A TOTAL FORCE MODEL FOR TRAINING THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS. (U)

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A TOTAL FORCE MODEL FOR TRAINING THE
ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOSEPH M. BOWMAN, MAJ, IN, USAR
B.A., Michigan State University, 1974

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1980

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A Total Force Model for Training the Army's Reserve Components

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Reserve Components  "One Army" Model
US Army Reserve  Total Force Policy Readiness
National Guard  Training
Army National Guard  Force Development
Total Army  Force Structure

See reverse
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Additional research was then undertaken to determine the present legal basis for organizing both the Army and the Militia as referred to in the U.S. Constitution. A significant finding is that the U.S. Army is legally composed of one active and two reserve components—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard in the service of the United States (ARNGUS) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)—and the Militia consisting of the Army National Guard in the service of individual states (ARNG) and the Unorganized Militia consisting of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 17 and 45.

Based on the research findings, the paper proposes a total force structural model which will integrate and standardize the organization, training and administration of the Total Army.
A Total Force Model for Training the Army's Reserve Components

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6 June 1980

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A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Name of candidate: JOSEPH M. BOWMAN, MAJ., IN., USAR
Title of thesis: A Total Force Model For Training The Army's Reserve Components

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

A TOTAL FORCE MODEL FOR TRAINING THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS, by Major Joseph M. Bowman, USAR, 163 pages.

This study was initially undertaken to determine a new organizational structure for the reserve components of the Army to promote more effective, standardized training. Research was conducted by consulting recent (1970-1980) sources such as congressional testimony, U.S. defense policy, current Army programs, official studies and reports, and the conclusions and recommendations of experienced military analysts. Preliminary review of the findings showed that such a restructuring cannot be performed in isolation, due to the Total Force Policy, but must rather be based on an analysis of the mission and organization of the Total Army.

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Based on the research findings, the paper proposes a total force structural model which will integrate and standardize the organization, training and administration of the Total Army.
IN MEMORY

OF

JONATHAN DAVID BROWN
March 20, 1964 - June 7, 1980
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was finished under difficult circumstances. It is literally true that I could not have completed the requirements for the MMAS degree without the assistance and understanding of the individuals named below, so I would like to give credit where it is due. My sincere appreciation and thanks to:

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Most of all, I would like to thank COL (Ret.) H. H. Bowman, USA--a friend--who volunteered his editorial assistance when it was most needed and travelled 200 miles to help me when I was physically incapacitated with a broken bone.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PROBLEM

In the past decade, the U.S. Army has implemented a series of structural and policy changes designed to integrate the Army's active component and its two reserve components into a single force. Under the Total Force Policy currently in effect, the two reserve components--The Army National Guard of the U.S. (ARNGUS) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)--are an essential element of the Total Army force. According to official strength figures published by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1978, reserve component (RC) units comprise 56 percent of the Army's deployable forces: 52% of its infantry and armor battalions, 65% of its combat engineer battalions and approximately 80% of its combat support/combat service support personnel.

Successful implementation of the Total Force policy depends on training the reserve components to the same standards as the active component in the same combat critical tasks, allowing for differences in unit mission and TOE equipment. While programs presently are underway to accomplish this through the evolving Army Training System, today's RC units and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are dangerously understrength and undertrained. Failure to correct this deficiency would prevent the rapid mobilization and deployment of reserve forces required by the Total Force Policy and result in the Army's failure to accomplish its national defense mission.
This study was undertaken initially to determine a new organizational structure for the reserve components of the Army to promote more effective, standardized training. However, a preliminary review of the findings showed that such a restructuring cannot be performed in isolation but must be based on an analysis of the mission and organization of the Total Army. Additional research was then undertaken to determine the present legal basis for organizing both the Army and the Militia as referred to in the U.S. Constitution. Based on the research findings, this report of the study now proposes a total force structural model which will integrate and standardize the organization, training and administration of the Total Army.

FINDINGS

The study uses the historical method to research and synthesize existing proposals for organizing and training the reserve components. Research was conducted by consulting recent (1970-1980) sources such as the United States Code, congressional testimony, U.S. defense policy, current Army programs, official studies and reports, and the conclusions and recommendations of current military analysts. To ground the model solidly in reality and aid the reader in assessing the relative influence each finding will exert as a criterion for decisionmaking, the findings are identified and grouped in categories ranging from these criteria mandated by law to those criteria representing educated professional opinion.

It is a significant finding that the U.S. Army is legally composed of one active and two reserve components—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard in the service of the United States (ARNGUS) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)—as well as the Army National Guard (ARNG) when federalized and every individual member of the Army serving without component. According to the U.S. Code, these elements come under the
purview of the term "Army" or "Armies" as used in the Constitution of the United States. The most important point about the reserve components is that they are an integral part of the Army, and are not the militia referred to in the U.S. Constitution. According to the U.S. Code, the militia of the United States is composed of two parts—the Organized Militia, consisting of the Army National Guard in the service of the individual states (ARNG), and the Unorganized Militia, consisting of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 17 and 45. (Note that the terms ARNGUS and ARNG are not synonymous.)

Additional key findings include the following points:

- By law, the "organized peace establishment" of the Army consists of all units and individuals required for "complete and immediate" mobilization. At present its authorized strength is 2,417,000 and in recent history other than the present it has been composed of from 45 to 52 divisions.

- The Army Chief of Staff recommends a flexible balanced force structure which might include CONUS-based forces with a mixture of AC and RC strength based on how early the unit is scheduled for deployment.

- The FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan calls for some units to begin mobilization within 24 hours of alert and for other units to deploy without any post-mobilization training. The old policy of reliance on "surge readiness" to save training and equipment costs will not work with today's short mobilization warning times.

- The two biggest problems facing the All Volunteer Force are understrength RC units and severe shortages of trained manpower in the individual replacement pool.

- Factors which degrade training readiness include organizing RC units at levels either too high (division) or too low (platoon); scattering of units across state boundaries or large areas; turbulence caused by rapid personnel turnover and constant unit reorganizations; grouping of unlike units under inappropriate headquarters; and "geographic recruiting" of units requiring large numbers of highly skilled individuals.
Congressional studies have found extensive duplication in staff organizations and lack of clear lines of command, control and communication. This problem is addressed by the Army Capstone Program, which groups related units, both AC and RC, into "force packages" and clarifies their peacetime and wartime chain of command by assigning them to an appropriate headquarters.

Studies show that the roundout program is of great value and that RC unit training and readiness improve with active cadre involvement, be it AC or RC. Congress is investigating the Full-Time Manning Program as a possible replacement for dual-status technicians, and other studies note that there is a need for a permanent support infrastructure to include non-military administrative technicians. This calls for streamlining both premobilization and postmobilization administration and removing non-mission-essential requirements from RC units.

The conclusions and recommendations of current military analysts as expressed in previous research papers were treated as findings in the present study. These findings include the following points:

Based on a thorough analysis of the total system, DA should develop a comprehensive Total Army organizational structure. Every unit of the Total Army should then be assigned a clear, specific mission in support of national strategic objectives. All training, including staff map exercises, CPX's and TEWT's would be keyed to the actual unit mobilization mission. Annual training would be a complete mobilization followed by intensive training to assess shortfalls between the unit's performance and its mobilization requirements. Public law should be amended to allow mobilization of units for training other than during times of actual emergency.

Combat divisions of the reserve force should be located each within the boundaries of a single state along with all organic support units. Higher staff units such as the Division Headquarters Company, DISCOM Headquarters Company and Artillery Headquarters Battery should be phased into an active status and manned with a 50/50 mix of AC personnel and RC personnel on two or four year tours of active duty. The division staff would function on a day-to-day basis as the planning agency for achieving and sustaining readiness. Subordinate units would all function in their normal combat, support, administrative,
logistic or communications role and perform mission training.

* Combat units would normally have a standardized organization with a high density of the same or similar MOS. Units would have inherent drill flexibility to allow planning drills for key staff members and might make use of cadre staffing with planned fillers or mobilization-TDA staffing with nationwide fill depending on the units required deployment date. When necessary, citizens could be ordered to initial-entry militia training under the provisions of the U.S. Code and retained in the IRR for a period of six years. Spin-off enlistments from this initial training should sustain the required levels for AC and RC unit personnel.

The conclusions of military analysts also result in a number of general suggestions for improving the existing system. In their opinion, it is possible to avoid large increases in fund appropriations, but only if there is a significant change by all in perception, attitude and understanding. Both evolutionary and revolutionary changes must be made within the general framework of Army policy which has developed throughout this century. Any new program should not attempt to minimize state allegiances and should capitalize on the strengths inherent in AC/RC differences rather than emphasize weaknesses. The unique ability of Reserves to shape public opinion through their extensive community ties should be taken into account. RC training programs should promote maximum development of individual skills, capitalize on and contribute to civilian experience, and improve leadership ability. High military standards should be required for all and benefits allotted on an equitable basis to all. The single most important consideration in both recruiting and retention lies in the individual feeling of performing a useful function.

This summary has highlighted the major findings of the present research, from constitutional requirements to the conclusions and recommendations of experienced military professionals. These findings form the basis of the Total Force
Model which is developed and discussed in Chapter III of this paper.

THE MODEL

The Total Force Model illustrates a structural framework for the Total Army which would eliminate nonfunctional differences that exist among the present three components while retaining the three types of forces required; i.e., units on active duty, units in a ready reserve status, and trained individual replacements. The term "ready reserve," as used here, means units which train in a drill status and which will be mobilized in an emergency to augment units already in the active force structure. It does not refer exclusively to the U.S. Army Reserve, nor ignore the Army National Guard. In fact, it must be clearly understood that the proposed model is not another attempt to absorb the Guard into the Reserve, nor the Reserve into the Guard, since such an attempt would be nonproductive. Furthermore, the model, while designed to standardize the organization and training of the Total Army, will not serve to put the reserve components as a whole in a subordinate position to their active duty colleagues.

It is not possible to summarize the complete model with sufficient accuracy to prevent its being misunderstood. However, its two major features may be stated as follows:

- The Total Force Model is a permanent structural organization for a "Total Army" comprised of 50 divisions and 2,400,000 members under conditions of full mobilization only. During peacetime, the force is manned at a lesser level by personnel in an active, selected reserve or individual replacement status in a mix determined by analysis of the enemy threat and Congressional appropriation. The purpose of the model is to provide a constant framework for all decisions concerning the organization and manning of the U.S. Army.
Every individual member of the Total Army has equal opportunity to serve in active, selected reserve or individual replacement status—depending, of course, on the needs of the service. Service benefits, to include retirement, are distributed equally among all members, either on a "blanket" basis or an "active service" basis, depending on the nature of the benefit.

Chapter III presents the model itself. A discussion and explanation of the model in terms of force structure, command and control, and personnel management techniques demonstrates its relationship to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of previous research and offers realistic ideas for approaching a solution to the problem under study.

CONCLUSIONS

Two major conclusions of this study are:

- The United States Army is a social and political institution of our nation created by the U.S. Constitution to insure the National Defense. It is a government agency responsive to the direction of duly elected national leaders and supported by public funds appropriated for that purpose by the elected representatives of the American people. It performs an essential service to the nation as a whole. The Army is neither a democracy nor a free market society in itself; rather it is an organization of citizens who have voluntarily subordinated—not abandoned—their personal interests to the collective interests of a democratic free market society. The Army is not a corporation—it neither manufactures a product nor makes a profit. Its "product" is readiness; its "profit" is freedom for our nation. Therefore, management techniques and labor practices appropriate to our society cannot be applied unaltered to Army operations without grave damage to the effectiveness of the system. Management and organization are vital to the Army, but they must in all cases be tailored specifically to support the two major building blocks of readiness—leadership and training.

- The present system of organization and management of the Army is not effective in light of the Army's mobilization policy and mission. A new, comprehensive structure must be created based on a thorough analysis of
the total system. However, a mere reshuffling of the existing pieces of the puzzle into a different order will be worse than no action at all. Organization alone cannot make a system function. A new chain of command making the same old leadership mistakes is worthless. A new training management program faced with the same old training problems will produce no better soldiers than before. It will be necessary to analyze the system from a military, not a market point of view; to gain the support and participation of individual commanders throughout the entire chain of command; to establish clear, ethical and practical leadership policies and standards; to police the system to insure initial compliance; and, finally, to foster and develop the indispensable atmosphere of mutual trust which is vital to the continued automatic functioning of the system. Only under these conditions can a reorganization of the Total Army have any practical value.

The final chapter of this paper presents realistic suggestions for partial or gradual implementation of the model, consisting of conclusions and recommended actions. Obviously, an immediate wholesale implementation of the model would be legally and politically impossible, as it would require Congressional approval and legal amendment of the U.S. Code. Of greater impact is the fact that the model certainly will not adhere to current political structures of the ARNGUS and USAR. Yet, this study is not "pie in the sky." First, findings which accurately reflect contemporary military thought deserve serious consideration and attention by other military professionals for their own sake. Second, a model based on such findings is a conceptual framework which fits the findings together and gives them a common focus. Even without an attempt to implement the entire model as an entity, a thoughtful examination of any single finding within the overall framework can be a basis for action.
CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the U.S. Army has implemented a series of structural and policy changes designed to integrate the Army's active component and its two reserve components into a single force. Under the Total Force Policy currently in effect, the two reserve components--The Army National Guard of the U.S. (ARNGUS) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)--are an essential element of the Total Army force. According to official strength figures published by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1978, reserve component (RC) units comprise 56 percent of the Army's deployable forces: 52% of its infantry and armor battalions, 65% of its combat engineer battalions and approximately 80% of its combat support/combat service support personnel.

Successful implementation of the Total Force policy depends on training the reserve components to the same standards as the active component in the same combat critical tasks, allowing for differences in unit mission and TOE equipment. While programs presently are underway to accomplish this through the evolving Army Training System,
today's RC units and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are dangerously understrength and undertrained. Failure to correct this deficiency would prevent the rapid mobilization and deployment of reserve forces required by the Total Force Policy and result in the Army's failure to accomplish its national defense mission.

This study was undertaken initially to determine a new organizational structure for the reserve components of the Army to promote more effective, standardized training. However, a preliminary review of the findings showed that such a restructuring cannot be performed in isolation but must be based on an analysis of the mission and organization of the Total Army. Additional research was then undertaken to determine the present legal basis for organizing both the Army and the Militia as referred to in the U.S. Constitution. Based on the research findings, this report of the study now proposes a total force structural model which will integrate and standardize the organization, training and administration of the Total Army.

In this introductory chapter I will present selected findings which indicate both the magnitude of the RC training problem and the seriousness of its consequences. These preliminary findings will highlight the history and present status of the problem through a discussion of the results of past mobilizations and a comparison of these results with conditions existing today in the RC environment. The rest of this chapter consists of an explanation of the scope of the
study; a discussion of the research methodology to include sources of data and treatment of findings; the explication of selected terms; the statement of certain basic assumptions; and a preview of the organization of the remainder of the thesis.

JUSTIFICATION OF PROBLEM

As noted in the introduction to this paper, the U.S. Army today adheres to a policy which places all U.S. military components within the framework of the "Total Force." Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird defined the Total Force as all military and related resources dedicated to Free World security, and stated that it includes "both active and reserve components of the United States, those of our allies, and . . . friends. . . ." In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, 1971, Secretary Laird also announced a:

... new policy with respect to the Reserve Forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve instead of draftees, will be the initial source of augmentation of the Active Forces in any future emergency requiring a substantial expansion of Active Forces.

These policy decisions of the early 70's had an immediate impact on the National Guard and Army Reserve. Since they were now counted equally as members of the Total Force, their authorized personnel strength could be directly compared to the personnel strength of the active forces. The result of this comparison seemed to indicate that, on a
one-for-one basis, a reserve component soldier cost the government only one-sixth the amount of funds for pay, subsistence and uniforms as did an active component soldier of the same pay grade. This opened the door for Army planners to begin a "numbers game" in which personnel spaces could be transferred from active to reserve, resulting in an apparent savings of funds with no reduction of the gross number of personnel in the Total Force. According to former Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hadlai A. Hull, this allowed the Army to "provide a greater total force within fixed budget, or an equal force with a reduced budget." But, is this statement really accurate? To determine this, it is necessary first to consider the mission and training of the Army's two reserve components.

The Federal mission of the Army National Guard is "to provide units with trained personnel and sufficient and suitable equipment, capable and ready for mobilization in time of war or national emergency to support the Army." In addition, the Guard has a state mission to "provide units organized, trained and equipped that ... will provide protection of life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety." The Army Reserve has the same mission as the Guard's Federal mission, and has an additional mission to furnish trained individuals as fillers for Active, Guard and Reserve units.

The National Guard is expected to accomplish both its State and Federal missions within 38 days of training each
year. Army Reserve units, likewise, have 38 training days available per year, but the individual replacements of the IRR rarely train more than 14 days a year, and many are on a standby status and do not train at all. Is it fair to equate these citizen soldiers to a professional active force which has approximately 260 duty days available during a year? Army planners are correct in their claim that they can maintain a force of equal size for a reduced budget, but is it a force of equal effectiveness? A brief examination of the history of the Army's reserve forces and the success of previous mobilizations should provide some indications.

Since the days of the American Revolution, the United States has never favored the keeping of a large standing Army of the type found in some European states, and has relied in each of our eight major conflicts on large numbers of citizen volunteers to fill out the ranks of the small professional Army. Although this policy has always proven successful, historical data show that it has required long periods of post mobilization training during the initial stages of the emergency to field sufficient forces to carry on the war. Furthermore, each conflict invariably has been followed by a massive demobilization and the reversion of American citizens to a "deep sense of apathy toward national defense."

Government planners have not ignored the lessons learned during these mobilizations. Continuous improvements in the organization and training of military forces have been
embodied in the National Defense Acts of 1903, 1916, 1920 and 1933, and the National Security Act of 1947. All of this legislation served to pull the reserve forces closer to the organization and training of the active forces, but it was not until after the Korean Conflict that appropriate legislation was passed to provide the reserve components with a real, active role in our national defense.  

In 1973, then-Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, announced Administration plans for a "National Guard and Reserve manned, equipped and trained to mesh on short notice with active forces." In this arrangement, national security depended on a mobilized ground force consisting of 55 percent Active and 45 percent Reserve personnel. Yet, two studies conducted prior to this time--the DA Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces and the Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilization and Deployment of U.S. Army Reserve Components--evaluate previous mobilizations as only marginally successful for the following reasons:

- Failure to maintain effective TOE strength
- Failure to provide adequate equipment
- Failure to provide adequate training, training facilities and sites
- Unsuitable organization of RC units
- DA policy on recruitment.

The justification of the problem, then, lies in the answer to two questions: (1) Are mobilization requirements
different under present policy than they have been in the past; and (2) Are we meeting the five challenges above any more effectively under present policy than in the past?

To answer the first question, a comparison of the current mobilization policy with previous experience can be made through a discussion of selected areas.

**Mobilization Response Time.** In previous mobilizations, response time has varied from a few months advance notice to up to three years from the outbreak of the conflict to the mobilization of reserve forces, as during the Vietnam Conflict. Present policy requires entire units to mobilize and deploy from home station beginning from 7 to 21 days following alert, while some units must begin mobilization within 24 hours and may be scheduled to deploy with no post mobilization training at all.

**Mobilization of Units.** In World War II, not one single Army Reserve unit was activated, as all units were provided by the National Guard. Instead, 80,000 Army Reservists were mobilized *individually* and used as a "manpower pool." Though limited numbers of units were called up in subsequent mobilizations, their members constituted only a small percentage compared to the individually called replacements. Frequently, Reservists mobilized as a unit were then transferred out of the unit as individual "fillers" and the unit lost its original identity. At times, as in the Korean Conflict, *individual reserve members* on the inactive roles were
unwillingly recalled to duty before unit members of the Volunteer (Ready) Reserve. During the Vietnam Conflict, the Administration made the decision to fill Army manpower needs through conscription of civilians rather than mobilization of units, due to the perceived unpopularity of the war. Yet, present policy intends to supply 56 percent of the Army's deployable forces through the wholesale mobilization of units of the National Guard and Army Reserve.

Force to be Mobilized. While the United States, in World War II eventually fielded an Army of nearly 13 million men, only about 80,000 were members mobilized from the active reserve. An additional 297,654 came from the mobilization of the National Guard. This was the last time the United States has ever undergone a total mobilization. In the three partial mobilizations since that time, the total number of Army Reservists mobilized has been less than 300,000.

Yet, present policy calls for the full mobilization, if necessary, of 400,000 National Guardsmen, 260,000 USAR Selected Reservists, and up to 720,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve. A comparison of these statutory requirements with the actual strengths shown in Figure 1 reveals a present-day shortfall of 48,206 Guard, 62,690 USAR Selected Reserve and 513,249 IRR personnel.

Level of Training. The Review of Recent Mobilization found that Army Reserve units called up for the Korean Conflict, Berlin crisis, and Vietnam Conflict were unready for
ACTUAL STRENGTH OF ALL RESERVE COMPONENTS
(NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY)

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**ACTIVE STATUS**

**INACTIVE STATUS**

**RETIRED STATUS**

**NOTE**

- Inactive Army National Guard members are in an inactive status (NGC 75) but, however, they must be counted in the ready reserve strength (NGC 75A) and are available for call to active duty the same as other members of the ready reserve (NGC 75A). 

**NOTE**

- Training pipeline includes enlisted members of both the selected reserve and plan in training pay categories P, P, and U.

**Figure 1**
deployment due to deficiencies in unit training and severe personnel shortages. In these mobilizations, as in World War II, Reserve members had to undergo complete cycles of post-mobilization training to become proficient, resulting in delay in their deployment up to several months. For example, the 3d Bn, 197th Artillery, New Hampshire National Guard--the first RC unit committed in the Republic of Vietnam--took five months to complete its postmobilization training.

The current FORSCOM Reg 350-2 requires company- and battalion-sized units in the D to D+60 deployment category to sustain a pre-mobilization readiness condition of C-2 ("substantially ready"). However, most Army RC units are rated only C-3 ("marginally ready") and many units are rated C-4 ("not ready"). A 1976 Congressional study published unclassified information which showed that 43 percent of all National Guard units and 54 percent of all Army Reserve units were rated "not ready." This comparison of present requirements with past performance tells us that unless the conditions existing in the past have been changed and the five deficiencies identified by the Army studies corrected, future mobilizations can be no more than partial successes. Furthermore, today's mobilization requirements in terms of size, response time and training level demand much more of today's reserve components.

To determine the mobilization capability of the RC today and answer the second question, I will present selected
aspects of the RC environment as contained in the findings of recent Army studies.

**Limited Time.** Reserve Component units have available a total of 38 days a year in which to train. This consists of 48 four-hour drill periods which are often combined in multiples of 4 to make one weekend per month during the year. This accounts for 24 days—the remaining 14 are served during annual training. By comparison, taking out Sundays, etc., the active component has about 260 duty days available per year, or nearly 7 times the amount for training.

**Austere Facilities.** Training facilities in most Reserve Centers and Armories are wholly inadequate. Existing classrooms are often small, ill-equipped and unsuited to the modern audiovisual techniques now being used in Army training courses. Training aids and devices are sometimes unavailable and often require unit members to drive hundreds of miles in private autos to pick them up from area TASCs. Some audiovisual aids and services are difficult to obtain due to limited funds or long lead times.

**Limited Equipment.** Many RC units have shortages of TOE equipment or receive "in lieu of" issues. Units with specialized or sophisticated equipment often do not have it at all. Other TOE items no longer exist in the active Army inventory, such as the ANPPS-4 ground surveillance radar. Some units are located up to several hundred miles from their equipment, or the unit and its equipment are located several
hundred miles from a training area which allows use of the equipment.

Administrative Burden. A recent 6th Army study points out that the Reserve units, since they are automatically subjected to all the administrative requirements of the active army, are being buried under an "avalanche of paper which overwhelms unit commanders and . . . their efforts to achieve readiness." If one considers the reserve work environment of two days per month, it can be seen that a normal active army monthly report must be filled out every second workday! Likewise, a quarterly report occurs every 6 days and an annual report every 6 weeks. Furthermore, there will be an AGI, CMMI and CLRT visit every 38 days. RC unit commanders' estimates of the amount of time they spend on administrative functions and tasks range as high as 35 percent.

Personnel Shortages. At present, National Guard and Reserve units have a total personnel shortage of 145,261 members. Of those personnel on hand, approximately 147,000 are not qualified in the duty MOS which they hold in their unit. In addition, the IRR pool of experienced individual replacements is 500,000 members below the strength recommended by DA. Recruiting incentives and enlistment bonuses have failed to reverse the downward trend.

Unsuitable Organization. The Review of Recent Mobilization study found that the Army Reserve force structure is unbalanced and Reserve units are sometimes organized under
obsolete TOEs. Command structure is impractical, with some Headquarters trying to control units spread over several hundred miles and other Headquarters supervising units which are geographically close but which have an organization and mission totally different from their parent headquarters. 34

This examination of selected points concerning the history of reserve mobilizations and the reasons for their limited success reveals that the present Total Force mobilization policy, to be successful, requires far more from the system, the reserve component unit and the individual Guardsman or Reservist than any previous mobilization has ever actually accomplished. Likewise, the review of present-day conditions in the RC environment shows that no substantial gains have been made to eliminate the five causes of previous failures. This is ample justification for the position that a serious problem does exist in the present situation which could undermine the entire basis of the Total Force Policy. Far from creating an effective fighting force at a fraction of the cost, it has instead created an illusion of readiness and national security.

SCOPE

The present study was conducted from the standpoint of the reserve components. However, in light of the preceding discussion, it becomes obvious that the problem under study is not a reserve component problem, but rather a
"Total Army" problem whose roots lie in the policies of our national government. Additionally, while the original scope was limited to the RC organization for training, the findings revealed by the research have forced this scope to expand to include RC force structure, and finally, Total Army structure, organization and management. Indeed, little survives of RC training in this study except in its title. Yet, it is important to realize that the goal remains unchanged. The ultimate goal of the study still is to encourage appropriate changes in Army training policy and programs to increase the ability of the reserve components to achieve readiness through standardized, high-quality training. Realizing that the appropriate vehicle for this is an innovative change to the Total Army organization, I have altered the scope of the study to establishing the need for innovative structural change generally within existing legal constraints; and to the design, explanation and justification of a force development model which can be used as a guide to restructuring the U.S. Army's reserve components within the framework of the Total Army. The design of the model will include a proposed structure for the Army force, a plan for command and control of the force, and a proposed system of personnel management and accountability which is necessary for a true "One Army." I will attempt to justify the proposed model as an efficient, standardized way to organize and train RC units and individuals to fulfill their mission within the Total Force.
The model is intended to illustrate a structural framework for the Total Army which would eliminate nonfunctional differences that exist among the present three components while retaining the three types of forces required; i.e., units on active duty, units in a ready reserve status, and trained individual replacements. The term "ready reserve," as used here, means units which train in a drill status and which will be mobilized in an emergency to augment units already in the active force structure. It does not refer exclusively to the U.S. Army Reserve, nor ignore the Army National Guard. In fact, it should be clearly understood at the beginning that the proposed model is not another attempt to absorb the Guard into the Reserve, nor the Reserve into the Guard, since such an attempt would be non-productive. Furthermore, the model, while designed to standardize the organization and training of the Total Army, will not serve to put the reserve components as a whole in a subordinate position to their active duty colleagues.

METHODOLOGY

The study uses the historical method to research and synthesize existing proposals for organizing and training the reserve components. Research was conducted by consulting recent (1970-1980) sources such as congressional testimony, U.S. defense policy, current Army programs, official studies and reports, and the conclusions and recommendations of
experienced military analysts. The findings which are the result of the current research illustrate the present situation and operational procedures of the U.S. Army. Existing deficiencies in RC organization and training will be identified, and will serve to justify the need for development of the model. These findings will not be analyzed in this study; readers are referred to the original sources for their respective analyses and proposed solutions. The findings also specify the existing legal and regulatory constraints which shape the Army's present organization and activities. In addition, findings are introduced to show trends in policy and programs which will influence future Army structure. Ongoing and proposed Army programs—as identified in current and draft Army publications—will be treated as factors which will shape the framework of the model. This is done to gain as much feasibility and credibility as possible for the model and to avoid "reinventing the wheel" or "trying to paint a moving train." Finally, the bulk of the research will be directed toward identifying and synthesizing the ideas for RC organization and training which have been expressed by military researchers and writers over the past decade. These will provide the content of the model, since I believe that the primary purpose of historical research is to collect, update, synthesize and pass on the ideas of previous researchers so that their contributions to the subject will remain current.
Treatment of the Findings

The findings of this study will represent the collective thought of military analysts from all three components of the Army and from the civilian/government community. It is inevitable that a proposed model based on these findings will not be acceptable to everyone. Yet, if I believed the model to be strictly an academic exercise of no practical value, this study would never even have been undertaken. Obviously, an immediate wholesale implementation of the model would be legally and politically impossible, as it would require Congressional approval and legal amendment of the U.S. Code. Of greater impact is the fact that the model certainly will not adhere to current political structures of the ARNGUS and JSAR. This alone would preclude its adoption. However, findings which accurately reflect contemporary military thought deserve serious consideration and attention by other military professionals for their own sake. Furthermore, a model based on such findings is a conceptual framework which fits the findings together and gives them a common focus. Even without an attempt to implement the entire model as an entity, a thoughtful examination of any single finding within the overall framework can be a basis for action.

BASIS FOR THE MODEL

An essential first step in constructing a total force model for training the Army's reserve components is to define
and discuss the elements of such a model. The discussion should establish clearly the mission and function of the United States Army, the role of the three Army components in support of that mission and the goal of National Defense, and the present operational systems and procedures for accomplishing this goal. In addition, the structural elements of Army force development and the research findings must be appraised and integrated. This will lead to the development of basic assumptions concerning the current situation, the areas requiring change, and the direction these changes should take. The three steps combined—model elements, findings and assumptions—should thus form both a structural framework and a rationale for the proposed model, which is presented in Chapter III.

In establishing the basis for a force model, it is necessary at the outset to clarify the meaning of this paper's title: *A Total Force Model for Training the Army's Reserve Components*. This section will define and discuss each element of this title along with Army mission, roles and procedures as a focal point for the findings presented in the next chapter.

**Total Force**

The Total Force represents all military and related resources of the United States and its allies dedicated to the security of the Free World. It is the basis for all current U.S. Defense policy and is reflected within the U.S. Army in the term "Total Army." It is commonly used as an
(uncapitalized) adjective to describe something which embodies the principle of the Total Force--as in "total force" model.

**Total Army**

The concept of the Total Army is an outgrowth of the earlier "one Army" concept which was intended to form closer ties between the Regular Army, the Army Guard and the Army Reserve. It is significant that the U.S. Army is legally composed of one active and two reserve components--the Regular Army, the Army National Guard in the service of the United States (ARNGUS) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)--as well as the Army National Guard (ARNG) when federalized and every individual member of the Army serving without component. According to the U.S. Code, these elements come under the purview of the term "Army" or "Armies" as used in the Constitution of the United States. The Total Army is portrayed in Figure 2.

**Reserve Components**

The most important point about the reserve components is that they are an integral part of the Army, and are not the militia referred to in the U.S. Constitution. According to the U.S. Code, the militia of the United States is composed of two parts--the Organized Militia, consisting of the Army National Guard in the service of the individual states (ARNG), and the Unorganized Militia, consisting of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 17 and 45. Note that the term ARNGUS is not synonymous with the Army National Guard.
### TOTAL ARMY STRUCTURE - FY 1980

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#### Special Theater Forces
- 76,300
- 65,100

#### General Purpose Forces
- 311,400
- 260,300

#### Individual Forces
- 107,300
- 107,300
- (107,300)
- (107,300)

#### Strategic Forces
- 4,000
- 4,000

#### Mobility Forces
- 300
- 200

#### Operating SLA Div
- 1,123,500

### Examples
- Armored
- Mech
- Infantry
- Truck Companies
- Field Hospitals
- Maintenance Bns
- MP, Signal Spec
- Engr Topo

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**Figure 2**

**Note:**
- RC individuals are recruited against unit space. Thus, structure is shown with unit space dedicated to structure requirement.
- Manned/Paid Div strength dedicated to structure requirement.
- **USAR** Unmanned.
(ARNG). The ARNG is defined as a federally recognized land force organized, armed and equipped at Federal expense which appoints officers and conducts training under the provisions of the sixteenth clause, Section 8, Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which is the section dealing specifically with the militia, as opposed to the Army. The ARNGUS, on the other hand, is specifically a reserve component of the U.S. Army composed of selected units whose members are members of the ARNG. No such dichotomy exists in the USAR, which is entirely a reserve component of the U.S. Army under federal control. This legal relationship, confusing as it is, is the key to development of a Total Army structure, and should be subjected to closer scrutiny by qualified legal researchers. As used in this study, the term "reserve component" usually refers to forces or units not included within the active Army structure and serves as an adjective for both individuals and units, without making any distinction between ARNGUS and USAR.

**Army Mission**

As an element of the Total Force protecting Free World security, the U.S. Army is dedicated to the defense of our Nation under the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. In support of national defense, the Army's primary peacetime mission is to achieve and maintain a state of operational readiness, or "force readiness." Force readiness is measured in terms of the Total Army's ability to man, equip and train its forces and to mobilize, deploy and sustain (i.e., support)
them as required to accomplish assigned operational missions.\textsuperscript{36} When authorized by law, the Department of the Army directs the expansion of the active component through mobilization of RC units and individuals and by the activation of additional AC units.\textsuperscript{37} Hence, the primary mission of the two reserve components is to provide individuals who are trained and units which are organized, manned, equipped and ready for mobilization to augment AC forces.

**Force Development**

Examination of the Army mission for both AC and RC forces shows that the organization and structure of any single component of the Army cannot be developed in a vacuum, but should be addressed as part of the overall structure of the Total Force. To achieve the force readiness required of the Total Army, the Army functions within the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). The specific procedure used by DA for structuring Army forces is that of "force development." Force development is the process of translating projected DA resources into both time-phased programs and structure--expressed in dollars, equipment and units--necessary to accomplish assigned missions and functions.\textsuperscript{38} Since force development must support force readiness, proposed changes to the structure of the whole Army, a particular component or even a specific unit must consider more effective or efficient ways to man the force, equip the force, train the force, and, finally, support the force.
While all four of these factors must be considered simultaneously, my primary interest in conducting this study is in training the force.

One of the force development tools used in the Army today is the Division Force Equivalent (DPE). Note that in the Total Army Structure shown in Figure 2, the DPE guideline is based on the 24 present-day divisions (16 AC, 8 RC) and accounts for only 1,152,000 personnel spaces of the Total Army. The DPE guideline will also be used as a basis for structuring the force model in Chapter III, but will be applied in a slightly different manner.

Training

Within the framework of force development, training must be conducted to increase the combat skills of individuals, crews and units from their existing levels to a level which makes them fully combat-ready for mobilization and deployment. Under the present Army Training System, training is classified as either individual training to develop each Army member's MOS skills, or collective training to develop the teamwork and proficiency of a squad or crew. In addition, training is categorized as either formal institutional training in an Army or Unit School, or on-the-job unit training conducted within a TOE unit as part of its readiness training. The complete Army Training System also includes Training Development, which is the systematic analysis of Army jobs and equipment to produce standardized training materials, publications.
and training aids; Training Management, which is a systematic procedure designed to analyze training needs, provide resources, conduct and evaluate training; and Training Support, which is delivering the required training materials to individuals and units in the field at the right place, the right time, and in the right amounts. The training system, and its component parts, will be the subject of a planned follow-on study which will be based on the concepts of the force model developed during the present study.

Model

A model is simply a way to express the relationships between selected factors in order to simulate real or expected conditions and attempt to foresee the expected outcome of a course of action. Basically, models simplify a problem and focus the decision process, thus serving as an aid to the decisionmakers' judgment. There are four elements common to every model. These are:

* Definition of the Problem
* Principal Factors or Constraints
* Verification (establishing validity)
* Application of criteria (decision process).41

The validity of a given model depends on the accuracy of its basic assumptions, its correct portrayal of relationships and its selection of pertinent factors for inclusion in the model. While the validity of some types of models can be established by mathematical proof or controlled experiments,
the conceptual model being developed in this paper is of the type whose validity is established by testing its workability. Hence, the proposed model will fulfill its purpose if it is used as a decision-making guide for selective or phased implementation of the relationships it portrays.

To try to insure the usefulness of the model, it is necessary to consider the Army's planning for future force design of the active component. For several years, work has been progressing on the concept of "Division 36." Though not yet in its final form, it will eventually become the standard Army "heavy" division of the 1980's, incorporating all the new weapons systems scheduled to make their appearance in the Army inventory. Last year, however, another project was begun—the creation of a new design for a Light Infantry Division of the 80's. Since this is an ongoing active Army project, and since it does not rely heavily on new, expensive systems, it may offer a vehicle for a "total force" model on which to base reserve component TOEs. To investigate this possibility, the study, and the planning of the model, was conducted within the framework of a Light Infantry Division to meet the needs of the Total Force--Active, Guard and Reserve.

ASSUMPTIONS

This study is based on the following assumptions:

- Defects exist in the present force structure which can be corrected by appropriate legislation
Force development leading to a more appropriate Army structure must take place before an effective, standardized training system can be designed.

A model force structure based predominantly on a standardized, multi-purpose Light Infantry Division would reduce manpower and training problems by reducing the number of MOS codes found in RC units and making it more likely for an individual to serve in the same MOS if he transfers to a unit in another state.

The model need not conform to the present monetary and statutory differences between the Regular Army, the ARNGUS and the USAR.

All recommendations of the study must be feasible and capable of being brought about by appropriate legislation.

ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II will examine the existing problem in detail. The history and present status of the problem will be outlined through a review of existing Army studies and a summary of their findings. These findings will identify the principal factors and constraints acting upon the Army which must be considered for the proposed model to be valid. In addition, the findings should illustrate the relationships between the factors in order to verify the use of these same relationships in the model.
Findings presented in this chapter will range from the oldest principles of our nation embodied in the U.S. Constitution, to the most recent assessments and opinions of current military analysts. To ground the model solidly in reality and aid the reader in assessing the relative influence each finding will exert as a criterion for decisionmaking, the findings are identified and grouped in categories ranging from those criteria mandated by law to those criteria representing educated professional opinion.

Chapter III will present the model itself. A discussion and explanation of the model in terms of force structure, command and control, and personnel management techniques should demonstrate its relationship to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of previous research and offer realistic ideas for approaching a solution to the problem under study.

Chapter IV will present realistic suggestions for partial or gradual implementation of the model, consisting of conclusions and recommended actions. The thesis will close with the identification and discussion of areas in which further study should be undertaken.
CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES I

1 U.S. Army Training Support Center, USAR Schools Division, "TRADOC Circular 351-11, Reserve Component Individual Training Development (DRAFT)," Fort Eustis, VA, 15 Feb 79, p. 3.

2 Junior H. Burkhead, LTC, "The Revised Role of the Army National Guard in the Total Force Concept," (Student Essay, USAWC, [1973]), p. 4, quoting Secretary of Defense Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 73 Defense Budget and The 73-77 Program.


5 Ibid.

6 National Guard Bureau, "Fact Sheet No. 101-76," April, 1976.

7 Ibid.


13 Carr, op. cit., p. 2.


15 Ibid., p. 9.


17 Carr, op. cit., p. 3.

18 Ibid., p. 5.

19 Ibid., p. 3.

20 Ibid., from Review and Analysis, p. 2-6.

21 National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet Number 105-75, The National Guard in America's Wars, Jul, 75.

22 Review and Analysis, Table 1-1, p. 1-2.

23 The first two figures are minimum strengths established by the U.S. Code and documented in the findings in Chapter II (p. 39). The strength figure for the IRR is derived by subtracting minimum USAR selected Reserve Strength (260,000) from maximum authorized JSAR strength (980,000).

24 Carr, op. cit., pp. 5-8.


29. SOFOND, op. cit., Preface.


31. Ibid., p. 3-3.

32. SOFOND, op. cit., Preface.

33. USAR School Study, op. cit., p. 2-1.


35. Title 10, USC, Chapter 1 - "Definitions," §101 (10) (B).


38. C2, AR 310-2, 1 Jun 79.

40. USAR School Study, op. cit., p. 4-1.

CHAPTER II

THE FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the findings of the current research which illustrate the principal factors and constraints acting upon the Army today. These findings range from the oldest principles of our nation embodied in the U.S. Constitution, to the most recent assessments and opinions of current military analysts. They specify legal and regulatory constraints which shape the Army's present structure and activities as well as showing trends in policy and programs which will shape future Army structure. Appraisal and integration of the research findings should provide an accurate basis for conclusions concerning the current situation, the areas requiring change and the direction these changes should take and should thus form both a structural framework and a rationale for the proposed model which is to be presented in the following chapter.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Law of the Land

The United States Constitution is the foundation of all law in our nation. Its framers were so aware of the
necessity for national defense that they specifically charged the U.S. Congress with the following powers:

- To provide for the common defense
- To raise and support armies
- To make rules for the government and regulation of land forces
- To provide for calling forth the militia
- To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia.¹

Reserved specifically to the individual states is the appointment of militia officers and the authority for training the militia. However, the inverse wording of this passage assigns an additional power to the Congress; i.e., to prescribe the discipline for training the militia. Finally, at the end of the section, Congress is given the authority "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."²

These laws authorized by the Constitution are enacted by Congress and compiled in the fifty titles of the United States Code (USC). Title 10, USC contains those laws of an enduring nature which affect the organization and regulation of the Armed Forces. It was "enacted into positive law" by the Congress on August 10, 1956.³ It is revised periodically by acts of congress and is officially the law of the land. Yet, it is important to be aware that the provisions of the code may be modified or more narrowly
defined by other public laws or even by annual appropriation bills. For example, the Army's active component is authorized 837,000 personnel spaces by the USC but is funded for only 767,000 by the current appropriation bill. While discrepancies like this must be identified for accurate, detailed planning, the fact remains that the USC is the primary source of statutory guidance for structuring the total force.

In addition to the regulations imposed by Congress, Title 10 grants authority to the President to prescribe additional regulations as necessary. This authority is delegated selectively through Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Army (DA), and Major Army Command level. It is this title which establishes the Department of Defense and its functions. However, it establishes only two specific duties for the Secretary of Defense. First, he is to provide more effective, efficient and economical administration and operation and to eliminate duplication throughout DOD. A comparison of this wording with the definitions established at the beginning of this Title establishes two things: first, that this function is "imperative" for the Secretary to accomplish, and second, that the charge to eliminate duplication applies in equal measure to "all Reserve Components." The second duty of the Secretary is the obligation to report annually to the Armed Services Committees of both the House and the Senate. A later paragraph requires this report to specifically address both the condition of the reserve components...
and the state of current efforts to achieve more efficient operations and elimination of duplication. A further finding established by Title 10 is that Congress sets the personnel strength of the Selected Reserve as part of the annual appropriation process.

The remainder of this section will present specific provisions of the USC which have particular application to the model being developed. These findings are taken at face value since legal research to identify the effects of other public laws is beyond the scope of this thesis. The Code states that Congress must authorize annually the personnel end strength of active duty, selected Reserve and DoD civilian spaces based on the written recommendation and justification of the Secretary of Defense. This written report must relate national policies to unit missions and capabilities of each combat division as well as identify those support and overhead functions necessary to accomplish the combat missions. A further authorization which must be made by Congress, based on the Secretary of Defense's written recommendation, is the average student load for officer and enlisted initial entry training, as well as all individual training of service members in military and civilian institutions.

As set forth in the Code, the two reserve components of the Army are the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS) and the Army Reserve (USAR). Beginning 1 July
1971, the authorized **minimum** strength of the Selected Reserve for these two components was set by law at 400,000 ARNGUS and 260,000 USAR.\(^{11}\) This minimum must be maintained **exclusive** of ARNGUS or USAR personnel serving on extended active duty.\(^{12}\)

The primary purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units or qualified individuals to serve on active duty in the armed forces whenever more units and individuals are needed than are in the active component.\(^{13}\) Whenever Congress determines that national security so requires, appropriate RC units considered necessary for a balanced force will be ordered to active duty for as long as they are needed.\(^{14}\)

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for providing personnel, equipment, facilities and support to enable reserve component units and individuals to meet training and mobilization readiness requirements. He must report, in writing to the Armed Services Committees of both the House and the Senate, the extent to which RC units and individuals satisfied these requirements.\(^{15}\)

The Army has a Ready Reserve composed of units and individuals who are subject to activation both for training and during times of national emergency. The Selected Reserve is drawn from within the Ready Reserve of the ARNGUS and USAR. The organization and unit structure of the Selected Reserve is approved by the Secretary of Defense based on JCS contingency and war plans.\(^{16}\) The Ready Reserve
is subject to continuous screening to ensure that it has a proper balance of military skills and that there will not be a significant attrition of units or individuals in the event of a mobilization. There is also a Standby Reserve consisting of reserve component units and individuals neither in the Ready Reserve nor the Retired Reserve. Members of the Standby Reserve are in an inactive status and are not eligible for pay or promotion.

In addition to the various organizations within the active and reserve components, there is yet another type of organization established as law by the U.S. Code as shown in Figure 3. This organization is the Militia of the United States. It is divided into two classes: the organized militia and the unorganized militia. The organized militia is the National Guard and Naval Militia, as most people would expect. The composition of the unorganized militia, however, is virtually unknown to the average American citizen. By law, every able-bodied male citizen of the United States between the ages of 17 and 45 is a member of the unorganized militia. Moreover, exemptions to militia duty are few, and are specifically enumerated in the Code. For the most part, exemptions include only federal and state elected officials and judges, active members of the armed forces, mail carriers, and persons already involved in the manufacture or movement of war materiel. I believe this statutory requirement for near-universal militia duty can be an effective vehicle for calling
THE MILITIA

CHAPTER 13—THE MILITIA

Sec.
312. Militia duty: exemptions

§ 311. Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are commissioned officers of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia;

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.


§ 312. Militia duty: exemptions

(a) The following persons are exempt from militia duty:

(1) The Vice President.

(2) The judicial and executive officers of the United States, the several States and Territories, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone.

(3) Members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty.

(4) Customhouse clerks.

(5) Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of mail.

(6) Workmen employed in armories, arsenals, and naval shipyards of the United States.

(7) Pilots on navigable waters.

(8) Mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

(b) A person who claims exemption because of religious belief is exempt from militia duty in a combatant capacity, if the conscientious holding of that belief is established under such regulations as the President may prescribe. However, such a person is not exempt from militia duty that the President determines to be noncombatant.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 15.)
individuals for military training in lieu of a draft.

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army which as part of the Total Force will defend the United States, support national policies, implement national objectives, and overcome "any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States." It is national policy for the Army to be organized, equipped, and trained for prompt and sustained land combat. The Army is responsible for preparation of land forces and for expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The organized peace establishment of the Army consists of all military organizations and members of the Army necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the National Defense. The authorized military strength of the Army under the USC totals 2,417,000 for the three components (Active: 837,000; USAR: 980,000; ARNGUS/ARNG: 600,000).

Testimony Before the Senate

The current chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, Dem. GA., in his opening remarks for a hearing on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) on 20 June 1978, stated, "For Our Reserve Forces, current AVF policies are a dismal failure." He also pointed out that the Selected Reserve was then 50,000 personnel understrength and the Individual
Ready Reserve (IRR) was 300,000 understrength. Congressman Robin L. Beard, Dem. TN., testifying before the subcommittee, added that the IRR had declined from 900,000 to 154,000 in the past several years. He added that strength improvements in the active force were off-set by the use of soldiers for non-military jobs [borrowed military manpower], and concluded, "Most recruits view military service as just a job; the concept of duty, honor, and country as motivation for service has little meaning." Dr. John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, testified that the two biggest problems facing the AVF concerned the reserve components; i.e., were shortages of enlisted personnel in ARNG and USAR units compounded by the decline in the Army's pool of pre-trained individuals assigned to the IRR. In response to questions posed by Senator Nunn, Dr. White confirmed that this is an existing problem which adversely affects "those reserve units scheduled to deploy in the early phases of a major war."

In further testimony concerning joint corrective actions being undertaken by DOD and the Department of Labor, it was pointed out that the "impact on military requirements must be considered in developing any national service program." Referring to the annual expenditure by Congress of more than $13 billion to support the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), it was suggested that a "more efficient program that emphasizes training and education might actually be an aid
to military recruiting" since such a program could help prepare a larger percentage of the nation's population to meet military entrance standards.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{House of Representatives Report}

The Army Reserve is a federal force at all times, while the Army National Guard is a federal force only in wartime, unless ordered into federal service under existing laws. It is commanded in peacetime by the governors of the several states. According to a report by the House Committee on Appropriations, "peacetime management assistance is provided to both the Army Guard and Reserve through a confusing maze of redundant and inefficient organizations which, at times, are not even sure of their relationship to one another."\textsuperscript{31} Extensive duplication of functions among the CONUS Army staffs, Army Readiness Regions (ARR), Readiness Groups (RG) and regional advisors led the Committee to conclude that the ARR represents an unnecessary management echelon.\textsuperscript{32} Citing previous studies and reports, the Committee also noted that nearly 25\% of deployable USAR units had "no assigned mission during the first six months following mobilization" and that 345 of these units with over 25,000 members could not be supported in a reserve environment.\textsuperscript{33} Units which were the least ready had the least amount of full-time support, thus leading the Committee to endorse the full-time manning (FTM) program as a replacement for redundant organizations.\textsuperscript{34}
Concerning overstrength units, the Committee declared they did not object to excess personnel in combat units, but did object to overages in such units as military bands, military history units, etc.  

The Committee notes that the FY 80 budget reflects an increase of $4.1 million to transfer some of the overhead and indirect costs previously paid by the States in support of National Guard units. These costs would be transferred to the federal government "to improve relationships between the Federal Government and State and local government."  

Commenting on the test conversion of civilian technicians to full-time military manning, the Committee stresses that "the high cost of the civilian wage grade force is one of the paramount reasons in support of conducting the test in the first place." This year's appropriation bill terminates this test on 1 July 1980, and calls for a six month evaluation and review. It requires a detailed report to Congress by 31 December 1980, to include "specific recommendations on the desirability of elimination of dual status technicians..., cost effectiveness of technicians versus full-time military, impact on readiness, etc." These two examples illustrate the detailed interest Congress takes in military matters.  

Although Congress seems to be more willing to appropriate money for the Armed Forces during these times of international stress, their basic concern is the effectiveness of the fighting force. Representative Larry Hopkins of
Kentucky, underscored this point in an address to the House which acknowledged the necessity for increased funding for national defense. He warned against throwing money at a problem "in traditional Washington fashion," and urged Congress to make a calm assessment of our national needs and spend more carefully "to support the strongest, most capable military force possible. . . ." 39

In the same vein, Rep. Richard Nolan of Minnesota said, in his remarks before the House, "I certainly encourage my colleagues to take the time to visit Reserve units in their home States, and to develop a greater awareness of the critical need for a strong Reserve system in this country." 40

**Army Policy and Programs**

The Army Chief of Staff, in a recent White paper, provided a framework for molding the Army of the 80's into a disciplined, well-trained force. 41 In it, he called for flexibility in Army thinking as well as force structure, and identified the challenge "to bring the force structure into harmony in terms of its manning, equipment, and training--all keyed to missions." 42 He pointed out that while our NATO emphasis is on heavy forces, we must make appropriate force structure changes to include light, rapidly deployable antiarmor forces within a well-balanced total force. 43 He raises the possibility of structuring CONUS-based units with a mixture of active strength and reserve strength which would be determined by their required deployment date. 44 He calls for
"lean, hard-hitting combat forces," and notes that force structure requirements identified by such studies as Division 86 (Heavy) and Light Division 86 must ensure proper force balance from a Total Army standpoint. To meet the Army's major challenge of manning the force, the Chief of Staff points out the need for an improved personnel management strategy which can accurately identify personnel requirements over the long term. He notes the need for realistic training based on a clear linkage to wartime missions, and highlights the continuing shortage of pretrained manpower vital to mobilizing and deploying a balanced force. Individual training designed to produce "motivated, disciplined and physically capable soldiers who are equipped with those specific skills they need to survive in combat" must be integrated with simulations and wargaming to train commanders and staffs and with low-cost training devices to maintain proficiency. The Chief concludes his comments on training with the statement: "No task is more important than training as we face this decade."

The Army's mobilization objective is to maintain a peace-time posture which supports war-time mobilization plans, to include expansion of the training and support base. To this end, a program has been initiated to align reserve component units with their war-time chain of command. This is known as the Army Capstone Program. Capstone, developed by the U.S. Army Logistics Center in 1975, provides
a clearly defined organizational format for force planning by grouping "force packages" of related AC and RC units and linking them to their most logical higher headquarters. This allows units in each Capstone grouping to associate their mobilization planning and conduct peacetime training with the same units with which they will deploy in wartime. Command relationships for Guard and Reserve units remain unchanged during peacetime, but upon mobilization the entire "package" of units comes under the command of the senior headquarters in the group and either deploys to Europe or provides stateside support.

In support of this concept, and as a result of the Army Command and Control Study 82 (ACCS-82), the Army is now testing ways to simplify the maze of control and assistance headquarters referred to in the Report by the House Appropriations Committee. On 26 October 1979 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved all ACCS-82 study recommendations which would not actually alter the present organizational structure. Then, on 26 March 1980, the VCSA approved the conversion of the nine ARRs into Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR) and assigned them the responsibility for coordinating Guard and Reserve unit mobilization plans. As this conversion requires 96 additional manpower spaces to support the mobilization planning function, it has not yet gained House Appropriations Committee approval as a means to identify "savings" in the command structure. This is how critical every manpower space has become.
Current policy calls for all mobilization manpower needs to be met from within the existing A2/RC force structure for the first 30 days following a mobilization. The Selective Service System will begin providing inductees after 30 days, and is expected to mobilize 100,000 citizens within 60 days.\(^5\) During a mobilization, DA will direct the expansion of the active component through mobilization of reserve component units and individuals and the activation of additional AC units.\(^5\) RC units which are scheduled to deploy within the first 30 days are called "M-Day Designated Units" and are available for immediate order to active duty upon alert notification. M-Day Designated Units must begin mobilization within 24 hours of alert, while all other RC units must begin mobilization within 7 days of alert notification.\(^5\) Post-mobilization training programs for most units will be developed based on their status of training on M-Day and will concentrate on preparing them for their wartime mission. To successfully complete post-mobilization training, each unit must achieve a readiness condition (RDCON) equal to or greater than its authorized level of organization (ALO).\(^5\) However, some units, designated "Direct Employment" units, are allowed no post-mobilization time and must be prepared for immediate employment in combat.\(^5\) In some cases, units must deploy to their mobilization stations or to the Port of Embarkation by motor march in their organic vehicles for a distance up to 800 miles.
The following section will present data from government studies evaluating the success of previous mobilizations.

**Army Studies and Reports**

There have been any number of studies conducted by agencies of the Army in an effort to evaluate reserve component problems and suggest reasonable solutions. In addition, the Department of Defense has often contracted with outside agencies for similar studies. These studies are often of considerable importance since their recommendations are frequently adopted as Army policy, as was illustrated by the ACCS-82 recommendations discussed in the previous section. Unfortunately, a thorough review of all significant Army studies of the last decade is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, several studies will be discussed in this section which, it is hoped, will provide the reader an overview of recent study findings and recommendations for improving the reserve components.

A recent study of the Army's Total Force Program conducted by the California National Guard quoted General Weyand, former Army Chief of Staff, as saying: "Today the first vital battles must be fought with whatever force is in being and ready. To a greater degree than in the past, our peacetime Army will be our wartime Army. It must be ready, both Active and Reserve Components." In commenting on total force planning for the Army, the study states: "The
role of the reserve component in the total force structure can only be evaluated in terms of the reserves' ability to accomplish their mission. The mission, in turn, is a factor of the strategy to be supported. It then suggests several policy guidelines essential to total force planning. These guidelines include setting appropriate reserve missions in support of a realistic national strategy, new management structures in line with the Total Force Policy, and insuring that reserves have adequate manpower, equipment, training and logistical support. One recommendation for improving shortfalls in reserve component readiness was to alter the DOD/DA management structure so that management of the Total Army reflects a recognition of the importance of today's reserve role. Additionally, policies causing different treatment of reservists must cease; this could be the basis for instituting a universal identification card for all members of the Total Force.

Several conclusions of the Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations are pertinent to the development of a total force model. Having judged the mobilization of World War II as "totally inadequate" and all following mobilizations as only "marginally" successful, the study goes on to state that the present-day reserve system "now produces units composed of individuals with the least experience at a time when presumably the need is greatest for the most experienced personnel so that training time after mobilization can be
minimized." It characterizes as "virtually unique among military forces" the U.S. Army's failure to include some active duty personnel within RC units and notes that civilian technicians are helpful but are not provided in sufficient numbers. This points out the need for a permanent infrastructure composed of military and civilian spaces which would support the peacetime administrative and logistic management of reserve component units.

The study also comments, somewhat drily, on the fact that apparently the "perceived need" for rapid reserve combat readiness has never been strong enough for Congress to appropriate money for sufficient equipment, training sites and facilities for RC units. It also cautions against organizing RC units at too high level, stating: "Large formations such as divisions and brigades require more training time and experienced leadership than smaller formations such as battalions." A move to battalion sized units was actually made over three restructurings which occurred prior to and during the Viet Nam conflict. This was a change from the previous divisional structure in effect during other mobilizations, as shown in the chart below.

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<tr>
<th>MOBILIZATION</th>
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<tr>
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<td>USAR</td>
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Although the change to fewer divisions resulted in more units having a higher percentage of personnel, these personnel were still no better branch/MOS qualified than in previous mobilizations. One reason for this was the necessity--under the current system--of recruiting all the members of a given unit from the local area. In a unit with a high density of highly technical skills, there simply weren't enough personnel qualified in that skill who lived within commuting distance. Further, these same skills are not suited for on-the-job training in a unit because they ordinarily require extensive formal active-duty training as a prerequisite for MOS qualification. Therefore, in the absence of effective unit training programs for highly technical skills, many personnel remained unqualified.

A recommendation made by the Board for Dynamic Training in 1971 would assist in solving this type of training problem. Their recommendation was to match unit training missions to the manning level of each unit as illustrated in the following figure:

MATCH TRAINING MSN TO MANNING LEVELS

| BN Fully Trained to Perform TOE Combat MSN | 110% |
| CO Level Tng | 90% |
| Plt/Composite CO Tng | 80% |
| Sqd or Composite Plt Tng | 70% |
| Individual Tng | 60% % of |
| Cadre Tng | 40% Full TOE |

Figure 4
In 1972, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) concurred in this recommendation. In a letter to DA, they remarked that in cases where a unit's assigned strength failed to match its authorized strength, the next higher headquarters should appraise the unit's capability for mission accomplishment and either provide the necessary resources or eliminate impossible missions; using the figure developed by the board as a frame of reference. 71

**DOD and DA Studies**

At about this same time, a study of reserve component readiness commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified 33 concepts for improving RC readiness. In 1972, CONARC, and at a later date, FORSCOM tested and evaluated 11 of these concepts. 72 A study was made of time required for RC units to achieve battalion-level proficiency under post-mobilization conditions and of procedures for affiliation of AC and RC units for training and deployment. 73 Test results showed that none of the three RC battalions tested were able to achieve the required level of proficiency. 74 Augmentation by full-time RC training cadre failed to significantly improve training readiness because cadre members in the test units concentrated on unit administrative, supply and maintenance activities rather than unit training. This did result in fewer Army General Inspection (AGI) deficiencies and improved unit operations during Inactive Duty Training (IDT), however. 75 On the other hand, active Army support did
have beneficial effects on unit training proficiency, leading to the conclusion that "the roundout concept, in general, was feasible." A further finding was that active Army divisions operating at 80% strength and then filled to 100% strength by Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) replacements did not degrade battalion proficiency.

A significant recommendation of the study was a re-definition of the traditional IDT/AT training model. In the present "plateau" model, IDT training is geared toward reaching a certain level of proficiency while AT is the means to confirm the attainment of this level. In the recommended "iterative" model, AT would be a period of intensive training which would assess any shortfalls between the unit's performance and its mobilization requirements, while IDT would be a period of sustained training devoted to consolidating lessons learned during AT and aggressively correcting specific selected deficiencies. The study emphasized, however, that such a model demands effective IDT training through more effective use of IDT training time. This could be accomplished through continual dynamic training management, increased ratio of time spent training to time spent preparing to train, and the use of full-time training cadres, either AC or RC, in RC units. Additionally, the study identified two prerequisites for effective RC training: reduction of high personnel turnover rates and improvement in RC leadership. This would require appropriate monetary compensation and "a vigorous
adherence to the current standards for the demonstration of acceptable leadership."\(^8\) In its summary, the study concludes that "Reserve Component readiness will require a combination of time, funds and direct Active Army involvement."\(^8\)

It then points out that under historical conditions of long mobilization times it was more cost effective to maintain the reserves on a low level of premobilization funding and then release funds for a post-mobilization "surge" in the event of national emergency. As the study points out: "Surge readiness, when needed, could be purchased at a high cost but at a lower total cost than if continual readiness were maintained."\(^2\) But, as mobilization warning times decrease due to the reliance on mobilization of RC as first line of support in lieu of the draft, the cost effectiveness balance actually shifts the other way. "In short, if faster deployment is desired, the cost of readiness is going to increase— an increase that will have to be borne in the premobilization period."\(^3\) The study concludes: "more efficient training will cost more in terms of better facilities and the use of more active Army assets. If time becomes the one element in the Reserve component training equation the amount of which cannot be increased, then it must be realized that the amount of funds and resources expended must be increased."\(^4\)

The problems of retention and leadership stressed by the previous study were the subjects of a 1975 National Guard
Bureau Manpower Study. The subjects of this study were selected entirely from the Missouri National Guard. It found that additional income was the primary reason given for reenlistment by all enlisted participants in the study, regardless of pay grade or income level. In addition, 34% of all respondents joined initially for additional income. In the over 35 age group, 69% said that their Guard pay went for a specific purpose and 73% rated retirement as an important reason for joining the Guard. This indicated to the study's author a growing dependence on Guard pay to supplement the family income of the older group. The study also showed that 34% of all respondents use their National Guard skills in civilian life, while 50% use their civilian skills in military life.

Some of the "dissatisfiers" listed by the respondents were: annual training, family attitude toward the Guard, and employer attitude. The study revealed that only one out of four employers was favorable to the National Guard.

The study recommends that commanders stress timely promotions and enlistment bonuses for young Guard members and that career counselors emphasize additional income. Drill periods should be made meaningful through increased training and exercise of the members' highest level of skills. AT periods should not be limited to the summer months. Leadership should be improved. Benefits, including retirement, should be made equal to those of the active component. In summary, the study concludes: "The single most important factor in retaining members is instilling the concept that
each member is performing a useful function."\textsuperscript{90}

The remainder of this section will contain a discussion of the findings of a recent study of mobilization readiness prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The focus of the study is on nondivisional engineer and combat service support units programmed for early deployment to Europe.\textsuperscript{91}

Concerning mobilization readiness, the study concludes that most early deploying units are incapable of fully performing their mobilization mission, if mobilized now, due to low personnel strength and deficiencies in their individual and collective training level.\textsuperscript{92} It further concludes that the "volunteer militia-type RC system" based on recruiting members who live within a 50-mile radius of the unit's peacetime location is ineffective, particularly in the case of units which require specialized technical skills.\textsuperscript{93}

Concerning training, the conclusions are that most RC units do not meet FORSCOM deployment standards, training programs are not based on post-mobilization missions, and IDT training is mostly ineffective due lack of "hands-on" training and the "extensive and complex" coordination required among the unit and the different RC chains of command.\textsuperscript{94}

Lack of authorized personnel strength, inaccuracies in strength reporting, and personnel turbulence have an adverse effect on the ability to accomplish the mission.
Loss of personnel before completion of their enlistment aggravates training problems and increases recruiting demand. Company-sized units are often split between two or more towns and are poorly located in terms of demographic considerations and the recruiting market. There is also a variety of equipment deficiencies.\(^5\)

A synopsis of the major recommendations of the study includes:\(^6\)

-- DA should develop organizational structure, missions and supporting policies based on analysis of the total system for manning, equipping, training, mobilizing and deploying RC units

-- Mobilization force planners must realize that RC units scheduled for deployment without post-mobilization training will be incapable of mission performance under the present system

-- Consideration should be given to a system of nationwide recruiting for some types of technically oriented RC units which includes incentives and training opportunities other than existing IDT programs

-- A premobilization "core" of essential mission-related training tasks should be identified and non-mission-essential requirements placed on RC units should be reduced or eliminated

-- The cost/effectiveness of subdividing company-sized units in different locations should be studied with a view toward consolidating a unit in one community
--The causes of personnel turbulence in units should be evaluated to increase retention and stabilize unit training programs.

--Units should be supplied with mission-essential equipment and training in its use in accordance with the deployment schedule. Lesser amounts of TOE equipment would require later deployment of the unit.

Opinions of Military Analysts

In the preceding sections I have presented findings ranging from the requirements of Constitutional Law to the recommendations of official studies which form a skeletal framework for any model which is to be legally and organizationally feasible. Fleshing out the model can only be achieved by considering the conclusions and professional opinions advanced by those who wear the uniform. This section presents recommendations from military members of all three components of the Total Army. The major source for these recommendations is the published essays of both resident and non-resident attendees at the U.S. Army War College. Unfortunately, the findings presented here are only a very small sample from a large volume of works by senior military analysts. This is a source which merits a great deal more research by those interested in contemporary military thought.

Understandably, many of the writings of contemporary analysts are based on the writings of General George
Washington who has been one of the profound influences on American military thinking for 200 years. His "Thoughts on a Peace Establishment" and other letters are often referred to in current essays. According to Adamson, in 1783, George Washington recommended to the Continental Congress the establishment of a "well-organized militia, upon a plan that will pervade all states, and introduce similarity in their Establishment, Maneuvers, Exercise and Arms." Based on his personal experience in trying to unify and lead an Army whose officers were appointed by different colonial governors, Washington felt the militia should have common training and organization and that its officers should be federally appointed. This proposal for a "national militia" caused such an outcry when he presented it before the U.S. Congress in 1790 that the idea was summarily dismissed. Not until the National Defense Act of 1916 did the present system evolve of federal recognition of state-appointed officers who serve on active duty.

Adamson notes that the cadre of a reserve unit which had seen service in Viet Nam considered their post-mobilization unit training to be of more value than their actual combat experience. Yet, the present law forbids mobilization of RC units except in time of emergency. He suggests the law be amended to allow RC units to mobilize for training for periods of 60 to 90 days, and that such mobilization be required every five years. He does not advocate this system
for units not scheduled for early deployment and he points out that subtle employer discrimination might prove a valid objection despite existing legal reemployment rights for Reserves. He contends, however, that a Reserve--like a full-time professional soldier--is a special type citizen, and that many Reserves find having two professions both challenging and rewarding. The necessary recruiting incentives for such a program--liberal retirement, pride, extra money and citizenship responsibilities--are, he concludes, already in existence in today's system.\footnote{103}

Odegard addresses the question of the most effective use of RC drills in his examination of the USAR additional drill program.\footnote{104} He points out the flexibility of this program and cautions against overregulating the program.\footnote{105} In response to Odegard's survey, 93 out of a sample of 95 unit commanders said that the improvement in their unit training justified continuing the additional drill program. When asked how many drills they would require for the unit as a whole, 55 commanders preferred the present 48 drills while the only other significant block (17 commanders) wanted 60 drills per year.\footnote{106} Odegard concludes that while there are some units who do not need 48 drills a year to maintain company-level proficiency, the selective variation of required drills on a unit-by-unit basis, coupled with additional drills, would promote readiness gains.\footnote{107} The overwhelming response from the units was that additional
drills for key personnel resulted in effective planning which made training more meaningful during regular full unit drills and increased both proficiency and retention. After examining possible disadvantages to this course of action, Odegard suggests that unit effectiveness in the event of a mobilization would be provided by spreading the extra drills across a wider segment of the unit, with an upper limit of 12 extra drills for any one individual.

Gross, in his study of the present zero draft environment, points out that since the reserve components interface directly with a large segment of the public, they are a key element in shaping positive public opinion crucial to a volunteer Army. He suggests that any positive steps taken to shape public opinion rest on the individual Reserve's positive attitude toward his mission and his unit. To achieve this, Gross, like many military analysts represented in the present research, points to the need for effective, meaningful training and capable leadership. He notes that "in the final analysis, it is the enlisted man, satisfied or dissatisfied, who will usually make the greatest impact on the potential recruit." He concludes that monetary inducements are not the only significant factor here, but that quality leadership, fewer reorganizations (with resulting MOS mismatch), career development that takes into account civilian career skills, and equal benefits are also important. He concludes that "perhaps
the most positive step a unit commander can take is to provide the Reservist with important and meaningful functions while attending scheduled drills." Gross strongly objects to the DOD position of cutting the authorized strength of the reserve components because of a shortage of volunteers rather than to take appropriate steps to recruit the size force required by national defense needs.

In his study of the total force, Leon states: "The basic concept of a 'Total Force' has in itself provided a renewed sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now see the requirements and roles they must fill in future emergencies." He then addresses the problem of scattering the units of a division across several states with resulting command and control problems, and points out that a step in the right direction has been taken by moving four National Guard divisions each within the boundary of a single state. Discussing equipment, he points out that while the reserve components have 71% of the equipment needed for training, 25% of it is obsolete, and only 53% of the equipment needed for mobilization is on hand. He also points out that DOD seems to use the reserve components as a repository and maintenance activity for old equipment which is then taken away and issued to allies. He supports this with figures from 1975 showing that of 2,549 tanks in the National Guard, only 796 were considered combat ready, while more than 750 combat ready M60s and M48A3s had been shipped
to foreign nations since 1973, with an additional 500 approved for shipment in FY 75. Leon concludes that it is mandatory to make the investment in adequate equipment due to the new status of RC units in the Total Force, and he also points out that a combat division of the Guard can be maintained for approximately 10% of the cost of an identical AC division, though it should not be assumed that citizen-soldier forces can supplant active forces. Another equipment-related problem is that equipment locations at weekend training sites may be a two to three hour drive from the unit, resulting in ineffective armory training without the opportunity for "hands-on." This contributes to low morale and motivation. Leon believes that the affiliation program will increase hands-on training, diminish the common feeling among active troops that Reserves are somehow "less than equal members of the Army team," and allow RC commanders to benefit from the experience of active component commanders without lessening their own authority or responsibility.

Bradford's study of the management of National Guard divisions sheds additional light on the problem of splitting divisions among several states as well as addressing the feelings of Guardsmen toward their involvement with the active component. Bradford's statement: "Most National Guard leaders today would be somewhat reluctant to accept a concept envisioning active Army personnel commanding or serving in Guard organizations," is mild compared with his subsequent observation that his conversations with Guardsmen
disclosed their "adamant position" against the idea. He acknowledges that this attitude has a 300 year old historical basis rooted in the deep resentment felt by colonial militia officers over the "second-class" status accorded them by English Law. However, he points out that the primary reason for this feeling today results from the continuing ability of the Guard to accomplish objectives without the direct participation of the active component. Bradford is speaking from a 1973 standpoint. Hopefully, the recent successes of the roundout program have done a great deal to break down the mutual suspicion which has always prevailed between the Citizen-Soldier and the Regular. For example, a recent article reports that the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Louisiana National Guard, is now considered to be the 3d Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division ("The Red Devils") at Fort Polk. "How can the 256th belong to the Louisiana Army National Guard and be part of an active Army division at the same time?" asks the article. The answer lies in a roundout concept which links the brigade to the division for training, mobilization and deployment while retaining its peacetime control by the governor and the Adjutant General of Louisiana. A significant point is that brigade members wear the Red Devil patch and consider themselves an integral part of the division without weakening their loyalty to the Guard and their state nor their ability to perform state missions. BG Ansel
former commander of the 256th Brigade, stresses that there is a clear understanding with Fort Polk that the 256th is a National Guard unit under state control. He also adds, "You hear a lot about differences between the Guard and the Active Army, but I've found most of them to be figments of somebody's imagination. They're just not there." In a similar vein, Bradford points out that all Guard divisions mobilized during World War I, World War II, and the Korea Conflict were infused before deployment with both draftees and regular Army personnel, and that this mix proved highly successful. He says, "All the once-Guard divisions employed overseas accomplished their missions with professionalism and courage."  

The most serious problem now plaguing the Guard—the scattering of units of the same command across several states—had its origin in a plan developed in 1965 to take the eight National Guard divisions (reduced from the previous 22) which were located in each of eight states and spread them over a 20-state area. Despite objections from the former CONARC commander and many National Guard leaders, the plan was carried out in 1968. The Army's reasons for adopting this plan were dubious at best, with the exception of preventing excessive casualties from one state. The reorganization may have been an appropriate action at the time, but even if that is true, it is woefully unsuited to the current situation. Problems that now exist include:
battalion headquarters and their subordinate units may be in different states, controlled by different governors.

- The division commander's authority is limited by his "out-of-state" status in relation to his brigades in other states.

- Brigade officers cannot serve on division staff unless they move to the state which has the division base.

- Training priorities and resources differ from state to state no matter what the division training plan says.

- Brigade commanders being forced to answer to two headquarters and two commanders violates the principle of clear command channels.

- There is an undercurrent of resentment among brigade personnel that command of the unit comes from another state.

- Ultimate result is a degradation in division readiness.

Bradford points out that the strong state relationship felt by most Guardsmen must be recognized and managed as a strength rather than a weakness. He says, "Any attempt to circumvent or minimize the strong state allegiance would have disastrous effects upon the morale of its personnel and esprit-de-corps of the Guard units." 129

This problem has grown to such proportion that "it begs a modern solution." 130 Bradford asks the question,
"What type organization can be used that will draw on the strengths of the National Guard and the active Army while diminishing the weaknesses inherent in any reserve component program?" He concludes, "Perhaps the time has arrived for a totally new approach to readiness and its associated problems. A course of action is needed that will require very little change in dollars budgeted, but a gigantic change in perception, attitude, and understanding." His recommendations include:

- couple the active and guard components into functioning organizations from division level to company level
- provide opportunities for infusion of active personnel into guard units and guard personnel into active units, while retaining the constitutional provision for peacetime control of guard units by governors
- phase all NG division HHC's, support command HHC's and division artillery HHB's out of the guard inventory into an active status
- relocate these headquarters to nearest Army installation
- consolidate combat support and service units into battalion-sized units each located within the boundaries of a single state
- fill TOE positions of activated headquarters elements with a 50/50 mix of active component and Guard personnel on two-to-four-year tours of active duty
allow active members to work for guard members and vice-versa when they are serving in the same unit

- make the division staff an active, functioning, day-to-day unit oriented toward planning, achieving and sustaining realistic unit readiness

- enact appropriate federal and state legislation to implement this concept.

Bradford concedes that these proposals are a radical departure from present-day concepts and admits that there are many obstacles blocking their implementation, "not the least of which is acceptance by governors, Guard and active Army leaders." But he notes that the National Guard exists primarily to provide combat ready units to augment the active component. "Guard units are authorized for Defense needs not state needs" and 90% of the support for Guard units comes from the Federal budget. Having prepared for its Federal mission, then, a "Guard TO&E unit, highly trained, adequately supported, and professionally led can perform almost any state mission one can visualize ...." Finally, Bradford points out that under the Total Force concept, with Guard divisions being assigned missions nearly equal to active division missions, the Army can no longer afford to sprinkle a few active advisors around the RC environment, but must make the commitment "to bring both Active and National Guard personnel into units together learning respect for each other's professionalism and dedication to the defense of the United States."
Gill's examination of NG command and control pursues many of these same ideas. Section 501, Title 32, U.S. Code implements the legal provisions set forth in the Constitution in regard to ARNG training. It says, in part, "the discipline, including training, of the Army National Guard shall conform to that of the Army," and "... the training of the National Guard shall be conducted by the several states and territories." As Gill points out, "since the training of the National Guard must conform to that of the Army, the Army must provide the policy and procedural framework for ARNG training." He notes that the mechanism for this was provided by the creation of the U.S. Army Forces Command.

Concerning ARNG command and control, Gill says, "some recommend and advocate all-out command and control of ARNG units by active Army personnel while some contend that the Army must have a firmer hand in controlling National Guard activities. The truth is that most active Army officers have little knowledge about the Guard since they have little need to know and few opportunities to learn about it." Gill lists 7 recommendations made in The Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces (1 Sep 72) which he says are unacceptable to the Guard. Of these, the recommendation to delegate training supervision of designated early deploying RC units to specified Class I installation commanders has since been instituted, at least in the case
of the Red Devil Division and its Guard Brigade at Fort Polk.
Three others, I believe, should be reconsidered in light of
the present research:

- equal consideration of all reserve officers of the
  Army for federally-funded long-tour assignments in the ARNG
  and USAR
- DA encouragement of states to separate the
  political and military functions which are now combined in
  the office of the state Adjutant General, and
- final authority for retention of all officers of
  the Total Army to rest with DA.\textsuperscript{142}

In discussing the disadvantages of the present RC
force structure, Rogers makes the following points:

- many combat support units are so sophisticated and
  their training mission so complex that there is no capability
  for mission-oriented training at home station during unit
  drills
- non-standard arrangements for command and control
  of units have been devised whereby the intermediate head-
  quarters is not an organic arrangement for the control of
  units so assigned
- units with high incidence of built-in problems
  require greater leadership capability to produce an effec-
  tive unit.\textsuperscript{143}

Rogers contends that "those units which have a bene-
"ficial purpose or a civilian correlation to their mission have
the greatest potential to maintain high strength and
effectiveness, and cities as examples. Engineer, Medical and Military Police units. He believes that these type units, along with Artillery, Armor, and Signal, should be retained in the force structure as presently constituted. He also proposes the organization of specific general support and depot maintenance units oriented toward maintaining the equipment of the proposed force structure. All other units, according to Rogers, should be standardized "neuter" units organized alike and oriented to training in small unit tactics and use of basic infantry weapons. Their training would emphasize basic soldiering and unit operations, with a heavy reliance on discipline and field training. Interested readers are referred to Rogers' study for a more detailed explanation and rationale of his proposed unit. I believe, however, that the important benefits seen by Rogers (e.g., dynamic standardized training, high esprit-de-corps, leadership development, efficient administration, and ability to operate as cadre units capable of accepting trained individual fillers) can also be realized by the "Light Division 86" program without having to create the concept of a non-TOE "neuter" unit.

In his study of USAR combat service support units, Koelling gives numerous detailed examples of support units with no one to support. Not only are they not given a mission to support functioning AC or RC units in their area, they are also prevented--by regulations, union rules, and,
sometimes, just plain indifference or hostility—from performing useful exercise of their military skills in support of the local community.\textsuperscript{148} In many instances, college-educated Reservists spend their drill periods pushing "empty corrugated cartons from one side of a room to the other pretending they are mail sacks . . ." or listening to "some horse's rear teaching a class in map reading." Although Koelling realizes the value of \textit{appropriate} simulations in training, he finds little evidence of it in the present RC environment. He quotes BG John E. Thames, USAR: "Unless we have imagination and freedom on the part of the individual commander to train his unit by participating in real activities in the community and in support of Government activities, we will lose our intelligent people."\textsuperscript{149}

Koelling's recommendation is to use support units in their actual role as organic support to the existing Army force structure. Among the examples he cites\textsuperscript{150} are weekend line haul of supplies from Class I installations to RC units; and laundry, renovation and baking services furnished directly to customer units on a regular basis. I think this is an excellent suggestion. He also points out, however, that in many cases this is not allowed by current Army regulations.

In Gordon's study of motivation in the Reserves,\textsuperscript{151} he rejects the view that increased bonuses can attract or retain qualified personnel in the face of pointless training
and meaningless, unchallenging work. He concludes that the fostering of more soldier satisfaction "would require re-

novation of the Department of the Army's policy; restructure of the organizational configuration, personnel policies and practices; and even a modification of mission," but that "revolutionary innovations must be developed within the military framework that has existed, essentially unchanged, since the early 1900s." Gordon says "there is evidence that the training in the Reserve components is the single major change that could make retention less of a problem." He also points out evidence that the prevalent feeling that American youth are anti-military is not supported by fact, and cites a 1974 University of Michigan study in which the military was ranked first among 15 public and private institutions which included large corporations and Federal agencies. He concludes that the Guard and Reserve can be competitive for the time, interest, energy and loyalty of today's youth "because the opportunity to find meaningful relationships, interesting work, and some personal recognition can be a reality even on a part-time basis." Quoting Augustus Thomas, he says "Creditable performance and a sense of accomplishment are the things esprit are [sic] made of." Gordon lays the burden squarely on today's Army leaders and commanders to use innovative tools of management and training to develop that esprit.
In their study of the Affiliation Program, 157 Samuels and Nomey include many statements by RC unit commanders which shed an interesting light on the success of the program. The program was developed from a limited test in 1970 at Fort Hood, Texas, based on the realization that "for too many years, the Active Army has simply been the 'evaluator' of training in the reserve components, not having a direct responsibility in monitoring and assisting in training."

They find there are many cases where RC equipment is either incompatible with or requires significantly different support from AC equipment; and in some cases, the affiliated unit is separated from its sponsor unit by relatively long distances. 159 An interesting point they raise is that ARR's, through their Readiness Groups, can assist in writing CPX's and FTX's and in preparing complete training plans that neither the sponsor division nor the affiliated RC brigade have the time or resources to accomplish. 160 However, statements by RC commanders indicate that following the initial assistance, and as the division begins to provide direct, close support of the brigade, the need for ARR involvement diminishes. 161 Samuels and Nomey conclude:

"It is likely that the regions and groups will provide less assistance to the affiliated units, but... they will continue to coordinate assistance outside the capability of the sponsor divisions or when technical assistance may be needed." 162
Their research shows that affiliation is clearly an effective program, but they add a word of caution that training priority "must first be directed to increased proficiency at 'the cutting edge'. Well-trained squads, sections, and platoons, who can execute orders and missions as efficient teams, are essential before any advanced training level can be attained." The findings and comments of this study (e.g., one Guard brigade noted that before the program, each unit had to develop its own staff training and then train its own instructors) illustrate an important Army training concept, i.e., centralized training development and planning should be coupled with decentralized conduct of training. In their summation, Samuels and Nomy advise that RC units participating successfully in the program must be willing to give and take. They "must accept the fact that the Active Army is well-qualified to plan training and does possess the expertise to present a meaningful training program."

Main, in his study of the citizen-soldier makes a case for mission type training of RC units. He also stresses community relations, since RC units are in a remarkable position to explain defense needs and demonstrate citizenship responsibilities. Main says that in the society in which we now live, "the regular must be ever the better citizen, and the minuteman must be ever the willing and trained soldier."
He further makes a very cogent point concerning military costs in relation to the market economy thinking which seems to afflict many force planners today. Military forces are not, Main says, "designed to produce goods or services in an economic sense for a nation. They do render a service indispensable to nations through the ages--its security against enemies, within and without." 167

In his study of the strengths and weaknesses of the Selected Reserve Force, Woolridge states,

As we enter an era when members of the Guard and Reserve will be required to fulfill a heightened role in the defense of the United States, the best possible approaches to administration, logistics and training requirements must be employed to carry out the new policies announced by the Secretary of Defense. An examination of the recent Selected Reserve Force (SRF) program reveals that many excellent procedures were used to very good advantage and will be helpful in formulating new directives, programs, and plans. Some SRF procedures were ineffective and should be avoided." 168

His recommendations include:

- divide the reserve force into three groups, each with a balanced mix of combat, combat support and combat service support units. Then assign each group a training category, based on desired readiness level and support priority

- rotate the status of these groups each year so that the priority group is assigned a training mission and given the necessary equipment and resources to achieve maximum readiness. At the end of the year, the high priority group would revert to the lowest priority (but would be
allowed to keep its equipment) and the other two groups would advance in priority and continue to increase their level of training. Note that the priority group could be retained in that status even as the next group moved up if the international situation warranted an increased level of alert

* avoid the prevailing atmosphere of a "crash training program" generated by the SRF policy of requiring 50% more unit drills during the year. An alternative probably more acceptable to the public would be to increase annual training from 15 to 21 days per year. This was authorized under existing National Guard Regulation 45, *Training Army National Guard* (15 Apr 68). [This regulation has since been rescinded]

* streamline administrative tasks required for mobilization so that only a few tasks are required upon actual mobilization.169

In commenting on administrative mobilization tasks, Burkhead170 notes that some members of SRF units mobilized for the Viet Nam Conflict had to wait four months for validation of their security clearances at Fort Carson when their clearances had already been authenticated by Fifth Army Headquarters. He also reports on two SRF brigades which were expected to complete their post-mobilization training in eight weeks. After evaluation at their mob station the estimates were changed to 13 weeks for one and 11 weeks for the other. The actual time required to achieve the necessary
A TOTAL FORCE MODEL FOR TRAINING THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS.
Concerning pre-mobilization training, Burkhead says, "Every commander at every level should be asking the question, 'Is my unit training preparing my troops for commitment within the total force concept? Is my unit prepared for mobilization physically, psychologically, technically, and tactically?'" He states that unit training both at home station and at AT must be a preparation for the unit's contingency mission. This gives rise to the idea that each AT could serve as a practice mobilization in accordance with a prepared mobilization plan keyed to the deployment mission. Burkhead recommends that all staff training, such as CPX's and map exercises, must also be keyed to the unit's specific mobilization mission, and points out that planning will be more involved and training more effective if the mission is real. This also contributes to recruiting and retention since it provides a tangible objective. Burkhead's final recommendation is to furnish complete and adequate mobilization guidance to all commanders which insures close and continuous communication among RC units, support installations and mobilization stations. He concludes, "Planning should be a joint and completely integrated activity where communication is open, ideas freely exchanged and mutual agreements achieved as to the best utilization of the Reserve Components in support of our national strategy."
In his study of reserve readiness, Zabych says "Historical precedence indicates that the greatest deterrence to a potential aggressor is the maintenance of a strong active Army supported by a Reserve that is fully trained, manned and equipped for rapid mobilization." Like other military analysts, he stresses major deficiencies in the areas of administration, logistics and motivational factors. His recommendations include:

- establish administrative support units to accomplish personnel and financial actions normally performed for AC units by post headquarters at active installations. Establish an annual review to consolidate or eliminate unnecessary recurring reports and make maximum use of pre-printed forms, line-through indorsements and handwritten reports
- conduct post-mobilization training during AT periods to test and improve mobilization planning, pre-mobilization administrative procedures and movement to the mobilization station
- simplify the redundant and expensive supply system by correcting existing deficiencies in policy, funding and accounting procedures
- replace obsolete, non-functional or non-existent equipment in RC units, but only issue the specific items of equipment needed to attain pre-mobilization operation and maintenance proficiency. This recommendation lends itself well to integration with the POMCUS program
fulfill the spirit of the Total Force Policy by treating Reserves as equals in the allocation of quarters at AT sites and travel arrangements to those sites.176

Carr, in his proposal for restructuring the reserve force, remarks that the two essentials for mission accomplishment in today's "volunteer environment" are "a motivating force beyond that of economic incentive and a tailoring or restructuring of the Army Reserve . . ."177 In discussing organization levels, he notes that RC brigade and division headquarters require extensive training generally not available in peacetime, but cautions that, "On the other hand units can be organized at such a low level that they become hamstrung by administrative detail and are unable to accomplish meaningful, effective training." He concludes that the optimum organization from a training and readiness standpoint is the battalion.178

An important feature of Carr's study is his inclusion of the following recommendations from a similar study by the 94th ARCOM at Fort Devens, Massachusetts:

- platoon and detachment-size Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units should be grouped together with appropriate augmentation to form balanced units of company or larger size
- total force requirements for very high skill units (such as Army Security Agency (ASA) detachments) should either be located in the active force structure or organized
as RC cadre-type units. [I suggest that mob-des might be more appropriate in this case rather than cadre.]

units with large numbers of low skill positions (such as port and terminal units) should be reduced in strength (to key cadre) and be "fleshed out" upon mobilization by filler personnel from the IRR or by conscription.179

Carr concludes: "A Single criterion should be used in restructuring the Reserve: What is the required deployment date of the units concerned?" While it is allowable in his opinion for low priority units to be manned in a mob-des or cadre status, high priority (i.e., early deploying) units should be organized as combat-ready battalions maintained at full TO&E strength.180

In a recent interview, GEN William C. Westmoreland expressed the basic reason for a military force: "To have all hands deployable and all hands trained and ready to engage in sustained combat on land, sea or in the air."181 He believes that the nation's military and political leaders have lost sight of this goal by "competing for soldiers in the marketplace," and that the volunteer system has resulted in deep trouble for our country. He proposes that the responsibilities of citizenship be underscored through the formation of a "zero draft;" that is, a draft law which would exist on the books as an inducement for enlistment. Based on the lottery system, it would notify those who had a high
probability of being drafted and allow them to select a range of options to include basic training and service at home in the reserve component. Only if the manpower needs of the total force could not be met would anyone be drafted. In a further comment on this system, he commented that soldiers in their first two years of service should be considered apprentices and paid the minimum wage. If a soldier elected to continue his service beyond two years he would receive a substantial pay boost.

Fishel, who has published extensive studies of Army Guard and Army Reserve forces, likewise concludes that the volunteer system will never correct the manpower shortage within the reserve component. He notes, however, that a significant source of manpower for the active component at present is the RC personnel who begin their required active tour of initial entry training and like it enough to enlist for a tour of active duty rather than return to the reserve status they originally selected. Therefore, he proposes that any plan for a peacetime draft be limited to conscription into the Individual Ready Reserve. The greater number of individuals sent to initial entry training would increase the secondary enlistments into the active component as well as hometown RC units while preserving our national policy of not forcing any individual to serve in a military unit against his will. Requiring a brief period of service for training would be more acceptable, emphasize the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship, and insure an adequate backup force in support of our national interests. The vehicle for such a system exists in the U.S. Code's provisions for militia training discussed earlier. When national security needs dictate, individuals of the unorganized militia can be notified to complete the 12 weeks of active training required by law for overseas deployment and then would be released from active service with a requirement to report any change of address for the next six years.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The foregoing findings represent a small sampling from available sources dealing with the organization and structure of the total force. Even so, they are sufficiently central to the problem of reserve readiness that they provide a reasonable basis for constructing a total force model. Most of these findings (such as statutory requirements) do represent principal factors and constraints on both the existing and future force. Verification of other findings (such as the recommendations of study groups) will depend on their correct portrayal of existing relationships and on their pertinence to the problem being studied. Assuming these conditions are fulfilled, a model based on the present findings should constitute a valid decisionmaking framework for structuring the Total Army.
In summarizing the key points on which the proposed model must be based, initial consideration must be given to the responsibilities of the various agencies involved. By law, the "organized peace establishment" of the Army consists of all units and individuals required for "complete and immediate" mobilization. At present its authorized strength is 2,417,000 and in recent history other than the present it has been composed of from 45 to 52 divisions.

The Army Chief of Staff recommends a flexible balanced force structure which might include CONUS-based forces with a mixture of AC and RC strength based on how early the unit is scheduled for deployment. The FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan calls for some units to begin mobilization within 24 hours of alert and for other units to deploy without any post-mobilization training. The two biggest problems facing the All Volunteer Force are understrength RC units and severe shortages of trained manpower in the individual replacement pool. The old policy of reliance on "surge readiness" to save training and equipment costs will not work with today's short mobilization warning times.

Factors which degrade training readiness include organizing RC units at levels either too high (division) or too low (platoon); scattering of units across state boundaries or large areas; turbulence caused by rapid personnel turnover and constant unit reorganizations;
grouping of unlike units under inappropriate headquarters; and "geographic recruiting" of units requiring large numbers of highly skilled individuals. Congressional studies have found extensive duplication in staff organizations and lack of clear lines of command, control and communication. The Army Capstone Program groups related units, both AC & RC, into "force packages," and clarifies their peacetime and wartime chain of command by assigning them to an appropriate headquarters.

Studies show that the roundout program is of great value and that RC unit training and readiness improve with active cadre involvement, be it AC or RC. Congress is investigating the Full-Time Manning Program as a possible replacement for dual-status technicians, and other studies note that there is a need for a permanent support infrastructure to include non-military administrative technicians. This calls for streamlining both premobilization and post-mobilization administration and removing non-mission-essential requirements from RC units.

The conclusions of military analysts result in a number of general suggestions for improving the existing system. It is possible to avoid large increases in fund appropriations but only if there is a significant change by all in perception, attitude and understanding. Both evolutionary and revolutionary changes must be made within the general framework of Army policy which has developed throughout this century. Any new program should not attempt to
minimize state allegiances and should capitalize on the strengths inherent in AC/RC differences rather than emphasize weaknesses. The unique ability of Reserves to shape public opinion through their extensive community ties should be taken into account. RC training programs should promote maximum development of individual skills; capitalize on and contribute to civilian experience; and improve leadership ability. High military standards should be required for all and benefits allotted on an equitable basis to all. The single most important consideration in both recruiting and retention lies in the individual feeling of performing a useful function. Based on a thorough analysis of the total system, DA should develop a comprehensive Total Army organizational structure. Every unit of the Total Army should then be assigned a clear, specific mission in support of national strategic objectives.

Likewise, there are many conclusions and recommendations which address specific changes to be made in the reserve force. First, divide the force into three equal groups containing a similar balanced mix of combat and support units. Assign each of these groups an initial priority for training and equipment support and then rotate the groups through the priorities annually. Priority would determine manpower and equipment authorization. Training mission would be matched to Manning level. Training would emphasize premobilization mission-essential "core" tasks
and eliminate non-essential requirements, and would be dedicated to preparation for mobilization mission. All training, including staff map exercises, CPX's and TEWT's would be keyed to the actual unit mission. Annual training would be a complete mobilization followed by intensive training to assess shortfalls between the unit's performance and its mobilization requirements. Public law should be amended to allow mobilization of units other than during times of actual emergency.

Concerning the combat divisions of the reserve force, each division should be located within the boundaries of a single state along with its organic support units. High staff units such as the Division Headquarters Company, DISCOM Headquarters Company and Artillery Headquarters Battery should be phased into an active status and manned with a 50/50 mix of AC personnel and RC personnel on two or four year tours of active duty. The division staff would function on a day-to-day basis as the planning agency for achieving and sustaining readiness. Subordinate units would all function in their normal combat, support, administrative, logistic or communications role and perform mission training. The combat units would normally have a standardized organization with a high density of the same or similar MOS. Units would have inherent drill flexibility to allow planning drills for key staff members and might make use of cadre staffing with planned fillers or mobilization-TDA staffing.
with nationwide fill depending on the units required deployment date. When necessary, citizens could be ordered to initial entry militia training under the provisions of the US Code and retained in the IRR for a period of six years. Spin-off enlistments from this initial training should sustain the required levels for AC and RC unit personnel.

This summary has highlighted the major findings of the present research, from constitutional requirements to the conclusions and recommendations of experienced military professionals. These findings will form the basis of the Total Force Model which will be developed and discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER III

THE MODEL

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth and explains the Total Force Model; that is, the proposed sample organization for a possible "One Army" which is the basis for comprehensive training. The rationale for particular aspects of the model will not become clear immediately, nor, in fact, will some of the departures from present-day organization be apparent until the model has been read in its entirety. This is because the model relies heavily on existing programs and organizations, since it is meant to be an evolutionary, not revolutionary, change within the framework of the Defense Department's long-term goals. On the other hand, the reader must recognize that some innovative features of the model do not now exist and should not be expected to comply with present-day regulations or procedures. These features and their rationale will be noted in the text.

The one feature which binds the model together and is absolutely essential for it to work is the equal treatment of every individual member of the Total Army. This includes equal eligibility for service benefits—in some cases on a blanket basis to all members of the force and in
other cases pro-rated by amount of active service—-but, more importantly, it means the equal opportunity for every individual member to transfer among all three components to accept an assignment as freely as active duty personnel now transfer between units. Fair apportionment of benefits and freedom of movement throughout the Total Force are the keys to achieving a true "One Army." The ultimate pay-off, of course, is standardized, efficient, effective training to achieve force readiness throughout the Total Army.

STRUCTURE

The first step in forming the model is to establish a permanent structural base for the Total Army in terms of both manpower and units. This is done through the use of the Division Force Equivalent (DFE) as a force structuring tool. It must be clearly understood at the outset that the use of the DFE to form the proposed model will differ from its present-day use in structuring the current Army force. Unlike the present total Army structure shown in Figure 2, Chapter I, the proposed Total Army model will be based entirely on a uniform DFE structure. Elements of today's Army not included in the DFE structure—e.g., special theater forces, TDA organizations, individuals, and the training base—will be assigned to the Tactical Support Increment in this model. Ultimately, it may be more appropriate to create a fourth increment of the DFE to account for these forces.
For structural purposes, each state of the Union will be represented by one DFE. Since the present DFE consists of 48,000 manpower spaces, this would yield a Total Army structure of 2,400,000 aggregate spaces. This figure would then be established by Congress as the permanent authorized strength of the Total Army which could be activated and deployed under conditions of full mobilization. This force would constitute a permanent framework which, if fully manned and mobilized, would form an active-duty minimum-risk force capable of meeting any postulated enemy threat to the United States. As is the case under the present system, however, only a selected portion of the minimum-risk force would be funded annually based on the tradeoff between degree of risk of the actual threat and monies available for appropriation. On the other hand, if a wartime need required the creation of combat units not currently existing in the authorized structure, appropriate legislation could provide for the activation of an additional 2,400,000 personnel under conditions of total mobilization by doubling the DFE assignment to two per state. This will be explained as the discussion of the model proceeds.

ORGANIZATION

Having established an aggregate strength for manning the Total Army, the next step is to lay the foundation for its organizational structure. This involves the internal
organization of the 2.4 million aggregate spaces into combat, combat support, combat service support, and training units along with appropriate control headquarters. The organization will be based arbitrarily, for the purposes of developing this model, on a 50-division force—both because it fits appropriately within the 50-DFE aggregate strength and because it adheres roughly to the historical precedent prevailing throughout most of this century. It is important to note here that the purpose of this model is to create an observable, specified "force structure" for the Total Army. This is not to be confused with a "force-in-being." That is, many units in this structure will exist only on paper as a numbered headquarters with a given TOE, but their very existence in writing will allow Army planners to make accurate decisions on manning, equipping, training and supporting the force; judging present and future capabilities; and assigning missions.

Initially, without considering the constraints of manning the force, the overall force must be tailored so that there is a good balance of combat power throughout the divisions, and the necessary units and headquarters exist to provide appropriate and adequate combat support, combat service support and training to the divisional force. In other words, if the United States had to go to war immediately with a fully mobilized, 2.4 million-member standing army, how should that army be structured to sustain itself and accomplish
its combat mission against the expected enemy threat? This may be referred to as tailoring the "macro-structure" of the Total Army. This use of an existing force-development term implies some novel considerations, which will present themselves as force developers begin to examine the concepts inherent in the model, yet it is not inconsistent with its present-day definition.

ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS

The basic tactical unit in the Army is the battalion, and the basic structural unit is the division. On the basis of this and the structural assignment of one DFE per state, organization of the Total Army would begin by assigning a division flag to each state government. Note that this is not an actual assignment of troops, but rather the association of a division headquarters with every state of the Union. At this point, Army historians must identify all numbered divisions ever activated in the past (to include their heraldry and historical associations), so appropriate assignments may be made. An obvious example is the historical necessity of associating the 28th I.D. ("The Keystone Division") with the state of Pennsylvania.

Assignment of a division flag to each state is the basis for organizing the mobilization force of 2.4 million. At a minimum, a division headquarters will be staffed in each state, located at the primary training site for that
state. In addition to these functioning division headquarters, a second flag will be assigned to each state in name only as a preparation for the emergency mobilization of 4.8 million citizens which could be achieved under total mobilization. Again, historical association will be honored, although it may become necessary to create new division flags on paper to reach a total figure of 100 numbered divisions.

Within each state, the functioning division headquarters must be organized in such a manner that it can be divided in times of emergency to form a cadre, or trained skeletal staff, of the second division for mobilization. This ability to divide in two should be built into key command and staff positions throughout the entire division structure and assignments should be specified in advance (e.g., Bde XO will become new Bde CO, Ass't. S-3 will be new unit S-3, etc.). Vacancies in both divisions will then be filled by mobilization designees or individual replacements.

With the division headquarters established in each state, subordinate units may be assigned. This requires the establishment of the division support command (DISCOM), division artillery (DIVARTY) and brigade base, as well as the assignment of eleven tactical battalions. As with division flags, some units will have to be created on paper to complete the assignments. Designated battalions will not be assigned to the 50 "standby" divisions, since they would
only be mobilized at a time when units not currently in the force structure are being formed.

The actual manning of the divisions will depend on both the mission and the peacetime demographic characteristics of the region. Each division should have an assigned mission based on national security needs. The mission would specify how quickly the division must mobilize and deploy as well as the geographic area assigned for deployment (not necessarily outside CONUS). As an example, a division assigned a contingency or Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) mission to deploy to Europe within 48 hours would have to be fully manned, and it would be necessary for all personnel assigned to the division to be in an active duty status.

Demography plays a part in manning the force due to the availability of persons eligible and willing to serve in the military. For example, several states today can field an entire National Guard division from within the boundaries of a single state. In terms of the proposed model, a division that was headquartered in such a state might be manned primarily by Selected Reserve members drilling on weekends. States which cannot presently support a full National Guard division could be manned in several ways. As an illustration, consider a state which has a demographic base to support one brigade (bde) of state militia. It could man its state division in one of the following ways:
- 1 bde Selected Reserve, 2 bde active duty
- 1 bde Selected Reserve, 2 bde MOBDES
- 1 bde Selected Reserve, 1 bde active duty, 1 bde MOBDES.

Other possibilities include manning at cadre strength or leaving units unfilled. In addition, the entire division associated with a state need not be physically stationed in that state. These manning options will become clearer during the discussion of personnel status in a later section. However, it is important to note that every division must have a combat mission assigned and every member of a division, in whatever status, must be deployable with his unit.

So far, this discussion of the model has dealt only with the 50-division force. Yet, only 16,000 spaces of the Division Force Equivalent make up the actual division, meaning that divisional forces in this model total only 800,000 out of 2.4 million. Based on the DFE assignment of 12,000 spaces for Non-Divisional Combat Increments (NDCI) and 20,000 spaces for Tactical Support Increments (TSI), the Total Army would be authorized 600,000 NDCI and 1,000,000 TSI spaces. As with the divisions, these spaces should be allocated into actual units with designated headquarters, so that the organization exists at least on paper for planning purposes.
TAILORING THE FORCE

In the previous section, after dividing the 2.4 million spaces of the Total Army into 800,000 division, 600,000 NDCI and 1,000,000 TSI spaces, it was stated that these spaces must be converted to actual units. That is, the force must be tailored. Having previously established the "macro-structure" of the Total Army, it is now possible to tailor its "micro-structure" (again, use of the term implies novel considerations), to arrive at both a "force-in-being" and a mobilization back-up force. This involves exercising the present-day process of comparing the enemy threat, the minimum-risk force and the congressional appropriations to decide which specific units of the total force will be assigned to the active force structure, which units to the Selected Reserve and which units will remain in an inactive militia or individual replacement status. This tailoring will now be discussed in relation to each of the three force increments:

Divisional Forces: The 50 divisions should be organized as either "heavy" or "light," with the bulk of the force being in the light divisions. This is an arbitrary assumption for purposes of the model because it would lessen equipment requirements, reduce fuel and ammunition consumption, and ease the logistic burden. It would also result in a force composed for the most part of a relatively small number of high-density MOS, thus promoting efficient,
standardized training and minimizing many of the problems caused by turbulence and MOS mismatch. At present, the heavy division is considered to be the "Division 86" concept now being developed or its future evolution. Development of a light division is in the initial stages now at the Combined Arms Center. To work effectively in the proposed force model, this new light division must make one significant departure from current military concepts. At present, the three types of divisions considered light (i.e., Light Infantry, Airborne and Airmobile) all differ in organization and training. In addition, they all differ from the Mechanized Infantry Division, which is considered infantry but is not considered light. However, it is commonly agreed in the Army today--particularly since the development of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)--that in reality, present-day mechanized troops equipped with the M113 are light infantry mounted in tactical carriers, since they do not fight from their vehicles. "Division 86" will create a single heavy division that makes use of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and cavalry fighting vehicles (all sharing similar speed, mobility and crew protection) to fight fast-moving battles on terrain favoring mounted operations of armored vehicles. It would seem appropriate for "Light Division 86" to create a single "type" light division which is organized and trained to conduct dismounted operations in any terrain and which is equally capable of being transported by wheeled
vehicle, airborne, air assault or tactical carrier. This would be feasible if two procedures were followed. First, consider all constraints imposed by each mode of transportation (e.g., capacity of M113 limits size of squad) and structure units from the bottom up to meet the most constrained situation. Second, identify the additional support required by each mode of transportation and structure it into an appropriate non-divisional or tactical support unit which is assigned to the carrier unit and not to the division base as is currently done. Naturally, when a carrier unit is assigned to transport a division, the support unit would come under the full command of the division commander. Although tactical carrier units have been phased out of the Army structure, I believe the concept should be reevaluated in light of the proposed model with a view toward resuming their use. Two of the possible benefits of this course of action are the standardization of MOS structure with resulting simplification of training throughout a major segment of the Total Army, and the ability to train in all aspects of infantry ground operations in the absence of vehicles and related equipment.

**Non-Divisional Forces:** Non-divisional combat forces include armored cavalry and air cavalry as well as separate brigades, non-divisional artillery and combat engineers. These units can be of battalion, group, regiment or brigade size. These forces are a necessary addition to the divisions
to complete the light, medium and heavy mix required for a well-balanced force. Necessary units would be designated which would fully complement and round out the 50-division force. Then specific units could be assigned an active or selected reserve status to tailor the force-in-being.

**Tactical Support:** This increment includes all non-divisional support units, corps headquarters and support commands, echelons above corps (EAC) and --for the purposes of this model--all TDA units, as well as any individual members in a travel, leave, medical hold or training status. Units must be designated which would support the overall 2.4 million-member force. As with the other increments, specific units could then be selected to support units and individuals of the force-in-being. It is in this increment that the proposed model would capitalize on many benefits unavailable to the present-day force. Before this can be explained or examples cited, however, it will be necessary to outline the principles for managing the members of the Total Army. These principles will be discussed after the following section on manning the force.

**MANNING THE FORCE**

During the "macro-structuring" of the 2.4 million-member minimum-risk force, it was unnecessary to consider personnel status (i.e., active vs. reserve) because of the planning assumption that, following a total mobilization, the
force would be entirely manned by personnel in an active duty status. The "micro-structuring" of the peacetime force-in-being, however, is integrally linked to such considerations. Before it is possible to man the force with an appropriate mix of personnel in a given status (e.g., active duty, selected reserve, individual replacement), it is first necessary to establish criteria for designating each billet of the Total Army to be filled by a member of a particular status based on an analysis of the job characteristics of that billet.

The first step in this process is to structure the active duty "force-in-being" within the strength ceiling set by Congress during the appropriation process. Criteria for designating active status spaces would include, for example, requirements for forward deployment or rapid deployment, immediate availability in the absence of national mobilization, extensive experience gained only by continuous active training, and the operation of complex, expensive equipment and weapons systems on a daily basis.

Criteria for selected reserve spaces might include requirements for completion of deployability training, immediate or quick mobilization, currency of MOS skills, and a minimum level of unit training. By contrast, the major requirement of individual replacement spaces would be the members' availability to report for mobilization and training with their unit of assignment a specified number of days
following mobilization.

Further criteria could be developed relating to specific types of units in the inactive militia, to determine what types of individual replacements may be assigned. Several examples of this are given in the section dealing with personnel assignment. First, however, a word must be said about a fourth category of the Total Army, that of the DA civilian. It will be necessary when structuring the Total Force to identify non-military support requirements which will require the services of both state and federal civil service employees. To plan and achieve a truly lean and effective force, the role of DA civilians must be carefully considered. I believe the present practice of identifying Army billets which may be filled by either military or civilian personnel is wrong. All spaces in the Total Force should be designated one or the other based on cogent military reasons arrived at from a thorough analysis of the duty performed. Considerations for military billets would include:

- Does the job require mobilization and deployment to a theater of war?
- Will the job be performed in combat below corps headquarters level?
- Does the job require military knowledge gained at the unit level?
Likewise, considerations for civilian billets would include:

- Does the job belong in a permanent infrastructure supporting a military unit?
- Does the job cease to exist during wartime?
- Does the job require specialized civilian expertise or education?

Simultaneously with the "macro-" and "micro"-structuring of the Total Army, decisions like these must be made in order to structure an appropriate support force composed of state and federal DACs. Once again, I disagree with current regulations which not only allow but sometimes require local civilian technicians to be members of the unit they support. My own observations of USAR units lead me to believe that this is exactly opposite from the most effective procedure. Frequently, the DAC spends his entire drill time doing jobs or answering questions which relate to his civilian job. If this is not the same as his military duty, he is a loss to that unit in his military capacity. If his two jobs are the same, they shouldn't be. By that I mean that the military billet should be purposely designed to contribute to the unit mission of mobilization readiness and deployment while the DAC job should be designed to accomplish functions (such as attendance feeder reports) which contribute to the peacetime administration of reserve units or the administrative actions necessary to mobilize them at home station, but which would cease to exist once the unit had been deployed for war. This
problem could be solved in the proposed model by allowing unit technicians to be assigned as individual replacements with inactive militia units having a much later date of deployment than the unit supported by the technician. An important thing to keep in mind, however, is that, based on job performance, there are reasons for a job to be military and reasons for a job to be civilian, and it is near-impossible for these reasons to coincide due to the nature of the duties required in peacetime versus wartime. Perhaps the most effective solution lies in a combination of full-time manning of selected military billets coupled with civil service clerical support.

PERSONNEL STATUS

Having determined the general characteristics of all billets of the 2.4 million-member force, it is now possible to determine the personnel status associated with each type billet. It is at this point that the model departs most radically from the existing legal and organizational basis of today's Army. Under the proposed Total Force Model, personnel management throughout the Army is based not on the individual member's component, but rather on his personnel status in relation to the billet he currently occupies. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the key to the success of the model lies in a legally-sanctioned system whereby every uniformed member of the Total Army may change
personnel status to fill an assignment with the same ease with which active component personnel now transfer between units. In other words, personnel status depends on the billet being filled rather than membership in a specific component. Hence, in the following discussion of personnel status it is important not to equate the features of each status with any one of the three present-day components, even though the differences may not be apparent at first. An individual's status may be distinguished as follows:

**Active Duty Status.** This is the condition of service presently defined by Title 10, USC as "active duty." The distinguishing features of active duty status in this model are that it is a voluntary status, for a specified time, associated with the specific personnel space being filled, and governed by a contractual agreement between the individual and the U.S. Army. A present-day program which bears all these same conditions is the USAR or ARNG Statutory Tour, as authorized by under § 672(d), Title 10, USC.

**Selected Reserve Status.** This is the condition of service which would include all Total Army members serving, under present-day policy, in all federally recognized National Guard units, the Selected Reserve, and all Ready Reserve units. In the proposed model, it would include all personnel whose normal duty was conducted as weekend drills supplemented by Annual Training. This status also has the four previously-stated features of voluntary service,
specified length, specified billet and contractual agreement.

**Individual Replacement Status.** This status includes all individuals of the 2.4 million-member force who are not serving in a unit (active duty or selected reserve). The important features of this status are that each member is identified against a specific type of billet in the 2.4 million-member force structure, that he is not required to be a volunteer, and that he is under some contractual obligation to the government. A Total Army member in this status is a "trained" replacement, meaning he has a skill required by the position in which he is billeted; however, the individual replacement may fall into one of three categories:

--- trained in basic combat skills only

--- trained in a civilian skill needed by the military (e.g., truck driver) to a level which meets U.S. Army standards, but untrained in basic combat skills

--- fully trained in both combat skills and MOS skills.

The rationale for these three categories and examples of their application will be presented later in the discussion of personnel assignment.

The question now arises: "How are members managed uniformly by personnel status and what is their incentive to serve?" The answer lies basically in the present-day system of "retirement points." Under this system, Guard and Reserve members are awarded one retirement point for each drill or each day of active duty, with additional points being
authorized for such things as membership in a unit or completion of correspondence courses. Upon retirement, the points are totaled for the member's entire career, and this total determines the percentage of retirement pay received. This system is easily adapted to the proposed model.

First, the basic rule throughout the Total Army would be the award of one point for every day of active duty, with a maximum allowable point total of 365 per year. Under present conditions, as an example, a member remaining on active duty for 20 years would accrue 7,300 retirement points which would qualify him for retirement at half pay. Under the same system, appropriate point values could be established for each type of service, to include inactive militia service in a civilian status. As an example only, it could be established that selected reserve personnel accrue one point per day of active duty, one point per drill and 30 points per year for unit membership. Individual replacement personnel, on the other hand, might be awarded 15 points for membership in the program in addition to any points accrued for active duty training. The important point is to establish a fair and correctly-balanced system for awarding points throughout the Total Army and to base all monetary payments on that system. For this to work correctly, I recommend three controls:

* Limit the total points accrued from any combination of sources to 365 per year to avoid penalizing active duty personnel.
* Eliminate the present-day concept of a "good year," under which 50 points are required each year to qualify for retirement, and simply use total time in the program and total points for all calculations.

* Specify a minimum number of total points below which retirement is not authorized, but instead pay a cash separation bonus pro-rated on the total points accrued.

A final word on incentives. The point system described above allows a way to determine equitable distribution of Army allowances and benefits. That is, all benefits should first be examined and a decision made as to whether they should be awarded to all Total Army members solely on the basis of membership, or whether they should be selectively awarded based on the amount of each member's contribution to the Army. The basis for awarding the second category would be total accrued points. Provided the categories were selected fairly and equitably, this would eliminate the currently justifiable feeling among non-active duty personnel that they are sometimes treated as "second-class citizens."

It will be necessary for each member of the Army today to reexamine his viewpoint toward his present component and ensure his view is directed at the Army as a whole. This model requires changes by each component for the good of all and at the expense of no single component. Yet the basic changes concerning the relationship among the three components have already been made. For example, today's
"Selected Reserve," which forms the basis for the "selected reserve" status explained in this section, is composed of both Guard and USBR units, without any fears that one group will be absorbed by the other. In addition, the present-day success of the Fifth Infantry Division roundout program in Louisiana shows how a National Guard unit can consider itself an integral part of an active division without weakening its loyalty to State and Governor. Such important achievements must be recognized and capitalized upon in implementing a true "One-Army" structure.

ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL

Having established the categories of personnel spaces within the Total Army and the pay and management criteria for personnel of each status, it is now possible to determine how to assign personnel to man the force. In all cases it is done on the basis of a contract between the individual and the U.S. government. Within strength ceilings authorized by Congress, members will be placed under contract to fill specific billets or specific types of spaces within the Total Army structure. The divisional structure should remain stable, although the proportion of heavy to light may be altered over a period of time to meet long-term threat trends.

A factor which may be altered annually, however, is the relative mix of personnel status making up the force. That is, an aspect of the annual appropriation process will
be the decision by Congress to specify the authorized number of active duty spaces and selected reserve spaces within the total force. This is in accordance with present-day procedures. These spaces would be filled by volunteers on contract, and the remainder of the 2.4 million spaces not authorized for active/selected reserve status would be listed in a computer for fill by individual replacements.

While existing units of the active and selected reserve force would be expected to be rather static, changing no more often than the annual appropriation, the TSI, on the other hand, can be very fluid and flexible. This can be illustrated through several types of examples. Concerning individuals, Army regulations could provide that any unit member (active or reserve) who will be absent from duty for some specified length of time due to leave, convalescence, civilian schooling, hospitalization, pregnancy, or other circumstances would be transferred from the rolls of the unit to a vacant TSI slot within the inactive militia. That is to say that any member of the Total Army not currently serving in a functioning unit will be carried as an individual replacement, with the result that the congressional allocation of active and selected reserve strength will be fully filled at all times with able-bodied personnel in a duty status. This could be done in various combinations of two methods. In the first method, specific individuals possessing specific skills could be billeted by name in a currently non-existent
(non-appropriated) unit in the manner of the present-day mobilization TDA. For example, the Medium Truck Company of the Division Support Command of a specific division could be pre-filled with trained individuals, by name, who would mobilize and man the unit during time of war. In the second method, aggregate numbers of unfilled spaces in specific MOS could be compiled across the total force as a guide for maintaining a list of replacements for that particular MOS. For example, if the total force, after the annual appropriation of active and selected spaces, had a total of 25,000 infantry billets (MOS 1IB10) not filled, then the force planners must insure that the pool of individual replacements for MOS 1IB10 has at least 25,000 individuals listed by name in the computer. These individuals would be assigned as needed upon mobilization, with no previous attempt to billet them in a specific unit during peacetime. Shortages in these lists would serve as a basis for decision by the national command authorities to call additional American citizens to duty as individual replacements.

A different type of example concerns units. Within the portion of the TSI not allocated to active or selected reserve status, there would be great flexibility in manning the support units (particularly those requiring such civilian skills as transportation and maintenance). Depending on how soon after M-Day the unit was to be mobilized, it could be filled by qualified active personnel temporarily in an
inactive status (pregnancy, civilian schooling, etc.),
previously qualified active personnel who had separated,
civilian professionals with or without Army experience, Vo-
Tech students training for those skills with or without Army
financial assistance, previous selected reserve members who
can no longer drill, etc. What all these individuals share
in common is that they are identified by name in a specific
personnel space of a specific unit and will mobilize and
deploy with that unit in the event of a national emergency.
To illustrate how this can work, here are some examples:

- late deploying transportation or cargo-handling
  units may be filled entirely on paper with civilian truckers
  and stevedores who will neither be issued uniforms nor trained
  in Army skills until national emergency is declared

- support units requiring a minimal amount of re-
 resher training to maintain military skills may be filled
  by mobilization designees who meet once a year for a two-week
  AT to train as a unit

- units requiring a high degree of skill among the
  leaders or key workers may operate at cadre strength with
  individual replacements in lower-skilled positions assigned
  for mobilization only or for both annual training and
  mobilization

- prior service personnel may be billeted in an
  inactive militia (MOB-TDA) unit with or without a require-
  ment for annual training depending on how soon the unit will
  mobilize and deploy.
The flexibility inherent in this system allows for many other ways to tailor the manning of inactive units. However, it is important to remember that the decision on how to man a unit is determined by the mission of the unit and the job characteristics of each duty position in the unit as well as peacetime demographic conditions in the local area. Only after the decision has been made on what way to man the unit (and there may be more than one, even for the same duty position) would an actual assignment be made of personnel in an appropriate status.

Allowances can be made for the temporary suspension of active or selected reserve contracts (due to illness, pregnancy, etc.) with the result that additional able-bodied personnel may be placed on contract to prevent degradation of the ready force. In addition, expiration of individual contracts may provide the Army the opportunity to "tune-up" or adjust its force structure as well as allowing each individual to change status, tailor his career and education plans, or even take a "sabbatical" from the Army for personal reasons without penalty. I believe that all these factors would work in favor of the Army from the standpoint of flexibility, quality control, increased troop satisfaction and enhanced education and career potential of individual members. It would also insure that the readily-deployable segment of the Army would be lean and muscular within its allocated strength.
This section outlines a simplified command and control structure for the Total Army. In fact, it is somewhat oversimplified in its present form since a great deal more research needs to be done specifically on this subject to develop and validate a more detailed organization. Basically, the proposed model remains within the framework of existing Army major commands, although there are slight variations, such as treating the Army Readiness Regions as Corps headquarters. This is not, however, a return to the old corps system (prior to the STEADFAST Reorganization of 1973) but a suggestion for a continued evolution in the Army command structure to control the proposed 2.4 million-member Total Army. The greatest change would probably take place in the staff organization at DA level, to include a redefinition of the roles of the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, but that is beyond the scope of the present research.

The following is a brief, simplified overview of the command and control system:

- All new accessions are controlled by the US Army Recruiting command from the time they are sworn into the Total Army to the time they begin their initial active duty assignment for individual training.

- All personnel assigned to individual training are controlled by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command until
their successful completion of MOS qualification and subsequent assignment to a unit of the Total Army. They are placed in the TSI during training:

- All MOS-qualified members assigned to an active duty unit are commanded by Unified or Specified Commands or Major Commands (MACOM) (e.g., Readiness Command, U.S. Army, Europe, Eighth U.S. Army (REDCOM, USAREUR, EUSA)) established by DOD/DA.

- All MOS-qualified members assigned to a selected reserve unit are controlled in a manner similar to a Joint or Unified Command, in the following form:
  - Command less operational control--DA to U.S. Army Forces Command to Army headquarters to Corps headquarters to Division/Regiment/ACCB. This becomes the wartime command structure.
  - Operational control--DA (NG3/OCAR) to State A2 (under direction of Governor) to Division/Regiment/ACCB within geographic boundary of state. This is the normal peacetime command structure.

- Personnel designated as Individual Replacements are assigned to various control groups (mobilization TDA unit, medical hold, inactive militia, MOS-qualified pool, etc.) and controlled by DA through an organization corresponding to the present-day U.S. Army Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC).

- Civil Service employees of the civilian infrastructure are controlled by States or MACOM under policies jointly developed by DA and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (formerly Civil Service Commission).
As stated previously, this is a highly simplified structure which outlines minimum guidelines for command and control. Refinement of this basic model will require further research, extensive staffing, and, ultimately, congressional amendment of the existing US Code in addition to alteration of present-day state laws. Once again, it must be emphasized that the model cannot work without a genuine sense of "One Army" by all individuals concerned (including State Governors) and the opportunity for all members to transfer freely between different-status duty positions throughout the Total Force. This ability would be enhanced by the maintenance of a central microfiche data bank for personnel records, with a duplicate field file which accompanies the individual member to each new duty assignment. This requires all States and other control headquarters to recognize and accept common standards for accession, training, MOS qualification and award of warrants and commissions. Such commonality of standards and qualifications falls under the purview of the US Congress as set forth in Art. I, Sec 8, of our Constitution.

ACCESSION AND TRAINING

The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe a discipline for training the militia and vests the several states with authority for conducting that training. The proposed model is designed to capitalize on this
constitutional provision. As stated in a previous section, Congress would review annually the overall force structure of the 2.4 million-member Total Army, review and approve the allocation of active and selected reserve strength in accordance with Joint Strategic Planning System procedures and appropriate the funds for operation and maintenance of the Total Army and its civilian infrastructure. It is during the annual appropriation cycle that Congress could review and approve the Army-wide accession and training programs developed by DOD/DA in conjunction with the several State Adjutants General. These programs could then be conducted uniformly by each state under federal and state appropriations.

The basic discipline for training the Total Army can be summed up in the phrase, "Train as you fight." States could best implement this dictum by making every annual training period a full-scale mobilization and deployment. That is, a unit preparing for AT would be required to complete all premobilization activities such as updating shot records, wills, powers of attorney, etc., and then would deploy to the AT site with all personnel and equipment just as it would do during an actual mobilization. Once there, units could conduct ARTEP missions for the remainder of the AT period. The state would exercise control through its associated division headquarters just as it would during a state or national emergency. The division headquarters would
issue mission-type orders to the unit, support the unit and evaluate the training. Units conducting AT would mobilize at full strength through activation of individual replacements who attend AT only, in accordance with their actual mobilization assignment. During the rest of the year, units could be authorized to drill at cadre strength by performing CPXs or TETTs under a DA/State-developed scenario approved by Congress. Since the bulk of state divisions would be organized on the "Light Division 86" model, a great deal of standardization could be achieved nation-wide. Unit missions would be stabilized and a relatively small number of high-density MOS would be common throughout the Army. This would drastically reduce the problems now caused by reserve members moving from state to state and finding that the unit in their new location can't use them in the MOS for which they are qualified. "MOS mismatch" and its attendant training problems would be much less common.

This system would also improve the present critical problem of keeping a manpower pool of trained replacements. The initial assignment for an individual replacement in a "high-priority" (i.e., divisional) unit would be active duty for BCT/AIT. His subsequent assignment would be in a divisional space as a mobilization "filler" for AT and national emergency, or assignment to a mobilization TDA unit in the DISCOM.
Individual replacements billeted not in a divisional unit but rather in a unit such as a corps transportation company which was considered "low priority" (i.e., scheduled for later deployment), could be of the type who possess necessary civilian skills but have not attended basic combat training. Since personnel of this type may seldom or never be called upon to serve in an active status, this allows the possibility of "drafting" individual replacements into the inactive militia. The term is enclosed in quotes because every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 17 and 45 is already, by law, a member of the inactive, or "unorganized" militia. For this reason, the 2.4 million-member force could be kept fully manned on paper and physically manned in selected units in preparation for mobilization by requiring citizens to register their civilian skills and keeping them on the computer rolls for some contractual period such as six years. When necessary, they could be ordered to militia training to keep them qualified and, upon expiration of their contractual obligation, they could be released and paid a cash bonus for the active duty and/or membership points they have accrued. In fairness to active and selected reserve members and for the good of the Army, however, I believe that all individual replacements in whatever control group should be ineligible for promotion unless they voluntarily transfer to an active or selected reserve unit.
CONCLUSION

This concludes the discussion of the proposed model for structuring the Total Army. Although there is much research and coordination left to do, I believe this model provides a basic starting point for the structure and organization of a coherent, manageable force which would solve manpower problems, require less equipment, ease the support burden and contribute to good, standardized training for the Army of the 80's.
The model outlined in the preceding chapter represents an organizational framework whose content was based solely on the research findings of the present study. The focus for the research and the underlying structure and form of the model are based on the military experience of the author. The conclusions and recommendations set forth in this chapter will likewise draw on the same sources. Also included is a brief discussion on costs, with one example of how the proposed Army structure described in the model can be used as a tool for planning innovative long-range solutions to the serious problems facing our Army today.

CONCLUSIONS

- The United States Army is a social and political institution of our nation created by the U.S. Constitution to insure the National Defense. It is a government agency responsive to the direction of duly elected national leaders and supported by public funds appropriated for that purpose by the elected representatives of the American people. It performs an essential service to the nation as a whole. The Army is neither a democracy nor a free market society in itself; rather it is an organization of citizens who have
voluntarily subordinated—not abandoned—their personal interests to the collective interests of a democratic free market society. The Army is not a corporation—it neither manufactures a product nor makes a profit. Its "product" is readiness; its "profit" is freedom for our nation. Therefore, management techniques and labor practices appropriate to our society cannot be applied unaltered to Army operations without grave damage to the effectiveness of the system. Management and organization are vital to the Army, but they must in all cases be tailored specifically to support the two major building blocks of readiness—leadership and training.

- The purpose of the U.S. Army (Title 10, USC, § 3062) is to:
  
  - preserve the peace and security, and provide for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
  
  - support the national policies;
  
  - implement the national objectives; and
  
  - overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

- Congress has declared (10 USC, § 3062) the Army (or Armies) referred to in the Constitution of the United States (10 USC, § 3001) to consist of:
  
  - the Regular Army [Active Component]
  
  - the ARNGUS [Guard Component]
  
  - the Army National Guard when in federal service
  
  - the USAR [Reserve Component]
  
  - all individuals appointed, enlisted or conscripted into the Army.
The Total Force Policy is the "Law of the Land." All management decisions and organizational structures must conform to this policy. Redundant staffing and confusing chains of command must be eliminated. Personnel management policies and techniques must be made fair and uniform. Turbulence brought on by constant reorganization and re-location of units must be reduced.

The legal basis of the Total Force Policy must not be used as a club to pound the three components into an identical mold which does not serve the best interest of the citizens and the nation. Decisions and programs affecting the Total Army must be jointly developed by prior coordination of the components of the Total Army. The strengths of all three components must be considered, and participants in the planning process must subordinate the parochial interests of their component to the interests of the National Defense and the American citizen.

The present system of organization and management of the Army is not effective in light of the Army's mobilization policy and mission. A new, comprehensive structure must be created based on a thorough analysis of the total system. However, a mere reshuffling of the existing pieces of the puzzle into a different order will be worse than no action at all. Organization alone cannot make a system function. A new chain of command making the same old leadership mistakes is worthless. A new training
management program faced with the same old training problems will produce no better soldiers than before. It will be necessary to analyze the system from a military, not a market point of view; to gain the support and participation of individual commanders throughout the entire chain of command; to establish clear, ethical and practical leadership policies and standards; to police the system to insure initial compliance; and, finally, to foster and develop the indispensable atmosphere of mutual trust which is vital to the continued automatic functioning of the system. Only under these conditions can a reorganization of the Total Army have any practical value.

COSTS VERSUS FUTURE PLANNING

Little has been said throughout this study of the costs associated with the creation of a 2.4 million space Total Army structure. Congressional leaders have agreed that defense spending must be increased, but are quite right in their reluctance to simply increase appropriations across the board without a careful evaluation of the cost/effectiveness of present-day programs. In this area alone, the proposed model can be a valuable tool for eliminating redundant and duplicative organizations or programs. However, there is little doubt that the proposed Army structure, no matter how efficient, will cost more to maintain
(if adequately supported) than the present organization.

For this reason, I would like to introduce at this point a single example of how the proposed model can be used as a tool for national policy decisions many years in the future. This example will develop one possible solution to a serious present-day monetary and support dilemma--dependents in Europe--which has no apparent relation to the model developed in this paper. The solution to this problem will be developed as a "spin-off" of a strictly military decision influenced by the model.

Assume that the model has been implemented essentially in its present form. The following conditions exist:

- The divisions in the Total Army structure consist of units in active, selected reserve, cadre, mob-des, augmentation and inactive status
- Units in selected reserve status have a requirement to mobilize once every five years
- Members of the Total Army have the freedom to change from one status to another
- Any deployable member of the Total Army may elect to sign a contract for a period of active duty from six months to four years
- The NATO requirement still exists for five forward deployed divisions in Europe
- There are five POMCUS sets dispersed in Europe, one for each division.
These conditions would allow the following scenario:

- Specific selected reserve units throughout the nation are alerted for their five-year mobilization. The type units alerted would include a Division Headquarters, DISCOM Headquarters, DIVARTY Headquarters, three Brigade Headquarters, various support units, and 11 combat battalions—In other words, a full composite division.

- Each unit would deploy to the mobilization site in its state and accomplish the following:
  - complete the administrative processing of all individuals who intend to deploy with the unit
  - administratively transfer to an individual replacement status all personnel who do not agree to deploy with the unit. (The only penalty involved is that their pay and promotion eligibility cease, and they are not guaranteed an equivalent position in their unit when it returns)
  - fill as much of the unit as possible through statewide (or nationwide) announcement of the deployment. Fillers must be current Total Army members who have completed initial entry training
  - when the unit is reformed, have each individual sign a new or updated contract for a six-month tour of service beginning on the day the unit is scheduled to leave the state mob site
On the designated day, each unit would deploy from its state mob site and begin to assemble at a designated national mob site where a division set of training equipment is located.

For a 30-day period, the complete composite division would continue to accomplish administrative actions; complete the filling process from all sources (including levy from standing active units, assignment of individual replacements from the trained manpower pool and initial active duty assignment of enlistees just completing initial entry training); and conduct minimum unit training and staff coordination.

During the same 30-day period the division completing its NATO tour in Europa would clean and inspect its equipment and return it to its designated POMCUS site.

Also during this 30-day period, military airlift assets would begin shuttling individuals and units back and forth across the Atlantic in a one-for-one replacement. As units arrived on-site, they would draw POMCUS and deploy to their caserns and training areas.

Upon completion of the transfer, the returning division would demobilize in the United States and the deployed division would begin four to five months of intensive training and maneuver.

This scenario is outlined as an illustration only. It would be easy to find fault with it, but it would be just as easy to speculate on its advantages. Most criticisms which
can be leveled against it will be based on present conditions and do not of necessity apply to such a projected system. Rather than defend this scenario, I will simply suggest to any dissenter a closer reading of the model on which it is based and some individual innovative thinking.

In terms of the point I set out to illustrate, it should now be clear. The division deployment is, of course, an unaccompanied tour. I make the assumption that there will be a permanent structure still in place in Europe (the Army and Corps Headquarters and their subordinate units), which will consist of members on two- or three-year tours and their dependents. Even so, the illustrative case accounts for about 80,000 deployed members without dependents in the divisions alone. The monetary savings would be enormous, not to mention "spin-off" solutions to other present-day problems such as housing, community services and wartime evacuation plans.

I will stress once again that the purpose of this example is to illustrate one use of the proposed force model as a tool for future planning. In the following section I will present some recommendations for immediate actions which can be taken to test the feasibility of the model.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to pursue a practical, effective program, for planning and designating a workable Total Army Model,
I recommend (in chronological order):

- Formation of a Congressional steering committee to set overall goals, monitor the program and forecast long-range appropriation guidelines
- Funding for thoroughgoing research of the United States Code and other public laws to establish a solid legal basis for a Total Army structure
- Formation of a DA action group to take the results of the legal research and generate military goals which fit within that framework
- Personal review of the developed goals by the Army Chief of Staff, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Chief, Army Reserve acting in concert to refine these goals and issue planning guidance
- Computer generation of a model force based solely on a 50-division force, subject to no other constraints, showing what number and type units would make up a balanced supportable, internally consistent 2.4 million-member Army
- Comparison of this force to the present force, the program force, the strategic requirements and the Chiefs' planning guidance, with resulting analysis
- Preparation of an interim report for review by the Congress, the Chiefs, the Army staff and all MACOM Headquarters
- A general officer review and planning conference to generate initial model
- Publication of initial model, planning guidance and additional supporting narrative as DA circular to be distributed throughout the Army for comment
- Following expiration of DA circular and collection of comments, further review and analysis leading to generation of refined model
- Comparison of refined model to legal base and preparation of list of required changes to existing laws
- Final review, revision and approval
- Publication of final report which includes the refined model, required legal action, implementation plan, cost analysis and supporting documentation
- Submission to Congress for review and action.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The research findings presented in this paper are only a small fraction of the material available concerning the components of the Total Army, their history, organization and training. The model developed from the present research literally changed with each new bit of information, so it obviously cannot claim to portray the ultimate form which will eventually be taken by the Total Army. The basic idea of the model is sound, however, and I believe further research will serve to refine it rather than invalidate it. In developing the specific content of the model, I found that research is truly the only way to avoid "reinventing the
wheel." Thus, we owe it to ourselves as military professionals to search out the conclusions and recommendations of experienced analysts and avoid duplicating their work. A knowledge of past decisions--and the reasoning behind them--stabilizes Army planning and allows us gradually to refine a long range program by successive decisions rather than to zig-zag back and forth between two extremes by unrelated decisions, as is so often the case.

Two areas which must be thoroughly researched in relation to the conditions existing in the Army today are training and the total force, to include each of the three components which make up the Army. A third area of great importance is that of military leadership. These suggestions for further research are not directed solely to students in military institutions. Every staff officer has a responsibility to research the background information of any project he works on, even if his research is confined to Army field manuals. This is not an academic exercise--it is a necessary prerequisite to knowing what you are talking about and supporting your boss by providing him an accurate basis for decisionmaking. In a business where uninformed decisions can cost human lives, we cannot afford to ignore the wealth of both factual information and military opinion available today.
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