STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF JAPAN UNDER THE TRI-POLAR STRUCTURE IN NOR--ETC(U)

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STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF JAPAN UNDER THE TRI-POLAR STRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

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Under the changing structure of Tri-polar Powers in Northeast Asia, Japan faces mounting pressure from outside and inside to step up its military strength. In this paper, the author analyzes the strategy of the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Japan; examines Japan-US relations; and seeks several strategic options for Japan's security policy and defense strategy. The conclusion is to reshape and strengthen the Japan-US bilateral treaty, and put the emphasis on improving the Japanese ground force as well as the maritime force.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF JAPAN UNDER THE TRI-POLAR STRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Hideya Aoto
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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Thirty years have passed since Japan signed the Japan-US Security Treaty in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. At that moment, the United States was fighting against China who was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Japan was weak and unstable economically and militarily, yet she was very important as a barrier to contain Eurasian continental communism.

Today the situation is drastically changing. Japan and the United States have normalized their relationships with China. China abandoned the Sino-Soviet Mutual Support Treaty in April 1980. The Soviet Union has emerged as a global military superpower and gained parity vis-a-vis the United States. Japan has achieved a remarkable economic success but still remains a minor military power.

The Tri-polar power structure is now fluid and each participant in the Northeast Asian power game seems to be in the transitional process to reform its strategy in the coming decade.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Japan, as an afloat island in the Tri-polar Powers, is trying to adjust to the new international environment and seeking the optimum strategy to follow through the next decade. No doubt, the most crucial issues are national security policy and defense strategy. We hear a lot of arguments, demands, or warnings about them from both inside and outside of Japan. Although the attitude of the Japanese public towards defense policies is
shifting steadily, the restraints by the Constitution and anti-military feeling still remain. It is time to assess and summarize the strategic environment surrounding Japan, and to discuss the possible alternatives of her security/defense strategy in the foreseeable future.

In addition, the clarification of the role and value of the ground force in Japan is of much importance in such an era when Japan is stepping up the defense buildup.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The primary issues examined in this paper are as follows:
- Future strategies of the US, Soviet Union, and China in Northeast Asia
- Japan's current security and defense strategy and the problems
- Examination of Japan-US relations
- Options of Japan's security policy and defense force structure
SECTION II

STRATEGIES OF THE US, SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA IN NORTHEAST ASIA

ASSUMPTIONS

Before starting the assessment of the future strategies of the Tri-polar Powers, it is necessary to set up some assumptions which are likely or unlikely to occur in the international arena until the year 1990 in order to simplify the complex relations.

- US and Soviet Union rivalry will continue
- US and Soviet Union will principally respect the Yalta-Potsdam Order to each other
- US and Soviet Union will try to avoid a general nuclear war
- No fundamental changes of alliance in both the East and West
- Sino-Soviet confrontation will continue but to some extent détente or military conflict may occur
- China will not try reunification of Taiwan by force
- No unification or rapprochement in the Korean peninsula
- No nuclear armament by Korea and Taiwan
- Soviet Union will not return the disputed Northern Islands to Japan
- US will not unilaterally terminate the Security Treaty with Japan
- US 2nd Division in Korea will not be relocated to Japan

BASIC AIMS OF TRI-POLAR POWERS

UNITED STATES

- To avoid mutual ruin by direct fighting with the Soviets
- To promote Sino-Soviet rivalry and maintain freedom of action with both countries
- To play the China card and force the Soviet to face two fronts

**SOVIET UNION**

- To avoid direct and decisive confrontation with the United States
- To try to split the US tie with China and other allies
- To prevent China from becoming a superpower, by isolating and neutralizing

**CHINA**

- To protect against Soviet invasion by using US until modernization is accomplished
- To promote US and Soviet fighting for mutual ruin

**THE US GLOBAL STRATEGY**

The US strategic triads are: deterrence, collective security, and flexible response. Although the US is no longer the world policeman, it aims to achieve its national goals, not only to survive and to secure its own territories but also to maintain US values and standards and to upgrade its standards of living. The US has strategic nuclear forces which only the Soviet Union can claim essential equivalence, forward deployed theater nuclear forces and conventional forces in high readiness condition strong enough to fight a 1½ contingency war. The largest threat to the US is, of course, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the only country that can directly attack the continent of America, that is demographically bigger than the US, that holds the geopolitical heartland, and that follows closely behind the US in economics and technology. Soviet differences in ideology, its economic system, a social institution governed by a totalitarian regime, and its aggressiveness are not compatible with US ideals and will inevitably
lead to a grave crash.

Thus the main concern of the US is to counter Soviet growth and expansion by using any means available to her, even communist countries like Eastern Europe or the PRC.

Another concern is to adequately secure US global access to overseas resources, markets, and investments. Upon the principle of capitalism and free trade, the US traditional policy has been the "Open Gate - Equal Opportunity" policy, opposing any country's domination of any area in the world. Moreover, increasing dependence on foreign oils and minerals, and huge income through multinational corporations and foreign investments, make the US very sensitive regarding growing Soviet power projection and overseas intervention capability which is threatening the lines of communications in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Consequently, the focal point of US global strategy has shifted from NATO only, or NATO and Asia, to NATO and the Middle East. In short, the worldwide encirclement against the Soviet Union, with two million US forces and some allied forces, is getting thinner and more dispersed because the US is forced to concentrate her attention and the bulk of her forces in Central Europe and the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Soviet Union can exploit its advantage of inner maneuver to conduct hit and run operations or multiple contingencies elsewhere.

THE US STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

The main factors which influence the formation of US strategy in the Pacific will be the degree of US interests in this area, the Soviet's intention and military strength, and China.

The potential US interests in Asia and the Pacific basin are enough to call "vital," yet are now less urgent than its interests in the Middle
East. The possibility, in spite of its intention, of Soviet hegemony in Asia is doubtful in the near future. China is functioning as an effective counterforce to the Soviet Union. The military confrontations in the Korean Peninsula, or at the Sino-Soviet border will not escalate to a global general war. Above all, the significant factor we cannot overlook is the growing buildup of Soviet air and naval force in the Far East. This force serves to limit the free maneuver of the once-dominant US Seventh Fleet along the Continent, and also to reduce the value of island chain bases which can be covered by the Soviet air and naval umbrella. SS-20 missiles, 125 attack submarines, Backfires and other bombers, Minsk·Ivan Logov, and other surface combatants, totaling up to 770, and 32 Army divisions deployed at the East of Baikal are all forces armed with modern PGMs and cruise missiles and can be seen as a formidable threat to any country in the Western Pacific. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the US strategy in the Pacific was the containment of Eurasian continental communism by holding footholds on the Continent, like Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s US strategy shifted to the so-called "Island Chain Strategy," that is, a rimland defense line connecting the Aleutians, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In the late 1970s, it seems to have changed again to the New Island Chain Strategy, that is, an outer crescent defense line, connecting the Aleutians, Midway and Hawaii, Guam-Tinian and Wake, Australia, Diego Garcia, and the Persian Gulf. The advantages of this new strategy are:

- Avoid Soviet direct attack on the US forward bases and the Seventh Fleet
- Avoid getting involved in a two-front war
- Achieve economy of force in protecting the US territories and traditional sea lines of communications (SLOCs) since the Rainbow Plan was created
- Use old island chain bases as forward screening lines to check Soviet movement by minimal US and allied forces
- Localize the stability/instability of Northeast Asia, counting on China and Japan
- US plays a reinforcing role, not a front-line player

THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST

The Soviet strategy in this area is not clear. We see Russian historical expansionism -- a desire for more and more buffer zones, warm ports, and free access to the Pacific Ocean. However it is difficult to clarify a consistent strategy to achieve such aims. Rather, we see a reactional, opportunistic diplomacy with many classical diplomatic skills of divide and rule, stick and carrot, bluff, reputation, extension, linkage, and so forth.

A weak and underdeveloped China, Japan as a military pygmy, and reduction of US military presence will give the Soviets some relief and inducement for adventurism and blackmail. Some of the Soviet intentions can be speculated.

- Breakthrough and split the encirclement of US-China-Japan axis
- Oppose US dominant control of the Western Pacific by:
  - directly threatening the US territories in the Pacific and CONUS itself
  - cutting SLOCs and limiting free movement of the US forces
  - neutralizing US bases in Japan, Korea, and Philippines
  - obtaining overseas bases in Vietnam, North Korea, or the Southern Pacific
- Increase operations in the Indian Ocean
- Develop the natural resources in Siberia and expand the market in Asia
- Protect its own merchant/fishing fleet
- Encircle and isolate China to prevent its modernization
- Utilize and exploit Japanese economy and technology

THE CHINESE STRATEGY IN ASIA

The biggest concern for China, right now, is to prevent the Soviet's invasion and to buy time to emerge as a superpower. The Soviet Union is the only neighboring country that has the capability with enough motivations to weaken China by force, so that China will shrink, abandoning Manchuria, Inner-Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

So far, China has seriously suffered with its domestic turmoil and disorder, low technology and mismanagement, low productivity and little capital, underdeveloped resources, and poor infrastructure, mixed with huge demands of a population of one billion. The governability of the Communist Party is still doubtful. In spite of these disadvantages, thanks to highly skillful diplomatic techniques cultivated through a history of power politics during 3,000 years, and combined with communist tactics, China has succeeded in mobilizing US, NATO countries, and Japan as a counterbalance for the Soviet Union, forcing her to face a two-front war. China is also trying to cut Soviet encirclement in Asia, countering the Soviet's influence in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea, and India. By any means China will keep its position as the master of Asia (Chun-Huaism), even under the Communist regime. Mao once wept when he saw a map of shrinking China. The closer the tie becomes between China and the West, the more frictions can be seen.
SECTION III

CURRENT STRATEGY OF JAPAN

STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPAN

Geopolitical Aspects
- As a rimland nation of the Eurasian Continent, Japan lies on the point of contact of Tri-polar Powers and East-West confrontation
- Manchuria and Korea were the historical focal point of national interests for which Japan fought three major wars
- Today's Japan is characterized by a large population (sixth in the world) of 116 million in the four small islands, GNP of $1 trillion (second in the world), high technology and little military strength

Military Aspects
- The insulated island has both strength and weakness. On the one hand, the existence of ocean water and mountainous area favors the defense. On the other hand, dependence on SLOCs, necessity for all-round defense, short depth, concentration of industries and population in a narrow belt area, all cause strategic vulnerability.
- Japanese control of three choke points between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean significantly affects the Soviet's activity

Economic Aspects
Again the strengths and weaknesses coexist.
- Capital, technology, labor force and high productivity, size of foreign trade, aid, and investment make Japan influential in the world economic order and IMF-GATT-OECD organization
Nearly total dependence on foreign resources and markets, particularly large imports of oil and food, causes the major problem in Japan's security.

Nation-state, and People

Homogeneous society composed of a single race, language, culture and history, religions, and the Emperor who works well toward cohesiveness and consensus. Sometimes decisionmaking is a time-consuming process, but once a decision is made, the national mobilization will be done within a short period of time.

Anti-militarism symbolized by Article 9 of the Constitution, and anti-nuclear weapons sentiments remain strong, unless tangible external shocks awaken the public or the generation changes cover up past memories.

NATIONAL GOALS AND INTERESTS

The national purpose of Japan should be survival. National goals can be defined as:

- To maintain national integrity and sovereignty (Independence)
- To protect the territories, people, and property
- To achieve peace and prosperity

National interests are:

- To hold access to the world resources and markets
- To avoid conflicts with other nations
- To encourage world stability and order
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The main body of current security policy was formed thirty years ago under conditions which permitted little choice. Since then Japan experienced the bitter struggles of pros and cons. Nowadays the majority of people seem to agree with the current guidelines of the security policy which are:

- To belong to the Western free world and admit capitalism
- To depend on the US militarily and economically by the bilateral treaty
- To prevent or solve any disputes by peaceful means such as economy and diplomatic negotiations
- To try to keep equidistance and to expand interdependence with both the Soviet Union and China (presently heavily inclining toward China as the result of realistic politics)
- To maintain a small and exclusively defensive posture so as not to threaten the Soviet Union and South East Asian countries

DEFENSE STRATEGY AND PROBLEMS

Deterrence
- Japan by itself can deter and repel on a small scale, conventional attack in the limited area
- Japan depends upon the US deterrence of nuclear and large-scale conventional attacks on Japan

Exclusive Defense
- Employ forces and fight solely within its own territory
- Do not declare any kind of war or launch any preventive and pre-emptive attack
- Unilaterally limit the quality, quantity, and readiness of defense forces

Self-regulation on Military Means

- Three non-nuclear principles
- Deny the dispatch of the defense forces abroad
- Deny the strategic and tactical counter offense on enemy bases
- Severely restrict foreign military sales
- Minimize the public obligation in terms of draft, emergency legislations, intelligence security, and tax burden for defense

Planning and Command Structure

- Defense planning and preparation are vague and general, not detailed as those of NATO or Korea particularly in combined and joint operations
SECTION IV

THREAT

THE SOVIET UNION AS A PERCEIVED THREAT

Because of the current diplomatic relationships between Japan and the Tri-polar Powers, the Soviet Union is the only country that has the reasons and capability to threaten Japan. If the assumptions as listed in Section II change, then other threats would be taken into consideration. However the biggest and immediate threat comes from the north. North Korea can play a role as an ally of the Soviet Union or as its surrogate force.

Some reasons to perceive the Soviet Union as a threat are:

- The only means of Soviet influence on foreign countries is said to be military power. The Soviet Union has achieved rough parity in strategic arms, and superiority in conventional weapons vis-a-vis the US. The steady and significant military buildup in the Far East has reached the point which will permit strategic power projection far beyond her border.

- Geographical proximity and geostrategic value of Japan

- Historical hostility between the two countries accumulated through the Triple Intervention, Japanese-Russian war, many border incidents, invasion of Manchuria at the end of WWII and casualties from the imprisonment of Japanese soldiers in the Siberian Labor Camps

- Present relationship shows no sign of accommodations. Dispute over the occupied Northern Islands disturbs the peace treaty negotiations. Frictions such as fishing, political asylum, show of force and espionage arouse the public attention once in a while. Moreover, Russian style arrogance and racial bias have caused the deep
hatred of the Soviet among Japanese people.

- The Soviet totalitarian communist regime is incompatible with Japanese society. The memories of the Soviet invasions of neighboring countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan are alive in the peoples' minds.
SECTION V

JAPAN - US RELATIONS

THE US CONCERNS ON JAPAN

Military Concerns
- Japan is an effective barrier to stop the Soviet's expansion toward Asia and the Pacific Ocean and to disrupt the Soviet's air and naval operations
- Together with China, Japan can contribute to force Soviet two-fronts force deployment
- Japan functions as a forward unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US to perform attack and interception, reconnaissance, communication and intelligence, repair, supply, relay, and other logistical support

Economic Concerns
- Japan works as a close economic partner of the US to stabilize the world economic order of currency, trading, inflation, recession, North-South relations and so forth
- Japan is the largest trading country with the US after Canada. US trade with Japan reached more than thirty-one billion dollars, that is 10% of total foreign trade. For instance, Japan is the biggest importer of agricultural products from the US.
- Mutual investments and tourism increase year by year
- There are common interests to develop huge potentials of resources and markets in Asia and the Pacific Basin

Political, Ideological Concerns
- Japan is a successful model as a largest democratic country and
 foothold against communism in Asia

- Peoples of Japan and the US both share common values and maintain a good friendly relationship with stable ties, and count on each other as beneficial allies, all of which has been proved in many public surveys and opinion polls.

- Above all, Japan can be a key factor in keeping the power balance among Tri-polar Powers and in contributing to a real stability in Northeast Asia to prevent the domination by any country. Without Japan, the big wave in the Pacific, that is, the direct threat to US territories in the Pacific and to the West Coast would force the US into far bigger defense spending, including ABMs, early warning systems, anti-submarine screens, and coastal defense forces.

THE JAPANESE CONCERNS ON US

Dependence of National Security and Economy on the US

- Through the bilateral security treaty, Japan depends for its survival on the US commitment of a nuclear umbrella and a large conventional force reinforcement

- The US is the biggest trade partner of Japan, which holds a share of more than 20% of the entire Japanese foreign trade

- The US will, strength, and posture generate a significant impact on Japan's access to the worldwide resources and markets, and also on the security of lines of communications

US Presence in Asia contributes to the stability and balance of power in that area vis-a-vis Soviet Union and China.
PROSPECTS

As Henry Kissinger stated in his address at Seattle on July 22, 1975, the relationship of the US and Japan will play a central and crucial role in the stability and progress of Asia and for the global balance of power with relation to Moscow and Peking. Japan and the US share common goals and interests in easing tensions in the Korean Peninsula, in promoting a stable, politically and economically resilient Southeast Asia, in encouraging strong ties among the industrial, democratic countries, and in forming a better relationship with developing countries. There is no reason to suspect that the US interests in Japan are no longer vital, yet we see some portents which indicate that the meaning of "vital" is changing and not as clear as it was before. Because of the basic differences in race, culture, language and religion, with the bitter memories of WWII like Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombs, it is not as easy for Japan to obtain and enhance mutual understanding and trust with the US as it is for European countries. Thanks to the existence of the big buffer zone of the Pacific Ocean, the loss of Japan does not necessarily mean a direct threat to the US public.

As Japanese economic growth becomes bigger, adverse effects on the US economy occur, and to some extent the frictions are inevitable.

The discord of national interests in world affairs, such as that in Iran, is likely to increase in the future. The imbalance in the economic power and military strength of Japan seems to be no longer welcomed or tolerated by the American people, who see it as an unfair free ride.

Other factors which may affect Japan-US security relations are:

- Japanese and US normalization with China has reduced the importance of the bases in Japan
- US recognition of the limitation of Japan's positive military cooperation with the US because of its domestic problems and international vulnerability.

- Japan's recognition of the changing credibility of the US commitment which was shown in such sudden and unilateral decisions as Vietnam, the Nixon shock and Nixon Doctrine, Taiwan, withdrawal from Korea, and so forth.

- Reversing trend of the US and Soviet military presence in Northeast Asia. It is understandable that it is difficult to maintain the readiness of a two million-man active duty military force in a democratic country in peacetime. Now that the risk and probability of war in Europe and the Middle East are bigger than in Asia, it is necessary to keep a local balance of power with minimal force in Asia. Thus the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons and a part of the 2nd Division from Korea, the "Swing Strategy" to Europe, employment of the 7th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the employment of a Marine force in Okinawa for Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), no combat army troops in mainland Japan, or Westcom instead of the Far East Command/USARPAC, and heavy reduction of MAAGs, all these clear reductions of visible and invisible US military presence in Asia signal the steady change of US interests. Under such circumstances, it is hard to expect the timely and sufficient reinforcement from CONUS bases, particularly ground troops. In the short war concept, time is a decisive factor to deter the enemy's aggression. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, achieving strategic parity with the US, now possesses power projection capability far outside of its own territory (as mentioned
in Section II). The Soviet Union, also, seemed to be encouraged by its success in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia partly because of the US unwillingness to intervene. Such a shift of military balance, and the US signal of its will in Asia, might induce another Soviet adventure in this area.
SECTION VI

OPTIONS OF FUTURE STRATEGY

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Through the analysis above, we see the substantial changes in the existing strategic framework and some symptoms of future instability in Northeast Asia. In general, the fundamentals of détente and peaceful coexistence to avoid general nuclear war will continue to work between the US and the Soviet Union per se, but they will not be extended beyond the two countries. The Rimland countries and the Third World countries will remain as a gray area full of potential conflicts -- racial, religious, territorial, economic, ideological, and a variety of historical disputes. The superpowers who once enjoyed the Pax Russo-Americana are losing the ability to control these conflicts in a gray area and increasing the rivalry to deal with them. In Northeast Asia, adding to the possible turmoil of local conflicts, the probability of Soviet adventurism, counteroffense to Japan-China-US relations, and the involvement in Sino-Soviet military conflict is higher than ever.

At least the Soviet will capitalize its military power for the bluff diplomacy to neutralize or Finlandize the neighbor countries with small military strength. Consequently, Japan's security policy and national defense strategy should be revised to properly fit the new situation. The most horrible thing would be defeatism and concession with no effort of resistance and suitable preparation.
OPTIONS

There are five options in the near-term security policy.

(1) Reshape the Japan-US Security Treaty
   - Enhance US interests in Japan
   - Increase interdependency and mutual support

(2) Self-reliance by building up of defense strength
   - The degree of rearmament, nuclear armament, and neutrality
     toward Tri-polar Powers would be examined in this context

(3) Regional collective security
   - Japan-Korea-Taiwan Triangle
   - Pacific Basin collective security

(4) Military tie with China

(5) Accommodation with the Soviet

ANALYSIS AND CHOICE

(1) Reshaping Japan-US Security Treaty
   - Most realistic, convincing solution, judging from the experience
     of the past thirty years
   - Uncertainty of reliance on foreign countries' will and strength
     which may swing as shown in the past
   - In order to assure the effectiveness of the treaty, Japan has
     to perform a considerable defense build-up to complement the
     US forces in the Pacific and to positively cooperate in peace-
     keeping efforts including the dispatch of Self Defense Forces
     abroad

(2) Self-reliance and neutrality by sufficient defense build-up
   - Japan can achieve independent, self-determination to some
degree and avoid getting involved in conflicts among super-powers
- Lose great benefits of collective security, increase expenses, and create adverse reactions and doubts among the neighboring countries
- In its implementation, strong leadership and patriotism generated by external turbulence are needed. Moreover, high bargaining power and diversified interdependence are necessary preconditions

(3) Regional alliance
- Ensure the security of southern SLOCs. Expect local stability to deter China and North Korea from attempting to reunify Taiwan and South Korea by force
- It has little effect against the northern threat. Difficulties in conclusion of agreement and new problems among member countries are foreseen

(4) Japan-China axis
- Strengthen China to prevent Soviet ambition over Manchuria and heighten the position of two countries in Asia and in the world
- Little gain and much adverse effect in conjunction with the northern threat against Japan. Automatic involvement in Sino-Soviet dispute. Possible friction and split between two countries are foreseen in the future.

(5) Accommodation with the Soviet Union
- Reduce the biggest neighboring threat and get access to the resources of Siberia
- Limitation in equal partnership and eventual course to a satellite state
Evidently, among the five options, the maintenance and reshaping of current Japan-US collective security will be the best course with the least instability and sacrifice and the easiest in its implementation. However, many things have to be done to wipe out Japan's "free ride" impression. As for Japan, more active cooperation with the US as a staunch ally, and an adequate defense buildup to effectively complement US military strength in Japan and Asia are essential.

As for the US, storing of war material and supplies in the region, Reforger-type exercises, and relocation of the 2nd Division or other ground combat troops from Hawaii or CONUS into Japan will be very effective in filling the credibility gap.

OPTIONS OF DEFENSE FORCE

In order to discuss the defense strategy, we need the more detailed premises besides the assumptions in Section II and a rough analysis of security policy in preceding pages. For instance, the probability of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Japan, the thresholds of threat invasion and the US military intervention, the expectation on the quality, quantity, time and place of reinforcement, and the Soviet's modernization of amphibious capability should be defined precisely as the given conditions. To simplify the discussion, I would like to define those conditions on the basis of the current posture. There will not be any drastic change, but smaller incremental changes that can be handled.

Options of Defense Sphere and Size

(1) Strategic counteroffensive force (i.e. attack the enemy bases)

(2) Regional defense force (i.e. extend the defense line to far outside the territorial sea)
(3) Entire territorial land, sea, and air defense force
(4) Limited territorial defense force (i.e. current conceptual force level)

**Tri-services Force Structure**

(1) Heavy army with moderate navy and air force
   - **Army**: defend all territorial land against any large-scale conventional attack
   - **Navy**: Secure territorial sea and nearby SLOCs
   - **Air Force**: Territorial air defense and coordinate army and navy operations

(2) Navy and air force heavy with modest army
   - **Navy**: Control the Sea of Japan and three channels, secure SLOCs of the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, with aircraft carriers and attack submarines and ASW forces
   - **Air Force**: Maintain air superiority and anti-ship attack capability
   - **Army**: Secure the bases for the navy and air force, safeguard the coastline and counter-insurgency

(3) Army and navy heavy with modest air force
   - **Army**: same as in (1)
   - **Navy**: middle of (1) and (2)
   - **Air Force**: Emphasis on the early warning and interception of enemy air strike and air defense of the valuable areas
SECTION VII

CONCLUSION

The Requirement and Possibility

There are a lot of scenarios, arguments, and factors which should be taken into consideration when we compare each option. The main elements are:

- Required force level decided by the threat and reinforcement from outside
- Political and economic possibility
- Impact on foreign countries
- Cost effectiveness

The immediate objective in the near future would be the gradual step-up to assume the defense of the entire Japanese territory against any scale of conventional attack with emphasis on ground and maritime force. Further expansion of defense sphere--like improvement of air force, and tactical defensive nuclear weapons will be the issues in the next phase.

The Role of Ground Force under the Current Security Treaty

In defense of Japan under the current combined operations concept, Japan Self Defense Force will fight closely with the US forces complementing each other. I would say the most needed force to complement the US force is the ground force.

- According to the Nixon Doctrine, the US will assist allies with Navy and Air Force but Allies, first, should provide the ground force. The American people and Congress will be reluctant to send the Army to directly face the Soviet Army in Asia. Even if the US government wants to do so, it may not be as quick as expected because of the restrictions of the War Resolution.
- Under the 1½ war strategy, the bulk of the US Army is tied to the NATO front and some of it is under the RDF command. Because of its nature, ground force re-deployment is very difficult in comparison with the navy or the air force. Thus the current US Army status in the Pacific area is exactly testifying to the limited expectation of ground force reinforcement in terms of size, time, and quality.

- The ability of naval and air force as a deterrent power in the Pacific have already been proven clearly in Korea and Vietnam. Strangely enough, despite the facts stated above, we hear a lot of recommendations both in the US and Japan to emphasize the ASW and air defense force buildup first in the JSDF. I agree that right now all three services are in insufficient status, however, in prioritization of the allocation of resources, we should analyze and decide logically on the basis of grand strategy. Strengthening of the Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces should not be carried out while sacrificing the Ground Self Defense Force.
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