularly to Syria and Iraq. The new Soviet approach thus combined renewed support for its traditional client, Egypt (particularly during Nasser's "war of attrition"), with an influx of direct aid to such places as Yemen and the PFLOAG insurrection in Dhofar. This new involvement was also intended to offset the heretofore unchallenged Chinese support of area revolutionary movements. In a short time, Chinese influence was undermined, and eventually replaced.

2. British Withdrawal From "East of Suez"

The announcement, in January 1968, by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson that Britain would withdraw its military forces from "east of Suez" by 1971 coincided with developments mentioned above. Soviet reaction was one of surprise and suspicion. The Kremlin thoroughly expected that the British move was a preliminary step to replacement by a U.S. presence in the area. In March, 1968, Tass published an article which noted the Soviet Union's "policy of protecting the national interests of sovereign countries or peoples against the encroachments of imperialists, and realizing that the plans of neo-colonialism are also directed against the security of the southern frontiers of the USSR, firmly comes forth against new attempts in the Persian Gulf area, to dictate their will to them."\textsuperscript{154}

In March 1968, the first Soviet warship had visited the Indian Ocean, but by 1969, Soviet naval ship days in the
region totaled over 1400. By that time, the Soviets had also issued their proposal for an "Asian security system."

3. The Iranian Reaction

The Shah had reason to view all of these developments with skepticism. A re-armed, revitalized Nasserite Egypt was seen as a potential threat to Iran. Likewise, substitution of Soviet aid to Yemen after Egypt's withdrawal did not promise an improvement in prospects for area stability. The development of increased Soviet ties to Syria and Iraq after 1970 were also seen as potentially destabilizing. Nevertheless, both the Kremlin and the Shah, for their own reasons, pursued development of economic ties throughout the period and refrained from excessive criticism of each other's activities. For example, the Shah maintained a "neutral" position on the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia in October 1968.

Similarly, the Kremlin adopted what may be described as a "wait-and-see" approach to Iranian activities in the Gulf. Perhaps no other event points up the Soviet dilemma in this case as Iranian 1968 efforts to prevent a federation of Arab Emirates. Several of the Kremlin's primary regional clients - particularly Egypt and Iraq - favored the federation. Soviet interest in maintaining good relations with both sides deterred the Soviet leadership from taking a firm position on the matter. When a federation finally did take place, the Soviets merely noted that "the new federation should be
directed against imperialism if it is to win the support of all the Arab peoples and the forces of progress."157

The Shah made clear the Iranian position on the matter at the same time.

I warn even our present friends that if they ignore Iran's interest in any respect, especially in the Persian Gulf, they should expect from Iran treatment befitting their attitude.158

Premier Kosygin subsequently endorsed the Shah's position in his visit to Tehran in 1968, but in such a manner so as not to alienate other concerned parties.159 Moscow's concern over her relationship with Tehran was also demonstrated in the Kremlin's quiescence over Iranian seizure of Persian Gulf islands in 1971, a situation over which Moscow had little influence in any case.

4. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War

The gradual shift of Soviet Mideast policy to the east brought inevitable conflicts of interest with Iran. Following Nasser's death in September 1970, Anwar Sadat became the Egyptian President. In May of 1971, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between the Soviet Union and Egypt. On 9 August 1971, the Soviets concluded a similar treaty with India. It had already become evident that the US had no intention, in light of the Nixon Doctrine, of replacing the British presence in the area. The announcement, in May 1971, that President Nixon would visit the PRC in 1972 dramatically affected both Soviet
and Iranian security perceptions on a regional, as well as international strategic level.

Relations with President Sadat began auspiciously enough for the Soviets, and for a time, Soviet influence in Egypt looked secure. Upon assuming office, Sadat was confronted with the immediate problems of consolidating his personal position and Egypt's massive domestic economic predicament. The unfulfilled foreign policy goals of avenging the 1967 loss to Israel and recovering the lost territories also had to be dealt with.

The legacy Nasser left me was in a pitiable condition. In the sphere of foreign policy I found that we had no relations...with any country except the Soviet Union...The economic legacy...was in even poorer shape...our liquidity problem was such that we might soon find it difficult to pay the salaries of our soldiers...I was confident that they key to everything - politically, economically, and militarily - was to redress the situation following from the 1967 defeat...The basic task was to wipe out the disgrace and humiliation that followed from the 1967 defeat.160

When the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty failed to meet Sadat's expectations in terms of arms and assistance, thereby forcing postponement of his "Year of Decision," Sadat eliminated the substantial Soviet presence and influence in Egypt. This event set off a series of reactions.

The Soviet response was to redouble its efforts further east. Support for Syria was increased, including new arms deliveries. On April 9, 1972, a fifteen-year "unbreakable" Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between the USSR and Iraq.161 Meanwhile, Iran re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt.
On the other side of the Indian Ocean, the Soviets had concluded a Friendship Treaty with India on 9 August 1971, in the midst of increasing Indo-Pakistani hostility. The USSR had previously sought such an agreement with India without success. India's fear of a US-China-Pakistan axis, in the wake of the announcement of Nixon's upcoming China visit, now prompted Prime Minister Ghandi to conclude the Treaty.

In the Indo-Pakistani clash which followed - commencing in November 1971 - Treaty provisions were invoked by India. The Soviet Union took the steps necessary to insure an Indian victory. Diplomatically, she blocked Security Council action until India had conquered East Pakistan. In the military sphere, Soviet troop units were moved into areas north of the Soviet-Iranian border to discourage Iranian intervention. And Soviet fleet elements moved into the Indian Ocean in an attempt to pre-empt possible interference by the US Seventh Fleet.162

5. Iran's Non-Alignment Re-defined
The late 1960's witnessed renewed efforts by the Shah to upgrade Iranian military capabilities and to propel Iran into a dominant role in the region. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Shah had convinced the US of the threat of increased instability and had secured US agreement for Iran's purchase of F-4 fighter-bombers and other hardware. Events now combined to reinforce the Shah's
determination to increase Iran's capability to perform a special role in the area.

First came the British decision in 1968 to phase out of the Gulf in 1971 - and the obvious power vacuum that would ensue. Then we suddenly saw (military) divisions crossing international borders, the dismemberment of Pakistan, the mass media applauding, the UN once again paralyzed and the powers sitting their hands...We're talking about a dangerous precedent for the future...Then there was the Soviet treaty with Iraq...another alarm bell. Couple with this America's reluctance to play the role of gendarme even when its vital interests are concerned and anyone with a modicum of geopolitical sense will conclude we didn't have much choice in the matter.163

As Chubin and Zabih have argued in their book, such statements reveal "a sense of isolationism (which) characterized the Iranian attitude in 1972-73 when some journalists used the term Moscow-Baghdad - New Delhi axis, embracing Iran on all three sides. Reaction to this concern was partially responsible for the renewed interest in resurrecting the CENTO Treaty in the summer of 1973."164

Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of Soviet activity was Moscow's seeming inconsistency. The Kremlin had taken special pains in the late 1960's to cultivate its relations with the Shah. Then, during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, Moscow risked these relations by troop movements on Iran's borders. Similarly, having previously refrained from taking sides in Iranian-Iraqi disputes over the Shatt al-Arab and the Kurdish questions, Moscow concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq, which was anathema to the Shah. The Soviets then hastened to "reassure" the Shah
of their good intentions via a Treaty of Cooperation with Iran.\textsuperscript{165}

In 1972, President Nixon visited Tehran and learned firsthand of the Shah's apprehensions. On his return to the US, the President effectively exempted Iran from controls on arms sales. In succeeding years, Iran purchased a variety of increasingly sophisticated military hardware, and sought to consolidate its regional standing by settling existing local disputes. In doing so, the Shah became a de facto, if not willing, supporter of the US policy (based on the Nixon Doctrine) of relying on "regional stabilizers" to protect their mutual interests.\textsuperscript{166}

Accordingly, the Shah, in the mid-1970's, used Iran's increased oil revenues to expand the Iranian military, lavishly furnishing it with sophisticated weaponry, and committed Iran to the role of Persian Gulf "policeman."\textsuperscript{167} And it was at that point that the events of 1978 so decisively intervened.

As the discussion to this point has demonstrated, the Russian/Soviet presence has been of primary concern to Iranian rulers and foreign-policy makers for nearly a century-and-a-half. Soviet policy has tended to display the same opportunistic tendencies with regard to Iran as did its Czarist predecessors. In times when Iran was internally weakened, with little or no external support, the Russians/Soviets pressed their advantages. When forced to deal with a united Iran, particularly when another power, such as Great Britain
or the U.S. were involved, a more cautious approach has been the order of the day. Having reviewed the development of Iran's relationship with the Soviet Union, this study will now focus on the Iranian Revolution and its impact on future Soviet-Iranian relations.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

58 A good account of this aspect of the first World War is to be found in op. cit., Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century*, Chapter III.


60 British support of the counter-revolution against the new Soviet regime terminated early in 1920 as a result of a British cabinet decision to cease active intervention. British troops were then withdrawn from Bahi and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed in April 1920.


62 One of the first steps it took, in November 1917, was to publish all of the Czarist government's secret agreements, including the Constantinople Agreement of 1915, and announce that the new government "annuls, immediately and unconditionally, the secret treaties (concluded by the Tsarist regime with other powers), in so far as they have for their objective to maintain or increase annexation by the Great Russians." See, __________, *Documents of Russian History 1914-1917*, (New York, F.A. Golder Co., 1927), pp. 620-623.


64 For texts of these documents, see op. cit., Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, Vol. II, pp. 27-28, 34-36.


Kuchek Khan shortly thereafter transmitted a message to Lenin, stating, "We, Persian revolutionaries have for a long time cherished the same hope, fighting against the evil and the hated English and oppressors...we consider it to be our duty to draw your attention to the fact that there are a number of criminals on Persian territory: Persian oppressors, English traders, and diplomats supported by English troops...we expect from the free Russian nation the assistance that may prove indispensable for the stabilization of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic..." quoted in A. Ghoreichi, Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran 1917-1960, (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms Int., 1965), p. 35. See also op. cit., Lenczowski, Russia and the West, pp. 54-60.

Text of Treaty found in, op. cit., Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. II, pp. 90-94. In response to a Persian request for clarification of Articles V and VI, the Russian Diplomatic Representative in Tehran wrote "...Articles V and VI are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack on Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown or its supporters among those foreign powers which are in a position to assist (them)." As will be seen, this specific reference to combatting the defeated anti-Bolshevik forces did not deter the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War from expanding their interpretation of these articles to justify threats of invasion or occupation.

In a Report on Soviet Foreign Policy to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 4, 1918, Georgi Chicherin, the Foreign Relations Commissar admitted this. He reported: "When the failure of any immediate support from the proletariat of other countries led to the defeat of the revolutionary Russian forces...the setting of Soviet Russia's foreign policy changed radically. For the last four months it has been compelled to pursue the aim of pushing off and postponing the dangers threatening it from all sides, trying to gain as much time as possible, both in order to give the growing proletariat movement in other countries time to ripen, and to gain more time for the new forms of political and social relationships established by the Soviet Government to take root among the popular masses of Russia..." quoted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (New York, Random House, 1960), p. 54.
Chicherin explained, "...the revolutionary proletarian movement, which is growing everywhere, has not yet reached the point of explosion, and therefore the report which we have to give is a grave report, a report of our retreats, a report of great sacrifices made in order to give Russia the opportunity of recuperating, of organizing its forces, and awaiting the moment when the proletariat of other countries will help us to complete the socialist revolution we began in October..." quoted in op. cit., Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, p. 55.


Op. cit., Lenczowski, Russia and the West, p. 67. It is also worth noting that the device of friendship treaties with littoral states has since become a major feature of Moscow's efforts to improve its political and military position in the Middle East. For a detailed explanation, see Avigdor Haselkorn, "The Expanding Soviet Collective Security Network," Strategic Review, Vol. VI, No. 3, Summer, 1978, pp. 62-73.


The Bolsheviks had asserted that a revolution in Iran would be the signal "for a series of revolutions that will spread through Asia and part of Africa" and that "For the success of the oriental revolution Persia is the first nation that must be conquered by the Soviets...all that is needed is an impulse from outside, an external aid, and initiative, and a resolute decision. This impulse, this resoluteness, can come only from our Russian revolutionaries through the intermediary of the Russian Moslems." Op. cit., Lenczowski, Russia and the West, pp. 9-10.

For a detailed presentation of the formation and subsequent development of the Communist Party in Iran, see Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966), Chapters 1 and 2.

Op. cit., Lenczowski, Russia and the West, p. 90. See also ibid, Zabih, pp. 52-58.

It was the British and Russian contention that the German presence in Iran posed the imminent threat of a coup against Reza and a base of operations for the Germans against the Soviet Union. Despite these assertions, however, no evidence has been uncovered to support allegations that the Germans were indeed preparing the coup. See A. Ghoreichi, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran 1917-1960*, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1965), pp. 124-131.

For complete text, see op. cit., Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, Vol. II, pp. 228-230. Moscow's acceptance of the draft stated more specifically, "...that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." Cited in op. cit., Rubenstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, pp. 154-155. See also op. cit., Yodfat and Abir, *In the Direction of the Persian Gulf*, p. 32.

In the Soviet note to the Iranian government on 25 August, 1941, the Soviets parrotted British claims that German agents were preparing a coup against the Shah and alleged that "the Iranian government has refused to take measures which would put an end to the troubles and disorders fomented by German agents on the territory of Iran, thus encouraging their criminal activities. As a result of this, the Soviet government has been forced to take the necessary measures and to avail itself immediately of the right belonging to the Soviet Union in virtue of Article 6 of the treaty of 1921, namely, the right to advance its troops into the territory of Iran for the purpose of self-defense." See, "Note of the Soviet Government to the

Ibid., Rubinstein, Foreign Policy, p. 178-180.

This bears some similarity to Soviet activity in Poland, for example, where the Soviets had, in 1945, arrested and continued to hold sixteen "underground" leaders, without trial, and on unspecified charges, while they were busy setting up a puppet government in place of the government-in-exile in London. See op. cit., Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 385-386.


As Firuz Kazemzadeh has noted, Stalin's "hold on East Germany, Poland, and the rest of Eastern Europe had not yet been consolidated. Czechoslovakia was still governed by a coalition of "bourgeois" politicians. Eduard Benes was still president and Jan Masaryk was alive. Rumania had not yet been rid of the King and the non-communist politicians, and in Bulgaria the struggle for control had not yet ended..." Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century of Freeze and Thaw," in op. cit., Lederer and Vucinich, ed., The Soviet Union in the Middle East, p. 62.


Demonstrations of growing US support for Iran's position were furnished in the Security Council debates regarding Soviet interference in Iran and in American ambassador George V. Allen's public assertions that Iran had an unquestioned
right to restore armed control over its own provinces and
to accept or reject any proposed oil agreements according
to its own interests. See Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in
the Middle East, (Washington, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1974), p. 27, and Robert Rossow,
Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal,

92 George E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-50 - Survey of
International Affairs, (London, Oxford University Press,
1954), p. 82.

32. See also, op. cit., Zabih, The Communist Movement in
Iran, pp. 123-165.

94 See William Griffith, "Iran's Foreign Policy in the
Pahlavi Era," in George Lenczowski, ed., Iran Under the
Pahlavis, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978),
p. 372.

95 In 1947, at the founding of the Cominform, Andrei
Zhdanov revealed what was to be the dominant theme of Soviet
foreign policy for the duration of Stalin's rule Zhdanov
asserted:

The fundamental changes caused by the war on the
international scene and in the position of individual
countries have entirely changed the political landscape
of the world. A new alignment of political forces
has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past,
the more distinct become two major trends in postwar
international policy, corresponding to the division
of the political forces operating on the international
arena into two major camps; the imperialist and anti-
democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist
and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving
force of the imperialist camp is the USA...The anti-
fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp
is based on the USSR and the new democracies.

Quoted in op. cit., Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the
Soviet Union, p. 237.

East in Historical Perspective," in Confino and Shamir,
The USSR and The Middle East, p. 65.
The Russians now began to realize that the grand object of their Middle East policy, which was to deny the Middle East to the Western Powers either for military bases or as zones of political influence, or, in the event of war, as a source of a vital raw material, could be achieved more immediately, more surely and more cheaply by diplomatic support of nationalist regimes than by attempted interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Middle East.


Professor Zabih has postulated that, "In view of its past total subordination to the Soviet Union, the Tudeh leadership may well have been discouraged by... (Soviet restraint towards Iran on the diplomatic level, and the lack of communication and guidance to the Tudeh)...to the point that it was unable to act resolutely when political conditions in the country seemed opportune." Op. cit., Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, pp. 106-107.


110 Ibid., Kazemzadeh, in Lederer and Vucinich, p. 72.

111 Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy, (Chicago, Henry Kegnery Co., 1959), p. 170. Ironically, despite Soviet protestations, the Baghdad Pact was more of a symbol than a threat. Paul H. Nitze once noted, for example,

...the Baghdad Pact...may have done little in adding to the strength and sense of commitment of the people of the Middle East as a whole and that has probably been outweighed by the antagonism which it has engendered.


114 As Professor Ramazani has noted, Soviet concessions were generally intertwined with Irano-Soviet relations and the actual implementation of agreements was often delayed to suit Moscow's purposes, and by the hostility which otherwise characterized Irano-Soviet relations. R. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973*, (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 290-308.

115 Uppermost in the Shah's mind was not an external threat to Iran, which the guarantees of the Eisenhower Doctrine seemed sufficient to deal with, but the possibility of an internal Iraqi-type coup against the Throne, to which he was feeling increasingly vulnerable. Accordingly, the Shah asked the US for added military aid, sufficient to equip two additional divisions. See *The New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1959, p. 5; Feb. 12, 1959, pp. 1 and 17. See also, op. cit., Lenczowski, "United States Support for Iran's Independence," pp. 54-55.

116 Op. cit., Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, pp. 294-299. The Kremlin's note of protest was broadcast over Radio Moscow prior to its being delivered to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In part, it accused Iran of "overstepping the limit beyond which begins direct support for certain foreign circles in carrying out their aggressive plans directed against the USSR." See, "Documents on International Affairs, 1958," (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962), pp. 330-332.

117 The breakdown of Soviet-Iranian talks has been ascribed by several writers to disagreement over the definition of "military bases," which the Soviets tended to view in the broadest of terms. Ibid., Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, pp. 295-299. Nevertheless, Soviet insistence on this point, not unlike their raising of technicalities in other negotiations on other matters, seemed intended to camouflage Moscow's underlying demand that Iran refrain from entering into any alliance or military pact. On the Iranian side, the Shah was ultimately moved to resist the Kremlin's proposals by US and western encouragement to do so, as well as by recognition of where Iran's security interests lay. See, op. cit., Lenczowski, "United States' Support for Iran's Independence," p. 55; and op. cit., Kazemzadeh, in Lederer and Vucinich, *The Soviet Union in the Middle East*, p. 75.


This pledge cost neither the US nor the Shah anything. Despite initial Western expressions of concern, it had already been made clear, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the technology which was placing an increasing number of Polaris missile submarines in the Mediterranean had rendered land-based IRBM's, such as those in Turkey and Italy, obsolete.

In Kissinger's view, for example, such a development was a natural outgrowth of the new environment.

Military bipolarity...not only failed to prevent, it has actually encouraged political multipolarity. Weaker allies have good reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming interest of their senior defense partner. Hence, they see no need to purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies. The new nations feel protected by the
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rivalry of the superpowers, and their nationalism leads to ever bolder assertions of self-will.

Ibid., Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 56.


125 During the period 1963-1968, Iran realized an 8.6% real growth rate in GNP. An analysis of the interaction of domestic economic, social and political factors and their impact on Iranian foreign policy at this time can be found in Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Changing Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Discussion," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1971.


127 The Shah's perception of Soviet preoccupation with its Chinese neighbor, particularly on their joint border areas, conditioned his attitude towards increased ties and cooperation with Moscow. The Shah's belief that this problem compelled the Kremlin to seek a quiet southern border region, as well as the economic and practical considerations, encouraged him to engage Iran in "functional cooperation with the Soviet Union." Op. cit., Chubin and Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran, p. 64.

128 Op. cit., Yodfat and Abir, In the Direction of the Persian Gulf, pp. 56-57. The Shah complained, "We see now what CENTO really is. It is a device to protect the West only. It was interesting to see that the United States quickly pointed out that it was only an 'associate' member." In addition to cutting off military aid to both India and Pakistan, the US "also reminded the Shah that military equipment, particularly aircraft, supplied by the United States as aid, could not be used by a third party." See F.A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, (NY: American University Field Staff, Inc., 1968), p. 219. As Henry Kissinger noted, concerning American termination of military supply to India and Pakistan,

The seeming evenhandedness was deceptive; the practical consequence was to injure Pakistan, since India received most of its arms either from Communist nations or from its own armories.
President Johnson, aware of the one-sidedness of the action, promised to arrange a transfer of some obsolescent American tanks through a third party such as Turkey. But he never (did).


130 Ibid., Yodfat and Abir, p. 57. In February 1967, Iran concluded an agreement with the USSR for $110 million worth of weaponry.


132 As one observer noted, none of the Shah's moves involved a renunciation of Western ties or a diminuation in the importance of the US tie for either ultimate defense, weaponry or diplomatic support. It was, rather, that the urgency of the need for that tie (had) diminished. Op. cit., Chubin and Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, p. 67.


139 Ibid., Chubin and Zabih, p. 83.

140 An excellent discussion of this topic is found in Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, (New York: Macmillan and Sons, 1968).

141 Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid to Developing Countries" in op. cit., Strong, The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin. See also, "Moscow and Tehran," New Times, 10 April 1968, for a review of economic relations between the USSR and Iran.


147 Op. cit., Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 35. Supportive of Lenczowski's view is George Liska's observation concerning the importance of Soviet aid and trade as instruments of foreign policy, and even as "weapons" during conditions of pervasive conflict. George Liska, The New Statement: Foreign Aid in American Foreign
Likewise, in her study of Soviet aid and trade, Joan Nelson comments on Moscow's employment of these tools in attempts to counter the influence of a rival state, secure military base rights, and affect government composition, op. cit., Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, p. 93.


149 Ibid., Chubin and Zabih, Relations, p. 75.

150 Ibid., Chubin and Zabih, Relations, p. 74.

151 Ibid., Chubin and Zabih, Relations, p. 82.


153 Algeria's President Boumedienne was one Arab leader who blamed the Soviets for Arab losses. As might be expected, the Chinese were also quick to criticize the USSR's role, as well as that of the United States: "Examine the facts: The Soviet revisionist clique on the one hand 'guaranteed' that Israel would not attack and on the other, working hand in glove with the US, instigated Israel to launch a surprise attack on the Arab countries and catch them unawares." "The Chinese People Firmly Support the Arab People's Struggle Against Aggression," (Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1967), p. 23. See also Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 185-187.

154 Quoted in USSR International Affairs (FBIS), 5 May 1968. See also, L. Medvedko, "The Persian Gulf States," New Times, 20 March 1968. "The Soviet Union harbors no selfish designs (in the Gulf) but it knows that the colonialists' plans are fraught with danger for its own southern frontiers" (p. 18).


156 In an interview with William McDougall in 1969, the Shah was asked if the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia influenced his feelings about more cooperation with the Russians. "A principle we have clearly stated is that we cannot accept the sending of troops into a country when they have not been invited by the official, responsible government
of the country...At the same time, life is continuing. We must live and try to find out ways to secure peace...In trying to do so, you cannot shut the door, unless you want to go to war - but who wants to go to war. "Exclusive Interview with Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran," Newsweek, January 17, 1969.

157 USSR International Affairs (FBIS), 7 March 1968, p. AA 17.


161 For a complete text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic, see op. cit., Yodfat and Abir, In the Direction of the Persian Gulf, Appendix 1, pp. 135-136.

162 An excellent chronology and analysis is available in S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), pp. 209-215.

163 Interview with the Shah, "Being Strong and Being Wise," Newsweek, May 21, 1973, p. 44.


165 The Soviets attempted to assuage both Turkey and Iran, neither of whom were on good terms with Iraq. President Podgorny journeyed to Turkey immediately after the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty. The Shah was invited to Moscow in October, 1972, where the previously mentioned 15-year economic Treaty was concluded, but the joint communique issued upon conclusion of the Shah's visit left no doubt as to the continued differences of opinion. For a discussion of this subject, see Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), pp. 109-110 and 116-117.
The change in the Shah's views of the USSR and Iran's position vis-a-vis the superpower in the mid-1970's is best described in his own words.

If Moscow wants a real detente in Europe, it will have to play the game here too. European security is sheer mockery without stability and security in the Persian Gulf.

Interview with the Shah, *Newsweek*, May 21, 1973, p. 44. See also, Interview, *US News and World Report*, May 6, 1974. The Shah also restated his view, in an interview with Barbara Walters on 31 December, 1977, that Iran and the US were "each other's allies." See *Middle East Affairs* (FBIS), 4 January 1978, p. R3. The Shah's view of Detente was also echoed by Eugene Rostow: "The West can hardly accept the notion of "detente" as a Soviet commitment to refrain from aggression in Europe and a license to pursue expansionist aims elsewhere in the world," A. Amirie and H. Twitchell, *Iran in the 1980's*, (Tehran, IIPES, 1978), p. 298.

IV. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: DOMESTIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

At the beginning of 1978, even after the onset of public demonstrations in Iran, one would have been hard-pressed to find anyone who would have predicted that, within a year, the Pahlavi Dynasty would be toppled by mass demonstrations and protests. Despite increasing speculation concerning Iran's domestic, economic, social and political problems, the general consensus, even among the Shah's most ardent critics, was that the regime's power and resources were largely intact and capable of dealing with any potential threat to the monarchy. Thus, in March 1978, in the aftermath of widespread rioting, it was still possible for one writer to note that,

Most observers agree that the situation is difficult but by no means critical. This analysis is based on the disunity of the opposition, the apparent continued loyalty of the armed services and the fervent commitment to ongoing stability of the vast new middle class, created and enriched by the oil boom.168

That the Shah was eventually overthrown is attributable, at least in part, to the nature of both the regime and its opposition, which made accommodation and compromise increasingly difficult, and ultimately, impossible to achieve. Another contributing factor was the international setting at the time that the revolution in Iran was growing. A discussion of topics and the phases of the revolution comprise this chapter.
A. THE REGIME

The events of 1978-1979 in Iran were the climax of a series of developments which stretch back over the course of nearly the Shah's entire reign. The confrontation between the monarchy and the anti-royalist elements, previously brought to a head in 1953, and although muted at times by the Shah's co-option efforts and security apparatus, was never completely silenced or eliminated.

In 1958, John C. Campbell had somewhat prophetically assessed that:

...nationalism has not been tempered and disciplined. The violent expression of anti-Western feeling and the religious fanaticism of men who can stir mobs to violence did not disappear with Mossaddegh. It merely lurks under the surface...Much, indeed too much, depends on the Shah himself, who rules as well as reigns. The existing political institutions are not rooted in popular acceptance and will attain stability only if they can attract the support of the rising middle class and eventually the peasantry.168

Likewise, in 1964, a report compiled by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran concluded that "the Shah's regime is regarded as an unpopular dictatorship not only by its opponents, but far more significantly, by its proponents as well...In 1964, organized opposition to the Shah was divided and ineffectual, but if one thinks of the opposition as a state of mind, it extended right into the establishment itself...one of the remarkable intangible factors in the present situation is that the regime has so few convinced supporters...even members of the establishment, while loyal to the Shah, are suffering from a malaise, from lack of conviction in what
they are doing, from doubts whether the regime deserves to endure."170

Reduced to its simplest terms, the single most important point of contention between the Shah and his competitors for power was the question of the proper role of the monarchy in Iran. The Shah, like many of the other elements in Iranian society, believed that only under a strong central government would Iran possess the unity and strength to withstand foreign domination. In the Shah's scheme of things, however, it was the monarchy which was to be the focus, or hub of that strength. As James Bill noted in his study of Iranian politics, the Shah was "the heart...the vital power point in the (political) system."171

The Shah's philosophical concept of the role of the monarchy stemmed from two sources. In the first place, the monarchy was a traditional Iranian institution. Its origins could be traced both to the pre-Islamic Persian divine-right kingships, as well as to Safavid Shi'a religo-politics. Thus, in Professor Lenczowski's view,

The assumption by Mohammed Reza Shah of the title of Aryamehr reaffirmed (the) revival of the primordial spirit of Iran fostered by a monarchy whose aim was to combine the continuity of the ancient principles with modern transformation.172

The other ingredient was the Shah's increasing tendency to identify the institution itself and his personal role as inseperable. In his book, The White Revolution, for example, the Shah asserted,
I will frankly confess that I was convinced that God had ordained me to do certain things for the service of my nation, things that perhaps could not be done by anyone else.173

It was not until the early 1960's that the Shah was in a sufficiently secure position to press these views. He had barely survived the 1953 attempt to remove him, and he had returned determined to never again undergo such humiliation. The decade following the Shah's triumph over Mossaddegh was one of chronic instability in Iran, during which he sought to consolidate his power.

The Shah's pronouncement of the "White Revolution" in 1963, if nothing else, symbolized the emergence of the monarchy as the center of power in Iran. The religious-based opposition made its last serious bid for power in June 1963 and was crushed. The Tudeh, abandoned for all practical purposes by the Soviets, distrusted by most Iranians, and persecuted by the Shah's security service, SAVAK, had ceased to be an important source of opposition. The National Front, which had been offered, but refused the opportunity to cooperate with the government of Prime Minister Ali Amini in 1962, remained a loose coalition of opposing factions (intellectuals, bazaari, etc.) with no effective leadership and few, if any, positive programs of its own.

From the mid-1960's until the early 1970's, with the consolidation of political power under the institution of the monarchy, Iran registered increasing political stability and remarkable economic achievement.174 Active opposition
to the regime was largely confined to student groups and disaffected young extremists.

Several factors accounted for this phenomenon. Foremost among them was the Shah's ability to co-opt and "balance off" competitors for power and potential opponents to his regime. This system of checks and balances permeated Iranian political life, from top to bottom. Professor Bill once noted, for example, the existence of "two-way tension between virtually every power point (in the elite network)" stemming from "the struggle of the individuals concerned to gain greater favor with the Shah and at the same time to capture more control in the Iranian economic arena."\(^{175}\)

Further observation of the system by Bill and Leiden confirmed the assessment that the practice of balancing had resulting in "a dynamically stable balance of tension in which ministers, courtiers, security agents, military leaders, industrialists and clerics are systematically divided against one another at all levels."\(^{176}\)

A related element of the Shah's strategy was the channeling of political "participation" into one, or at the most two, recognized and controllable political parties, and the suppression of those who could not, or would not, be co-opted. In Professor Zabih's estimation,

The regime hoped to be able to confine (political) participation to competition and mobilization for allocation of rewards. It intended that the politically articulate Iranians would acquire a sense of identity with the system, without challenging its policies. Apparently, the party was viewed by those in power merely as a mechanism of mass cooption of alienated or
apathetic groups...A broad-based political party could extend the same cooptation program to the lower middle class and simultaneously bring it into conformity with the already coopted intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{177} 

Ultimately, the key ingredient of the formula was the regime's ability to anticipate and adopt as its own demands for certain improvements, and the substitution of economic and selective social development for political liberalization. In a 1978 assessment of the Iranian political scene by James Bill, it was noted that,

An examination of the Shah's reform program indicates overriding emphasis on industrial growth, technological progress and military development. Lagging far behind has been...social change...Political development has been completely ignored. What the Shah has done, in effect, has been to encourage enormous economic change and some social change in order to prevent any basic political change.\textsuperscript{178}

This "grand strategy" turned out to be a two-edged sword. There is no denying that it succeeded in part, insofar as the Shah's position was maintained and his programs were carried out until 1978. At the same time, however, many underlying causes of grievances remained unaddressed, and the integration of the other traditional power centers, i.e., the ulema and the bazaar, under the institution of the monarchy was never achieved.

The Shah's reliance on manipulation rather than recognition of the need to create viable secular institutions must be regarded as one of the great failures of his regime, and a key reason for his downfall. As Samuel Huntington once observed,
The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also the least stable... A political system with several different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions; the needs of the next by a different set. The system possesses within itself the means of its own renewal and adaptation.

The Shah overestimated the ability of the monarchy as an institution and of himself as Shah to propel Iranian society in the direction he wanted it to go. If the Iranian people wouldn't come along peacefully, they could be pushed, coerced, or suppressed.

To be sure, if there was to be any change under the conditions which existed in Iran at the time of his succession and after WW II into the 1950's and 1960's, a strong executive was required. But to attempt it alone - as was increasingly the case from the mid-1960's on - practically guaranteed that, just as all credit was claimed by the monarchy, all blame would be heaped upon it.

The net effect of these factors was perhaps best described in a perceptive editorial in Kayhan International in September 1978.

By anticipating what people wanted, the government effectively deprived them of the satisfaction of getting what they demanded. Thus, in the long run, the government was caught up in a race against time to retain its position as the "Grand Benefactor" from whom all the good things flowed to everyone in increasing abundance...

The famous economic and social reforms that launched and maintained the enterprise of national reconstruction in Iran had two sides: an economic one and a political one. Originally, the idea was first to give everyone a stake in the system by the creation of a
better life for all, and then introduce democracy that
would flourish on the basis of this common stake in
the system.

But the more economic development paid results, the
more complacent became the government about the
need for participatory politics. At the beginning,
economic development was rightly thought of as a pre-
requisite for a smoothly functioning democracy. But
later, economic growth was seen as a substitute for
politics. 180

In the inflation and overheated economic conditions
which prevailed in Iran, particularly after 1974, the Shah's
delicately balanced arrangement began to show signs of strain. 181

As that happened, the Shah's regime - always a harsh, tra-
ditional Persian monarchy - crossed the line and became a
modern, pervasive police state, in which the Shah's vision
of an economically developed and socially modern Iran was
advanced increasingly at the cost of personal and political
freedoms, and in which overt suppression was increasingly
relied upon to maintain the stability and political status-
quo previously provided for by improving economic conditions. 182

According to Professor Bill,

Between 1971 and 1976, the Shah's carefully blended --
tactics broke down... A period of un-Persian rule by
repression set in and a group of hard-liners in the
intelligence organization took charge. The Shah, who
was certainly aware of the nature of this rule, did
nothing to stop the reign of terror, which included
the systematic use of torture. Prisons were full and
hundreds were executed. The religious establishment
was attacked frontally. 183

Moreover, in 1977, the Shah promised programs of liberali-
ization, but failed to follow through with them. He thereby
not only prolonged the repression, but as events were to
prove, also undermined his own credibility. When, in 1978,
in response to mass protests, he evidently really intended to carry out reforms, the Shah found that no one believed him.

As a commentary in *Arab Report and Memo* in August 1978 noted,

The Shah has sought to defuse (the) dangerous situation by timid measures of liberalization introduced over the past few months. The climate has certainly been less oppressive, the use of torture less systematic against political prisoners, the press somewhat freer. In June 1978 the Shah dismissed the head of the SAVAK secret police, Gen. Nasiri...The Shah has also promised that general elections due in the summer of 1979 will be "one hundred percent free"...These sops thrown to public opinion have been largely ineffective, first because the Shah's late conversion to democracy is not believed. In that he is prepared to dismantle the Rastakhiz single-party structure and allow contending parties to contest the elections; second, because he has used great ferocity in putting down the demonstrations. Leading divines have been arrested, and Ayatollah Madari's own home was entered by the police and two of his pupils killed there. Such incidents inflame passions and far outweigh gestures of conciliation.184

The Shah also failed to properly gauge the extent of opposition with which he was faced as the revolt spread. In recent years, the Shah had repeatedly characterized the opposition as an extremist minority, an "unholy alliance between extremists of both left and right," the "black reaction coupled with the red destruction."185 His belief - that the vast majority of Iranians supported him and that it was primarily, in his terms, "Islamic-Marxists"186 who opposed the regime - if indeed ever accurate, appears to have been most valid during the late 1960's and into the early 1970's.

By 1978, although the Shah's perception of his opposition as an extremist minority remained largely the same,187
the reality was that it had developed into a growing, broad-based rejection of the regime's arbitrary style of rule.\textsuperscript{188} The identification of repressive measures with the monarchy, and the excesses of the regime, whether or not the Shah fully engineered and directed them, ultimately led to the events of 1978.

B. THE OPPOSITION

It is not a difficult task to identify and categorize the various groups which combined to challenge, and ultimately overthrow the Shah's regime. On the one hand were those groups which composed the traditional forces in Iran, namely, the ulema and the bazaari. Since the late Qajar Dynasty, these elements had been the primary sources of opposition to the throne. They had played a pivotal role in fomenting the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, and were the mainstays of Mossaddegh's nationalist movement. Their role in the 1978 revolution was to prove no less crucial.

Aligned with the traditional forces in 1978 in opposing the Shah was a second category of opposition elements, those which may be termed "non-traditional" or modern, comprised of Iran's intellectual elite, middle class and labor activists, and the radical left. These groups were relative newcomers to the Iranian political scene, having developed largely as a result of the increasingly rapid influx of western education, technology, industry and culture into Iran during the Shah's reign.\textsuperscript{189}
Opposition views in 1978, as in 1953, at first ranged from the desire to eliminate the monarchy completely (few foresaw this as an achievable goal early in the revolt) to those which favored some type of working arrangement, in which the Shah would play the role of a Constitutional monarch, and actual power would be wielded by the Majlis. 190

As has been discussed, until 1978 the Shah had been able to balance off and check the various opposition groups, largely through the exploitation of their natural differences. His success in doing so had evidently lulled the regime into believing that the very diversity of the groups mitigated against their forming any viable coalition. The religious and secular elements had heretofore proved unable to achieve any lasting cooperation (a situation which continues in post-Shah Iran) and, in any case, it was difficult to imagine that any possible coalition could successfully challenge the regime. And yet, that is exactly what happened, as the opposition groups overcame their differences, even if only temporarily, and focused on their single common objective - the disposal of the Shah.

1. The Traditional Elements
   a. The Religious Dimension

   Perhaps no aspect of the Iranian Revolution has received more comment, and, at the same time, been less understood than has the religious aspect of the anti-Shah protest. This misunderstanding generally stems from the tendency of Westerners to downplay or disregard the role of
religion in the Islamic societies, where religious principles govern not only spiritual, but political, economic and social aspects of life. This is as especially true in Iran where the dynamic fusion of ancient Persian culture and Shi'ite Islam produced an institution which has proved uniquely suited to meeting the social, economic and political demands of the Iranian people.\textsuperscript{191}

The religious dimension of the revolution was important in two ways. First of all, tenets of Shi'a Islam provided the moral basis for anti-regime struggle as an effort to overcome a corrupt, oppressive and illegitimate government which was subservient to foreign (U.S.) domination. Secondly, there was the emergent role of the ulema as the leaders and mobilizers of the population-at-large for political action.\textsuperscript{192} That the ulema was able to do so stems from their traditional role and prestige as protectors of the Iranian people, a role which is historically derived from the following factors:

\dots Twelver Shi'a theory, which considered all temporal rulers illegitimate and came increasingly to assert that legitimate guidance, pending the return of the "hidden" Twelfth Imam, is to be found in the Shi'a religious leaders, the mojtaheds: \dots

\dots the great veneration for the ulama leaders by most Iranians, along with very close ties between the guilds and the ulama: \dots

\dots identification of the ulama with the popular anti-foreign cause, ever since the first wars against Russia in the early nineteenth century; and \dots

\dots the material wealth of the ulama... and their control over the low courts and education... \textsuperscript{193}
From its very inception, the relationship between the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Mujtahedin was influenced by these factors. In the 1920's and 1930's, Reza Shah's secular reforms had had the effect of partially undermining religious authority. This trend continued under his son. Among the personal grievances of the mullahs was (1) the Shah's land reform program, which reduced the "Oghaf" shrine-controlled lands (thereby reducing the revenues of the Mujtahids); and (2), judicial modernization measures which reduced their functions in marriage, divorce and other family matters.

As one religious scholar commented in 1967, Reza Shah did not even go through the motions of appealing to the religious. This is in a way what has happened again in Iran during the last several years. In the land reform, for example, the mujtahids were not even consulted nor was the Islamic method even considered. Thus, the opposition of mujtahids like Khomeini was not to the idea of land reform, but rather to the manner in which it was implemented.

In more recent years, the Shah continued to unnecessarily antagonize the religious sector. No effort was made to reconcile modernization programs with what the Shah considered reactionary religious views. Other irritants included the adoption of the Imperial calendar in place of the Shi'a Islamic Calendar, and the reduction, in 1977-1978, of the annual subsidy regularly given to the religious foundations from $80 million to $30 million for no apparent reason.
Thus as the protests and demonstrations developed in 1978, the Mujtahids came to play an increasingly important role. Although by no means of one mind concerning alternatives to the Shah's regime - the quiet debate between those religious leaders who favored a "mash routeh" or Constitutional monarchy versus those who supported "mashrou'eh," or theocracy, had continued unabated since the 1906 revolution - it was clear that the majority of the clergy was dissatisfied with the prospect of the indefinite continuance of the regime as it then existed. 197

An important consideration in the clergy's ability to play a role of active leadership, from a practical standpoint, was the continued viability of the mosque as an institution. It was the mosque which had, through the years, proven most resistant to the regime's efforts to reduce the influence of other traditional power centers. According to one observer, although the mosque did not totally escape the effects of these measures,

...the progressive weakening of all other institutions in our society, especially during the past half decade, cleared the ground for the return of the mosque in renewed strength.

The banning of political parties, the turning of the parliament into a club for sycophants, the muzzling of the press and the continued underdevelopment of trade unions and other associations, deprived society of its natural means of self-expression and political activity. This led to a gradual return of the mosque as a multi-purpose institution that could counter the inordinate expansion of the state as a super-institution. 198

The mosques were thus not only natural, but ready centers for the direction of the revolution as it developed. 199
The emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeini as the symbolic and titular head of the opposition in late 1978 culminated the revolution's process of gravitation towards religion. The reasons for Khomeini's assumption of this role included his philosophy of politics as a logical extension of Shi'ism, his exile following his condemnation of the Shah in 1964, and his persistent criticism of the Iranian regime over the years. Additionally, there was the emotional issue of the mysterious death of the Ayatollah's son in October 1977, which was attributed by many to SAVAK.

The regime also proved to be its own worst enemy when, in January 1978, the Ministry of Information caused the daily newspaper Ettela'at to print an attack on Khomeini, alleging that he was a homosexual and a British stooge. This attack touched off the first massive anti-government riots by the Ayatollah's supporters in Qom that same month. An event that proved to be just as important was the regime's apparent engineering of Khomeini's expulsion from Iraq. His residence in Najaf had provided the Ayatollah rather easy access to visiting Iranians over the years, and it was apparent that liaison between domestic opponents and the Ayatollah was being facilitated by his continued presence there. As it turned out, however, Khomeini's move to France proved to be even more critical - increased access to the international media was both available, and very effectively employed.

Khomeini thus came to symbolize the unity of purpose of the revolutionary coalition, although it soon
became clear that even his prestige was insufficient to maintain that coalition in the face of post-revolution issues.\textsuperscript{203}

b. The Bazaari

As was mentioned early in this discussion, since the Qajar Dynasty the bazaari has been the traditional partner of the religious leadership in opposing certain aspects of secular rule. This is based primarily on the commonality of interests which binds the two groups, not the least of which is bazaari financing of clergy charities, hospitals, schools, orphanages and theological colleges.\textsuperscript{204}

The animosity of the bazaar towards the regime stems from the economic policies pursued by the Pahlavis. Beginning in the 1930's, the development of a state-controlled economy and the growth of imports gradually undermined the economic base of the bazaari. As Zabih notes, the acceleration of the decline of the bazaari's economic strength under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi is specifically attributable to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] Huge government-owned industrial units which sprang up throughout the country over the 15 years 1963-1978.
  \item[b)] Increased involvement and near monopoly of the state in export-import businesses.
  \item[c)] Expansion of the banking system which first rivaled and then pre-empted the credit institutions of the bazaari.
  \item[d)] Breakdown of traditional patterns of socio-economic organization which served to accentuate the opposition of the bazaari to what was vaguely termed "modernization."\textsuperscript{205}
\end{itemize}

Other observers cite such symptoms as the state's direct or indirect control of more than 80% of the Gross National Product. Moreover, the bazaar was partially displaced by
the growth of the nouveau-riche, who administered and participated in the new economic programs. 206

In the aftermath of the oil price increases after 1973, a "truce-of sorts" existed for a time between the regime and the bazaar as a result of the influx of increased revenues to the merchants. This truce ended, however, when the regime, in 1975, launched an "anti-profiteering campaign," which imposed guilds onto the bazaar, and subjected shopkeepers and merchants to arbitrary fines and imprisonment for hoarding and profiteering. 207

Thus, there were adequate grievances for cooperation between the ulema and the bazaar in the 1978 protests, in which the bazaari played the role of protest organizers. As one observer noted early in the crisis,

If the demands of the clergy have had such serious repercussions, it is precisely because they correspond to a very deep discontent among urban sectors, especially those of the merchants and artisans. With religious life and social life so closely linked, the call to revolt spreads immediately through the maze of tiny streets, through the stalls and workshops of the bazaars around each mosque. 208

At the same time, neither of these groups, either alone or together, had the power to bring down the government. The clergy and the bazaari could and did provide the leadership and organization, but the cooperation and participation of other social groups was crucial to the eventual outcome of the protest.
2. **The Non-Traditional Opposition**

The second category of regime opposition in Iran in 1978 consisted of what may be broadly defined as the modern middle class, comprised of such diverse elements as professional people, industrial managers and labor, students and extremists.

   a. The "New Middle Class"

James Bill has used this term to describe what he calls the "professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia" in Iran. According to Bill, included in this group are not only students, teachers, professors, writers and artists, but technocrats and administrators, managers and clerks. As such, they are distinguishable from the traditional middle class (bazaari, landowners, etc.) in that its members:

   ...refuse to accept the traditional power relationships that dominate Iranian Society...

   ...possess or are in the process of acquiring a higher education (i.e., a modern or 'new' education as opposed to the traditional maktab – madrasah education)...

   ...owe their power position to...the skill or talent that they possess due to their modern formal education...

   ...have been exposed in varying degrees to outside philosophies, thoughts, and ideas...

   ...are free of any rigid religious dogmatism and of any blind worship of past history.

Despite these differences, the existence of continued strong relationships to the more traditional elements should be noted. In the words of one commentator,

As the bazaaris were until a few years ago the only large social group capable of financing higher education for their children, an unusually high proportion of the...
new "intellectual elite" is related to the bazaar. A majority of university teachers, lawyers, media men, technocrats, and the middle "cadres" of the service and armed forces comes from bazaar families.\textsuperscript{211}

Perhaps the most volatile elements of this group were the students. The regime had realized the dangers associated with the introduction of modern western education and training into a traditional society and had thus sought to minimize them through a combination of intimidation, bribery and selected concessions directed at students and academics. Thus, in the view of one observer, the central political authority came to view the Iranian universities "more in terms of control and as...center(s) for producing the skills needed to carry out its programs than as serious ...center(s) of learning."\textsuperscript{212}

Direct offspring of the Iranian students were the small leftist groups which had begun to operate in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and among whose membership students or former students played a prominent role. These organizations were undoubtedly among the most cohesive and best organized of the groups opposing the Shah. Over the past decade many of them had received training from PLO, PFLP-GC, and other Palestinian groups, which they applied to terrorist activities within Iran.\textsuperscript{213} In the early stages of the revolt, these types of activities continued to receive prominence in the headlines of the domestic and foreign press. But the regime was not undone by selective terrorist
acts and the importance of these groups transcends that aspect of their role in the revolution. It must be recognized that, just as the ulema provided the moral direction and impetus of the revolt, and the bazaari the structure for the organization for popular participation, the extremist groups were at the forefront of the leadership of mass street demonstrations which resulted. It is also apparent that the larger extremist groups like the Mujahedeen and Fedayeen-e Khalq will continue to play important roles in the continued internal turbulence in that country.

b. The Working Class

The most important participants, in terms of numbers, were the industrial working class members — laborers, workers, housewives, the unemployed, etc. Since the regime had effectively prevented the formation of institutions capable of channeling their demands and needs or responding to them, these people had "no legally recognized political party or social organizations able or willing to alleviate their discontent and to protect and promote their interests," and were thus "left to the mosques or to the underground leftist organizations to exploit their grievances." The involvement of the industrial working class, centered as it was in the cities, transformed regime opposition into a mass popular movement.

One final point should be made before leaving this topic. The most important aspect of this coalition of opposition groups, so often cited as a major weakness, was its
very diversity. A September 1978 *Time Magazine* assessment that the Shah's problems in dealing with the crisis were magnified by the fact that the opposition was not confined to a single political sector was, at the time, a minority view.215

The regime was obviously shocked and caught off balance by the extent of the opposition which evidenced itself in 1978.216 The diversity of the opposition increasingly rendered ineffective appeasement and/or suppressive efforts directed at any single group - tactics which in the past had worked largely because of economic incentives. As the crisis worsened, however, no measure or combination of measures proved sufficient to win new support for the regime, or quiet the growing opposition, whose common focus had become the Shah. Just as all credit for progress had been claimed by the monarchy, so too would all blame be heaped upon it.

C. ARMS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SHAH: THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

The special relationship which existed between Washington and Tehran, focused as it was on Western access to oil and regional stability, has been well-documented elsewhere and need not be further replicated here.217 Suffice it to say that, by the beginning of 1978, ties between the two countries were at least as strong, if not stronger than at any time in the past.218
There is, at this time, no clear answer to the question of the U.S. role in and responsibility for the course of events in Iran, and, if the dialogue carried on to date is any indication, the subject will continue to be debated for some time to come. For every critic of U.S. support for and reliance upon the Shah, there was an ardent supporter, with both sides equally able to argue their respective viewpoints.

Thus, at one extreme, for example, there were those who argued that American support for the Shah was, at best, a risky investment in an unreliable and unstable regime. At the opposite pole were those who viewed the Shah as little more than an American puppet, whose ties to Washington served only to strengthen the repressiveness of his regime.

It is not possible, in this brief space, to resolve this controversy. Nor will there be an attempt to disavow American involvement in Iran. Rather, there will be an attempt to place in perspective some of these arguments and the reasons for them.

Iranian criticism of the nature of past US involvement with the Shah was based primarily on complaints highlighted by Abol-Hassan Banisadr in a December 1978 article published in the *New York Times*. Among the grievances cited were the CIA's role in the 1953 coup which restored the Shah to power, continued CIA links to SAVAK which, according to Banisadr made the American people "a party to every kind of degradation
and cruelty inflicted by the Shah's secret police on his political opponents," and the massive arms sales to Iran, at the expense of social and economic development.219

It is clear that Banisadr's position was fairly representative of the attitude of the opposition-at-large, if not a substantial number of politically-aware Iranians. In the minds of many of these people, US involvement in the 1953 coup placed Washington in a position of responsibility for any and all consequences of that act. Continued American support for the Shah was therefore seen as nothing more than a further manifestation of interference in Iran's domestic affairs.220 The convergence of American and Iranian policy and interests in so many areas, and the visible and growing American presence in Iran was, to many nationalistic Iranians, equatable with subservience, and even colonialism.221

1. Arms Sales to the Shah

There is no doubt that the issue most responsible for the often-voiced contention that the US did, in fact, hold the "strings" to the Shah's regime was that of American arms sales to Iran. Proponents of this view held that Washington's continued sales of arms to the Shah were partially responsible, on the one hand, for the increasing oppressiveness of the regime, and on the other, for the lack of progress in curing Iran's economic and social ills. Such was the concern of Professor Marvin Zonis that, in testimony to the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in 1973, he charged, that, "...American foreign policy is

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contributing to the suppression and the postponement of fundamental changes in Iran."\textsuperscript{222}

The implications of this charge are threefold. First of all, the extensive arms purchases were seen as diverting capital and skilled human resources from much-needed economic and social programs. Secondly, the Shah's pursuit of an arms build-up was perceived by many as the means of strengthening the military's traditional role (since the inception of the Pahlavi Dynasty) as the power behind the throne.\textsuperscript{223} There was apparently little popular concern with the Shah's view of regional threats to Iran, but much fear that his real interest was to enhance the tools of political repression within the country.\textsuperscript{224}

The third implication is that the United States, through some adjustment of its arms sales policies (i.e., restriction or termination or the threat to do so) would have forced the Shah to make substantive changes in the nature of his regime. Furthermore, it hints that by failing to do so, the US acquiesced in - and abetted - the use of repression by the Shah.\textsuperscript{225}

This is a flawed argument in several respects. In the first place, it overlooks the changed nature of the US-Iranian relationship during the decade prior to the crisis. Secondly, it exaggerates the amount of leverage the US had acquired through arms sales by assuming that the Shah was so reliant on US arms that the threat to terminate their
supply would have automatically required his compliance with whatever demands Washington cared to make.

The reality of the relationship which existed between Washington and Tehran does not coincide with the myth of the Shah as a puppet of American administrations. While the US, by virtue of the Nixon Doctrine did encourage the Shah to play the role of "gendarme" in the Gulf, it did not dictate that he do so. Clearly, this was a role which the Shah himself chose to pursue. Indeed, given the underlying premise of the Doctrine - that being that the US would refrain from involving itself in regional security problems short of a threat by the USSR - it is difficult to see how Washington could have prevented the Shah from assuming that role even had it desired to do so.

Another factor in the more balanced U.S.-Iranian relationship was the final unmasking of U.S. and Western dependence on Middle East oil in 1973-1974, and the inability of the United States and other oil consuming nations to prevent the escalation of oil prices. The net effect was that the U.S. found itself reliant on the Shah - for his influence within OPEC and as a stabilizing force in the region - while the huge influx of oil revenues after 1973 gave the Shah increased discretion in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy. The Shah, for example, sold Iranian oil to Israel, an act which earned him the enmity of the Palestinians, and refused to participate in the Arab oil embargo in 1973-1974.226
With reference to the arms sales themselves, one of the ironies of the controversy over this subject during the 1970's is that while many American opponents were loudly complaining that, despite U.S. willingness to sell arms to Iran, the U.S. had not secured the Shah's cooperation on some important issues (e.g., oil prices), the Shah's critics cited arms sales as proof positive of his subservience to Washington's desires. The somewhat popularized American portrayal of the Shah as an unreliable megalomaniac, bent on rebuilding the Persian Empire, even at the cost of dragging the U.S. into war, starkly contrasted the Iranian view of the Shah as a tool of American imperialism. 227

It would therefore seem that the true impact of the arms sales lies somewhere in between these two extremes. The US role as Iran's primary weapons source, even when other forms of influence are taken into account, simply never "bought" the amount of influence over the Shah's policies which some proponents of the program promised it would. Nor did it translate into the domination of the Shah critics allege it did. Thus, William B. Quandt's assessment of 1978 prior to the Iranian revolution found that:

All in all, despite the enormous size of the US-Iranian arms relationship, it does not have the characteristics...that help insure a measure of U.S. influence... It is noteworthy that the United States did not invoke the arms supply relationship in an attempt to influence the Shah...After all, the Shah was paying for arms in hard currency, his orders were welcomed by arms manufacturers, and alternative arms suppliers stood eager to enter the Iranian market. In these circumstances, it would have been surprising
had the United States been able to influence the Shah outside the military sphere by manipulating the flow of weapons.228

2. The Issue of Human Rights

The one aspect of the arms issue which perhaps best demonstrates the true nature of the US-Iranian relationship, and Washington's own perception of its ability to pressure the Shah was the apparent reluctance on the part of the Carter Administration to strictly apply human rights policies to Iran. Several observations are in order in this regard.

It is clear, first of all, that, for better or worse, increased emphasis on human rights aspects of American foreign policy, beginning in 1976, ultimately had the effect of raising expectations in some quarters that a redefinition of the US-Iranian relationship was imminent. In 1976, Congress had passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which linked American provision of security assistance to human rights considerations.229 Almost immediately after the bill's passage, military aid to Uruguay was cancelled because of human rights violations. Similarly, in 1977, the new Carter Administration had refused to even consider Chile's military assistance request on the same grounds. Many thought that Iran would be the next to face at least the threat of such action.230

This view was further encouraged by Mr. Carter's evident sincerity, both during the Presidential campaign and after having assumed office, in stressing human rights issues.231
He had, in fact, singled out "the deplorable state of human rights in Iran" during his campaign.232

That the U.S. did not resort to threats to curtail arms supplies to Iran or to turn down future requests is attributable primarily to two factors. One was that the Shah had obviously taken note of the increased discussion of the subject and Mr. Carter's personal views and had moved to defuse the issue. The timing of his pronouncement of a program of "liberalization" in 1977 - his oft-stated concerns for his own image and intentions of turning over a different kind of system to his son taken aside - does indicate that the program had as a primary goal the avoidance of possible tensions with the new Administration in Washington and the reduction of criticism of Iran in the American press.233

At the same time, it is also apparent that, with or without American pressure, the Shah was fully determined that it was to be he, not Washington, the media, nor any of his domestic opponents, who would decide upon the extent and pace of reforms, and who would fix the limits on the amount of open opposition which would be permitted. By mid-1978, there were indications that those limits had been reached. The Shah chose not to try to return completely to repressive measures, but, as previously mentioned, sought to divide the opposition into "reformists" and "revolutionaries."234 Liberalization would be reserved for those who would go along with his stated intentions of gradually moving
towards closer adherance to the Constitution. Those who sought an end to the monarchy would not be tolerated.235

As has already been suggested, the second reason that further U.S. pressure was not applied was because, once in office, President Carter was faced with the practical consequences of attempting to force the human rights issue upon the Shah. The President assessed that, while American influence was sufficient to encourage the Shah to liberalize, the U.S. was ultimately not in the position to dictate domestic change in Iran.236 While the President had indeed sought to make the human rights issue a key ingredient of his Administration's foreign policy, the basic problem of how to confront the Shah - or for that matter any other foreign government with whom the U.S. shared vital interests - without risking those interests had not been solved.237

By the end of 1977, with the Shah apparently moving in the direction of liberalization, such pressures, having already been deemed inadvisable, were further adjudged to be unnecessary. The Shah visited Washington in November 1977 and was praised by the President as an enlightened leader, whose alliance with Washington was unbreakable.238 Subsequently, during the 1977 New Year's Eve stopover in Tehran, Mr. Carter commended the Shah's leadership and the stability of Iran.239 The President later noted that he and the Shah had discussed human rights and that, in his view, the Shah was "very deeply concerned about human rights."240
To some of the Iranian opposition, these developments amounted to little more than a "betrayal" on the issue of human rights. No sooner had the President departed Tehran when the regime verbally attacked the Ayatollah Khomeini in January 1978, and forcefully suppressed resulting rioting in Qom, with the reported loss of 100 lives.

Critics tended to overlook the fact that the Shah's reform program - however half-hearted it might have been - had resulted in part from the U.S. stand on human rights. Rather, they faulted President Carter for not going even further in pressuring the Shah, and some have interpreted his failure to do so as an outright endorsement of not only past regime policies, but also of whatever actions the Shah might choose to undertake in the future. And, as subsequent events have demonstrated (i.e., the "hostage crisis" of 1979-1980) this view has continued implications for future U.S.-Iranian relations.

3. American Reaction to the Crisis

As events unfolded in Iran in 1978, the Administration's policies gave the appearance of being indecisive and even contradictory. That this was so is attributable to a number of factors, some aspects of which are discussed below.

In the first place, one should recall the atmosphere in which the Carter Administration's foreign policy was operating at the time. Having entered the second year of his presidency under fire for his approach to and handling of
foreign policy issues, Mr. Carter had sought to redefine some of his earlier objectives.\textsuperscript{243} He faced the task of overcoming the impression that his foreign policies were based on flawed strategy, poor tactics and a shrinking base of domestic and Congressional support.\textsuperscript{244}

As a result, the Administration seemed determined to concentrate on a few issues which held promise of producing foreign policy victories, which, according to one observer, were needed to "bolster Mr. Carter's prestige before Congress, the country and, incidentally, the world."\textsuperscript{245} By the beginning of 1978, two such issues had emerged. The first was the Panama Canal Treaty which the President had signed in September 1977, and was due to go before Congress for ratification in March 1978.\textsuperscript{246} According to one report at the time,

\begin{quote}
The President has lived, thought and talked Panama for the past several weeks. Says an aide: There's no other single foreign policy issue that, politically, consumed more of his time.\textsuperscript{247}
\end{quote}

The second, and decidedly more important issue was that of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations which, in the aftermath of President Sadat's journey to Israel, had added a whole new dimension to the Mideast peace process. It was this issue, the related Mideast plane deal, and the series of events which led to Camp David in September 1978, which was to occupy most of Mr. Carter's foreign policy attention and energy until the autumn of 1978.\textsuperscript{248} It was obvious that President Carter sincerely believed that an agreement between
Egypt and Israel would be an important step towards the solution of the Mideast problem. At the same time, however, if handled successfully, it also offered him the possibility of an achievement as significant to the foreign policy record of his own presidency as the opening to China had been to Richard Nixon's. The net effect of these circumstances was that, until late in the year, the Administration was preoccupied with foreign policy issues other than Iran, and "the failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation in time to devote systematic presidential attention to it...."

This leads to a second observation concerning the lack of American response, namely that the anti-regime demonstrations in Iran, at least at the outset, were not immediately perceived, either in the White House or Niavaran Palace, as constituting a "crisis." As has previously been mentioned, there seemed to be every reason to believe that the Shah, who had periodically faced similar outbursts of protests, was still in firm control. For the most part, Washington's reaction to events from January until late summer 1978 was limited to watching events and occasional expressions of confidence in the Shah. This continued to be the case at least until the period August-September, when events took a decided turn for the worst.

From that point on, Washington's reaction to the worsening situation in Iran was essentially limited to two forms:
a. Continued expressions of support for the Shah:
The Administration, through September and October and into
November, privately and publicly voiced its support for the
Shah. In the President's September 10 phone call to the
Shah, in the aftermath of what came to be known as Tehran's
"Black Friday," Mr. Carter reaffirmed U.S.-Iranian ties and
expressed "regret over the loss of life and his hope that
the violence would soon be ended. He further expressed the
hope that the movement toward political liberalization would
continue."253

This same theme, stressing U.S. support and urging
continued moderation, continued to be voiced as late as
November, despite the possibility that other actions might
have alleviated the continuously worsening situation.254 It
was, in fact, not until November, after most other observers
had already given up on the Shah's chances of remaining in
power, that Washington finally agreed to support "sterner"
measures, including the Shah's appointment of a military
government. The State Department also reluctantly approved
the sale of riot batons and tear gas to the Shah.255 By
that time, however, the combination of continued unrest,
labor stoppages, and growing confusion within the regime
rendered these measures useless.256

Thereafter, American statements of support became
more tentative. The Administration was known to be divided
over the issue of the prospects of the Shah's survival,
although Mr. Brzezinski, for one, continued to encourage
the Shah. The President himself expressed reservations on December 7, and further indications of American pessimism were evident in the U.S. decision to fly military and civilian dependents out of Iran at Government expense, and in the revelation that the U.S. had discreetly encouraged contacts with the Ayatollah Khomeini.

b. The Disavowal of Any Intention to Intervene in Iran's Internal Affairs: The Administration's expressions of support for the Shah were almost invariably coupled with the assertion that the U.S. had "no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, and we have no intention of permitting others to interfere..." The President further expressed "confidence in the Iranian people to make the ultimate judgements about their own government."

With the appointment of the Bakhtiar government in January 1979, the White House at first attempted to encourage the Shah to remain in Iran. The President apparently believed that his presence was essential to that government's chances for success, and to the future of a Constitutional monarchy in Iran. Ultimately, however, Washington was forced to accept the reality of Iranian demands for the Shah's departure, and noted U.S. readiness to cooperate with the new government, whether or not the Shah remained.

Within a matter of weeks, U.S. efforts to rally support for Bakhtiar notwithstanding, the Ayatollah Khomeini staged his triumphant return to Iran and the U.S. was faced
with the problems of attempting to establish normalized relations with a fragmented ruling coalition in Tehran.

A retrospective look at these policies yields several criticisms. First of all, despite whatever impressions the Iranian opposition might have held, American options for influencing the situation were clearly limited. Of the extreme alternatives - either urging a "crackdown" or encouraging the Shah to a speedier return to Constitutional government - neither was attractive to the White House. On the one hand, the President's personal convictions and public stand on human rights argued against even the hint of U.S. support for a return to the "old order" in Iran. And, on the other hand, it was argued that the urging of quicker liberalization would be interpreted by an Iranian opposition already convinced of the Shah's dependence on Washington, as withdrawal of support for the Shah, thereby further weakening his position.

What the Administration did not perceive was that its resultant rather ambiguous and often contradictory stand was itself a source of encouragement to the Shah's opposition. As Shahram Chubin has pointed out,

The myths of pervasive Western influence and cunning Occidentals congenitally conspiring die hard in the Middle East, and Washington's curiously equivocal statements and desultory responses to the crisis lent credence to the Iranian view that Carter was dumping the Shah. In the cacophony of voices one theme stood out: that the United States could not and would not intervene in Iran's internal affairs. After more than thirty years of pervasive interference, this statement during a crisis was an advertisement
of retreat; to Iranians it signalled the withdrawal of the American veto against opposition to the Shah.265

An unwelcome side-effect of this situation was the diminishing of the confidence of other regional actors, the Saudis in particular, as to the American commitment to its friends. This damage was not destined to be easily repaired by the dispatch of unarmed F-15's to the Kingdom, or the indecision apparent in the dispatch and subsequent recall of the aircraft carrier Constellation to the Gulf region in December.266

Even the White House's stated policy of non-interference was not without problems. In January 1979, the Administration dispatched General Robert E. Huyser to Tehran. The purpose of the Huyser mission, though controversy persists, appears to have been two-fold:

(1) to preserve order in the Iranian military and to insure that it remained a viable force for the future;

(2) to discourage a military coup and, at least initially, to persuade the military to support Shapur Bakhtiar. There is some indication, however, that Washington had decided that it would be best for the Iranian military not to intervene at all, even if Bakhtiar's government was to collapse.267

It is obvious in retrospect that the effect of Huyser's mission was to demoralize and neutralize the Iranian military and to remove it as a force to be reckoned with in the showdown between Bakhtiar and the revolutionary
movement. This has lead to charges by the Shah and Bakhtiar that Huyser's mission from the outset was to prevent military from intervening to save the monarchy in order to allow Moslem, anti-communist forces to gain control in Iran. Whatever Huyser's original purposes may have been, however, it is inconceivable that the mission could be interpreted as anything but interference.\(^{268}\)

There are, of course, many other aspects of the question of American involvement in Iran and the U.S. reaction to the crisis which merit examination not possible within the scope of this paper. There are also many lessons which may be drawn from this experience, two of which bear re-emphasis.

The first is that U.S. failure to encourage the Shah - to curb his appetite for weaponry and particularly to implement political liberalization in the early 1970's - has had the unfortunate consequence of contributing to the illusion of unqualified support for his policies.\(^{269}\) This illusion will not be easily dissipated and should be borne in mind by American policy-makers once events permit a normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations.

From the standpoint of American foreign policy-making, the Iranian experience has graphically demonstrated the dangers of over-reliance on a single foreign leader. The contradictions inherent in the Nixon Doctrine's urging of "self-reliance" on the part of others while the U.S. was itself in search of "pillars," if not apparent

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before, should be at this time. In the case of Iran, the failure to realize this and the continued over-reliance on the Shah, ironically not only contributed to the demise of his regime, but has also left a residue of misunderstanding which is likely to bedevil American-Iranian relations for some time to come.

D. THE STAGES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS: FROM PROTEST TO REVOLT

In his study of revolutions, Crane Brinton observed that, "The first steps in revolution are by no means clear to the revolutionists themselves, and the transition from agitation to action is not a sudden and definite thing..." As has been indicated, this was certainly true of the Iranian revolution, which began as a protest against the Shah's excesses and developed into a revolution which succeeded partly because of the initial failure of the regime to adequately perceive and react to the threat posed by growing demonstrations.

The effect of these circumstances on American policy has already been generally described, and its impact on the Soviet reaction will be dealt with in the following chapter. In order to do this, it is first necessary to outline in greater detail the phases through which Iran's revolution progressed and to highlight some crucial events. The establishment of this framework of dates and events is essential to the examination of the nature and timing of Moscow's reaction, and resulting Soviet policy towards Iran.
Brinton's analysis of revolutions proposed several "uniformities," which may be summarized as follows:

1. Each revolution begins with a period of agitation, during which the constituted authority is eventually challenged by illegal acts.

2. The government ultimately invokes the use of police and/or military force to meet these acts.

3. For one reason or another - either because the opposition is too well-organized, or because its attempts at suppression are carried out half-heartedly or inefficiently, the government fails to smother the rebellion.

4. The government falls only after it has lost control over its armed forces or lost the ability to use them effectively.

5. This stage of the revolution ends with the victory of the revolutionaries after what is dramatic rather than serious bloodshed.

6. In the first stages, and at the critical moment when the test of force comes, the old regime is faced by a solid opposition. The opposition is indeed composed of various groups, but welded together by the necessity of effectively opposing the old government. Once the opposition itself becomes the new government, however, it faces a different set of problems. When it actually begins to deal with these problems, the "honeymoon" between the various coalition groups is soon over.
In the case of the Iranian Revolution, the existence of each of these uniformities is, to one degree or another, detectable during the period under study in this paper, from January 1978 to March 1979. And within that period, it is possible to identify four "stages" which the revolt underwent, each of which displayed "distinct features with respect to strategy and participants."

The first stage, which may generally be termed the "agitation or protest stage," began with a series of demonstrations during the months of January through May. This was probably the least revolutionary of the stages. Protest focused primarily on regime repression, the lack of serious reform and the country's economic conditions. The opposition had not yet coalesced and the overthrow of the regime had not yet become the opposition's central objective.

On 9 January a protest march in Qom against the regime's character assassination on the Ayatollah Khomeini had resulted in a clash with police and the deaths of twelve students. Following this incident and the traditional Shi'ite 40-day mourning period, a nationwide demonstration and strike was called to mourn the deaths of the students. This resulted in further clashes with the authorities and new casualties and established a 40-day cycle of demonstrations, deaths, mourning, etc., which endured until May.

During the months of June and July, there appeared to be a slight change in tactics on the part of the opposition. A general strike was called on 5 June 1978, and the bazaars...
in Tehran, Mashad, Qom, Tabriz and other large cities shut down, but no demonstrations were held. Similarily on June 17th, the 40th day since the last deaths in Qom in May, the bazaar in Tehran was closed, but no mass demonstrations occurred.

During this deceptive lull, the opposition was apparently reorganizing and regrouping, as they waited to see what the regime might do. In an interview in late June, Ayatollah Shariatmadari noted, "The government must accede to our demands (for a return to constitutional monarchy and a stricter adherence to Islamic law) sooner or later. We have started our campaign and we will pursue it." He further warned that if the Shah did not liberalize fast enough, the opposition "would give the order to our followers to go on the streets, to come out and fight."

The pause in street demonstrations was broken by the start of a new round of public protests on July 22 in Mashad. On August 11, angry crowds in Esfahan publicly protested and attacked government buildings to protest previous killings and demand the release of a local religious leader. The government did not regain control of Esfahan until two days later when it declared martial law and rushed in army units. With these developments, and the Shah's decision to change his prime-minister, Phase I of the revolution ended.

For his own part, as has been indicated, the Shah failed to properly assess the danger of the situation and take the
steps necessary to truly defuse the situation. Having noted the diversity and disorganization of the opposition, and having further miscalculated that opposition demands might be satisfied through what were in fact half-measures designed to placate opponents rather than actually reform, the Shah failed to realize the very real danger that the opposition's demonstrated ability to organize nationwide protests and strikes posed. Opposition warnings were ignored, while the Shah confidently proclaimed, "Nobody can overthrow me. I have the support of 700,000 troops, all of the workers and most of the people."^283

Thus, instead of undertaking serious reform when there was apparently still time to do so,^284 the regime sought to court its moderate opposition. "It apologized to Shariatmadari for police intrusion into his home; promised to reopen the Fuzieh seminary; banned pornographic movies; removed the hardline head of SAVAK; and vowed to proceed with the process of 'liberalization'."^285

The fact that these measures were probably insufficient to head off further protest anyway was complicated by regime activity which reinforced the impression that the opposition was not being taken seriously. In May, for example, in the midst of protests stemming partly from Iran's economic problems, the Shah's approval of a $1.3 billion purchase of Chieftan tanks from Britain could only have further aggrava-

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vated the opposition. Furthermore, commencing with the
Shah's delayed Eastern European trip (Hungary and Bulgaria in late May 1978), there was a flurry of diplomatic activity, which, if nothing else, encouraged the view that domestic problems were continuing to be ignored. Among the visitors to Iran were Shayk 'Isa Ibn Sahman, the amir of Bahrain and Bohuslav Chnoupek, the Czechoslovakian foreign minister. Most importantly, the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua visited Tehran on 15-18 June 1978. And, according to one report,

Instead of taking advantage of the relative calm of the month of July to mount some decisive action and open a dialogue with the religious and lay opposition, the Shah went off on his annual vacation by the Caspian Sea with his friends ex-King Constantine of Greece and King Hussein of Jordan.

Finally, the Shah's August 5th address to the nation on the Anniversary of the 1906 Constitution did nothing to convince the population of his sincerity. The Shah praised "the Shah-nation revolution" and "the astounding achievements we have scored in the past 15 years" at length. At the same time, he pledged complete freedom in the next Parliamentary elections, which he scheduled for June 1979. By this time, however, the Shah's credibility had been badly eroded and his pledge was seen by the opposition as "either a mask or a concession which had come too late and had done too little to satisfy their fundamental demands."

The second stage of the revolution was marked by the renewed violence of August and corresponded roughly with Sharif Emami's tenure as Prime Minister (27 August - 6
November). By this time, the regime was faced with well-organized opposition whose demands could no longer be put off. Furthermore, while it had been primarily the bazaar, clergy and some middle class groups, notably students and professional workers, who had carried the revolution to this point, they were now joined by the working class - laborers, factory workers and construction workers. As a result, Emami was charged by the Shah to solve the public's grievances and fight corruption.

Emami's initial actions - reverting to the Islamic calendar, closing down casinos and gambling houses, dismissal of several officials and generals and attempts to open a dialogue with the religious leaders - evoked only a "wait and see" attitude from some opposition leaders. Nevertheless, demonstrations, civil disobedience and sporadic strikes in both the public and private sectors continued unabated throughout the country.

On 7 September 1978, the government declared martial law throughout the country. This failed, however, to prevent a demonstration in Tehran the following day in which several hundred people lost their lives in clashes with army forces. Friday, 8 September 1978, became "Black Friday" and thus marked a major turning point in the revolution. The new government, which had entered office with two strikes against it because of Emami's previous connections with the Pahlavi Foundation and what appeared to be a lack of serious intent
to fix blame for the Abadan cinema fire, now lost all credibility. As an editorial in *Kayhan International* noted on the first anniversary of that day,

Black Friday...shattered the reputation of the already discredited monarchy. It destroyed the flimsy credibility of the newly installed Sharif-Emami government...Black Friday also deeply affected the attitude of the security forces...(and) eroded the centre position in Iranian politics. (Emphasis added.)

Largely as a result of martial law, and the ban on demonstrations, there were no further major outbursts of violence in September. Instead strikes for better wages and working conditions spread throughout Iran during that month. By October, the strikes had taken on a distinctly political tone. "Under the guise of supporting an end to martial law, freedom of political prisoners, and the return of political exiles, the strikers were joining the more radical opposition groups, and agitating for progressively more revolutionary demands."

None of the regime's attempts at reconciliation, including the Shah's extraordinary admission of "mistakes, excesses and misappropriations," or Emami's charter guaranteeing freedom of the press proved sufficient to prevent continuing unrest.

By the end of October 1978, the revolution had become completely radicalized. Iranians from virtually every social/economic strata had joined the opposition. The last significant element of moderate opposition, the National Front, had refused to participate in a coalition government.
as long as the Shah remained in power. Moreover, during this period, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been forced to leave Iraq and moved to France in October, emerged as the symbolic head of the revolution.

During the first week of November, strikes, shut-downs and protests spread throughout Iran. On 5 November, the first openly anti-Shah rioting erupted on the campus of Tehran University, thereby leading to the resignation of Sharif-Emami and the installation of the military cabinet under General Ahzari.

The third stage of the revolution coincided with the period of military government and lasted until the establishment of the Bakhtiar government and departure of the Shah on January 16. It was characterized by the growing determination of the opposition to force the collapse of the regime, and by the growing inability of the Shah, his advisors and the military to act decisively to prevent that development.

The opposition's reaction to the installation of the military government and the Shah's declaration of support for the people's efforts to overcome cruelty and corruption was immediate. Ayatollah Khomeini declared,

...I am sure that (the brave Iranian people) will not be deceived by the Shah's intrigues or softened by his sweet talk or be intimidated by his iron fist...The goal is the same as I have outlined in my speeches and statements: (a) The overthrow of the Pahlavi Dynasty and the sinister monarchical regime. (b) The establishment of an Islamic republic based on the principles of Islam and the will of the people.
By mid-November, the labor stoppages had brought the Iranian economy to a virtual standstill.\textsuperscript{306} The month of Moharram (22 November - 11 December) witnessed a worsening of the situation as the military proved incapable of preventing or controlling traditional religious processions and related demonstrations.\textsuperscript{307} On 10 December, the ninth day of Moharram, over a million people peacefully marched in Tehran in support of the religious and political leadership's demand for dissolution of the military government and removal of the Shah in favor of an Islamic Republic. The following day similar marches were held throughout the country.\textsuperscript{308}

Meanwhile, a decidedly gloomy and irresolute Shah was engaged in efforts to form a coalition government. Karim Sanjabi, the National Front leader who had been imprisoned, was released and asked to form a cabinet, but refused to do so. In mid-December, Gholam Sadigi, a former minister under Mossaddegh, was approached, but proved unable to do so.\textsuperscript{309} Thereupon, Shahpur Bakhtiar, vice-president of the National Front, was asked to form a civilian government. He agreed to do so provided that the Majlis gave its prior approval, the military declared its support, and the Shah pledged to leave the country.\textsuperscript{310}

On 6 January, Bakhtiar presented his cabinet to the Shah amidst continued rioting, strikes and growing rumors of an Army coup.\textsuperscript{311} The Regency Council was named on 13
January and the Shah departed Tehran for Egypt on the 16th, leaving Bakhtiar and the Regency Council to face an unrelenting opposition with the support of a divided and discouraged military. As events were to prove, the third stage of the revolution had significantly diminished the ability of Iran's armed forces to play a decisive role in determining the outcome of the revolt, which now entered its fourth stage.

Iran was plunged into a state of chaos during this phase, which lasted from 16 January until 11 February 1979. As Bakhtiar attempted to open a dialogue with Khomeini, who refused to have any dealings with the "illegal" government or Regency Council, mass demonstrations were held in favor of Khomeini's return. The military closed off Iran's airports on 24 January to thwart Khomeini's plans to return to Iran, but merely succeeded in postponing the inevitable until 1 February.

On February 6, the Ayatollah named Mehdi Bazargan prime minister and demanded the resignation of Bakhtiar, who continued to refuse to do so despite his increasingly isolated position. Nevertheless, the two days of fighting between the Imperial Guard and Air Force elements in Tehran decided the issue for him. The Army leadership, without further instructions from the Shah, divided as to the possibilities of a coup, and having noted General Huyser's advice, declared the military's neutrality and ordered the units back to their
barracks. 317 Prime Minister Bakhtiar resigned and fled on 11 February 1979, thereby bringing to an end the Pahlavi Dynasty. 318

As events since that time have demonstrated, however, Iran's revolution may be far from over. The "honeymoon" between the secular leadership and elements under Bazargan and the Ayatollah, true to Brinton's formula, immediately showed signs of strain as the provisional government set to work on the nation's problems. 319 And, if Brinton's model continues to hold true, the rule of the "moderates" (Bazargan and Banisadr) may eventually give way, in the face of the continued assertiveness of the Ayatollah's "shadow government," to the accession of more extreme elements. 320
Likewise, An Nahar's Tehran correspondent noted, "With 37 years on the throne and the political savvy that goes with it, the Shah still enjoys the support of the bureaucracy and the well-to-do. Even his political foes agree that he still has the power to crush any major threat to his rule. And although his government has become a little exasperated trying to rally the support of a reluctant public, the opposition threat has so far not been great enough to warrant an all-out crackdown." (p. 4). See also An Nahar, Vol. 2, No. 34, 21 August 1978, pp. 3-4.


"In 1970, annual oil revenues passed the $1 billion mark; it went to $25 billion in 1975-76, while the economy registered growth rates of 34 percent and 43 percent. Per capita income, the regime's favorite statistic, has soared from $150 a year to $2,250 a year in little more than a decade. (Of course, the income is very badly distributed.)" Flora Lewis, "Iran: Future Shock," New York Times Magazine, 12 Nov. 1978, p. 60.


One observer has noted,
From 1973 to 1978, Iran's economy "overheated" as inflation topped 40% at times due to the $18.2 billion in arms purchases, rapid building projects and investments of foreign companies (the 1978 book value of total U.S. private investment was $700 million alone). The inflation was accompanied by a high rate of unemployment, 150-200% increases in rents, widespread shift from countryside to city of unskilled urban labor, use of Korean and Philippine workers and doctors and a rapid rise in food imports with accompanying food scarcity of basic staples.


Professor Ramazani observed, "To be sure, authoritarianism has been part and parcel of the traditional Iranian political culture, but at no time in Iran's modern history had monarchical absolutism entailed such a degree of despotism...Centralization of governmental authority went hand in hand with the ever-expanding reach of repression." R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Revolution in Perspective," in Z. Michael Szaz, The Impact of Iranian Events Upon Persian Gulf and United States Security, (Washington, D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979), p. 21.

In a typical remark, the Shah once assessed that his opposition was comprised of "the few hundred, or at most, couple of thousand" who still held "unhealthy dark and deviationist ideas." *The Economist*, 21 May 1971, p. 40.

The only groups which can honestly be said to fit the description are those such as the Mujahedeen, whose philosophy was based on "militant religion" and a Marxist interpretation of the historical role of religion. A December 1977 publication, the "Manifesto of the Ideological Positions of the Organization of the Mujahedeen of the People of Iran" proclaimed,

...we still believe that Islam, and particularly Shi'ism, still contain those progressive and fighting elements which can provide the explanation for the struggle of (religious) groups and strata against the dominant imperialist oppression. The historical revolutionary traditions in a religion that since its inception in the 7th century A.D. was, in the form of an underground party, a gathering place of fighters and rebels against the oppressive regimes of the time, including the progressive traditions of the thought and practice of the exemplary uprising of Hassein, are the backings which have still maintained their anti-oppression and progressive political-social concepts within this ideology.


Even after the Shah had acknowledged the dissatisfaction of the Iranian people in August and September, he clung to his belief that the opposition was essentially "radical" and a conspiratorial minority. "Naturally, mistakes, excesses and abuses had an effective part to play in creating and spreading the crisis. Meanwhile there is no doubt that behind-the-scene provocations, as well as extensive plots...also played an important role." (FBIS, 18 October 1978, p. R2) "...Among the mullahs, as well as among the people, there is a silent majority which wants to wait and see. Certain persons have a personal score to settle with me. I am sorry that this has taken on such proportions." (FBIS, 6 February 1979, p. R1). See also, "The Barren Womb of Red and Black Reaction," *Kayhan International*, April 16, 1978, p. 4, and FBIS, *Middle East Affairs*, 19 April 1978, p. R1.
The Shah's apparent reluctance, or inability to face the reality of the extent of his opposition no doubt owes itself to the Shah's own self-image. To admit that a significant portion of the Iranian people opposed his continued rule would have been to admit, in effect, that his entire concept of the "Shah-people revolution" and of the centrality of the monarchy in Iran was invalid.


Commenting on the more moderate proposals which had been put forth, Abol-Hassen Banisadr noted,

Certain people have suggested that it is necessary to go step by step. In the first step, they say, we should accept the policy of "gradual liberalization," and then, when the Shah's regime weakens further, we can move to eradicate it. The supporters of this course of action seem to be unaware that if the regime believed the first step could lead to the second, it would not itself propose this solution...the one definitive resolution of the crisis (in our opinion)...is the fall of the Shah's regime and the establishment of an Islamic republic founded on the popular support for Islamic precepts and goal of national independence.


Ibid., Taheri, p. 4.

In October 1978, for example, a leader of Iran's Liberation Movement noted, "In spite of the power of the security forces, the mosques and religious centers were sanctuaries where we met, talked, prepared, organized and grew." Quoted in Nicholas Gage, "Iran: Making of a Revolution," New York Times Magazine, December 17, 1978, p. 132. See also op. cit., Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," pp. 332-333.


Ibid., Zabih, p. 28.


Ibid., Taheri, p. 4. See also, op. cit., Zabih, pp. 30-32.


(The) bazaar could organize crowds for demonstrations almost instantly...In Tehran alone, one report estimated the number of procession leaders or 'contact men' who could be summoned on short notice at 5,000...the bazaari could rely on another segment of the population, namely the rural inhabitants. Traditionally, by means of the purchase of agriculture surplus and the sale of consumer goods, the bazaari had maintained close ties with the peasantry.


For a discussion, see, op. cit., Bill, The Politics of Iran, pp. 53-72.

Ibid., Bill, pp. 57-62.


For an analysis of the origins of the various radical groups, including Iran's Liberation Movement, the Mojahedine Khalgh-Iran, the Sazeman Cherichaye Fedayee Khalgh and others, see op. cit., Zabih, pp. 39-44. See also, "The First Spark of Revolution," Kayhan International, February 8, 1979, p. 2; also Hubert Johnson, Recent Opposition Movements in Iran, (Master's Thesis, University of Utah, June 1975).

While the diversity of the opposition gives it the appearance of broad support and unpredictable, almost ubiquitous power to erupt in demonstrations—which have often led to bloody violence—that diversity is more probably a source of weakness. The groups are fragmented, suspicious of one another's aims.


In November 1977, during the Shah's visit to Washington, President Carter asserted that the U.S. and Iran were...bound together with unbreakable ties of friendship, of past history and mutual commitment to the present and the future. Our military alliance is unshakeable...We look upon Iran's strength as an extension of our own strength and Iran looks upon our strength as an extension of theirs...


New York Times, December 11, 1978, p. 1. Banisadr charged that "...the economic health, social welfare and cultural integrity of the Iranian nation are all being sacrificed so that the Shah can continue to rule Iran within the framework of U.S. strategic objectives." Another important grievance was the passage of a Status of Forces Agreement in 1963 which granted the U.S. jurisdiction in
criminal matters over its military personnel stationed in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini's vocal opposition to this bill was the immediate cause of his exile from Iran in 1964, which was destined not to end until the Shah's regime crumbled in 1979.


221 Critics somewhat conveniently tended to downplay the real and important differences which often existed between the Shah and American Administrations. One example was problems related to oil. William Quandt, for one, once pointed out that

...the two allies have often been on opposite sides... the United States was unable to influence the Shah... (not to completely take over the INOC). A similar situation occurred in 1973, when the Shah played a leading role in pushing for higher oil prices within OPEC. Once again, the Americans subsequently protested, but to no avail.


R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Revolution in Perspective," in Z. Michael Szasz, ed., The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Persian Gulf and United States Security, (Washington: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979), p. 23. See also Eric Rouleau, "The Shah's Dream of Glory," in op. cit., Nobari, pp. 83-85. Neither of these claims is totally without validity. The regime's programs to deal with Iran's socio-economic transformation were inadequate in many respects. And the military admittedly had a role to play in internal security. At the same time, however, Iran's social and economic woes were not soluble simply through a reallocation of revenues alone. Indeed, part of the inflation problem resulted from the rapid expansion of many of the economic development programs after 1974. Nor is it possible for the Shah's detractors to lightly dismiss his security perceptions in light of events in Pakistan, Afghanistan and renewed Irano-Iraqi tensions. See, "Iran: Political Challenge, Economic Contradictions," Middle East Research and Information Reports No. 69, Vol. 8, No. 6, (Washington: Middle East Research and Information Project, July-August 1978), pp. 3-20, and op. cit., Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis," p. 812.


159
This amendment, which became the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, stated in part:

It is the policy of the United States...to promote and encourage increased respect for human rights... (and) to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries...

It is further the policy of the United States that, except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.


Hearings by the House International Relations Committee on civil and political rights in Iran and convened in the summer of 1976. Among the reports furnished to the committee was William J. Butler's, "Report on Human Rights in Iran," which outlined limitations on free speech and political rights, suppression of political suspects by SAVAK, and allegations of torture. For a discussion, see Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, "Arms and the Human," Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest, February 1977, pp. 33-37.

In testimony before that committee, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton gave the following explanation for not having confronted Iran on the subject of human rights up until that time.

First, we believe that the administration of Iranian judicial and penal systems is above all a matter of internal Iranian responsibility, and that one sovereign country should not interfere lightly in another's domestic affairs...
Second, if Iran's internal practices in matters relating to human rights were a growing affront to international standards, we would of course reconsider our judgements...

The human rights situation in Iran was considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1975. The commission members determined that there was not sufficient evidence presented to the commission on which to base further action. The commission adopted the following consensus decision: "The Commission decided that in the case of Iran, no action is called for under Council Resolution 1503."


234 See "Shah Interviewed on Human Rights, Other Topics," FBIS, April 19, 1978, pp. R1-R4. That this was the case is also indicated, for example, by a Kastakhiz Party statement of April 3, 1978, which asserted,

...What the Shah wished is not to leave the arena wide open and without challenge to hooligans and trouble-makers, simply because we want an open society, and then sit by. The open political climate in Iran is meant for the progressive and patriotic people, not for reactionaries and traitors...


The contention that the President could have compelled the Shah to undertake even further reforms persists despite the historical record, which reveals that even when the Shah was in a far less secure domestic position and theoretically even more susceptible to such pressures, only superficial adjustments occurred. Such was the case when President Kennedy's Administration pursued similar undertakings. See op. cit., Faroughy in Nobari, pp. 70-76.

237 Stanley Hoffmann, for one, has commented on the dilemma of how to go about the incorporation of human rights issues into foreign policy. According to Hoffmann,

The choices are in some ways all unpleasant: If the United States is too selective about which countries to denounce, it risks becoming hypocritical (for instance, if it singles out only its foes and spares its friends). If it pursues the cause of human rights everywhere, in an almost crusading manner, that is likely to be a highly self-destructive ordeal. But if the policy becomes merely verbal, it will be a splendid demonstration of impotence.


238 "Exchange of Toasts at State Dinner Honoring Their Imperial Majesties the Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran," Press Release - Office of the White House Press Secretary, November 15, 1977, p. 2.


Criticisms of Mr. Carter ranged from trying to do too much, such as his initial goal of achieving an overall settlement in the Middle East, to having done too little, for example, in actually curbing U.S. arms sales. Representative of these and other viewpoints are op. cit., Pryor, Arms and the Shah; Thomas L. Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," Foreign Policy, No. 31, Summer 1978, pp. 34-55; Daniel Southerland, "Is the President Overdoing Foreign Affairs?", Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1978, p. 30; and Richard Strout, "Carter's Second Round: Clearer Priorities," Christian Science Monitor, January 9, 1978, p. 1. Of particular interest is op. cit., Stanley Hoffman's "The Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, Number 29, Winter 1977-78, pp. 3-23.

Ibid., Hoffman, pp. 5-21.


The President faced an uphill struggle to secure Congressional approval and domestic support. As Richard Strout noted at the time, "...Panama pacts ratification early in 1978, many believe, would have psychological benefits to the administration out of proportion even to the importance of the measures themselves." Ibid., p. 1.


As one former U.S. official later noted in an interview, "(Secretary) Vance has been away a lot and traveling with him has been Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. There's been nobody but
a desk officer at State paying attention to the whole damn thing." Washington Star, January 2, 1979, p. 8.


250 In point of fact, the President and his advisors were engaged in the Camp David negotiations with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin when the September 8 demonstrations in Tehran were suppressed with the loss of several hundred lives. Iranian Ambassador Zahedi telephoned Mr. Brzezinski at Camp David to persuade him to convince the President to do something. Between meetings, Mr. Carter telephoned the Shah to assure him of support. Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah, (New YOrk: Wyndham Books, 1979), p. 53.


252 As will be discussed in the following section, the revolution in Iran progressed through several stages. The period beginning in late-August 1978 marked the increased radicalization of the Shah's opposition and proved to be an important turning point.


254 Op. cit., Hoveyda, p. 166 and Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis," p. 810. In his November 13 news conference, the President noted, for example, "We trust the Shah to maintain stability in Iran, to continue with the democratization process, and also to continue with the progressive change in the Iranian social and economic structure." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Volume 14 - Number 46, November 13, 1978, p. 2019. See also, ibid, Volume 14 - Number 48, December 4, 1978, p. 2101.


256 Op. cit., Hoveyda, pp. 178-180. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal reportedly commented, after visiting Iran at this time, that the Shah himself was no longer functioning. Ibid., p. 166.
The President later insisted that his policy of support for the Shah remained unchanged, but neither the Shah nor his opponents had missed the inference that the US was losing confidence in his regime. Ibid., p. 184.


Ibid., p. 2102.


Professor Lenczowski, for example, has noted the Shah's failure to adopt either of these courses of action, as has former Iranian ambassador to the U.N. Hoveyda. See op. cit., Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis," p. 810, and Hoveyda, pp. 48, 166.


According to Alvin Cottrell, "General Huyser's mission was to prevent a coup by the Iranian armed forces and perhaps even hold them in check so they would not fight at all." Cottrell cites allegations by the Shah that Huyser told the generals that if they tried to seize control, the U.S. would cut off all supplies and assistance to them. Alvin J. Cottrell, "American Policy During the Huyser Mission,"
International Security Review, Vol. IV, Number IV, Winter 1979-1980, pp. 435-436. A Washington Post article, however, stated that the White House had ordered Huyser to develop contingency plans for a coup in the event that revolutionary forces appeared to be toppling Bakhtiar. Huyser is alleged to have later reported that such a coup was possible on short notice. Washington Post, April 2, 1980, p. 1.

268 Secretary Vance, for one, declared that he did not view Huyser's activities as interference. Op. cit., The Secretary of State, January 11, 1979, p. 1; ibid., Cottrell, pp. 437-439; see also, op. cit., Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval, p. 66. As James Bill noted during the crisis, it is essential that American decision-makers realize that Iranians read much into the slightest word or gesture made by any U.S. official concerning Iran; theories abound these days in Tehran concerning what Washington has in store for Iran.


269 Ibid., p. 342.


275 Middle East Research and Information Project Report No. 69, Volume 8, No. 6, July-August 1978, p. 4.


FBIS, 15-17 June 1978. Other visitors included the commander-in-chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy, the British Chief of Defense Staff, and the Secretary General of CENTO. FBIS, 12 and 29 June and 13 July 1978.


294 Ibid., pp. 1 and 3; there were also unconfirmed reports that the new government was planning to contact Khomeini, ibid., September 3, 1978, p. 2.

295 There were, for example, riots in Mashad on 31 August; Tehran, Ardebil, Mashad and Qazvin on 1 September, and massive public prayer gatherings and parades on 4 September to celebrate the end of Ramadan. Kayhan International, September 1-4, 1978.


298 Kayhan International, September 6, 1979, p. 2. See, op. cit., Zabih, for an explanation of measures taken to neutralize the Army, p. 53.

299 Ibid., Zabih, p. 55.


*Kayhan International*, January 7, 1979, p. 3. It was reported that the military leadership had been considering this option even prior to the appointment of the Ahzari cabinet. The January 14, 1979 issue of *Kayhan International* reported that the Shah had rejected the idea of a coup and had instructed the military to support Prime Minister Bakhtiar. P. 1. See also ibid., January 16, 1979, p. 1.

Bakhtiar was left in a rather isolated position. Ousted from the National Front for agreeing to form a cabinet, denounced by Khomeini as a traitor, he nevertheless continued to try to work within the constitutional framework in the face of continued demonstrations and strikes. *Kayhan International*, January 18, 1979, p. 2.


V. THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION ON SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

It is generally agreed that the fall of the Shah and his replacement by a decidedly neutralist Islamic regime in 1979 represented a setback for American interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. Conversely, the loss of U.S. influence in Iran and prestige in the region is, in itself, a gain for Moscow.\textsuperscript{321}

Beyond that, however, and despite its best efforts to preserve Soviet interests in Iran (primarily economic) and to develop normalized relations with the new Iranian leadership, the Kremlin has yet to achieve meaningful success. In short, Moscow has been unable to translate the potential benefits of Washington's expulsion from Iran into real influence for itself.

The key factors of this dilemma are to be found in the hesitant Soviet reaction to the events which led to the Shah's overthrow, and in the perceptions of his successors concerning the future of Iran's relations with the superpowers in general, and the Soviet Union in particular.

A. THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: THE DILEMMA OF OPPORTUNISM

From the outbreak of the very first protests in Iran in early 1978 until nearly the last crucial month prior to the Shah's departure, Moscow's reaction was studiously non-committal. The Soviets, like many other observers,
were obviously unsure as to the true meaning and significance of these early developments, and what the outcome might be. Thus, as the Kremlin attempted to discern some pattern in the rapid course of events in Iran, the Soviet reaction developed several characteristics.

1. **Moscow's Neutrality**

   Particularly during the initial stages of protest, when no serious threat to the Shah's regime was perceived, there was a noticeable absence of official Soviet government comment concerning events in Iran. Even as the crisis deepened, however, there appeared to be a conscious effort to "avoid taking sides."^322^ The initial outbreak of demonstrations in January and February 1978 received only brief comment in the Soviet press, indicating that the Kremlin saw no reason to disrupt its generally correct relations with the Shah for simple reasons of propaganda.\(^323^\) Thus, for example, the third series of protests in Iran in April 1978 received sparse commentary in the Soviet press. A *New Times* article devoted three short paragraphs to the subject, citing the official Iranian Pars news agency as its source.\(^324^\) One Western commentator attributed this lack of criticism to a Soviet-Iranian "conspiracy of silence."^325^ One notable exception to the reserved commentary was the Soviet reaction to a May speech by Iranian Ambassador Zahedi in Washington, charging that "the USSR seeks to control the oil-rich areas of the Middle East."^326^ *Isvestiya* labeled
such behavior "contrary to the interests of good-neighborly Soviet-Iranian relations."³²⁷

The worsening of the Iranian crisis in late-August 1978 and during the revolution's second stage marked the beginning of what might best be termed a growing "dilemma of opportunism" for Moscow. Until that point, Soviet involvement in the anti-regime activities had been limited primarily to the printing of Tudeh Party materials and the financing and support of the PLO/PFLP, which was training Iranian extremist organizations.³²⁸ The renewed and widespread clashes throughout Iran, however, created a situation which the Kremlin's essentially opportunistic leadership might be able to exploit in the future, particularly if the Shah's connections with the U.S. were weakened, or if he were to be removed completely.³²⁹

To the Soviets, the prospects of the demise of the Shah might be advantageous in some respects, but there were also a number of risks to their interests. On the one hand, Moscow's relations with the Shah were, at best, admittedly only "correct." Since the early 1970's, his increasingly assertive foreign policy had conflicted with Soviet strategy and activities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Of particular note were the Shah's military expansion, Iran's intervention against the Soviet-supported Dhofari rebellion in Oman³³⁰ and encouragement of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.³³¹ Outside of the Persian Gulf proper, Iran had joined
Saudi Arabia in furnishing financial support to Somalia against the Soviet and Cuban-supported Ethiopians, and, even more importantly, the Shah was openly seeking to promote more extensive relations with the People's Republic of China.\textsuperscript{332}

At the same time, Moscow's leadership no doubt recognized it had somewhat of a "stake" in the Shah. They were accustomed to dealing with him, and under his regime Iran had established a record of stability in a volatile region which was of extreme sensitivity to Soviet security interests. There were also tangible interests, not the least of which were gas and petroleum deals which were important to the Soviet economy.

An examination of the two extreme alternatives open to the Kremlin - either support of the Shah or encouragement of his opposition - clearly reveals some important considerations and the nature of Moscow's dilemma.

a. In the first place, on an ideological level, the Kremlin has often found itself hard-pressed to support "popular" revolts abroad, while suppressing such developments "at home" (e.g., Czechoslovakia - 1968). Furthermore, in the case of Iran, the Soviets were virtually without representation among the opposition forces. The Tudeh Party - its leadership in exile and its membership depleted - had been thoroughly discredited as a result of its historic subservience to Moscow.

b. Until relatively late in the crisis, it seemed unlikely that any opposition movement in Iran could succeed
in either reducing the Shah's power or removing him. Advocation of regime opposition, if the Shah did survive, would have had a ruinous effect on relations with Iran. At the same time, if the Soviets did indeed desire the elimination of the Shah, such pronouncements might have had the opposite effect. The Shah would undoubtedly have played up Iranian fears of historic Russian and Soviet designs on Iran, attributing the protests to an external, Communist threat and proceeded to defuse the opposition in the process. Any overt Soviet involvement in the anti-Shah movement was also likely to provoke a U.S. response.

c. The proximity of Iran, and the ethnic and religious makeup of the populations along the common border, argued against Moscow's encouragement of a revolt. However attractive the prospects of an Iran minus the Shah might have appeared, the potential "spill-over" effect of the increasingly dominant religious dimension of the opposition posed serious problems for the Soviets.

d. Finally, even given the case that Moscow supported an opposition which succeeded in forcing some change in the Shah's regime, or in removing him, the Soviets could not be sure that his successors' foreign policy would be any more considerate of their interests than had the Shah's.

The Kremlin therefore made no apparent moves to alter its practice of brief, balanced reporting of events in Iran, with no official notice of the protests. Ami...
commentary regarding continued anti-government riots on September 7, Foreign Minister Gromyko cabled a congratulatory note to Iran's newly appointed foreign minister, and Brezhnev telegraphed his condolences to the Shah for the heavy loss of life in the Tabas earthquake.

Although the lifting of press censorship in Iran in September enabled Moscow to increase the volume of its reportage on events there, commentaries continued to rely on foreign and domestic press sources, and editorializing was avoided. Soviet newspapers and broadcasts in September and October carried details of demonstrations, explaining the reasons for the disturbances through quotes of articles from such publications as The Christian Science Monitor, Time, Ettelaat, Reuters, Ayandegan and Kayhan. Additionally, there was an attempt made to "balance" Soviet reporting by pointing out positive aspects of the Shah's rule.

By the end of October, the opposition in Iran had become completely radicalized and the regime had failed to avert a deepening of the crisis. Having sensed that the revolution in Iran was entering a critical stage, Moscow altered its approach. Although Moscow did not commit itself, there was a gradual shift away from the practice of couching Soviet reportage of events in Iran in the terms of foreign press commentaries. Moreover, it was possible to discern the increasing prominence of the other important characteristics of the Soviet reaction during and after November 1978.
2. The Anti-Imperialism Theme

Commencing in November, Moscow began to stress the "anti-western" aspect of the revolution. Although the Soviets had previously made references to Iran's importance as a source of oil and strategic bridgehead for the U.S., after October "American imperialism," and the Iranian revolution as a manifestation of a "backlash" against its effects, became the dominant theme of Soviet commentaries.

The Kremlin apparently saw this as a comparatively "safe" manner in which to voice its point of view. Direct criticism of the Shah was avoided, and Moscow could not be accused of taking the opposition's point of view. At the same time, some influence with the opposition might be obtained as a result of statements which demonstrated understanding and sympathy for the grievances of the protestors. The most attractive feature of this approach, no doubt, was that it added to American discomfort over the course of events in Iran.

The most startling of Moscow's efforts to emphasize this theme was Premier Brezhnev's "warning" to the U.S., in the form of a personal statement to Pravda on November 19, not to interfere in Iran. Mr. Brezhnev stated,

The Soviet Union, which maintains traditional, neighborly relations with Iran, resolutely states it is against foreign interference in Iran's internal affairs by anyone, in any form and under any pretext... It must be also clear that any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran - a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union - would be regarded by the USSR as a matter affecting its security interests.
Undoubtedly, this comment was prompted by hints that the U.S. was indeed preparing to intervene in some manner on behalf of the Shah. On 18 November, for example, TASS had reported that "the United States continued making plans for military interference in Iran's internal affairs. The main part in this is played by the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency."\(^{341}\)

It should be noted that it is entirely possible that, despite this "warning," the Soviet leadership actually expected the U.S. to act. The Kremlin's expressions of doubts concerning American denials of any intention to intervene were probably induced, at least in part, by honest disbelief that the United States would stand by while its stated vital interests in Iran were threatened. The President's somewhat timid response, reaffirming that position, could only have been a pleasant surprise for Moscow.\(^{342}\)

Brezhnev's statement was also significant in that it was the first official Soviet government comment concerning events in Iran. Its blunt tone was in marked contrast to his cordial telegram to the Shah only three weeks before expressing his congratulations on Iran's national day.\(^{343}\) This deliberate change was no doubt a reflection of Moscow's perception that events in Iran had reached a critical point. Meanwhile, the Soviets complained that American speculation that the Kremlin itself was interfering in Iran was nothing more than "an attempt to cover their
own responsibility for the situation which has taken shape in Iran and for the causes of unrest." 344

The revolution's anti-U.S./anti-imperialist aspect was stressed both in Russian domestic commentaries and in those broadcast to Iran in the Persian language. A 26 November Moscow radio broadcast alleged that, "The threat of imperialist intervention is hanging over our neighbor Iran," 345 while Pravda repeated charges that the CIA and Pentagon were initiating plans for military interference. 346

Similarly, a broadcast in Persian on 12 December attributed the huge demonstrations at the end of Moharram to a desire for "the eradication of imperialist oppression and tyranny." 347 Moscow also broadcast the news that U.S. aircraft had delivered riot control equipment to Iran. 348 On 15 December, another statement charged "U.S. CIA officers and operatives are arriving in Iran to help crush the demonstrators." 349

Typical of the anti-U.S. broadcasts was a December 24 commentary which told the Iranians:

Being apprehensive of losing their control in Iran, U.S. imperialists are helping to crush the national movement, which has been gaining momentum in Iran. Participants in peaceful demonstrations have been executed in dozens of Iranian cities with U.S.-made weapons; it was U.S.-manufactured gases which were used to poison those who had taken part in strikes and demonstrations. Washington statesmen who give so much voice to their defense of human rights have not uttered a word in defense of the Iranians struggling for freedom and democracy. U.S. imperialists are acting unashamedly to safeguard their interests in Iran. 350
Direct criticism of the Shah also emerged for the first time in December, but Moscow reverted to its past practice of citing foreign sources. An Izvestiya article stated:

Without venturing to make categorical forecasts, many foreign observers are stressing several facts. First, to judge from the intensified fierceness of the antagonism, the trial of strength is acquiring a decisive nature and matters are evidently coming to a head. Second, even those whose sympathies are fully on the side of the ruling Iranian regime are now seeing the Shah's throne as a frail little ship bobbing on the waves in a raging sea of the people's anger. It is unanimously noted that there is virtually not a single social group expressing support for the regime and that there is no complete guarantee of the army's continued loyalty.\(^{51}\)

With the failure of Iran's military government to restore order and the Shah's attempts to organize a coalition government, the Soviets hastened to adopt a stance more favorable to opposition success. Commentaries openly engaged in propaganda. By the beginning of January, Izvestiya was telling its readers that the Shah's opponents regarded the Americans as "the mainstay of the anti-popular regime."\(^{52}\) General Ahzari's resignation as Prime Minister was reported without comment,\(^{53}\) but in succeeding days, Soviet commentators noted the uncertainty as to whether Bakhtiar would be able to form a new government.\(^{54}\) A Russian radio broadcast observed that it was obvious that "Bakhtiar's Cabinet, even if it is formed and wins a vote of confidence, will find it far from easy to perform its duties."\(^{55}\)

The threat of impending U.S. intervention continued to dominate Soviet commentary. TASS accused Washington of
"drawing up a script for Iran's future political life," while a January broadcast in Persian alleged that,

According to foreign correspondents,...the CIA has put forward a detailed plan for Iran and now attempts to bring to power its puppet, whom the Americans have trained and coached over many long years, as prime minister of Iran.

On January 6, 1979, Izvestiya again stated Brezhnev's warning that "any outside interference in Iran's international affairs cannot be permitted." For the first time, however, the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty was mentioned. According to Moscow, the Treaty was the basis of "equality, mutual respect for each other's sovereign rights and interests, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and businesslike cooperation." American protests over Soviet propagandizing continued to be dismissed.

As rumors that the Shah might leave Iran increased, and particularly during the period between his actual departure on 16 January, which Moscow saw as the beginning of the "decisive phase" of the crisis, and the final neutralization of the military in February, the Soviets concentrated their efforts on warnings of an American-backed coup. Broadcasts in Persian alleged "U.S. officials are dragging matters to a military coup d'etat in Iran." Among the evidence cited was General Huyser's mission, designed "to instruct Iranian generals in how to combat popular demonstrations." An 8 February Persian language broadcast reiterated these charges, stated that the U.S. objective was to keep Iran as "a subservient agent implementing its commands."
Following Bakhtiar's resignation and the assumption of office of Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government on February 14, Moscow was among the first governments to extend congratulations and recognition. Chairman Kosygin's message expressed "readiness to maintain and develop relations between our two countries on the basis of the principles of equality, good-neighborliness, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." At the same time, the Soviet press was to continue its efforts to stress the dangers of American efforts to subvert Iran's revolution in following months.

3. Emphasis of Socio-economic Causes and Downplay of the Religious Aspects of the Revolt

Accompanying the Soviet Union's attempts to portray the Iranian revolution as an anti-imperialist struggle was a conscious effort to downplay the role of the religious factor and emphasize social causes as the principal reason for popular unrest. This was particularly true in the Soviet domestic press and broadcasts. In one of its first efforts at explaining the motivations for unrest in Iran in August 1978, Moscow noted that foreign analysts attributed the worsening situation to the sharpening of the religious-secular confrontation, but hastened to add that "clashes between secular authorities and the religious opposition are of course nothing new in Iran." Instead, a *New Times* article stated, the roots of the protests were "the serious economic and social difficulties Iran is experiencing."
Further commentaries carried this explanation forward. Izvestiya explained to its readers that Iran's revolution was caused by inflation, corruption, a shortage of medical personnel, and a lack of public services in the country. An October Russian radio broadcast further explained, "This crisis is caused by the growth in social inequality, the general corruption of the government bureaucracy and the unrestrainable inflation." 

Commenting on the role of the clergy in early November, Moscow conceded that "representatives of the Islamic clergy are taking part in the turbulent events in Iran," but voiced the opinion that "...it is not these opponents of the regime who are playing the main role in the anti-government demonstrations...the clergy's slogans were interwoven with the demands by millions of people for long-needed social, economic and political reforms..."

Another commentary evidenced deliberate distortion of the facts to de-emphasize the religious aspect of events in Iran.

There has been unrest in Iran for nearly a year now. Impetus was given to the mass disturbances by events last January in Qom, a major religious center, when prices for a series of articles and for accommodation and water tariffs were raised. Stirred up by the preaching of the Mullahs, tens of thousands of people went into the streets. This demonstration took place during the 16th anniversary of the adoption of the land reform law, which substantially affected the interests of the major priesthood. They wanted to use the broad masses' dissatisfaction for their own purposes. But events took on a different character. The priests' slogans...have been overwhelmed by the demands by millions of people to implement long-pressing socio-economic and political reforms..." (emphasis added).
Similarly, a Pravda article acknowledged the "religious coloration" of the demonstrations, but asserted that "the real reasons for the disturbances are the grim material situations of the broad people's masses, the dominance of foreign capital, bureaucracy and corruption in state establishments."374

Moscow persisted in this fashion even after the assumption of leadership of the opposition by the Ayatollah Khomeini was an established fact. In December, Isvestiya informed its readers that, "there is nothing surprising in the fact that the current movement has acquired religious overtones. In the absence of legal political parties and organizations, and with military and security organs dominant, the people can at times express their dissatisfaction only through religious organizations and congregate only in mosques."375 And, although the people's social complaints were often voiced "in a religious guise," Isvestiya asserted that religious leaders were really opposed to modernization, but had been forced to take account of the feelings of the masses, who were demanding widespread socio-economic reform.376

Another aspect of the Soviet effort to downplay religion was the lack of comment concerning Ayatollah Khomeini's role as the head of the opposition. Russian newspaper articles instead claimed that the National Front was "the country's prime political force," and grouped the religious, middle class and working elements, etc., under the title "other
opposition and religious organizations. Statements by Ayatollah Khomeini and other prominent religious leaders drew only brief mention.

Once the Shah had departed the country and Moscow sensed that the government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar and the Regency Council were not likely to endure, Moscow began to devote more attention to Khomeini and portrayed his efforts favorably. Moreover, Russian reports described the ulema as "Iranian patriots and supporters of economic and political independence." Additionally some details of Ayatollah Khomeini's plans for an Islamic Republic were set forth.

An interesting contrast to a previous commentaries was evident in a Pravda article on 24 January 1979, in which it was noted that "A specific feature of Iran is that a large proportion of its population is linked with the traditions of Shi'ism whose slogans are of an objectively progressive nature." Nevertheless, the article continued to stress social inequality, inflation, weapons purchases, and even regime links to Israel as the roots of the crisis.

The impending return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran left the Soviets with no alternative but to report his efforts to do so, and his eventual homecoming in February. The victory of the revolutionary forces was noted, and congratulations expressed, and on 25 February Vladimir Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador, visited the Ayatollah
to personally convey Moscow's congratulations.\textsuperscript{386} As subsequent events were to demonstrate, however, Moscow continued to have difficulties in the confusing weeks following the installation of Bazargan's Provisional government in attempting to understand and describe what was happening in Iran.\textsuperscript{387}

4. Prominence Accorded to the Tudeh Party Position

A final feature of the Soviet response to events in Iran was its attempt to promote the viewpoint of the Communist Iranian Tudeh Party (ITP). Initially, Moscow published brief Tudeh statements which expressed the party's support for the anti-Shah movement.\textsuperscript{388} In November, however, a lengthy interview with party leader Eskandari was published, in which the Tudeh view of events in Iran was defined.\textsuperscript{389} The statement noted that "there is no official cooperation" between the Tudeh and other opposition groups, and that the party was "merely participating in the same movement armed against the present regime."\textsuperscript{390}

By January 1979, Moscow had publicized the Tudeh's parroting of Soviet condemnation of U.S. interference in Iran's affairs,\textsuperscript{391} and a call for the "formation of a government of national unity capable of implementing freedoms, guaranteeing independence and ending the economic and social crisis in the country."\textsuperscript{392} On 23 January, the Tudeh Party endorsed the plan for the establishment of an Islamic Revolutionary Council,\textsuperscript{393} and Moscow broadcast that news to Iran.
Following an unexplained change in Party leadership, with Eskandari being replaced by Nureoddin Kianuri in February,\textsuperscript{394} the Tudeh called for "a national front of all anti-imperialist and democratic forces,"\textsuperscript{395} in which presumably the Tudeh would be able to participate. Subsequently, the Tudeh Central Committee congratulated the opposition on the installation of Bazargan's government, and the Soviets broadcast a party statement which reiterated support for the Provisional Government to Iran, and in which the Tudeh expressed the intention of resuming open political activities.\textsuperscript{396}

Thus, Moscow's approach to events in Iran derived from a combination of factors. First of all, Moscow's assessment and understanding of initial developments in 1978 was flawed; like other observers, the Kremlin leadership failed to perceive the rapidity with which events would overtake the Shah's regime. The Soviets were no more positive than the U.S., or even the Shah himself, as to the eventual outcome of the unrest. Accordingly, they proceeded cautiously, and avoided unnecessary and risky speculation and editorializing.

As the crisis deepened, there was a need to keep pace with events, and, at the same time, not to commit themselves to one side or the other too soon. The Kremlin thus adopted a "proper" neutral stance, stressing their own non-interference, and exploiting the decidedly more exposed American position of support for its ally.
Commentaries concerning the social, political and economic grievances of the opposition, based on statistics and quotes from foreign publications, and the Iranian government's own sources, were safe methods of evaluating the situation in Iran without criticizing the Shah directly. At the same time, prudence dictated de-emphasizing the fundamentalist Islamic overtones which the revolution quickly took on. The potential for "spill-over" involved both other regional countries, such as the "progressive" regimes of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union's Moslem republics.

Through this essentially conservative, and at the same time, opportunistic policy, the Kremlin obviously intended to safeguard its interests, while maintaining the best position possible for future dealings with whatever regime was to govern Iran. Despite these hopes, however, the Kremlin's policy did not completely achieve these goals.

One problem was that, in spite of Moscow's later claims that "the Soviet Union most emphatically supported the Iranian revolution," the Kremlin's "neutrality" and "non-interference" resulted in what was seen by the Shah's opponents as only a "tardy" endorsement of the movement to overthrow the Shah. An Iranian opposition spokesman observed that the Soviet Union...

...maintained excellent relations with the Shah's regime, but it is obvious that the Iranian people's movement very soon made it change its attitude and that it is trying to take advantage of the changes now taking place.
Moreover, the religious leadership specifically resented Moscow's treatment of the Islamic aspects of the revolt and the attempts to promote the Tudeh as the "spokesman" for the entire revolutionary movement, even though the party's role as a political organizer among the oil-workers in southern Iran may have been a crucial factor in the success of the anti-regime strikes. Nor did Soviet support of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations, which trained certain of the Fedayeen and Mujahadeen groups, win the Kremlin special recognition as a friend of the Islamic Republic. It soon became apparent that the nature of Moscow's future relationship with Iran's new government would depend on how successful both parties were at resolving differences on a number of specific issues.

B. ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

On the surface, relations between the Kremlin and the new Iranian leadership began on a cordial note. Moscow had quickly recognized Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Government in February, and Kosygin and Bazargan had exchanged greetings in March. Following Khomeini's proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Brezhnev sent a telegram of congratulations to Khomeini. Nevertheless, fundamentally divisive issues had emerged which could not be avoided.

1. The Continued Threat of Soviet Interference in Iran's Internal Affairs

Although much of the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the revolution was directed at the United States, it was also
clear that the fear of Soviet intervention in Iran's internal affairs is an on-going concern of Iranian foreign policy. This concern manifested itself almost immediately as the Bazargan government was installed, and it involves three issues.

a. The "Tudeh Card"

The first of these is Moscow's persistent support of the Tudeh Party. Although the Iranian Tudeh Party voiced its support for Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic after January 1979, most of Iran's leaders doubt its sincerity. In a January interview, Ebraheim Yazdi asserted that:

The Tudeh Party in particular is not a nationalist party, not to mention the applicability of the requirement of "faith" to it...the truth as we have known it in Iran is that this party has always moved according to the interests of the Soviet policy and not according to the Iranian national interests.

Nevertheless, the Tudeh mounted a campaign designed to win for itself a legitimate role in the Iranian political arena. The Party manifesto published in April 1979, after duly noting the revolution's accomplishments and Tudeh support for the Islamic Republic, set forth its program for a "people's unity front" consisting of "all the forces of the revolution...from the conservative partisans of Ayatollah Khomeini to the ITP and other forces of the revolutionary left..."

A second proposal was for the establishment of a "people's democratic army," or national guard, to be
composed of "all sincere national and patriotic forces, without any prejudices, without any discrimination and without any monopoly." The net effect of adoption of these proposals would have been not only a recognized political voice for the Tudeh, but a legally armed faction within the government composed of Tudeh and other Marxist groups.

In an April interview, Prime Minister Bazargan explained his attitude towards the Tudeh Party. He accused it of "playing a double game. That section of the left now claims to be favorable to the Iranian Government with a view to winning votes, but we know what they are after." In July 1979, the Tudeh announced several candidates, including Party Secretary Kianuri, for election to the Assembly.

For its part, Moscow publicized the Tudeh's viewpoints on the need to safeguard the revolution against imperialism, and the party's favorable reactions to the draft Constitution. Furthermore, the Soviets reacted strongly to an Iranian government crackdown against Tudeh activities in August 1979, including the banning of Mardom, the party newspaper.

Since that time, the USSR and Tudeh have been proclaiming a second and higher stage to the revolution. In a November interview, Kianuri declared

Indisputably a new stage of the revolution has started. Its two main aims are the liquidation of all manifestations of U.S. rule in Iran as well as a deepening of the class content of the revolution through drawing the mass of the people into a more active struggle against the big bourgeoisie.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF SOVIET-Etc(U)

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The Tudeh has continued to express its support for the major aims of Khomeini's policies, in the hopes of recognition of a broad popular front including both Khomeini and the ITP. Moreover, Kianuri has asserted that Iran's leadership recognizes that the U.S. is its enemy, and that the Soviet Union is a friend.

Although the actual strength of the Tudeh Party is difficult to assess, its importance in any future struggle for power in Iran cannot be overlooked. It claims to have established links with the oil workers and, as a result, possesses a potential economic and political strength not measureable in numbers alone. Furthermore, in line with the party platform, support has been voiced for granting "cultural and administrative autonomy" to all the national minorities, a step which would certainly accentuate existing separatist tendencies. In October 1979, Kianuri announced that the Tudeh intended to become active in Kurdestan, where it would supposedly back Kurdish demands for cultural autonomy and self-management.

Dealing with the Tudeh will be no easy matter for the Iranian leaders. The lifting of the ban against the party previously in force under the Shah's regime has undoubtedly facilitated its reassertiveness, although the government has demonstrated that it will curb what it perceives as excessive activities.

Of greater importance, however, would be the ability of Iran's leadership to deal with an overt threat by
the Tudeh and other leftist factions. Despite its professed support for the Islamic Republic, Tudeh backing is little more than a "marriage of convenience." Kianuri himself has repeatedly stressed the need for "combat readiness" to prevent a repetition of the repression of 1953. In February 1979, Kianuri noted the ready availability of arms in Iran for an armed struggle, while clandestine broadcasts to Iran from the USSR urged leftist forces to retain their weapons and noted that thousands of Iranian exiles were willing to return to "help" the revolution.

Iran's leadership would be hard-pressed to counter such a challenge, given the decimation of the country's armed forces. In April 1979, Prime Minister Bazargan noted that Iran's "armed forces have been greatly weakened both morally and materially" and observed that the communist groups were asserting that "all army and police officers are imperialist stooges and must be eliminated. In fact, the aim of their maneuvers is to secure the total disarming of the government." Not surprisingly, the Tudeh platform contains provisions for a purge of the army of all anti-national and corrupt elements, fundamental altering of the internal structure of the army, and cuts in the army budget and manpower.

Moscow obviously views the Tudeh in its traditional role as a representative and advocate of Soviet interests in Iran. Despite the fact that their support of the ITP is an
irritant to the Iranian leadership, the Soviets have apparently concluded that its potential value exceeds whatever damage might be done to Soviet-Iranian relations.

b. Exploitation of Autonomous Movements

A second aspect of the question of Soviet interference is centered on the problem of the autonomous separatist movements in Iran. Historically, demands for autonomy have occurred in Azerbaijan, Kurdestan, Baluchistan, Khuzistan and the Turcoman regions along the Caspian and adjacent to the Soviet Turcoman Republic. Of particular sensitivity has been the Kurdish issue, because of the distribution of the Kurd population astride the borders of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the USSR.

It will be recalled that the Soviet Union backed the establishment of "independent" republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdestan at the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, they had supported a Kurdish revolt in the early 1960's, both as a lever to apply pressure on the Iraqi government, and because they realized that an autonomous Kurdestan had potential anti-CENTO implications.425

Following the improvement of relations with Iran, and in conjunction with a move to improve ties with the Ba'athist regime after its 1968 takeover in Iraq, the Soviets had attempted to disassociate themselves from the Kurdish military struggle for autonomy, and sought to promote a political solution to the problem. Following the conclusion of an agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds in 1970, Moscow
claimed it had "helped to clear the atmosphere with the aim of encouraging dialogue and furthered the attainment of results necessary to insure Arab and Kurd national interests." The Soviets encouraged both sides to move towards the establishment of an autonomous Kurdestan, citing their own "experience of building their state" through "the just solution of the nationalities issue."

During 1974, elements of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) continued their military struggle against Baghdad, largely with the support of Iran. The Soviets, rather than risk their now substantial ties with Iraq, abandoned the Kurds and supported Baghdad's efforts to solve the issue. In 1975, Iran and Iraq reached an agreement by which Iran agreed to terminate its support to the Kurds in exchange for recognition of Iranian demands concerning the Irano-Iraqi border. Without this support, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq collapsed.

In Iran, the strength of the central government and the military under the Shah had generally kept Kurdish and other separatist tendencies in check. With the overthrow of the regime in 1979, however, and the resultant weakening of political and military authority in these provinces, renewed demands for autonomy immediately arose. Unrest first broke out in January 1979 among rival Kurdish tribes, quickly involved Iranian army units, and spread to Khuzistan, Mazanderan and Baluchistan.
Although there was little conclusive proof of Soviet involvement, the timing of these new demands prompted speculation that Moscow might somehow be involved. There were unconfirmed reports of arms being transported south across the Soviet-Iranian border into Kurdestan, the direct involvement of Soviet Turcomans in the fighting, and indirect interference in Baluchistan. Moscow immediately responded to these allegations. Pravda labeled such reports "lies" and "slander", charging in turn that...

...it is characteristic that the enemies of the revolution, the forces that bear direct responsibilities for the systematic suppression in the recent past of lawful democratic and national aspirations of various peoples of Iran--SAVAK agents, former officials of the state apparatus, officers of the Shah's army, courtiers, CIA agents and other reactionaries--now try to aggravate problems in establishing new life, to raise friction among nationalities and religious strife to an explosion, to stir up separatist attitudes.

Similarly, New Times found that "agents of the CIA and the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, as well as former informers of the Shah's secret police, SAVAK, are concentrating their counter-revolutionary machinations."

Further charges of Soviet interference, however, continued to appear. In May, a Tehran magazine asserted that "relations between Iran and the Soviet Union are based on fear" and that "the Soviet Union is perpetuating the policy of Peter the Great, and is awaiting the moment when Iran will fall like rotten fruit under its feet." In July and August, there were also reports of the capture of Soviet weapons in Khuzestan.
The collapse of negotiations between the Iranian government and several Kurdish groups in July and August 1979 led to renewed clashes and threatened to again spread to Khuzestan. This resulted in renewed charges of Soviet interference. On 31 August, Ayatollah Teleghani accused the Soviet Union of helping the Kurdish insurgents, while Khomeini asserted that "we are not facing a Kurdish question; we are up against a Communist question aimed...at the destruction of Islam."\(^4\)

On 2 September, government spokesman Sadegh Tabatabai spoke of "conclusive evidence of superpower involvement" and claimed that "several thousands of Soviet-made AK 47 Kalashnikov rifles had been smuggled into Iran via Bulgaria."\(^{440}\) Tass on September 4 denied these allegations, and, in an obvious reference to Khomeini himself, the Soviet press attacked the "religious fanatics" who were running Iran's paralyzed government.\(^{441}\) Furthermore, Moscow charged that the Kurds and other ethnic minorities "are being executed and the Shi'ite religion (a Moslem sect headed in Iran by Khomeini) is being forced on them."\(^{442}\)

The Kurdish situation is clearly problematic for the Soviet Union. In the first place, largely because of past attempts to manipulate the issue for its own benefit, renewed unrest during a time of apparent disorganization and weakness in Tehran immediately made Moscow the target of suspicion. At the same time, the issue of Kurdish separatism
has implications for larger Soviet interests, in that it has again "spilled over" into Irano-Iraqi relations and, in fact, has become a kind of "surrogate war" between Khomeini and President Saddam Husayn. In response to the Ayatollah's instigation of Iraqi Shi'ite and Kurdish activity against the Sunni Iraqi regime in early 1979, Baghdad retaliated by lending its support to Iranian Kurdish unrest.

The eruption of new fighting in early 1980 led to border clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces. In April, an Iranian-backed assassination attempt against an Iraqi deputy minister accelerated the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Iran threatened war, while the Iraqis demanded renegotiation of the 1975 Irano-Iraqi Treaty, and Iranian withdrawal from the Gulf islands it occupied in 1971.

The Kremlin, whatever its long term plans for a Kurdestan might be, clearly perceives its more immediate interest as having good relations with both Iran and Iraq. Furthermore, the Soviets are aware that stirring up Kurdish unrest might adversely affect relations with Turkey, which also has a significant Kurdish minority. Moscow therefore quickly conveyed its concern that the confrontation between Iran and Iraq was getting out of hand. A broadcast to Iran cautioned:

If Iran and Iraq lose control of this situation and allow the tension of the situation to intensify, it could be greatly detrimental to both countries, especially under present conditions when U.S. imperialism...
is stationing military forces in the Persian Gulf region, and is threatening to resort to military intervention in Iran and to intervene in the affairs of other oil-producing countries like Iraq. At present, Moscow's position, echoed by the Tudeh, is to support greater Kurdish autonomy within a united Iran. However, should future developments in Iran not meet with Soviet satisfaction, Moscow has the demonstrated ability to exploit the Kurdish issue, as well as the cause of Arab minorities in Iranian oil areas.

c. The 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty

A final concern involved in the threat of Soviet interference is Moscow's continued reference to the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty. It is Article 6 which still causes the greatest amount of controversy, in that it reserved to the Soviet Union "the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense," if the Soviets perceived a threat to the security of the USSR.

Brezhnev's November 1978 warning to the U.S. "that any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran - a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union - would be regarded by the USSR as a matter affecting its security interest," although it did not specifically mention the Treaty, was a clear inference to it. In January 1979, lest any doubt remain, Izvestiya linked the two, describing the treaty as "operative even now."
Since that time, Moscow has repeatedly sought to remind Iran that it considers the treaty a valid basis for the Soviet-Iranian relationship. In February 1979, a broadcast in Persian to Iran stated that the treaty...

...was the first equal rights treaty that Iran signed with a big power based on Leninist principles of non-interference in affairs of others. As you are aware, the Soviet Union has consistently followed Lenin's policy of good-neighborly relations and cooperation with Iran. The Soviet-Iran treaty signed in 1921, the anniversary of which is now occurring, is a clear example of this policy.

Similarly, an August newspaper article asserted that "Articles 5 and 6 guaranteed the security and integrity of both sides" and constituted a "serious warning to world reaction which has on several occasions encroached upon Iran." Despite the fact that Iran's Revolutionary Council abrogated Articles 5 and 6 in January 1980, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a February 1980 Moscow broadcast in Persian declared that the policy of "equality of rights, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in one another's affairs, and the principles of peace, cooperation and good neighborliness...set during the first years of Soviet rule, is manifested in the 1921 Soviet-Iranian agreement."

It can be of little comfort to the present Iranian government that the Kremlin resurfaced the treaty under the pretext of defending Iran's independence. Nor can they afford to ignore the fact that Soviet coverage of developments in Iran has increasingly sought to depict a situation comparable
to the one purported to have prompted Soviet "assistance" to Afghanistan: that is, one in which a revolutionary regime on the border of the Soviet Union is being threatened by the United States. Indeed, in March 1980, an Iranian commentary noted that the Soviet Union had "lost much of its reputation after its invasion of Afghanistan, and will lose the rest if it stands against Iran."460

2. Afghanistan

Pleasantries had barely been exchanged between Moscow and Iran's new regime in 1979 when it became apparent that Tehran considered Soviet activity in Afghanistan an issue for Soviet-Iranian relations. Although there are no indications that the Kremlin was directly involved in the April 1978 coup, the Soviets had immediately recognized the regime of Nur Mohammed Taraki, who proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Moscow's satisfaction with the new government's pronounced progressive tendencies was evident. In May, Izvestiya declared that "the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is undergoing profound democratic transformations that have never been seen before in this country throughout its ancient history."463

By the summer of 1978, Moscow and Kabul had concluded more than twenty-five agreements covering trade, oil and gas projects, and government affairs. Furthermore, the Soviets assisted Taraki "in what became the transformation of a neutral buffer state into a Soviet satellite."465 This
process included the signature, on 5 December 1978, of a twenty year treaty of friendship and cooperation.\textsuperscript{466}

The stability of the Taraki regime however, was faced with two challenges. The first of these was an internal struggle between the Communist Parcham and Khalq factions within Taraki's People's Democratic Party. This resulted in a purge of the Parcham group, and relegation of its leader Babrak Karmal to de-facto exile as ambassador of Czechoslovakia, while the Khalquists (the faction to which Taraki belonged) consolidated their control, with Hafizullah Amin becoming Prime Minister and second-in-command.\textsuperscript{467} As a result of the purge, the Afghan bureaucracy, military and economy were nearly crippled, and Moscow responded by dispatching Soviet civilian technicians to run various ministries.\textsuperscript{468}

The second challenge was the development, in late 1978, of an anti-regime insurgency centered primarily among Afghanistan's tribes. As the Taraki regime's policies and the growing Soviet presence continued to alienate the population, the rebel movement gathered momentum. In March 1979, rebel forces temporarily overran Herat, with the resultant deaths of between 60-100 Russian advisors.\textsuperscript{469}

The Afghan regime and Moscow immediately implicated Iran, Pakistan, the PRC and the U.S. An Afghan declaration alleged that "nearly 10 weeks ago 7,000 soldiers were sent from Iran to Afghanistan on the pretext of repatriating
Afghan nationals. These soldiers settled in and around Herat and created anti-government disturbances.470

Reacting to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari's 16 March 1979 statement, which urged Moslems around the world to rally to the support of the Afghan Moslems who were suffering the worst medieval tortures, a Moscow broadcast in Persian charged that Iran's intent was to "destabilize the conference of the people toward the revolution of the Afghan masses."471

In further commentary, Pravda denounced such statements as inflammatory, while another broadcast inferred that Iranian and Pakistani support of an Afghan counter-revolution would only serve the PRC's "notorious aims of hegemonism and direct servility to the West." All of the charges were denied by Iran.472

Nevertheless, it was clear that Iran's leadership was not prepared to ignore the Soviet role in the persecution of Moslems in Afghanistan. Ayatollah Khomeini told a group of Soviet journalists that the Soviet Union "should not allow the Government of Afghanistan to deal harshly with the Muslims of that country and with the Islamic personalities and thinkers of Afghanistan...It is in the best interests of the USSR and Afghanistan to let the nation of Afghanistan live in peace within the framework of Islamic principles."474 In June, Iran attacked the Soviets for attempting "to force the Indian Government to militarily assist the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan."475
As the rebellion in Afghanistan intensified in mid-1979, the Afghan army began to suffer from increasing defections, casualties among the approximately 1,000 Soviet advisors began to climb, and Taraki's regime grew more unstable. By August, with the rebellion having spread to virtually every one of Afghanistan's 28 provinces, the Soviets apparently attempted to take some steps to moderate the situation. It was reported, for example, that Noor Ahmad Etemade, the Prime Minister under the monarchy, had been taken from prison for talks with Soviet representatives. Moreover, Moscow dispatched Deputy Defense Minister and Commander of Soviet Ground Forces Pavlovsky to Afghanistan to evaluate the situation.

According to one source, Pavlovsky determined "that the Afghans could no longer control the situation and that an effort should be made to appease the opposition by slowing down the revolution and getting rid of its most visible symbol - Hafizullah Amin." Nevertheless, Amin pre-empted this plan and Taraki was killed. Although the Soviets continued aid to the new Afghan regime, the insurgency continued to accelerate in November and December, as Amin disregarded Moscow's advice to moderate his policies and broaden his political base. By year's end, it was apparent that no amount of aid would be sufficient to contain the rebellion, and that more direct action was necessary to install a more controllable regime.
The Soviets attempted to defuse the impact of their December invasion of Afghanistan, following yet another attempt to assassinate Amin, by claiming they had merely met an Afghan request for aid "including military aid which the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly requested from the Government of the Soviet Union." 

Anticipating a strong reaction from the Moslem world, the Kremlin sought to conjure up an external imperialist threat to Afghanistan and other regional Islamic governments. 

Pravda asserted that

There is no need for special insight to be able to see through the motives of the United States' actions. There are figures in Washington who persistently look for replacements for the positions that were lost as a result of the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran. Cracks appeared in the notorious 'strategic arc' that Americans have been building for decades close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union, and in order to mend these cracks, it was sought to bring to heel the Afghan people and also peoples of other countries of the region...

Another article claimed that Washington had instigated and directed the aggressive actions of the anti-Afghan forces, carried out increasingly flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and deliberately brought tension to a fever pitch.

With regard to Iran, Moscow endeavored to reaffirm its good will, disavow any expansionist aims in the region, and focus Tehran's attention on the U.S. threat to Iran, particularly over the ongoing hostage question. Pravda printed a statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko alleging that "Washington decided as if to forget about the question
of the U.S. hostages in Tehran to attempt to divert the attention of the Iranians from U.S. gross threats and pressures including that of concentrating its naval forces near the Iranian shores."\textsuperscript{485}

Nevertheless, in line with its previous statements on Soviet pressures in Afghanistan, Iran rejected Moscow's claims. An official statement to that affect was issued on 29 December 1979. Subsequently, Khomeini reportedly told the Soviet Ambassador to Iran that "Brezhnev was stepping into the Shah's shoes and was heading for the same catastrophe that befell the ex-dictator. He said that the Soviets would come to grief if they remained in Afghanistan."\textsuperscript{486} Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh asserted that "we cannot tolerate this intervention, which we consider a threat to our vital interests." Furthermore, he announced that Iran would help the Afghans, possibly through aid to the Afghan mujahedin (guerilla) organization.\textsuperscript{487} \textit{Ettela'at} termed the invasion of Afghanistan a danger to the "security of Iran's Baluchestan va Sistan Province," and Iran joined in the February 1980 Islamic Conference's condemnation of the invasion.\textsuperscript{488}

While the Kremlin did not respond directly to Iran's statements of intent to aid the Afghan insurgents, there are grounds to believe that other forms of pressure to deter such action were being undertaken by Moscow. In early February, Washington reported "unusual" Soviet military activity to the north of Iran, reports quickly rejected by Tass as a lie.
designed "to distract the attention of Iranians from the real...threat coming from the American armada." A spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, opined that the Soviet troop movements in the republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan "are for the purpose of putting pressure on Iran to refrain from insisting the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the soil of Afghanistan."

Iran has nonetheless continued to voice its objections to Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and will undoubtedly continue to do so. Moscow has generally tended to ignore statements by Khomeini and other religious leaders, probably so as not to further antagonize Islamic opposition. Meanwhile, Tass reacted strongly to statements by President Bani-sadr, including a demand that the Russian Government "make a statement without any condition or pretext and leave Afghanistan speedily. There is no need for any negotiations."

For Iran's leadership, the lesson of the invasion of Afghanistan must be that the Soviet Union has the capability, and, given what Moscow sees as just cause, the will to re-enact the Afghan scenario elsewhere.

3. Religion

A related issue which was raised by the Islamic fundamentalist aspect of the Iranian Revolution, and one which Soviet action in Afghanistan further complicated, is that of religion. It is an issue that clearly has the Kremlin's leadership on the defensive, both with regard to
its impact within the Soviet Union, and in Moscow's relations with the Moslem world.

Soviet policy towards its own Moslem population and the persistence of religious feelings has always been ambiguous. In her study of religion and nationalities in the USSR, Helen Carrere d'Encausse observed,

> At times, Moscow boasts loudly about this phenomenon as tangible proof of its democratic attitude toward all religious beliefs. At other times the Soviets grow quite uneasy about religious sentiment, and then the organs specializing in antireligious propaganda are mobilized.\(^4\)

In its early dealings with Moslem populations, not only did the Soviets stress the latter aspect, but they overtly repressed religion. This was true of Islam in particular because of its claim to being a community, with its own juridicial, legal and financial institutions, which transcended national boundaries.\(^4\) Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia had 26,000 mosques and 45,000 officiating mullahs, imams and muezzins to serve 18 million Muslims. Between 1928 and 1933 alone, over 10,000 mosques, 14,000 Muslim elementary schools and 500 madresehs were closed down. By 1979, as a result of the repressive policies of the 1920's/1930's and subsequent discouragement of religious practice, there were approximately only 200 mosques and fewer than 3,000 working clerics to administer to approximately 45-50 million Soviet Moslems. Shi'ites comprise some 3.2 million, or roughly 6 percent of the total Moslem population.\(^4\)
World War II and Khrushchev's attempts to build Moscow's influence in the Middle East in the 1950's and 1960's had the general effect of restraining Moscow's use of direct pressure on the nationalities. In recent years, although the use of pressure has been present in subtler forms, such as in only infrequent and limited publications of the Koran, the Soviet Union has increasingly sought to portray to the outside world the rights and freedoms its Islamic peoples enjoy.

For the Kremlin, the religious dimension of the Iranian revolution compounded on-going concerns over how to deal with its own Moslem populations. In the first place, it is obvious, Soviet assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the appeal of Islam is not slowly dying out in the USSR. According to one study, in fact,

...everything suggests that Islam in the USSR is undergoing a rebirth among new conditions, and that this renaissance is being aided and guided by the Moslem hierarchy, which is directing its efforts to two particular areas: facilitating the practice of Islam by adapting it to the needs of modern life, and giving it temporal power by uniting it with Soviet ideology.

It is possible to find evidence of this even in Soviet sources. An August 1979 article by the head of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation decried the "tenacity of religious ceremonies and holidays," while another article described the growing practice of "underground Islam" and worship services held in "home mosques." The writer complained that
"the prevalence of this form of religiosity...makes atheistic upbringing very difficult."497

These difficulties are further complicated by the relation of religion to the nationality problem in the USSR. Islam is a social bond as well as a religious one. Because of socio-cultural conditions largely rooted in Islam,498 the Moslem national groups of the USSR have resisted Soviet attempts to eliminate national differences through "Russification." These nationalities tend to marry among themselves and cling to their native tongues. And although recent efforts have been undertaken to make the military an instrument of national integration,499 the Soviet political and military structure continues to be dominated by Russians.

Another factor is geography, which has placed many of these national groups astride borders with other countries. The Azeris, for example, are separated by the Soviet-Iranian border, with approximately 11 million living in Iran, and 4-5 million in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. "It is obvious," a Kommunist journal editor said, "that we follow developments in Iran with interest and anxiety."500

The second problem faced by the Soviets was that Iran's new leadership, especially the religious leaders like Khomeini, had made it clear from the beginning that they considered Moscow's attitude towards Islam an important factor in the future of Irano-Soviet relations. In January 1979, Khomeini's spokesman Sadegh Qotzbzadeh told a news
conference that a Khomeini-inspired government would press its views among Soviet Moslems. Qotzbazdeh asserted that, "We intend to propagate the depth and dimensions of our movement...We have the same right to propagate our views as the Soviets have for their ideology."\footnote{501}

Khomeini himself stressed the importance of Soviet domestic policy towards religion. In April 1979, he told visiting Soviet correspondents, "we expect the USSR to show greater respect for the religion of the 45 million Muslims of that country and to allow them greater freedom."\footnote{502} He had previously rejected the Soviet Union's claim of support for liberation movements on the basis that the Soviet Union denied freedom of religion to the Islamic peoples of the USSR.\footnote{503} Just as the Carter Administration's advocacy of human rights had become an issue in Soviet-American relations, Iran now seemed determined, with even greater fervor, to stress Islamic rights in its dealings with Moscow. And the governments of other Islamic states might follow suit.

Thus, the Kremlin had adequate reason for concern over the development of a highly nationalistic, religiously-oriented revolution in Iran. Moscow's leaders fully realized that heightened religious and national consciousness was not merely an Iranian phenomenon. The size of the Soviet Moslem population, its demographic dynamism and its geographic position along the edge of a world where the Soviet Union is directly competing with the West; all of these contribute to
Moscow's uneasiness. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan betrayed this apprehension when he bemoaned "the persistence and influence of Islam and denounced 'the centers of foreign lies which are issuing frantic propaganda in favor of nationalism and pan-Islamism...'."

Moscow's response to these developments was to re-emphasize its ongoing campaign of stressing the existence of religious freedom in the USSR. Additionally, attempts have been made to further the argument that Marxism and Islam are not totally incompatible; and, in fact, that the Soviet Union is the "best friend" of the Islamic countries.

In its broadcasts to these countries, Radio Moscow has tried to convince its listeners that Moslems in the Soviet Union are indeed well off. A March 1979 broadcast to Iran typifies the Soviet approach:

The Soviet constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to choose any religion or not to follow any religion...Religion is not taught in Soviet schools, but parents are free to acquaint their children with any religion. Government officials do not interfere in the work of purely religious organizations.

A second technique has been to publicize evidence of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet government has permitted only 20-25 Moslems per year to make the pilgrimage to Mecca in the past, Radio Moscow and other media directed at the Islamic nations point out that Soviet Moslems are able to travel abroad to maintain contact with their co-religionists. In a January 1979 Persian broadcast,
one Soviet Moslem cleric, who had just returned from the Middle East, declared that he was thanked for "the timeless support that the Soviet Union has given to the wishes of the Arabs." 506

Visits of foreign Moslems are also widely publicized. The imam of the Mosque of Aden, after a visit to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, noted that "Soviet mosques are full of praying people. This clearly and categorically proves that the Soviet Government permits freedom of religion." 507

A September radio broadcast in Arabic related the news of a Moslem newspaper conference in Tashkent, attended by "men of religion from the Soviet Union and leading Islamic theologians and correspondents of Islamic papers and magazines from 12 countries." 508 In November 1979, Iranian clerics were invited to visit Soviet Transcaucasia by Moslem clergy-men; the Soviet government also requested permission for a group of clergy from Caucasus, Moscow, Leningrad and Central Asia to visit Iran during the month of Moharram. 509

Continued efforts along these lines include an Islamic exhibit in Moscow in January 1980, reported increased expenditures for the restoration of Islamic monuments in Kazakhstan, and the announcement of an international Islamic conference in Tashkent scheduled for September 1980. 510

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the spectacle of Soviet troops directly engaged in the suppression of an anti-Marxist, pro-Moslem rebellion complicated Moscow's
task of convincing the Islamic states that the Soviet Union was their "best friend." There is no doubt that the religious aspect of this rebellion and the prospect of the establishment of another "Islamic Republic" was a consideration in the Kremlin's decision to intervene. The overthrow of a pro-American Shah in Iran by a religiously-oriented rebellion was one thing; the overthrow of a Marxist-oriented regime in Afghanistan, especially by a religiously-oriented movement, was something quite different.

The Kremlin thus made a special effort to portray their action in Afghanistan as an anti-imperialist move. Foreign Minister Gromyko asserted:

It is rather difficult for Washington to make the Muslim world believe in imperialist's good intentions with regard to the Islamic world and to make Muslim states believe in yarns about the Soviet Union's ill designs concerning Islam and Muslim countries...Each person who objectively appraises the developments in the world and policies of states see that the Soviet Union is a true friend of the Arabs, a true friend of all Islamic peoples.

A Pravda article further claimed that "the facts indicate that it is not the Soviet Union but American imperialism that, having decided earlier on a course aimed at exacerbating the international situation, has now taken advantage of the events in Afghanistan and is moving towards the undermining of detente and toward confrontation in the context of an arms buildup."

If the position adopted by Iran and other Islamic countries is any indication, Moscow, despite its exertions,
faces an uphill struggle to impress the Moslem world of its healthy attitude towards Islam and of its friendship. An Iranian cleric, returning from an Islamic conference in the USSR observed,

What is clearly felt is that the relationship of Muslims with the Soviet government cannot be isolated from the relations of the latter with Islamic nations of the world.513

4. Iran's Non-Alignment

A potential issue for Moscow's relations with Tehran is the nature of Iran's future non-alignment. In March 1979, Iran formally announced that it was withdrawing from CENTO. Furthermore, the Iranian leadership committed the country to a policy of non-alignment.514 Prime Minister Bazargan subsequently announced that Iran would no longer play the "role of a gendarme" in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and that any projects connected with that role would be terminated.515

Predictably, the Soviet Union praised these developments. Isvestiya observed that "the events in Iran have shaken the military-economic structure which the United States had been erecting for decades in the Persian Gulf region."516 Moscow Radio cited Iran's actions as symbolic of Iran's becoming a country which was "truly independent" by virtue of its having "pulled out of the imperialist game," while it condemned U.S. policy for attempting "to resurrect the same policy of blocs in the Near East and Indian Ocean."517
Although Moscow views the reduction of American influence and the demise of Iran's military role in the region as steps in the right direction, the Kremlin may not be completely satisfied with a truly neutral Iran. If that is so, the Kremlin leaders may decide to try to pressure Iranian leaders into joining the Soviet-proposed Asian Security plan, an attempt that is sure to provoke Iran's resistance.

Leonid Brezhnev first proposed such a system in 1969, although it was not until 1972 that any substantial details concerning the concept came forth. In April 1972, Brezhnev asserted that:

Collective security in Asia must, in our view, be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, noninterference in internal affairs and the broad development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.

One aspect of the concept which was not fully explained was that, in such an organization, an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all, requiring joint action against the attacker.

The Soviet proposals had three unstated goals:

- the neutralization/isolation of the PRC, which could be accomplished by inclusion of China in the scheme, in which case Beijing would be forced to recognize the political and territorial status-quo in Asia. It could also be realized by China's exclusion, in which case she would effectively be isolated from other Asian countries which joined.
the elimination of American military presence in the Indian Ocean region would be realized by the adherence of countries like Pakistan and Iran to the arrangement, and by a Soviet-American agreement on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Negotiations between the United States and the USSR on this subject were begun in 1977, but collapsed in 1978 amidst the Soviet/Cuban venture in the Horn of Africa.522

- the reduction of the potential for regional conflicts, which would result from each member's tacit recognition of the status quo with regard to borders, etc., and from the mutual security aspects of the arrangement.

Moscow, however, was singularly unsuccessful in persuading countries to endorse the proposal, with the exception of Outer Mongolia, which approved the concept in 1970.

In 1973, the Soviets attempted to convince the Shah that Iran should leave CENTO and join an Asian collective security arrangement. Although the Shah initially displayed some interest in the proposal, nothing further came of it.523

The only significant development concerning the idea in the decade since it was first proposed occurred in 1978, when Afghanistan concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR which included a mutual commitment to promote "the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent."524

In April 1979, Moscow again called attention to its belief in the need for an Asian security arrangement. An editorial in New Times stated, "The USSR views with understanding the idea, as advanced by the countries of the region,

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that their homeland should be made a zone of peace...To realize this idea, a collective quest for constructive measures that would guarantee security, as well as concerted action by the countries concerned, is needed.\textsuperscript{525} And the Kremlin's voice in Iran, the Tudeh, has included the proposal in its platform.\textsuperscript{526}

Whether or not such a proposal, and Iran's overall attitude towards non-alignment becomes an issue for Soviet-Iranian relations depends on how seriously Moscow pursues the subject. The Kremlin's on-going anti-U.S. propaganda campaign demonstrates Soviet interest in driving a more permanent wedge between Tehran and Washington, and the inclusion of the Asian security proposal in the Treaty with Afghanistan is evidence that the Kremlin has not abandoned the idea of a collective security arrangement by which U.S. influence in the region would ultimately be eliminated and the Soviet Union would become a "manager" of Indian Ocean and Asian affairs.

5. \textbf{Energy Matters}

A final area of contention between Moscow and Iran's new leadership has been the re-negotiation of agreements concluded between the Shah and the Kremlin on the sale of Iranian natural gas and oil to the Soviet Union.

Iran began exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union in October 1970, as the result of the economic and technical agreement which was signed in 1966.\textsuperscript{527} Between 1970 and 1978,
Iran sold approximately 70 billion cubic meters of gas to the USSR, in return for Soviet financial and technical assistance in construction of a steel mill, pipeline, and industrial goods. Moscow, in turn, sold gas to its Eastern bloc partners, as well as to Austria, earning much-needed hard currency. Additionally, beginning in 1973, the Soviets began purchasing about 2 MMT of Iranian oil per year.

In December 1977, the two countries signed a trade protocol under which Iranian gas or oil would have been bartered for Russian-built machine tool parts. This plan, however, was soon overtaken by the events of 1978.

As a result of a series of strikes in Iran, the supply of gas from Iran to Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia ceased at the end of October 1978. Furthermore, striking workers refused to continue work on the Igat-2 pipeline, which, when completed, would provide gas to West Germany and France. The gas stoppage had an immediate impact in the Soviet republics, which relied on Iranian gas for approximately 60 percent of their industrial and domestic (home heating) purposes. Additionally, the Soviets were unable to meet their commitments to Eastern Europe (a 40 percent shortage), and lost needed revenues.

One of the first acts of the new government in Iran in February 1979 was to announce that it was going to review all prior economic agreements with foreign countries to
determine which might need to be re-negotiated. The energy agreements with the USSR did not escape attention. A Radio Tehran editorial noted "if we are faced with a situation whereby one takes delivery of Iranian gas at the border, and then without any effort, sells it there and then at three times the amount one paid for it, then this is a clearcut case of swindle, even if one is the USSR." Moscow protested, noting that "the fact that the price of gas continues to increase and is now three times what it was at the beginning, while at the same time the price of Soviet machinery and industrial goods has remained almost unchanged, proves that the export of gas to the Soviet Union was profitable for Iran." 

Although the export of gas to the USSR resumed in April 1979, Iran declared its intention to re-negotiate the agreement. By the end of April, exports to the USSR reached approximately 17 million cubic meters per day, and 20 MCM per day in May. Meanwhile, negotiations were begun in May on the terms of a new agreement. The Iranian ambassador to Moscow announced that work was progressing on the Igat-2 pipeline and that a third gas line, which would provide natural gas to Soviet Turkmenistan, Tadzhikstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was still being planned. Shortly thereafter, however, negotiations reached a standstill and Iran announced that it was going to break the contract for the only partially-completed Igat-2 pipeline. It soon became
apparent that Tehran was prepared to use its exports of natural gas to the USSR as a lever to persuade Moscow to meet Iran's price demands. Negotiations continued intermittently, with no real progress. In February 1980, the Iranian oil minister announced that gas exports to the Soviet Union, having risen to 27 million cubic meters per day, were being cut "due to domestic need." On 23 February, it was announced that Iran had unilaterally raised the price of export gas to the USSR.\textsuperscript{538}

In early March a new round of negotiations was begun, but broke down. Iran thereupon terminated gas and oil exports to the USSR. The Iranian minister of oil, Ali Mo'informar claimed that "we can easily forget our income from gas exports and compensate for the loss by increasing the price of our crude oil exports by less than 50 cents per barrel."\textsuperscript{539}

In mid-April, a Soviet delegation arrived in Tehran, and one report noted the possibility that its purpose was to propose an arrangement with the USSR and Eastern bloc countries to circumvent application of U.S. economic sanctions. Oil minister Mo'informar later confirmed that a delegation had arrived to discuss the gas export situation and also stated that Iran was negotiating increased oil deliveries with several socialist bloc countries.\textsuperscript{540} In an interview at the end of April, Mo'informar claimed to have found "other customers," including some Eastern European countries, for its oil.\textsuperscript{541}
While Iran has constantly asserted its ability to withstand any economic sanctions, it is obvious that whatever capacity it has is not without limitations. Iran's leaders are not likely to back down too far off their price demands for gas; one reason is that oil production is approximately only one-third to one-half of what it was under the Shah, and higher prices for both gas and oil are necessary to offset some of that difference.  

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, is obviously attempting to take advantage of the state of U.S.-Iranian relations to further develop Iranian ties with the Eastern bloc. It should also be noted that Iranian oil and gas agreements with East Europe could considerably ease Moscow's burden in supplying CEMA demands for energy. Under these circumstances, some compromise on pricing would seem logical, and would serve the interests of both Tehran and Moscow.

The future course of Soviet-Iranian relations is, at this point, uncertain. The manner in which the issues discussed above are resolved will be important to the eventual outcome. Compromise may be possible in some areas; in others, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither Iran nor the USSR is likely to abandon its position regarding Soviet presence there.

It seems likely that how the issues are eventually resolved is highly dependent on two factors. Much depends on Iran's own internal political situation in the months to
come. Iran has been without a strong central government for over a year; indeed, given the confused state of the Pahlavi Dynasty's last months, eighteen months is probably a more accurate figure. The country's past experience under these circumstances, as was discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis, does not lead to an optimistic forecast for Iran in its present condition. Indeed, despite all that has already taken place, the truly critical stage is yet to come. The passing of the Ayatollah Khomeini from the Iranian scene—a development which is certain even in his case—will undoubtedly set off a struggle for power among the various factions within the country—the secular leaders, militant religious elements, leftists, Tudeh, etc. Civil strife is again likely. If the Soviets do indeed intend to "play the Tudeh card," such a development would probably present their best opportunity to do so.

The second factor is whether the Soviets succeed or fail in their efforts to maintain their puppet Afghan regime in power. If they are successful, the Kremlin's leaders may decide to press their advantage and attempt to pressure Iran, and Pakistan, into cooperating with their regional policies. Given a Soviet failure in Afghanistan, or even a protracted involvement requiring a greater investment of time, resources and manpower, conditions would be much less favorable for doing so. In either case, Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to divorce its intervention in
Afghanistan from its relations with Iran, other regional countries, the Islamic world and the world-at-large. The "spill-over" of Soviet actions in Afghanistan into Iranian-Soviet relations, in the long term, will be unavoidable, and may be a significant factor in defining Iran's future relationship vis-a-vis Moscow and Washington.
CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES


322 Of course, in the case of the Soviet Union, the "division" between the government and the media is artificial. As Ronald Hilton has noted,

The press and scholarship are not viewed in the Soviet Union as having the verification and analysis of facts as their primary objective. The market place of ideas does not exist. The press is an important cog in a propaganda machine, the aim of which is to promote the cause of Muscovite communism...


324 FBIS, 11 April 1978, p. F6. (USSR). Review of 80 issues of FBIS covering the months of January to April 1978 yields fewer than 10 translated Soviet reports concerning Iran, of which one concerned the Shah's arms purchases (7 February 1978, p. F4); four described Soviet-Iranian talks concerning the trans-Iranian gas pipeline (13 and 17 April 1978); one described joint cooperation on Caspian Sea problems; and two concerned the protests (11 and 13 April 1978).


TASS carried reports of the imposition of the curfew in Esfahan, protests over housing, and casualties from clashes with police on 11-13 August. FBIS, 15-17 August 1978. FBIS, 10 August 1978, p. F1. A report of the Abadan theatre fire was broadcast to Iran in Persian, citing Iranian and foreign press sources, but refrained from attempting to fix blame. FBIS, 28 August 1978, p. F2.


338 One commentary noted, for example, agrarian reform, women's rights, and the drive against illiteracy and disease undertaken by the regime, even though it saw them as being poorly carried out. FBIS, 3 October 1978, 1978, p. A3; FBIS, 1 November 1978, p. F11.


342 A 6 December Isvestiya article, noting Washington's attitude towards providing some assistance for the Shah, rejoiced, "It wants to (and this includes direct military intervention), but at the same time it is wary. Washington cannot fail to take into account a number of circumstances. Above all L.I. Brezhnev's reply to the Pravda correspondent's question has had a due effect." FBIS, 8 December 1978, pp. F1-2. This article was also broadcast to Iran in Persian. FBIS, 14 December 1978, pp. F9-10.

343 FBIS, 1 November 1978, p. F1.


350 FBIS, 26 December 1978, p. Fl.


352 The Economist, January 20, 1979, p. 52.

353 FBIS, 2 January 1979, p. F2.


355 FBIS, 4 January 1979, p. Fl. It was also reported that Brezhnev personally met with an envoy of Ayatollah Khomeini in January to discuss the religious leader's future political course. Kayhan International, February 4, 1979, p. 4.


358 Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 15, 1979, p. 3.


The broadcast noted the "contradictions between the relatively rapid, although extremely uneven, economic development of the country. It is also caused by the police, the antipopular political regime and the archaic social structure." FBIS, 3 October 1978, p. A2.
The Soviets also began to criticize the Shah directly. FBIS, 31 January 1979, pp. F3-6.


Ibid., pp. F6-7.

FBIS, No. 7, February 1979, pp. 6-7; FBIS, 2 February 1979, p. F1.


FBIS, 29 November 1978, (Annex), pp. 2-5. For another explanation by the Tudeh Party Secretary, see FBIS, 7 February 1979, (Annex), pp. 2-4.


Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 15, 1979, p. 3. According to one report, Eskandari was replaced

395 Ibid.


399 FBIS, February 1, 1979, (Middle East), p. R1.


404 "Tudeh Drive to Join Khomeini Bandwagon," Kayhan International, February 6, 1979, p. 3.


408 Ibid., p. R11.
See op. cit., Moss, "Who is Meddling in Iran," p. 17 for an account of the arming and training of leftist guerrilla groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

FBIS, 13 April 1979, p. 3 (Annex).

JPRS 74100, 29 August 1979, p. 58.


Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15, 1979, p. 5. FBIS (USSR), 29 August 1979, p. H1; FBIS (USSR) 12 September 1979, p. H4. The ban was subsequently lifted, but Kianuri acknowledged that "part activity elsewhere is experiencing difficulties." Kayhan International, October 10, 1979, p. 2. In a February 1980 interview, Kianuri noted that four copies of the paper were being sent to Khomeini's office in Qom daily, at his request. FBIS, 11 February 1980, p. 23 (Supplement).


Ibid.


Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 12, December 15, 1979, p. 3.


Kayhan International, 6 February 1979, p. 3.

423 FBIS (Iran), 13 April 1979, p. 3. (Annex); See also Alvin J. Cottrell, "American Policy During the Iranian Revolution: The Huyser Mission," International Security Review, Vol. IV, No. VI, Winter 1979-1980. Cottrell notes, "...the Marxists and the Moslem radicals...wanted to remove the chief obstacle to their own political ambitions which they knew might be thwarted if the integrity of the professional Iranian military was preserved," p. 439.


427 FBIS (USSR), September 21, 1972, pp. B4-7.

428 FBIS (USSR), September 23, 1974, p. F2.


431 New York Times, March 4, 1979, p. 3E.

432 FBIS (USSR), 6 April 1979, p. H7.


436 FBIS (USSR), 16 May 1979, p. H8.


439 Kayhan International, 1 September 1979, pp. 1 and 4.


442 Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15, 1979, p. 5.


445 FBIS (Iran Supplement), 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21 February 1980; 31 March 1980, p. 22. For reports of continuing unrest see ibid., (South Asia), 4, 8, 11, 14-18, 21, 22 and 29 April 1980.

446 FBIS (Iraq), 2 April 1980, p. El.

447 See, for example, FBIS (Iraq), 19 and 25 February 1980, 27 March 1980.


451 See FN 68.

452 Ibid.

453 FBIS (USSR), 20 November 1978, p. Fl.

Reza Shah, in 1925, attempted to acquire a Soviet repudiation of both Articles 5 and 6, without success. Op. cit., Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, pp. 234-235. In March 1959, Iran formally notified the USSR that it regarded these articles as invalid. In 1974, the Shah asserted that "This treaty is incompatible with the articles of the UN Charter." The Statesman, June 26, 1974, p. 6. Nevertheless, the Soviets have never concurred with this point of view.

FBIS (USSR), 5 March 1979, pp. F3-4.

Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 15, 1979, p. 5.


FBIS (Iran Supplement), 3 March 1980, p. 17.


FBIS (Iran), 20 April 1979, p. R1; see also Radio Liberty Research 131/79, April 23, 1979, p. 5.


New York Times, 14 August 1979, p. 3.


Ibid. As Geoffrey Godsell later noted, "If Mr. Taraki had wanted to make his government more acceptable to his own people, the ouster of Mr. Amin from it probably would have had priority because of the latter's identification with indiscriminate killings and the scorched-earth tactics being used to crush rural resistance." The Christian Science Monitor, 18 September 1979, p. 3.


Ibid.


FBIS (Iran Supplement), 11 February 1980, p. 20. See also Ibid., 22 January 1980, p. 11.


500 FBIS (USSR), 3 July 1979, p. H1.


504 FBIS (Middle East), 16 August 1979, p. 3.

505 Radio Liberty Research, No. 126/79, April 19, 1979, p. 3.

506 Ibid.


508 FBIS (USSR), 14 September 1979, p. CC7. The countries were Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Bulgaria and Japan.


513 Kayhan International, October 8, 1979, p. 2.


515 FBIS (Iran), 4 April 1979, p. R1.

516 FBIS (USSR), 20 March 1979, p. A3.


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526 **FBIS** (Iran), 10 April 1979, p. R12.


530 Arab Report and Memo, 26 December 1977, p. 6.


533 **FBIS** (Iran), 26 February 1979, p. R5.


536 **FBIS** (Iran), 10 July 1979, p. R5.


539 FBIS (Iran Supplement), 18 March 1980, p. 9; also, 11, 13, 14 and 17 March 1980.


541 FBIS (Iran Supplement), 29 April 1980, p. 120.


543 See Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 16, 1979; p. 4; Vol. 4, No. 8, August 15, 1979, p. 5.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

The thesis offered in Chapter I was divided into three basic parts. In Chapters II and III, Iran's relations with both Czarist and Soviet Russia were catalogued to demonstrate the nature of their historic relationship, a relationship in which the Russians strove to dominate Iran, often as a means to achieve other foreign policy ends. The role of opportunism was shown to be an important ingredient of both Czarist and Soviet policies toward Iran. Particularly during times of internal weakness and isolation, Iran has been susceptible to Russian pressure. Czarist Russia, for example, exploited Qajar Iran's weaknesses and lack of any meaningful support in the early half of the 19th Century to wrest from her territorial and other concessions. Faced with a more active British role in the last half of the century, Russia curbed its efforts. Similarly, Moscow sought to exploit its occupation of northern Iran during the Second World War by establishing puppet regimes in Iran's northern provinces, an attempt that failed in the face of US opposition. A further consequence of the history of Iran's relations with her northern neighbor is that Iranians have a healthy distrust of Soviet motivations, despite the "normalized" relations which developed during the 1960's.
In Chapter IV, an examination of the decisive events which propelled the unrest of 1978 into a revolution which would settle for nothing less than the overthrow of the regime was undertaken. The primary contention of this chapter was that, although the nature of the American relationship with the Shah contributed to the causes of discontent, internal factors lay at the root of the Iranian revolution. In the early stages of unrest, the overthrow of the regime was not an inevitable development; the Shah was, in many ways, his own worst enemy. The senseless attack on Khomeini in January 1979; the timing of reforms, some half-heartedly undertaken or poorly executed; the decision not to hold elections until mid-1979; the rapid change-overs of ministers, some of whom were sacrificed to "anti-corruption" drives; and the excessive use of force in suppressing demonstrations; all undermined the Shah's already shaky credibility and resulted in his increased isolation, not only from the Iranian people, but from the very people he chose as his ministers and advisors.

The opposition, which the regime misunderstood and underestimated from the very beginning, gained momentum because of these factors. The "impossible" - the coalition of the admittedly diverse opposition elements - occurred. Incensed over the regime's repressive policies, lack of serious political reform and failing economic conditions and ultimately rallied around a single cause - the removal of the Shah - these factions united under the one non-regime element
in Iran which possessed a legitimate claim to authority and whose record of opposition to secular rule was virtually unblemished. It was also perhaps the element for which the Shah had the greatest disdain - the Shi'ite clergy. Khomeini - the Shah's most unrelenting critic for a decade and a half - became the symbol of the revolution and of Shi'ism's political role in Iranian life.

Because of the high visibility of the "American connection" to the Shah - evidenced in historic support for the regime, billions of dollars of arms purchases and a large American community in Iran - the United States became a target of Iranian anger. In retrospect, it is clear that, if there were any American "sins" with regard to Iran, they were of "omission" and not "commission." The Nixon Doctrine - born of America's fear of future Vietnams - was a way of not becoming directly involved. It found in the person of the Shah a receptive audience, and during the mid-1970's, an apparently capable agent.

The second omission was derived from the first. With U.S. regional policy interests tied so directly to the Shah, no American administration could afford to risk a confrontation over other issues. Carter the campaigner could make Iran's human rights record an issue; as President, his ability to do so diminished considerably.

The final portion of the thesis, addressed in Chapter V, concerned the Soviet reaction to the crisis and those factors which may affect the future of Soviet-Iranian relations.
There is every indication that Moscow was surprised at the speed with which the Shah's regime - built on a system of internal controls, a seemingly pervasive security system and a well-armed military (a combination with which the Soviets themselves are no strangers) - could be overthrown. Of equal surprise in the Kremlin must have been the failure of the U.S. to undertake substantive measures to assist the Shah.

The Soviet reaction was a pragmatic one. There was no direct link between Moscow and the Palestinian-trained Iranian extremists. Normal political and economic relations continued with the Shah. Early unrest in Iran went virtually unmentioned in the Soviet press. Only when it became apparent that the Shah's troubles were getting worse did they begin extensive reporting of events in Iran. It was at this point that Soviet opportunism began to emerge. The anti-imperialist theme was a comparatively safe one and one that built to a crescendo by the time the Khomeini/Bazargan regime was installed. It was a traditional weapon in the Soviet propaganda arsenal, targeted against the U.S. and designed, in this case, to indicate sympathy for the opposition point-of-view, while avoiding direct criticism of the Shah. It should also have been expected by any policy-maker familiar with Soviet propaganda techniques and combatted accordingly.

The religious aspect of the revolution was more complicated. It is to be expected that the Soviets will deny any
concerns over the possibility of "spill-over" of religious consciousness and re-assertiveness into their own Moslem republics. To do otherwise would be a de-facto admission of the transparency of their constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion and, contrary to their arguments that mutual agreement is possible, that there exist not only fundamental, but irreconcilable differences between Marxism-Leninism and Islam.

In this regard, however, the Soviets have betrayed themselves. The intent to downplay and focus attention on the other-than-religious aspects of the Iranian revolution are too obvious to overlook. Their efforts to prevent a "spill-over" into their Moslem republics has evidently been successful. An Iranian cleric visiting the USSR noted on his return that "Soviet Muslims had inadequate information about the Iranian Revolution because the Russian authorities had drawn far more attention to the revolution's anti-imperialistic aspects rather than its Islamic content."544

Moscow's strategy was not totally successful however. While the Kremlin will vehemently deny that the religious aspect of opposition to its Afghan puppet regime was a factor in its decision to invade that country, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin's leadership savored the prospect of the overthrow of that government by a second Islamic revolt along its southern border. There is, furthermore, no denying that Moslem rebels in Afghanistan were encouraged
by the success of the Islamic revolt in Iran, a fact that
Moscow cannot afford to ignore.

B. CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis, although it is too early to
definitively state what the future holds for Soviet-Iranian
relations, several observations are possible.

For the time being, Moscow seems to be content to watch
developments in Iran to see if the Islamic Republic proves
to be viable. The Kremlin appears to be somewhat perplexed
by current political developments in Iran and is obviously
preoccupied with Afghanistan. Moscow's continued emphasis
of the "threat of imperialism" may be seen partially as a
device meant to exacerbate tensions and prevent any rapproach-
ment between Tehran and Washington in the meantime, and
partially as a means of deflecting attention from its own
indefensible actions in Afghanistan.

The critical factor is Iran itself. The country currently
finds itself in a critically weakened state, without a strong
central government or military, beset by provincial unrest
and a hostile Iraq (largely of Iran's own making), and uns-
solved economic and social problems. Moreover, Iran's inter-
national position is one of increasing political and economic
isolation due to the perpetuation of the hostage crisis.
This is the classic situation in which Soviet opportunism
and exploitation have evidence themselves in Iran in the past
and which is already apparent in Moscow's attempts to channel
Iran's oil to Eastern Europe.

The May 1980 elections, in which the clerical Islamic
Republican Party won the majority of the seats to the
Parliament was not a development likely to cure Iran's
political paralysis. The IRP is clearly subservient to
Khomeini's wishes and thus the struggle between the secular
and conservative elements for dominance seems sure to con-
tinue. President Bani-sadr has watched his authority gradu-
ally erode over the five months since his election in the
face of opposition by the ultra-conservative clerical ele-
ments led by Ayatollahs Beheshti and Khalkhali. His com-
paratively moderate position on the hostage issue has con-
tributed to this and it is likely that any real executive
power will be vested only in a prime minister nominated by
the Parliament and approved by Ayatollah Khomeini.

It is clear that the political arrangement of the Islamic
government in its present form is not destined to survive
Ayatollah Khomeini, if indeed it lasts that long. From the
very beginning, it has been his vision, and his alone, and
it must be admitted that it is a tribute to his prestige in
the country that he has been able to make it prevail thusfar.
Even other prominent religious figures, Ayatollah Shariat-
madari and Ayatollah Taleghani included, opposed the concept,
preferring a return to the 1906 Constitution, with veto power
over all legislation to be vested in the clergy.546 Shariatmadari
in particular had backed the secular elements, and one recent report stated that, as a result of his opposition to Khomeini's policies, Shariatmadari "was being kept under very tight control by those close to Ayatollah Khomeini." 5

Given the eventual demise of the Islamic Republic and the widespread dissatisfaction with its record to date, it is highly likely that the successor government will be secular in nature, within a parliamentary framework not unlike that of the 1906 Constitution. One possibility that cannot be lightly disregarded is that opposition efforts currently being undertaken by former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar from France may result in the establishment of a nationalist, secular regime. Bakhtiar is said to have the support of a number of Iranian military officers, both in exile and still in Iran, as well as certain secular groups, possibly including the bazaar. Among other potential allies might be some of the more moderate clergy, Shariatmadari included, as well as leftists like the Mujahideen-e-Khalq members.

If such a government comes to power in Iran at a future date, domestic issues will undoubtedly take precedence over foreign policy matters, with the exception of a still unresolved hostage situation. Priority would be placed on restoring order in the provinces and stimulating the economy. Of primary importance would be the oil industry, which would probably require military personnel to prevent continued
acts of sabotage which have plagued the oil and gas pipelines in recent months.\textsuperscript{549}

It is also likely that re-structuring of the Army would take place, although its size would be considerably more modest than under the Shah. One long-term problem is likely to be the numbers of weapons which found their way into the hands of various extremist groups during the revolution; the military will not go unchallenged. The demise of Khomeini and his associates would almost certainly remove the main barrier to a re-normalization of relations with Iraq. Iran would stress regional cooperation with Iraq and other nations and oppose foreign intervention in the Gulf area, but the Shah's tendency towards unilateral action would be avoided.

The ascendency of such a government would not be an unmitigated disaster from Moscow's point of view. Relations with Iran under Khomeini are at least as bad, if not worse than at any time during the Shah's reign. Some improvement would probably occur. At the same time, assuming a continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Moscow would face unrelenting criticism of her intervention there. The government's stand would be equally insistent on the matter of non-interference in Iran's affairs, particularly if the Tudeh were to attempt to insert itself into a governmental change-over process. Iran would probably seek to maintain a neutralist status, in which case improved relations with other non-aligned states would be pursued. An improvement of relations
with the PRC would undoubtedly evoke the same reaction from the Kremlin which Chairman Hua's 1978 visit to the Shah did. On the other hand, the Kremlin would probably find reason for satisfaction in Iran's adoption of a more equidistant stance between Washington and Moscow.

A second possibility is that the Iranian military will somehow reassert itself and install a "strongman" by virtue of a coup d'état. Such a development, although possible, seems improbable at this time due to the continued problems in the areas of discipline and chain-of-command. There are few military leaders who presently command enough respect to fill such a role, although there are exceptions, such as former Navy Commander Rear Admiral Admad Madani, who is popular among middle class elements and who is known to favor a secular, orderly and right-wing anti-clerical approach to politics.

While it is not a likely development, the advent of such a regime would present Moscow with a situation much like it faced under the Shah. Iran would be stabilized, and would probably present a much more assertive foreign policy, with closer ties to the U.S. and the possible re-introduction of small-scale American personnel presence to help restore and maintain some of Iran's deteriorating military equipment. Such a regime might also undertake a crackdown on leftist, particularly Tudeh, activity, a policy which would be extremely frustrating to Moscow after a quarter century of
sustaining the party-in-exile and seeing it return to active participation following the Shah's overthrow.

A more likely scenario is a post-Khomeini struggle between Muslim rightists and Iranian leftist elements which could quickly plunge Iran into civil war. Both sides have political and quasi-military organizations; both are presumably well-armed, having participated in the armed resistance to the Shah during the revolt.

A development of this nature would pose a serious threat to Iran's ability to maintain its integrity and could occur in one of two ways; either a religiously-oriented government crack-down on the leftists, which would certainly not go uncontested, or a leftist attempt to assert itself in the wake of Khomeini's passing. The left's stated support for Khomeini to date is little more than a thinly-disguised fiction; in the case of the Tudeh, Moscow ordered it.

It is highly unlikely that the left could hope to prevail in this situation without substantial external support. Given a choice between the conservative religious elements and the communists, whether of the Tudeh or another of the various splinter parties, the majority of Iranians will oppose the latter. Moscow would be faced with again having to abandon the Tudeh to its fate, or rendering critical assistance. Separatist tendencies, which would be unchecked during a period of civil strife, could be effectively exploited, thereby complicating the task of the conservative religious elements.
A fourth possibility is that a combination of the first and third situations will occur; that is, elements of the left and right will clash after Khomeini's passing, but that a coalition of secular, moderate religious, and military forces, such as that described in the first scenario, will be able to insert itself into the process, neutralize both extreme groups, and establish a viable government prior to the involvement of an outside force. Such a government would probably be able to obtain broad popular support, pursue the policies discussed in the first situation, and incorporate all but the most radical elements of both extremes.

While nobody can predict which of the above scenarios may develop, one thing is certain. Iran's revolution is as yet unfinished, and it is fast approaching a critical juncture. The political paralysis and economic stagnation prevalent in Iran over the past year have worsened, and current developments do not indicate that the trend is about to be reversed.

Some years ago, Richard Cottam contrasted his first two opportunities to view Iran in the following manner. At the "apex of the Mossadeq era...Iran...had much verve but little order." During the period of the late 1950's, "one of royal dictatorship...this Iran had much order but little verve." It remains to be seen whether, in the period that lies ahead, Iran is destined to forever alternate between "order" and "verve" or whether some happy medium can be struck.

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CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES


548 Ibid, pp. 6-7.

549 See, for example, FBIS (Iran Supplement), 8 April 1980, p. 139; 22 April 1980, p. 129.


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