AN IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPROGRAMMING AND PROCESS MANAGEMENT FOR--ETC(U)

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THESIS
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPROGRAMMING AND PROCESS MANAGEMENT FOR A SECURITY KERNEL OPERATING SYSTEM

by
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June 1980

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
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An Implementation of Multiprogramming and Process Management for a Security Kernel Operating System

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an implementation of multiprogramming and process management functions for the security kernel of a distributed multiprocessor system. The implementation is based on a family of operating systems designed to provide controlled access in a microcomputer network to data bases containing multiple levels of sensitive information.

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This implementation describes a processor multiplexing technique for a distributed kernel and presents a virtual interrupt mechanism. Its structure is loop free to permit future expansion into more complex members of the design family.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The application of contemporary microprocessor technology to the design of large-scale multiple processor systems offers many potential benefits. The cost of high-power computer systems could be reduced drastically; fault tolerance in critical real-time systems could be improved; and computer services could be applied in areas where their use is not now cost effective. Designing such systems presents many formidable problems that have not been solved by the specialized single processor systems available today.

Specifically, there is an increasing demand for computer systems that provide protected storage and controlled access for sensitive information to be shared among a wide range of users. Data controlled by the Privacy Act, classified Department of Defence (DoD) information, and the transactions of financial institutions are but a few of the areas which require protection for multiple levels of sensitive information. Multiple processor systems which share data are well suited to providing such services - if the data security problem can be solved.

A solution to these problems - a multiprocessor system design with verifiable information security - is offered in
a family of secure, distributed multi-microprocessor operating systems designed by O'Connell and Richardson [1]. A subset of this family, the Secure Archival Storage System (SASS) [2,3], has been selected as a testbed for the general design. SASS will provide consolidated file storage for a network of possibly dissimilar "host" computers. The system will provide controlled, shared access to multiple levels of sensitive information (figure 1).

This thesis presents an implementation of a basic monitor for the O'Connell-Richardson family of operating systems. The monitor provides multiprogramming and process management functions specifically addressed to the control of physical processor resources of SASS. Concurrent thesis work [4] is developing a detailed design for a security kernel process, the Memory Manager, which will manage SASS memory resources.
SASS SYSTEM

HOST 1

DATA LINKS

HOST n

SASS BOUNDARY

LOCAL MEM

CPU

LOCAL MEM

CPU

GLOBAL MEM

SECONDARY MEM
(e.g., hard disk)

SECONDARY MEM
(e.g., hard disk)

Figure 1
A. BACKGROUND

The general family design is composed of a supervisor and a security kernel. The supervisor provides dynamic linking, a discretionary security policy, demand memory management, and a hierarchical file system in support of the user. The security kernel manages physical resources to provide scheduling, interprocess communication and synchronization, and a non-discretionary security policy. The design is loop-free to permit the implementation of system subsets ranging from a simple monitor to a general purpose computer utility.

SASS is a subset of this system and does not require use of several higher levels of the general system design. Dynamic linking, demand segmentation, transient processes, and a user domain are not necessary for its intended operation, and are excluded. The software of SASS is partitioned into two domains. The security kernel, which is the most privileged domain, manages system physical resources in a manner designed to prevent unauthorized information flow, regardless of action taken by other elements in the system. The less privileged domain, the supervisor [2], provides each host with a hierarchical file system in which it may store and retrieve files and share them with other hosts. The hosts send commands and transfer files via bidirectional digital links. SASS was designed for
implementation of currently available microprocessor hardware. Multiprogramming is used to improve system efficiency and to create a virtual environment which frees the remainder of the operating system from a dependence on the physical processor configuration. Processor management provides a means of coordinating the interaction of the asynchronous processes which comprise the system. This implementation employs a processor multiplexing technique for a distributed kernel and presents a virtual interrupt mechanism. The modular, hierarchical structure of the software is loop-free to support system expansion to higher level functions.

Although the primary goal of the design is security, the clean, logical, process-oriented structure of SASS offers other benefits as well, including fault tolerance, resource configuration independence, and efficiency.

B. COMPUTER SECURITY

The need for providing protection for information within a computer system is well documented. Development of the security kernel technology [5,6], has transformed the operating system designer's approach from a game of wits with penetrators into a methodical design process.

In general, security is provided by providing protection for information in accordance with a specific protection
policy. In the case of computer security this is accomplished by controlling the access of people to information. Although this protection can be provided by external controls (e.g., confining the computer system and all its users within a physical security perimeter), this method is inefficient and prone to human error. Furthermore, a distributed computer network will probably be dispersed over too wide an area to be physically confined. Supported by the security kernel approach, an internal protection mechanism controlled by the computer operating system is a feasible solution.

1. Reference Monitor

The concept of protection is realized within the computer system by the implementation of a mathematical model of information security. This model is based on an abstract representation of security called the Reference Monitor [7]. The Reference Monitor describes a mechanism for controlling the access of subjects to objects, based on a set of access authorizations (figure 2).

![Reference Monitor Diagram](image)

**Figure 2**
Every time a subject attempts to access an object, the Reference Monitor checks to determine if the subject has authorization to perform the desired operation (e.g., write, read) on the object. If the policy does not authorize the access, the Reference Monitor will prevent the subject from performing the requested operation. This mechanism is realized within the operating system as the security kernel. Several system features are required in order for the mechanism to function correctly.

First, every reference to information (i.e., every access to primary memory by the processor) must go through the security kernel.

Second, the implementation of the security kernel must be an exact representation of the mathematical model of information security.

Third, the security kernel must be tamper-proof.

2. Security Policy

The security policy to be enforced by the computer system consists of external laws, rules, regulations, etc., which establish permissable information access independent of the computer system. Therefore, a computer system will be secure only with respect to a specific security policy. The security kernel concept supports a broad range of security policies that can be divided into two classes, non-discretionary and discretionary security.
a. Non-discretionary Policy

Non-discretionary security policy uses labels to insure only permissible access of subjects to objects is provided. Object labels reflect object sensitivity and subject labels reflect subject authorization. (For example, National Security Policy labels include Unclassified, Secret, etc.). A non-discretionary security policy provides compromise protection (from unauthorized reading), integrity protection (from unauthorized modification), and must prevent information leaks resulting from indirect access to unauthorized information as well. A non-discretionary security policy requires that all subjects and objects have labels. Most contemporary computer systems do not provide this explicit labeling and therefore implicitly make all access permissible.

b. Discretionary Policy

Discretionary security policy provides a finer division of access by allowing individual subjects to decide which of the permissible accesses, determined by non-discretionary policy, will actually be allowed (e.g., DoD’s "need to know"). Many contemporary computer systems support discretionary security policy with access control lists, file passwords, capability lists and other mechanisms.
3. Security Kernel Design

By careful interpretation of the mathematical model of the Reference Monitor, the security kernel is designed to be a subset of operating system functions. Kernel primitives form an interface between this subset and the remainder of the system. If these primitives are implemented correctly, their use guarantees that information will be protected in compliance with system security policy, regardless of any action taken by other portions of the operating system or by the user. A more detailed discussion of the security model is provided in [4, 5, 6].

C. SCOPE OF THESIS

In this chapter a subset of the general operating system design, the Secure Archival Storage System (SASS), was described. The concept of information security was examined and the security kernel was presented as a technically sound approach to the problem of providing internal computer security.

Chapter Two will discuss the design goals of this operating system. Functional design requirements will be developed and the issues of physical resource management and performance will be traced to specific attributes desired in system hardware. The rationale behind the ultimate selection of Zilog's Z8000 Microprocessor and Z8100 memory management
unit (MMU) for use in the SASS testbed implementation of this operating system will be discussed.

Chapter Three will describe the high level design of SASS with an emphasis on the security kernel design. A view of the user (computer host) environment as a collection of cooperating processes will be presented, and the hierarchical structure of the distributed kernel modules will be examined in detail.

Chapter Four will present an implementation of the SASS security kernel modules that provide multiprogramming and processor management. The construction of the virtual machine environment will be described and the advantages of a two-level scheduling mechanism will be explained.

Finally an evaluation of this implementation will be presented with recommendations for improving the design and suggestions for follow on work.
II. OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN CONCEPTS

The kernel primitives providing multiprogramming and process management form one of the smallest and most basic subsets in the family of operating systems designed by O'Connell and Richardson [4]. As developed here they were implemented specifically to support SASS. In general the same kernel primitives will support all members of this design family.

Before discussing the high level design of the SASS security kernel and presenting an implementation of these primitives, it is useful to investigate the general design methodology applied to the development of this operating system. In this chapter the design goals of SASS will be analyzed and traced to functional requirements and hardware attributes considered necessary or desirable in support of the system's design goals. It is recognized that the operating system user will probably not address these issues directly when specifying system design goals. The material presented here concerns the approach of the system designer to the definition of requirements implicitly related to user design goals.
A. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY

Two issues confront the operating system designer. First, he must provide system functions which support the services requested by the user. These functional requirements affect the logical design of the system. Second, he must address issues of cost and performance. Cost and other management considerations will not be addressed here. Performance issues concern the management of physical resources and ultimately can be reduced to hardware requirements.

There is a considerable amount of literature devoted to the development of the functional design of operating systems. Dijkstra [8] has described a technique for reducing the complexity of the design by allocating operating system activities to a number of cooperating processes. Process structure is simplified in turn by defining its functions in levels of increasing abstraction and by applying the principles of structured programming.

Madnick and Donovan [9] have described an operating system as a hierarchical extended machine. Program modules are added to the system hardware to provide many extended instructions in addition to the hardware instructions available on the bare machine. In complex systems one extended machine may be constructed upon another to form a system composed of levels of abstract (virtual) machines.
Saltzer [10] and Reed [11, 12] have discussed the advantages of resource virtualization and have described some useful interprocess communication mechanisms. The general design strategies presented in this and other research aid the operating system designer in developing system functions in a clean, logical, verifiable design.

The selection of an appropriate computer architecture, which supports both functional requirements and the efficient management of physical resources, often proves to be a more difficult issue. Frequently operating systems design is shaped by the capabilities of system hardware. This may be a result of performance limitations or cost of available hardware, but often this course is taken because traditionally, system design begins with hardware. Since a primary goal in operating systems design is to create a specific operational environment for the user, it would appear to be preferable to design from the desired environment "down to" the hardware. In this way all components of the system, software and hardware alike, are evaluated in the light of the ultimate goals of the system, and any incompatibilities between required functions and hardware capabilities will be discovered early in the design. Then, if modifications are required, design changes can be made at a high level which will preserve design integrity. LSI technology currently provides a wide variety of relatively inexpensive microprocessor hardware from which
to select specific physical components. Furthermore, it is often feasible to design special purpose hardware to specification. So the traditional restrictions on hardware versatility in systems design need not apply in many cases to microprocessor systems.

In summary, the top-down design philosophy can be applied to operating systems design in the following manner:

1. Identify general and specific design goals.
2. Derive functional design requirements.
3. Identify performance requirements.
4. Select system hardware.
5. Develop kernel software.
6. Develop the remainder of the O/S software.

B. GENERAL DESIGN GOALS

Although many design goals depend upon specific system application, there appear to be some attributes desirable in all operating systems.

1. Logical Structure

Computer system design is an engineering problem and the tools of the engineering design process should be applied to the development of software as well as hardware [13]. Clarity should be a major goal of any design for if the operating system cannot be understood easily it will be difficult to test, difficult to maintain, and its correctness will always be in doubt. A sound engineering design philosophy is not guaranteed to generate error free
systems, but if system functions are cleanly organized and well understood, then it is likely that there will be few errors and these can be corrected without difficulty when discovered.

2. Fault Tolerance

If an operating system is to be reliable, the software it uses must be protected from damage whenever possible. In particular, tasks performed by the system should be isolated from another so that a malfunction (e.g., as the result of hardware failure) in one task has no effect on others.

3. Efficiency

The efficient use of physical resources (processors, memory, peripherals, etc.) continues to be a primary design goal. However, since hardware is no longer the scarce, expensive commodity it once was, a concern for overall system efficiency (i.e., higher throughput, faster response time) may be more important. With appropriate component selection many software functions can be replaced by hardware functions that can provide an improvement in system performance at a small additional hardware expense.

C. SPECIFIC DESIGN GOALS

The family of operating systems designed by O'Connell and Richardson provides all of the services expected of a
state of the art, general purpose operating system. Many of these general services are not necessary in the SASS subset of the family. The number of processes required by SASS is determined by the number of host computers linked to SASS hardware. A design choice was made to fix this number at system generation time. Therefore dynamic process management is not required; SASS processes exist for the life of the system. A primary function of SASS is the transfer of files between host computers and SASS via bidirectional digital links. As a result, the system will have a low transaction rate, and the relatively fast response time desired in a time-sharing system is not required here. Sass does not provide programming services to users; the system strictly manages an archival storage system. This eliminates the requirement for a user domain and because the demands on primary memory are not excessive, there is no need for dynamic memory management.

Other services of the general system provide essential support to SASS. These services include I/O management, file management, and the physical resource management and information protection functions provided by the security kernel.

The SASS requirement to provide multiple host computers (users) with controlled, shared access to a multilevel secure "data warehouse" leads to several design goals. These include: internal security to protect information in a
distributed computer network; configuration independence for system versatility; and a subsetting capability to support future system expansion to more complex members of the design family.

1. **Internal Security**

   A unique feature of SASS is the specification of multilevel security as a primary design goal. Multilevel security provides controlled sharing of information of varying sensitivity among many users in accordance with an access policy implemented internally by the operating system. It is essential that a system supporting a remotely accessed database containing information of different access classes be provided with an internally enforced security policy.

2. **Configuration Independence**

   The resource configuration of a multicomputer system is highly changeable. Processors are added and removed; memory is reconfigured; interconnection schemes are altered and peripheral equipment is changed. The operating system of such a design should be sufficiently flexible to permit maintenance and to allow for growth and reconfiguration without requiring drastic system redesign or noticeably affecting the user's environment.

3. **Sub-setting Capability**

   Operating system "sub-setting" refers to the ability to form meaningful subsets of the design by eliminating many
of the services that can be provided by the system without affecting the usefulness of the remainder of the system. Sub-setting permits the system to be tailored to fit a number of specific designs ranging from a simple monitor to a full service time-shared computer utility. The implementation presented in this thesis creates a monitor that provides multiprogramming and processor management. This subset supports more complex family members of the design such as SASS.

D. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

In a top-down approach to design, goals are clarified and defined by requirements which describe either the system functions or address cost and performance issues (hardware requirements). The functional requirements defined below support the specific design goals of SASS and provide features desirable in any operating system, such as a logical structure, fault tolerance, and efficiency of operation.

1. Functional Requirements

   Functional requirements define services which must be provided to support the user's environment.

   a. Process Organization

      By designing an operating system as a collection of cooperating processes, system complexity can be greatly
reduced [E]. This is because the asynchronous nature of the system can be structured logically by representing each independent, sequential task as a process and by providing interprocess communication mechanisms to prevent races and deadlocks during process interactions.

The notion of a process provides a complete description of all instructions executed and all memory locations referenced during the performance of a task. A process is defined by an address space and an execution point. The address space is the set of memory locations which could be accessed during process execution. (The process is viewed as a past, present and future "history" of memory locations which actually were referenced.) The execution point is the state of the processor at a given instant during process execution. In the abstract view, an address space is defined by a collection of discrete points, each representing a memory word. The process is described by the path traced through this address space from process creation to destruction. In figure 3 the main path traces the process execution point as it moves from one instruction (i.e., memory word) to another during process execution. The branches from this execution point path represent data references.
Several advantages result from using a process oriented design. As a tool for dealing with the asynchronous nature of system operation, processes provide a simple, logical, high-level structure for the design. For example, the Secure Archival Storage System supports each host with three processes: a I/O Manager, a File Manager, and a Memory Manager, which interact to provide secure file management services to the host. This interaction will be described further in the next chapter. Since each process is confined to a specific address space, tasks are isolated from one another and system fault tolerance is improved. By providing an internal representation for each user, a process nicely fits the definition of a "subject" in the Reference Monitor and therefore supports the design goal of providing internal security.
b. Memory Segmentation

The address space of a process is composed of a collection of segments. A segment is a logical collection of information (e.g., procedure, data structure, file, etc.) and is the basic logical object of this design. Figure 4 illustrates the two-dimensional nature of the segment address. Each segment consists of an arbitrary region of memory containing a sequence of words with conventional linear addresses. Two-dimensional addressing frees information from dependence on a particular memory location by making it arbitrarily relocatable.

Segmented Addressing

\[
\text{<<SEG \#n>> OFFSET}
\]

Descriptor segment

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{SEG \#n} \\
\vdots
\end{array}
\]

Segment \#n

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{offset} \\
\vdots
\end{array}
\]

mem. word

Figure 4

The descriptor segment provides a list of descriptors for all segments in a process address space. In addition, segmentation supports information sharing since a segment may belong to more than one address space.
Segmentation also provides a means of associating logical attributes and labels with each segment, such as access class, domain, etc. This feature supports segments as internal representations of the Reference Monitor's "object".

c. Abstraction

Abstraction provides a method for reducing problem complexity by applying a general solution to a collection of specific cases [14]. Structured programming provides a tool for creating abstraction in software design. By strictly applying two special rules in addition to the general principles of structured programming, a structure consisting of levels of increasing abstraction can be constructed.

First, calls cannot be outward toward higher levels of abstraction. This frees lower levels from a dependence on higher levels by creating a loop-free structure [15] and results in a design which is capable of having subsets.

Second, calls to lower levels must be by special entry points or gates. Each level of abstraction creates an virtual hierarchical machine [9]. The gate to each level provides a set of instructions created for that virtual machine. Thus higher levels may use the resources of lower levels only by applying the instruction set of a lower level machine. (At domain boundaries, use of gates is strictly
enforced by a ring-crossing mechanism; otherwise gate use is implicit in the structure of the software.) Once a level of abstraction has been created, the details of its implementation are no longer an issue. Instead users see layers of virtual machines, each defined by its extended instruction set.

Each process used in SASS is designed in levels of abstraction. When the rules of abstraction are applied to level 0, the physical resources of the system, these resources are "virtualized". Thus the first level of abstraction creates "virtual processors", "virtual memory", and "virtual devices" from the system's hardware. At each higher level the detail of the design is reduced. The gate at the boundary between the highest level of the security kernel and the lowest level of the supervisor provides a mechanism for isolating the kernel as well as insuring that each memory access is via kernel software. This mechanism is implemented in SASS by a ring-crossing mechanism called the Gatekeeper.

d. Resource Virtualization

The first levels of abstraction above system hardware create virtual representations of physical resources (virtual processors, virtual memory, virtual peripherals). Since upper levels of the design operate on these virtual resources, rather than on physical resources, most of the design (i.e., everything above resource
virtualization levels) is independent of the physical configuration of the system. By providing virtual to real resource binding in the kernel, and by enforcing entry into kernel levels with the Gatekeeper, SASS protects physical resources from tampering and insures memory access only via the kernel. As a result, the kernel modules of each process will guarantee that the system's non-discretionary security policy is enforced. Including in the kernel only those functions essential to system security keeps it small and reduces the job of verification to manageable proportions.

2. Hardware Requirements

Virtual resources are created by the multiplexing of various types of information on a physical resource. Multiplexing can be defined as the use of a single resource for different purposes at different times. For example, the physical bus lines can be used both for addresses and data during different times during the machine cycle. Similarly, logical users of a hardware system can share resources. The ability to multiplex processors and memory efficiently provides a mechanism for the virtualization of these physical resources.

a. Processor Virtualization.

A virtual processor is a data structure that contains a complete description of a process in execution on a physical processor at a given instant. This description is
contained in the process execution point. The address space of the process must be accessible to the virtual processor when it is loaded on (bound to) a CPU. To provide a useful virtualization capability, the CPU must have the ability to efficiently multiplex process execution points and address spaces (i.e., it must support multiprogramming).

b. Memory Virtualization.

In many memory handling schemes, a process cannot run unless the entire address space is loaded in primary memory. This may require a large main memory or it may restrict the size of the address space. An alternative plan requires an 'operating system which manages primary and secondary memory to create the illusion of a memory which is larger than the system's primary memory. Since the larger memory is only an illusion, it is often called virtual storage. The logical, relocatable, information objects created by memory segmentation provide an essential memory multiplexing mechanism for the efficient implementation of virtual storage.

c. Protection Domains

An essential requirement of internal security is that the security kernel be isolated from other elements of the system. This can be accomplished by the construction of protection domains. Protection domains are used to arrange process address spaces into rings of different privilege. This arrangement is a hierarchical structure in which the
most privileged domain is the innermost ring. The structure essentially divides the address space into levels of abstraction with strictly enforced gates at the ring boundaries (Figure 5).

![SASS Protection Rings Diagram](image)

Figure 5

Protection rings may be created in software, but a hardware implementation, where use is enforced by hardware, is much more efficient [16].

The protection provided by the ring structure is not a security policy. (Security protection is implemented by a lattice structure known to the Non-discretionary Security module in the kernel.) It does, however, enforce the hierarchy of the virtual machine by creating a privileged kernel ring within the supervisor ring.

E. HARDWARE SELECTION

The manifestation of an operating system design is, of course, software in execution on system equipment. If system
equipment must be selected early in the design, care must be taken to insure that overall system design goals are compatible with actual hardware capabilities. If design goals must be met (e.g., the enforcement of internal security in SASS), then actual hardware selection should be made late in the design process. Then, even if a poor hardware choice is made, the penalty for correcting it will be small, since only the lowest level of the design (where resources are virtualized) need be changed. In any case the design of the operating system and the design or selection of system hardware must proceed in concert.

1. **Zilog Z8001**

The Z8001 is a general purpose 16-bit microprocessor [17] with an architecture which supports memory segmentation and two-domain operations. It was selected as the target machine for implementation of the system because of the full range of support and close match it provided to design requirements. These supporting features are described below.

a. **Memory Segmentation**

The CPU can directly access 8M bytes of address space using a memory segmentation capability provided externally by a Memory Management Unit (Z8010 MMU). The 23-bit address required to address 8M bytes is a logical two dimensional address consisting of a 7-bit segment number and a 16-bit offset. The memory management unit converts this into a 24-bit address for the physical memory. The address
space can be divided into as many as 128 relocatable segments containing up to 64K bytes each. Each memory segment can be assigned several attributes which provide memory access protection (read only, system mode only (i.e., ring #), execute only, etc.) and memory management data (changed, referenced). With these capabilities the Z8001 CPU can support all requirements for segmentation, memory virtualization and protection domains.

b. Multiprogramming

Processor multiplexing is supported by the CPU’s multiprogramming capabilities. MULTI-MICRO instructions aid in establishing a synchronization mechanism (by mutual exclusion) between multiple processors. Separate stack, data and code address spaces are maintained for each ring of operation. The load multiple instruction allows the contents of registers to be saved and loaded efficiently. These features permit efficient storing and loading of process execution points.

Address space multiplexing is also supported but is somewhat inefficient. In some systems, such as Multics [18], a descriptor base register (DBR) is provided to point to a process descriptor segment in memory, so changing the address space of the physical processor is accomplished merely by changing the DBR. Since the Z8001 CPU implements the descriptor segment as a collection of descriptor registers in the MMU, all of the descriptors for the address
space must be saved and loaded to change processes. This can make processor multiplexing (multiprogramming) quite inefficient. In the worst case, when the entire MMU is saved and loaded, a process switch will take about 2 ms. It may be possible to improve on this performance by increasing the number of MMU's in the system. Then the address space can be changed simply by switching control to another MMU.

c. Two-Domain Operations

The Z8001 CPU can operate in either system mode or normal mode. In the system mode all operations are allowed, but in the user mode, certain system instructions are prohibited. The system call instruction allows controlled entry to the system mode. This two-domain instruction capability supports the two domain structure of SASS by providing a single controlled entry into the kernel (SYSTEM CALL instruction). The descriptors contained in the MMU registers provide the capability to partition process address spaces into supervisor and kernel domains.

2. Selection Rationale

The characteristics listed above - processor multiplexing support, a memory segmentation capability, multiple domain instructions, and multiple domain memory partitioning - are features which are essential to an efficient implementation of SASS. The Z8001 has other desirable features: vectored and non-vectored interrupts, large, powerful instruction set, many data types, etc. These
attributes make the Zilog system a suitable choice as a bare machine for the Secure Archival Storage System.

F. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a description of the methodology employed in the design and specification of SASS. In particular it was noted that a top-down design philosophy most effectively supported implementation of system design goals. Requirements supporting the primary design goal of internal security and other general and specific goals were defined and traced to desired hardware capabilities. Finally, capabilities of Zilog's Z8061 microprocessor which support the SASS design were described.

Chapter Three will provide an overview of the SASS design. The design will be described from a process viewpoint and the hierarchical structure of the distributed kernel will be examined.
III. SECURITY KERNEL DESIGN

The high level design of the Secure Archival Storage System can be described by a collection of cooperating processes. The use of processes to perform operating system functions greatly simplifies the problem of describing the asynchronous manner in which services are requested.

A. PROCESS VIEW

There are two kinds of processes within SASS, supervisor processes and kernel processes. Supervisor processes provide high level services to host computers [2]. Certain functions of the operating system are distributed throughout all of these processes; that is, supervisor processes logically share a collection of distributed kernel modules. Kernel processes provide specialized services within the operating system. The system user is not aware of the existence of these processes, but they are called upon, within the kernel domain, by supervisor processes to perform necessary operating system functions in support of user services.
1. **Supervisor Processes**

One pair of supervisor processes, an I/O Manager and a File Manager, represents each computer host supported by SASS.

The File Manager controls SASS and directs all interaction between SASS and computer hosts in order to maintain a structure of hierarchical files on behalf of each host. It interprets commands received from hosts via the I/O Manager and coordinates the execution of requested services with assistance from the I/O Manager and the Memory Manager (described below).

The I/O Manager transfers information via a link between each host and SASS. Data is transferred by fixed-size packets in command, data, and synchronization formats. The I/O Manager provides only a transfer service and does not interpret the data.

2. **Kernel Processes**

The two kernel processes used by SASS are the Memory Manager and the Idle process. The Memory Manager controls primary and secondary memory. The design of this process is the topic of concurrent thesis research [3]. The Memory Manager transfers segments between primary and secondary memory in response to requests from supervisor processes.

The Idle process defines the "no work" state of the system. SASS attempts to schedule useful work on system processors whenever possible. Only when there is no work to
be done. (i.e., no commands pending from hosts) will this process be called upon to execute.

3. **Host Environment**

Host computers view SASS as a remote data warehouse where they may store and retrieve files (figure 6). Each host is provided with a virtual file hierarchy constructed from directory and data files. A pair of SASS supervisor processes (an I/O Manager and a File Manager) provide each host with a set of commands by which it may store and retrieve files in its virtual file system and share files with other hosts. The distributed kernel functions of each process control the physical resources of the system in support host commands and SASS security policy.

![SASS Process Configuration Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 6**
E. VIRTUAL MACHINE VIEW

The distributed modules of the security kernel create a virtual hierarchical machine which controls process interactions and manages physical processor resources. The kernel is not aware of the details of process tasks. It knows each process only by a name (viz., an entry number in a table) and provides processes with scheduling and interprocess communication services based on this process identifier. All supervisor processes share the modules of this virtual hierarchical machine (Figure 7).

The kernel is constructed in layers of abstraction. Each layer, or level, builds upon the resources created at lower levels. The rules of abstraction described in Chapter 2 were applied to the design of this structure. Level 0 is the bare machine which provides the physical resources (processors and storage) upon which the virtual machine is constructed. The remainder of this chapter will describe the level of virtualization (or layer of abstraction) created by each distributed kernel module.

1. Inner Traffic Controller Module

Level-1 of this virtual machine is the Inner Traffic Controller Module. This module creates a set of virtual processors with the extended instruction set: SIGNAL, WAIT, SWAP_VDBR, IDLE, SET_VPREENPT, TEST_VPREENPT, and RUNNING_VP.
Figure 7
SIGNAL and WAIT provide an interprocessor communication mechanism used within the kernel to provide multiprogramming. These instructions invoke the level-1 scheduling procedure, GETWORK, which multiplexes virtual processors on a physical processor.

SWAP_VDBR and IDLE are instructions invoked from level-2 by the Traffic Controller Module to schedule processes on a virtual processor.

SET_VPREEMPT and TEST_VPREEMPT create a virtual processor interrupt mechanism. SET_VPREEMPT is invoked from level-2 when the traffic controller desires to load a new process on a virtual processor that is not scheduled. TEST_VPREEMPT is invoked by the Gatekeeper of each distributed process upon every exit from the kernel domain. The Gatekeeper unmask virtual interrupts by testing the interrupt flag of the scheduled virtual processor. If the flag is set, a virtual interrupt handler is invoked, otherwise the process enters the supervisor domain normally.

RUNNING_VP is invoked from level-2 to provide the Traffic Controller with the identity of the currently scheduled virtual processor. The identity of a particular processor must be known in the virtual environment, just as the identity of a physical processor is required in a multiprocessor system.
2. Traffic Controller Module

The Traffic Controller resides at level-2. It manages the scheduling of processes on virtual processors by invoking the extended instructions of the virtual processors in level-1. In addition to implementing the level-2 scheduling algorithm, the Traffic Controller creates the extended instruction set: ADVANCE, AWAIT, and PROCESS_CLASS.

ADVANCE and AWAIT are used to implement eventcounts and sequencers [11], an inter-processor communication (IPC) mechanism invoked by the supervisor. Although SIGNAL and WAIT provided an adequate interprocessor synchronization mechanism within kernel, Parks [2] determined that supervisor process synchronization would be more effectively served in the secure environment of SASS by the use of eventcounts.

PROCESS_CLASS is invoked from level-3. It returns the label, subject access class, of the current process for determining a subject-object relation.

a. Scheduling

Scheduling functions are divided between the Inner Traffic Controller and the Traffic Controller. The Inner Traffic Controller multiplexes virtual processors on a CPU. The Traffic Controller schedules processes on virtual processors.

The division of the scheduling algorithm between these two levels simplifies its design, because it separates
the issues of virtual processor management (multiprogramming) from virtual memory management [12]. A design choice was made to provide each system CPU with a small fixed set of virtual processors. Since the virtual processor data base is shared by all system CPU's, it must remain permanently in global memory.

The process data base, used to implement level-2 scheduling will be much larger. Since supervisor processors are known to the entire system, this data must also be kept in global memory. Because level-2 is subject to memory management, this data could be kept on secondary storage and moved to primary memory when requested.

SASS does not provide dynamic memory management, therefore the two-level scheduling design presented here is not essential to the design. However, the structure has been provided in this implementation to support more complex family members of the O'Connell-Richardson design. Figure 8 illustrates the two levels of scheduling employed by the distributed kernel.

The two virtual processors (Mem_Mgr_VP and Idle_VP in Figure 8) are permanently bound to kernel processes and are not in contention for process scheduling. The remaining VP's are temporarily bound to supervisor processes as determined by the Traffic Controller. If no supervisor process is available, the Traffic Controller
invokes the Inner Traffic Controller (IDLE) which loads an
Idle process on the virtual processor.

The Inner Traffic Controller schedules virtual
processors on the physical processor. Ready virtual
processors with temporarily bound idle processes (VP #1 and
VP #2 in Figure 8) will be scheduled only to give an Idle
process away for a supervisor process (i.e., when virtual
preempt flag is set). The Idle process will actually run
when the virtual processor to which it is permanently bound
(the Idle-VP in Figure 8) is scheduled. This will happen
only when all other VP’s are waiting or temporarily bound to
Idle processes, i.e., when there is no useful work for the
CPU.
TWO-LEVEL SCHEDULING

LEVEL 2

LEVEL 1

LEVEL 0

Figure 8
3. Non-Discretionary Security Module

The Non-Discretionary Security module in level-3 reflects the system's security policy. It compares two labels, subject and object access classes, passed to it by other modules, and returns the relationship of the labels based on a lattice structure known to it. To perform this function it provides the extended instruction, RELATION, which is used by the Event Manager and the Segment Manager to determine access permission. These modules make decisions about access based on the relationships: equal, less than, greater than, and not related. The Non-discretionary Security module is the only module which interprets the labels themselves. A different security policy (e.g., Privacy Act vs DOD) can be implemented simply by changing the lattice structure used in this module.

4. Event Manager Module

The Event Manager is a level-3 module invoked by supervisor processes via the gatekeeper. This module creates a set of extended instructions: ADVANCE, AWAIT, READ and TICKET. It determines the access permission of desired interprocess communications and obtains a global handle from a Memory Manager data base where event data is stored. If access is permitted, the event manager passes this handle, which identifies the event, to the Traffic Controller where the appropriate event count instruction is invoked. For sequencer operations the Memory Manager is invoked directly.
The use of the handle is necessary because of the design choice to store event data in a data base of the Memory Manager [3]. This insures that inter-domain IPC does not violate SASS security policy.

5. Segment Manager Module

The Segment Manager also resides in level-3. This module creates a set of extended instructions for manipulating segments. These instructions are: CREATE, DELETE, SWAP_IN, SWAP_OUT, MAKEKNOWN, and TERMINATE. Modules of the supervisor domain invoke these instructions to coordinate host support. CREATE and DELETE add and remove segments from the system. SWAP_IN and SWAP_OUT cause a segment to be moved between primary and secondary memory (i.e., between a paged disk and contiguous memory). MAKEKNOWN and TERMINATE add and remove a segment from a process address space.

6. Gatekeeper Module

The Gatekeeper exists on the boundary between the kernel and supervisor domains. It provides the sole entry point into the kernel domain, so when the execution point of a process enters the kernel domain of its address space it must do so through the Gatekeeper.

The hardware of the MMU partitions process address spaces into two domains by setting the ring number (zero or one) in each segment's
attribute register. Software provided by the Gatekeeper performs the following additional functions:

Kernel Entry

1. Unmask Hardware interrupts.
2. Save supervisor domain registers.
3. Save supervisor stack pointer in kernel stack segment.
4. Check arguments and invoke appropriate kernel entry points.
   (Virtual machine instructions).

Kernel Exit

1. Invoke TEST_VPREEEMPT
   (i.e., unmask virtual interrupts).
2. Restore supervisor domain stack pointer.
3. Restore supervisor domain registers.
4. Unmask hardware interrupts.
5. Return to process execution point in supervisor domain.

C. REVIEW

This chapter has described the high level design of the Secure Archival Storage System kernel from two points of view. In the process view the system is composed of pairs of supervisor processes (an I/O Manager and a File Manager) for
each host computer and a pair of kernel processes (a Memory Manager and an Idle process) for each real processor in the system. The supervisor processes provide high level services to host computers while the kernel processes control system memory resources and provide an idle system state. Distributed kernel functions implement two levels of scheduling, provide interprocessor synchronization and communication, manage segments, and isolate and protect the kernel domain of process address spaces. The distributed kernel is constructed as a hierarchical virtual machine. Evidence of the versatility of the loop-free, configuration independent structure of this design can be observed in concurrent thesis work in this area [19]. An Intel 8036 multiprocessor operating system implementation, based on the same design, uses essentially the same virtual instruction set described in this chapter. An implementation of the first two levels of this kernel machine is presented in the next chapter.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the distributed kernel was simplified by the hierarchical structure of the design for it permitted methodical bottom-up construction of a series of extended machines. This approach was particularly useful in this implementation since the bare machine, the ZE00E Developmental Module, was provided with only a small amount of software support.

A. DEVELOPMENTAL SUPPORT

A Zilog MCZ Developmental System provided support in developing ZE00E machine code. It provided floppy disk file management, a text editor, a linker and a loader that created an image of each ZE00E load module.

A Z8000 Developmental Module (DM) provided the necessary hardware support for operation of a Z8000 non-segmented microprocessor and 16K words (32K bytes) of dynamic RAM. It included a clock, a USART, serial and parallel I/O support, and a 2K PROM monitor.

The monitor provided access to processor registers and memory, single step and break point functions, basic I/O functions, and a download/upload capability with the MCZ system.
Since a segmented version of the processor was not available for system development, segmentation hardware was simulated in software as an MMU image (see Figure 9). Although this data structure did not provide the hardware support (traps) required to protect segments of the kernel domain, it preserved the general structure of the design.

**Figure 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MMU_IMAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFSET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seg #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. INNER TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

The Inner Traffic Controller runs on the bare machine to create a virtual environment for the remainder of the system. Only this module is dependent on the physical processor configuration of the system. All higher levels see only a set of running virtual processors. A kernel database, the Virtual Processor Table is used by the Inner
Traffic Controller to create the virtual environment of this first level extended machine. A source listing of the Inner Traffic Controller module is contained in Appendix A.

1. **Virtual Processor Table (VPT)**

The VPT is a data structure of arrays and records that maintains the data used by the Inner Traffic Controller to multiplex virtual processors on a real processor and to create the extended instruction set that controls virtual processor operation (see Figure 10). There is one table for each physical processor in the system. Since this implementation was for a uniprocessor system (the Z8000), only one table was necessary.

**Virtual Processor Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCK</th>
<th>RUNNING_LIST</th>
<th>READY_LIST</th>
<th>FREE_LIST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP INDEX</td>
<td>DBR</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>STATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG INDEX</td>
<td>MESSAGE</td>
<td>SENDER</td>
<td>NEXT_MSG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10*
The table contains a LOCK which supports an exclusion mechanism for a multiprocessor system. It was provided in this implementation only to preserve the generality of the design.

The Descriptor Base Register (DBR) binds a process to a virtual processor. The DBR points to an MMU_IMAGE containing the list of descriptors for segments in the process address space.

A virtual processor (VP) can be in one of three states: running, ready, and waiting (figure 11).

Virtual Processor States

![Diagram of virtual processor states]

FIGURE 11
A running VP is currently scheduled on a real processor. A ready VP is ready to be scheduled when selected by the level-1 scheduling algorithm. A waiting VP is awaiting a message from some other VP to place it in the ready list. In the meantime it is not in contention for the real processor.

2. Level-1 Scheduling

Virtual processor state changes are initiated by the inter-virtual-processor communication mechanisms, SIGNAL and WAIT. These level-1 instructions implement the scheduling policy by determining what virtual processor to bind to the real processor. The actual binding and unbinding is performed by a Processor switching mechanism called SWAP_DBR [10]. Processor switching implies that somehow the execution point and address space of a new process are acquired by the processor. Care must be taken to insure that the old process is saved and the new process loaded in an orderly manner. A solution to this problem, suggested by Saltzer [16], is to design the switching mechanism so that it is a common procedure having the same segment number in every address space.

In this implementation a processor register (R14) was reserved within the switching mechanism for use as a DBR. Processor switching was performed by saving the old execution point (i.e., processor registers and flag control
word), loading the new DBR and then loading the new execution point. The processor switch occurs at the instant the DBR is changed (see figure 12). Because the switching procedure is distributed in the same numbered segment in all address spaces, the "next" instruction at the instant of the switch will have the same offset no matter what address space the processor is in. This is the key to the proper operation of SWAP_DBR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process #1</th>
<th>Process #2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address space</td>
<td>Address space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call SWAP_DBR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save return point on call stack. (Process #1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save execution point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swap DBR (R14)</td>
<td>Swap DBR (R14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processor switch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load new execution point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load return point from call stack (process #2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12
To convert this switching mechanism to segmented hardware it is necessary merely to replace SWAP_DEP with special I/O block-move instructions that save the contents of the MMU in the appropriate MMU_IMAGE and load the contents of the new MMU_IMAGE into the MMU.

a. Getwork

SWAP_DEP is contained within an internal Inner Traffic Controller procedure called GETWORK. In addition to multiplexing virtual processors on the CPU, GETWORK interprets the virtual processor status flags, IDLE and PREEMPT, and modifies VP scheduling accordingly in an attempt to keep the CPU busy doing useful work.

There are actually two classes of idle processes within the system. One class belongs to the Traffic Controller. Conceptually there is a ready level-2 idle process for each virtual processor available to the Traffic Controller for scheduling. When a running process blocks itself, the Traffic Controller schedules the first ready process. This will be an idle process if no supervisor processes are in the ready list.

The second class of idle process exists in the kernel. The kernel Idle process is permanently bound to the lowest priority virtual processor.
The distinction is made between these classes because of the need to keep the CPU busy doing useful work whenever possible. There is no need for GETWORK to schedule a level-2 idle process that has been loaded on a virtual processor, because the idle process does no useful work. The virtual processor IDLE_FLAG indicates that a virtual processor has been loaded with a level-2 idle process. GETWORK will schedule this virtual processor only if the PREEMPT flag is also set. The PREEMPT flag is a signal from the Traffic Controller that a supervisor process is now ready to run.

When GETWORK can find no other ready virtual processors with IDLE and PREEMPT flags off, it will select the virtual processor permanently bound to the kernel Idle process. Only then will the Idle process actually run on the CPU.

Getwork contains two entry points. The first, a normal entry, resets the preempt interrupt return flag. (RZ is reserved for this purpose within GETWORK.) The second, a hardware interrupt entry point, contains an interrupt handler which sets the preempt interrupt return flag. The DBR (P14) must also be set to the current value by any procedure that calls GETWORK in order to permit the SWAP_DBR portion of GETWORK to have access to the scheduled process's
address space. Upon completion of the processor switch, GETWORK examines the interrupt return flag to determine whether a normal return or an interrupt return is required.

The hardware interrupt entry point in GETWORK supports the technique used to initialize the system. Each process address space contains a kernel domain stack segment used by SWAP-DBR in GETWORK to save and restore VP states. For the same reason that SWAP-DBR is contained in a system-wide segment number, the stack segment in each process address space will also have the same number (Segment #1 in this implementation). Each stack segment is initially created as though it's process had been previously preempted by a hardware interrupt. This greatly simplifies the initialization of processes at system generation time. The details of system initialization will be described later in this chapter. It is important to note here, however, that GETWORK must be able to determine whether it was invoked by a hardware preempt interrupt or by a normal call, before it can execute a return to the calling procedure. This is because a hardware interrupt causes three items to be placed on the system stack: the return location of the caller, the flag control word, and the interrupt identifier, whereas a normal call places only the return location on the stack. Therefore, in order to clean up the stack, GETWORK must
execute an interrupt return (assembly instruction: IRET) if entry was via the hardware preempt handler (i.e., R0 set). This instruction will pop the three items off the stack and return to the appropriate location. If the interrupt return flag, R0, is off, a normal return is executed.

During normal operation, SWAP-DER manipulates process stacks to save the old VP state and load the new VP state. This action proceeds as follows (figure 13):

1. The Flag Control Word (FCW), the Stack Pointer (R15) and the preempt return flag (R0) are saved in the old VP's kernel stack.

2. The DBR (R14) is loaded with the new VP's DBR. This permits access to the address space of the new process.

3. The Flag Control Word (FCW), the Stack Pointer (R15) and the Interrupt Return Flag (R0), are loaded into the appropriate CPU registers.

4. R0 is tested. If it is set, GETWORK will execute an interrupt return. If it is off, a normal return occurs.
By constructing GETWORK in this way, both system initialization and normal operations can be handled in the same way. A high level GETWORK algorithm is given in figure 14.

3. Virtual Processor Instruction Set

The heart of the SASS scheduling mechanism is the internal procedure, GETWORK. It provides a powerful internal primitive for use by the virtual processors and greatly simplifies the design of the virtual processor instruction set. Virtual processor instructions perform three types of functions: multiprogramming, process management and virtual interrupts.
GETWORK Procedure (DBR = R14)

Begin

Reset Interrupt Return Flag (R0)

Skip hardware preempt handler

Hardware Preempt Entry:
Set DBR
Save CPU registers
Save supervisor stack pointer
Set Interrupt Return Flag (R0)

Get first ready VP

Do while not Select
    If Idle flag is set then
        If Preempt flag is set then
            select
        else
            select
        end if
    else
        select
    end if
end do

SWAP DBR:
Save old VP registers in stack segment
Swap dbr (R14)
Load new VP registers in stack segment

If Interrupt Return Flag is set then
    unlock VPT

    simulate GATEKEEPER exit:
    Call TEST_VPREEMPT
    Restore supervisor registers
    Restore supervisor stack pointer

    Execute Interrupt Return (IRET)
end if

Execute normal return

end GETWORK

Figure 14
SIGNAL and WAIT provide synchronization and communication between virtual processors. They multiplex virtual processors on a CPU to provide multiprogramming. This implementation used a version of the signal and wait algorithms proposed by Saltzer [10]. In the SASS design each CPU is provided with a unique (fixed) set of virtual processors. The interaction among virtual processors is a result of multiprogramming them on the real processor. Only one virtual processor is able to access the VPT at a time because of the use of the VPT LOCK (SPIN_LOCK) to provide mutual exclusion. Therefore race and deadlock conditions will not develop and the signal pending switch used by Saltzer is not necessary.

This implementation also included message passing mechanism not provided by Saltzer. The message slots available for use by virtual processors are initially contained in a queue pointed to by FREE-LIST. When a message is sent from one VP to another, a message slot is removed from the free list and placed in a FIFO message queue belonging to the VP receiving the message. The head of each VP's message queue is pointed to by MSG-LIST. Each message slot contains a message, the ID of the sender, and a pointer to the next message in the list (either the free list or the VP message list.)
IDLE and SWAP_VDBR provide the Traffic Controller with a means of scheduling processes on the running VP.

SET_VPREEMPT and TEST_VPREEMPT install a virtual interrupt mechanism in each virtual processor. When the Traffic Controller determines that a virtual processor should give up its process because a higher priority process is now ready, it sets the PREEMPT flag in that VP. Then, even if an idle process is loaded on the VP, it will be scheduled and will be loaded with the first ready process. Test_VPreempt is a virtual interrupt unmasking mechanism which forces a process to examine the preempt flag each time it exists from the kernel.

a. Wait

WAIT provides a means for a virtual processor to move itself from the running state to the waiting state when it has no more work to do. It is invoked only for system events that are always of short duration. It is supported by three internal Procedures.

SPIN_LOCK enables the running VP to gain control of the Virtual Processor Table. This procedure is only necessary in a multiprocessor environment. The running VP will have to wait only a short amount of time to gain control of the VPT. SPIN_LOCK returns when the VP has locked the VPT.
GETWORK loads the first eligible virtual processor of the ready list on the real processor. Before this procedure is invoked, the running VP is placed in the ready state. Both ready and running VP's are members of a FIFO queue. GETWORK selects the first VP in this ready list, loads it on the CPU, and places it in the running state. When GETWORK returns, the first VP of the queue will always be running and the second will be the first VP in the ready queue.

GET_FIRST_MESSAGE returns the first message of the message list (also managed as a FIFO queue) associated with the running VP. The action taken by WIT is as follows:
WAIT Procedure (Returns: Msg, Sender_ID)

Begin

Lock VPT (call SPIN_LOCK)

If message list empty (i.e., no work) Then
    Move VP from Running to Waiting state
    Schedule first eligible Ready VP (call GETWORK)
end if

(NOTE: process suspended here until it receives a signal and is selected by GETWORK.)

Get first message from message list (call GET_FIRST_MSG)

Unlock VPT

Return

end WAIT

If the running virtual processor calls WAIT and there is a message in its message list (placed there when another VP signaled it) it will get the message and continue to run. If the message list is empty it will place itself in the wait state, schedule the first ready virtual processor, and move it to the running state. The virtual processor will remain in the waiting state until another running VP sends it a message (via SIGNAL). It will then move to the ready list. Finally it will be selected by GETWORK, the next instructions of WAIT will be executed, it will receive the message for which it was waiting, and it will return to the caller.
b. Signal

Messages are passed between virtual processors by the instruction, SIGNAL, which uses four internal procedures, SPIN_LOCK, ENTER_MSG_LIST, MAKE_READY, and GETWORK.

SPIN_LOCK, as explained above insures that only one virtual processor has control of the Virtual Processor Table at a time.

ENTER_MSG_LIST manages a FIFO message queue for each virtual Processor and for free messages. This queue is of fixed maximum length because of the implementation decision to restrict the use of SIGNAL. A running VP can send no more than one message (SIGNAL) before it receives a reply (i.e., WAIT's for a message). Therefore if there are N virtual processors per real processors, the message queue length, L, is:

\[ L = N - 1 \]

MAKE_READY messages the virtual processor ready queue. If a message is sent to a VP in the waiting state, MAKE_READY wakes it up (it places it in the ready state) and enters it in the ready list. If a running VP signals a waiting VP of higher priority, it will place itself back in the ready state and the higher priority VP will be selected. The action taken by signal is as follows:
SIGNAL Procedure (Message, Destination_VP)

Begin

Lock VFT (call SPIN_LOCK)

Send message (call ENTER_MSG_LIST)

If signaled VP is waiting Then
Wake it up and make it ready
(called MAKE_READY)
end if

Put running VP in ready state.

Schedule first eligible ready VP
(called GETWORK)

Unlock VFT

Return (Success_code)

End SIGNAL

c. SWAP_VDB?

SWAP_VDB? contains the same processor switching mechanism used in SWAP_DBR, but applies it to a virtual processor rather than a real processor. Switching is quite simple in this virtual environment because both processor execution point and address space are defined by the Descriptor Base Register. SWAP_VDBR is invoked by the Traffic Controller to load a new process on a virtual processor in support of level-2 scheduling. It uses GETWORK to control the associated level-1 scheduling. The action taken by SWAP_VDBR is:
SWAP_VDER Procedure (New_DER)

Begin

Lock VPT (call SPIN_LOCK)
Load running VP with New_DER
Place running VP in ready state
Schedule first eligible ready VP
(call GETWORK)

Unlock VPT
Return
End SWAP_VDER

In this implementation one restriction is placed upon the use of this instruction. If a virtual processor's message list contains at least one message, it can not give up its current DER. This problem is avoided as the natural result of using SIGNAL and WAIT only for system events, and "masking" preempts within the kernel. If this were permitted, the messages would lose their context. (The messages in a VP_MSG_LIST are actually intended for the process loaded on the VP.)

d. IDLE

The IDLE instruction loads the Idle DER on the running virtual processor. Only virtual processors in contention for process scheduling will be loaded by this instruction. (The Traffic
Controller is not even aware of virtual processors permanently bound to kernel processes.)

IDLE has the same scheduling effect as SWAP_VDBR, but it also sets the IDLE_FLAG on the scheduled VP. The distinction is made between the two cases because, although the Traffic Controller must schedule an Idle process on the VP if there are no other ready processes, the Inner Traffic Controller does not wish to schedule an Idle VP if there is an alternative. This would be a waste of physical processor resources. The setting of the IDLE_FLAG by the Traffic Controller aids the Inner Traffic Controller in making this scheduling decision. Logically, there is an idle process for each VP; actually the same address space (DBR) is used for all idle processes for the same CPU, since only one will run at a time. As previously explained, virtual processors loaded by this instruction will be selected by GETWORK only to give the Idle process away for a new process in response to a virtual preempt interrupt. The action of IDLE is:
IDLE Procedure

Begin

Lock VPT (call SPIN_LOCK)
Load running VP with Idle DBR
Set VP's IDLE_FLAG
Place running VP in ready state
Schedule first eligible ready VP (call GETWORK)
Unlock VPT
Return
End IDLE

e. SET_VPREEEMPT

SET_VPREEEMPT sets the preempt interrupt flag on a specified virtual processor. This forces the virtual processor into level-1 scheduling contention, even if it is loaded with an Idle process. The instruction retrieves an idle virtual processor in the same way a hardware preempt retrieves an idle CPU by forcing the VP to be selected by GETWORK. The only difference between the two cases is the entry point used in GETWORK. The action of SET_VPREEEMPT is:
SET_VPREEMPT Procedure (VP)

Begin
Set VP's PREEMPT flag
If VP belongs to another CPU Then
send hardware interrupt
end if
Return
End SET_VPREEMPT

Since the action is a safe sequence, no deadlocks or race conditions will arise and no lock is required on the VPT.

f. TEST_VPREEMPT

Within the kernel of a multiprocessor system all process interrupts (which excludes system I/O interrupts) are masked. If process interaction results in a virtual preempt being sent to the running virtual processor by another CPU, it will not be handled since GETWORK has already been invoked. TEST_VPREEMPT provides a virtual preempt interrupt unmasking mechanism.

TEST_VPREEMPT mimics the action of a physical CPU when interrupts are unmasked. It forces the process execution point back down into the kernel each time the process attempts to leave the kernel domain, where the preempt flag of the running VP is examined. If the flag is
off, TEST_VPREEMPT returns and the execution point exits through the Gatekeeper into the supervisor domain of the process address space as described above. However, if the PREEMPT flap is on, the TEST_VPREEMPT executes a virtual interrupt handler located in the Traffic Controller. This jump from the Inner Traffic Controller to the Traffic Controller (TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER) is a close parallel to the action of a CPU in response to a hardware interrupt, that is a jump to an interrupt handler. The Traffic Controller Preempt Handler forces level-2 and level-1 scheduling to proceed in the normal manner. The preempt handler forces the Traffic Controller to examine the AFT and to apply the level-2 scheduling algorithm, TC_GETWORK. If the AFT has been changed since the last invocation of this scheduler, it will be reflected in the scheduling selections. Eventually, when the running VP's preempt flag is tested and found to be reset, TEST_VPREEMPT will return to the Gatekeeper where the process execution point will finally make a normal exit into its supervisor domain. TEST_VPREEMPT performs the following action:
TEST_VPREEMPT Procedure

Begin

Do while running VP's PREEMPT flag is set
  Reset PREEMPT flag
  Call preempt handler
    (call TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER)
End do

Return

End TEST_VPREEMPT

C. TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

The Traffic Controller runs in a virtual environment created by the Inner Traffic Controller. It sees a set of running virtual processor instructions: SWAP_VDER, IDLE, SET_VPREEMPT, and RUNNING_VP, and provides a scheduler, TC_GETWORK, which multiplexes processes on virtual processors in response to process interaction. It also creates a level-2 instruction set: ADVANCE, AWAIT, and PROCESS_CLASS, which is available for use by higher levels of the design. The Traffic Controller uses a global database, the ACTIVE PROCESS TABLE to support its operation.

1. Active Process Table (APT)

The Active Process Table is a system-wide kernel database containing entries for each supervisor process in SASS (Figure 15). It is indexed by active process ID.
The structure of the APT closely parallels that of the Virtual Processor Table. It contains a LOCK to support the implementation of a mutual exclusion mechanism, a RUNNING_LIST, and a READY_LIST_HEAD. The Traffic Controller is only concerned with virtual processors that can be loaded with supervisor processes. Since two VP's are permanently bound to kernel processes (the Memory Manager and the Idle Process), they cannot be in contention for level-2 scheduling; the Traffic Controller is unaware of their existence; since there are a number of available virtual processors, the RUNNING_LIST was implemented as an array indexed by VP_ID. The READY_LIST_HEAD points to a FIFO queue.
that includes both running and ready processes. The running processes will be at the top of the ready list.

Because of their completely static nature, idle processes require no entries in the APT. Logically, there is an idle process at the end of the ready list for each TP available to the Traffic Controller. If the ready list is empty, TC_GETWORK loads one of these "virtual" idle processes by calling IDLE, and enters a reserved identifier, #IDLE, in the appropriate RUNNING_LIST entry. This identifier is the only data concerning idle processes that is contained in the APT. Idle process scheduling considerations are moved down to level-1, because the Inner Traffic Controller knows about physical processors, and can optimize CPU use by scheduling idle processes only when there is nothing else to do.

The subject access class, S_CLASS, provides each process with a label that is required by level-3 modules to enforce, the SASS non-discretionary security policy.

2. Level-2 Scheduling

Above the Traffic Controller, SASS appears as a collection of processes in one of the three states: running, ready, or blocked. Running and ready states are analogous to the corresponding virtual processor states of the Inner Traffic Controller. However, because of the use of
eventcount synchronization mechanisms by the Traffic Controller, the blocked state has a slightly different connotation than the VP waiting state.

Blocked processes are waiting for the occurrence of a non-system event, e.g., the event occurrence may be signalled from the supervisor domain. When a specific event happens, all of the blocked processes that were awaiting that event are awakened and placed in the ready state. This broadcast feature of event occurrence is more powerful than the message passing mechanism of SIGNAL, which must be directed at a single recipient.

Just as SIGNAL and WAIT provide virtual processor multiplexing in level-1, the eventcount functions, ADVANCE and AWAIT, control process scheduling in level-2.

a. TC_GETWORK

Level-2 scheduling is implemented in the internal Traffic Controller procedure, TC_GETWORK. This procedure is invoked by eventcount functions when a process state change may have occurred. It loads the first ready process on the currently scheduled VP (i.e., the virtual processor that has been scheduled at level-1 and is currently executing on the CPU).
TC_GETWORK Procedure

Begin

VP_ID := RUNNING_VP

Do while not end of ready list
  if process is running then
    get next ready process
  else
    RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID] := PROCESS_ID
    Process state := running
    SWAP_VDER
  end if
end do

If end of running list (no ready processes) Then
  RUNNING_LIST := #IDLE
  IDLE
end if

Return

End TC_GETWORK

A source listing of TC_GETWORK is contained in Appendix B.

b. TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER

Preempt interrupts are masked while a process is executing in the kernel domain. As the process leaves the kernel, the gatekeeper unmasks this virtual interrupt by invoking TEST_VPREEMPT. This instruction tests the scheduled VP's PREEMPT flag. If this flag is off, the process returns to the Gatekeeper and exits from the kernel; but if the flag is set, TEST_VP PREEMPT calls the Traffic Controller's virtual preempt interrupt handler, TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER. This handler
invokes TC_GETWORK, which re-evaluates level-2 scheduling. Eventually, when the schedulers have completed their functions, the handler will return control to the preempted process, which will return to the Gatekeeper for a normal exit. This sequence of events closely parallels the action of a hardware interrupt, but in the environment of a virtual processor rather than a CPU. The virtualization of interrupts provides the ability for one virtual processor to interrupt execution of another that may, or may not, be running on a CPU at that time. This is provided without disrupting the logical structure of the system. This capability is particularly useful in a multiprocessor environment where the target virtual processor may be executing on another CPU. Because these interrupts will be virtualized, the operating system will retain control of the system. The action of the TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER is described in the procedure below. A source listing is contained in Appendix B.
TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER Procedure

Begin

Call WAIT_LOCK

VP_ID := RUNNING_VP

Process_ID := RUNNING LIST [VP_ID]

If process is not idle Then

Process state := ready

end if

Call TC_GETWORK

Call WAIT_UNLOCK

RETURN

End TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER

WAIT_LOCK and WAIT_UNLOCK provide an exclusion mechanism which prevents simultaneous multiple use of the APT in a multiprocessor configuration. This mechanism invokes WAIT and SIGNAL of the Inner Traffic Controller.

3. Eventcounts

An eventcount is a non-decreasing integer associated with a global object called an event [11]. The Event Manager, a level-3 module, controls access to event data when required and provides the Traffic Controller with a HANDLE, an INSTANCE, and a COUNT. The values for all eventcounts (and sequencers) are maintained at the Memory Manager level and are accessed by calls to the Memory Manager. The HANDLE provides the traffic controller with an
event ID, associated with a particular segment. INSTANCE is a more specific definition of the event. For example, each SASS supervisor segment has two eventcounts associated with it, a INSTANCE_1 and a INSTANCE_2, that the supervisor uses to keep track of read and write access to the segment [2]. Eventcounts provide information concerning system-wide events. They are manipulated by the Traffic Controller functions ADVANCE and AWAIT and by the Memory Manager functions, READ and TICKET. A proposed high level design for ADVANCE and AWAIT is provided in Appendix C.

a. Advance

ADVANCE signals the occurrence of an event (e.g., a read access to a particular supervisor segment). The value of the eventcount is the number of ADVANCE operations that have been performed on it. When an event is advanced, the fact must be broadcast to all blocked processes awaiting it and the process must be awakened and placed on the ready list. Some of the newly awakened processes may have a higher priority than some of the running processes. In this case a virtual preempt, SET_VPREEMPT (VP_ID), must be sent to the virtual processors loaded with these lower priority processes.
b. Await

When a process desired to block itself until a particular event occurs, it invokes AWAIT. This procedure returns to the calling process when a specified eventcount is reached. Its function is similar to WAIT.

c. Read

READ returns the current value of the eventcount. This is an Event Manager (level three) function. This module calls the Memory Manager module to obtain the eventcount value.

d. Ticket

TICKET provides a complete time-ordering of possibly concurrent events. It uses a non-decreasing integer, called a sequencer, which is also associated with each supervisor segment. As with READ, this is an Event Manager function that calls the Memory Manager to access the sequencer value. Each invocation of TICKET increments the value of the sequencer and returns it to the caller. Two different uses of ticket will return two different values, corresponding to the order in which the calls were made.

D. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION

Because the Inner Traffic Controller's scheduler, GETWORK, can accommodate both normal calls and hardware
interrupt jumps, the problem of system initialization is not difficult.

When SASS is first started at level-1, the Idle VP is running and the memory manager VP, which has the highest priority, is the first ready virtual processor in the ready list. All VP's available to the Traffic Controller for level-2 scheduling are ready. Their IDLE_FLAG's and PREEMPT flags are set.

At level-2, all VP's are loaded with idle processes and all supervisor processes are ready.

The kernel stack segment of each process is initialized to appear as if it had been saved by a hardware Preempt interrupt (Figure 16).
All CPU registers and the supervisor stack pointer are stored on the stack. R15 is reserved as the kernel stack point; R14 contains the DBR. All other registers can be used to pass initial parameters to the process. The order in which these registers appear on the stack supports the Z/ASM block-move instructions.

The status block contains the current value of the stack pointer, R15, and the preempt interrupt return flag. This flag is set to indicate that the process has been saved by a
preempt interrupt. The first three items on the stack: the process entry point, the initial process flag control word, and an interrupt identifier, are also initialized to support the action of a hardware interrupt.

To start-up the system, R14 (the DBR) is set to the Idle process DBR; the CPU Program counter is assigned the PREEMPT_ENTRY point in GETWORK; the CPU Flag Control Word (FCW) is initialized for the kernel domain; and the CPU is started. Because the Idle_VP is the lowest priority VP in the system, it will place itself back in the ready state and move the Memory Manager in the running state. The Memory Manager will execute an interrupt return because the interrupt return flag was set by system initialization. There will be no Work for this kernel process so it will call WAIT to place itself in the waiting state. The next ready VP is idling, but since it's IDLE_FLAG and PREEMPT flag are set, GETWORK will select it. It too will execute an interrupt return, but because its PREEMPT flag is set, it will call TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER. This will cause the first ready process to be scheduled. Each time a supervisor process blocks itself, the next idle VP will be selected and the sequence will be repeated.

The action described above is in accord with normal operation of the system. The only unique features of
initialization are the entry point (PREEMPT-ENTRY: in GETWORK) and the values in the initialized kernel stack.

The implementation presented in this thesis has been run on a Z8000 developmental module. System initialization has been tested and executes correctly. At the current level of implementation, no process multiplexing function is available. There is no provision for unlocking the APT after an initialized process has been loaded as a result, a call to the Traffic Controller (viz., ADVANCE or AWAIT). In a process multiplexed environment this would cause a system deadlock. Once the process left the kernel domain with a locked APT, no process would be able to unlock it. The Traffic Controller must handle this system initialization problem.
V. CONCLUSION

The implementation presented in this thesis created a security kernel monitor that runs on the ZELO Developmental Module. This monitor supports multiprogramming and process management in a distributed operating system. The process executes in a multiple virtual processor environment which is independent of the CPU configuration.

This monitor was designed specifically to support the Secure Archival Storage System (SASS) [1, 2, 3]. However, the implementation is based on a family of Operating Systems [4] designed with a primary goal of providing multilevel security of information. Although the monitor currently runs on a single microprocessor system, the implementation fully supports a multiprocessor design.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Because the Zilog MMU is not yet available for the ZELO Developmental Module, it was necessary to simulate the segmentation hardware. As explained in Chapter IV, this was accomplished by reserving a CPU register, R14, as a Descriptor Base Register (DBR) to provide a link to the loaded address space. When the MMU becomes available, this simulation must be removed. This can be done in two steps.
First, the addressing format must be translated to the segmented form. This requires no system redesign.

Second, the switching mechanism must be modified to accommodate to use the MMU. This can be done by modifying the SWAP DBR portion of GETWORK to multiplex the MMJ_IMAGE onto the MMU hardware and this can be accomplished by changing about a dozen lines of the existing code.

B. FOLLOW ON WORK

Although the monitor appears to execute correctly, it has not been rigorously tested. Before higher levels of the system are added, it is essential that the monitor be highly reliable. Therefore a formal test and evaluation plan should be developed.

An automated system generation and initialization mechanism is also required if the monitor to be is a useful tool in the development of higher levels of the design.

Once the monitor has been proven reliable and can be loaded easily, work on the implementation of the Memory Manager kernel process and the remainder of the kernel can continue.
APPENDIX A

1 INNER_TRAFFIC_CONTROL MODULE
2
3 ! ** VERS. 1.4 **!
4 ! ** NOTE:
5
6 1. GETWORK:
7      A. NORMAL ENTRY DOES NOT SAVE ANY REGS.
8      (THIS FUNCTION OF GATEKEEPER).
9      B. R14 IS INPUT PARAMETER SUMULATING INFO WHICH
10         WILL EVENTUALLY BE AVAILABLE ON THE HARDWARE (MMU).
11         THIS REG IS ESTABLISHED AS THE DBR BY ANY ITC
12         PROCEDURE CALLING GETWORK AND BY THE PREEMPT
13         INTERRUPT HANDLER (PREEMPT_ENTRY).
14
15 2. GENERAL:
16      A. ALL VIOLATIONS OF VIRTUAL
17         MACHINE INSTRUCTIONS ARE CONSIDERED ERROR CONDITIONS
18         AND WILL CRASH SYSTEM (RETURNING AN ERROR_CODE: R0).
19      B. ALL ITC PROCEDURES CALLING GETWORK PASS DBR: R14
20         AS INPUT PARAMETER (SIG, WAIT, SWAP_VDBR, & IDLE) **
21
22 CONSTANT
23 ! ********** ERROR CODES ********** !
24
25     UNAUTH LOCK            := 0
26     MSG_LIST_EMPTY        := 1
27     MSG_LIST_ERROR        := 2
28     READY_LIST_EMPTY      := 3
29     MSG_LIST_OVERFLOW     := 4
30     SWAP_NOT_ALLOWED      := 5 ! MSG_LIST_NOT EMPTY !
31     VP_INDEX_ERROR        := 6
1 ******* SYSTEM PARAMETERS *******
29
30  NR_MMU_REG := 64  !LONG WORDS!
31  NR VP := 4
32  IDLE VP := NR VP-1
33  STACK_SEG := 1
34  STACK_SEG_SIZE := %100
35  !** OFFSETS IN STACK_SEG **!
36  STACK_BASE := STACK_SEG_SIZE-%40
37  STATUS_REG_BLOCK := STACK_SEG_SIZE-%40
38  F_C_W := STACK_SEG_SIZE-%20
39  PROCESS ID := STACK_SEG_SIZE-%1E
40  N_S_P := STACK_SEG_SIZE-%1C
41
42  ON := %FFFF
43  OFF := 0
44  READY := 0
45  WAITING := 2
47  NIL := %FFFF
48  INVALID := %EEE
49  MONITOR := %A900  !HBUG ENTRY!
50  TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER := %A820
51  PAGE
52 TYPE
53 MESSAGE        WORD
54 ADDRESS        WORD
55 VP_INDEX       INTEGER
56 MSG_INDEX      INTEGER
57
58 MMU_TABLE RECORD [ BASE ADDRESS
59             ATTRIBUTES WORD
60 ]
61
62 MSG_TABLE RECORD [ MSG MESSAGE
63             SENDER VP_INDEX
64             NEXT_MSG MSG_INDEX
65             FILLER ARRAY [5, WORD]
66 ]
67
68 VP_TABLE RECORD [ DBR ADDRESS
69             PRI WORD
70             STATE WORD
71             IDLE_FLAG WORD
72             PREEMPT WORD
73             PHYS_PROCESSOR WORD
74             NEXT_READY_VP VP_INDEX
75             MSG_LIST MSG_INDEX
76             FILLER_1 ARRAY [5, WORD]
77 ]
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A
78 INTERNAL
79 $SECTION DATA
80
81 VPT RECORD
82 [ LOCK WORD
83 RUNNING_LIST VP_INDEX
84 READY LIST VP_INDEX
85 FREE_LIST MSG_INDEX
86 FILLER_2 ARRAY [4, WORD]
87 VP ARRAY [NR_VP, VP_TABLE]
88 MSG_Q ARRAY [NR_VP, MSG_TABLE]
89 ]
90 IPAGE
$SECTION INT_PROC

0000  PROCEDURE

0000  GETWORK

0000  ***************

0000  | SWAPS VIRTUAL PROCESSORS |
0001  | ON PHYSICAL PROCESSOR. |
0001  | *********************** |
0002  | REGISTER USE: |
0003  | STATUS REGISTERS |
0003  | R0: INTERRUPT_RETURN_FLAG |
0004  | R14: DBR (SIMULATION) |
0005  | R15: STACK_POINTER |
0006  | LOCAL VARIABLES: |
0007  | R1: READY_VF (NEW) |
0008  | R2: CURRENT_VF (OLD) |
0008  | R3: FLAG_CONTROL_WORD |
0009  | R4: STACK_SEG_BASE_ADDR |
0009  | R5: STATUS_REG_BLOCK_ADDR |
0010  | R6: NORMAL_STACK_POINTER |
0011  | *********************** |

0011  ENTRY

0011  | TURN OFF PREEMPT_RETURN_FLAG |
0012  | LD  R0, #OFF
0013  
0014  | GET STACK BASE |
0014  | LD  R4, R14(#STACK_SEG*4)
0015  | LD  R5, R4(#STATUS_REG_BLOCK)
0016  
0016  | SKIP PREEMPT_HANDLER |
0017  | JR  END_PREEMPT_HANDLER
PREEMPT_ENTRY: ! GLOBAL LABEL !

! ** PREEMPT_HANDLER ** !

! SET DER !
000E 6102 0002' 126    LD    R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST
0012 612E 0018' 127    LD    R14, VPT.VP.DBR(R2)

! PUT CURRENT PROCESS IN READY STATE !
0016 4D25 0014' 130    LD    VPT.VP.STATE(R2), #READY
001A 0001

! SAVE ALL REGISTERS !
001C 0307 0020 132    SUB    R15, #32
0020 1Cf9 010F 133    LDM    QR15, R1, #16

! SAVE NORMAL STACK POINTER (NSP) !
0024 7D67 136    LDCTL R6, NSP
0026 93F6 137    PUSH QR15, R6

! SAVE LAST STATUS_REGS !
139    ! NOTE: SINCE PROCESSES CAN BE PREEMPTED ANYWHERE
140    ! IT IS NECESSARY TO HANDLE RECURSIVE CALLS
141    ! TO GETWORK. BY SAVING THE MOST RECENT SP
142    ! AND IRET_FLAGS (R15 & R0) ON THE STACK
143    ! THE CONTEXT OF THESE STATUS REGISTERS IS
144    ! MAINTAINED TO ANY DEPTH OF RECURSION.
I SAVE LAST_STATUS_REGS !
LDM R7, @R5, #2
PUSH @R15, R7
PUSH @R15, R8

I SET INTERRUPT RETURN FLAG !
LD R0, #ON
****

END_PREEMPT_HANDLER:

I GET READY_VP_LIST !
LD R1, VPT.READY_LIST

SELECT_VP:
DO I UNTIL ELIGIBLE READY_VP FOUND !

CP VPT.VP.IDLE_FLAG(R1), #ON

IF EQ ! VP IS IDLE ! THEN
CP VPT.VP.PREEMPT(R1), #ON

IF EQ ! PREEMPT_INTERRUPT IS ON ! THEN
EXIT FROM SELECT_VP

FI

ELSE ! VP NOT IDLE !
EXIT FROM SELECT_VP

FI

I GET NEXT READY_VP !
LD R3, VPT.VP.NEXT READY VP(R1)
LD R1, R3
OD
184 I NOTE: THE READY_LIST WILL NEVER BE EMPTY SINCE
185 THE IDLE VP, WHICH IS THE LOWEST PRI VP,
186 WILL NEVER BE REMOVED FROM THE LIST.
187 IT WILL RUN ONLY IF ALL OTHER READY VP'S ARE
188 IDLING OR IF THERE ARE NO OTHER VP'S ON
189 THE READY_LIST. ONCE SCHEDULED, IT
190 WILL RUN UNTIL RECEIVING A HARDWARE INTERRUPT. !
191
192 SWAP_DBG: 1
193 I * * SAVE SP AND INTERRUPT RETURN FLAG ** !
194 ! NOTE: R14 IS USED AS DBG HERE. WHEN MMU HARDWARE
195 IS AVAILABLE THIS SERIES OF SAVE AND LOAD
196 INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE REPLACED BY SPECIAL I/O
197 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MMU. !
198

0068 1C59 0F01
0069 LDM OR5, R15, #2
006A 006B 006C 7D32
006D 006E 3343 00E0
006F 0070 0071 0072 4D15 0014'
0073 0074 0075 0076 0000
0077 0078 6F01 0002'
0079 007A 007B 007C 611E 0010'
007D 007E 007F 0080 31E4 0004
0081 0082 0083 3445 00C0
0084 0085 0086 1C51 0F01

200 I PLACE NEW VP IN RUNNING STATE !
201 LD VPT.VP.STATE(R1), #RUNNING
202
203 LD R4(#F_C_W), R3
204
205
206
207 LD VPT.RUNNING_LIST, R1
208
209 I SWAP DBG !
210 LD R14, VPT.VP.DB(R1)
211
212 I LOAD NEW VP SP & INTERRUPT RET FLAG !
213 LD R4, R14(#STACK_SEG*4)
214 LDA R5, R4(#STATUS_REG_BLOCK)
215 LDM R15, OR5, #2
216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243
00BC 3143 00E0 0090 7D3A 0092 0B00 FFFF 0096 5E0F 00BC 009A 4D3B 0000 009E 5F00 0102 00A2 97F8 00A4 97F7 00A6 1C59 0701 00AA 97F6 00AC 7D67

! * * LOAD NEW FCW * * !
LD    R3, R4(#F_C_W)
LDCTL FCW, R3

! TEST FOR HARDWARE INTERRUPT !
CP    R0, #ON
IF EQ ! PREEMPT RETURN ! THEN
! HARDWARE PREEMPT INTERRUPT RETURN !

! UNLOCK VPT !
CLR VPT.LOCK

! TEST FOR PREEMPT !
! NOTE: SINCE A HARDWARE INTERRUPT DOES NOT EXIT THE
THROUGH THE GATE, THOSE FUNCTIONS PROVIDED
BY A GATE EXIT TO HANDLE PREEMPTS MUST BE
PROVIDED HERE ALSO. !
CALL TEST_PREEMPT

! RESTORE LAST STATUS_REGS !
POP   R8, GR15
POP   R7, GR15
LDM   GR5, R7, #2

! RESTORE NSP !
POP   R6, GR15
LDCTL NSP, R6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Opcode</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00AE</td>
<td>1CF1</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00B2</td>
<td>010F</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00B6</td>
<td>7B00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00BE</td>
<td>5E00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00B2</td>
<td>9E00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00FE</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

244 * RESTORE ALL REGISTERS *
245 LDM R1, OR15, #16
246 ADD R15, #32
248 * EXECUTE HARDWARE INTERRUPT RETURN *
249 IRET
250 ELSE ! NORMAL RETURN !
252 RET
254 FI
255 END GETWORK
256 !PAGE
00BE 6102 0002' 277 LD R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST

00C2 6103 0006' 278 279

00C6 0B03 FFFF 280 281
00CA 5F0E 00DA' 282
00CE 7601 00CE' 283
00D2 2100 0004 284
00D6 5F08 A900 285

00DA 6134 0094' 286
00DE 6F04 0006' 290

LD R3, VPT.FREE_LIST

!* * * * DEBUG * * * !
CP R3, #NIL
IF EQ THEN
LDA R1, $
LD R0, #MSG_LIST_OVERFLOW
CALL MONITOR
FI
!* * * END DEBUG * * * !

LD R4, VPT.MSG_Q.NEXT_MSG(R3)
LD VPT.FREE_LIST, R4
! INSERT MESSAGE LIST INFORMATION!

00E2 6F30 0090' 0092' 296
00E6 6F32 0092' 297
LD VPT.MSG_Q.MSG(R3), R0

00E8 6F32 0092' 298
LD VPT.MSG_Q.SENDER(R3), R2

00EA 6115 001E' 299
! INSERT MSG IN MSG_LIST!

00EB 0B05 FFFF 300
LD R5, VPT.VP.MSG_LIST(R1)

00F2 5E0E 00FE' 301
CP R5, #NIL

00F6 6F13 001E' 302
IF EQ I MSG LIST IS EMPTY I THEN

00FE 0B05 FFFF 303
! INSERT MSG AT TOP OF LIST!

0102 5E0E 010A' 304
LD VPT.MSG_Q.MSG(R1), R3

0106 5E08 0112' 305
ELSE ! INSERT MSG IN LIST!

010A A156 306
MSG_Q_SEARCH:

010C 6165 0094' 307
DO I WHILE NOT END OF LIST I

0110 88F6 308
CP R5, #NIL

0112 6F63 0094' 309
IF EQ I END OF LIST I THEN

0116 6F35 0094' 310
EXIT FROM MSG_Q_SEARCH

0116 6F35 0094' 311
FI

011A 9E08 312
I GET NEXT LINK!

011C 338 313
LD R6, R5

011E 6F63 0094' 314
LD R5, VPT.MSG_Q.NEXT_MSG(R6)

0122 6F63 0094' 315
OD

0126 6F63 0094' 316
! INSERT MSG IN LIST!

012A 6F35 0094' 317
LD VPT.MSG_Q.NEXT_MSG(R6), R3

012E 6F35 0094' 318
FI

0132 6F35 0094' 319
LD VPT.MSG_Q.NEXT_MSG(R3), R5

0136 6F35 0094' 320
RET

013A 338 321
END ENTER_MSG_LIST
GET_FIRST_MSG

PROCEDURE

**REMOVES MSG FROM MSG_LIST**
**AND PLACES ON FREE LIST.**
**RETURNS SENDER'S MSG AND**
**VP_ID**

**REGISTER USE:**

**PARAMETERS:**

**R0: MSG (RETURNED)**
**R1: SENDER VP (RETURNED)**

**LOCAL VARIABLES**

**R2: CURRENT VP**
**R3: FIRST_MSG**
**R4: NEXT_MSG**
**R5: NEXT_FREE_MSG**
**R6: PRESENT_FREE_MSG**

**ENTRY**

LD \( R2, \text{VPT.RUNNING\_LIST} \)

LD \( R3, \text{VPT.VP.MSG\_LIST}(R2) \)

! **DEBUG**

CP R3, #NIL
IF EQ THEN
LD R0, #MSG\_LIST\_EMPTY
LDA R1, $CALL MONITOR
FI

! **END DEBUG**
LD R4, VPT.MSG.Q.NEXT.MSG(R3)
LD VPT.VP.MSG_LIST(R2), R4

! INSERT MESSAGE IN FREE_LIST !
LD R5, VPT.FREE_LIST

CP R5, #NIL
IF EQ ! FREE_LIST IS EMPTY ! THEN
! INSERT AT TOP OF LIST !
LD VPT.FREE_LIST, R3
LD VPT.MSG.Q.NEXT.MSG(R3), #NIL

ELSE ! INSERT IN LIST !

FREE.Q_SEARCH:
DO

CP R5, #NIL
IF EQ ! END OF LIST ! THEN
EXIT FROM FREE.Q_SEARCH
FI

! GET NEXT MSG !
LD R6, R5
LD R5, VPT.MSG.Q.NEXT.MSG(R6)
OD

PAGE
PROCEDURE

****************

IN SCHEDULE VP ID INTO

READY LIST IAW PRIORITY AND

PUTS IT IN READY STATE.

****************

REGISTER USE:

PARAMETERS:

R1: SIGI_ED VP (INPUT)

LOCAL VARIABLES

R2: SIG VP PRI

R3: PRESENT VP

R4: NEXT VP

****************

ENTRY

R4, VPT.RUNNING LIST

** ** DEBUG ** **

CP R4, #NIl

IF EQ ! LIST IS EMPTY ! THEN

LD R6, #READY_LIST EMPTY

LDA R1, \\

CALL MONITOR

FI

** ** END DEBUG ** **
0198 6112 0012' 440
LD R2, VPT.VP.PRI (R1)
019C 4B42 0012' 441
CP R2, VPT.VP.PRI(R4)
01A0 5E02 01B0' 442
IF GT I SIG.VP.PRI > READY.VP.PRI I THEN
01A4 6F14 001C' 443
I INSERT AT FRONT OF LIST I
01A8 6F01 0004' 444
LD VPT.VP.NEXTREADY.VP(R1), R4
01AC 5E08 01D8' 445
LD VPT.READY_LIST, R1

ELSE I INSERT IN LIST I

READY_LIST_SEARCH:
DO I WHILE NOT END OF LIST I

01B0 0B04 FFFF 450
CP R4, #NIL
01B4 5E0E 01BC' 451
IF EQ I IF END OF LIST I THEN
01B8 5E08 01D0' 452
EXIT FROM READY_LIST_SEARCH
01BC 4B42 0012' 453
FI
01C0 5E02 01C8' 454
CP R2, VPT.VP.PRI (R4)
01C4 5E08 01D0' 455
IF GT I SIG.VP.PRI > PRESENT.VP.PRI I THEN
01CA 6134 001C' 456
EXIT FROM READY_LIST_SEARCH
01CE 8F00 457
FI
464

I GET NEXT LINK I

01C8 A143 465
LD R3,R4
01CA 6134 001C' 466
LD R4, VPT.VP.NEXTREADY.VP(R3)
01CE 8F00 467
OD
470 1 INSERT SIG_VP IN LIST 1
471
472 01D0 6F14 001C' 473 1D VPT.VP.NEXT_READY_VP(R1), R4
474 01D4 6F31 001C' 475 1D VPT.VP.NEXT_READY_VP(R3), R1
476 477 FI
478 01DE 4D15 0014' 479 1 CHANGE STATE TO READY 1
480 01DC 0001 481 1D VPT.VP.STATE(R1), #READY
482 01DE 9E08 483 RET
484 01E0 485 END MAKE READY
**INNER TRAFFIC CONTROL ENTRY POINTS**

GLOBAL $SECTION GLR_PROC

HARDWARE_PREEMPT LABEL

0000 WAIT PROCEDURE

[************ INTRA_KERNEL SYNC/COM PRIMITIVE ************]

| PARAMETERS |
| R0: SIGNALED_MSG (RETURN) |
| R1: SENDING_VP (RETURN) |

GLOBAL VARIABLES

| R14: DBR (PARAM TO GETWORK) |
| LOCAL VARIABLES |
| R2: CURRENT_VP (RUNNING) |
| R3: NEXT_READY_VP |
| R4: LOCK_ADDRESS |

ENTRY

| LOCK VPT |
| LDA R4, VPT_LOCK |
| CALL SPIN_LOCK ! (R4: VPT_LOCK) |

| NOTE: RETURNS WHEN VPT IS LOCKED BY THIS VP. |
0000 6102 0002' 514
000C 6123 801C' 515
0010 4D21 001E' 516
0014 FFFF 517
0016 5E00 0046' 518

LD R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST
LD R3, VPT.VP.NEXT_READY_VP(R2)
CP VPT.VP.MSG_LIST(R2), #NIL

IF EQ I CURRENT_VP'S MSG LIST IS EMPTY I THEN

! REMOVE CURRENT_VP FROM READY_LIST !

! * * * * DEBUG * * * * !
CP R3, #NIL
IF EQ THEN
LD R0, #READY_LIST_EMPTY
LDA R1, $
CALL MONITOR
FI

! * * * END DEBUG * * * !

001A 0B03 FFFF 524
001E 5E00 002E' 525
0022 2100 0003 526
0026 7601 0026' 527
002A 5F00 A900 528

LD VPT.VP.NEXT_READY_VP(R2), #NIL

LD VPT.VP.STATE(R2), #WAITING

0036 4D25 001C' 533
0038 4D25 0014' 534
003C 0002 535
003E 612E 0010' 536
0042 5F00 0000' 537

I PUT IT IN WAITING STATE !

I SET DBR !

0042 5F00 0000' 538
0042 5F00 0000' 539
0042 5F00 0000' 540
0042 5F00 0000' 541
0042 5F00 0000' 542

I SCHEDULE FIRST ELIGIBLE READY VP !
CALL GETWORK ! (R14: DBR) !
545
546
547 ! GET FIRST MSG ON CURRENT (MAYBE NEW) VP'S MSG LIST !
548       CALL GET_FIRST_MSG  ! RETURNS R0:MSG, R1:SENDER VP !
549
550 ! UNLOCK VPT !
551       CLR  VPT.LOCK
552
553 ! RETURN: R0:MSG, R1:SENDER VP !
554       RET
555       END WAIT
556
557 I PAGE
SPECIFICATION

SIGNAL PROCEDURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@0050 7604 0000'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@0054 5F00 0150'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@0058 5F00 00BE'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@005C 4D11 0014'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@0060 0022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@0062 5E6E 007C'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@0066 5F00 0180'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PARAMETERS:
- R0: MESSAGE (INPUT)
- R1: SIGNALED VP_ID (INPUT)
- R14: DBR (PARAM TO GETWORK)

GLOBAL VARIABLES:
- R1: SIGNALED VP
- R2: CURRENT VP
- R4: VPT.LOCK ADDRESS

REGISTER USE:
- LDA R4, VPT.LOCK
- CALL SPIN_LOCK ! (R4:~VPT.LOCK) !
- CALL ENTER_MSG_LIST ! (R0:MSG, R1:SIGNALED VP) !
- CP VPT.VP.STATE(B1), #WAITING
- IF EQ ! SIGNALED VP IS WAITING ! THEN
- ! WAKE IT UP AND MAKE IT READY !
- CALL MAKE_READY ! (R1: SIGNALED VP) !
006A 6102 0062'
006E 4D25 0014'
0072 0001

590 591 592 593
1 PUT CURRENT_VP IN READY_STATE!
LD R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST
LD VPT.VP.STATE(R2), #READY

594
1 SET DBR !

595 596 597
LD R14, VPT.VP.DBR(R2)

598
1 SCHEDULE FIRST ELIGIBLE READY VP !
CALL GETWORK ! (R14: DBR)! 

599 600
FI

601
1 UNLOCK VPT !

602 603 604
CLR VPT.LOCK

007C 4D08 6000'
0080 9E08
0082

605
RET

606 END SIGNAL

607 !PAGE
0082 SET_PREEMPT PROCEDURE
610 | ************************************|
611 | SETS PREEMPT INTERRUPT ON !
612 | TARGET VP. CALLED BY TC 
613 | ADVANCE. 
614 | ************************************|
615 | REGISTER USE: 
616 | PARAMETERS:
617 | R1:TARGET VP_ID
618 | LOCAL VARIABLES
619 | R1: VP_INDEX
620 | ************************************|
621 | ENTRY
622 |
623 | NOTE: DESIGNED AS SAFE SEQUENCE SO VPT NEED NOT
624 | BE LOCKED. !
625 |
626 | I CONVERT VP_ID TO VP_INDEX !
627 | LDK R0, #0
628 | MULT RR0, #SIZEOF VP_TABLE
629 | I THIS LEAVES VP_INDEX IN R1 !
630 |
631 | I TURN ON TGT VP PREEMPT FLAG !
632 | LD VPT.VP_PREEMPT(R1), #ON
633 |
634 | ** IF TARGET VP NOT LOCAL (NOT CONNECTED TO THIS CPU),
635 | [ IE. IF <<PROC_SEG>>PROC_ID <> VPT.VP_PHYS_PROC(R1) ]
636 | THEN SEND HARDWARE PREEMPT INTERRUPT TO CPU ** !
637 |
638 | RET
639 | END SET_PREEMPT
640 IPAGE
0090 IDLE

PROCEDURE

[*********]

LOADS IDLE DBR ON
CURRENT VP. CALLED BY
TC.GETWORK.

[*********]

REGISTER USE
GLOBAL VARIABLE
R14: DBR

LOCAL VARIABLES:
R2: CURRENT VP
R3: TEMP VAR
R4: VPT.LEAK ADDR
R5: TEMP

ENTRY

[*********]

LOCK VPT!

LDA R4, VPT.LEAK

CALL SPiN.LOCK 1 (R4: VPT.LEAK) !

NOTE: RETURNS WHEN VPT IS LOCKED BY THIS VP. !

GET CURRENT VP!

LD R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST

SET DBR!

LD R14, VPT.VP.DBB(R2)
669 I LOAD IDLE DBR ON CURRENT VP
670
671 LD R3, #IDLE_VP*SIZEOF VP_TABLE
672 LD R5, VPT.VP.DBR(R3)
673 LD VPT.VP.DBR(R2), R5
674
675 I TURN ON CURRENT VP'S IDLE FLAG
676 LD VPT.VP.IDLE_FLAG(R2), #ON
677
678 I SET VP TO READY STATE
679 LD VPT.VP.STATE(R2), #READY
680
681 I SCHEDULE FIRST ELIGIBLE READY VP
682 CALL GETWORK !R14: DBR
683
684 I UNLOCK VPT
685 CLR VPT.LOCK
686
687 RET
688 END IDLE
689 I PAGE
SWAP_VDBR PROCEDURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>690</th>
<th>SWAP_VDBR PROCEDURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>691</td>
<td>[--------------------------------------------------------------------------]</td>
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ENTRY

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</tbody>
</table>

00C2 7604 0000' | 00C6 5F00 0150' |
00C2 7604 0000' | 00C6 5F00 0150' | 00CA 6102 0002' | 00CA 6102 0002' |
00CE 4D21 001E' | 00D2 FFFF |
00D4 5E06 00E4' | 718 |
00DB 2100 0005 | 719 |
00DC 7E01 00DC' | 720 |
00E0 5F00 A900 | 721 |
00E0 5F00 A900 | 722 |
00E0 5F00 A900 | 723 |
I SET DBR 1

LD R14, VPT.VP.DBR(R2)

I LOAD NEW DBR ON CURRENT VP !
LD VPT.VP.DBR(R2), R1

I TURN OFF IDLE FLAG !
LD VPT.VP.IDLE_FLAG(R2), #OFF

I SET VP TO READY STATE !
LD VPT.VP.STATE(R2), #READY

I SCHEDULE FIRST ELIGIBLE READY VP !
CALL GETWORK ! (R14:DBR) !

I UNLOCK VPT !
CLR VPT.LOCK

RET

END SWAP_VDBR

IPAGE
0102 TEST_PREEMPT PROCEDURE

**************************************************

| TESTS FOR PREEMPT INTERRUPT |
| FLAG AND HANDLES INTERRUPT |
| IF FLAG IS SET. |
| INVOKED UPON EVERY EXIT FROM KERNEL |

**************************************************

ENTRY

TEST_FLAG:
DO "I WHILE CURRENT_VP'S PREEMPT FLAG IS ON !

NOTE: NEXT TWO STATEMENTS MAY NOT BE RACE FREE.
LOCK MAY BE REQUIRED HERE FOR MULTIPROCESSOR SYS. !

0102 6102 0002" 768
LD R2, VPT.RUNNING_LIST

770

| TEST PREEMPT INTERRUPT FLAG ! |
| LD R1, VPT.VP.PREEMPT(R2) |
| CP R1, #0FF |
| IF EQ ! PREEMPT FLAG IS OFF ! THEN |
| EXIT FROM TEST_FLAG |
| FI |

| *** VIRTUAL PREEMPT HANDLER *** ! |
| ** NOTE: SAFE SEQUENCE AND DOES NOT REQUIRE |
| VPT TO BE LOCKED. ** ! |

781
0116 4D25 0018' 762  I  RESET  PREEMPT  FLAG!  
011A 0000 783  LD  VPT.VP.PREEMPT(R2), #OFF  
011C 5F00 A628 784  I  SIMULATE  PREEMPT  INTERRUPT!  
011C 5F00 A628 785  CALL  TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER  
011C 5F00 A628 786  !  **  NOTE:  THIS  JUMP  TO  AN  UPPER  LEVEL  (TRAFFIC  CONTROL)  
011C 5F00 A628 787  IS  USED  ONLY  IN  THE  CASE  OF  A  PREEMPT  INTERRUPT,  
011C 5F00 A628 788  AND  SIMULATES  A  HARDWARE  INTERRUPT.  **  !  
0120 E6F0 791  !  ***  END  VIRTUAL  PREEMPT  HANDLER  ***  !  
0122 9E08 792  OD  
0122 9E08 793  !  RETURN  TO  GATEKEEPER!  
0124 795  RET  
0124 796  END  TEST_PREEMPT  
0124 797  !PAGE
0124 800  RUNNING_VP  PROCEDURE
001  [************************************************************]
002  | CALLED BY TRAFFIC CONTROL.|
003  | RETURNS VP_ID. RESULT IS VALID!
004  | ONLY WHILE APT IS LOCKED.|
005  [************************************************************]
006  | REGISTER USE |
007  | PARAMETERS |
008  | R1: VP_ID (RETURNED) |
009  | LOCAL VARIABLES |
010  | R0: DIVIDEND |
011  | R0: REMAINDER |
012  | R1: QUOTIENT |
013  [************************************************************]
014  | ENTRY |
015  | [************************************************************]
016  | 0124 7604 0000' |
017  | LDA  R4, VPT.LOCK |
018  | 0128 5F00 0150' |
019  | CALL  SPIN_LOCK! (R4:~VPT.LOCK)!
020  | 012C 6101 0002' |
021  | LD   R1, VPT.RUNNING_LIST |
022  | 0130 BD00 |
023  | LDK  R0, #0 |
024  | 0132 1B00 0020 |
025  | I CONVERT VP_INDEX TO VP_ID! |
026  | 025  DIV  RR0, #SIZEOF VP_TABLE |
0136 0B00 0000
013A 5E06 014A '
013E 2100 0006
0142 7601 0142 '
0146 5F00 A900

014A 4D08 0000 '
014E 9E08
0150

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843

! * * * DEBUG * * * !
CP R0, #0
IF NE IREMINDER <> 0 ! THEN
LD R0, #VP_INDEX_ERROR
LDA R1, $-
CALL MONITOR
FI

! * * END DEBUG * * !
CLR VPT.LOCK

RET
END RUNNING_VP

PAGE
0150 846  SPIN_LOCK  PROCEDURE
     847                      **********************
     848                      | USES SPIN_LOCK MECH. |
     849                      | LOCKS UNLOCKED DATA |
     850                      | STRUCTURE (POINTED TO |
     851                      | BY INPUT PARAMETER).|
     852                      **********************
     853                      | REGISTER USE |
     854                      | PARAMETERS |
     855                      | R4: LOCK ADDR (INPUT)|
     856                      **********************
     857 ENTRY
     858                      ! ** NOTE: SINCE ONLY ONE PROCESSOR CURRENTLY IN |
     859                      ! SYSTEM, LOCK NOT NECESSARY. ** !
     860                      ! ** * DEBUG ** * !
     861                      CP Q4, #OFF
     862                      IF Q4 NOT UNLOCKED THEN
     863                      LD R3, #UNAUTH_LOCK
     864                      LDA R3, $  
     865                      CALL MONITOR
     866                      FI
     867                      ! ** END DEBUG ** !
     868                      TEST_LOCK:
     869                      I DO WHILE STRUCTURE LOCKED !
     870                      TSET Q4
     871                      JR M1, TEST_LOCK
     872                      ! ** NOTE SEE PLZ/ASM MANUAL
     873                      FOR RESTRICTIONS ON
     874                      USE OF TSET. ** !
     875                      RET
     876                      END SPIN_LOCK
0168 9F08
016A 877                    END SPIN_LOCK
016B 878
016C 879
016D 880
016E 881 END INNER_TRAFFIC_CONTROL
APPENDIX B

TRAFFIC_CONTROL MODULE

I VERS 4 I

CONSTANT

I ********** SUCCESS CODES ********** I

ADVANCED := 0
EVENT_NOT_FOUND := 1

I ********** DEBUG CODES ********** I

BLOCKED_LIST_ERROR := 0
READY_LIST_ERROR := 1
RUNNING_LIST_ERROR := 2

I ********** SYSTEM PARAMETERS ********** I

NR PROCESSES := 4
NR_MMU_REG := 64
NR VP := 4
NR_AVAIL VP := 2
STACK SEG := 1
STACK SEG SIZE := %100

I ** OFFSETS (FROM TOP OF STACK) ** I

PROCESS_ID := STACK SEG SIZE-%1E
25 1 ******** TEMP PROCEDURE DEFS ******** 1
26 1 (JUMP_TABLE,4) 1
27 ITC_SET_PREEMPT := %A00B
28 ITC_SWAP_VDBR := %A00C
29 ITC_IDLE := %A010
30 ITC_RUNNING_VP := %A018
32 1 ******** SYSTEM CONSTANTS ******** 1
33 TRUE := 1
34 FALSE := 0
35 ON := %FFFF
36 OFF := 0
37 EVENT_R := 0
38 EVENT_W := 1
39 RUNNING := 0
40 READY := 1
41 BLOCKED := 2
43 IDLE := %DDDD
44 NIL := %FFFF
45 INVALID := %EEEE
46 MONITOR := %A902 1 HBUG ENTRY 1
47 1PAGE
49 TYPE
50    AP_POINTER    WORD
51    ADDRESS      WORD
52
53    EVENT_TABLE_RECORD
54        [ HANDLE    WORD
55        EVENT      WORD
56        TICKET     WORD
57        FILLER_2   ARRAY [5 WORD]
58 ]
59
60    AP_TABLE_RECORD
61        [ DBR       ADDRESS
62        PRI        INTEGER
63        STATE      INTEGER
64        NEXT_AP    AP_POINTER
65        FILLER_1   ARRAY [4 WORD]
66        EVENTCOUNT EVENT_TABLE
67 ]
68
69    MMU_TABLE_RECORD
70        [ BASE_ADDR WORD
71        ATTRIBUTES WORD
72        FILLER_3   ARRAY [6 WORD]
73 ]
74
75    EST_TABLE_RECORD
76        [ ASTE_NO   WORD
77        CLASS      WORD
78        FILLER_4   ARRAY [6 WORD]
79 ]
GAS_TABLE RECORD
    EVENT_1 WORD
    EVENT_2 WORD
    TCKT WORD
    FILLER_5 ARRAY [4 WORD]

RUNNING_ARRAY ARRAY [NR_AVAIL_VP WORD]

$SECTION TC_DATA
INTERNAL

APT RECORD
    SUCCESS_CODE WORD
    LOCK WORD
    RUNNING_LIST RUNNING_ARRAY
    READY_LIST WORD
    BLOCKED_LIST WORD
    FILLER ARRAY [2 WORD]
    AP ARRAY [NR_PROCESSES AP_TABLE]

KST ARRAY [NR_MMU_REG MMU_TABLE]

GAST ARRAY [NR_PROCESSES*NR_MMU_REG GAS_TABLE]

1 PAGE
104 $SECTION TC_INT_PROC
105
0000
106 GETWORK
107
108 PROCEDURE
109 ***********************
110 | LOADS NEXT READY DBR |
111 | ON CURRENT VP. |
112 | ***********************
113 | REGISTER USE |
114 | PARAMETERS (INPUT) |
115 | R1: CURRENT_VP.ID |
116 | LOCAL VARS |
117 | R2: NEXT.AP |
118 | R3: VP_PTR |
119 | ***********************
120 ENTRY
121 LD R2, APT.READY_LIST
122 READY_AP_SEARCH:
123 DO 1 WHILE NOT (END LIST OR READY_PROCESS)!
124 1 CP R2, #NIL
125 IF EQ 1 IF NO READY PROCESSES ! THEN
126 EXIT FROM READY_AP_SEARCH
127 FI
128 CP APT.AP.STATE(R2), #READY
129 IF EQ 1 IF PROCESS READY ! THEN
130 EXIT FROM READY_AP_SEARCH
131 FI
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>001E</td>
<td>GET NEXT READY AP !</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>6123</td>
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<td>133</td>
<td>0016`</td>
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<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>LD</td>
<td>R3, APT.AP.NEXT_AP(R2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>LD</td>
<td>R2, R3</td>
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<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>OD</td>
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<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>0026</td>
<td>CP R2,#NIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>0B02</td>
<td>IF EQ ! IF NO PROCESSES READY ! THEN</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>FFFF</td>
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TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER PROCEDURE

ENTRY

*** CALL WAIT_LOCK (APT\^ LOCK) ***
*** RETURNS WHEN PROCESS HAS LOCKED APT ***

CALL ITC_RUNNING_VP !(RETURNS: R1: VP_ID)

! GET AP !
LD R2, APT\^RUNNING_LIST(R1)

! IF NOT AN IDLE PROCESS, SET IT TO READY !
CP R2, #IDLE
IF NE ! NOT IDLE ! THEN
LD APT\^AP\^STATE(R2), #READY
FI

! LOAD FIRST READY PROCESS !
CALL GETWORK !(R1: VP_ID)!
184        !** CALL WAIT_UNLOCK (APT^LOCK) **!
185        !** RETURNS WHEN PROCESS HAS UNLOCKED APT **!
186        !** AND ADVANCED ON THIS EVENT **!
187
188        RET
189        END TC_PREEMPT_HANDLER
190
191        END TRAFFIC_CONTROL

0 errors
Assembly complete
APPENDIX C

ADVANCE Procedure (HANDLE, INSTANCE)

Begin

Call WAIT_LOCK (APT)

! wake up!

PROCESS := EVENT_LIST_HEAD (HANDLE, INSTANCE)

COUNT := MM_ADVANCE_COUNT (HANDLE, INSTANCE)

! make ready!

Do while not end of READY_LIST
  If PROCESS.COUNT <= COUNT then
    Call MAKE_READY
  end if
end do

! initialize preempt array!

Do for VP_ID = 1 to #NR_VP
  RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID].PREEMPT := #TRUE
end do

! find preempt candidates!

CANDIDATES := Ø

PROCESS := READY_LIST_HEAD

Do (for VP_ID := 1 to #NR_VP) and not end READY_LIST

  If PROCESS = #RUNNING then
    RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID].PREEMPT := #FALSE
  else
    CANDIDATE := CANDIDATE +1
  end if

Get next ready process
end do
! preempt candidates!

Do for VP_ID := 1 to CANDIDATES
  If RUNNING_VM [VP_ID] = #TRUE Then
    Call SET_VMPREEMPT (VP_ID)
  end if
end do

Call WAIT_UNLOCK (APT)

Return

End ADVANCE
AWAIT Procedure (HANDLE, INSTANCE, COUNT)

Begin

Call WAIT_LOCK (APT)

VP_ID := RUNNING_VP

PROCESS := RUNNING_LIST [VP_ID]

CURRENT_COUNT := MM_READ_COUNT (HANDLE, INSTANCE)

If CURRENT_COUNT < COUNT Then
    Call THREAD_BLOCKED_LIST (HANDLE, INSTANCE, PROCESS)
    PROCESS.HANDLE := HANDLE
    PROCESS.INSTANCE := INSTANCE
    PROCESS.COUNT := COUNT
    PROCESS.STATE := #BLOCKED

    Call TC_GETWORK
end if

Return

End AWAIT
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