INNOVATIONS FOR NAVY WAR GAMING IN THE 1980'S

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Innovations for Navy War Gaming in the 1980's.

Eleven ideas are postulated for innovations to current Navy war gaming concepts for the 1980's. The ideas range from development of simple board games for use in wardrooms of the fleet to a proposal that the Center for War Gaming become the proponent and facilitator for war gaming discipline within the Department of Defense. Emphasis is placed on making war games more realistic by combining the techniques of analytical simulation with "human gaming." Accolades are offered to the Navy Materiel Command for its innovative use of SEACON I to "train" civilian weapons contractors. Personal experience from the U.S. Army was used to develop the innovative concepts that are presented.
Abstract of

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Eleven ideas are postulated for innovations to current Navy war gaming concepts for the 1980's. The ideas range from development of simple board games for use in wardrooms of the fleet to a proposal that the Center for War Gaming become the proponent and facilitator for war gaming discipline within the Department of Defense. Emphasis is placed on making war games more realistic by combining the techniques of analytical simulation with "human gaming." Accolades are offered to the Navy Materiel Command for its innovative use of SEACON I to "train" civilian weapons contractors. Personal experience from the U.S. Army was used to develop the innovative concepts that are presented.
PREFACE

Simulation of war can never perfectly represent a real conflict. Close coordination between real world decision makers and designers of simulations can, however, produce war games that will accurately portray the outcomes of tactical and strategic decisions.

The key to war gaming is the combination of real world force employment experience with mathematical simulation expertise. I have trained and practiced in both these arenas. My experience has been limited to land combat and land war gaming, but I have appreciated the opportunity to explore the dimensions of Navy war gaming for the 1980's.

As an "outsider," I hope my ideas are beneficial to the execution of the Navy's responsibility for defense of the United States of America.
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INNOVATIONS FOR NAVY WAR GAMING IN THE 1980'S

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the decade of the 1980's, the Navy will celebrate one hundred years of war gaming at the Naval War College. Quantum increases in sophistication have occurred since Lieutenant William McCarty Little delivered his first lecture. In fact, as we enter this decade we find that computers and color video displays are increasingly supporting and supplementing the decisions of the war gamers. This type support has given us: more time to think before making our strategic or tactical decisions, more information on which to make our decisions, more variables modeled and evaluated, and instantaneous aggregation of outcomes. We almost don't have time for a cup of coffee between decisions.

The purpose of adding this computer and color video display support was not to displace the decision makers but rather to provide them with better and more realistic outcomes based on their decision variables. It is commendable that during the last one hundred years we have not lost sight of our original war gaming objective: simulate war to evaluate the impact of decisions.

With increased sophistication and added capabilities, the 1980's will provide us with bigger and faster machines
capable of handling more variables and reducing the time required to give us our results. In spite of these advances, we will not be able to completely simulate all the variables of war. We can, however, employ our capabilities in some innovative ways so that the ultimate purpose of war gaming can be achieved. Our ultimate purpose is to gain insight into the very complex interaction of the elements of war.
CHAPTER II

INNOVATIONS FOR WAR GAMING AND SIMULATION PERSONNEL

War games and computer simulations are not widely trusted by decision makers. This distrust is the fault of the personnel who have the responsibility to plan, control and develop all simulations of war from the "all human" conflict game to the fully computerized one-on-one duel engagement. The distrust stems from the parochialism that has built up between those who advocate analytical simulations and those that favor human decision making games. This latter group even taunts decision makers with statements such as "This is not an analytical game." By attempting to separate war gaming into two artificially unrelated parts, both groups have created doubts among decision makers as to the utility of the separate efforts.

Those that espouse human decision making games point out that analytical simulations are devoid of the human element or at best the human factor is treated only probabilistically. Those who push for analytical simulations see the human decision maker as a possible negator of the true capabilities of weapon systems because of possible misinformation or staid, archaic employment doctrines. Surely there is a balance between these two camps and for the 1980's our initiatives should be keyed to combining the strong attributes
of both techniques into an amalgamation that leads to a single war gaming discipline.

While an initiative in this area will be considered by some to be invalid ("we do it already") or purported to be easily solved ("ok, we are now together"), the fact remains that the "we" of analytical simulation must couple with the "they" of human gaming to produce an "us" that can employ war gaming techniques to the many pressing problems of today's and tomorrow's Navy—a Navy that must be structured and employed now to perform its mission.

Navy leadership will experience no rush to consolidate techniques because each camp is convinced that its type of war gaming is the best, the most realistic, and the most appropriate for use. Continuous interaction between the human game advocates of the Naval War College with the Center of Naval Analysis analytical experts and the simulation efforts of other Navy bureaus and the Navy Postgraduate School can produce a viable Navy war gaming discipline for the 1980's.

Once all personnel are "steaming on the same course," they need to begin a concerted program to account for the impact of the environment on all war game results. The Navy war environment consists of man-controlled weapon systems operating in the fog, rain, snow or sunshine. They are employed in all levels of light conditions and in a water and air medium that varies in temperature extremes and sea
states. The systems also react with and to each other through both visual and nonvisual communications means that can be degraded by man and by nature. The "Orange Force" is also part of the environment. We have abundant material on his tactics and equipment capabilities. His performance should not be mistreated by gross simplification as a benign aggressor.

Our war games must consider these factors and the results should show the sensitivity to these effects. We have the knowledge and equipment to simulate these environmental factors. Our goal should be to quit operating war games that cannot "handle" these factors. We are past the point where today's decision makers can gain beneficial insight to problems from war games that provide unlimited flying conditions for aircraft, unlimited logistics which are instantly transported and transferred to the battle, or ASW games that are not sensitive to temperature gradient and do not portray the interaction between air, surface, and subsurface ASW platforms.
CHAPTER III

INNOVATIONS FOR THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM

General. The Naval War College curriculum centers around education but is also an opportunity to enhance the training of Navy leadership. War gaming can enhance both the educational and training benefits of the War College if the games consider an operational environment based on a realistic appraisal of the capabilities which we, and possible adversaries, will have tomorrow, in the near future, or in the next century. The co-location of the Navy's Center for War Gaming with the College facilitates opportunities for the students and for the Navy.

Unstructured Time Alternative. Interactive gaming terminals should be employed throughout the student cubicle study area. These terminals, with basic instruction books and a catalogue of basic games, would provide the student an option for his unstructured time and simultaneously enhance the educational aspects of any course—in essence, a "tap into the student's individual initiative." With a wide variety of simulations/games packaged for this man-vs.-machine system, the new War College computer could serve as the "scorekeeper." Options could also be included for man-vs.-man gaming after the students honed their individual tactical and strategic force employment options.
A basic ASW search problem in an open ocean, outside of land-based air range, could easily be gamed. The student could be given a set of Blue forces and then develop his own employment options to accomplish the ASW mission against a given Orange threat. A follow-on function could permit a change in the size of the Blue forces; another could change within reasonable bounds the parameters of the Blue ASW capabilities. This same system could also provide training in opposing force tactics and strategies and familiarize students with opposing force equipment and capabilities. Interactive gaming is available at many other facilities and could be made available at the War College for little additional cost. The learning that would be gained during the student's unstructured time could be invaluable. It would sharpen skills of resource allocation, force planning, tactical employment and decision making under uncertainty.

"ASW in the open ocean" is just one of the games that would be available. Others include submarine operations, air superiority, convoy protection, anti-air defense, mine and countermine operations, barriers and operations in straits, fiords, etc. Because of computer time availability, all of these programs could be simplified but should be as realistic as possible with at least: constraints on logistics (i.e., no unlimited asset games), imperfect information flow (EW
environment), and realistic results of combat losses (i.e., not perfect information on friendly or enemy damage).

If such a system of games and terminals were properly designed and made available, its use would be quickly oversubscribed. This system would help the students visualize the impact of variations in parameters/capabilities of the forces they are being trained/educated to command. Those who don't subscribe to this need only to ask professional experienced officers what impact a 10% increase in capabilities will have on force employment and tactics. By and large, they will not be able to articulate the impact of marginal capability increases of either a single ship, aircraft, task force or an entire fleet.

Scenario Production. Current policy at the Center for War Gaming permits a civilian contractor to be engaged for the production of war game scenarios. While other services would question the cost effectiveness of such a policy, the Navy apparently feels that the cost is worth the added manpower that would be expended. What has been overlooked, however, is the direct linkage with scenario review and preparation facets of the War College curriculum. Scenarios are a key portion of the last phase of the Strategy course and the force planning portion of the Management course. In both departments the students are instructed in, think about, and write papers on strategic and tactical concepts for Navy
forces, contingency forces and strategic defense. With very little loss of instructional benefit, the senior courses could produce scenarios that could be used for subsequent war games. I am not advocating that the student curriculum be turned into a war gaming support mission, but quick and easy benefits can be obtained by having students prepare at least some of the scenarios that are used throughout the war gaming year. The students would gain the benefit of contributing to real-life problem solutions, and thus the "importance" of their courses would be greatly increased.

Ongoing War Games. The Center for War Gaming performs gaming functions several times every month, yet the seniors of AY 1979-1980 were not involved in the ongoing efforts until February 1980. At that time they received a 60-minute pregame orientation and a 90-minute "hot wash-up" at the end of a CINCLANTFLT game. Great interest was generated during the pregame orientation and it was followed by extensive discussions of strategy, tactics and war concepts in the student study areas during their unstructured time. The less than 3-hour cost to the student curriculum resulted in a quantum benefit for the military services. Of particular note was that the game scenario was a duplicate of one which the students had studied last trimester. I would recommend that each game that is played at the Center for War Gaming be briefed in similar fashion to the student body. If students
also develop scenarios as I have proposed, these briefings will reinforce the student learning process plus point out the current problems the Navy is concerned with in a war gaming arena. On my own volition I attended the Seacon I briefing on 2 February and felt that the briefing on the objectives and outcomes would have specifically benefited my Navy classmates.
CHAPTER IV

INNOVATIONS FOR THE FLEET

General. The Navy has probably been the first service to adopt a program where fleet exercises were "proofed" with a war game before any lines were cast off and the fleet went to sea. While this initial effort is commendable, war gaming for elements of the fleet should be exploited for their potential benefit.

The Wardroom Board-Game. A simplified but effective method of training is the board-game. Consider the training benefits that would accrue if every chief and officer wardroom in the combatant fleet had a board-game based on the functional mission of its ship. Would this game be used extensively by the interested professional personnel? The answer is clearly--yes!

The professionals are interested in the interaction of their combatant duties and the "big picture" mission; a board-game portraying their ship's portion of the mission gives them a chance to participate and at the same time learn of their contribution. Board war gaming has undergone a quantum increase in the civilian sector in the past five years. New officers frequently bring to the service their experience with college war gaming clubs and for all of us the electronic entertainment game has been a "market leader"
in adult toys. I am advocating that special types of naval war games be packaged into a simplified board-game format and issued to the fleet. These games will be an excellent teaching vehicle and motivator and would be well received.

Ten years ago the U.S. Army Management School dedicated a 4-hour block for its Executive ORSA course to play Guadalcanal, an amphibious war game. Not only did the students become acquainted with war gaming and simulation techniques during their play, but they exhibited enthusiasm for the game and the WHY of the outcome. Of course, the more they played (on their own time), the better the tactics and the sharper the timing of the force employment. Board games of this type perhaps in air, destroyer/frigate, submarine, and ASW versions would be extremely beneficial to the Navy—and the benefits would accrue from the unstructured time of the officers and NCO's.

The board game should involve and include logistical considerations of critical assets such as missile loads, time-distance factors, search techniques and realistic enemy tactical employment. The Naval War College and the War Gaming Center could develop and produce these board games at very little cost. For those who might doubt the concept, try the technique as an experiment with senior chiefs as players while young petty officers and commissioned officers act as observers. I will almost guarantee that the "observers" will
quickly be demanding to play and all participants will learn from the experience.

"Captain Training." Training of ships' captains is one of the most critical factors that impact on true readiness. The Navy sends its captains to an extensive precommand course but at the same time does not include any gaming techniques to "reawaken" their fleet experience on system employment. It is at the ship captain's level that the real interface begins between ship capabilities and employment tactics. Attendees at precommand courses necessarily have a broad range of experience, from those officers whose last tour was with the fleet to those who have "been away" on Washington assignments for some period of time. A session in a war gaming environment is mandatory to sharpen employment skills.

War gaming is also an ideal technique for introducing new ships' capabilities to the "users." The captain of a new type frigate needs to war game his new command in today's environment before he assumes command or the ship receives its commissioning pennant. I have chosen the frigate as an example. All new weapons and electronic "suits" need to undergo a commander's interaction with a war game simulation to quickly and cheaply portray system and employment limitations as well as the positive system benefits that might modify current employment techniques.

Commodores and task group commanders could also benefit greatly from participating in war games that accurately
portray the capabilities and limitations of a newly assigned ship. While I'm sure that these commanders as well as the ships' captains will have read voluminous publications about new capabilities, there is no substitute for seeing an individual combat performance and interaction portrayed on a video display or floor gaming board before taking command or operational control of the actual hardware. I recommend that the precommand course include a phase where the commanders can interact with a computer war game to sharpen or enhance their employment skills. The Army uses this technique successfully for O-5 and O-6 commanders and they report having received beneficial insight into the capabilities of their units, as well as requirements for the flow of information that is needed to make the myriad of combat decisions required for successful command in combat.

Staff Training and Plan Testing. Training fleet staffs and validating plans and command and control systems using fleet war games are an important aspect of combat readiness. The many services say they are doing this, but are they really? Have we diluted participation in the games to the point where we are no longer actually achieving our stated goals? Here are some key questions that every leader must ask himself when he involves his command in a war game:

Am I taking key members of my staff away from their assigned wartime duty positions to play the Orange forces?
Are key staff officers not participating because they are involved in critical day-to-day operations and cannot be spared for the game?

Are "third deputies" acting as principals in the play of the game?

Are players making decisions based on the plan or on their experience?

A positive response to any of these questions must key the leader to one indisputable fact--war games with their human decision making interaction are impossible to replicate. Decisions made in this environment are based on the decision makers' values, experience, and skillful use of leadership, management, and information processing techniques. Using surrogates to make these gaming decisions does not validate a plan nor does it accurately train subordinates. We must recognize this and not "fool" ourselves into thinking we are training the fleet staff. We are actually providing training only for those personnel who have been selected to "act" as the decision makers for the game.

Our use of decision making surrogates may be necessary due to the daily crush of routine readiness business. The current Center for War Gaming's proposal to provide computer access terminals at remote locations (Norfolk and San Diego) is a major step in the right direction. In essence we are taking the war game to the regular duty station of the
players we want to train and the actual subordinates who will maintain the plot of our combat operations. While it is not my place to remind CINC's that the training of personnel and the testing of plans are major aspects of their force readiness responsibilities, these senior officers must actively participate in their war games. Partial participation is, of course, less acceptable—but it is better than "last day" visits to war game facilities.

I am advocating that the leaders and the principal staff officers participate in a series of realistic war games to test operational plans. Adoption of this technique will enhance the strategic posture of the operational fleet.

*Fleet Staff and Task Force Gaming.* War games have traditionally been constructed to provide a fixed level of resolution. Accordingly, we either don't play some elements, grossly aggregate likely results, or provide set scenario input from subordinates and superiors. We have "bounded" our games in order to reduce the cost by decreasing the manpower for each game. While it is too much to expect that we could formulate and control a naval war game that included all the participants from the President of the United States down to every ship's captain, the limits on our bounds must be as realistic as possible. Within a fleet it is possible to conduct a war game with only an upper bound on participation of senior officials. This can be accomplished realistically.
in our current environment only by using sequential gaming techniques. Here is a feasible sequence:

(a) Fleet commander and his staff review current plan and issue "execute" instructions along with necessary plan modifications. They then return to their peacetime duties.

(b) Task force commanders receive plans and begin execution until first enemy contact is established. At first contact they return to their peacetime duties.

(c) Fleet staff reconvenes in its operations center and receives task force reports that have been stored in the computer in sequential order. Fleet commander issues new orders based on his estimate of the situation and specifies what near-term tactical activities/events he perceives as critical to accomplishment of his force mission. He then returns to his peacetime duties.

(d) Task force commanders and captains of subordinate ships review new instructions, if any, and then proceed to war gaming the conflict from the first enemy contact until they reach a point where a critical event, as specified by the fleet commander, occurs. They then return to their peacetime duties and the fleet staff begins the iteration process again.

This sequential technique will release some of the overburden that results from operating requirements competing with participation requirements in a war game. The procedure
is still costly in terms of time but the time lengths of the steps of the sequence can be varied to match the time available. If the fleet staff training games and the computer-assisted games used for training ship captains and commanders are properly constructed, a sequential game is easily formulated by the addition of an output system integration routine overlaid with an appropriate command and control communications system.
CHAPTER V

INNOVATIONS FOR NAVY RESEARCH

General. Researchers are traditionally the advocates of computer simulations. They use simulations both to design systems and to determine their overall effectiveness, but they only infrequently allow the user to interact with their simulations to make his decisions. The presence of this human in the system prevents the statistical replication that is considered so necessary for research analysis. Recognizing that almost all Navy research will result in a system that, when placed in the fleet, will be under human control, a sterile analysis--which does not include human interface--should be generally unacceptable for the Navy.

System Designers. The Navy has already approached a high level of sophistication by exposing its designers to war gaming. On the 2nd of February 1980, I attended the "inbrief" for SEACON I. The game employed new weapons with specifications that would be feasible for the 1990 time frame. Also in attendance during the game, as observers, were civilian weapons contractors. These contractors could see the decision process in action and were urged to ask the game participants why they made the decisions they did. This approach is novel and recognizes that these designers usually can't be out on a ship's bridge during actual operations. I
laud the Navy Materiel Command for this effort as it is truly an innovative use of war gaming. I doubt that the other services have used this technique—but they should! The designers who attend these games come to appreciate more deeply the Navy decision makers' problems and thought processes for solutions, with the result that their research is more fruitful for the Department of the Navy.

**Simulation Designers.** Simulations continue to grow in size and complexity but, more often than not, the validation of the model is done in only a cursory manner with most validation efforts directed toward mathematical correctness and repetition of results of common input. Usually missing is a user validation where a group of users sit down and interact with a manual version of the model to insure that the analytical steps match plausible human decision making criteria. Designers of these simulations must request, and the Navy must demand, that this "fleet user" validation take place before production runs are made. Navy user personnel should also assist in the interpretation of results of production runs. Often the "fleet user" will be able to provide tactical rationale correlation with the results that would otherwise be lost within the system.

**All Researchers.** Bring your machine simulation expertise and combine it with the experience of manual gaming in the manner I have recommended in Chapter II. Teamwork will
result in a better product for the Navy—which, after all, is your final objective.
During the CINCLANTFLT briefing on 22 February 1980, it was announced that, for the first time in recent memory, a war game involving an amphibious task force would be played all the way to the Marine objective area. This was feasible because the Marine Corps had brought its analytical machine capability from Quantico and co-located it with the Navy system at Newport. The Navy gamers and their machine system would simulate the contingency mission scenario from the port of embarkation to the beach. Then the Marine officers and their equipment would carry the battle from the beach to the final security of the Marine objectives. The integration of effort is outstanding but should be the normal "modus operandi" rather than the exception. Those portions of the scenario which include the employment of land-based air and AWACS should be gamed by Air Force personnel using their simulation programs. All services need to interact in war games where missions cross service "lines."

I recommend that the Navy "take the lead" in establishing interservice coordination for war gaming techniques. Other than the JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency, I think the Navy's Center for War Gaming is the only central emphasis point for war gaming of all the services. The other services
have their gaming and simulation capabilities fragmented to
different agencies by functional area. A Navy lead in bring-
ing the services together in a conference to exchange "state
of the art" information on simulation and gaming techniques
would have exceptional benefit for the Department of Defense
as a whole.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

War games can never perfectly represent a real conflict. They can, however, be designed to accurately portray the outcomes of tactical and strategic decisions and thus can provide valuable insight on "possible solutions to complex problems" for the player-decision makers.

A dedicated and direct coupling of analytical simulation advocates with those who espouse a human decision maker gaming approach will result in an amalgamation that leads to a single war gaming discipline. This single discipline will provide a more accurate portrayal of armed conflicts with resultant gain in confidence by the decision makers.

The War College curriculum will be strengthened if gaming capabilities are readily available for students to use during their unstructured time. Student efforts in scenario formulation and force planning will be more meaningful if the scenarios are subsequently gamed at the Center for War Gaming. Positive learning benefit is also available for the students if they are briefed on the objectives and outcomes of all war games played at the Center during the academic year.

Training within the fleet will be enhanced if simple board games are issued to the wardrooms and air stations for use by mid-level leaders during their unstructured time. A war gaming phase added to the Navy's precommand course will
familiarize ship captains with the capabilities of new equipment and reinforce their previous experience with different system deployment options. Task group commanders will also benefit from war gaming employment of their forces to review interaction of major systems. Staff training and testing of operational plans are facilitated and increased in value if war games are used to train the actual decision makers and not performed with "ad hoc" groups who serve as surrogate decision makers. A trained fleet staff gaming with subordinate task force players down to the ship captain level in a sequential war game can validate operational plans without a complete disruption of peacetime duty responsibilities and requirements.

Continuation of the program that permits Navy system designers to observe war game decision makers "on the scene" should be "exported" to other services for similar gains in researcher-user interaction. A concerted interaction of users and simulation designers will produce a better/more reasonable validation of system models, thus increasing the decision makers' confidence in production results. Research personnel should also take the lead in combining their expertise in machine simulation with man decision-maker gaming.

Finally, the Navy has taken the lead in interservice coordination and should continue to push for more interaction, using their Center for War Gaming as a facility for the exchange of war gaming techniques.
Armed conflict is a complex problem to model but the expertise and knowledge are available to use the expansive machine capability that is currently programmed. Adoption of any of the innovations presented in this paper would enhance our ability to structure and train for employment a defensive force which is highly capable of protecting the vital interests of the United States of America.
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