Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers
Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policymakers

edited by Franklin D. Margiotta

the national defense university
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Foreword

The international system is undergoing rapidly accelerating and destabilizing change, vastly complicating the conditions under which policy choices must be made and managed. It is difficult to comprehend the trends underlying these complex unfolding events, and therefore to select the optimum policies for dealing with this changing world order. Yet, it is essential to attempt to understand the nature of these evolving issues, and to re-examine our strategic postulates in light of them, if we are to adapt our policies and programs to ensure our national security in these turbulent times.

The seminars which were the genesis of this volume were designed to identify and address some of the evolving issues which appear to have significant implications for the security of the United States. A few of the topics, such as US-Soviet relations, have long been the focus of policy concern; others, such as perceptions of declining US power, have more recently become part of the decision equation of policymakers. But all the issues we addressed raise questions about the validity of the more traditional views of the reality which shapes the formulation of policy choices. In our discussions we were not seeking unanimity on solutions to problems, but informed debate to focus thinking on means of managing these issues in a changing world political and economic order.

With the varied points of view we sought among the seminar participants, it is not surprising that we did not reach consensus on the policies we should adopt in addressing these new realities. There was, however, implicit agreement that there is validity in the somewhat trite notion that vision and steadfastness are required if we are to meet the challenges, and profit from the opportunities, presented by these events.

This volume contains the papers on which we based our seminar deliberations and a summary of our discussions of the issues. We hope that the insights will continue to stimulate debate; for in responding to events crucial to the national welfare, and even survival, we must not permit illusions to obscure the evolving realities of our strategic environment.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President
Preface

The National Security Affairs Institute of the National Defense University is a governmental institution with a unique mission. It was established in response to the National Defense University’s charter to provide creative thinking and research on major policy issues faced by the United States as our government defines and defends US security interests. The University has several other research programs that take advantage of the unique capabilities of its student body and faculty; the Institute endeavors to bring objective scholarship and thoughtful commentary to bear directly upon relatively short-term national security policy problems and issues.

In seeking to accomplish this formidable task, the University has been fortunate to cosponsor cooperative efforts with several staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Through these joint undertakings, the National Security Affairs Institute provides various forums in which responsible civilian and military policymakers may join in candid, informal discussions with knowledgeable citizens from academy, private industry, the Congress, the media, and other sectors of our society. Papers are sometimes commissioned to stimulate dialogue on selected issues. These issues are then discussed by relatively small groups (led by a chairman) who assess implications and, oftentimes, suggest policy initiatives. Normally, the results of these meetings are published and circulated to select policymakers and others interested in security policy issues.

One such jointly sponsored enterprise generated the ideas contained in this volume. From November 1979 to April 1980, the Institute hosted a series of six monthly dinner seminar meetings. The Seminar Series, in its third year, focused upon “Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers.” This theme and its constituent parts were selected to focus attention upon national security policy issues which were evolving from past social and environmental trends. Particular emphasis was given to recently recognized strategic realities or to those that had received little public or intellectual attention and debate. We sought to stimulate further understanding of these issues and their influence as catalysts to action or constraints upon policy for those US policymakers concerned with choices about national security.

Papers were developed to provide a basis for discussion by a
group of selected citizens. A core group of “regulars” was invited to participate in each meeting; they were supplemented at any one seminar by others who represented particular expertise or the agencies charged with making policy in the subject area to be discussed at that seminar. Normally attended by approximately twenty individuals, these seminars served as a forum for mixing the diverse views, disciplines, educational backgrounds, and experiences of our participants. This volume presents the papers that stimulated thoughtful discussion at this series of meetings. The final chapter in this book represents my attempt to sift through the collected wisdom displayed during these evening discussions and to provide a summary of the themes that emerged in these intellectual exchanges.

However, this volume represents more than the excellent efforts of the several authors who prepared chapters based upon their research and experience. Unique credit must be given to Lieutenant General R. G. Gard, Jr., President of National Defense University, who not only initiated and supported the meetings from which this book evolved, but also chaired each meeting and led our discussion groups through their task of critiquing and contributing to further understanding of the issues raised in each chapter of this book. This was no mean task, given the divergent perspectives of our participants.

Of equal importance was the cosponsorship, support, interest, and intellectual stimulation provided by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. David E. McGiffert, and several other members of the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In July 1979, while assessing the conclusions of the annual conference organized by the Institute, Secretary McGiffert suggested further exploration of two themes which emerged as seminar topics and chapters in this book: “Managing US-China Relations” and “Perceptions of American Power.” As world events evolved in late 1979, and US interests were threatened by developments in Iran and Afghanistan, the focus on US-China relations and on “Perceptions” became increasingly important for US policymakers. The insights provided in this book are also indebted to the support and understanding of other key members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Mr. Walter Slocombe; Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Dr. Lynn E. Davis; and Director, Policy Research, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. John P. Merrill.

The dinner seminar meetings, which provided the focus for each contributor’s paper, would not have been possible without the organizing skills and devoted efforts of Colonel Gayle Heckel, Lieutenant
Colonel Verna S. Kellogg, and Ms. Joe Anne Lewis. Their attention to detail made the meetings a pleasant experience for each of our guests and permitted us to focus upon the challenging issues.

A special note of thanks is due to the staff of the National Defense University Research Directorate who made rapid publication of this volume possible. Ms. Evelyn Lakes and Mr. George Maerz gave invaluable assistance in editing and administering the production of this book. Mr. Al Helder assisted in preparing the seminar notes which provide the basis for the concluding chapter. Our word processing technicians, Ms. Dorothy Mack and Ms. Laura Hall, carefully typed the manuscripts at each stage of the drafting and editing process.

We must naturally express our sincere appreciation to those who define the ultimate quality of this effort. The authors who contributed did so on relatively short notice and sought to tailor their approach to, and focus their insights upon, the rapidly changing world that challenges US policymakers today. Thus, the value of these papers resides not only in their scholarship and their policy prescriptions, but also in their value as catalysts for an interchange of informed, but diverse, views which lead to new perspectives on the present national security environment. We hope that their insights will also stimulate those who study and are interested in US national security affairs. Our contributors’ published thoughts speak to the quality of their response to our challenge.

Finally, we must thank that splendid group of seminar members—policymakers, lawyers, staff members from Congress, editors of learned journals, professors, and those from other sectors of our society—for the serious and thoughtful spirit that they brought to our series of deliberations. As they put each paper through the test of careful and open inquiry, the implications of each study and the qualifications surrounding it became that much clearer. The final results of their efforts are collected in the concluding chapter of this book. In many respects, this volume represents more than a series of meetings and bits of research. It represents the efforts of a conscientious, concerned group who came to know each other during the course of these meetings, and who expressed their respect for each other and for our Nation’s concerns by carefully challenging each other’s ideas on policy issues. It was a unique privilege to participate in such a series which made this book possible; for this experience, and for everyone’s contribution, we at the National Defense University are sincerely grateful.

FRANKLIN D. MARGIOTTA
Evolving Strategic Realities

Franklin D. Margiotta
National Defense University

As the United States enters the decade of the 1980s, new realities are emerging in the international and domestic environments within which US national security will be determined. The more clearly we understand the nature of these realities, the more likely it is that our democratic society and its responsible policymakers will be able to develop rational stratagems for dealing with an increasingly complex and uncertain world. An important purpose of this volume is to aid understanding of and focus attention upon the implications of evolving strategic realities. These realities will act as catalysts that drive the United States toward hard choices, and as constraints that limit our national ability to achieve desired outcomes.

This volume presents chapters on discrete issues with implications for US policymakers. Subjects worthy of attention surfaced from many directions. The emergence of some realities was only being broadly recognized as we prepared for the National Security Affairs Institute Dinner Seminar Series. Other issues seemed to be deserving of greater public exploration than they had previously received.

The Issue Areas and International Events

The topics of the Dinner Seminar Series were chartered in August 1979, but the issue areas selected have moved to the forefront of public debate in the United States after recent developments in military manning, in the Persian Gulf, and in Afghanistan. Two topics were suggested by Mr. David E. McGiffert, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He proposed that it would be useful to examine where the United States stood in managing its relationship with the People’s Republic of China. This topic proved fortuitous since we discussed it after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and after our Vice President and our Secretary of Defense had traveled to China to develop new areas of cooperation with that important nation.
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Secretary McGiffert also reinforced a theme that had surfaced at the July 1979 National Security Affairs Conference held at the National Defense University; he thought that a further exploration of perceptions of power might make a contribution to US national security policymakers. This subject became even more relevant after the November 1979 seizure of the United States Embassy in Iran and the crisis in Afghanistan. At the February seminar, US initiatives in response to these two destabilizing events made for a lively discussion about the real, or perceived, decline in US power as measured by the capability of the United States to influence events in Iran and Afghanistan.

Another topic, dealing with energy and US national security, also was made more relevant by the Islamic revolution and the potential future challenges to Western oil supplies portended by developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Our earlier choice to have the January 1980 seminar focus upon the growing importance of economics and the ability of the United States to manage this phenomenon was put into sharper relief by the attempts of the United States and its allies to bring to bear economic sanctions, boycotts, and, possibly, military force against a hostile Iranian government and a truculent Soviet Union.

Our first seminar in November 1979, on changing US military manpower realities, met under the cloud of the failure of all four military services to meet fiscal year 1979 recruiting goals—the first such failure in the history of the all-volunteer force. By the spring of 1980, serious doubts had surfaced about the quality of the manpower the US military is attracting and about the ability of the US military to retain qualified and experienced technicians within its forces. A swelling chorus of public questions was being raised about manpower registration and the draft.

Finally, our obvious early luck in scheduling persisted through the year; in August 1979 we left our April session open, in order to compensate for the vagaries of Washington weather which had sometimes caused us to postpone dinner seminar meetings. After a relatively mild winter, we were able to complete our series with an analysis of new dimensions of Soviet foreign policy in an attempt to understand what recent Soviet initiatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere meant for US national security policy choices.

The April meeting, thus, contributed appropriately to the purpose of our series. But this very purpose somewhat defeats the ambition of anyone editing a collection—to assemble a coherent set of papers around a single theme. While the relevance of our meetings unfortunately profited from the world's miseries and excesses, this turbulence
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did not provide an easily identifiable, overarching theme for this volume. Nevertheless, as the year progressed and as we addressed the separate issue areas that we and the staff members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense had agreed were worthy of research, one could discern at least a minimal logic for presenting the seven papers prepared by our contributors.

Catalysts and Constraints to Action

The papers examine issues which will act as both catalysts and constraints. They are not presented in the order in which the seminar groups addressed them. Rather, the three chapters on Soviet policies, US-China relations, and energy-related issues can be clustered primarily around a focus on catalysts for US national security policy formulation, or, viewed alternatively, as major challenging issue areas that will require significant attention and choice in the near term. The chapters on the economic, military, and psychological instruments of statecraft can be suitably grouped together as representing constraints that will be operative in limiting US policy options.

Because of events in late 1979 and early 1980, the US relationship with the Soviet Union may have again emerged as the central concern of US policymakers as they deal with a turbulent and dynamic world. The next chapter in this book examines "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy" by Professor Vladimir Petrov. We wanted the seminar to review Soviet foreign policy in an attempt to focus more closely upon recent Soviet international behavior and to determine whether this behavior represented a tactical shift or a major change in strategic objectives. We examined the factors that motivated recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives and sought to understand their implications for US national security policy.

In his chapter, Vladimir Petrov provides Americans with a unique and challenging perspective—an uncritical reconstruction of Soviet foreign policy over the last few years from the Soviet point of view. He suggests that the rulers of the Soviet Union know their own weaknesses and that current Soviet policies emanate from views developed in the 1950s. Since that time, the Soviets have sought to break out of containment by the United States and the West, build an international following of anti-Western Third World states who seek to balance the power of the West, and accumulate strength by means of these policies and increases in military power. All this was to lead to recognition of the Soviet Union as a coequal superpower, with the ultimate purpose of achieving a US-USSR condominium that would protect each "em-
Evolving Strategic Realities

In Petrov's view, the interests of the Soviet state today take priority over those of the Communist world revolution and Soviet rulers are extremely sensitive to any deterioration of their personal or governmental power, especially within their perceived empire or in the developing world. Petrov declines to grant the Soviet Union a grand strategy and notes that Soviet tactics eventually become strategy if they meet with success. He believes that inconsistency is normal in any government's foreign policy and that perhaps the only element of grand strategy discernable in Soviet foreign policies may derive from reactive moves by the Soviets to a historic and still residual US containment policy. After reviewing the numerous shortcomings the Soviets perceived on the part of the United States, Petrov suggests the Soviet leadership decided that detente had failed.

The invasion of Afghanistan is seen as reflecting Soviet weakness inasmuch as the situation in Afghanistan had so deteriorated that the Soviets believed it was in their vital national security interests to intervene—a drastic move. Afghanistan was viewed as a strategically vital, nonhostile buffer state that was being threatened by Chinese support of Afghan rebels. The Soviets were emboldened to move because the United States was distracted by the hostage crisis, Iran was in turmoil, and US military action and presence in the Persian Gulf had increased. Inhibitions normally provided by a Soviet interest in completing SALT, in reducing NATO defense budgets, and in limiting improvements in NATO nuclear technology had been overtaken by events. With these inhibitions behind them, the Soviet Union moved into Afghanistan. This major act of open aggression naturally forced the United States to reconsider its policies toward the People's Republic of China.

Any serious discussion of US-Soviet relationships must necessarily consider US-China relations as a major corollary of that relationship, but one with an inherent importance and dynamic of its own. "Managing US-China Relations" was addressed in a seminar which attempted to understand better the changing relationships emerging between the United States and China since normalization. We tried to develop appropriate objectives that should be sought in US policy toward China to insure that the United States maximizes its national interests within its triangular relationship with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

In Chapter 3, Professor Harry Harding provides insights into the choices facing the United States as it calculates its national security interests relating to the People's Republic of China. He indicates that
Evolving Strategic Realities

the United States faces a major strategic issue which involves clearly defining a long-term US relationship with China and integrating that relationship into regional and global concerns. The immediate challenge of the 1980s, on the other hand, is viewed as tactical—the problem of managing a fragile relationship. These strategic and tactical concerns flow from the aftermath of normalization which had five aspects: the formalization of the 1970 agreements; the extension of normalization from political to economic matters; the consolidation of normalization through the formation of private and governmental networks of relationships and cooperation; the furtherance of Chinese development in civilian areas; and the beginnings of limited military and strategic cooperation.

On the strategic side, Dr. Harding feels that there is insufficient discussion about the fundamentals of our long-term goals in our relationship with China. He proposes that the United States has several, not mutually exclusive, options: the United States could become an adversary with cool relations, or a diplomatic colleague, or an economic partner, or a military and strategic quasi-ally against the Soviet Union. He cautiously suggests that the appropriate long-range strategic role of China will be relatively minor in the overall US global posture and US strategy. As we seek to integrate our Chinese relationship into regional concerns, Harding proposes that we should attempt to incorporate China into the Pacific economic community which must include Japan, Northeast Asia, and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He also recommends a strategic dialogue with China on Pacific matters, remembering that Japan remains the cornerstone of our Pacific strategies.

As Harding reviews the appropriate option for the United States, he notes that any further playing of the “China Card” against the Soviet Union could be counterproductive. Further, the United States should avoid forming an immediate military relationship with China, since it would not contribute to a solution of current US global problems, but could exacerbate US relations with the Soviet Union.

Harding believes that the tactical side of the US-Sino relationship may be the most productive one to develop, despite the difficulties. China is emerging as an economic colleague of the United States, but Taiwan will remain a contentious issue. He suggests that while encouraging negotiations between China and Taiwan, we should continue to maintain our Taiwanese relationship, sell arms to Taiwan, and carefully monitor the Taiwanese response to internal political pressures. In managing the US-Sino relationship, the United States must beware of an arrangement in which the Chinese set up a student-teacher
relationship with the United States. This could be dangerous, because the United States would tend to oversell its solutions to unique problems that are rooted in Chinese culture. Should this situation develop, it could lead to ultimate distrust and a feeling of betrayal on the part of the Chinese. Because of the increasing network of governmental, private, and commercial ties that are rapidly developing, the problem of merely monitoring US-China relations will become increasingly difficult.

The third major catalyst to action and choice is examined in Chapter 4, where Melvin A. Conant summarizes "The Global Impact of Energy on US Security Interests and Commitments." The seminar focused upon analyzing the implications of current energy problems for the national defense of the United States. We attempted to define the role of energy in defense efforts short of war and during a limited or more encompassing war. Fortunately, Mr. Conant broadened our perspectives to a more global view of this important issue and also reinforced our intuition that energy issues would be as much a constraining factor as a catalyst.

Mr. Conant notes that serious concerns about energy are a relatively recent phenomenon and that only a few years ago we would not have held a meeting and written papers on this subject. He points out that there are serious questions about whether military forces developed for past requirements will meet the energy-related security needs of today. His assessment is that energy is a dominant security issue and that the allocation of petroleum resources will remain the most important energy issue for at least the next twenty years.

The flow of petroleum relates directly to US national security interests because of the vulnerability of the United States. Seventy to eighty percent of US petroleum imports come in through the Caribbean where the straits are narrow; these supply a few, very large off-loading terminals. In Mr. Conant's view, protecting these lines of communication in the Caribbean and diversifying our off-loading facilities in that area may become important national security priorities.

As he reviews other areas of the world, Mr. Conant questions whether the United States will become the watchdog of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf since there appears to be no regional power that will insure the security of oil supply. Another concern which will become more important stems from the traditional approach of the oil companies to supplying petroleum. They seek to keep oil moving with virtually no reserves; the margin for error or interruption remains very small.

Finally, the future may bring oil-reserve shortages—a vulnerability that could have divisive effects upon US alliance structures. Merely
reviewing a world map provides us with valuable insights into our allies' problems. The United States is relatively remote from the major oil-exporting regions of the world; our allies are geographically much closer and require a much higher percentage of their petroleum imports from these regions than the United States requires. The threatening proximity of the Soviet Union to the crucial oil basin of the Persian Gulf does not go unnoticed by Western Europe and Japan. There will be a normal tendency for our allies, who are vitally dependent upon Middle Eastern oil, to view issues and events in the Middle East differently than does the United States.

The evolving strategic realities emerging in the energy area, and in US relations with the Soviet Union and China, will have important implications for US policymakers. As we have noted, these three issue areas will generally force hard decisions, and developments within any one area might also constrain US freedom of choice. In our seminar program we also tried to examine some of the important constraints that will limit the potential effectiveness of any US policy options. Papers were developed which examined aspects of three of the classic "instruments of statecraft": the economic, the military, and the psychological.

Again, we must caution—every "constraint" has areas where action might change or moderate the effect of a particular restraint. Thus, when we turned to the growing importance of economics on the world scene, we sought to understand whether the United States was organized adequately to manage this phenomenon. We examined the increasingly important role that the economic instrument of statecraft plays in the international relations of the United States, and the relative importance of economic power in comparison with the more traditional measurement of national influence, that of military power. We attempted to analyze whether, and how well, the United States Government is organized to understand and manage economic relationships in a rapidly changing world.

Chapter 5, by Professors James K. Oliver and James A. Nathan, addresses these issues. The authors suggest that there have been two relatively polar images of international reality for the past decade. These images, based upon general perceptions of international reality and economic relationships, shaped the approach of numerous US intellectuals and policymakers as they considered national security issues.

One school of thought subscribes to a view of the world as a complex, interdependent system in which the compellent aspect of military force has declined in utility and in potential for influence. In
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general, this intellectual school views economics as increasingly more important than military power.

Recently resurgent, but always an alternatively held view, is the more traditional approach that subscribes to the view that the complex interdependent scenario, focusing upon economics, is premature. This more traditional school of thought does not believe that international relations are dominated by international economics and believes there might be danger in the United States defining its national interest as a stable world order which has not yet come into being.

When assaying the utility of economics as a major instrument of national power, the authors conclude that there appear to be limited possibilities for inter-state leverage in the economic realm. In fact, they submit that the American political system may be a weak base of support for either of the above world views. Oliver and Nathan note that one must realistically conclude that in our democratic society it is difficult for any government establishment to extract sacrifices from a society that is based upon self-interest, which, at its extreme, leads to something approximating narcissism. In addition, there is rarely the requisite consensus or institutional cohesion available to make a unified approach feasible.

While recognizing the increasing importance of international economics, the authors feel that the potential utility of economic leverage in furthering US national security interests should not be overdrawn and we should have few illusions about the efficacy of this approach.

Another major constraint upon the ability of the United States to deal with the changing realities of our relations with the Soviet Union and China, and with the oil-producing nations, may be the evolving nature of US military manpower realities. When the seminar reviewed this issue, we explored the increasing difficulties encountered by the US military in recruiting and retaining quality personnel. We attempted to assess the possibility that the US military might decline significantly in size over the next five years. Our group also examined the interesting notion that the current all-volunteer force might be merely an interim phenomenon providing a transition period to a new concept of national service which will emerge over the next decade.

Chapter 6 (which I authored) examines recent evidence that may suggest that the all-volunteer force is already in, or headed for, serious trouble. Two theoretical or abstract concepts are proposed as organizing devices to help explain and summarize the underlying factors causing recruitment and retention problems.

A military identity crisis and the declining legitimacy of military service are viewed as being reinforced by several major factors or
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trends in the international and domestic environment. The chapter reviews these social and political phenomena: the increasing complexity of the international situation; the decline of executive branch freedom of action caused by the increased power of Congress; the challenge to traditional military self-image and values as the military absorbs new value systems and larger numbers of minorities and women; the increasingly "married nature" of the military institution and a more independent family system; the major decline in the pool of male youths available for service; the frustrations caused by centralization of command and control dictated by technology and the threat of nuclear war; and the sociological and personal doubts generated by sophisticated military technology which leads the military toward an occupational (versus service) orientation and blurs the boundaries between military and civilian jobs, leadership styles, and organizational forms.

The conclusion is that the military will find it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain enough quality individuals to man its forces in the 1980s. Implications for the future are suggested: overseas commitments might be reviewed and evaluated in light of a possibly smaller force; national manpower programs might be viewed more as a coherent set of issues rather than as discrete issues; manpower policy adjustments might increase recruitment and retention; and approaches are suggested to assist with the questions of military identity and legitimacy of service.

Chapter 7 views military manpower problems and the all-volunteer force from a very different perspective. Professor Morris Janowitz, noted military sociologist, suggests broad societal approaches for accommodating the historic US concept of a citizen soldier with an all-volunteer force. The all-volunteer force may contain major elements of the citizen soldier concept and may be a transition to general youth national service.

Professor Janowitz defines the central elements of the citizen-soldier concept as obligatory service, universal service, and the legitimacy of service by democratic standards. Some of these elements remain in the all-volunteer force; high turnover rates and the persistence of earlier military attitudes may contribute to this continuity.

Janowitz proposes that we adopt a modern view of the citizen soldier even though this concept is somewhat weakened by the all-volunteer force. One should view the current approach as a ten-year to twenty-year transitional trial period leading toward a new form of citizen soldiery, one incorporated within universal youth national service. He avers that this service, both civilian and military, can modernize the elements of obligation and universality by multiplying the numbers
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participating in these programs. Military service might be combined with other programs as a transition to national service. This approach could take advantage of the current proclivity of youth to "drop out" and try alternatives before making firm, long-range, career commitments. The military option would be attractive under Professor Janowitz' plan because it would provide enhanced monetary incentives, as well as educational benefits, in return for service.

He argues that military service must be legitimated by democratic standards and that conscription can never be reduced to "a tax," but must be recognized as a philosophical question of the obligations of citizenship in a free society. He cautions that universal national service will not begin tomorrow, and will take much experimentation and preparation. The US political system, thus, must cope with an all-volunteer force and must retain the idea of the citizen soldier as we transition through new military manpower realities.

Finally, in one of the more interesting, if the most abstract, seminar programs, we sought to review how perceptions are formed about US national security policies and forces by assessing current perceptions generated in the US domestic political system and among our allies and adversaries. We tried to understand the vehicles available to policymakers in signaling national will, intent, and force posturing, and to examine the dangers inherent in national policymakers seeking to "bluff" on the world scene.

The paper that provided the basis for our dialogue was written by Dr. Earl Ravenal and is presented as Chapter 8, "Perceptions of American Power." This treatise is placed toward the end of this volume, because it uniquely cuts across many of the issues raised in other chapters and addresses the most abstract, but perhaps most powerful, potential constraint—the psychological dimension of international interaction.

Dr. Ravenal summarizes the new realities that have recently shocked the United States: a decline in US power in the view of other nations; a shift in the central balance with the Soviet Union; domestic constraints upon the use of US power; new threats, not necessarily military, in areas not normally considered threatening; and shaky deterrent and alliance structures, both in balance and in the views of allies and adversaries.

Under these changed strategic realities, the chapter suggests that perceptions become more important. Allies and adversaries act upon them. Deterrence, which relies upon perceptions, becomes less certain. The importance of perceptions suggests that the United States has options which range from increasing our actual forces, to maximizing

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other’s views of our forces, to shedding commitments to bring them in balance with the forces possible.

In some respects, the problems faced by the United States appear to be historically related to those of a mature, far-flung empire beset by enemies, and lacking in means to honor its extended security commitments. The stratagems developed by the Romans for defense of their empire could be instructive to the United States. Ravenal suggests that Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon succeeded in fashioning a coherent and sensitive response to these realities, which sought to move the United States out of forward defense and to invoke others to share the burdens. The Nixon Doctrine for coping with new realities was operative until President Carter was recently forced to change this national policy. Since the Romans also had to change their approach, we may suspect some potentially ominous future developments.

Confronted with these difficult new realities, some would suggest that perceptions be used as a multiplier of a nation’s true forces. In any assessment of this suggestion, however, the difference between force and power must be well understood. Force can be spent and replaced, but power is dissipated with its use. When nations wish to enhance their international credibility and to deter their enemies, these ideas assume importance. The United States must be interested in perceptions because we cannot generate sufficient real force and because credibility and deterrence are both perceptual.

The “reality principle” becomes important because perceptions will ultimately be tested by real threats. Constraints upon the United States are real and this is an important point—constraints and threats are both tangible and real. The proposition that a nation can achieve large objectives with an economy of force reveals its weakness rather quickly. To think that rhetoric can be substituted for military means is a fallacy. Mobilizing national will and increasing national wealth are not a panacea, but in a democracy may be the absolute preconditions for the development of the true force required to credibly affect the global environment.

Ravenal further disputes that actual power and the appearance of power are substitutable. This is only effective at the middle range of options; at the margins, if power is truly lacking, then difficult times ensue. Only so many tricks are possible by manipulating perceptions. At some point, a tough choice must be made either to generate the resources necessary to support strategies, or to shed commitments. This is the real dilemma.
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Perspectives on the Future

The concluding chapter weaves together the themes and conclusions of this volume. Each of the six major issue areas developed in the chapters is examined and the insights provided by our seminar participants are summarized. Qualifications to the central issues surfaced by each of our contributing authors are suggested, further dimensions of each problem are explored, and the implications for US policymakers are developed. This synthesis of our discussions permits us to suggest important trends that may require choices or that may constrain the US national security policymaking community in the future.

Unfortunately, neither the seven authors nor the knowledgeable seminar participants suggest an optimistic outlook for the United States or the world. In many respects, both the papers and the discussions support intuitions that the United States may already be adjusting to one of the more difficult eras in its history. We must all be careful not to overdramatize current events, nor forget that the United States has weathered difficult periods in its relatively brief national history. Nevertheless, there is at least some evidence that serious threats will impinge more directly upon US security and well-being, and that the United States may no longer have the material and psychological resources to always successfully confront these challenges.

Our summary perspective portrays a future that seems troubled and dominated by uncertainty and rapid change. Few readers will accept the conclusions of this volume in their entirety; we sincerely hope that the analyses will be questioned, debated, and reinterpreted. This collection cannot solve these anticipated national security policy issues. However, policy choices must be made and constraints will limit America's capacity to respond. This collection does challenge Americans to consider the evolving strategic realities which will shape our Nation's future, and does challenge policymakers to deal with the implications of the complex and difficult realities described.
New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy

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What follows is not my critical analysis of Soviet foreign policy. It is rather a reconstruction of a Soviet insider's view of Soviet foreign policy, not of a Politburo member but of an individual intimately familiar with the prevailing attitudes and perceptions at high working levels in Moscow's foreign policy establishment. For obvious reasons, such a view is never expressed in public and for the record in the Soviet Union; usually we search for it, combing through piles of printed matter, attempting to separate grain from chaff.

This laborious exercise has been my lot as well. But, additionally, for the past ten to twelve years I have had extended conversations with scores of Soviet scholars and officials, some of whom I have come to know rather well. I asked questions, I answered their questions, but above all I listened. As S.I. Hayakawa, presently a Senator from California, once wrote:

"Listening does not mean simply maintaining a polite silence while you are rehearsing in your mind the speech you are going to make the next time you can grab a conversational opening. Nor does listening mean waiting alertly for the flaws in the other fellow's argument so that later you can mow him down. Listening means trying to see the problem the way the speaker sees it—which means not sympathy, which is feeling for him, but empathy, which is experiencing with him. Listening requires entering actively and imaginatively into the other fellow's situation and trying to understand a frame of reference different from your own."

Needless to say, my "fellow" Soviet interlocutor is a composite of many. I had to judge their integrity, knowledge, comprehension, and the quality of the links tying each individual to the policymaking establishment. I had first to be aware of their particular biases and predilections and of their attempts, sometimes unconscious, to "influence" me in a desirable direction, and then to make appropriate discounts. I also
had to avoid giving the impression that I was interviewing these men, which would have been utterly self-defeating; and I had to be content if I got an insightful comment or two out of several hours of conversation. In time, my ability to listen—in Hayakawa’s sense—has greatly improved and my cumulative experience has made the task easier.

It has been a time-consuming exercise, but the effort is worthwhile for anyone studying international relations who is concerned with the motivations of foreign policymakers. I firmly believe that before making up our minds as to how to deal with an adversary (or, for that matter, with an ally) in a crisis situation, we ought to be able to comprehend him in his own context, for which task empathy is indispensable—as it is indispensable for developing our capacity to predict his behavior and perhaps to head off a crisis before internal and external pressures begin to limit the government’s choices.

In the text of this chapter, my own views and interpretations will be stated explicitly in its last section, marked by the pronoun “I”. For the rest, the reader should assume that it is the narration of a well-informed Soviet foreign affairs observer, familiar with the thinking on the upper levels of Soviet bureaucracy, be it of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) or the Foreign Ministry, and uninhibited by ideological hangups. By no means conclusive, this narration is as close to “reality” as I could make it.
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ey and tactics: we know that not infrequently Moscow elevates a successful tactic to the level of strategy and downgrades the poorly conceived strategies to the level of tactics. It is only with the lapse of considerable time, and with the full benefit of hindsight, that we can discern the broad outlines of Soviet strategic objectives and the basic motivations determining major acts of foreign policy in a given period.

The inability of the United States to appraise Soviet intentions realistically has at times had calamitous consequences. A stark illustration is the so-called "strategic reassessment of 1950" contained in the National Security Council document known as NSC 68. This document, which guided American policy toward the Soviet Union for two decades and which still serves as a gospel for many people today, contained extravagant exaggerations of Soviet power. By grossly misrepresenting Soviet intentions, it laid the foundation for the strategy of containment of communism and confrontation with the Soviet Union, and assigned the United States the unsustainable task of guarding the world peace. In addition to straining the economic and political resources of the United States, this strategy forced the Soviets into an arms race and global activism, turning the assumptions of NSC 68 into self-fulfilling prophecy. The measures which Americans regarded as precautionary, or aimed at liberating Soviet-dominated nations, inevitably appeared as threatening to the Soviets, who were left with no choice but to assume evil intentions on the part of the United States and drastically rearrange priorities in resource allocation. The popular American belief that the Soviets would have traveled the same road anyway because communism is expansionist by definition rests on questionable grounds. It disregards geopolitical, economic, and even psychological limitations with which Communist leaders must contend and assigns them powers which they do not possess.

In retrospect, Americans realize that in spite of Moscow's menacing posture during the first postwar decade, its strategic objectives were essentially defensive, and the acts of Soviet foreign policy—including the Berlin Blockade and the Korean war—reactive. The top leadership during the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower was well aware of this, but nevertheless based its strategy on the premise that Soviet security concerns lacked legitimacy. Thus the United States took an unyielding position on the German issue and on disarmament (including nuclear disarmament), created a world-wide network of anti-Soviet alliances, and challenged Soviet domination of other Communist-run states—even as it utilized the image of the Communist monolith as a political underpinning of its strategy. This "monolith," as we know, has never existed.
Directions of Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin

The Soviet grand strategy which began to take shape during the early Khrushchev period and within which Soviet foreign policy initiatives developed in subsequent years had the ultimate objective of establishing a world-wide Soviet-American condominium. Considering the vast weaknesses of the Soviet international position relative to that of the United States, this strategy envisaged the following intermediate goals: (a) breaking out of containment; (b) developing the ways and means of weakening the American alliance system while preserving and expanding the Soviet system, so as to be able to claim a change in the "correlation of forces" in the world in favor of socialism; and (c) building up a creditable military might which would discourage the United States from dealing with Moscow from a "position of strength." The idea of condominium was strengthened further in the mid-1960s, for it promised to exclude the now hostile China from playing a major role in international politics.

In pursuit of this strategy, the Soviets broke the Western monopoly on international arms sales and, at considerable cost to themselves, began to buttress their relations with select nonaligned nations by economic assistance. They employed military threats in the crises involving their newly found friends, and when it became apparent that their nuclear bluffing did not work, they launched an ambitious program of strategic arms build-up. The decision to undertake this program was made late in 1959, shortly after Premier Khrushchev’s failure to reach understanding with President Eisenhower at Camp David. It was reconfirmed after the U-2 episode and given a powerful boost after the Cuban missile crisis.

There was a distinct strategic purpose behind the Soviet effort to catch up with the United States militarily. It was not “defense” in the traditional sense: fears of an American-led attack had largely subsided in Moscow by the early 1960s when the Soviets concluded that their advanced position in Europe and a score of ICBMs targeted on the United States provided them with a minimal deterrent capacity. Nor was it preparation for an aggressive war: there would be no sane justification for it even if the vast preponderance of the combined Western military power did not exist. Instead, having failed to reach a political modus vivendi because of their position of weakness, the Soviets concluded that only by attaining strategic parity with the United States would they be able to reap benefits from a status of the ranking superpower they felt they were entitled to, a status accorded to them during the war by
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President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and, briefly, by President Truman.

Khrushchev sought this superpower status not out of some nebulous ambition, but because international recognition of the new role of the Soviet Union would have allowed it to expand—in “peaceful competition” with the West—its influence by rendering support to any nonaligned regime or national liberation movement of its choosing. The trade-off which the Soviets offered in exchange was avoidance of the use of force and direct confrontations, expansion of economic and other East-West relations, and cooperation in controlling the development and spread of nuclear weapons. Implied but not stated was a respect by both sides of each other’s vital economic and security interests, narrowly defined, in third areas. Although Khrushchev’s threat to settle unilaterally the Berlin issue, of paramount importance to the Soviets and the German Democratic Republic, captured universal attention at the time of his meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, Khrushchev elaborated at some length his views about the Soviet commitment to national liberation movements to the young President. Kennedy rejected them on the spot, maintaining that the possible spread of Communist influences to new regions would represent an intolerable enhancement of Soviet power. In spite of this rejection, undeterred by the spectacular expansion of American might undertaken by the United States, the Soviets in the following years adhered doggedly to their strategy. Utilizing anticolonialist sentiments and taking advantage of the American predicament in Southeast Asia, they sought friends in the Third World wherever they could and, by lowering their profile in Europe, made significant inroads into a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states.

The costs of Soviet efforts were high, and there were numerous painful setbacks in Asia and Africa, entailing the loss of prestige and fortune. China’s defection to the enemy camp was nothing short of calamity, and the disarray in Eastern Europe and the Communist movement in general absorbed much of the Soviets’ energies. Yet the decline of the American role in the world and the improvement of the atmosphere in Europe (resulting, among other things, in the resolution of the vexing Berlin question and normalization of relations between the two Germanys) had created preconditions for detente, inaugurated during Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972. The Soviets thought that they had finally attained the long-sought recognition of “equality” with the United States, symbolically bringing to an end twenty-five years of confrontation and opening a new era of opportunities: they saw detente as a
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giant step toward the Soviet-American condominium, dismissing Secretary of State Kissinger’s "multipolar" constructions.

Detente with the United States was by no means an unmixed blessing for Moscow. It caused a great deal of uneasiness among some of its allies, notably North Vietnam and East Germany, who felt they might be betrayed by the Soviets for the sake of reaching accord with the United States. It evoked concerns among some of the Soviets' Third World friends, the most dramatic case being the one of Egypt, which virtually broke relations with the Soviet Union because in the name of detente they refused to supply Egyptian armed forces with advanced offensive weapons. China, already hostile and fearful of the growing Soviet self-confidence, accelerated the process of its rapprochement with the United States. Major Communist parties of Western Europe began to assert their independence from the cradle of world revolution by subjecting the Soviets to biting criticism. And in keeping with the new image, internal security had to be relaxed, Jewish emigration expanded, and foreign contacts of the dissidents tolerated. But as relations with the United States improved, a mild euphoria began to prevail in the Soviet Union. The "hardliners" who doubted the wisdom of the new policies, were silenced. There were high hopes for economic improvement, for reductions in defense budgets, and for cut-downs of aid to fickle Third World friends and to Communist-run client states.

Disintegration of Detente

The state of euphoria began to evaporate by 1975, as alarming signs of opposition to detente appeared in the United States. There were attacks on the SALT agreements, in the Senate, and human rights agitation resulted in the Jackson amendment, dimming Soviet hopes for the expansion of trade and the attainment of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. There were plenty of indications that the American public was in no mood to accept the legitimacy of the Soviet "co-equal" status: Kissinger's diplomacy all but squeezed the Soviet influence out of the Middle East; and the Soviet-Cuban venture in Angola, the country which in Moscow's view was not of vital interest to the United States and therefore not covered by detente understandings, provoked furious charges that Soviet imperialism was again on the march. There was enough momentum left in detente to enable the Soviets to expand dramatically-economic relations with Western Europe and Japan and to carry out the long-cherished project of legitimizing the status quo in Europe, imbedded in the Helsinki Accords signed in the summer of 1975. But in the 1976 election campaign, both President Ford and
Jimmy Carter treated "detente" as a dirty word, as a symbol of American weakness robbing the United States of its international preeminence. Soviet propaganda also changed its tune: so recently declared "irreversible," detente was now presented as being under attack in the United States by assorted cold war warriors, "Zionists," and the notorious military-industrial complex. The party hierarchs, although insisting that detente was still alive, began to hedge by emphasizing that the "global ideological struggle" with the adversary must go on.

The first year of the Carter administration brought no improvement in Soviet-American relations. In fact, everything indicated to the Soviets that the new President, having fallen under the spell of his national security adviser, was determined to dismantle detente and revert to dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. The "comprehensive" proposals on SALT II, presented by Secretary of State Vance in Moscow in March 1977, infuriated the Soviets by their drastic departure from the earlier agreements and understandings; and in some of President Carter's statements they detected a new militancy and an appeal to make American power "second to none," in effect scrapping the concept of "parity" they had come to cherish.

Another disturbing sign that the United States was evolving a new anti-Soviet strategy was the increased emphasis on playing the "China card," to a degree few people in Moscow thought possible. The development of closer relations with China indicated a prospect of the formation of what Moscow analysts described as a Washington-Peking-Tokyo axis. The "axis" was seen as complementing the NATO alliance, already under pressure from the United States to increase its defense outlays. We can surmise that the Soviet General Staff and the Warsaw Pact Command were instructed some time in 1977 to review the changing situation and accelerate the modernization of their combined armed forces.

More worrisome to the Kremlin was the deterioration of the political climate in the United States. Carter's human rights campaign in which the news media and members of Congress excitedly participated appeared as a concerted effort to mobilize public opinion against the Soviet Union and to stir up Soviet dissidents, thereby aggravating the KGB's (Committee of State Security) internal security problems. During the review of the Helsinki Accords implementation in Belgrade late in 1977, the American delegation led an assault on the Soviets' human rights record and almost succeeded in splitting Europe along the old cold war lines. Not everything was bleak yet. Trade relations—much more profitable to the United States than to the Soviet Union—continued, as did scientific and cultural exchanges and several joint projects.
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of a technical nature. But there were no observable improvements and new undertakings which could be counted as "strengthening the infrastructure of detente," once advocated by Kissinger. In all, the post-Vietnam syndrome in the United States, which had figured prominently in Soviet calculations a few years earlier, seemed to be wearing out.

Kremlin World Review, 1977

Pivotal as relations with the United States have been in shaping Soviet foreign policy, they have accounted for only a part, albeit a major one, of the external preoccupations of the leadership. But on surveying the scene at the end of the first year of Carter's Presidency, Soviet leaders could detect few positive developments in the world which could offset the disintegration of detente with the United States. With the shortcut to the superpower condominium now denied to them, they had to resume the arduous and costly efforts to enhance their image as representatives of the world power "equal" to the United States. This meant hardening the policy positions, internally and externally; pressuring the allies into greater conformity to Moscow's posture vis-a-vis the West; drawing the line beyond which no retreat would be allowed; expending more on defense; exploiting more US political and economic difficulties with NATO states; and expanding commitments to more regimes, unstable and hopelessly weak but claiming to have chosen a "socialist path of development," in order to uphold the thesis of the "changing correlation of forces."

Not everything looked uniformly bleak, especially in Europe. Relations with continental governments remained on an even keel, trade kept expanding, as did travel in both directions and cultural-scientific exchanges, and the two Germanys seemed to be coexisting without major frictions. A visible spread of anti-Americanism, eroding the NATO political structure and hampering transoceanic economic and financial relations, was also seen in Moscow as a positive development. On the other hand, there was a revival of alarmist talk about the growing Soviet menace, spurred by stories about the buildup of offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces. Not that many people believed in the likelihood of a Soviet-led assault on the West, but there was much speculation about the coming "Finlandization" of Europe, aided by Trojan Horse tactics of the Italian, French, and Spanish Communist parties which were professing independence from Moscow and adherence to democratic principles. Human rights activists vocally denounced the suppression of freedom in the Soviet Union, calling for a concerted
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effort to prod it toward ever-greater "liberalization," an old anathema to all Communist leaderships.

Soviet policies in Africa and Asia not only produced no accomplishments in 1977, but suffered two major setbacks. In March, the friendly Indira Ghandi government of India was replaced by that of Moraji Desai, who proceeded to downplay publicly the significance of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1971, and simultaneously moved to improve relations with China and Pakistan. While not materially damaging to Soviet interests, this shift of India's orientation raised concerns in Moscow about its strategic implications. Much more dramatic were the developments in the Horn of Africa, where the Soviets had attempted to strengthen their position by an even-handed policy toward Somalia and Ethiopia, both ruled by self-styled "Marxist" regimes. This policy crumbled as Siad Barre, ignoring Soviet warnings, launched a campaign to "liberate" Ogaden from Ethiopian domination. Upholding the principle, popular in Black Africa, of inviolability of national frontiers, the Soviets decided to ship weapons to a militarily weaker Ethiopia. In retaliation—and counting on United States and Saudi Arabian help—Siad Barre expelled all Soviet military and civilian personnel, took over Soviet naval facilities, and abrogated the Friendship Treaty with Moscow concluded only three years earlier. Partially to make up for this setback, the Soviets increased further military assistance to Ethiopia and commenced to airlift Cuban troops to help the Mengistu regime to fight not only the Somalis but also the Eritrean secessionists who, to complicate matters further, also claimed to be "Marxists" and victims of Ethiopian oppression. Supporting Ethiopia entailed regional risks, for Egypt and the Sudan strenuously objected to Soviet intervention. The former announced a suspension of payments to Moscow on its huge outstanding debt. The latter proceeded to oust all the Soviets from the country, disrupting relations on every level. Impoverished South Yemen, an old recipient of Soviet aid and scheduled soon also to become "Marxist," remained the only country in the region capable of offering port facilities to the Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Much more disturbing to the Soviets and infinitely more complicated were the developments in Southeast Asia, closely connected with the state of Soviet-Chinese relations. The latter showed no signs of improvement after Mao's death in 1976; on the contrary, the new leaders in Peking began aggressively to cultivate close political and trade relations with Japan, capitalizing on its anti-Soviet posture, and throughout 1977 minor, but nevertheless worrisome, incidents took place along the Soviet-Chinese border, emphasizing the continuous tension.
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simultaneous worsening of relations between Peking and Hanoi represented an altogether difficult problem for Moscow. Vietnam, by now with a firmly "pro-Soviet" orientation—it joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in April—emerged as the principal Soviet ally, helping to put China on notice of the Soviet political presence south of its border. But Vietnam's near-desperate economic situation strained Soviet resources allocated for foreign aid and, worse still, in keeping with the tradition of its relations with Moscow, Hanoi stubbornly asserted the independence of its foreign policy decisions.

The key to Hanoi's strategy was a determination to dominate the old Indochina by creating a federation consisting of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (renamed Democratic Kampuchea). From the Soviet point of view, Laos was not a serious issue, although declaring this hopelessly backward country, at Hanoi's request, "socialist"—which solemn elevation Brezhnev announced in September—was hardly justified in terms of Marxist-Leninist prerequisites for such a status. Quite different was the situation with Kampuchea, ruled by a murderous Pol Pot regime which was closely allied with Peking and receiving generous Chinese assistance. From the Soviet standpoint, reinforcing Vietnam vis-a-vis China was one thing; to risk becoming embroiled with China over the expansionist Vietnamese moves against Kampuchea, with a distinct possibility of a Chinese-Vietnamese military confrontation, was something else.

With their powerful aversion to "the tail wagging the dog" situations, the Soviets for a while searched for ways of controlling Hanoi's ambitions. They tried to bring about Vietnam's reconciliation with the United States which could moderate Hanoi's militancy, or serve to deter a probable Chinese retaliation if Vietnam proceeded with plans to attack Kampuchea. But the United States displayed no interest in recognizing the Vietnamese Government; US policies in Southeast Asia for all intents and purposes were rapidly becoming subject to Peking's veto. With the deterioration of Soviet-American relations and, particularly, with the growing signs that a US-Chinese entente was in the making, Moscow's attitude toward Hanoi began to change. It, in effect, became resigned to the prospect of conflagration in Southeast Asia, rationalizing that an Indochina federation dominated by Hanoi and the loss to China of its client state of Kampuchea would be beneficial to Soviet geopolitical and strategic interests, therefore justifying higher costs and risks.

Of all the setbacks and reverses of 1977, which the Soviet leaders gloomily surveyed at the end of the year, none was as damaging to the superpower status of the Soviet Union as the one dealt to it in the Middle East. As a co-chairman of the UN-sponsored Geneva
Conference, convened in 1973, and entrusted to effect an overall political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union could claim to be on a par with the United States, another co-chairman. Initially disregarding the conference because of Israeli objections, the United States changed its position because of a growing dependence on Arab oil and concern about the political effects of systematic Israeli "retaliation strikes" against Palestinian camps in Lebanon. The Carter administration decided that the still considerable prestige of the Soviet Union in several Arab states and with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) could be employed in bringing the warring parties to negotiations.

The Soviets, who had been frozen out of Middle East conflict management by Kissinger's diplomacy, were delighted to oblige. After preliminary talks, Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko issued, in October 1977, a joint communique calling upon the Geneva Conference to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 in regard to the territories seized by Israel in 1967, and to guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The specter of a Soviet-American condominium, feared not only by Israel but also by Egypt, whose relations with the Soviets were at an all-time low, produced an unexpected development. It took the form of a dramatic Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, capped by President Sadat's triumphant journey to Jerusalem in December. His bilateral accord with Prime Minister Begin evoked a fury of indignation in the Arab world and the Soviets were enraged. But Sadat stood fast. Angrily responding to charges of betrayal of the Arab cause, he broke relations with five Arab states. He also declared that Egypt would not pay its debt to the Soviet Union and evicted scores of representatives of Warsaw Pact countries who had been manning various "cultural centers" in Egypt.

The sudden realignment in the Middle East and the emergence of an anti-Sadat coalition, soon joined even by arch-conservative Saudi Arabia, were of small consolation to the Soviets. The Arab states, fully integrated in the international capitalist system, displayed no interest in appealing to Moscow for help or in employing the "oil weapon." Saudi Arabia cut its huge subsidy to Egypt, forcing the United States to pick up the tab, but otherwise the Arabs had to face the reality of an emerging unbeatable Egyptian-Israeli coalition backed by the United States. From the Soviet viewpoint, this eliminated for the foreseeable future not only the possibility of another Middle East war, the threat of which accounting for much of the Soviets' political leverage among the Arabs, but also the American need for Soviet cooperation in reaching an overall political settlement in the region. The net result of the cleverly executed Sadat maneuver was the denial to the Soviet Union of its superpower role.
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leaving the United States as the only arbiter potentially capable of adjudicating the Middle East conflict.

The damage to Soviet prestige was irreparable. The evident impotence of the Soviet Union accelerated adverse trends in its relations with Iraq, theretofore heavily dependent on Soviet weapons and equipment for its armed forces; another crackdown on Iraqi Communists soon followed. The less affluent Syria went through another arms deal with Moscow in January 1978, but resentful of Soviet criticism of its policing of Lebanon, it moved closer to other Arab states and even attempted to patch up its traditionally bad relations with Iraq. But although the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement foreshadowed further assertion by OPEC states of their power to inflict economic damage on the West, the basic political weakness of the Soviet Union was underscored for all to see. Needless to say, the unhappy Soviet leaders ascribed their plight to sinister American plotting.

With the debunking of the Geneva Conference and the Soviet role in it, the only remaining symbol of equality with the United States was the Soviet nuclear arsenal; the only remaining underpinning of detente, SALT II. But as the year of 1977 drew to a close, a massive campaign against SALT was launched in the United States by the elements for whom any notion of parity with the Soviets was unbearable. Initially, this campaign did not disturb Moscow’s leaders too much; they felt that at least in this field they held high cards and that the Carter administration recognized it. But the prospect of a SALT II agreement was clearly insufficient as a foundation of detente, assuring the primacy of relations with the Soviet Union for the United States. A reappraisal of the Soviet international strategy was clearly called for.

Rearranging Priorities

Changes and even modifications of international political strategies do not take place overnight, particularly in governments encumbered by huge and slow-moving bureaucracies with many branches having diverse and often conflicting interests. The centralized Soviet system theoretically gives the Politburo the power to move Soviet policies in any direction at will. In actual practice, the process of arriving at major decisions is very cumbersome, involving feasibility studies, developing of options and projections, committee discussions, and interagency negotiations. Ministries and the Council of Ministers, CC CPSU departments, and the Secretariat must consider all aspects of a policy change prior to presentation of the matter to the Politburo. Those individuals and agencies opposing a change in policy voice their argu-
ments, suggesting remedies, and alternative courses of action. Those who favor the change bear the burden of assuring the Politburo that the machinery of government would be able to implement the new policy, that the necessary human and material resources are available. And in any but routine foreign policy matters, the external consequences of the proposed change must be assessed, the likely reactions of other governments evaluated, and expected gains weighed against possible losses. The Soviets know very well that the conduct of foreign affairs requires give-and-take; that not even a client regime is fully responsive to Moscow’s wishes or necessarily capable of effectively governing its own country; and that unless the necessity for change is self-evident, it is usually better to avoid posturing and rocking the boat. Thus Moscow’s preference is for a gradual modification of policy rather than for a dramatic turnaround, and for extended advance consultations with the interested friendly governments whose political support is deemed desirable. Only after all the preliminary work is done and the Politburo decision has been made does the policy begin to take shape and formal statements signal to the world that a new Soviet move is under way.

Apprehensive of losing their assets and opportunities, the Soviets rarely show their hand in advance. Long after they had become disillusioned with detente with the United States, they maintained an officially upbeat posture as they tried to salvage detente relations with Western Europe and Japan whose policies, as the Soviets knew, were coordinated with Washington. An openly hostile anti-American posture, as experience has demonstrated, tends to prompt the allies to close ranks. Therefore, maintaining the image of reasonableness and taking advantage of the differences and conflicts in the Western camp, Moscow regards as a practical necessity.

The rapidly multiplying signs of American hostility were already affecting Soviet perceptions in major ways. No one in Moscow counted on material expansion of the detente relationship, only recently seen as being of paramount significance for both superpowers. The task now appeared to be to salvage as much as possible of what had been achieved; the only movement forward the Soviets could expect was the SALT II negotiations which, upon conclusion, could hopefully help to reverse the trend. But while keeping the negotiations going, the Carter administration seemed increasingly bent on international confrontation suggesting to the more pessimistic Moscow observers that another American crusade against the Soviet Union was in the making. To be sure there was no fear in Moscow of another hostile encirclement, reminiscent of the Cold War days. American power and influence, although still formidable, the Soviets saw as declining but their own, in
spite of many reverses, as having grown considerably in the intervening
years. Nevertheless, the mood in the United States was becoming more
militant, promising more attempts to damage Soviet interests, and re-
quiring the Kremlin to expend more energies and resources in order
to maintain its newly gained position. The short-lived relaxation gone,
the Soviet strategic posture toward the late 1970s turned distinctly
defensive, reflecting the increased external and internal security con-
cerns of the leadership. Signs of the renewed vigilance were unmis-
takable.

The most serious threat to Soviet gains appeared in Europe, tra-
ditionally the “central front” to Soviet strategies. The near-readiness of
NATO governments to accept the American offer to produce the neutron
bomb, and their voting for year-to-year three percent defense budget
increases in April 1978, were seen as symptomatic and highly disturb-
ing. Very upsetting was the violent reaction in Europe to the Angolan
invasion of Zaire’s Shaba province, for which Cuba and the Soviet
Union were roundly denounced even though they had nothing to do
with it. At least by implication, the Soviet Union was also blamed for
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and for the mass exodus of
refugees from Indochina. United States inspired scare stories about the
Soviet military build-up became standard fare in the European press.
In all, the Spirit of Helsinki, which the Soviets had worked so hard to
create, appeared to be disintegrating.

Unlike in Europe, where the Soviets felt that the new trend en-
dangered their political and economic positions, with war talk being only
one manifestation of the spreading hostility; the Chinese threat in Asia
they saw as military, distinctly long-term, and controllable by their su-
peror might. But while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by itself
was in no position to damage Soviet interests directly, its rapproche-
ment with the United States and Japan—on a clearly anti-Soviet basis—
was an altogether different matter. National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s boisterous invitation to China to join forces against the
Soviet Union during his visit to China in May-June 1978, followed in
succession by the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship with the anti-Soviet “hegemony clause”; by the provocative
pilgrimage of Chairman Hua to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran; and by
the US–PRC “normalization” of relations later in the year, were all
pointing to the formation of a dangerous coalition in which aggressive
Peking, rather than Washington, appeared to play first fiddle. To the
more nervous Muscovites it looked as if the Soviet Union was again,
as in the late 1950s, getting boxed in between two hostile power centers.
with the enormous difference that this time China was part of the enemy camp.

There were other adverse developments throughout 1978. The United States kept pumping huge amounts of advanced weapons into Iran and the Middle East, and resumed military aid to Turkey; Ethiopia’s counteroffensive in Ogaden provoked stern United States “warnings” not to push Somalia too hard—and new denunciations of the Cuban mercenaries. The tension was growing on the Sino-Vietnamese border. Agitation in the United States against the yet unsigned SALT II agreements was getting into high gear. These developments were seen in Moscow as further manifestations of a serious deterioration in the Soviet Union’s strategic posture.

It would be fruitless to try to detect what, specifically, the Soviets did in the late 1970s in reaction to adverse developments abroad, if only because we have no way of knowing what they would have done under different circumstances. Modernization of the economy, chronically ailing: imports of large amounts of grain, to upgrade the diet of the populace: further modernization of the Red Army arsenal and research in new weapons systems: or even more noticeable movements of Soviet naval vessels in the Pacific and the Mediterranean—all of which may or may not have been related to the perceived erosion of the Soviet strategic position.

More to the point was the new attention given to the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO), whose cohesiveness had deteriorated considerably during the euphoric detente years. If the Soviets had hoped to reduce their contributions to their militarily near-worthless and economically burdensome allies, the new situation dictated the need to court and cajole them. This proved to be a hard task. Although the renewed trend toward international polarization made it imperative for East European regimes to rally to the Soviet flag, few of them were happy about doing so, for it meant parting with hopes for expanded trade and cultural contacts with the West and for a higher degree of independence from Moscow. Some, notably Romania, Poland, and to a lesser extent Hungary, resisted Soviet pressure to devote more of their meager resources to defense: they also tried to preserve their newly-acquired international connections. But they understood that in the final analysis they had no choice, for there were no viable alternatives to remaining in the WPO and the CMEA, to Soviet-supplied oil, gas, and raw materials at prices below those of the world market, to Soviet weapons, and to the Soviet market for most of their exports.

One difficult decision the Soviets reluctantly made was to increase their support of the recalcitrant Vietnamese, an increasingly valuable
ally who could be counted upon in containing China. The potential political and strategic price the Soviets had to pay for the advantage of having Vietnam on their side was high: Moscow had to acquiesce in Hanoi's expansionist drive to dominate Laos and Cambodia and reckon with the possibility of being forced to come to Vietnam's rescue in case of its armed confrontation with China. The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, concluded in November 1978, immediately preceded the major Vietnamese offensive in Cambodia—and coincided with normalization of US-China relations.

On the politico-strategic level, the Soviets had to define their international commitments, deciding where to draw the line and which positions to hold. The fundamental principle of irreversibility of the socialist revolution obviously had to be upheld: it alone could assure a degree of loyalty of other Communist regimes. This meant a virtually open-ended commitment to the preservation of socialism in the WPO countries, and, less clearly, in Yugoslavia, with a similar commitment extended to Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and, since September 1977, to Laos. Cambodia, not without hesitation, was admitted to the "socialist community" only in December 1979, with at least an implication of automatic Soviet protection against hostile encroachments.

The commitment to preservation of socialism in individual countries which had attained this status was less rooted in ideology than in the perceived necessity to uphold an international political system over which the Soviet Union presided. To let one country go meant endangering the whole edifice and inviting other dominoes to fall. Sometimes defections from the system could not be prevented, as with Yugoslavia, Albania, and China; sometimes they were, as with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On the propaganda level, the Soviets made a point that even the defectors from the system remained socialist in their internal structure, thus not reversing the favorable trend in the "correlation of forces."

The self-declared "Marxist" regimes with close connections to Moscow represented the second group in Soviet strategic assets and liabilities, and as of 1977 consisted of Angola, the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Syria. Afghanistan joined this group in April 1978 shortly after its revolution; South Yemen joined in June 1978, after a bloody coup which had effectively ended its nonaligned status. By no means "socialist" by Moscow's definition, these regimes were assumed to be moving in the right direction, therefore entitled to Soviet economic and military aid, political support, and protection against possible "imperialist" encroachments. In relations with the countries belonging to this group the Soviets maintained flexibility, determining the extent of
their support according to specific situations and resources available, taking advantage of available opportunities, and cautiously guarding against possible reverses of which there had been too many. Then there was a group of friendly countries with external interests and ambitions partially overlapping those of the Soviets, such as Libya and Iraq, which, although dependent on the Soviet Union for supplies of weapons and political support, were otherwise independent. Finally there were major trade partners—West Germany, France, Italy, Japan—which policies toward the Soviet Union tended to be moderated by economic as well as geopolitical considerations. Thus, in spite of the precipitous deterioration of relations with the United States, the Soviet international position was a great deal better than during the Cold War years. Needless to say, although no longer exploited for the purposes of crude political intimidation, the Soviet nuclear and conventional military might weighed, in places heavily, upon policy considerations of other governments, adding to the attractiveness of non-alignment. And there were still other forces in the world—such as oil-producing Arab nations—which in spite of their staunch anti-communism, appreciated the military standoff between the two superpowers because it limited American options in extracting from them political and economic concessions.

**Crises of 1979**

The state visit of China's Vice-Premier Deng-Xiaoping to the United States in January was followed shortly thereafter by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, assumed in Moscow to have been encouraged by Carter and Brzezinski. The invasion, although anticipated, caused a great deal of alarm, the Soviets uneasily calculating at what point they might be forced to come to the rescue of their ally. The war turned out a draw—the Chinese pulled out in March—but there was no way of knowing whether or not the attack would be repeated. The Soviets made menacing statements, conducted maneuvers on land and sea, and dispatched more supplies to Vietnam. Hanoi projected self-confidence (and presumably turned down the Soviet request for port facilities at Camranh Bay), but so did Peking, and tensions remained high.

Concurrently with the PRC attack on Vietnam, a revolution broke out in Iran. The Shah fled in January and his regime, which so recently had appeared as a tower of strength, disintegrated within months. The collapse of the Guardian of the Persian Gulf greatly impressed the Soviets. Hopes were privately expressed in Moscow that having been taught a lesson in humility—the biggest since the Vietnam war—the
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United States would acquire a more conciliatory mood and be more amenable to recognizing its strategic parity with the Soviet Union. The symbol of this recognition, the SALT II agreements, were signed in Vienna in June. They were enthusiastically hailed in the Soviet Union (and praised by America's European allies), but distinctly failed to evoke approval among the Americans who by then had already been conditioned to see in SALT II a mark of decline in American power. The spectacular developments in Iran only made matters worse. The attempts to blame the Iranian revolution on the "leftists" and on the inflammatory broadcasts of the Tudeh radio station in Baku soon indicated to the Soviets that detente was probably beyond salvation and that in the nationalistic resurrection of the American public the post-Vietnam syndrome was rapidly dissolving.

From their viewpoint, the Soviets could not see the spreading anarchy in Iran as beneficial to their interests. Islamic fundamentalism showed every sign of hostility toward communism and the Soviet Union. The KGB feared that the religious and political agitation south of the border might prove to be contagious to the Muslim population in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The disruption of natural gas deliveries caused considerable economic dislocations in the Caucasus. When in September Carter suddenly raised the issue of the "Soviet Brigade" in Cuba and a new wave of anti-Soviet agitation swept the United States, SALT II could safely be pronounced stillborn. War talk, accompanied by a dispatch of a sizeable naval force into the Indian Ocean and by a feverish search for military bases, made Moscow strategists ponder over possible responses in case of an American military intervention. As a warning of their determination to maintain their presence in the region, the Soviets concluded, in October, a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with South Yemen, thus formally committing themselves to the support and protection of its present regime.

**Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan**

The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was influenced by a number of factors: the cumulative effect of deterioration of detente, culminating in December 1979 in NATO's acceptance of the American offer to supply it with 600 missiles to be targeted on the Soviet Union, which act eliminated much of the Soviets' self-restraint; the uproar in the United States caused by the seizure of hostages in the American Embassy in Teheran and the anticipation of US military action in Iran which could greatly aggravate the situation in Afghanistan; the relative calm in Southeast Asia following Vietnam's victory over the Pol Pot
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regime in Cambodia; the expected return to power in India of Indira Gandhi, an old friend; and, of course primarily and overwhelmingly, the developments in Afghanistan itself. Although the Chinese and American not-so-covert actions carried out of Pakistan, as well as the support some rebels in the western provinces received from Iran, doubtless contributed to Soviet apprehensions, there is no reason to believe that the Afghan crisis was regarded in Moscow other than as a local, isolated case which assumed international dimensions only after the application of military force.

The specifics of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, as a major provider of economic and military aid since the late 1950s, are sufficiently well known. Both under the monarchy and the subsequent Daoud regime, Afghanistan was a nonaligned country, which because of economic necessity and geography tilted toward Moscow. In a strategic sense, the Soviets valued Kabul’s tense relations with Pakistan, which was seen as a close ally of China; these tensions were caused by Daoud’s advocacy of independence for Peshawar, a Pakistan province, and Islamabad’s suspicions that Kabul was supporting the Baluch insurgency in the south. The Soviets were doubtless unhappy when, under the prodding of the Shah, Daoud made a truce with Pakistan in March 1978, but this unhappiness had nothing to do with Taraki’s revolution in Kabul one month later; the established Soviet preference in dealing with client states is to enhance their stability, not to create chaos. Moscow knew that Afghanistan was a barely governable country, with no national cohesion, held together by history and tradition and Kabul’s intricate dealings with the chiefs of assorted tribes of mountaineers and nomads. “Progressive elements” were few and far between, to be found among Afghan intellectuals and army officers trained in Soviet academies, and some civil servants. But even the “progressive elements” were highly nationalistic and not anxious to serve as obedient tools in the hands of Moscow.

The revolution, led by Taraki, initially evoked little enthusiasm in Moscow, although the new regime declared itself socialist and announced a series of progressive reforms. But as it displayed staying power, the Soviet attitude began to change and the flow of economic aid noticeably increased. Speaking in Baku in September, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union would do “everything necessary” to help advance the goals of the Afghan revolution; in December, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed.

Rendering assistance was one thing, controlling Kabul’s policies was something else, particularly since the regime was in the hands of Taraki’s militantly nationalistic Khalk faction which soon launched a
purge of the more moderate and Moscow-oriented Parcham group, headed by Babrak Karmal. By the end of the summer, hundreds of Parcham leaders and army officers were evacuated to the Soviet Union or sent to diplomatic missions abroad; others were simply arrested; and Taraki proceeded with the implementation of his program. However, the regime's reforms and especially its attempt to extend its effective power to far corners of the country quickly encountered fierce resistance among ardent Muslim nationalists and the tribesmen who resented socialism in any form and cherished their independence. Application of military force only made matters worse. By the spring of 1979 a dozen of tribes were in a state of open rebellion, thousands of refugees were pouring into Pakistan, and hundreds of Soviet technicians and members of their families were massacred by enraged Afghan mobs who believed that Taraki's regime was installed by Moscow.

Having committed themselves to the support of the Afghan revolution chiefly because they had no other choice, the Soviets kept their grievances to themselves. They sent Taraki material assistance and more technicians, supplied the army with the weapons to fight insurrection, and lauded Taraki's reforms in the Soviet press, but could not control the course of the revolution. After Taraki appointed Amin in March 1979 to the post of Prime Minister, revolutionary terror intensified. At the same time the governmental structure continued to disintegrate and desertions from the army acquired ominous dimensions. To make matters worse, Afghan refugees, armed and organized in Pakistan by specialists of hostile intelligence services, were returning to join the rebels.

Of particular and growing concern to the Soviets was the Tajik tribe rebellion in the adjacent province of Badakshan and in Afghanistan's Kunar Valley. The Chinese appeared to be heavily involved in the revolt, and Amin was suspected of duplicity and unwillingness to suppress the rebellion. On the one hand Amin had been requesting more Soviet military aid, but on the other was conducting secret negotiations with President Zia of Pakistan, which had been actively aiding and encouraging the insurgents. In all, the Soviets saw a sinister foreign plot to administer a coup de grace to their controlling influence in Afghanistan.

Responding to the pleas of the tottering regime, the Soviets sent high-ranking military experts to Kabul to help direct operations against the insurgents: military advisers and technicians, to assist the troops; and several Soviet army units, to guard strategic points. The appearance of foreign troops seems only to have stiffened resistance to the regime and may have triggered another crisis in Kabul. In September,
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Amin staged a bloody coup against President Taraki, further reducing the already miniscule political base of the regime.

We do not know exactly what conclusions the Soviet military and political experts in Afghanistan presented to the Soviet leadership but the gist of them can be guessed. The country was in a state of chaos, the government did not govern, the army was falling apart, and nothing short of a change of regime and a massive military intervention on a scale similar to that which the Soviet Union resorted to in Czechoslovakia could possibly restore order in the country. A total collapse of the regime would mean that counter-revolutionary forces, inimical to the Soviet Union and likely to be tools in the hands of Chinese-American-Pakistani agents, would take over Afghanistan.

Such conclusions called for a decision. Theoretically, if the situation in Afghanistan could be isolated, if detente were operative and no external hostile forces tried to worsen matters, the Soviets could conceivably cut the losses and disengage in Afghanistan under some kind of neutralization arrangement with the major regional powers and the United States. But these conditions did not obtain; the Chinese and the Americans appeared to be determined to aggravate the situation, and a threat of US military action in Iran injected an additional element of uncertainty into the turbulent region.

Thus, as matters stood, a diplomatic solution of the Afghan crisis was ruled out. The ultimate decision to intervene by a massive infusion of Soviet troops and to replace the Amin regime with the trusted and obedient Karmal group was determined by the following considerations:

-The need to preserve Afghanistan as a Soviet protectorate which the Soviet leaders already regarded as such because they had heavily invested their prestige and treasure in that country. To lose Afghanistan to hostile forces would have also meant that the Soviet Union and its allies would at least on the map be encircled by assorted enemies, from Japan to Norway.

-The need to draw the line beyond which the Soviet Union would not retreat. After all the setbacks of the preceding years and in view of the mounting NATO and Sino-Japanese-American threat, to abandon Afghanistan appeared impossible.

-The need to uphold the Soviet commitment to a government claiming to be socialist, the commitment central to the Soviet claim to leadership in the world socialist system. To let Afghanistan fall into hostile hands would undermine the credibility of Soviet protection in the eyes of other socialist regimes and Communists in general, opening a possibility of falling dominoes.

-The need to maintain presence in the region. Along with Ethiopia and South Yemen, Afghanistan was a country of substantial strategic value—and Russia’s immediate neighbor. To let it go, especially in view of the American military build-up, would auto-
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matically mean a weakening of the Soviet’s regional status and a corresponding decline of Soviet influence in the Middle East and South Asia.

There were, to be sure, considerations to the contrary. Nobody in Moscow could hope that pacification of Afghanistan would be accomplished quickly; it was not Hungary or Czechoslovakia where some pro-Soviet elements existed along with a functioning government/party structure and where no serious resistance to Soviet military forces was expected. The outcry in the West was expected to be great, although no one anticipated the political need of President Carter to project a “tough” image, a need which resulted in a volley of “sanctions” and “embargoes” and led to a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. More optimistic observers in Moscow remembered that President Johnson had barely reacted to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, partly because of the United States own interventions in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. The Soviets also expected protests from Western Europe and from nonaligned nations, but these were seen as much less consequential than the preservation of a strategically important piece of real estate. As to the reaction in the Middle East, the most important consideration for the Arab states, in the Soviet view, was to avoid being drawn into a superpower confrontation—which was likely to work against the United States no less than against the Soviet Union. It was important to reassure Iran—the Soviets vetoed the UN Security Council resolution calling for sanctions against Iran—and India; Delhi’s pressure on Pakistan could help to induce Zia to keep hands off Afghanistan. Fundamentally, however, Moscow was prepared to face the consequences of its action.

Implications for US National Security

Strategic assessments of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, drawn thus far in Washington, seem to share one common characteristic: namely, that we are witnessing a new projection of Soviet power into a potentially volatile region of vital importance to the West. Iran and Pakistan have been declared outflanked—if not actually facing a Soviet invasion—and the Soviet Union is assumed to be on the verge of fulfilling “Russia’s age-old dream” of establishing a “warm-water port” on the shores of the Indian Ocean, from which it would be in a position to interdict Western oil supplies. On the basis of such assessments, the Carter administration has declared a series of punitive measures, presumably devised to force the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, and has undertaken steps to enhance the US military
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posture in the region as well as to rally our allies to the cause of resisting Soviet aggression.

I find these strategic assessments less than convincing for the simple reason that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is in itself a manifestation of weakness, rather than strength: the troops were sent there to prop up a rapidly disintegrating and exceedingly unpopular regime, with no prospect of achieving stability and security in the foreseeable future. I don’t know what an “outflanking” of such sizeable countries as Iran or Pakistan means, and there is no shred of evidence that the Soviets contemplate the conquest of those countries, now or in the future. “Russia’s age-old dream” of establishing a port of its own on the shores of the Indian Ocean has never existed except in the imagination of British Tories in the days of the Empire. The idea that the Soviets were entitled to a “warm-water port” was advanced by Hitler to Molotov in November 1940, and by Roosevelt to Stalin three years later at the Teheran Conference, but was not embraced by the Soviet Government on either occasion. As to the interdiction of the flow of oil supplies, which the Soviets have technically been able to do even before the intervention in Afghanistan, it goes without saying that such an action would be tantamount to war, most likely leading to a nuclear war, and should be considered in that context.

The Carter administration felt it had no choice but to react to the Soviet move and to supplement its vocal condemnation of the violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty by more tangible measures, to drive home to the Soviet leaders that such adventures can be costly. But many of the measures taken subsequently had primarily a nuisance value and were disapproved by US allies, strongly disinclined to return to the implacable East-West hostility of the Cold War era. It can also be said that the experience of the last decades has amply demonstrated that nations disregard international law and public opinion whenever they feel their national security threatened, and the Soviets are no exception. In addition—not unexpectedly—the Soviets vehemently reject the claim of the United States that it is its duty to maintain order in the world, or that the West has an exclusive right to Middle East oil supplies.

This returns us to the specific situation in Afghanistan where the real “punishment” to the Soviets is likely to be administered. I regard it as self-evident that Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan until a viable government, unquestionably friendly to Moscow, emerges in Kabul. This will take many years of costly and painful effort, causing a drain on Soviet human and material resources and tense relations with many governments formerly friendly to the Soviet Union, not excluding some Warsaw Pact allies. The only benefit the Soviets can
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count on would be a genuine neutralization of Pakistan which cannot sustain, with or without US and Chinese assistance, a posture of hostility toward India and the Soviet Union simultaneously. Zia must also reckon with the possibility of a Pakistani ayatollah challenging his shaky military regime, and of a tribal rebellion which the Soviets might be in a position to foment and exploit. Iran, in its present inflamed state of ongoing Islamic revolution, is likely to remain fundamentally immune to external manipulations; any attempt to apply military pressure on it will backfire against either superpower and probably have repercussions throughout the Moslem world.

The absence of a master plan for a Soviet expansion in the Gulf area does not of course mean that Moscow will not take advantage of opportunities if such present themselves, provided that they would be both low-cost and low-risk. This may change in five or ten years if the Soviets succeed in substantially strengthening their position in Afghanistan.

Although the Afghan venture does not represent a major shift in Soviet international strategy which has been based on taking advantage of Western vulnerabilities and exploiting internal socio-political conflicts in unstable countries with a potential of contributing to a further change in the "correlation of forces" in the world, it does reflect qualitatively new thinking in the Kremlin. On the one hand, the Soviets are determined to practice selective detente: the collapse of relations with the United States has not resulted in giving up the cultivation of good relations with other states, including American allies. On the other hand, there is a new determination not to yield to external pressures in conducting active policies in third areas, including those of vital significance to the West. Under conditions of detente, the Soviets may abstain from fishing in troubled waters, if only out of the need to demonstrate their cooperation and avoid creating chaotic conditions which they detest. But no "punishments," and no demonstrations of US military might short of the presence of impressive ground and sea forces in a contested region are likely to deter the Soviets from exploiting anti-Western trends in the Third World if detente is replaced by open hostility. In any but a situation which credibly threatens to lead to war, the dimension of the nuclear arsenal of the United States is not going to have a measurable impact on Soviet foreign policy decisions.

The Afghan venture is doubtless a departure from previous Soviet practices in that it reflects Moscow's readiness to accept unprecedentedly high costs for attaining its objectives. Although not dissimilar from the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in basic intent, this venture indicates that the Soviets appear ready to live with a drawn-
out military involvement and to put up with widespread international resentment. This readiness indicates at least a partial abandonment of the politically expedient low profile—and a greater reliance on the Soviet Union's own power. Forced to choose between marring its international image and the loss of a strategically important client-state, Moscow—probably not without hesitation—chose the first. Even if the invasion of Afghanistan remains an isolated episode, sheer prudence requires us to see in it a precedent for the future, and be alert in forestalling such moves wherever possible.

At the same time, it will serve no good purpose to suggest a basic reappraisal of United States foreign policy, to counter the new tactics the Soviets employed in the Afghan episode. A simple examination of the map will show that should the Soviets want to use similar means to prop up another "socialist" regime, say in South Yemen or Ethiopia, they would face formidable logistic handicaps. As to the chances for a "socialist" regime emerging in Iran, these should be judged minimal if the West treats the Iranian upheaval with patience and prudence.

Finally, it ought to be emphasized that for the United States to embark on a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in the absence of the readiness to go to war is folly. Even if both superpowers could be counted upon to stop short of pressing the red button, confrontations of this sort disrupt the fabric of international relations, endanger political and economic ties among nations, and put enormous strain on established alliances. The rivalry of the superpowers is bound to continue, each scoring a success here, suffering a failure there. But there is a decided oversupply of trouble spots in the world and it may be wise for us to define our national security interests more narrowly, limiting our concerns to the areas of major economic and strategic importance to the United States and developing a sustained policy for keeping these areas stable and prosperous. Our omnipotence, if it has ever existed, belongs to the past. Recent history also shows that Soviet international activism has not borne the fruits Moscow has been seeking, and probably has depleted, rather than added to, Soviet power. Moscow's mischievous claims that every leftist victory in a country—no matter how backward and insignificant to the well-being of the West—signifies a further shift in the "correlation of forces" in the world ought to be ignored. We must stop imitating the Soviets and learn to control our urge to rush military aid to every shaky regime which happens to be challenged by an internal opposition, only out of fear that "our guys" may be losing. If such aid arrests the ongoing political change at all, it usually amounts to no more than a temporary stopgap. And a careful examination of the record of the 1960s and 1970s convincingly proves, that our "losses"
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were not necessarily Soviet "gains" and that many of their apparent gains were short-lived.

In spite of the present state of US-Soviet hostility, the bipolarity in world affairs cannot be re-enacted in the 1980s. There are too many nations determined to stay outside the bloc alignments, and too many allies on each side unwilling to face heightened tensions and a risk of war for reasons not sufficiently valid to them. Without a devout following, neither superpower can simultaneously challenge the other, manage regional conflicts, or even constructively influence internal developments in small countries.

The need for the world to function in an orderly fashion and for nations to live in peace and relative prosperity is obvious. The continuing decline of the superpowers' capacity to preserve order even in their own claimed spheres suggests a rationale for their developing a modicum of cooperation with each other and a resumption of the dialogue interrupted by Carter's violent reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Picking up the pieces in the emotion-charged atmosphere will not be easy; the suspended ratification of the SALT II agreements provides the only link with the earlier period of detente. But pragmatic necessities, pressures from unhappy allies on both sides, and the high cost of confrontation may yet bring about a degree of normalization in US-Soviet relations, hopefully not accompanied by excessive expectations and demands for "concessions," and not followed by a compulsive search for advantages at the expense of the other side.
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One of the more remarkable aspects of American policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the extent to which it has ceased to be a salient national issue since normalization was achieved in December 1978. Beginning in 1975 and 1976, and through the first two years of the Carter administration, America's China policy was a topic of relatively great national concern. The pace with which the United States should proceed toward normalization was a matter of sharp internal debate. The transfer of military-related technology to China was discussed vigorously inside the Government, as part of the process of drafting two Presidential Decision Memoranda concerned with the issue. A subject of even greater controversy was the terms on which Washington and Peking should establish formal diplomatic relations. Scholars and analysts across the country introduced a variety of formulas for normalization, ranging from proposals that the United States should adopt Peking's terms relatively unchanged (the so-called "Japanese formula"), to demands that Washington insist on maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taipei even as it recognized Peking (the "German formula").

Once it became clear, however, that Taiwan was not about to collapse because of the changes in American policy, and once the Congress adopted the Taiwan Relations Act in late March 1979, public debate over China policy came largely to an end. At the time of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to Peking in January 1980, admittedly, there was a flurry of discussion on the desirability of a stronger military and security relationship between the United States and China. But other issues, particularly Iran and Afghanistan, have assumed greater topical importance than our relations with China. Outside the Government, at least, Sino-American relations have become a subject of benign neglect.
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In part, this is healthy, for it simply reflects the fact that the relationship between the United States and China has been developing relatively smoothly since normalization. But it is also somewhat dangerous, for it is equally true that a number of crucial questions remain unresolved. We need, for example, to reach an agreement on controlling textile imports from China, conclude maritime and aviation agreements with Peking, develop a program of arms sales to Taiwan, decide whether to grant official aid and tariff preference to China, identify specific regional and global issues on which Sino-American dialogue might be productive, and decide whether to relax controls on the export of advanced technology to Peking. But resolving these issues depends on answering a more fundamental question: what kind of long-term relationship do we wish to create with China in the 1980s?

Before addressing this question, however, it might first be wise to review the events that led to the normalization of Sino-American relations in December 1978, and then to assess the major trends in US relations with China in the fifteen months since that time. Such an examination of the state of US-China relations can provide a basis for planning the future of our policy towards the People’s Republic of China.

The Path Toward Normalization

The announcement of normalization in December 1978 ended a long and difficult process of negotiation between China and the United States. Normalization—the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries—had been the formal policy of both governments since the Shanghai Communique of February 1972, signed at the end of Richard Nixon’s first visit to China. But despite agreement on this ultimate goal, it took almost seven years for the two countries to achieve it.

The reasons for the delay were, interestingly, similar on both sides of the Pacific. For one thing, both China and the United States were in political turmoil in the mid-1970s. In the United States, Watergate and its aftermath meant that neither the Nixon nor Ford administrations were able to undertake any potentially controversial initiatives toward China. And in China, the succession to Mao Zedong was producing considerable division and disorder within the highest levels of the leadership hierarchy. One issue appears to have been the wisdom of China’s overall policy of improving relations with the United States as a way of counterbalancing the Soviet Union. Because of the succession struggle, Chinese leaders responsible for foreign affairs may well have concluded that it would be politically dangerous to make the
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concessions necessary to reach agreement on normalizing relations with the United States.

Moreover, both countries saw other foreign policy issues as being more pressing than US-China relations. For Peking, the principal issue was China’s policy toward the Soviet Union, and its response to the rise of “appeasement” in the West. For the United States, at least after the inauguration of Jimmy Carter, a number of problems took priority over relations with China, particularly the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Panama Canal treaty, and relations with Africa and the Middle East.

Finally, the issue was a difficult one for the two countries to resolve. The Americans wanted to maintain ties with Taiwan—perhaps even a lesser form of official representation in Taipei—and to gain some assurance from Peking that force would not be used to gain control of the island. The Chinese, for their part, established three tough conditions for normalization: the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan; the withdrawal of all US Forces from the island; and the termination of diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei. At the same time, Peking insisted that the method by which it would “liberate” Taiwan was not of legitimate concern to the United States.

Despite these obstacles, the deadlock was finally broken in 1978. After the death of Mao and the purge of the “Gang of Four,” the Chinese were clearly interested in expanding economic and scientific ties with the United States—ties for which normalization would be a stimulus, if not a prerequisite. In addition, one can speculate that the growing conflict between China and Vietnam encouraged Chinese leaders to consolidate Sino-US relations so as to gain a freer hand in dealing with their obstreperous neighbor to the south. And, on the American side, there was increasing concern that Sino-American relations might deteriorate if normalization were not accomplished relatively soon, and the hope that improved relations with Peking would give the United States additional leverage over Moscow.

As a result of these considerations, the momentum in Sino-American relations was restored after Zbigniew Brzezinski’s visit to China in May 1978, which culminated in intense negotiations between Washington and Peking between September and December of the same year. Finally, on December 15 (December 16 in Peking), the two sides announced that they had reached agreement on the normalization of relations, and that they would establish formal diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979.
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The joint communique, separate unilateral statements, and comments by high-ranking leaders on both sides indicated that the United States had accepted China's three conditions for normalization, but had obtained important concessions on each point. First, Washington did agree to terminate its diplomatic relations with Taipei. But it was also made clear that, like the Japanese, the United States would continue informal relations with Taiwan, and would establish an “unofficial” instrumentality that would perform most of the functions of an embassy. Taiwan would be permitted to do the same in the United States.

Second, the United States agreed to terminate its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, after giving the one-year notice required in the text of the treaty. But Washington expressed its continuing interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, and announced its expectation that the issue would be resolved without the use of force. China did not acknowledge or accept the declaration, but did not contradict it.

Third, the United States agreed to withdraw its remaining forces from Taiwan, but simultaneously announced its intention to sell defensive arms to Taipei after a one-year hiatus. Peking objected strongly to this aspect of American policy, but said that disagreement on this point would not be permitted to prevent the achievement of normalization.

The Sino-American agreement of December 15-16 led to sharp debate within the United States. Some critics focused on procedural issues: the right of the President and his administration to end diplomatic relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan without the formal approval of Congress. Indeed, Senator Barry Goldwater and others filed formal suit against the President challenging his legal power to end the treaty unilaterally—a suit that ultimately was rejected by the Supreme Court, but only days before the treaty was scheduled to expire.

Other critics emphasized more substantive issues, complaining that the United States had given up too much and had received too little from Peking in return. This opposition was reflected in a number of amendments to the Taiwan Relations Act—amendments that the administration was forced to accept, but that Peking sharply criticized. The amendments went beyond the original agreement on normalization by stating that China's use of nonpeaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue would be of "grave concern" to the United States, that the United States would maintain the capacity to resist the use of force or coercion against Taiwan, and that the President must report any threat to the security of Taiwan to the Congress, so that it can determine an appropriate American response.
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Trends Since Normalization

Since December 1978, one of the most important aspects of Sino-American relations has been the series of steps by which the bilateral agreement on normalization has been fully implemented. One such step was the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act of March 1979, defining the new relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Other steps included the opening of embassies in Peking and Washington on 1 March 1979, the establishment of Chinese consulates in San Francisco and Houston; the opening of American consulates in Canton and Shanghai, the withdrawal of the remaining US Forces from Taiwan, and the termination of the defense treaty with Taipei on 1 January 1980.

In addition, however, Sino-American relations have experienced rapid development along four further dimensions since December 1978. First, the process of normalization has been extended from the diplomatic sphere to the economic realm. The December 1978 agreement concerned only the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the opening of embassies. It did not clear away what one State Department official has described as the "underbrush left by nearly thirty years of hostility that obstructed the development of economic relations between China and the United States.

Promoting economic normalization has been an important feature of Sino-American relations over the last fifteen months. Two agreements have played a particularly crucial role in this process. The first was an agreement on the blocked claims and frozen assets dating from the Korean War—a pact negotiated by Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal during his visit to Peking in late February and early March 1979, and then signed formally by Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps during her trip to China the following May. Under the agreement, Washington promised to unfreeze some $80.5 million of Chinese assets in the United States, and even to help the Chinese Government in locating the assets. In return, Peking agreed to pay to the US Government, for transfer to American claimants, an equivalent amount in installments over a five-year period. This gave Americans whose property was seized in China in the early 1950s a return of about forty cents on the dollar. In theory, it restored all frozen Chinese assets to their owners, but American specialists doubted whether the Chinese Government would actually be able to locate and repatriate all of the $80.5 million that the US Government had pledged to release.

Second, in July 1979, the two countries signed a formal three-year trade agreement, providing not only for MFN (most-favored-nation) sta-
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tus for China, but also for protection of American patents, trademarks, and copyrights; prevention of the disruption of American markets by Chinese exports; establishment of arbitration procedures and trade promotion mechanisms; and the expedition of visa formalities for Chinese and American businessmen. The agreement also makes it possible for the United States to provide China with Export-Import Bank credits and OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) guarantees. Initially, the administration was reluctant to present this trade agreement for congressional approval before it could also ask for MFN status for the Soviet Union. But, acting on the grounds that the Chinese had relaxed their emigration procedures sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and responding to sharp Chinese criticism, the administration finally submitted the trade agreement to Congress in October 1979. Any congressional opposition to treating China more favorably than the Soviet Union was overcome by the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the Trade Agreement was approved by both houses of Congress in January 1980.

Progress has been slower on other aspects of economic normalization. Consular, maritime, and aviation agreements have been under consideration for nearly a year, but without any final results. The maritime agreement has been delayed because of the American insistence on specifying a minimum proportion of trade to be carried on American ships. Similarly, the two sides have been unable to reach a civil aviation agreement because of the Chinese desire to provide landing rights to only one American airline, and the American insistence that such rights be given to more than one US carrier. Details remain to be negotiated on the agreements to provide China Export-Import Bank credits and OPIC guarantees, and both agreements will require congressional sanction. And the two sides failed to reach agreement on the limitation of Chinese textile exports to the United States, leading Washington to impose unilateral quotas on five kinds of Chinese merchandise in mid-1979. But the overall trend in 1979 was toward the normalization of economic, as well as diplomatic, relations between the two countries.

A second aspect of US-China relations over the past year has been to consolidate normalization by creating a complex network of relationships connecting the governments and societies of both countries. The second-ranking leaders of China and the United States—Deng Xiaoping and Walter Mondale—have visited each other's countries. Also, almost every US Cabinet officer and the officials of a number of independent Federal agencies have visited China with return visits by a number of Chinese vice-premiers and government ministers. The apparent goal is to forge links with as many parts of the Chinese bu-
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reapacracy as possible, in order to strengthen the Sino-American rela-
tionship by increasing the number of Chinese officials who have a direct
stake in it. One can speculate that there are leaders in Peking, like
Deng Xiaoping, who have been receptive to such an approach because
they, too, wish to increase the durability of their new relations with the
United States.

The broadening of Sino-American relations has extended far be-
yond the central governments of the two countries. A number of Amer-
ican states and Chinese provinces have traded delegations and estab-
lished a variety of ongoing exchanges. Similarly, the two countries have
created several "sister city" (or, to use the Chinese term, "friendship
city") relationships, including San Francisco and Shanghai, and New
York and Peking. American municipal officials are quickly learning that
the Chinese take these relationships seriously, and intend to use them
as a framework for facilitating commercial, cultural, and educational
exchanges between the United States and the People's Republic of
China.

Consequently, a host of connections have been forged between
private American firms and organizations and their Chinese counter-
parts. No longer do the major American national exchange organiza-
tions—the National Committee on US-China Relations and the Com-
mittee for Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of
China—monopolize cultural, scientific, and athletic contacts between
the United States and China. Indeed, it is now difficult for these two
organizations even to keep track of the exchanges organized and ad-
ministered by others. A number of public and private universities have
established ties with research institutes and universities in China, and
are exchanging students and scholars. And, of course, recent changes
in Chinese attitudes toward economic relations with foreign countries
have permitted American firms to develop a host of new relationships
with China, including coproduction, compensation trade, and Chinese
manufacture to American specifications, and even direct investment in
China.

All this has led to a great quantitative increase in almost every
dimension of the Sino-American relationship. Before normalization,
there were no American journalists permanently stationed in Peking;
now there are twelve. Before normalization, there were only a handful
of American students and scholars living in China; now there are about
three hundred. Some eleven hundred Chinese students and scholars
are now in the United States, almost half of whom come as private
individuals. Trade doubled in 1979 over 1978, from about $1 billion to
more than $2 billion. And 40,000 American tourists traveled to China
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in 1979, taking advantage of opportunities that, until very recently, were available to only the few.

A third aspect of Sino-American relations over the past year has been the clear willingness of the US Government to extend official aid to China's civilian economic development. This has involved a host of official agreements between the two governments, by which the United States has offered the assistance of virtually every Federal department in the economic and scientific modernization of China. According to the Chinese, fifteen such bilateral agreements had been signed by the end of 1979, in areas as diverse as meteorology, oceanography, medical research, education, culture, and hydroelectric power. These, of course, supplement earlier agreements signed by Presidential Science Adviser Frank Press in 1978. Two Cabinet-level commissions have been established to oversee economic relations and scientific and technological cooperation. And the administration has indicated its willingness to make China eligible for reimbursable government aid under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Fourth, the military and security relationship between China and the United States has developed much more rapidly since normalization than most observers would have predicted fifteen months ago. It is true, of course, that Sino-American relations have had an important security component from the very beginning. The initial Chinese interest in rapprochement with the United States was based on the belief that Washington could serve as a counterweight against the Soviet threat to the north. And the Ford administration undertook several actions designed to strengthen Sino-American relations by contributing, directly or indirectly, to Chinese military security. These actions included the approval of the sale of Spey jet engines to China in 1975, the sale of CYBER computers to Peking the following year, and the statement by Henry Kissinger in October 1976 that the United States would not look with disinterest on a Soviet attack against China.

It is also true that the Carter administration had, even before Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to China in January 1980, taken several steps which signaled a continued American interest in China's security. There was, first, the declaration by Zbigniew Brzezinski in May 1978 that the United States had an interest in a "strong and secure" China. There was also the announcement by Cyrus Vance in November 1978 that Washington would not object if its Western European Allies decided to sell weapons to Peking. And Walter Mondale moved the rhetorical relationship between the United States and the People's Republic one step further when, after his visit to China in August 1979, he declared that Sino-American ties had taken on a "maturity" and
"directness" comparable to those of the United States with its European Allies.

But the military and security relationship between China and the United States took a "leap forward" with Defense Secretary Brown's visit to China in January 1980. Originally, the visit had been described as a way of beginning arms control discussions with the Chinese, and of introducing Peking's leaders to the third of President Carter's principal national security advisers. However, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, the visit took on a different tone. The Secretary informed the Chinese that the United States was now ready to move "from passive to more active forms of security cooperation" with Peking, and that this would include "complementary" and "parallel" actions "in the field of defense as well as diplomacy." According to press accounts, Secretary Brown and his Chinese counterparts addressed ways of responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, including cooperation in supplying arms to Pakistan and possibly in providing assistance to Afghan insurgents resisting Russian troops.

Secretary Brown also conveyed the administration's willingness to sell advanced, dual-purpose technology to China on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, he announced that the United States would sell the Chinese a Landsat satellite ground station. Although the United States would ensure that the data sent to the ground station did not have military application, the station's equipment—including computers and taping equipment—could have military use. The Landsat sale was described by State Department officials as part of a new policy, under which Washington would be willing to sell dual-purpose technology to the Chinese as long as there were reasonable assurances that it would be used only for civilian purposes.

About two weeks after Secretary Brown left China, however, the administration announced a further loosening of export controls to Peking. A Pentagon press conference declared that the United States would now be willing to sell nonlethal equipment to China that clearly had military use, including trucks, communications equipment, and early-warning radar. Officials said that the list of acceptable exports might later be expanded to include transport aircraft and battlefield computers, and later announced that the United States would support a relaxation of COCOM restrictions on exports to China.

In short, then, Sino-American relations since December 1978 have moved rapidly along five dimensions:

—The two countries have now fully implemented the agreement on diplomatic normalization reached on December 15-16, 1978;
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—This diplomatic normalization has been complemented by the normalization of economic relations, now nearly complete;
—Normalization has been extended from the national governmental level to include the creation of a wide range of state-to-province, city-to-city, and private relationships;
—The United States Government has shown a substantial interest in actively assisting the civilian economic modernization of China;
—And Washington has moved closer, in both rhetoric and action, toward a military relationship with the Chinese.

The progress along these five dimensions has not always been smooth or easy. As mentioned, there has been opposition in the United States at several points—the criticism in Congress concerning the terms of normalization, the legal challenge to the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the Congress' initial reluctance to consider the trade agreement with China until it could extend MFN status to the Soviet Union, and some criticism of Secretary Brown's visit to China.

Also, there have been instances of disagreement between China and the United States over a number of specific issues. The Chinese have complained about the amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act. They have expressed concern that they will not be able to recover all their frozen assets in the United States. They have criticized the delay in the formal ratification of the Sino-American trade agreement. They have complained about the unilateral American imposition of textile quotas, and the continued application of COCOM and Export Control Act restrictions on the export of advanced technology to China. And, above all, they have criticized the resumption of American arms sales to Taiwan in January 1980.

For their part, US Government officials have had fewer complaints. But there have been difficulties in winning Chinese acceptance of certain academic exchanges proposed by the United States, and according to Leonard Woodcock, the Chinese have been slow in responding to requests to expand American Embassy facilities in Peking. Also, in December 1979, the Carter administration imposed travel restrictions on Chinese diplomats in the United States in retaliation for similar restrictions on American officials in China.

Nevertheless, both sides appear relatively pleased with the development of their relationship over the last fifteen months. Ambassador Woodcock has described Sino-American ties as being "on course." Harold Brown referred in Peking not only to the "convergence" of Chinese and American strategic interests, but also to the possibility that remaining differences could be "narrowed" through future negotiations. The Chinese, too, have been relatively enthusiastic. Their complaints, outlined above, have been muted. And Chinese commentaries point
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with satisfaction not only to the pace of development of bilateral ties, but also to what they see as signs of a more "enlightened" American approach to the Third World and a firmer policy of resistance to Soviet expansion.

A General Perspective on US-China Relations

The events since December 1978, then, add up to a China policy that goes far beyond "normalization," in even the broadest definition of the term. The question, of course, is whether this is what we want. What the administration has not yet fully articulated—but what is a crucial component of our foreign policy—is the long-term relationship that we seek to create with China in the 1980s. An assessment of this relationship depends not only on bilateral considerations, but also on the regional and global contexts in which our policy toward China must be placed.

In my view, the United States faces four fundamental options in this regard. They are not, I must emphasize, mutually exclusive. They can best be understood as a spectrum, ranging from distant to close, and from guarded to friendly. While the extremes are incompatible, it would be possible (and, indeed, desirable) for the United States to select combinations of two or three options that lie next to each other on the spectrum just described. The four options, in increasing order of friendliness, are to treat China:

1. As a potential adversary. Because of remaining differences in social systems, ideologies, and national interests, the United States could choose to have only a relatively cool relationship with China, avoiding any assistance to Chinese economic development, let alone any military cooperation with Peking. China would, under this option, be subject to the same restraints on trade and technology transfer that the United States imposes on the Soviet Union.

2. As a diplomatic colleague. Because of China's growing role in Asia and in international forums, the United States might actively seek to draw China into constructive dialogue on global and regional issues. We would not always expect to agree, but we might hope to narrow our differences so that solutions might be reached. In its pure form, this option would still not envision heavy American involvement in China's economic development, although the restrictions on trade that are inherent in the first option would be greatly relaxed.

3. As an economic partner. Because a prosperous and modern China is more likely to act in ways that parallel American interests than is a China that remains poor and backward, the United States might decide to provide substantial assistance, both material and technical, to the development of China's civilian economy.
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4. As a military ally (or quasi-ally). Because American and Chinese strategic interests have come increasingly to coincide, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the United States might decide to forge a closer military relationship with China. This might involve the transfer of intelligence, military technology, or arms to Peking. It might also involve the coordination of policy, in ways ranging from “parallel actions” in third areas, to joint military exercises, or even to a formal Sino-American alliance.

Our post-normalization China policy has clearly been a combination of options (2) and (3), with increasing movement in the direction of option (4). Is this combination a desirable one? What might be the most appropriate mix of these four options?

First of all, I think it wise that the United States has moved beyond normalization, and beyond the “cool and correct” relationship with China described in option (1). Chinese and American interests in Asia now do parallel each other in enough ways to warrant a relatively close relationship between Washington and Peking, despite the differences in social systems and national goals. Both countries seek to prevent Soviet hegemony over Asia as a whole, or Vietnamese domination over Southeast Asia. To this end, China and the United States agree on the desirability of a Japan that is secure and confident, a United States that remains actively involved in Asian affairs, and an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that is prosperous and stable.

The increasing convergence in Chinese and American national interests distinguishes Sino-American relations from Soviet-American relations, and argues against any artificial attempts to be “even-handed” or “balanced” in our dealings with Peking and Moscow. No one can object, in principle, to an improvement of our relations with both China and the Soviet Union. But it would be unfair and unrealistic to allow our problems with Moscow to hold back our consultation and civilian cooperation with the Chinese.

Moreover, to treat China as a potential adversary might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would remove China’s incentives to reduce its differences with the United States where the possibility of conflict still exists, as in Korea and Taiwan. Even more, it would increase Peking’s incentive to reach some kind of accommodation with the Soviet Union. To be sure, nothing we do can guarantee that we can avoid conflict with China or prevent a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. But we can act in ways that reduce the possibility that either development will occur.

Nor can there be much disagreement with the proposition that China should be treated, under option (2), as a major diplomatic colleague. Indeed, this is perhaps the least controversial of all the options.
under consideration here. It is already clear that a whole series of regional and global issues—from the situation in Korea to the international energy crisis—cannot be resolved without China's participation and support. And China's stake in, and influence over, such matters will only increase in the decade ahead, as China develops its economy and modernizes its armed forces.

For the remaining options, however, the balance sheet is much more mixed. As a result, options (3) and (4) deserve somewhat fuller consideration.

There are, for example, arguments that can be raised against actively assisting even in the civilian modernization of China. Some of these arguments concern the future role that Peking might play once its economy is more highly developed. It may be, for example, that Chinese goods would come to compete with American manufactures or with the exports of some of our Asian allies. It may also be that a more modern China would be a more assertive China that might act in ways that do not always parallel American interests.

While these dangers may be real, there is relatively little that the United States could do to prevent them. As Dwight H. Perkins of Harvard University has recently argued, China is likely to develop its industrial plant relatively rapidly in the 1980s, whether or not the United States chooses to help. What China is prevented from purchasing from American suppliers can be obtained relatively easily elsewhere.

Moreover, there are strong arguments that the United States has a positive interest in China's economic success. As Michel Oksenberg suggested, a poor and backward China could become an increasing drain on world food supplies, or even a destabilizing force in Asia. Thus the United States has both a humanitarian and a material interest in cooperative ventures that are of mutual economic benefit to both China and the United States. And a policy of partnership is more likely to enable us to resolve, through negotiation, whatever economic and diplomatic problems emerge than is a policy of economic aloofness.

As a practical matter, official US Government assistance to China will be limited. It would be wrong for Peking to receive a disproportionate share of our overall foreign aid budget. And Congress is unlikely to support an extensive aid program for China. Therefore, American involvement in China's modernization will come largely from the private sector, rather than from the Government.

Even so, there are grounds for caution in devising the specific tactics with which we become involved in China's modernization. These concerns are psychological and cultural, rather than economic or mil-
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itary. One of the lessons of the past hundred years has been that China and the West—and perhaps China and the United States in particular—have tended to form an explosive "pupil-missionary" relationship. The relationship operates in cyclical fashion, first pulling the two sides together and then driving them apart.

The Chinese, I would argue, have a deep-seated cultural inclination to look for models to emulate—models with whom they attempt to form a student-teacher, or a younger brother-older brother, relationship. (It was no accident, for example, that one of the most common Chinese slogans of the mid-1950s was the exhortation to "learn respectfully" from the experiences of China's "older brother," the Soviet Union.) Learning from the model is believed to provide the solutions for the economic, technical, and institutional problems of a backward China.

For our part, many Americans respond to such overtures with missionary-like enthusiasm. Convinced that we have the solutions to Chinese problems, we tend to insist that China adopt values, institutions, and technology that may not be fully appropriate to Chinese society. Relatively isolated from foreign experiences ourselves, we find it difficult to understand the profound historical and cultural differences between China and the United States.

The problem with this "pupil-missionary" relationship is that it is inherently unstable, largely because both parties enter into it with unrealizable expectations. The Chinese "pupil" expects panaceas, but finds that the "solutions" offered by the foreigner often provide one-sided benefits and are poorly suited to Chinese conditions. The American "missionary" expects gratitude, but finds that the reaction is more often ambivalence, uncertainty, and even anger. Both sides feel betrayed. And a relationship once characterized by eagerness and euphoria now serves to throw the two sides apart with great force.

Thus it is vital that, to the greatest extent possible, American involvement in China's economic affairs be appropriate to Chinese conditions, that it be within China's ability to absorb, that it be offered in a spirit of friendship and respect, and that the distribution of benefits be just and equitable. The Chinese, for their part, must be open to change, yet able to choose foreign technology selectively and to adapt it to their own conditions.

Fortunately, there are signs on both sides of the Pacific that such a relationship may be developing. The United States Government has taken care to describe its relations with China in such terms as "equality" and "mutual benefit," and has denied any intent to impose American solutions on Chinese problems. The Chinese have, since
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1977. expressed both their eagerness to study foreign experiences, and their insistence that it be done cautiously and critically. Nonetheless, it would take only a few dramatic failures for Sino-American relations to be severely damaged. It is difficult for the United States Government fully to control, or even monitor, the relationship, since the overwhelming majority of scientific and economic contacts are now in private hands. And the vast number of official agreements signed over the last several months represent pledges that the United States must still redeem.

Finally, let us consider the desirability of a more extensive military-strategic relationship with China—probably the most controversial of the four options facing the United States. Those who favor such an option make three principal arguments: first, that China is militarily weak, and is eager to purchase military equipment and technology from the West; second, that Chinese and Western interests are now essentially equivalent, and that Western military aid to China is therefore fully justified; and third, that Western assistance to China would help create a strong counterweight to an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. In the words of Justin Galen, writing in the *Armed Forces Journal International* in February 1979, "the flow of Western technology made possible by the shift in US-Chinese relations may strengthen PRC military capabilities to the point where the Soviet Union is increasingly forced to pursue a conservative, defensive, and detente-oriented strategy."

I am convinced, however, that such an argument is largely erroneous, and that a closer military relationship with China would, at this point at least, be premature. This is because the additional benefits of such a relationship are uncertain, while the risks are considerable.

First of all, a strong case can be made that the United States has already reaped whatever benefits are likely to flow from any strategic relationship with China that we might reasonably consider. The Sino-Soviet dispute has already forced Moscow to deploy substantial portions of its land, air, and strategic forces along its frontier with China, and in Mongolia. The improvement in Sino-American relations since the late 1960s has already reduced the probability of American involvement in an Asiatic war. Further military cooperation with China would reinforce these benefits, but would not significantly increase them.

This calculus might be different if China were so weak as to encourage a Soviet attack across its frontier. But the Sino-Soviet military balance, while unequal, is nonetheless relatively stable. A recent Pentagon study, leaked to the *New York Times*, reportedly indicated that China already has the capability to deny the Soviet Union any "decisive
victory" in a conventional war. Nor do the Chinese appear to fear, or expect, a Soviet attack. Since 1973, Peking's consistent position has been that Moscow is only "feinting in the East" to "attack in the West." More recent assessments of the global strategy of the Soviet Union add that Moscow is attempting to isolate Western Europe and Japan by seizing strategic points in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and that Moscow cannot deal militarily with China until Europe is first subdued.

Conversely, it is not clear what realistic program of American military assistance to China could significantly alter the Sino-Soviet strategic balance. The same Pentagon study referred to above is said to have concluded that it would require between $40 and $60 billion to give China a "confident capability" for defending itself completely against any Soviet attack. This sum is far beyond what either Washington or Peking could reasonably afford. And the technology and equipment involved would be far beyond what the Chinese People's Liberation Army could realistically absorb.

Therefore, if China is already relatively secure against a Soviet attack, and if China already ties down a substantial portion of Soviet forces, it is difficult to see what additional benefits would accrue to the United States from closer military ties with China. What are easier to identify are the risks that would be inherent in such a relationship.

First, there remain a number of regional conflicts where American and Chinese interests do not completely coincide. Taiwan is the most obvious case. But there are other examples as well. Recent signs of progress in the negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang notwithstanding, China and the United States remain tied to different sides on the Korean Peninsula. China and India have border disputes in which the United States might not wish to choose sides. And Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam are probably more hostile and less flexible than are those of the United States.

These differences in national interest and outlook would be less disturbing were it not for clear signs that the Chinese are willing to act on them forcefully. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in early 1979 showed not only that Peking was willing to send military forces across its borders to pursue its foreign policy objectives, but also that the Chinese were willing to do so despite openly expressed American reservations. What is more, Peking made it appear, by launching the attack right after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States, that its actions had tacit American support.

Thus, military assistance to China runs the risk that it may enable
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Peking to use force in ways that are inimicable to American interests, but that may imply American approval. It is for this reason, I believe, that none of our Asian allies appears, at the moment at least, enthusiastic about a military relationship between Washington and Peking.

Second, and more important, is the risk that such a relationship might have a counterproductive effect on US relations with the Soviet Union. It may be that, in its first years, Sino-American rapprochement did have a positive effect on Soviet-American relations, perhaps facilitating the conclusion of the SALT I pact and the 1973 agreement on reducing the danger of nuclear war. But, by 1975, the Soviet Union had already discounted further improvements in Sino-American relations, and it became increasingly difficult to find evidence that Washington was enjoying the leverage over Moscow that its “Peking connection” had once provided.

By 1979, moreover, one could begin to argue that the early signs of a military relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China had begun to produce a hostile, rather than a compliant, response from the Soviet Union. Although, it is too early to assess fully the calculations that led Moscow to invade Afghanistan, it seems obvious that the Soviet Union was not the least deterred by the announcement that Defense Secretary Brown would visit China in January 1980. Indeed, as Craig Whitney reported in the New York Times in mid-February 1980, the Russians may well have been “obsessed by a threat to Soviet security from the United States and China,” as symbolized by Washington’s forging a kind of military alliance with China” in 1979. True or not, it does seem indisputable that a military relationship with Peking is one of the most provocative actions the United States could undertake toward the Soviet Union.

Finally, a closer military relationship with Peking even carries risks for Sino-American relations. If, as some have suggested, we link the sale of military technology to China with the international behavior of the Soviet Union, so that military sales to China are used to punish Moscow for foreign policy transgressions, we run the risk that China will see us as manipulative and self-serving. And by providing military technology to China, we assume an implicit commitment to China’s security interests that, in particular circumstances, we might find ourselves unwilling or unable to meet. We might, for example, find ourselves associated with hostile Chinese policies we do not fully endorse. Even worse, the Soviet Union might attempt to embarrass the United States by launching a limited military probe against China, assuming that Washington would be unlikely to respond.

None of these arguments is intended to rule out once for all closer
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military cooperation between China and the United States, particularly if Sino-American relations continue to improve, and Soviet-American relations continue to deteriorate. But they do suggest that such a relationship be entered into with extreme caution, and full realization that each step is risky, and that a strategic alignment with China may be difficult to reverse. Above all, they suggest that sales of military technology to China, even non-lethal technology, should not be undertaken as a “quick fix” for America’s international weakness, as a short-term tactical response to Soviet behavior, or as a way of mollifying the Chinese in times of strain in Sino-American relations. They must, instead, be an integral part certainly of a broader American foreign policy for the 1980s. Such a policy would, I believe, assign higher priority to improving American military preparedness, strengthening the American economy, working to improve relations with our allies, and attempting to stabilize the Persian Gulf than to establishing a security relationship with China.

Put in a somewhat different way, I would argue that closer military ties between Washington and Peking, particularly the provision of military technology to China, should develop only after certain preconditions have been met. First, such ties should await further consolidation and development of civilian relations between Washington and Peking. Second, they should be conditioned on signs that the Chinese are, as a result of the growing bilateral consultations between the two countries, actively seeking to reduce their differences with the United States over regional and global issues. Third, a military relationship with China requires the support and understanding of our traditional allies in Asia. And, most important, it must await a thoughtful, sober, long-term assessment of the prospects for Soviet-American relations.

Meanwhile, I see no objections to carefully limited forms of military relations between Peking and Washington. These might include the exchange of military delegations, discussion of the global and regional strategic balance, sharing of intelligence, and exchanges of views on the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. All of these would be in keeping with a consultative relationship with Peking. Nor should sales of dual-purpose technology to China be excluded, as long as the Chinese are willing to give reasonable assurances that the equipment will be used for civilian purposes.

US China Policy in the 1980s

A strategy for US-China relations in the 1980s, then, would be to emphasize consultation with China on regional and global issues, and
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cooporation with Peking in China's economic development. A strategic alignment with China, while not to be ruled out definitively, should be undertaken only with the greatest caution. For now, the emphasis should be on consolidating and developing our civilian relations—relations that, in a formal sense, are less than two years old—and broadening our promising new dialogue with China on issues of common concern.

This is, I believe, a perfectly feasible relationship to forge with the Chinese. Peking does not, in my view, wish to be either a formal American ally, or an American proxy. To be too closely tied with the United States, particularly in the realm of national security, would produce serious objections at home, threaten China's standing as a member of the Third World, and, perhaps most important, pose serious risks for China's relations with the Soviet Union. Conversely, however, most Chinese leaders also wish to move beyond a cool and manipulative relationship with the United States. While some may still see the opening toward Washington simply as a tactical device for strengthening China's security toward the Soviet Union, a greater number are coming to see the longer term benefits of a consultative and cooperative relationship with the United States.

Such a relationship will require that Sino-American ties be sensitively managed. Consultation will require that we identify specific regional and global issues on which Sino-American dialogue might make progress. Economic cooperation will require that we resolve remaining issues in Sino-American economic relations, particularly the three to one trade imbalance between the two countries and the deadlock in the negotiations over textile quotas. It will also require that the US Government monitor the growing network of private relations with China to ensure that, on balance, they are of mutual benefit to both nations. None of these specific tasks will be easy. But with a broad and thoughtful conception of the kind of relationship we seek with China, we will have a firmer base on which to build.
The Global Impact of Energy on US Security Interests and Commitments

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Three basic propositions define the essence of our energy situation over the next decade:

One. There is no substitute for oil likely to be available over the next twenty years in sufficient quantity to displace oil as the primary commercial fuel for most industrial and developing nations.

Two. With the exception of a few industrial nations (Canada, Norway, possibly the United Kingdom), the rest will remain significantly dependent upon imported oil and major disparities will characterize their import dependencies.

Three. There is no prospect that the Middle East will be displaced as the source of the bulk of oil placed in world trade. This will remain the case even if oil provinces (huge accumulations) are discovered in the Arctic, the more northern reaches of the North Sea, offshore China, or elsewhere. It will still be true even if the industrial world—particularly the United States and the Soviet Union—begins now to exploit its domestic energy options and bring on additional energy supply from a range of sources.

The central reason why the United States (and most other states) are locked into their present situation, without realistic prospect of fundamental change, lies in the time required to bring on other energy sources, on a sufficient scale. Technology, capital, and the requisite management skills are available—or could be made so. Environmental and safety concerns will continue to limit what can be done—but are not insurmountable obstacles. However, for these or almost any great energy undertaking, long lead times are the rule.

Despite the President’s national goal to limit imports and eventually to reduce them below 50 percent of present levels, it is unlikely that this can be achieved; virtually every analyst sees little chance for
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reducing imports to below 7.5 million barrels a day or some 40 percent of our country’s petroleum consumption over the next decade.

The prospects for Western Europe and Japan are no brighter. Even if the United States exploits its domestic resources on an unprecedented scale, and diversifies its sources of imports away from the Middle East, NATO members and Japan are very likely to remain greatly dependent on oil imports generally, and on Middle East oil in particular.

The continuing heavy dependence upon Middle East oil of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) nations generally; the possibility that the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China will be new claimants for oil in world trade; and the certainty that a number of developing nations, including members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), will continue to escalate their demand for oil—all serve to stress the urgency of our knowing if supply will be adequate, continuous, and at a price within one’s capacity to pay.

This litany of harsh realities concerning oil dependency leads inevitably to the Middle East. It is therefore fitting to begin our global review of energy and US security with a look at this volatile region.

Middle East Oil and US Security

The strategic importance of Middle East oil is understood. The conditions by which a nation obtains supply are, for the most part, now set by a relatively few oil exporters who are distant from the industrial world in terms of geography, political experience, and national objectives—both domestic and foreign; moreover, these oil exporters by-and-large are chronically unstable, mistrustful of each other, and undergoing profound shocks to their cultures. Finally, quite apart from the importance of their oil, they are located in one of the great strategic areas of the world, the traditional crossroads between the civilizations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, and within range of the southern marches of the Soviet Union.

Are there prospects for political stability within the Middle East? For deep-seated reasons whose origins lie in ancient history, now made more incendiary by oil, it is unlikely that the political environment will improve. Years from now the United States will still be attempting to deal with a highly unstable situation.

Those who cling to the belief that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli issue would bring stability to the region underestimate the reach of historical events and attitudes which embitter Arab relations...
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National animosities abound: Egypt against the lot; Iraq and Syria contending for paramount influence in the Fertile Crescent; Iran against the lot; the Arabian Peninsula as an occasional target for other Arabs (and non-Arabs); Lebanon as still a "cockpit" of conflict; and so forth.

External powers (France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) have further complicated these relationships by first siding with one Arab group, and then with another, in a continual juggling of their economic and strategic interests in the region. Some Arab states, at one time or another, have solicited the support of an external power to help preserve their domestic control or to obtain arms and political support in a variety of Arab causes. All of these factors and forces persist.

The national objectives of the United States in the Middle East can be defined as:

—Preserving the independence of the countries in the region and promoting their peace and stability;

—Securing a continuous flow of oil, in adequate volume, and at a near-predictable price for the United States, and helping Allies to obtain the same;

—Maintaining a capability to counter the actions of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (including a US force available to the region);

and

—Ensuring a "defensible" Israel, which implies a sufficient defensive capability as well as political policies which promote peaceful and stable relations with neighboring Arab states.

Each of these summary objectives has far-reaching implications. Each requires a close-in US interest both in the internal affairs of most Middle East countries and in their relationships with each other, and with the Soviet Union. The examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia come instantly to mind, as does Egypt. These three key regional powers all have long-standing conflicts of interest with each other and with an epicenter in the Fertile Crescent.

Corrosive Effects of Allied Competition for Oil

Further complications come from the separate and frequently conflicting pursuits of the United States, France, Germany, and Japan for access to Middle East oil. There is no agreement among these nations as to how this corrosive competition can be mitigated; and even countries with more modest requirements for imported oil, like Canada, will eventually be forced into this competition.
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Some may be lured by the hope that oil obtained on a government-to-government basis will prove to be more secure by virtue of the absence of private company interests. Yet we are wanting for a single example in which government-to-government deals have resulted in lower price, and assured supply on a long-term basis. Thus, may we conclude that individual government attempts for favored position lack promise? At best, one may "presume" that the broader range of consumer government powers and interests may lend greater durability to an agreement or, at a minimum, might make the exporters more reluctant to reduce or terminate supply. This is far from certain, however; witness the examples of France-Algeria, United States-Saudi Arabia, United States-Iran. Irrespective, the choice between bilateral government deals and continued reliance upon the private sector is no longer our decision alone to make.

Central to this competition is the apprehension that the volume of oil exported by producing nations will be insufficient to meet demand. The reasons for this gap have been listed: conservation of oil for its future greater value; conservation of oil because surplus revenues obtained from oil sales cannot be invested without an eventual loss in value (inflation, declining US dollars); limitation of production to put pressure on importers for political purposes (Israel, South Africa, the United States) as most recently attempted by Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria, each for a variety of reasons; and, finally, limitation of exports to support price.

In two respects these policies have now become particularly consequential: first, in the pricing of oil, there has been an abandonment of the Saudi marker crude with ever-escalating prices far exceeding the OPEC ceiling price of $23.50. The spot market, which previously was entered only by marginal suppliers, may set the price for term and sellers' option contracts, which account for the bulk of oil in world trade. Along with this pricing phenomenon have come sweeping, unilateral changes in contracts so that now it is accurate to say that no contract can be relied on.

The second consequential change comes in the near-universal adoption of "preferred producing rates" whose total constitutes the volume of oil placed in world trade. Previous production limits were usually set after analysis of field characteristics which indicated the prudent rate of extraction. This definition is now superseded by a lower level defined as that which generates "sufficient" revenue, with the rest being "banked." At this time, the volume of oil taken off the market by this new definition is about 5 million barrels per day (b/d), or more than
the volume Iran could hope to produce today. As prices continue to soar, revenue needs can be met by lower volumes.

Saudi Arabia is the only key producer that has not yet adopted a preferred rate of production. Its production of 8.5 million b/d is a level said to be justified by technical and economic considerations; current production is higher than that amount by perhaps 1 million b/d.

It may be the case, however, that the present Saudi regime might conclude that it should adopt the broader definition of a production rate more closely set to meet present needs. It has been assumed that the Kingdom could cut back 3–4 million b/d. Should it do so, the volume of oil in world trade would be in the range of 26–27 million b/d. The required volume (based on today’s demand) is nearer 31 million b/d.

The Lack of Adequate Strategic Petroleum Reserves

There has been, understandably no public definition of an import level below which importing nations would face exceptionally severe shortages bordering on the “unacceptable.” That figure, for Europe, is about 11 million b/d; for Japan 4.5 million b/d; and for the United States some 7 million b/d. The developing world requires about 2 million b/d. These add up to 24.5 million b/d. Through this calculation we are reminded of the great importance of Saudi Arabia. We are also reminded that there is no internationally agreed-upon policy to deal with a shortage which is the result of such a definition of production levels. (The International Energy Agency (IEA) does have a formula for dealing with emergency shortfalls caused by “political” actions aimed at one or more importers, such as embargoes.) There are three principal reasons why we do not have an allocation system for the type of unacceptable shortage being discussed here:

—The Germans and Japanese (and likely also Americans) think they can probably buy what they need and escape the harsher consequences of inadequate supply. An allocation scheme, by definition, uses additional criteria.

—Importing nations dread a confrontation with OAPEC members.

—The French in particular, but the Japanese probably as well, think they may yet work out special arrangements with key suppliers so that they might meet their needs, come what may; we have noted what may be viewed as the folly of this approach.

In the absence of a credible commitment to allocation (and an agreement among the key importers not to pay more than OPEC-set prices) each of these key nations will remain vulnerable to a potential situation of chronic shortage.
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Moreover, if the individual and collective energy vulnerabilities of importers were put to a severe test—if, for example, Saudi Arabia were to reduce its level and Iraq followed suit—not one of the key importing states possesses a strategic crude reserve worth mentioning. Such a strategic reserve was to be the cornerstone of the IEA effort. If we use the proper definition of stocks not counted in commercial inventory, the current strategic stock levels of four key countries are listed in table 1.

Table 1

Strategic Oil Reserves of Four Key Western Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Oil Imports (million b/d)</th>
<th>Strategic Stocks (excluding commercial inventory)</th>
<th>Days of Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA = Not Available

The failure to have a reserve could have immense consequences. A reserve linked to a stringent rationing program would give the United States the options of being able to mark time, of allowing other factors and forces to be employed, and of not having to respond militarily. The Department of Energy’s failure to create this essential reserve can only be condemned—an incomprehensible performance, the war-equivalent of no spare parts, no reserve rations, no ammunition supply, no reserve.

Producer-Country Moves to Consolidate Control of Oil

Concern over future crude shortages, moreover, is just part of the problem. Three other developments also add to future supply uncertainty. First, to a large extent, oil exporters intend to process more of their crude than they now do. OPEC refining is about 5 percent of OECD refining. There is a fundamental imbalance here which must be
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corrected, or so OPEC/OAPEC repeatedly warns. Second, oil exporters
(Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela among others) will limit
sales of lighter crudes to a proportion taken of their heavier oils. In-
sistence on this point, wholly understandable from the producers' side,
will make the obtaining of supply more difficult as competition increases
for the lighter end of the barrel. And third, oil exporters are likely to take
increasing care in the selection of export destinations, both to favor
less developed countries and to meet the exporter's political objectives.

Motivated by a desire to extend their control over world oil trade
beyond that day when consuming countries develop alternative refinery
feedstocks (e.g., shale oil, tar sands, coal liquids, and heavy oil), the
Middle East/North African producers plan to expand their 1985 export
refining capacity by 5-6 million b/d.

Producer-countries are attempting to reach this goal by subsidizing
investment in domestic refinery expansion through entitlements (as a
means of compensating for the higher costs associated with their re-
moteness from markets and the much higher costs of transporting prod-
uct as compared to crude oil). These attempts will, logically enough,
diminish to some measure total crude volumes placed into world trade—
and, hence, further fan the fires of consumer-country competition for
those specific gravity crudes (i.e., light-vs-heavy; also, sweet-vs-sour)
suitable for their own refineries.

Moreover, unlimited or substantial market access for foreign-pro-
duced refined products suggests various adverse effects for "down-
stream" refinery operations (e.g., declining utilization rates, reduced
profit margins, and inadequate investment incentives for expansion
and conversion from "sweet" to "sour" crude oil feedstocks). Collect-
ively, these effects threaten to inhibit consumer-country efforts to
diversify refinery feedstocks and, hence, exacerbate existing crude oil
dependence.

The continuing importance of adequate downstream refining ca-
pacity and control over the seaborne transport of crude oil is unmis-
takable. The United States and other consuming countries were able
to mitigate the effects of the 1973 politically motivated Arab oil embargo
only because of their ability to juggle reduced world oil allocations.

Initial fears that OPEC members would move forcefully into the
world tanker market and, thus, acquire the ability to "target" embargoes
proved unfounded. OPEC's enthusiasm was to some degree dampened
by the prevailing surplus in world tonnage and the depressed spot
market prices which it fostered. Consequently, OAPEC's joint-venture
Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company (AMPTC) today
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comprises only a miniscule 3 percent of world tonnage. Nevertheless, AMPTC is expected to turn a profit in 1980 and current plans call for further expansion. Occasional echoes of the past are still heard urging a "strategic" unification of all Arab fleets under AMPTC control.

For the United States, the paramount logistical concern, perhaps, centers on the evolving composition of the world fleet. Lacking the deepwater ports and offshore facilities of Europe and Japan, the United States is uniquely dependent upon smaller sized tankers to meet the bulk of its future import requirements. Given past trends toward larger vessels which enjoy economies of scale, this situation bears close watching.

All of these concerns are symptoms of the current loss of flexibility, hitherto the hallmark of the international oil system. Until the recent events in Iran, the international oil companies (IOCs) were able to retain their position as suppliers to a substantial number of nonintegrated or not-fully-integrated refineries. These buyers were able to shop around for reasonably competitive terms from one, or the other, of the IOCs. This flexibility hinged upon the IOCs' multiple sources of supply which are absent in the case of "direct deals" involving the national oil companies of the oil exporting countries. Thus, collectively, the IOCs provided the world market with a universal pool of spare capacity. With the demise of third party sales, an increase in individually held stocks (quantitatively exceeding the universal pool) and storage facilities will be required.

The Key Role of Saudi Arabia

The importance of a Saudi commitment to a continuous and adequate supply of oil into world trade focuses attention on the stability of the regime and on the kinds of decisions we might anticipate. In beginning such a discussion, one must acknowledge what has been inadequately considered: just as oil is embedded in a very broad range of US interests, so, too, is oil integral to Riyadh's perspective.

Just as the US stake in oil supply may cause adjustments, new directions of policy, and then, further changes as domestic and foreign situations evolve, so will Saudi policy be modified. It is also crucial to remember that Saudi interests in the Middle East have deep historical roots and must include concerns in which oil may not figure.

The list of concerns/objectives to which the level of Saudi oil production will relate includes:

—Securing of the Holy Places in Jerusalem; and strengthening the role of Islam;
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- Defending the oil fields and facilities from attack: giving particular attention to the intentions and capabilities of Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and possibly Iran (note that the United States is presumed to have special influence in Israel and Egypt).
- Protecting the regime from internal subversion possibly instigated by the PLO, Iraq, Iran, the Yemens, etc.;
- Limiting sharply the number of foreigners who are presently an economic necessity;
- Maintaining effectiveness within OPEC and OAPEC;
- Limiting the expansion of Soviet influence;
- Controlling the pace and direction of social economic change within the Kingdom;
- Improving upon the return from revenues that are surplus to current needs; and
- Limiting the economic damage to the industrial world from immoderate actions by other OPEC members with regard to volumes and prices for oil.

These nine concerns are not in order of priority: such an ordering in this analysis would be misleading for it is more important to understand that the priorities attached to some concerns will alter, sometimes subtly, with changing circumstances. Almost any Saudi regime would come to adopt this list, over time, by reason of those enduring factors whose origin lies very deep in time, as well as for contemporary imperatives.

What, then, is the future of Saudi-US relations? Would a breach in Sunni-Shiite Islamic relations drive the Saudis closer to the United States for protection from turmoil? Would widespread regional hostility towards the United States, if contagious, weaken the cement of Saudi-US friendship by necessity?

The Soviet Role

The Soviet Union’s interest in the lands bordering upon its southern flank is undoubtly of continuing importance to the Kremlin. Soviet objectives include protection of these non-Russian territories from subversive influences; limiting the role of any power external to the region (it used to be Great Britain and Germany, now it is the United States); gaining access to the sea; improving upon the Soviet capability to disrupt oil supply; and affecting the balance of political and military relationships from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Arabian Sea, including the Red Sea.

No discussion of Russia and the Middle East should overlook the implications raised by the Soviet Union’s position as the world’s fifth
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most populous Moslem state. The Moslem-dominated Soviet Republics of Central Asia, moreover, are increasing in population far more rapidly than the country's European Russian citizenry west of the Urals. This explains the concern felt by Soviet leaders as they look ahead to the day when Soviet Asians will become the single largest source of new manpower for both the country's armed forces and industry.

Presently less than one-third of the people of Central Asia speak Russian, and this challenge to Moscow is compounded by the deep attachment which Central Asians feel to Iran and the Middle East. This, together with geopolitical concerns, explains the Kremlin's keen interest in the present turmoil south of its borders.

Some Western demographers have estimated that about one-third of all eighteen-year-olds conscripted into Soviet military service by the end of the century will be of Central Asian origin—speaking either Turkic or a Persian-based native tongue, and struggling with Russian-language instruction manuals. The implications of the commonly shared Persian and Arab heritage—so markedly different from that of the Slavs—are enormous for the future course of Soviet society.

As for the nature of the Soviet interest in Middle East oil, we have again been reminded by the public report of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Soviet Union may be evolving into an importer of oil. While it seems as if the report now warns of a more modest demand for imported oil, less than the 3.5-4.5 million b/d indicated several years ago for the mid-1980's, the new estimate still involves a USSR demand for imports of about 700,000 barrels a day, which implies a loss in Soviet oil exports to the West (and Eastern Europe) of some 3 million b/d—or a net additional claim for some 3.7 million b/d. Where will the oil come from?

Although the CIA estimate of USSR oil demand is contested, it remains a possibility and must be considered carefully. If the CIA estimate is proven correct, the Soviet Union, which places great importance on being self-sufficient in energy, will find itself rendered vulnerable for the first time to oil supply interruptions. How will it attempt to deal with this prospect? Will US technical aid be necessary to help the Soviets overcome their need to import oil?

Should the United States provide such assistance if only to keep the Soviets out of Middle East oil? Soviet options are limited by the staggering cost of imports obtained through the commercial process (if that is still a useful term); the Soviet Union presently obtains 50 percent of its current foreign exchange from the sale of its oil; this inward flow will be lost, and there is no substitute available for the role of oil—except, eventually, gas exports. In this difficult situation can the
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Soviet Union expect to buy its oil? Will it attempt to obtain preferred access to Iraq's oil? To Iran's oil through barter, military sales, development technology? Through a client-state relationship? Through occupation? The Soviet Union has a uniformly poor record in its relations with developing countries; can it do better than it has with Iraq? Possibly—especially if the Soviets have a clear perception of the Iraqi role in intra-Arab affairs and encourage Baghdad's initiatives aimed at making their country the most influential oil power in the region. Yet such support could get the Soviets into trouble and might earn them little thanks even from the Iraqis. A relationship of that kind is fragile, and inherently unstable. Even so, a Soviet initiative with Iraq would cause the Saudis, at the very least, to reappraise their own relationship with the United States.

Additional Regions of Concern: East Asia, the Arctic, the Caribbean, Africa

In a very different part of the world—Northeast Asia—it is probable that the People's Republic of China will also be importing oil. Once the Chinese develop more extensive modern transport systems and further industrialize their economy, it is quite likely that their modest export capability (about 200 thousand b/d) will fade. The Chinese may then become an additional claimant for a share of oil in world trade—from the Middle East? Malaysia? Indonesia? The impact of such a change in China's energy requirements could be considerable on Japan's appraisal of its own strategic interest. These are the same sources which are of increasing significance to an extremely vulnerable Japan.

To what extent may the Japanese believe themselves compelled to diversify their sources, to obtain additional supply, and to re-examine their interest in the energy resources of eastern Siberia?

How soon will the Japanese acquire the capability to protect their vulnerable supply lines? The deep mistrust between the Russian and Chinese peoples may effectively preclude any meaningful relationship between them (such as might make the Japanese believe they could assist Soviet energy efforts in Siberia and not offend Peking). If so, then a major Japanese decision will have to be made: the extent to which Tokyo believes it must risk its relationship with Peking by an energy venture with the Soviet Union; or, alternatively, the extent to which Tokyo believes it must place greater reliance on the Chinese connection for interests larger than oil.

Another region likely to have both strategic and energy significance for the United States and its allies is the Arctic Zone. There is near
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unanimous agreement that the Arctic will prove to be a petroleum province of great magnitude, a source of both oil and gas. Generally, the US Arctic offshore as well as Canada’s Mackenzie Delta are thought to hold more oil than gas, while the reverse may be true for the Canadian East Arctic. The Spitzbergen region and much of the Soviet Arctic are thought to be highly prospective for oil.

There are still unsettled issues of sovereignty in the Canadian region involving transit rights through Arctic passages, as well as conflicts in safety and environmental laws and in regulations governing exploration and development. Are there common defense obligations for the security of the anticipated Alaskan gas pipeline crossing the US and Canadian Arctic?

There are issues of Norwegian control over resource exploitation on and offshore Spitzbergen. And there are major strategic interests elsewhere as well—especially those found in the Soviet West Arctic where the Kola and Barents Sea defense zones make petroleum activities a very sensitive matter to Moscow. This must be one of the most complex and critical issues that will hinder the West’s ongoing search for new sources of oil outside the Middle East. It is a region of great strategic consequence. Here, it may not be possible to move on the energy option for the foreseeable future.

We have mentioned the competition for access to the oil of South-east Asia: Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s resources (Malaya and Brunei) as the common objective of Japan and China. The current contest between Vietnam and Cambodia may well be part of this competition. In this round, Soviet support of Vietnam (if that is correct) carries the implication at least of denying the Chinese a presence closer to the two oil (and gas) exporters of Southeast Asia. The enormous strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca and Sundra to Japan, China, and Russia is another aspect of energy supply which the United States must take into account.

The last energy region of national security interest to the United States is the Caribbean. The geographic convergence of US supply here underscores its vital importance—as evidenced by Venezuelan supply to New England; the existence of major refining centers on Aruba and Curacao, the Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas and Puerto Rico; plus the maritime supply from Mexico to the US Gulf (and some Alaskan supply through the Panama Canal). Also, the movement of Nigerian, Libyan, and Middle East crude oils mainly to the US Gulf ports, plus the awesome vulnerability at this end of concentrated receiving terminals of the SEADOCK design—all remind one of the permanent US
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interest in the political stability of the region and in the security of sea
lanes.

Yet, apart from the Middle East, there may be no region more
troublesome for the United States than the Caribbean. With the prospect
of a further extension of Cuban influence in Central America and among
the islands, the US political, economic, and military presence will have
to be greatly expanded; here, in a region whose modern history has
already recorded too many of these interests, as we are reminded
repeatedly.

There are several other areas of the world where US security and
energy interests cross paths. Nigeria is the second largest exporter of
oil to the United States. Washington, therefore, has a clear, strategic
interest in assuring this supply. At the moment, the principal political
issue affecting Nigerian exports relates closely to the resolution of Rhod-
esia’s future in a manner acceptable to Lagos. The United States and
Great Britain are deeply implicated in the outcome. (The British stake
is not in Nigeria’s exports directly, but in British Petroleum’s continuing
access—despite the nationalization of its holdings—to Nigerian crude
to meet important supply commitments.)

The Mediterranean-Red Sea route still has enormous strategic
importance for oil supply to southern and central Europe. The various
roles of Libya in the region (and beyond) will be of continuing concern
as that nation becomes the largest supplier to Italy, continues to be of
interest to the Soviet Union (and vice versa), and persists in its design
upon Malta.

On the same continent, the United States has felt it necessary to
assist Morocco in its Saharan adventure, although Algeria has warned
that it may withhold oil/gas from countries not siding with Algiers in this
somewhat bizarre incident.

And finally, while there is no direct US energy stake involved, the
Greek-Turkish question over Aegean claims has implications for US
Forces in the region. Control over access to the Bosphorus Straits is
a permanent Russian concern which will be heightened if Soviet oil
imports begin moving into the Black Sea, which is highly probable.

An Enduring Set of US Energy and Security Realities

The endeavor has been to discuss energy as a factor in US national
security in peace, and in situations of limited and general war. As
already mentioned there is one energy/security ingredient that ought
to be found in each circumstance, but would be found lacking in all: a
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meaningful Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). To repeat, the existence of an SPR equivalent to 90 days imports, plus a rigorous regime of rationing, would permit the United States to function 6–8 months without a single imported barrel. By not possessing this resource, the United States is robbed of that flexibility in response which could be truly crucial to our Nation.

There is an implication to be drawn from the ways in which these many and varied interrelationships between “energy” and “security” have been presented. In almost every instance—the exceptions being the North Sea and the Mediterranean—the US role in securing oil supply for its own needs, or in helping to assure supply to NATO and Japan, is still a lonely one. Need this continue to be the case? Is there no possibility that the NATO members, if not NATO itself, could perform a larger military and naval role?

Is there no prospect for dependable regional security arrangements within the Persian Gulf, in Southeast Asia, and in the Caribbean, which would lighten the load placed upon the United States?

This author cannot add insights as to the role of energy in armed conflicts beyond what seems so obvious: the general dependence of the industrial world on a continuous supply of oil imports heightens the power of other states to saddle the United States and its allies with unprecedented problems in time of war. In no earlier period—including World War II—has there been such an overwhelming reliance upon oil for societies' needs in general, if not for armed forces in particular. We shall not see this situation change in its fundamentals within our lifetime.

A summary of energy interests with strategic implications for US national security could never be complete, for fresh complications and risks—and sometimes opportunities—present themselves almost daily. Some situations (Japanese need for Southeast Asian oil, oil security and the Caribbean, and containment of the Soviet presence in the Middle East) have been with us for many years; others (the Arctic, Spitzbergen, and Nigerian supply) are comparatively new. All in all, they represent a global set of energy concerns of undoubted strategic importance, with which we shall be coping for decades. They are not of transitory significance. Each has its security aspects because of the importance of uninterrupted oil supply and because of the geographic locations in which oil is found; and also, because of the intrinsic strategic importance of lands bordering upon the Soviet Union, which include NATO members, the key oil exporting countries, and Japan.
The Growing Importance of Economics: Can the United States Manage This Phenomenon?

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Few who have sought to understand the intersection of "high" and "low" politics during the last decade continue to maintain a conception of national security policy based solely upon the strategic imagery and metaphors of the Cold War. Elements of that earlier policy agenda remain very much with us: in our strategic relations with the Soviet Union, NATO, and the American posture and presence in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere. But attention to these problems must now also contend with the persistent and intensifying vulnerabilities of the American economy.

Some observers suggest that this new salience of economics marks a fundamental structural transformation of world politics. In this view, the rising costs associated with the use of conventional military force have combined with mutual strategic deterrence to limit significantly the utility of military power in contemporary world politics. In these circumstances, a diffusion of economic power to some raw materials producers and the proliferation of cross-cutting economic vulnerabilities throughout the world's economy serve to define a new world system in which all nations' policy options, but especially those of the industrialized world, have become more constrained by a web of complex interdependence.

Others contend that such constraints are largely self-imposed by a liberal internationalist elite within the industrialized world, especially in the United States, who, having been traumatized by the Vietnam experience, now seek to expiate their guilt and loss of will with a too facile submission to "new" forces of interdependence. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) successful embargo of the industrialized world was not, in this view, a manifestation of unique economic circumstances or the exercise of new instruments of state-
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craft. Rather, it was a “classic” politico-strategic act that was successful because of passivity and resignation in the West. The West has succumbed to “oil power” not because of the inapplicability of political and even military means but because of a loss of morale and confidence.

In this chapter the role that economics and economic instruments of statecraft play in the relations between states in the international system will be examined. An initial juxtaposition of contemporary world politics will be used to define issues and focus subsequent discussion on the potential and limits of economic instruments of statecraft. Finally, the capacity of and constraints on the American system to respond to or manage relationships within the present milieu will be examined.

The Interdependence Image

The character of world politics was a matter of debate throughout the 1970s, but by the latter part of the decade proponents of the notion of a transformed world system had developed an image of the new reality. Among the external events contributing to the emergence of concern about economics and economic instrumentalities, none seems more important in retrospect than the travails of American power in Vietnam and the OPEC oil embargo. To many observers, the American experience in Vietnam demonstrated that military instrumentalities were rapidly losing, if they had not already lost, much of their efficacy as a means of controlling events on the periphery of world politics. Ultimate power in the form of nuclear weapons seemed disproportionate means to the attainment of any objectives, excepting deterrence of strategic attack or blackmail. And, the limited and gradual application of conventional force seemed to call for more patience and sacrifice than the American public was willing to expend in places deemed marginal to its immediate interests.

The combination of a perceived declined in the utility of force on the periphery and the deterrent effect of the amalgam of strategic nuclear weapons, tactical or theater nuclear weapons, and a fragile, but persistent NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff in Central Europe are crucial
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elements in the image of a transformed system. Where military force retains a measure of utility it is primarily deterrent in its effect; when used in a compellent manner, it is likely to be accompanied by high social costs to the user with uncertain effects on the target, especially if the latter achieves a high degree of social mobilization. At the industrialized “center” of the international system,

fears of attack in general have declined, and fears of attack by one another are virtually nonexistent. . . . Intense relationships of mutual influence exist between these countries, but in most of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy.

Under such circumstances, the effects of the dramatic post-World War II increases in nonmilitary transactions across national boundaries have increasingly shaped world politics. The reinforcing effects of modern transportation and telecommunications technology have accelerated the transnational movement of money, goods, people, and ideas, creating circumstances in which states are interpenetrated and interconnected.

In such an environment, vulnerability becomes a crucial measure of an actor’s responsiveness to the costs associated with a transaction—a fact driven home by the OPEC use of its monopolistic control of oil vis-à-vis Europe and Japan. Costs and a loss of national autonomy are now assumed to be the essence of interdependent relationships, but costs are not in themselves an indication of vulnerability. Rising costs are simply an indication of sensitivity to various transactions. In the face of this sensitivity, vulnerability is better understood as a function of the availability of alternatives and options. Thus vulnerability is inversely related to the ability to manage one’s environment and the costs associated with changing any particular policy framework in the face of adverse impact associated with transactions.

“Compellent” power can be understood as the ability to get another actor to do something he would not otherwise do. Hence, vulnerability in any interdependent relationship can be viewed as a crucial continuity in contemporary world politics. Presumably one might manipulate another state’s vulnerabilities so as to control that state’s behavior. If so, this view of interdependent world politics is not all that radical a change from the policy context of the 1950s. Perhaps the primary instrumentalities of world political intercourse, that is, military means, have changed (and then, perhaps, only temporarily due to a peculiar conjunction of military technology and its diffusion), but if the behavior of states could be controlled by new means, then surely the essence of world politics had not changed. However, the proponents and expositors
of the new paradigm of interdependence have maintained that the exercise of power is so complex in this new concatenation of social, political, and economic intercourse that recourse to the manipulation of vulnerabilities is fanciful if not counterproductive.

If it is true that sensitivities and vulnerabilities are the essence of contemporary world politics, then virtually all states possess them to some degree. The problem of power and its exercise, therefore, becomes quite elusive. In such an environment, power is not a function of a single set of vulnerabilities although some, for example the need for oil or development capital, may be more important than others:

Power in an interdependent world also depends on how fungible others' dependencies are (that is, how easily their dependencies in one realm can be converted to offset yours in another) and how serviceable your vulnerabilities are (that is, when interdependence is asymmetrical, how much others hurt themselves by hurting you).

In other words, the crucial factor may be how vulnerabilities relate to one another and under what conditions and at what costs to whom are they subject to manipulation. "Power" becomes less a matter of coercion and manipulation and more a matter of "exchange." Thus, in a sense, if complex interdependence is inescapable, then it is precisely the ability to gain access to and maintain a position at "the intersection of numerous and different forms of interdependence" that now and for the foreseeable future will constitute the essence of power and influence.

The position and potentiality of the United States in such a world may be seen as very high. In the first place, throughout the 1970s the United States maintained sufficient military capability to insure that the deterrent effects of military instruments at the center remained viable. Intense debate has arisen and persisted concerning the future adequacy of that military capacity and its effectiveness on the periphery where stability has been viewed as increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet Union and its clients, the Cubans. Nonetheless, the proponents of the interdependence paradigm maintain that the most salient development of the last decade concerning military power, especially regarding major power strategic relations, has been the attempt, through the Strategic Arms Limitations process, to institutionalize a relationship of parity such that future changes in that relationship would occur in an incremental and predictable fashion. The decades-long imbalance—and perhaps further deterioration—of conventional capability in central Europe, Soviet/Cuban activism on the periphery, and the uncertainties surrounding the proliferation and diffusion of advanced weapons technologies, in-

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cluding nuclear capability, were all sources of concern. But in the former
two cases increases in American defense spending were regarded as
sufficient to maintain an acceptable state of balance for the foreseeable
future. And in the case of proliferation, concerted action by the world’s
nuclear technology suppliers, along with the maintenance and perhaps
marginal expansion of an American presence on the periphery of Asia,
was thought to be sufficient, if not to stop proliferation, then at least to
prolong the period during which nuclear weapons capability might
spread, thereby providing an opportunity for developing an orderly re-
gime.

To the extent that American military potential could maintain these
crucial conditions, the full capacity of the United States as a politico-
economic power and leader could be brought to bear on the multiple
and intersecting interdependencies of world politics. The collapse of
the Bretton Woods system, the nagging weakness of the dollar and
above all, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-1974 made it clear that the
United States was no longer a hegemonic power in the sense of the
1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. However, even as OPEC sought to
exploit its economic leverage on the United States, its largest member,
Saudi Arabia, invested significant amounts of its profits in the American
economy or through American financial management and urged the
United States to end its profligate energy consumption lest it precipitate
a world economic collapse. Although the less developed countries per-
sistently castigated American insensitivity to their needs, they, none-
theless, were compelled to rely for development assistance on inter-
national institutions requiring substantial American support for their
operation. The presence of American based multinational corporations
and the pervasiveness of American capital were assumed by many to
be the crux of a relationship of dependencia rather than interdepend-
ence; but it was American capital and expertise that was sought by the
developing world to deal with its proportionally greater financial burden
induced by the exercise of oil power in the mid- and late 1970s. And
finally, it has been the presence or absence of American agricultural
surplus that has constituted the measure of food security throughout
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and is likely to continue so for some time
to come.

Thus, in a word, the United States, though no longer a hegemonic
power remains, nonetheless, a preponderant power in the contempo-
rary world system. The sheer size and scope of the American economy
and its centrality to the economic security of the industrialized and less
developed world insure that, as Helmut Schmidt put it in 1974: “It is
hard to achieve anything fundamental without the cooperation of the
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United States."15 That is, the United States because of its preponderance of politico-economic potential and its vulnerabilities inevitably finds itself at the point where most important interdependencies intersect. Hence the United States is a necessary participant if the successful management of these vulnerabilities is to be achieved. The dictation of outcomes is no longer within American grasp, but to the extent that the vulnerabilities of others are fungible and those of the United States are in considerable measure serviceable, the United States retains considerable liquid assets for use in the present situation.

But to what ends is this political currency to be invested? Proponents of the interdependence paradigm concede that the state of affairs described above, especially its "political effects . . . are not always benign."16 Insofar as the United States maintains its position of preponderance and centrality in an interdependent world, there will be an intense temptation to yield to the domestic pressures resulting from the inevitable loss of national autonomy that is the essence of its position. Internationally, this could and has upon occasion manifested itself in an attempt to achieve economic security unilaterally rather than collectively. This distinction is crucial to the policy prescription that emerges from the analysis of the interdependence proponents. "Collective economic security" is clearly preferred by most liberal interdependence theorists and they have few illusions as to what it entails:

Broadly defined, collective economic security means governments' acceptance of international surveillance of their domestic and foreign economic policies, of criticism of the effects of their policies on the economic security of other countries, and of various forms of international presence in the operations of markets.17

In other words, foregoing for the most part the unilateral and self-interested use of economic instruments of statecraft.

These foreign policies imply in turn, strong government management to control and "halt . . . the fight over income shares" which is seen as the root of domestic inflation.18 For the United States to behave otherwise would be to forfeit the leadership potential available to it in an ultimately futile pursuit of unilateral gain. Thus would be foregone not only the necessity of bridging existing political cleavages but also the opportunity of pursuing longer term objectives such as the development of a "sense of collective responsibility for economic security" and the reinforcement of "perceptions of the joint-gain aspects of economic relationships," the establishment and maintenance of a "gradually rising floor under world poverty," and ultimately, the achievement of a "greater integration of economic systems."19
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The "Traditionalist" Critique

It is possible, however, to accept the notion that the United States finds itself in an interdependent world and nonetheless arrive at a quite different view of the situation's implications for US policy. Whereas proponents of interdependence/"world order" policies see the necessity of depoliticizing the disputes that must inevitably arise in an interdependent world, if those disputes are to be resolved, the last decade provides evidence that precisely the opposite has happened. Moreover, the character of disputes has become more intensely political, thus suggesting to some observers that the objective of "collective economic security" in the 1980s will prove no less chimerical than was the goal of collective military security in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, the very conditions deemed necessary for the integration of high and low politics and the onset of interdependence politics—the presumed decline in the efficacy of military force—is viewed by many as the source of the politicizing of international economics during the 1970s. Similarly, the decline of American economic hegemony contributes to the likely slowing of whatever movement toward greater integration of the world's economy that might have been developing earlier.

Interdependence/integrationists have sometimes argued as if the decline of American hegemony was a necessary condition for the development and then maintenance of international conditions subject to their preferred policy framework: the management of interdependence toward the end of greater integration. Skeptics, on the other hand, suggest that it was precisely American politico-military and economic hegemony that made possible the establishment of conditions necessary for interdependence during the later 1960s. Furthermore, it is the decline in that hegemonial position during the 1970s which makes less likely movement toward integration in the 1980s and beyond. Even as an open, liberal world economy in the nineteenth century required British hegemony, so also the "interdependent" economy of the industrialized West in the post-World War II era has required American hegemony. As British hegemony declined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the world slid towards world war, economic nationalism, depression, and yet another world war. American hegemony provided the opportunity for economic recovery and the onset of interdependence in the industrialized world by providing military security and absorbing the economic costs associated with the transition back to the "open," that is, interdependent, international economy deemed necessary to avoid a return to the chaos of the first half of the century.
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In sum, most skeptics, while emphasizing the politico-military prerequisites of interdependence, nonetheless concede that interdependence, rather in the form described by its proponents, was characteristic of the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. However, a combination of:

—Eroding political or strategic foundations for that interdependence, that is, the shifts in the character of US-Soviet security relationships during the late 1960s and early 1970s;

—A reordering of the character and priorities of the market economies within the industrialized world, that is, toward welfare political economies, an undermining of traditional political authority, and a general decline in the bourgeois political and economic ethos of market economies (the emergence of the “culture of narcissism” and the “distemper of democracy”); and

—The shift in world economic power (and perhaps marginally, in military capability as well) away from the market economies of the industrialized world, for example, the emergence of OPEC,

all suggest that economic interdependence is unlikely to expand at the rapid rate with which it has over the past several decades. More importantly, the nature of economic interdependence is changing. In the areas of trade, investment, and international currencies, government intervention in markets greatly accelerated in the early 1970s. International economic relations, in fact, became increasingly politicized as nations sought to enhance their own individual benefits and protect their particular security interests from the harmful effects of an open-world economy.

Consequently, international economic relations come to be viewed as highly politicized relations. Whereas the interdependence/integration proponents aspire to depoliticized, essentially technically defined and managed international relationships culminating in more closely integrated national economies, the traditionalists suggest a future in which the combination of domestic and international circumstances described above is likely to overwhelm whatever “open” and interdependent world economic conditions or possibilities that might remain. Indeed, some observers insist that this realization is coming none too soon. Robert Tucker, for example, has argued for more than five years that American policymakers, simultaneously bedazzled by the neo-Hullian vision of an open interdependent world and enervated by the Vietnam experience, have consistently and disastrously misapprehended the nature of the times and especially that quintessential event of the times, the 1973–1974 oil embargo. In Tucker’s view there can be no successful economic resolution of the deepening crisis posed by the use of petro-
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power simply because the crisis is above all political, and must, therefore, be attacked politically, to include a willingness to confront OPEC employing means that do not exclude the resort to military force. The fashioning of applicable and appropriate means has proved more difficult, however, than the exhortation that the United States do so.

The inability (Tucker might charge, unwillingness) to develop and bring to bear military means for effecting the release of American hostages during the fall of 1979 could be employed by interdependence proponents in support of their position. On the other hand, the results of the major international trade negotiations of the 1970s, the Tokyo Round, challenged belief that international economics could be depoliticized in the future. Some analysts were going so far as to insist by decade's end that:

The postwar trade system, which helped nations manage co-operatively these political frictions, is dying. It was mortally wounded by the international economic shocks of the 1970s and their domestic political repercussions. A new set of trade rules announced last spring performed the coup de grace. . . . The Tokyo Round agreements effectively replace the GATT rules. While remaining on the books, the old rules will be largely ignored when they conflict with the new agreements. The GATT rules, for example, require that imports from all sources be treated equally. The Tokyo Round agreements, by contrast, condone discrimination by stipulating that only signatory countries are to enjoy benefits. . . . As a result of the Tokyo Round, highly complex agreements, which will operate independently of each other, bless government-administered trade in key respects.

In sum, we may well have an international system in which elements of both perspectives outlined above coexist. On the one hand, the political efficacy of compellent uses of military power may well have diminished somewhat. (Which, as Kenneth Waltz has suggested, does not mean that those possessing great military capability are, therefore, militarily weak.) However, it need not follow, and the economic events of the 1970s suggest that it has not followed, that the character of international politics has been radically transformed. That is to say, the interaction of self-interested national political economies capable of mobilizing unequal economic and military capability remains an essential quality of international relations. These units are perhaps more sensitive to their mutual but asymmetric military and economic vulnerabilities, but this sensitivity contributes to a more, not less, conflictual milieu. The proponents of greater international economic integration are quite cognizant of this situation. They insist, however, that the long-term interests of the United States and the world are congruent and
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can be realized only through American resistance to pressures to maximize American interests at the expense of others and the fashioning of a new mix of political and economic means appropriate to the opportunities inherent in the present crisis. Other, more traditional observers, suggest that even if one grants the desirability of an openly interdependent world (and many would not!), the conditions in which we find ourselves ensnared constitute an immediate threat to the national interest. And especially if one grants that military instruments have lost some of their former efficacy as political means, the national interest requires that the United States view its economic relationships with the rest of the world instrumentally and apply whatever economic leverage it possesses and can develop.

The Economic Instruments of Statecraft

The nature and uses of international economic leverage have received considerable attention during the last decade as the salience of economic factors and relations has increased. But a survey of these analyses leaves little room for optimism about the easy or effective application of international economic leverage. Two kinds of problems confront an American attempt to apply leverage: first, problems deriving from fulfilling the international conditions necessary for the successful application of economic leverage, and second, (to be dealt with in the next section), problems deriving from the domestic political and economic structure of the United States.

Three broad objectives for the use of economic leverage have been identified: (1) applying coercion, (2) gaining a position of "general influence" over another state or trying to weaken or strengthen a state's economic security, welfare, and capabilities without any attempt to compel it to behave in a specified way (Klaus Knorr has suggested distinguishing these as different objectives), and (3) extracting monopoly profit. The last objective is more in the form of an economic objective; since we are concerned primarily with the political utility of economic instruments of statecraft, we will focus the discussion on the first two objectives.

Coercive Uses of Economic Leverage.

Coercive uses of economic leverage and the closely related but more diffuse objectives of "weakening" or "strengthening" a target state are the foci of most contemporary analysis. The conditions necessary to achieving either objective are similar. Assuming the existence of a minimal amount of political will and diplomatic skill in application, it has been suggested that the state seeking to use economic leverage must:
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—Stand in a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence with the target; that is, the state must possess a high degree of control over necessary goods and services required by the target of the effort;

—The target state’s need for the controlled goods and/or services must be “intensive,” but also

—The costs of compliance with the coercive effort must be less than doing without the goods and services comprising the lever.  

How the applicant of leverage meets these conditions will vary with specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the available analyses suggest that, in general, it is not easy to fulfill these conditions. First, as Knorr notes, the necessary degree of control “is extremely rare, because foreign markets, sources of commodity supply and aid are usually dispersed internationally.” Intensity of demand is clearly necessary but this condition is closely related to costs of compliance and together they often prove to be the most difficult conditions to meet.

The extraction of economic gain from the use of economic leverage is not generally viewed as exceptional. Indeed, in a market relationship such manipulation of economic position and advantage is “normal” and “legitimate” behavior. But experience suggests to many observers that problems arise precisely in those areas of most interest in the contemporary context, that is, the use of economic instruments to achieve political gain. The use of economic leverage for political objectives is obviously not without precedent, but for the target of such an influence effort, the costs of compliance entail something more than economic costs (although these will undoubtedly be present as well). Insofar as compliance involves a diminution of national sovereignty or autonomy, the nation’s “core values” may be perceived as under attack. The “costs” of compliance may be seen, therefore, as exorbitantly high. Thus consciously politicizing economic instruments and relationships as leverage on either national leadership or the more diffuse target of “national unity” may and often has proved counterproductive:

There is considerable evidence from a number of cases, including those of collective sanctions [the United Nations vis-a-vis Rhodesia and South Africa, the League of Nations and Italy, or the Soviet Union and COMECON versus Yugoslavia] . . . that attempts at economic coercion tend to increase rather than diminish national political unity and cohesion . . . . It is even possible that some societies regard a yielding to economic pressure as more ignominious than yielding to military pressure.

Furthermore, economic and political costs must be borne by the state employing economic leverage. If, for example, the leverage em-
ployed by state A consists of denial of markets to state B, or the reverse—the provision of goods and services beyond those of “normal” transactions—then A may well have to endure higher prices or even shortages of the goods normally purchased from B or not normally provided to B. The latter proved to be the case in the mid-1970s when the United States provided the Soviet Union with extraordinary grain sales as part of the pursuit of detente. Something like the former has been anticipated in the US-Iranian crisis in that it has been assumed that the US refusal to purchase Iranian oil is likely to result in higher prices for the United States. Moreover, in this case, the additional step of freezing Iranian assets caused concern throughout the international financial community that the United States was establishing a precedent for subsequent interventions in normal economic transactions. The upshot was a further diminution of already thin confidence in the economic leadership of the United States. British and West German banks, though cooperating with the United States, were nonetheless expressing considerable displeasure with the aggressiveness of American banks in their moves against Iranian assets.

At the time of this writing, the Iranian crisis had begun to force to the surface other important questions concerning the American use of economic leverage. Clearly a boycott of Iranian oil and the application of financial pressure on Iran could not be effective unless the rest of the industrialized world was enlisted in the American-designed-and-led economic warfare. Indeed, most Iranian oil was exported to markets other than the United States, namely, less than 15 percent to the United States.34 Thus, as American officials sought to mobilize Western Europe and Japan behind American-initiated economic sanctions, reluctance in Europe and outright resistance from Japan emerged. Reports circulated that while the Europeans might participate in the freezing of Iranian assets and perhaps even a slowing of trade with the Iranians, they were reluctant to go much further due to pressures from European private bankers and a general concern that open economic warfare might lead to a cutoff of their energy supplies.76

The Japanese, on the other hand, were accused by American officials of actively undercutting American economic diplomacy by assisting the Iranians in circumventing the assets freeze and moving with “unseemly haste” to buy-up on the spot market Iranian oil previously intended for the United States.36 The Ohira government, having narrowly survived a parliamentary crisis during the fall of 1979, was therefore resisting having the almost totally import-dependent Japanese economy drafted into the American economic war against Iran. With more than 15 percent of Japanese daily imports coming from Iran,
Japanese sensitivity was or should have been predictable. Further, inasmuch as the Japanese had been the primary target of the Ford and Carter administrations’ attempts to get the rest of the industrialized world to relent in its export pressure on the American market, one suspects that there were few if any American “credits” left in Tokyo. Indeed, one wonders whether at some point this series of actions, presaged as they had been by the Nixon “shocks” of the early 1970s, does not risk setting in motion a syndrome of Japanese hostility similar to that of the interwar period.

By Christmas of 1979, although the Japanese had relented somewhat in their resistance to American-inspired economic warfare against Iran, they insisted all the while that their economic well-being required, and hence they intended to continue, purchases of Iranian oil. European leaders publicly indicated support for the American position but added caveats that any escalation of economic pressure on Iran should proceed within the United Nations framework, notwithstanding (because of?) the possibility that the Russians might block such action. Thus, as this paper was completed, any “lessons” to be drawn from the Iranian case—perhaps the most dramatic attempt ever by the United States to mobilize economic power coercively—were necessarily speculative. In fact, caution in extrapolating from the crisis seems in order, even if coercive economic statecraft should work in the Iranian case.

In the first place, the Iranian case has been characterized by extraordinary conditions not likely to be present in the future. Not the least of these conditions was that the Iranian violation of international custom and law in the seizure of American diplomats and embassy was so blatantly beyond the pale that even those hostile to the United States were compelled to support, at least initially, American demands for some form of international response. The fact that the Carter administration first sought to exhaust recognized multilateral means to gain release of the hostages undoubtedly made it more difficult to stand openly with the Iranians. Thus the isolation of the target was, at least initially, unusual.

Further, because “the concentration of its assets primarily in dollars and in American and British banks, the Iranians were extraordinarily exposed to concerted American and British action. Moreover, such retaliation was perhaps facilitated by the conservative coloration of the American and British Governments of the moment. These ideological factors were at least partially reflected on the Continent and certainly marked the European financial and multinational corporate establishment. The grudging willingness of the latter to cooperate at the outset may also have been conditioned by a sense that the Khomeini
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regime was uniquely vulnerable not only financially but also domestically. In circumstances where the vulnerability of and prospect for rapid capitulation by the target are less apparent, the mobilization of an international effort may prove beyond the capacity of a preponderant but no longer hegemonial United States.

We should also note that to the extent that the US effort proves successful, its success may make replication of economic coercion difficult or less palatable in the future. Future potential targets will likely learn from the Iranian experience and seek to reduce the international exposure of their domestic economies. A diversification of reserve currencies, investment placements, or moves by oil-exporters toward requiring payments in currencies other than the dollar might be evidence of such a response. Furthermore, if American economic warfare against Iran proves devastatingly effective, it may lead to considerable difficulty for the successor government(s) in Teheran. If, for example, the Iranian economy is reduced to rubble, the government may become a ward of the United States or the international financial establishment—a situation not likely to enhance its prestige within Iran or stability in the region. At a minimum, the litigation resulting from the assets-freeze and related counter-litigation by the Iranians might inhibit future commercial activity.

At worst, the United States could be confronted with a situation in which the Iranians turn to a third party whose political objectives are even more threatening to the United States. This seems to have been the outcome of US efforts to apply economic pressure on Castro’s Cuba in the early 1960s. Cuba suffered economically (though perhaps as much from its own internal mismanagement as from US pressure), but more importantly, Russian influence over Cuba became overwhelming. Further, instead of weakening Castro’s regime internally, the US actions provided substantiation for Castro’s charges of American imperialism and a ready explanation for Cuba’s internal economic difficulties other than Cuban mismanagement. More broadly, US economic warfare against Cuba became a sore point with America’s allies when they sought to maintain some measure of economic relations with Cuba. American actions also confirmed the Latin American image of an interventionist and neo-imperialist American presence in inter-American relations. Similarly, American economic embargoes against major and minor Communist powers after World War II may have worked to intensify these governments’ resolve to resist the United States, to strengthen their claims that they represented the vanguard of the anti-Western revolutionary movement, to rationalize their internal economic failures and repression, and to compel them into relationships of
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strategic dependence upon the Soviet Union. A similar response by the present or successor regimes in Iran is not inconceivable. Indeed, one might conjecture that such a response becomes more likely as coercion becomes more effective.

In sum, the coercive use of economic leverage in an interdependent world is likely to require the mobilization of a multilateral effort. Insofar as economic vulnerabilities are asymmetrical and domestic circumstances and constraints therefore variable, the task—even in situations where most would agree that some punitive action is warranted such as in the Iranian case—is likely to prove inordinately difficult. Or, if economic coercion is successively orchestrated, one should be sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case in question. The weight of available case studies suggests that the problems associated with primary reliance upon economic instruments are so great, that successful coercive effect in a particular situation is sufficient reason for extraordinary caution in making extrapolations from such events.

"General Influence"

Even in those instances where the United States has employed economic leverage in pursuit of general influence to strengthen its allies, the results have not always been clear cut. Perhaps the most significant attempt of this sort was the Marshall Plan which had as its primary objective the strengthening of Western Europe vis-a-vis feared Soviet subversion or military aggression, or both. Notwithstanding the success of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing Western Europe, the Soviet response was to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe. The weight of historical judgment in the West, though having yielded somewhat before revisionist analysis, concludes that the Soviets would have responded in this manner in any event. But the syndrome of distrust and fear clearly intensified after the summer of 1947. Furthermore, in later years when the now recovered West Europeans sought to expand economic relations with the East, they came up against US insistence that such contacts must be restricted under the strategic goods embargo framework developed in the early 1950s. The resultant inter-alliance pulling and hauling over COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation) restrictions on East-West trade could only contribute to the troubled character of the Atlantic partnership.

Elsewhere, American use of economic instruments in the form of foreign aid has had no less ambiguous consequences. One can point to a number of "success" stories such as South Korea and Taiwan (or at one time, Iran), but in neither case was economic leverage applied in isolation. In these and other instances of successful "strengthening"
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policies, military assistance and even US military intervention were no less important in the establishment and maintenance of general influence. Further, the use of American influence in these cases has proved problematic, for American policymakers have never found it easy to translate general influence or access into specific target country responses congruent with American objectives. “Close” US-Israeli relations have not meant a pliant Israel. US economic and military assistance to the Shah did not prevent him from becoming one of the leading OPEC price-hawks during the mid-1970s. American success in South Korea could not be translated into a more democratic regime in Seoul. And decades of general influence in Taiwan evaporated in clouds of bitter recrimination when “larger” American needs intervened. Finally, the achievement of general influence and identification of political elites with the United States can become a liability if those elites become the object of revolutionary attack—Vietnam and Iran being the most immediate and painful cases in point.

Thus, concerning the more general and less coercive use of economic leverage, we find it difficult to improve upon Klaus Knorr’s summary observation:

The historical record does pose the question whether the employment of economic leverage is a good means, at least by itself, for achieving durable relations of sympathy, let alone friendship.

... The purpose of fostering general influence is easily adulterated by the occasional attempt at effecting coercion. ... And in any case, even if this does not happen at once, the recipient of economic values, being the weaker party, may well suspect that, sooner or later, it will.38

Exceptions?

It has been suggested that there are at least two possible exceptions to the thrust of the discussion to this point. Where a state or perhaps more commonly a group of states possess monopoly control over some intensely demanded economic good, such monopoly economic capability might be readily converted into political effect. Here, of course, OPEC’s embargo of 1973–74 comes to mind. Despite great concern at the time, however, the oil cartel’s example has not proved easily replicable. Indeed, its very success drove erstwhile cartel-forming Third and Fourth World raw materials producers more deeply into debt to public and private financial institutions in the industrialized world to meet their proportionately greater energy cost burden. None of this is to gainsay the continuing importance of the OPEC example. However, its continued singular nature and OPEC’s difficulties in protecting its
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economic stake in the industrialized world's economic future suggest that not even monopoly power provides easy escape from the strictures of an interdependent world. Moreover, the calamitous series of events in Iran during 1978–79 and rumbles of discontent in Saudi Arabia confirm that the successful exercise of monopoly power internationally can have disastrous domestic consequences if political elites fail to appreciate the disruptive effects of "modernization" on traditional societies.

A second set of circumstances in which economic leverage might have greater applicability is with respect to less developed countries where the exercise of economic coercion can be applied with minimal publicity. The presumption here is that the internal social and political structure of these societies is much more fragile than that of industrialized societies and therefore more likely to crack when subjected to subtle pressures on their more vulnerable international economic positions. A proponent of such a position notes that:

The list of subtle economic weapons is long: declines in investment, either in new funds or for expansion; delays in delivery of spare parts and in other areas of trade; snags in licensing or other technology transfers; dwindling bilateral and multilateral loans and grants; refusals to refinance existing debts; drying up or outright elimination of credit lines (or even just changing the "risk category" of the applicant) by private bank consortia, etc. All of the above can create serious economic distress in an LDC while not providing much in the way of a nationalism-generating scapegoat.

However, in some of the more prominent examples of the successful application of economic coercion of this type—Chile between 1970 and 1973, Brazil in the early 1960s, and American pressure on the Trujillo regime in the 1960s—considerable time or the ultimate resort to other instruments, for example, violence, was required to effect American objectives. In addition, one suspects that such pressures must be indeed subtle if replication of the Cuban experience is to be avoided.

Here again, the Iranian crisis suggests some limits to the coercive use of economic leverage. To the extent that American economic warfare has an objective (which was not evident at the time of this writing) or a byproduct, a weakening of the Khomeini regime's control and further exacerbation of the internal Iranian fractionation apparent by the end of 1979, it might confirm the proposition advanced above and yet prove disastrous to American and other interests. If Iran disintegrates under economic and other American pressure into Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Baluchistani and other republics, it may well demonstrate the vulnerability of LDCs to external economic pressure. However, if the consequences of that susceptibility also include encouragement of
subnational desires for self-determination in Turkey, Iraqi intervention, or Soviet intervention to protect their energy interests in a collapsing Iran, or a significant permanent reduction of Iranian oil exports to the industrialized world, the "success" of the use of economic or other instruments of statecraft becomes at least arguable. In sum, the exercise of these instruments against less developed countries carries with it the ambiguous consequences of deeper involvement in the maelstrom of LDC internal politics—an environment into which the United States has ventured in the past with, at best, mixed results. Furthermore, to the extent that the world is interdependent, the consequences are not likely to be restricted to the "target" of the United States.

Finally, these latter uses of economic leverage offer little succor for the American policymaker seeking to orchestrate American economic power against other industrialized states—those states with which American economic relations are most intense and thus the more likely subject of politico-economic conflict and statecraft. Additionally, fulfilling the conditions for the successful application of economic leverage is likely to prove the most difficult in those instances where American policymakers might seek to direct instruments against its major antagonist, the Soviet Union. Projections of the Soviet Union being pulled increasingly into the ambit of Western economic relations because of internal economic shortfalls in food, feed grains, technology, capital, and perhaps in the future other raw materials as well, might suggest manipulable Soviet vulnerabilities. However, the experience of the 1970s suggests that the linking of American economic goods and services to Soviet political responsiveness is invariably public, highly politicized both domestically and internationally, and usually counterproductive.41

It is therefore difficult to be very sanguine about economic instrumentalities as primary policy means in the "new" international environment of the late twentieth century, where used in pursuit of general influence or in a more directly coercive manner. The very conditions of intersecting and mutual politico-economic vulnerabilities in the presence of the ambiguous efficacy of military power which constitute the purportedly new framework of international relations, may prove to be a most important limiting factor on the coercive uses of economic instrumentalities. If, on the other hand, as the traditionalists claim, and as also seems to be the case, economic relations and issues have become more highly politicized, those issues and relationships will now be regarded as the least conducive to subtle manipulation for political effect. Insofar as economic vulnerabilities have achieved the prominence now generally attributed to them, they have entered the domain
of high public salience and visibility. And under such circumstances the exercise of economic coercion is likely to elicit resistance and attempts at economic retaliation—a prospect made quite likely if, as also seems to be the case, economic vulnerabilities are, in large measure, mutual in contemporary world political economics. Low visibility and subtle orchestrations of economic leverage against weak LDCs may be more "productive." However, there will be a constant danger in these cases of pushing the target into the arms of one's adversaries. And, in any event, the benefits of maximum leverage on the world's weakest are ambiguous. If, therefore, "confrontations" between major wielders of economic capability have become the order of the day, one should have no illusions that the efficacy of politico-economic instruments will prove any less uncertain than politico-military instruments of statecraft.

**Domestic Limits and Constraints**

Even if one assumes that the international structural preconditions for successful economic leverage could be fulfilled, there is reason to conclude that the United States could not take advantage of such conditions on a sustained basis. It will be recalled that the preceding discussion of the structural requirements for the application of economic leverage assumed a minimal level of political will and diplomatic skill on the part of the state applying economic leverage. That is to say, the question whether the United States could mobilize its economic capability in a systematic policy embodying the application of economic instruments of statecraft was temporarily set aside. However, most analysis of the capacity of the Government and society to mobilize and apply economic instruments on a systematic and sustained basis is pessimistic concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the American system.

The strengths of the system have been noted above in our discussion of the character of interdependence: the sheer size of the American economy relative to the world economy, the technological virtuosity of the American system, and a position vis-a-vis other major and minor powers allowing the United States to stand at the intersection of multiple, if asymmetrical, interdependencies—which means that the United States is an essential participant in the resolution of most significant international political and economic conflicts. However, the realization of the advantages of this central position must proceed from a domestic system marked by what some fear are crippling cultural, political, and institutional disabilities.
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Concern about the political-cultural stability of the American system usually focuses on the shift from a national ethos based on traditional, bourgeois, middle-class values summarized in the notion of the "Protestant work ethic," to a new "culture of narcissism." Whereas the former embodied self-discipline, sobriety, thrift, deferral of gratification, and a commitment to the future, a recent analysis argues that

In an age of diminishing expectations, the Protestant virtues no longer excite enthusiasm. Inflation erodes investments and savings. Advertising undermines the horror of indebtedness, exhorting the consumer to buy now and pay later. As the future becomes menacing and uncertain, only fools put off until tomorrow the fun they can have today. A profound shift in our sense of time has transformed work habits, values, and the definition of success. Self-preservation has replaced self-improvement as the goal of earthly existence. . . . Men live by their wits. They hope not so much to prosper as simply to survive. . . . The happy hooker stands in place of Horatio Alger as the prototype of personal success. 4

In such a political culture doubt and cynicism concerning authority become pervasive. Hence governmental appeal and exhortation falls not on merely apathetic ears but on an increasingly hostile populace. Conceivably, such sentiment could be temporarily forged into a nationalistic consensus directed at some foreign target as part of economic warfare. However, policymakers would have to be concerned with whether such a mood could be sustained if the application of economic leverage required denial of economic goods and services that Americans had come to regard as essential or their "right." Throughout the late 1970s public officials strove to convince Americans that there was an energy crisis which required a measure of modest self-denial as part of an essentially defensive American response. The character of the popular response could hardly be encouraging to the would-be economic warrior.

This preoccupation with economic security has manifested itself in important political changes which may make the American system even less responsive to centralized mobilization. As economic growth has become less certain, the distribution of economic values within American society has inevitably become more highly politicized. Growth provided a means throughout most of American history for the deflection of political conflict onto questions of access to the politico-economic struggle. As long as participants or would-be participants in politico-economic struggle were reasonably confident that the aggregate shares would continue to grow, the relative size and distribution of the shares could remain a secondary matter. If the pie was going to grow, then
what counted was the right to participate in the process of gaining a share, for if one’s group could participate, then the opportunity for improving one’s relative standing was always available notwithstanding relative shares at any moment. Moreover, the temporary costs of adjusting the game to the admission of new participants could always be shifted onto other less powerful and as yet unrepresented social groups. If, however, growth is perceived as having slowed or even stopped, access to the struggle or mere opportunity to struggle is no longer sufficient. Now the outcome of the struggle, the size and relative shares of economic value become the primary object of the political system; equality of opportunity is no longer adequate; inequalities of outcome become more difficult to accept because they may be permanent; securing one’s position to receive the largesse of the welfare state is a matter of survival.

Under such conditions the resort to political organization to protect one’s politico-economic position becomes essential. But to the extent that such organization is successful in mobilizing political power, the process of shifting the costs of adjustment to change becomes more difficult. If international interdependence results in internal displacement, the demands for protection or compensation, or both, are made more intense. And to the extent that the political system is open and proves responsive to such internal demands, the maintenance of an open or internationalist economic posture towards the world becomes more problematic. But by the same token, asking sacrificial enlistment in economic warfare which has inequitable domestic effects is no less problematic.

The consequence is a declining capacity of the state to govern. The problem is perhaps characteristic of the Western world, but is especially acute for the United States because of its highly fragmented institutional and political structure which makes it among the weakest of the capitalist governments. The problem of structural fragmentation is in large measure inherent in the American constitutional design, but certainly events of the last decade have exacerbated the situation. Insofar as the response to the linked traumas of Vietnam and Watergate has been a reassertion of congressional prerogatives and institutional capability without major reform of an already fragmented executive branch, the result has been an even more extreme or “hyper-fragmented” Madisonian governmental structure.

The fragmentation of the executive branch needs no elaboration here. It should be noted, however, that in the area of economic policy, the executive policy mechanism does not possess even the arguable merits of a coordinating framework of the sort set forth in the National
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Security Act of 1947. The increasingly interpenetrated domains of domestic and international economic policy are spread throughout a plethora of departments, "independent" regulatory agencies and commissions, and quasi-independent or autonomous groups such as the Federal Reserve Board. Apart from normal bureaucratic politics, centrifugal force lines run to a fragmented Congress and to external constituencies and client publics outside government.

Whereas the executive could traditionally expect a degree of congressional deference on national security and foreign policy matters, economic policy and politics have never stopped at the water's edge. Moreover, within Congress decisional fragmentation is immense with scores of committees and now subcommittees jealously sharing overlapping jurisdictions and authority. Ironically, in the late 1960s and early 1970s the proliferation of subcommittees was viewed as something of a reform in that they were a means of at least diluting the hold on congressional business of the standing committee chairs. Similarly, other "reforms" within the Congress of the 1970s have contributed to this hyper-fragmentation.

Thus the response to the imperial Presidency of the 1960s was the reassertion of congressional institutional capacity and authority in the 1970s. Institutional capacity was augmented through a general "staffing-up" on the part of individual members and the establishment of new congressional staffs and analytical capacities in the form of the Congressional Budget Office, Office of Technology Assessment, and an expanded Congressional Research Service, and General Accounting Office. New congressional authority was forthcoming in challenges to Presidentially-asserted budgetary and impoundment prerogatives and the emergence of the legislative veto as a major congressional threat to executive discretionary power. At the level of the individual member, students of Congress noted that throughout the 1970s and especially in the wake of Watergate, an assertion of the independence of the individual member ensued generally at the expense of party leadership. Thus scores of new Democratic members of the House having been elected in traditionally Republican districts proved difficult to keep in line on key votes, especially those affecting the economic interests of their constituents who were often more conservative than their representatives. Unlike the 1964–66 period most of these Democratic members survived their initial reelection tests, but there was a sense that they had done so by being more solicitous of their constituencies than of the congressional party leadership. Finally, the 1970s have seen the emergence of often bitter regional conflicts over economic policy within the Congress. Significantly, some of the signal man-
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manifestations of this new line of cleavage within Congress have emerged on economic and especially energy issues.

In sum, the institutional changes of the last decade seem to have contributed to the further fragmentation of an already fragmented congressional policymaking process. There have been increases in institutional capacity, but perhaps the most significant changes have been in the direction of a greater diffusion of power within the institution thereby increasing the ponderousness of an already incremental and sometimes glacial policymaking process. In other words, an institution perhaps even more sensitive to the external pressures of a political system which is more fragmented, insecure, and prone to seeking a governmental response to its demands and discontents now constitutes the legislative core of government. In its relationship with the executive branch the Congress may be better able to play its traditional role than it has for some time. However, that role is one of checking executive initiative and not one of congressional government, as many reformers of the early 1970s had perhaps hoped. But insofar as the executive is without its own policy dynamism in the area of economic policy, the result is the inaction and false starts that have characterized the unproductive pursuit of energy policy and that drove the rapporteurs of the Trilateral Commission’s report on The Governability of Democracies to observe at mid-decade:

The absence of strong central leadership in Congress . . . made it impossible for a President to secure support from Congress in an economical fashion. The nationwide “informal governing coalitions” which have buttressed postwar Presidents . . . have substantially disintegrated. The independence of bureaucratic agencies vis-a-vis the President had inevitably been strengthened by the growing power of the national media and Congress.

The decline in governmental authority resulting from the “democratic distemper” in America reduces the capacity of the government to deal with complex problems. . . . The decline in the governability of American democracy at home means a decline in the influence of America abroad.

It is now popular to attribute much of this seeming paralysis to a lack of leadership and the self-inflicted wounds of Watergate. Perhaps, but we would point out that these apparent governmental disabilities are also the result of design. Especially with respect to economic policy, the constitutional and philosophical basis of the American system has been a preference for private over public power. From the very outset, the system was designed to maximize the private exploitation of property and the institutional framework deemed most likely to preserve this value was one of highly fragmented and essentially inefficient
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governmental structures appropriate to protecting and not transforming the status quo. Thus the original institutional design assumed fragmented government confronted with significant concentrations of private power. That intention has been in large measure fulfilled. Indeed, one might argue that it has been more than fulfilled in that even if one could somehow "rationalize" the structures of government to make international economic policymaking more efficient, one would still be confronted with enormous concentrations of financial and productive capacity beyond the bounds of government. In fact, this private economic power is now transnational in its resources and structure which raises the question whether any national power, no matter how efficiently organized and administered, can exercise control over it and its accompanying milieu for very long.

In the final analysis, therefore, the problem of whether the government of the United States is organized to understand and manage contemporary economic relationships is a question of fundamental constitutional design. To the extent, as Robert Gilpin has suggested, that these new economic relationships require a governmental response that is centralized and "efficiently" organized for sustained mobilization of the instruments of economic statecraft, then the US Government is not, at least in its present form, likely to be equal to the task. But we should have no illusions as to what a governmental structure appropriate to such a task requires in terms of transforming some of the most fundamental assumptions of American democracy.

Future Challenges

Throughout much of the last decade American policy has been suspended between two images of the international system. The notion of "complex interdependence" has tended to emphasize purportedly "new" conditions and forces present in international politics. Although not denying the continuing deterrent utility of military force, the proponents of this new perspective argue that its compellent efficacy has declined, especially for the nations of the Western industrialized world. As traditional politico-military relations and determinants of international hierarchy and structure have receded somewhat, they are now joined, indeed supplanted, by economic relations and instruments as major determinants of the international order. A more traditional image of international reality would contend that if not substantially wrong, the complex interdependence perspective is at least premature in its implicit judgment that these changes have resulted in a transformed international order. In fact, to argue as if international relations have been
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somewhat transmuted into world political economics, is to obscure dangerously the continuing primacy of politics. It is dangerous because to regard international relations in any other light than the “realists’” conception of a struggle for power is to invite disaster for the United States, in that the national interest will become prematurely identified with an as yet unformed conception of “world order” and world order policies.

Both perspectives underscore the new salience of economic relations and economic instrumentalities, but the policy prescriptions of their proponents tend to point in opposite directions. Both acknowledge the centrality of mutual but asymmetrical vulnerabilities in the contemporary system and the likelihood that these relations can become highly politicized. Proponents of the necessity of greater international management of these circumstances suggest, however, that the United States must resist the inclination to use its preponderant capacity and position in pursuit of unilateral gain. Rather, American policy should be directed at maximizing opportunities for joint gain which implies in turn the exercise of “leadership,” understood in this instance as a willingness, if necessary, to sacrifice short-term gains in the interest of international and, ultimately, depoliticized management of interdependence.

The traditionalist analysis, on the other hand, would suggest that exploitation of highly politicized vulnerabilities is an inevitable condition of an international system in which American political and economic hegemony is no longer present. Moreover, to the extent that military force has lost its efficacy for the industrialized powers, whether as the result of milieu changes or a loss of American will, the willingness to use America’s preponderant position at the nexus of complex economic interdependencies is crucial to the American national interest. Even if desirable, the opportunities for the pursuit of “joint gain” and international management are illusory, for the major economic event of our time—the OPEC oil embargo—demonstrated that relations in this new environment are not merely “economic.” Rather, that event and the new relations are quintessentially political, though the instruments are economic. The resulting crisis is, therefore, the prototype of an interdependent world order—unless the industrialized nations, especially the United States, are prepared to mobilize their considerable economic leverage (and preferably their military capability as well), confront those who would use their preponderant position astride lines of Western vulnerability, and fashion a world order which acknowledges the continuing relevance of political power and interest.

Our survey of past attempts to use economic leverage for political gain suggest, at best, a highly constrained applicability for economic instruments of statecraft within either image of international relations.
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Whether employed for coercive or more general purposes, states applying economic instruments have been confronted by circumstances that have made it extremely difficult to demonstrate the unequivocal efficacy of these instruments. Of course, it might be objected that no instrument of statecraft is likely to be unambiguously effective. We would agree, but note that the acknowledged conditions necessary to the achievement of coercive leverage—near monopoly control of necessary goods and services, "intense" target state need, and a favorable balance of political costs and benefits within the target state—have proved extraordinarily difficult to meet in the past and may prove even more so in the future. To the extent that markets and suppliers are more widely diffused and interdependent in the contemporary system and all actors more acutely sensitive to attempts to politicize and manipulate these relations, economic leverage applied for political gain must move an object that is illusive, and of weight and historical resiliency: National sovereignty and the desire for autonomy.

Further, the political and economic costs associated with the exercise must be borne by the applicant of economic leverage and, in a world of diffused economic capability and vulnerability, third parties as well. Consequently, the application of economic leverage must entail, in most circumstances, the mobilization of a multilateral effort. And to the extent that the view of highly politicized economic relations among essentially self-interested national actors is accurate, such mobilization will, as in the past, likely prove difficult to sustain, if it is achieved at all.

Finally, the American political system would seem to be a somewhat weak base from which to launch a pursuit, by economic means, of the objectives of either perspective. To the extent that the American people have become more "narcissistic" or self-regarding, it will prove difficult for a policy establishment to extract from them voluntarily, the necessary degree of sacrifice and forbearance required by either interdependence proponents or realists. A more coercive enlistment stands as an alternative, but democratic institutional constraints might well confound the attempt if it must be sustained for a prolonged period. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the policy establishment possesses the necessary degree of policy consensus or institutional cohesion for the task of "managing" the political economic environment. Popular consensus would aid in overcoming institutional fragmentation, but there would remain the mobilization and enlistment of those concentrations of transnational private economic power so central to the American ethos.

Robert Gilpin has suggested that if politicized economic power and competition continue or become even more salient in the future, that:
This situation, if carried to its logical extreme, would be the transformation of all economies into mobilization economies. But, whereas the mobilization economies of the past were organized for military conflict, those of the future would be organized for economic conflict. In an age of economic interdependence and of mutual military restraint, international economic relations—to paraphrase Clausewitz—could well become the pursuit of policy by other means. If so, however, the American system will confront its severest challenge, for the notion of a "mobilization economy" implies a mode of social, political, and economic organization antithetical to that on which the United States was founded.
Changing Military Manpower Realities: Implications for the Next Decade

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Can the United States be adequately defended in the next quarter century? This is more than a rhetorical question. It is not generated by the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. Nor is it generated by public expressions of concern over whether the US military establishment is receiving a sufficient allotment of funds for its purposes. Rather, this question is generated by recent trends in the all-volunteer force which suggest that changing military manpower realities will have an important effect upon the future national security efforts of the United States.

Indeed, one might hypothesize that changing military manpower realities may be the single most critical and persistent issue impinging upon US policy in the next decade. The inability to recruit and retain sufficient high-quality military personnel may seriously constrain the choices of national security policymakers. The salience of this issue led to the development of this chapter which seeks to stimulate an informed awareness and discussion of these changing realities.

What evidence is there that the manpower issue will become critical? The most recent visible indication of the future problems that the US military may face was its inability to attract sufficient numbers of recruits in fiscal year 1979. Since recruiting statistics have turned down, there now seems to be a greater receptivity to a broad-ranging discussion of the factors that may have contributed to these shortfalls which are summarized in table 1.

The US military fell short of its recruiting goals in fiscal year 1979 by approximately 24,000 young men and women. Significantly, for the

Author's Note: The primary materials that provoked the thoughts contained in this chapter were generated while I edited The Changing World of the American Military (Westview Press, 1978). Thus, in developing my analysis and conclusions, I am indebted to the thirty-three scholars who contributed to that work.
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Table 1

DOD Recruiting Results
(Fiscal Year 1979: 1 October 1978–30 September 1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Service</th>
<th>Recruiting Objective</th>
<th>Number Recruited</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
<th>Percent of Objective Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>158,700</td>
<td>142,700</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>84,830</td>
<td>79,630</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>41,500</td>
<td>40,300</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>66,600</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>353,030</strong></td>
<td><strong>329,230</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>93</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


first time, even the Air Force failed to achieve quarterly and yearly recruiting goals. Not contained in this statistical summary are the questions that have been raised about the integrity of hard-pressed recruiters in several military services as they tried to achieve difficult quotas.\(^1\) The prospects for meeting future quotas are not necessarily better and there is at least a possibility that the active duty Armed Forces could fall below the 2 million mark in the 1980s, or that the quality of new recruits could diminish.

Unfortunately, a brief review of other issues facing the US military signals that the problems of recruiting eighteen-year-olds may be only symbolic of broader trends. For instance, the Reserves and the National Guard (in late 1978) were well under the strength required for a full wartime mobilization.\(^2\) Table 2 graphically highlights the decreases in active duty and Reserve strengths. Significantly, the success of the all-volunteer force depends upon a total force policy which has shifted many important wartime tasks and equipment to the Reserve structure.

Problems in manning the active-duty forces have also appeared. The US Marines have been unable to recruit enough young men to fill their ranks; their numbers will decline to below statutory provisions.\(^3\) The US Navy has recently reported the highest rates of desertion and unauthorized absence in the distinguished history of that service and suffers from serious shortages of skilled petty officers. These shortages of skilled technicians became so severe in the spring of 1980 that the US Navy could not send one of its major ships to sea, for want of a skilled crew; this was the first time in recent memory that such an action has become necessary.\(^4\)
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Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>Selected Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,687,000</td>
<td>953,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,547,000</td>
<td>922,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,127,000</td>
<td>896,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,049,000</td>
<td>788,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,014,000</td>
<td>807,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The US Army is having difficulty in recruiting, and, as publicly acknowledged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is burdened with drug abuse problems in Europe. In addition, top officials describe a unique military phenomenon: when alert signals sound in West Germany, Army troops—male and female—show up with their children in hand, leave them in dayrooms, pick up their rifles, and go about their duties. Army generals express concern that in the event of war, troops in Central Europe may rush home to join their families rather than head toward the front to protect them.5

The United States Air Force currently faces the problem of massive resignations by its critical warrior force—the young pilots between the six- and eleven-year career point; in some major commands this loss is so serious that the Air Force has had to reassign senior pilots from staff jobs back to the cockpit. And the loss of pilots from the Navy and Marines is also severe.6

Since much of the incentive to join the all-volunteer military is economic, one cannot discuss shortfalls in recruitment and retention without addressing the importance of economic inducements to new recruits and those serving on active duty. Indeed, in discussing the all-volunteer military with hundreds of officers and enlisted personnel, it has become clear to me that the economic quality of their families' lifestyles is an important factor in career choices; this is especially true in those career fields where military service has created a special skill which is also quite marketable in our competing American civilian economy. In recognition of the key role of economic incentives in recruiting and retaining personnel, the Service Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, 103
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and key congressional committees have of late given significant attention to this issue.7

Another very important variable has recently come to our Nation's attention—there are now serious questions about the quality of the forces we have recruited since the advent of the all-volunteer force. Although there had long been rumbles at the unit level about the ability of new recruits to read, learn, and accept minimum levels of discipline, the overall recruiting statistics suggested that it was possible to describe the US military as the best in the history of our Nation, and one which had attracted a high proportion of recruits in the higher intelligence categories. Recently, however, the Department of Defense has discovered that its aptitude tests may have been improperly calibrated against those used in the past, which tended to give higher test scores to those in the lower mental categories. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, Robert B. Pirie, told the Senate in March 1980 that there may be five times as many military members in the lowest intelligence category—category four—as originally estimated. Mr. Pirie noted that under the old estimates, 10 percent of Army recruits were in category four, but under the new estimates that percentage may now be as high as 45 percent. The problems this generates in training the Army enlisted force is evidenced by massive failures of the basic Skill Qualification Tests which measure a soldier's mastery of required combat skills. Not only have test scores perhaps been faulty, but also there is strong suspicion that recruiters have fraudulently enlisted and falsified records of thousands of recruits who would not normally qualify for military service.8

By probing beneath surface manifestations, one can speculate that these developments are mere symbols of basic changes affecting the US military. Nonetheless, these and other factors suggest that legitimate questions remain about the ability of the US military to defend the United States adequately in the near future. Are these phenomena transitory, a phase in the development of the all-volunteer force, or are there precedents in US history? Are there implications for national security policymakers? Are there remedies or approaches that might help alleviate the impact of the manpower issue on our national defense posture? What helps to explain these relatively recent phenomena? Since the economic aspect of military service is receiving widespread public attention, this chapter will focus upon an area which has received almost no attention, but may be equally important—the psychological dimension of attitudes toward military service.

104
The Crucial Issues: Military Self-Concept and the Declining Legitimacy of Military Service

From World War II to the present, the United States has accepted worldwide security responsibilities, but, since 1973, has attempted to shoulder these responsibilities with relatively large military forces procured through an all-volunteer system. The combination of these factors makes this a unique period in the American military experience.

The problems facing US policymakers are very complex. However, in focusing upon the developments within the all-volunteer military, two generalizations may provide some understanding of manpower issues. Like any summary concepts, these overarching, rather abstract, ideas do not fully explain the phenomena; however, they may provide an intellectual framework within which to analyze more discrete social and environmental trends that can provide us with some explanatory power.

I hypothesize that two underlying concepts help us to understand why sufficient youngsters will not join the US military and why the military will have an increasingly difficult time retaining quality personnel to do complicated defense tasks in an era of high-technology weapon systems. To a certain extent these two concepts are interconnected, although one deals primarily with the military's view of itself, and the other provides a major linkage with the society.

Within the military, I propose that both institutions and individuals are subconsciously wrestling with a very difficult "identity crisis." The notion of a military identity crisis was suggested by several authors in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, this concept seems to have even more explanatory power today because, since Vietnam, the pace of change in the military may have accelerated and thus exacerbated earlier incomplete adjustments. We join these authors and suggest that the US military is trying to adjust its self-concept and is struggling to sort out what it is, who it is, what it should be doing, and why it is important to "wear the uniform." The military is accommodating to striking and dramatic social and environmental change. It is struggling to create a new set of values and a new ethos that will support the military institution as it moves toward the twenty-first century.

A second abstract concept that may provide explanatory power is the suggestion that the military faces a declining sense of the legitimacy of military service. Several factors currently make this service more closely approximate service in the 1930s than in the 1950s or 1960s. A major question is how "legitimate" is service in the US military in the 1980s, although in many respects, military service has historically been
somewhat “un-American.” Samuel P. Huntington best described the clear dichotomy between the norms and values of American society and the norms and values required of a combat-ready military force. American societal norms flow from nineteenth-century liberalism, a capitalistic free-enterprise economic system, the Judeo-Christian ethic, individualism, self-interest, and principles exemplified by the one-man, one-vote concept. On the other hand, the military is structured, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and comparatively authoritarian. The military draft once bridged the gap across these two value systems in suggesting that it was the duty of young Americans to serve in the military as part of their civic responsibilities.

I do not yet believe that a return to the draft is either desirable or politically feasible. I do infer that a major problem in an all-volunteer system is the matter of convincing eighteen-year-old Americans from a relatively liberal society with one set of values to enter the military and accept more structured military values. Such adjustments are much easier when society is stirred by emotional or psychological concerns for national security and when individuals recognize that service in the military is a commitment to the national interest. The adjustments were perhaps easiest during World War II. But, today, it has become increasingly difficult to convince young Americans to adopt the values, norms, and sacrifices of military service in a peacetime environment, and it has become increasingly difficult to rationalize continued military service and sacrifice to quality military members.

Young Americans are asked to leave their families and live for six months at a time on aircraft carriers and sleep in steel bunks surrounded by the hum and the buzz of equipment. Youths from New York City must be convinced that every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday they must take their rifles and crawl around in the mud of north-central Europe. Air Force captains are asked to fly in the Military Airlift Command and be away from their families almost one-half of the time when airline pilots fly less, under better conditions, and earn two to five times the amount of money. A democratic society can tolerate these artificial conditions when it is emotionally and psychologically concerned about its security. But such acceptance is more difficult under present international and national circumstances. In their sampling of 17,000 high school seniors, Bachman and Johnston clearly document that the military work setting is viewed as the least desirable or acceptable of all of those offered. Only 5 percent view military service as desirable, while 50 percent find it not acceptable. Thus, young citizens have returned to the historic perception of military service as a responsibility (or as desirable or acceptable) only when the Nation is clearly and directly
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threatened. Because of several current and future trends, potential and actual military members sense this societal evaluation as making service in the US military much less legitimate in the decade ahead, which will make it difficult to recruit and retain quality personnel.

Current and Future Trends

An analysis of several broad social trends and environmental factors can help explain why the military is struggling to create a new identity and set of values and why the legitimacy of military service is questioned. There are naturally many interrelated factors that have helped create this subconscious questioning attitude, both within the military and society. Among the more important are a more complex interdependent international arena; an evolution in the relationships between the executive and legislative branches of Government; a major change in social values which has most explicitly acted itself out within the military through the increasing recruitment of and demands placed upon military institutions by minorities and women; the change of the military into a married institution; the decline in the youth manpower pool: an increase in the centralization of choice and command; and, finally, the effects of technology which have moved the military toward an occupational model and increased civilianization of military functions.

With the concepts of "identity crisis" and "declining legitimacy of service," we have summarized the intellectual confusion resulting from the interplay of, and accommodation to, these dynamic factors: as the military and society adjust, old beliefs are questioned and traditional modes of operating and thinking no longer suffice. All of these factors are being "digested" by the military today; this is a period of adaptation to dynamic change on many fronts. And one of the more confusing aspects of current military life revolves around the more sophisticated knowledge and understanding required by the current international system.

We live in an increasingly complex interdependent world in which the Soviet Union has achieved military parity in many areas and, superiority perhaps, in others. The elite elements of the US population can understand Presidential calls for a strong defense on the one hand and negotiations for strategic arms limitations on the other. But the average American finds it difficult to understand and support both premises and then commit himself psychologically and emotionally to national defense. A farm boy in Kansas questions the requirement for him to stand in Western Europe when his father has sold wheat to the Soviets for six years; indeed, his father may become quite upset over
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embargoes of grain to the Soviet Union. In addition, the threat from "the Communists" appears less direct and understandable when the North Vietnamese attack Cambodian Communists, China invades North Vietnam, and the Soviets mass a major military force on the northern Chinese frontier.

Military force is not very useful in addressing energy shortages, an inflated dollar, rising interest rates, or international trade competition. The world is more complex; the threats are more subtle; the role of the military is less evident and useful; it is increasingly difficult to develop a clear-cut policy consensus about ways to deal with issues in this complex world.

Indeed, after the failure of the Vietnamese intervention, the United States is much less likely to use its military power abroad. Economic power has grown in importance as a lever in international relations. Although Americans rate the US military highly as an institution, the American public was no more willing to become militarily involved abroad in 1976 than it was in 1940. And that is a dramatic low point in public sentiment. However, recent threats in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia may be gradually altering these views in the body politic.

Growing restrictions on the freedom of action of the executive branch, the Department of Defense, and the military services further confound the military as it adjusts to these international realities. The balance and separation of constitutional powers is obviously being rearranged in Washington as the Congress reasserts itself. Although reassertion of congressional prerogatives began about 1965 during the Vietnam war, the Watergate incident added to the momentum, with Congress now challenging forty years of executive dominance.

The earliest evidence of renewed congressional strength was the growth in the size and confidence of congressional staffs and increased congressional interest in foreign policy and national security. Since 1965, Congress has expanded its own administrative budget to almost one billion dollars, has created several new research agencies, and has doubled the number of its employees. Two specific legislative actions are important symbolic events in the reestablishment of congressional initiative—the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The 1973 Resolution is a major potential restraint on the use of military force because it limits the President to a sixty-day commitment of the Armed Forces before he must seek congressional concurrence and approval. It injects Congress into contingencies below a declaration of war, which is viewed as a limited alternative in the nuclear age. The restrictions implied by
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this resolution are clear signals that Congress will be more active in important national security choices of the future.\textsuperscript{14}

As noted, although the general public is reluctant to commit US Forces overseas, strong executive leadership or clearly perceived threats might change these attitudes; the President always retains the capacity to mobilize congressional and public opinion behind his commitments in the national security arena. But the executive branch appears to have less latitude in this area than at any time since the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{15} These congressional and public restrictions complicate the tasks of the President and the military in an age when cataclysmic or dramatic threats to US security are not likely. There will be few Pearl Harbors in the future. Threats to US security and well-being will likely come in longer range, more subtle, and more sophisticated forms.

Similar restrictions in the budget area emerge from passage of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Military leadership faces new budgeting procedures and another set of important actors in justifying major program budgets. Congress now recognizes that the Federal budget is a more limited resource with virtually unlimited demands on it. Many of these demands stem from earlier programs that require continuing mandatory budget entitlements. And this budgeting takes place within a constrained economy. Growing interdependence in the international economic arena and limitations placed on growth by scarce resources, particularly energy, suggest a national economy that may never again expand at the rapid rates of the post-World War II era. Inflation, a degree of industrial stagnation, and a relatively high level of unemployment seem to face advanced industrial societies as they move into a post-industrial age. Thus, the military may continue to receive a “fair share” of the total Federal budget, but it must recognize that this budget will be a portion of a total gross national product that may not expand as rapidly as in the past. All programs will be more carefully scrutinized, and out-year costs will be measured against other military and social programs.

A major political revamping seems to be under way, and the new balance between executive and congressional power is not yet clearly drawn. The military may be profoundly affected by important shifts in civil-military relations. Congress has not only taken a more intense interest in shaping national policy and in guiding the executive bureaucracy, it has also created its own bureaucracy which is devoted to researching and preparing approaches to national security policy concerns.
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Indeed, increasing staff capability in the executive and legislative branches may require the military services and the Department of Defense to reexamine their techniques for justifying military programs. Will operational skills and a chest full of ribbons be as credible as they were in the past? A new Chief of Staff will face testimony on narrow issues that he has never before addressed in his military career. Questions will be framed by congressional staff members with impressive credentials and years of experience in following given programs. Military assignment policies based on functional experiences and high turnover rates may no longer serve the Pentagon staffs. Credentials, experience, and continuity in dealing with Congress may become as valuable as operational experience and rank. Heroic leaders of US combat forces may find their interests best represented in Washington by a military managerial elite.16

At best, the military can expect to face a more adequately staffed Congress which is much more likely to mandate more detailed changes in military programs and policies. These changing executive-congressional relationships are likely to reduce institutional freedom of action, complicate decisionmaking, put military assignment and educational procedures in question, and intensify self-doubt and questions about the legitimacy of military service. The military must cope with these new realities while dealing with significant changes in its social environment.

The military is currently accommodating within its ranks a process of social change germinated in the 1960s. Everyone who has teenagers can certify that the youth of today have adopted values that are different from those of the generations that preceded them. One must be cautious about predicting social trends, particularly in such a volatile era when today’s rapid communications intensify “generation gaps” that may occur every two or three years, rather than every twenty or thirty. However, the values of youths have been shaped by several major factors. A more affluent society has permitted them to prolong their choice or commitment to a particular career path or educational program. There have been conflicts between the pressures generated by the advent of the “pill,” changing attitudes toward the need for marriage, a somewhat existentialist concern with “doing one’s own thing” and the more conservative constraints once imposed by church and traditional family structures.

While these broad social currents have been affecting the Nation’s youth, more organized movements have generated significant changes in societal relationships and attitudes toward minorities and women. The liberation movements of the 1960s and the early 1970s are now
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acting themselves out in greater detail within the military. Minorities and women moved forward and demanded a more equitable share of social and economic opportunities. Since the all-volunteer era, the US military has recruited a significantly higher number of minorities and women. As this trend continues in the 1980s, these groups will seek an increasingly greater share of rank and important jobs. The result is a natural trauma and confusion within the traditional military structure. The self-concept and self-image of the military as a "macho," almost all-male, relatively white institution has been shattered. The military must create a new image of itself, one that can accommodate relatively large numbers of minorities and women within its ranks.

But the inclusion of increasing numbers of women creates other issues for the hierarchical military structure and self-image. Attractive female two-stripers marry sergeants. Air Force nurse captains marry Air Force staff sergeants. Questions are raised about whether particular supervisors are favoring some of those supervised because of their sex. "Sexual harassment" and "women in combat" become contentious issues. On a daily basis, in many units, social change and adjustment are taking place and, until they are resolved, will continue to create doubts about the organizing ethos of the military profession.

In a more formal way, increased marriage between service members will create its own unique personnel problems. There will be increased tension and strain caused by personnel movement requirements. Issues will be raised about the care of children. If both spouses are in a combat or combat-support unit, family tensions will be generated by deployment or normal military alerts. Unless unique adaptations are made, it will be increasingly difficult to keep portions of this force both combat-ready and relatively content. Some of these tensions are even now causing retention problems in critical skill areas.

At the same time, the military faces adjustments required by the fact that it has become a married institution, that marriages have changed, and that military members and their spouses now come from different social classes. In the 1950s, approximately 35 percent of the US military were married; in the late 1970s, over 60 percent are married. The Air Force officer corps includes the highest percentage of married personnel (89 percent). These families have been shaped by the same social forces that generated the demands for rights of minorities and women.

Morris Janowitz forecasted a more socially representative officer corps: this meant recruitment from lower social classes than was true in the 1930s. A more socially representative officer corps is now a fact, but there is little analysis of what this has meant to fundamental
changing military manpower realities

military traditions and attitudes. As Admiral Gerald E. Miller recognizes, the military has become more egalitarian as lower social classes have entered the officer corps. Officers and their wives no longer bring to the service those upper-class traditions based on breeding in elitist families.

On the other hand, many wives now possess college degrees and feel that they are relatively competent to deal with their own environment. For many of these reasons, the military is no longer viewed as an all-embracing institution. It can no longer approximate a small elite club of people from similar backgrounds. And it can no longer take for granted a group of spouses who are willing to sit at home, take care of the family, and wait for Daddy to return from his twenty-four-hour-a-day job or from an overseas tour. Civilian spouses now are sometimes male, and officers of both sexes have married enlisted members. The entire social composition of the military force has changed, and this change has hardly received public recognition.

The military community's value system was once generated by a small corps of officers, recruited from upper social classes and indoctrinated at the academies. The modern military is broadly recruited and has discarded much of the social ritual of the 1930s. American social values, norms, and dress have penetrated the once separate lifestyle of the army post. This penetration by different social classes has been reinforced or, perhaps, has even been led by the mass nature of American communications, merchandising, and publishing. Societal values, styles, and ideas overwhelm any values generated by the uniqueness of the military profession. More than half of the wives work with members of the civilian community, and children go to school with other children from all walks of life. And because of improved pay scales, both single and married members are much more able to live in the civilian community. There is no longer an all-encompassing consensual set of military values and sense of legitimacy of military service. The "suburban Army" is a reality.

Families passively resist moving, changing, and acceding to the demands of the military environment, which requires movement to achieve readiness and upward mobility. Whereas a single member once made sacrifices with a sense of excitement, sacrifices become more difficult when a married member must account for a working spouse and children. The services will have to recognize more clearly, and adjust to, the growing tension between increased numbers of more independent families and the normal demands of military readiness and mobility. Pressures from these very different military families will continue to cause service members to doubt their career choices and the
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continued acceptability of their service. An uneasy balance must be
struck if retention problems are to remain manageable.

Unfortunately, an even less tractable issue faces the United States
in the 1980s; youth demography may be one of the more critical vari-
ables facing future planners. After the Korean war, the US birth rate
fell off sharply: this means that the military is beginning to reap the
shortage of eighteen-year-olds. By 1990, there will be approximately
20 percent fewer youths turning eighteen each year than there were
when the all-volunteer force was implemented.\textsuperscript{2} A look at the Orwellian
year of 1984 is informative: to maintain military strength at 1979 levels
with 1979 ratios of male to female personnel and authorized numbers
of Reserves, we must recruit one of every two eligible young male
Americans who will not attend college in 1984. Since the US military
currently experiences difficulty in recruiting one of three male Americans
and many young people seem to question the merits of military service,
this will be a formidable, if not impossible, task.\textsuperscript{22}

The US military may well recruit more women, yet still shrink in
size and quality based on an inability to recruit and retain high caliber
young male Americans. One can engage in further pessimistic spec-
ulation that viable, youthful US Reserve Forces may dwindle signifi-
cantly, with the exception of certain elite Air Force and Navy units
closely integrated with regular forces.

While society is producing a reduced pool of eighteen-year-olds,
we can observe other trends that may not be quite so crucial, but which
contribute to a sense of quiet doubt and frustration in the operational
fighting units. During normal peacetime operations, technology permits
the highest level of command to determine attitudes and issues, ma-
ipulate these data rapidly through the use of computer technology,
and then implement servicewide policies. During crisis situations, tech-
nology permits decisions to be made and transmitted from the centers
of civilian and military command. The use of these capabilities signifi-
cantly affects the power, control, and authority of the traditional chain
of command, especially that of local unit commanders. Major changes
in social organization will eventually come to the forefront if these trends
continue.

Admiral Miller has made a pointed and forceful plea for the military
to regain its authority or lose its credibility as a valued profession.\textsuperscript{23}
Others have counterbalanced his argument with their explanation of
centralization and its causes. Clearly, the age of nuclear weapons,
computers, instant communications, and everything implied by these
technologies are aspects of future military life. The complexities and
costs of modern weapon systems and the potential nuclear conse-
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quences of battlefield error have affected earlier concepts of the chain of command. Although traditional chains of command have remained intact, and large staffs have continued their functions, instant communications and computer networks may have made these management elements somewhat anachronistic. Modes of operation tend to centralize functions and choices at higher levels of command and staff.

There must be a more fundamental understanding of the problems faced by small unit and local commanders. They are burdened by responsibility for their organizations, but they control very few of the resources and the individuals provided to them. Military organizations are organized functionally, and functionally specialized individuals are often efficiently assigned from central locations and distributed to the various operating commands and units. But local commanders have little choice in deciding who works for them, how often they will be rotated, or what priority is given to their unit needs. These natural, modern developments frustrate career military members and cause them to question the continued viability of military service.

An offshoot of the increasing specialization required in a modern military establishment has been the growth of staffs and bureaucracy. The well-known management consultant and author, George Odiorne, has provocatively described the problems of individuals when they deal with a faceless, large bureaucracy, such as the military. We have yet to understand fully the effects of this bureaucracy on the efficiency of the organization; the role of this bureaucratic structure may help explain the occupational malaise found in samples of service members and in the negative feelings of high school seniors toward the job climate offered by the military.

Technology has thus permitted, or perhaps even forced, the centralization of management and the growth of bureaucracy within the US defense organization. Technology can also be viewed as a major force in challenging the ethos of the military institution. Charles Moskos provides us one of the more informative recent sociological analyses of the US military and suggests that the military is moving toward an occupational model and away from the more traditional mode of viewing the military as a "calling" or institution. Moskos' model seems a very accurate surface description of trends within the US Armed Forces. Although the occupational model is enlightening, it restates, in many respects, Janowitz' forecast that the US military would require increased combinations of administrative and managerial talents with the more traditional attributes of the heroic combat leader.

Moskos' model for understanding recent trends pushes beyond Janowitz' predictions, however. Moskos infers that the changes have
been more explicit within the junior ranks, those recruited since the advent of an all-volunteer force which proposed a basically economic approach toward military service. In any discussion of these issues, it is important to use Moskos' understanding of "institution" and "occupation" to guide our thinking. An institution is legitimated in terms of institutional values with purposes which transcend individual self-interest for a higher good. Compensation is often in the form of social benefits in the institutional format (such as allowances, quarters, and food), and individuals do not organize to seek redress of grievances. An occupation, on the other hand, is legitimated in marketplace terms with prevailing monetary rewards for contractual services. Employees usually have some voice in salary and work conditions: focus is upon self-interest organized through unions.

Moskos' analysis can only be the beginning of understanding of the complexities of the modern military. Moskos provides a precise description of recent trends in the military, but his model deserves further consideration in terms of its depth of analysis, causes of trends, and the effects of an occupational model on the military. In the first case, the model aids understanding of macro trends, but it cannot accurately describe any particular subset of the military. As is necessarily true of most models, it oversimplifies reality.

There are vast differences in functions, missions, and manning within the US military. The author's experiences in the US Air Force lead to the conclusion that there are perhaps thirty or forty air forces. All Air Force members share the blue uniform and a vague belief that they contribute to national defense. But beyond these two shared values, they may find very little in common.

Bomb squadrons, fighter squadrons, and missile operations have a high institutional character. These organizations consist primarily of officers and they are characterized by high esprit de corps: by commonly shared values and knowledge; and by symbols, such as unique patches, that set them apart. These combat organizations also share unique hardships—the potential for overseas missions at any time and the requirement to be always alert and on duty nights and holidays. Although there is always the risk of death in combat, in flying organizations, death may come on a routine training flight. These factors build a unique and all-encompassing lifestyle for these individuals and organizations.

As we move further from the flight line toward support areas, the occupational model appears more prevalent. Staff work, for example, is perhaps more bureaucratic than institutional, although the military in many ways has created a unique bureaucracy with distinct character-
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istics. Functional support areas, such as finance, personnel, supply, procurement, and civil engineering, are more able to organize their activities on the basis of a standard workday and standard workweek. Further away from the operational units, the occupational model becomes even more prevalent. In the massive logistics complexes, one finds fewer military members and more civilian employees who lead relatively stable lives with normal working hours.

Entirely different and necessarily looser styles of operation are common in the large research and development complexes. These operations are similar in many respects to the operations in any large bureaucratic research system. Rank is often less important than credentials, experience, and scientific know-how. Virtually no research has been conducted on the social organizations that develop among the highly technical services associated with these large support areas. Every organization in the military may thus be more or less vocational, professional, or occupational.

Not only does Moskos' model require further qualification in level of analysis, but we might also examine the validity of his explanation of causes. Moskos suggests, in general, that the move to an all-volunteer concept based on economic competition in the marketplace has produced an occupational model. This neglects the broad social movements that have led to increased demands by workers and youth for participation in choices and for "fate control." One might deduce from other analyses that several other powerful factors have merely been reinforced by higher pay.29 These same factors might also explain, in a subtle manner, why an all-volunteer force is based on an economically competitive approach.

Of particular importance are the implications of advanced technology for the social organization of the military. From the author's Air Force perspective, one might argue that technology is the organizational essence of the Air Force. This same phenomenon will grow in all of the services. The Air Force is not organized around masses of men who deliver firepower; it is, instead, organized around a relatively small number of sophisticated, high-technology war machines. Produced in cooperative ventures with industry at the cutting edges of science and technology, these machines incorporate a continuously expanding array of improved mechanical, electrical, and aerodynamic devices. The fighting force in the Air Force is relatively small, and consists of college-educated officers who have completed significant advanced training within the military. The technology of the equipment requires more intelligent users who combine intellectual and physical skills to make their machines function efficiently. The Air Force can deliver high vol-
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umes of firepower, and it can range the globe at a moment’s notice. Indeed, this is a unique fighting force.

The technology of maintaining these machines also requires a different kind of organization and enlisted man. The Air Force wing exists to support the fighting squadron. Brainpower and training often take precedence over physical stamina in the tasks of a wing. Repairing an advanced airborne radar system or using a computerized supply system to produce the required inventory of parts requires an enlisted technician carefully trained in the classroom and on the job.

Technology ultimately affects organizational and leadership styles. The bodies of knowledge required to keep high-technology machines operational are diverse and complex. Therefore, functional specialization requires that individuals must learn narrow and specialized tasks in greater depth. Many of these tasks are similar to the tasks performed in civilian occupations related to high-technology areas, such as computers or industrial production.

A wing commander cannot repair his airplanes, although he is able to fly them; an Army, or a Marine, division commander can field-strip his men’s rifles, but he cannot repair his armor or helicopters. Technology has led the military toward an industrial type of scheduling and planning. Machines must be repaired on fixed time schedules; work loads must be planned and programmed months in advance at distant locations. Since work away from combat is relatively scheduled and planned, it is more likely to “create” an occupational mode. It may be more efficient to have these workers available during a relatively standard workday in an occupational mode.

Technology that demands high levels of specialization and relatively high levels of education and training drives the occupational model in all services. The nature of the jobs associated with a high-technology military might be an underlying factor in the adoption of an economic approach to recruitment. If one requires quality computer programmers, inventory specialists, and procurement experts, then one must compete with the private sector.

One also must adopt different leadership styles than those required to lead unquestioning men in an action-oriented ground combat environment. There is a different kind of discipline involved in maintaining high-technology war machines and in organizations where the vast majority support a small number of officer “warriors.” Rank, which is a traditional form of authority, is challenged by technology which suggests expertise as a criterion for leadership. In addition, as technology changes job standards and qualifications, there is legitimate confusion
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about the boundary lines between civilian society and its tasks and those that differentiate the military as a unique organization.

Many social scientists wonder about the relative success of the Air Force in recruitment and retention of personnel, and the low level of such indicators of dissatisfaction as desertion rates, absent-without-leave rates, and disciplinary incidents. Could one reason for this success be that the Air Force is less traditional and has subconsciously moved toward an occupational style based on its high technology business? Are fewer Air Force people in an institutional vocational role? Is "the Air Force style," thus, closer to the norms of a more liberal, industrial society?

We can speculate that the effect of this trend toward an occupational model may be a positive factor in recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel in certain areas. But these technological effects, at the same time, are challenging the military to adopt different organizational and leadership forms to adjust to these new military manpower realities.

Adjusting to New Realities

The US military, thus, is adjusting to a complex set of dynamic technological, social, and environmental factors. It is intellectually convenient to summarize this process of adjustment with our two concepts; in coping with these major changes, the military is struggling to resolve its identity, establish a new set of institutional values, and formulate a new rationale that once again makes military service more legitimate.

Many of these same agonies are shared by other important American social institutions. Indeed, one might suggest that it is normal in our democratic society for the military to pass through a period of self-doubt and retrenchment after each important war effort. What makes this quiet and subconscious soul-searching important is that it is affecting the US military's capacity to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of quality youth. What makes this "normal" retrenchment important is the changed role played by America in the world. For the first time, the United States is a linchpin of world stability, the leader of the democratic West, and the center of a series of security commitments. These worldwide commitments, and particularly the US commitment to assist our NATO allies in a conventional defense of Western Europe, have generated a goal of a standing, combat-ready force of approximately 2.1 million military personnel.²⁹

Barring a major and threatening international crisis, or a significant shift within the American political system and the Congress, the military
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will continue to recruit in an all-volunteer mode, without the assistance of the draft or any form of general youth national service. The analysis in this chapter relies upon a description of several broad social and environmental trends. So long as these persist, the issues described as a crisis of identity and as declining legitimacy of service will continue. The US military will thus struggle to maintain its size and its quality, with a very high probability that it will not be successful in the open marketplace.

Lest I be accused of being merely a Cassandra bringing ill tidings, it is incumbent that this chapter provide some preliminary approaches for adjusting to the implications of this gloomy analysis. Neither this chapter, nor this volume, aim to solve problems. Rather, our primary purpose is to focus upon evolving strategic realities that might act as catalysts and constraints upon national security policymakers in the future. Prescriptions for US national policy are, at best, a chancy business. Nevertheless, several potentially helpful questions may be suggested. At this stage of formulation, these proposals are admittedly heuristic and will require much more careful analysis.

National security policymakers might consider the assumption of the possibility of significantly smaller US military forces. A force size of 1.3 million to 1.7 million is not out of the question by 1985–1990 and contingency planning might include this prospect. This force could contain increasingly larger proportions of minorities and women. Inferring from our earlier social analysis, it could become more difficult to maintain this force in a combat-ready posture without seriously jeopardizing reasonable retention rates.

Rational and farsighted decisionmakers may have to face up to very difficult and unpalatable choices, but it is best to at least study these issues prior to the time that an emergency demands immediate choice. Should US planners quietly recalculate the priorities and weight of US international troop commitments? Based upon potentially declining manpower force sizes, should a decremented set of commitments be developed? Could new analyses again examine the advantages and disadvantages of a large US-based strategic reserve versus forces deployed in overseas bases?

The whole spectrum of military tasks may be reexamined and debated: a very important question can be posed. Should a manpower resource allocation system be developed that approximates the bureaucratically political process of allocating fiscal resources to armed service missions and weapon systems? Roles and missions could be weighed against each other, and those of highest priority might receive the appropriate skill levels and numbers of people from the declining pool available.
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At the most abstract national level, thus, the fundamental international security assumptions that undergird US commitments and force structures may be challenged by changing military manpower realities. However, some of the impact of these evolving strategic realities may be mitigated by other available alternatives.

Many of the dire circumstances suggested in this paper can be reduced, especially if the growing public debate about this manpower reality continues. Perhaps one of the more important approaches is a relatively simple one—we must develop a clear recognition on the part of responsible civilian and military officials that the "people problem" may be one of the most serious, near-term national security issues. This does not denigrate the growing capability of potential adversaries, the increasing tension and instability in the world, or the threats to economic well-being generated by an increasingly complex and uncertain world resource and trade market. One of the primary purposes of this paper is to reinforce a growing awareness that the inability to recruit and retain quality people may, in the long run, weigh equally with these other considerations. If this premise is ultimately accepted, then there are several innovations that may assist in coping with manpower issues.

At the national level, could American manpower be viewed more systematically and more coherently than in the past? For instance, the Federal Government funds "competing" youth programs—in education, job training, youth employment, and military service. Survey data strongly indicate that educational opportunity is one of the best ways to increase the potential military manpower pool, particularly among college-bound, middle-class youths who have virtually abandoned enlisted military service as a viable short-term opportunity. Training for future jobs has also been validated as a high motivator for military recruitment. Could innovative and more systematic treatment of varying Federal programs integrate these forms of youth training and education while providing higher quality recruits for the military? Could some of these programs either be combined with military service or be "rewards" after shorter military tours (six months to two years) are completed? This would be particularly beneficial to the ground combat arms which have a higher demand for trainees whose skills may be honed in a shorter time; however, we must recognize the irony in this approach. Incentives to join, such as education and training, become incentives to leave, since education and training make youths more marketable to civilian industry.

A corollary to this approach would be further progress along paths already charted by the Department of Defense. Must there be clearer
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recognition that the manpower pool within the Department of Defense is a more integrated system that is often studied as though it had distinct and very separate parts? For instance, the all-volunteer force relies upon a total force policy which heavily integrates reserve forces into military calculations. In the past, however, has recruitment of regular and reserve forces sometimes been treated very differentially by scholars and legislation? Have the steps taken to improve recruitment or retention potential in one portion of the forces always been completely assessed for possible impact upon the others? If there is a relatively limited pool of potential military volunteers, do inducements which increase reserve recruitment potential have a negative impact upon regular forces, and vice versa?

A final aspect of the suggestion that manpower must be more carefully considered as an integrated system might involve a more careful focus upon the end results desired. If one takes a primarily economic and numeric approach at the input end of the manpower spectrum, then statistics may indicate that recruiting policies are succeeding. However, is the ultimate payoff in national defense the combat readiness of the force? What if the recruits are increasingly married with children, or lack a high-school education, or score lower in mental potential, or are disproportionately minority or female? Might the net effect be increased attrition, reduced interpersonal compatibility, unstable combat units, and decreased combat readiness? The recruitment input has a psychological and qualitative dimension by the time it reaches the combat forces; can this always be measured in statistical terms? While these cautionary notes must be sounded, they also suggest areas within the military manpower system that might be adjusted in order to increase the human resources available to the combat units.

It is not our purpose to discuss, in any depth, possible changes in military manpower policies. However, in order to provide a balanced picture, it is essential to review, briefly, the published suggestions for changes to these policies, some of which have recently been adopted. Recruiting budgets and the number of recruiters may be increased. Could the kinds of appeals made to American youth be modified? Recent advertising shifts that stress the “service” and training aspects of military life can be reinforced.

Physical and mental standards may be adjusted downward. Can job functions and requirements be more carefully defined to permit increased usage of varying categories of mentally or physically equipped individuals? Is it true that the more technological the services become, the less traditional physical standards will apply across the board? The appeal to women can be broadened, although several
social science analysts conclude that the pool of women interested in voluntary enlisted military service will remain rather limited for at least another generation.32

These approaches have drawbacks, as well. The more accommodation is made to differentiating specialties and manning requirements, the less flexible the overall force will become. Also, such approaches make more certain that particular types of individuals will bear disproportionate shares of the riskiest tasks—those involved in the combat functions. To what extent will service members tolerate equal pay for unequal tasks and risks?

Once recruits are on board, other approaches may increase retention. Can attrition rates be reduced through a less lenient approach toward those desiring to leave the military before completing their terms of service? Should military members on active duty be extended for longer terms of service? Will early retirements and resignations become less acceptable during this time of manpower shortages? Reenlistment efforts can receive greater emphasis with monetary awards, perhaps, playing a more important role at the crucial phase points of an individual’s career. All of these suggested approaches might have some positive effects, even though each also brings along a different set of problems.

Other ideas outside the normal manpower pipeline may merit further attention. The Department of Defense can reinforce and reward attempts to substitute technology for manpower, while recognizing that technology forces major changes in organizational modes and leadership styles. We must make another major caveat to the American penchant for technological solutions; will it become important to calculate man-hours as carefully as we measure the expenditure of financial resources? In designing new weapon systems, should the man-hour maintenance rate become a most critical variable, almost as important as performance in combat? If more sophisticated weapon systems are purchased, recognition of the long-term manpower price must be carefully assayed.

Other approaches to fulfilling military tasks may become more attractive. The Department of Defense may be forced to consider increased use of contract services and lateral entry of skilled, older persons. One might still estimate that all of these approaches will fall short of ultimate solutions for the emerging manpower reality.

More sweeping proposals have been examined publicly and the Congress has just begun a long-term debate over the merits of registration, selected drafts, a return to the draft, or several forms of national
service. Fortunately, these are adequately reviewed in several places, and form the basis for Morris Janowitz’ discussion in Chapter 7. We can, in good conscience, leave any discussion of these approaches in the innovative hands of Professor Janowitz, who, in the 1950s, was first to predict the adoption of a voluntary military manpower system. In this paper, we can more productively focus upon approaches that could be considered within the individual services.

I am not foolhardy enough to suggest that the intellectual constructs which organize this paper are consciously felt, on a daily basis, by a paratrooper as he departs the back end of a C-130. On the other hand, I am prepared to argue that the social and environmental trends described are an accurate enough reflection of current reality to merit attention from service leaders. There are alternatives for coping with the discrete, somewhat psychological, issues that are disturbing US military recruitment and retention rates.

For example, could there be clearer recognition that continued recruitment of increasing proportions of minorities and women will cause dilemmas and problems for unit leadership and will force major adjustments in the military ethos? This is not to suggest that this recruitment should be reduced, but rather that this recruitment should not be seen as an end in itself. These recently available human resources must be considered for what they are—a solution and a boon in certain areas, but capable of generating other sorts of problems within individual units. Perhaps the clearest example of this “mixed blessing” involves marriage between military members of varying ranks.

Indeed, military policies, generally, might have to weight more heavily the “family quotient.” Family stability and deprivation appear to be a much more important variable in the career choices and commitments of increasing numbers of service members. Must more careful consideration be given to family tensions, strains, and the financial burdens imposed by movement to certain areas of the Nation and the world? Must the growth of the military as a family institution be recognized and accepted as important a social factor as the increasing recruitment of minorities and women?

Another social phenomenon, the trend toward occupationalism, can be viewed as both threatening and promising. Can we make rational calculations of where these trends may be productive in recruiting and retaining high-quality people, and where they might assist in mission accomplishment? On the other hand, should there also be a much more intensive educational effort to explain to our troops the unique nature of our military business, the unique sacrifices required, and the unique kinds of people that make up the Armed Forces of the United States.
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It seems important for the leadership to clarify for the soldier the dimensions of his job that stretch far beyond those required in a civilian occupation.

At the same time, must there be more recognition and acceptance from senior officers and noncommissioned officers of the views of youth toward the military as a job or an occupation? Much data indicate that job satisfaction is a crucial variable and that job design might increase responsibility and challenge each individual's potential. Do we still sometimes treat human resources as a "free economic good," a view once made possible by the draft? If GIs spend most of their time picking up cigarette butts and beer cans, will we keep them very long?

As a military officer of an older generation, I must admit to some difficulty in sympathizing with some of the current youth proclivities. I have stood my share of ground and airborne alerts, during war and peace and time of international crisis. I have naturally been frightened by the closeness of death several times during my career, and thus find it difficult to suggest the following proposition, because I know only too well the importance of preparation for combat. On the other hand, certain questions emerge, once it is concluded that the US military will be trying to survive in the next decade because of manpower problems.

Under the circumstances described in this paper, is there a very difficult line that must be walked between the combat readiness required by potential threats and the retention and motivation of intelligent individuals who come from an American society which is relatively at peace with its neighbors? Is there a definable tradeoff between the artificial combat readiness required in peacetime and the retention potential of the military? Would we do well to consider the adage ascribed to General Russell Dougherty (while Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command) who is reputed to have said that the motto of the Strategic Air Command had always been "Mission, mission, mission," but that it was time to make that motto "Mission, people, people"? This is an extremely difficult suggestion for military commanders charged with defending the Nation and having their units ready to go to combat on a moment's notice. On the other hand, it must be considered if the analysis contained in this paper is relatively accurate, if the US military continues to have difficulty in recruiting and retaining quality young people, and if an all-volunteer system of manpower recruitment continues.

On another front, some of the data gathered from the field on retention problems indicates a bewildered discouragement with "military leadership." During a peacetime environment such as exists today, is "bureaucratic courage" as important as that courage required to phys-
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ically lead troops into a difficult combat situation? Are the people in operational units looking to their leadership to stand up for them, articulate their interests, and reduce the amount of bureaucratic "going along"? Recent moves to reinforce the responsibility and authority of local commanders could be supported and extended. Must high-level policymakers and staffs constantly assess their purposes in accruing choices to their level? Must job responsibilities be expanded at the lower levels if quality people are to be retained? Can staffs be curbed in their natural proclivity to dictate policy to the field, except when absolutely necessary?

There are no miracles that will reverse the birth rates of the 1960s; however, the views of youth toward the perceived arbitrariness of the military system can be marginally affected by the attitudinal reforms described above. Perhaps even more important would be an increase in the perceived legitimacy of serving. This perception, both within the youth population and the military population, might be improved through a recognition of the problem and, then, an effort on the part of national opinion elites and political leaders. It is important that these opinion molders understand and treat service in the military as a unique opportunity of citizenship and not as a job or occupation. Is continued service in the military, ultimately, as much psychological as it is financial? Are there enough Americans who will, for a price, systematically risk their lives and put their families' future in jeopardy on a daily basis? Wouldn't the economic cost of this approach be prohibitive? Wouldn't it be helpful if national leaders, even while criticizing the military for shortcomings or failings, made the point that military service is a worthwhile and legitimate responsibility of citizenship? Even if service in the military again becomes more legitimate, many military members would still feel residual subconscious alienation, frustration, and confusion.

Implications for the Next Decade

The military will always struggle with the evolving realities of military service in an attempt to accommodate to changing domestic and international environments. But unless success rewards this current intense effort to define a new organizing ethos and to reinvigorate the legitimacy of military service, then national security and foreign policy decisionmakers will find that the diminishing size and quality of US Forces will act as major constraining factors. The international goals of the United States will have to be reevaluated in light of these reduced US capabilities.
Nor will a mere increase in expenditures for the military solve all military manpower problems. Although changing military manpower realities are potential future constraints, they also provide opportunities for choice. International commitments and threats to US security interests can be reviewed; weapon technology can be more carefully examined from the perspective of the potential intelligence level of the individuals who will operate and maintain it. Finally, and most importantly, the democratic society of the United States, and its leadership, can closely examine the US military and determine for itself what sort of military manpower realities are emerging. If the society and its civilian and military elites choose to maintain the United States as the major stabilizing and balancing force in the world, and choose to continue the growth of high technology weapon systems, but the middle and upper social classes remain unwilling to commit sufficient numbers of their competent sons and daughters to these national tasks, then the implications for US policymakers may be nightmarish. It seems vital that these issues be addressed in the societal debate beginning on military manpower realities. Ultimately, after education in, and discussion of, these issues, the Nation can be led toward some currently unpredictable consensus by its elected leadership. What is most important is that the changing realities of military manpower and their implications for the next decade be recognized and that the strategic nature of these realities be carefully integrated with the other strategic realities emerging in the troubled decade of the 1980s.
In one important aspect, the history of the US Military Establishment can be written as a history of compromise between policies designed to strengthen professional "standing" forces and policies emphasizing the citizen-soldier concept. The citizen-soldier concept has traditionally been embodied in the colonial militia, state and national guard formations, Federal conscription, and the Reserves. But the end of conscription on 30 June 1973, and the introduction of an all-volunteer professional military represented a drastic break in traditional reliance on the citizen soldier. For the first time in US history, the President, with congressional approval, brought into being an expanded all-volunteer professional force during a period of no combat operations. This force was conceived to meet continuing military requirements under the US strategy of deterrence.

Although the idea of an all-volunteer force represents a radical departure from the tradition of the citizen soldier, my thesis is that the citizen soldier is still an important element of the all-volunteer concept. In fact, only by clarifying the potentials of the citizen soldier can the all-volunteer force recruit sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to meet its needs in a period of increased recruiting difficulties. For the long term, a system of national service suggests the appropriate format for military service in a democratic society pursuing a strategy of deterrence.

One might consider initially that a strategy of deterrence precludes the short-term service of citizen soldiers because such a strategy requires a military organized more as a force in-being and less as a mobilization cadre; that is, it requires personnel already in place or available for immediate mobilization and deployment. Nevertheless,
there is still an extensive need for persons with two- to four-year assignments. Important semiskilled and even unskilled tasks in each service can be performed by persons with limited tours of duty, and even some vital combat assignments can be filled efficiently by persons who serve for only two years. Short-term service is also a form of effective career recruitment. Many men and women are prepared to try short tours of duty to determine whether the military meets their needs, and short tours enable them to take honorable exits without stigma.

There are many measures of personnel turnover, and available data on turnover in the Military Establishment are limited. However, the typical or modal length of service for military personnel under the all-volunteer concept appears no longer than the average period of service under conscription. The fact that some 400,000 men and women (one-fifth of the total) enter and leave the active-duty forces each year hardly means that present-day services are not stable, professional formations akin to the standing forces of the eighteenth century.

The first step in this analysis is to identify the persistent elements of the citizen-soldier concept; that is, to think of the citizen soldier as an analytic category. The second step is to determine common elements in the all-volunteer concept and the citizen-soldier format. And the third step is to outline alternative policies that can strengthen the citizen-soldier component of the contemporary US military. In terms of policy analysis, one can view the current all-volunteer force as a transition to national military and civilian service. Furthermore, the expected decline in the size of the manpower pool of eighteen-year-olds in the coming decade necessitates creative approaches in dealing with the increased difficulties of military recruiting.

The American Concept of the Citizen Soldier

National military and civilian service can be viewed as a modern version of the citizen-soldier concept to assist the military in recruitment and as a social device for dealing with a wide range of societal problems. It would be an institutional procedure that could be structured to deal with difficult ideological problems and with imperfections in the American educational system. The extension of academic education to the college level has had serious dysfunctional consequences for the socialization of young people. In excessively separating the "world of school" from the "world of work," the system has made it difficult for young people to mature and make realistic career decisions. National service would broaden learning experiences leading to adult responsibilities. At the same time, national service would be a device for
dealing with specific social and economic problems of an advanced industrial society. Short-term, labor-intensive work without prior elaborate training is very effective in a variety of educational, community, and welfare activities. Just as the military requires a constant flow of short-term personnel, many civilian tasks can be effectively performed by people who do not define the tasks as life careers. In this fundamental sense, the military and the civilian components of national service converge, and we have an enlarged concept of the citizen soldier.

What are the common elements in the American concept of the citizen soldier? As applied to the militia, the conscript military, and the associated Reserve forces, the concept is characterized by three significant dimensions: obligatory service, universality, or a pervasive element of universality, and essential legitimacy by democratic political standards.

Militia service and conscript service mean obligatory service or, more bluntly, compulsory service. But the essential point is that obligatory service stands in juxtaposition to the voluntary decision to offer one's service. The contemporary all-volunteer system depends on an elaborate system of monetary incentives to ensure a competitive and "fair market" value for military personnel.

Obligatory systems differ from voluntary systems in the social groups that are recruited. However, obligatory systems always contain escape mechanisms for particular persons and groups. The military depended on various systems of obligatory service and conscription during the American Revolution and the US Civil War, but they were very loose systems. The institutionalization of conscription during World War I eliminated an important escape mechanism, the hiring of substitutes. But new exemptions have developed. For example, contemporary systems more explicitly recognize conscientious objection, specific skill categories, and family position. The important point is that the legitimacy of a militia or a conscript military declines if the public views the escape mechanisms as extensive, arbitrary, or distorted.

As applied to the militia and to the conscript force, the citizen-soldier concept implies a strong emphasis on universal service. Both the American Revolution and the French Revolution dramatized the theme of the "nation in arms." In this sense, they introduced a dimension of military service in sharp contrast to feudal practices and the practice of absolute monarchs with standing armies. And the principle of universality of service inevitably led to larger and more destructive military establishments.
The Citizen Soldier and National Service

The concept of universality applies to service both as an officer and as an enlisted person, but, of course, in a different fashion. As applied to officers, universal service means that entrance into the officer corps is no longer the monopoly of aristocrats. In the American colonial setting and in the French Revolution, the negative image of hereditary European aristocracy and the open recruitment of militia officers undermined the aristocratic model. Although the ideal was not fully realized in revolutionary France and the United States, it did serve to broaden the base for recruiting the officer corps. At the enlisted level, universality of service means that every citizen is eligible for military service, that is, eligible to be armed and obliged to serve.

However, even as a political ideal in the past, universality did not originally mean that the total population was eligible and obliged to serve. Special groups—low-status and marginal groups or potentially hostile individuals—were excluded. Universality extended to actual or potential citizens, and citizenship and military service were exclusively men’s worlds. As citizenship rights were extended to excluded groups, military service was made more and more socially inclusive.

Particularly important for the citizen-soldier concept has been the issue of age groupings. The militia held that the widest range of the male population would at least be enrolled for service. Conscription was fashioned on the ideals of the militia, but it explicitly acknowledged age limitations. For both the militia and the conscript military, universality meant priority of service for certain age groups on the basis of physical prowess and the pressure of military needs. Interestingly, in the past exemption by age did not in general undermine the legitimacy of conscription.

Once the categories of eligible age have been defined by law, each deviation from the principle of universality tends to weaken the legitimacy of the citizen-soldier concept. For example, a crucial problem arises when military needs require only a portion of an eligible category. Who shall serve when all members of a particular age group are deemed unnecessary? This is an almost insoluble problem. Such nations as France and Sweden have emphasized the importance of maintaining maximum universal service, and they have sought to fashion their military institutions to accommodate relative universality. On the other hand, the pressure of cost-benefit analysis in the United States has led to a tendency to increase the scope of exemptions; thus the legitimacy of conscription has been weakened.

The citizen-soldier concept applies in varying degrees to Reserve units, particularly reservists who are trained while conscripts are clearly
part of the citizen-soldier category. During the Vietnam period, the political choice was to mobilize only limited numbers of Reserves. Many people who entered the Reserves were deliberate in their intent to avoid combat duty; thus, the legitimacy of the Reserves as citizen soldiers suffered temporarily. However, the fact that reservists are part-time soldiers has helped to reaffirm their citizen-soldier status.

The third dimension of the citizen-soldier concept, essential legitimacy by democratic standards, is based on obligatory and universal service; it does not exclude legitimacy and a strong element of popular support. Such support is most easily gained for military units on the basis of local self-defense, but, no doubt, some militia formations have functioned primarily through negative sanctions and organizational pressure. Likewise, conscription has sometimes been enforced on the basis of passive compliance without the extension of citizen rights. Such forms of conscription are not compatible with the ideals and realities of the citizen-soldier concept. One can refer to conscripting citizens in contrast to conscripting subjects, but the latter action does not conform to the citizen-soldier concept. Only a society that accepts important components of democratic practice or strives to achieve political democracy can effectively implement the citizen-soldier concept by conscription.

Various political regimes in the past have conscripted subjects—Prussian, Czarist, Austro-Hungarian, and Imperial Japanese. And, in the more recent period, one must, of course, add the Soviet Union. In fact, there are more instances of subject conscription than citizen-soldier conscription.

For the United States, the research literature is replete with instances in which the American public has opposed conscription, especially during the Civil War. And individual efforts to avoid conscript service have never ceased. But the legitimacy and acceptance of conscription in the United States and other Western nations reached a high point during World War I and World War II. However, in light of the sacrifices accepted by the citizenry, conscription, at the least, must be considered a remarkable social invention. The introduction of nuclear weapons brought a decline in popular acceptance of conscription, but even this threshold of military technology did not thwart the extensive but declining use of conscription among Western political democracies. The reintroduction and persistence of conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany exemplifies the self-perpetuation of fundamental institutions, given the continuity of nation-states and international conflict.
The Citizen Soldier and National Service

The crux of the dimension of legitimacy is the political definition of military service by conscripts. For conscription to be legitimate by democratic standards, military service must not deprive the individual of his basic political rights. Even professional cadres are citizens, although they must behave under extensive self-imposed restrictions to avoid partisan affiliations that might lead to conflicts with civilian political leaders. And the conscription of subjects is not without a certain legitimacy, but it is not democratic legitimacy. It is the legitimacy that derives from the prerogatives of ruling elites to extract service from their subjects. Under the citizen-soldier concept, however, civilian leaders persist in their concern that the rights of soldiers as citizens are not needlessly infringed. These leaders must be particularly alert to ensure that soldiers are free to inform themselves of political developments in civil society and that they are allowed to exercise their rights in voting for political leaders.

Since the end of World War I, Western democracies have effectively expanded the political and legal rights of military personnel on active duty. Perhaps the most dramatic and extreme case is the Federal Republic of Germany, where military personnel on active duty can run for elective office. Practices vary from one nation to another, but the essential element is that the legitimacy of military service is grounded in recognition of the soldier's political and legal rights as a citizen.

Thus, we can identify the broad outlines of the citizen-soldier concept, which represents an admixture of military requirements and political definitions imposed by the leaders of the larger society. And we can think of obligatory service and universal service as dimensions that take directly into account the forms and pressures of military organization. But we must give special emphasis to legitimacy, and we mean legitimacy in a democratic political context.

Finally, the citizen-soldier concept not only provides a formula for civilian political control and political legitimacy of the military but also makes an important contribution to military effectiveness. The arguments are well known. To the extent that the concept draws on a representative segment of civilian society, it mobilizes the broad range of skills and aptitudes required for a modern military establishment. If the all-volunteer force is heavily weighted with personnel from socially deprived backgrounds, the military does not have access to all available human resources that it can acquire through conscription.

Furthermore, the logic of the citizen-soldier concept rests not only on the premise that the military has important concentrations of positions that can be filled by persons who acquire their skills in civilian society but also on the parallel premise that the military has important
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centrations of positions that can be filled by persons with limited training. Equally important is the perception that a variety of military training, including combat training, can best be accomplished by personnel who have acquired adequate educational backgrounds in civilian life. In broader terms, adequate educational backgrounds make for more effective military performance, and the citizen-soldier concept is a device for recruiting persons with appropriate educational backgrounds.

Personnel Turnover in the All-Volunteer Force

To what extent does the contemporary all-volunteer force contain elements of the citizen-soldier concept? Answering this question involves a review of data on career patterns, especially personnel turnover. In fact, high personnel turnover in the all-volunteer force is a critical indicator of elements commonly associated with the citizen-soldier model.

The Military Establishment that evolved at the end of conscription does not conform to the model projected, anticipated, and desired by experts in manpower analysis. They believed that they could fashion a stable military in terms of overall numbers and low personnel turnover. Neither result has been realized.

In fact, from 30 June 1973 to 30 June 1978, the overall manpower level had declined, and it was accompanied by a high rate of turnover, despite sharply increased pay levels. Amazing as it may appear, one must entertain the possibility that we have comparable and even higher rates of turnover under the all-volunteer concept than under conscription. Thus, the planners' hopes for reduced training costs and increased efficiency through less turnover have come to naught.

Basically, the planners did not take into consideration a wide range of complicated structural factors that contribute to personnel turnover in any military organization—conscript or all-volunteer. In addition, the need for a flexible retirement system has been increasingly recognized in the military, both to meet personnel needs and reduce retirement costs. Of course, such a system would permit six-to-twelve-year tours of duty with pension rights and would further increase turnover.

As I see it, personnel turnover is not necessarily or automatically a negative phenomenon. It can represent effective recruitment for a military establishment that seeks to maintain its linkages with civilian society and wishes to mobilize skills, aptitudes, and sentiments representing a broad segment of that society. It can also contribute to recruitment for the Reserves. The military that wishes to maintain at
least some of the citizen-soldier perspective acknowledges the realities and benefits of meaningful turnover.

Although some active-duty turnover has been disguised in the overall decrease in the force since 1973, there has been a sharp decline in Reserve force levels. For instance, the Department of Defense expects that by 1982 the strength of the Individual Ready Reserve will be approximately 11 percent of its 1972 level. To state the issue differently, the percentage of personnel turnover would have been higher if the force had not been reduced in size, and there would have been a need to recruit more personnel.

In assessing personnel turnover, we are dealing fundamentally with the continuity of powerful structural factors that have not been modified by the end of the draft and the introduction of monetary incentives. The basic issue is whether increases in retention rates are offsetting increases in attrition before the completion of the first term. Sources of information indicate that this is not the case to any noteworthy extent. One must emphasize that the average length of service for officers and enlisted personnel is a wholly inadequate measure of turnover because it excludes from the data base everyone who has left the Military Establishment.

An examination of trends in officer retention and turnover shows that all three military services have attempted to stabilize the officer corps by increasing the concentration of academy graduates in the active-duty force. This trend began in the post-World War II period with the establishment of the US Air Force Academy and with marked additions to the size of the student bodies at the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy. The period also saw extensions in the obligated tours of duty for academy graduates. These policies have not had much effect, since attrition has kept pace with enrollments, but one must emphasize that a portion of this attrition is not undesirable.

Basically, these rates of separation reflect the instability of career interests among young people in contemporary society. Many young men and women are not able to make enduring career choices when they graduate from high school. Thus, the withdrawal of cadets from the service academies is the equivalent of changes in major fields of study at civilian universities. In addition, many cadets postpone changes in their career choices until they have completed their obligated tours of duty. And thereafter, attrition continues year after year until officers gradually change their career goals and decide to complete the required 20 years for a pension.
This high turnover of officer personnel reflects at least two basic structural features. One feature is the marked career distinction between military academy graduates and ROTC graduates; the other is the rank hierarchy and the system of promotion up or selection out. The officer personnel system has not shifted its policies to articulate with a force that would be based on a lower rate of turnover.

The ROTC has, in effect, altered its mission from recruitment and training of Reserve officers to procurement of active-duty officers. ROTC officers have relatively short obligated tours of duty, during which they can recognize their prospects for promotion and full military careers. In fact, the increased numbers of academy graduates in the active-duty force only intensify career competition and earlier resignations by ROTC graduates. Further, the rank structure and the system of selection up-or-out serve by design to increase officer turnover and separation. The crucial point is that an important segment of the officer corps with technical, administrative, and operational skills required by the military would be prepared to remain on active duty without competing directly for promotion. The up-or-out system militates against this opportunity and renders it impossible.

Personnel turnover is also extensive in the enlisted force even though the two-year conscription tour of duty was eliminated on the assumption that three- and four-year tours would improve the retention rates. Two structural factors contribute to the dilemma. One is that rates of reenlistment are critical. Although these rates vary considerably from service to service, they are not high enough to have any marked effect on turnover. They are low, in part, because recruits at the end of the first term either demonstrate low capacity for promotion or wish to leave the service. The other factor is the very high rate of attrition during the first term of service. In the all-volunteer force, this attrition has reached a level of 35 to 40 percent and represents separation primarily at the initiative of individual commanders. The military services, like the academies, are dealing with instability in occupational choices among high school graduates and, to an even greater extent, among people who fail to complete high school and lack personal qualifications.

One can construct a more adequate turnover measure indicating the survival rate of first-term volunteers; that is, individuals who remain on active duty after four years of service. This measure includes attrition plus failure to reenlist either because of lack of interest or lack of qualifications for reenlistment. It should be noted that a stark pattern has persisted throughout most of the period of the all-volunteer force.
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For the Army, only 13.5 percent of the people who entered the service in fiscal year 1971 remained on active duty as of 30 June 1975. Of the new recruits in fiscal year 1973, the figure had risen to only 17.4 percent by 30 June 1977, indicating very little decrease in personnel turnover. The figure of 17.4 percent or, conversely, a turnover measure of 82.6 percent is, indeed, very high. Only the Marines had higher turnover, since the survival percentage was lower, 13.9 percent. The Air Force had lower turnover, but even its figures are noteworthy. For new recruits who entered the service in fiscal year 1973 when the Air Force could be very selective, the number still on active duty stood at no more than 28.9 percent as of 30 June 1977. In short, even in the Air Force, 70 percent of new personnel had left after a tour of four years. Thus, all of the available data point in one direction: the all-volunteer force presents a configuration of personnel turnover similar to the turnover encountered under conscription after World War II—a pattern with elements of the citizen soldier.¹

Motives and Self-Conceptions

A close examination reveals changes in the motives and self-conceptions of people who enter the Armed Forces of the United States under the all-volunteer format. Obviously, the end of the draft has meant the elimination of the reluctant conscript who merely served a tour of duty as a matter of course without much reference to his attitudes. From the point of view of the contemporary military, the all-volunteer concept has eliminated the initially reluctant conscript who decided while in service to make the military a career. This development may point up a crucial loss in dedicated personnel.

Despite these profound changes, a strong feature of continuity characterizes the attitudes of the new recruits, both officer and enlisted personnel. For the time being, the attitudes and self-concepts of the force in-being have not become extensively “militarized” although there is some evidence of increased homogeneity and a stronger “absolutist” outlook. The contemporary attitude patterns of the military, in effect, converge with the patterns of the larger society. These attitudes remain compatible with and receptive to a gradual shift toward a national service format and a modern version of the citizen-soldier perspective if such a format should ever become national policy.

Unfortunately, sufficient data are not available to analyze these changes although there is an obvious basis for probing them. Thus, I must proceed without adequate documentation, since the massive machinery of social research in the Armed Forces avoids the study of
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in-depth self-conceptions. We must not rely too heavily on superficial and stereotyped responses generated by paper-and-pencil tests although such data have some utility. The services have, indeed, sponsored some important civilian-administered surveys, but these surveys cannot be effectively compared with attitude patterns under conscription, since adequate data are not available for earlier periods. Moreover, the motives of men and women reveal themselves slowly and indirectly. Therefore, I must incorporate impressions and the flow of pointed observations that reach me from Inter-University Seminar Fellows who are on active duty.

When I studied officers in the 1950s, I cited four motivational patterns that I believe still characterize officer attitudes: tradition or, more precisely, family and social inheritance; desire for education, expertise, and social development; previous experience in a military setting, including a strong interest in an active outdoor life; and boyhood ambition.

In the 1970s, monetary incentives probably play a more significant role in these mature patterns. In fact, many career officers report some dissatisfaction with their standard of living, or, rather, they are concerned with the problem of eroded benefits. In part, new officers entering the US Armed Forces are exposed to a strong emphasis on economic incentives, since Congress and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense believe that these incentives are primary career considerations. But officers on active duty find themselves in an environment that does not stress economic rewards as the basis for effective performance and achievements. The military officer wants good pay and fringe benefits, but he still likes to think of himself as a person in the service of the State. Thus, in the simplest terms, career military personnel hardly think of themselves as mercenaries, that is, as "hired guns." In fact, most military personnel—both officers and noncommissioned officers—bride at the word "mercenaries," reflecting their sensitivity to the issue of economic motivation, which, they believe, is insufficient to account for their behavior.

This is not an obvious, meaningless, or trivial observation. It reflects a common sense of identity that officers and noncommissioned officers have developed and perpetuated. Thus, new recruits still enter a military managed by officers who think of themselves as professionals, a situation similar to that of the conscription era.

The motives of officers for entering and remaining on active duty are accompanied by a striking missionary zeal. Military officers strongly believe that they are engaged in a special class of tasks required for the collective good as opposed to individual self-interest. Frustration
in one's immediate assignment, discontent with bureaucratic procedures, and family tensions weaken or eliminate this missionary sense. Blocked promotion can be especially devastating. But despite the many sources of stress, a strong missionary zeal is still a persistent trait among professional officers.

In this connection, I find no evidence of major increases in self-conceptions that one must call "careerist," especially among new officers. I believe that the military, like any other large organization, has had significant concentrations of people who viewed the service as just a job or as a place to practice a specialized profession. Perhaps the concentration of "careerists" has increased somewhat; if such is the case, the same trends have no doubt taken place in civilian institutions.

Furthermore, professional military officers, like civilian professionals, are definitely changing their lifestyles, and these changes are not related to the end of conscription. Military personnel particularly desire greater personal privacy, increased personal autonomy, and more regularized work hours, except in emergencies. But there is no reason to believe that such preferences and even demands make the officer more "careerist." Of more importance, perhaps, is the fact that the all-volunteer military tends to distribute its workload unevenly, in part, because of the nature of military assignments and command responsibilities. Some officers feel that they are underemployed or, more to the point, that they are engaged in trivial or unproductive work. This is especially the case among new officers without command assignments. On the other hand, a minority are consumed under the pressure of their assignments, but this state of affairs is likely to persist. Most officers adjust to and accept these conditions, but others tend to leave the service and thereby contribute to turnover.

The motivation of enlisted recruits also shows continuity with the recent past. Of course, the extensive recruitment of marginal personnel results in a strong concentration of individuals who just drift into the military: they make the decision to enlist without deliberate calculation or clear motives. And they are the people who just as casually drift out. In his analysis of reasons offered by recruits for enlisting in the Army in 1971, Gilbert Badillo found strong elements of continuity. Skill training and educational benefits, the prospect of a career, and the desire for personal maturity ranked high during both periods. By 1977, the financial rewards of a military tour of duty had obviously become increasingly important, and many persons joined to learn skills, to receive educational assistance, or to grow and mature. I am also fully aware that many young men enlist on negative impulses based on a perceived lack of personal competence, inability to find civilian jobs, or previous
failures. But many young persons in these situations do not enlist. Rather, they seek alternative solutions to their problems or merely rely on social welfare until they are older. The labor market is then more inclined to accept them because they are older.

However, one must consider an additional factor. A larger number of new enlisted recruits, including many of the most uncertain and most diversely motivated persons, view enlistment as something special. They feel that they are entering a different, noncivilian organization with a special task. They are attracted to the societal goals pursued by the Armed Forces, and they are beguiled by the military purpose. This motive may not be dominant; indeed, it seldom is dominant. And it is certainly not the sole motive, but its presence is observable. The day-to-day real-life situation in the Armed Forces may extinguish these vague feelings more often than strengthen them. In 1976, a service-wide sample of male enlisted personnel in all the services (with the rank of E-3/E-4) were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “Doing the job the military does is both necessary and important.” Despite the limited educational background and marginality of enlisted military recruits, fewer than 10 percent disagreed. Only 25 percent of the recruits strongly agreed with the statement. Even if it is all too faint, this is a residue of the citizen-soldier’s persistent motives. To the extent that the routines and frustrations of military life weaken these motives, the officer corps has failed in one of its essential civic tasks.

For both officer and enlisted personnel, I have stressed continuity not only in personnel practices but also in self-concepts that reflect the survival of the citizen-soldier concept. But I must point out that, even in the short period of the expanded all-volunteer force, the anticipated trends in the ideologies of career personnel are beginning to manifest themselves. Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal have evaluated the available systematic research on this issue in The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military. They conclude that “we failed to find a clear and uniform promilitary stance among the military men as a whole.” In short, the military continues to reflect the pluralism of the larger society, in part because of the presence of short-term officer and enlisted personnel, the modern equivalents of citizen soldiers. But, with the passage of time, “those who had career interests in the military were, on the average, enthusiastically promilitary along virtually every dimension.”

A Modern View of the Citizen Soldier

Our investigation of personnel turnover and the motives that stimulate volunteer service leads directly back to the essential dimensions
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of the citizen soldier: obligatory service, universality, and legitimacy. If these three dimensions are applied directly and mechanically to the contemporary Military Establishment, it appears that the citizen-soldier concept has indeed atrophied. But our analysis points to important survivals and, in fact, adaptations. For both officers and enlisted personnel, the sheer volume of rotation is the precondition for the relevance of the "citizen-soldier" concept. In policy terms, the first ten to twenty years of the all-volunteer force can be a transitional period for fashioning new forms of the citizen-soldier concept.

No doubt, the dimension of obligatory service represents the most profound issue in adapting the citizen-soldier role to the contemporary setting. The policies and standards of the modern, all-volunteer military, in effect, reject the peacetime application of obligatory service. But the distinction between peacetime and wartime is weakened, if not eliminated, under the strategy of deterrence. The force in-being is paramount in the day-to-day management of international relations. Moreover, one need not accept the doctrine of a "short war" to recognize that the active-duty force and Reserve elements that could be immediately deployed would determine the outcome of a conventional war in Central Europe.

The standard of obligatory service is linked to the standard of universal service. The fact that only a portion of eligible members in a new age group is required for military service helped to undermine the legitimacy of selective service. This reality stands as a barrier to the efforts of those people who seek to revive conscription on a fair, selective basis. In the end, a system of national service combining military and civilian-based tasks can modernize the traditional ideals of obligation and universality.

To what extent does the present all-volunteer system with its high personnel turnover involve an extensive segment of the youth population? In very rough figures, I estimate that one of every three eligible eighteen-year-olds is presently being recruited. The next logical question is just how many more would be involved if national service were a reality.3

One should bear in mind that the size of the eighteen-year-old group will gradually decrease until the male component will total only 1.61 million by 1992. On the other hand, educational and medical requirements for civilian components of national service would not be as exacting as current military standards. National service would probably involve two and three times the number of males currently enlisting; the inclusion of females, of course, would greatly expand the number
of eligibles. These figures demonstrate that the volunteer force can be considered as a form of transition, incomplete and implicit, to national service. In fact, the personnel structure of the Armed Services is potentially congruent with national service and the citizen-soldier format. Perhaps the most important change would be the introduction of a two-year enlistment period for people who enter the Armed Forces under national service.

The figures do not include existing civilian national service enterprises and related full-time youth job-training programs. The Federal Government sponsors national civilian service opportunities through the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and the Teacher Corps. In addition, the US Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Young Adult Conservation Corps administer modest but related programs.

Present full-time Federal vocational training programs involve significant numbers of young people in efforts that resemble the national service format. In addition to the Job Corps, various youth training programs administered by the Comprehensive Employment Training Act and by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act include arranged employment in community programs and, especially, in governmental agencies. At least one million additional young men and women participate in such programs, some of which are of very short duration. In effect, 400,000 to 500,000 persons are probably involved in activities equivalent to national service.

Still another form of student behavior might also be adapted for national service. Each year, tens of thousands of students take a year off from their undergraduate studies or wait a year before they enter professional or graduate school. I am not referring to students who take breaks because of financial pressure but only to those who report that they need diversion from their educational routine, time to “find themselves,” or time to explore the real world. In my estimate, at least 5 percent of college students make such decisions each year. This orientation suggests positive youth support for national service.

Surveys indicate that popular opinion is much more supportive of national service in various forms than are national legislators. Congressional leaders, no doubt, are aware of the powerful lobbies that oppose national service, especially educational and social welfare lobbies. To be economically feasible and relevant to career development, national service should not merely be added to current periods required to complete education programs. Some modification of existing levels would be necessary, but it is difficult to anticipate vigorous initiatives by
educational authorities to this end. Trade unions are opposed to the idea simply because civilian service would offer only nominal pay, and national legislators are fearful of the difficulties involved in setting up a new Federal bureaucracy. Further, resistance comes from many military planners who believe that such a system would not produce additional high-quality recruits or more socially representative recruits.

A body of research literature supports two observations concerning the ability of national service to produce additional military manpower. First, under most proposals for national service, the military option would be a tour of duty of two rather than three years. The difference between two and three years is psychologically very great for a young man or woman. Second, national service would have greater financial rewards for military as compared with civilian service. Civilian service would result in nominal monetary compensation, but the military option would give national service recruits meaningful educational benefits rather than competitive market wages. College-bound young people oriented toward careers in the military reject a purely financial or "mercenary" definition of their short-term military tours; they are more disposed to "exchange" military service for education benefits, both post-high school vocational training and college assistance. It is not feasible to reduce sharply, or even meaningfully, the pay scale of career-oriented military personnel, but one can anticipate that national service personnel would probably become important components of the active-duty military list.4

At this point, it is necessary to recognize the vast administrative complexities and barriers to the implementation of any national service system. However, these problems would be less important than the political and moral issues involved in obligatory service and in the degree of universality that would result. One can argue that implementation of the citizen-soldier concept through national service would require obligatory national service. But an obligatory system that strives for universality would still need to permit exemptions similar to the exemptions from the militia and conscription. The joint application of health and educational exemptions could be reasonably achieved, but the range of tasks to be performed in civilian national service would greatly limit the number of medical exemptions. Presumably, both military and civilian national service organizations would include remedial educational components.

Since obligatory service does not require total participation, acceptable forms of exemption would be necessary. The United States does not require a tyranny of the majority. One crucial group would consist of conscientious objectors. In the modern world, conscientious
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objection includes opposition on both religious and secular (that is, political) grounds. Clearly, the availability of civilian service as an alternative would reduce conscientious opposition, especially since civilian service could be provided in privately administered organizations. However, some groups would still oppose any involvement in national service, and exemption would be necessary for these groups on the grounds of both religious and secular conscience. But other difficult categories of young persons would oppose national service because of extensive drug culture or criminal perspectives. National service cannot be considered a national reformatory system. Like the citizen-soldier concept and conscription, it must be based, paradoxically, on a high degree of voluntarism and popular acceptance.

National service is not designed to produce a moral regeneration in the United States. The purpose of national service is to organize and mobilize the positive sentiments and values that already exist in the youth population. These feelings and aspirations, though hardly universal, are stronger than the adult population recognizes, and they are strong enough to support gradually expanding programs of national service.

The last criterion of the citizen-soldier—legitimate service by democratic standards—involves both long-standing and new components. The philosophical and political opponents of conscription in the 1960s introduced a new argument grounded in laissez-faire economics. According to Milton Friedman, conscription was unfair because it was a hidden tax, and he argued, with considerable effect, that persons were not paid their full economic worth when they were conscripted. In my view, it is impossible to ascertain a person's "full economic worth" when he seeks to defend his nation-state by force of arms and faces the prospect of death, but I shall not press that point. No doubt, mercenaries have market value, but, as I have indicated, that mentality has not taken hold in the US military. The essential issue is that conscription cannot be reduced to the status of an unfair or a hidden tax. It is an obligation of citizenship transcending monetary considerations. For a society cannot exist exclusively on the basis of monetary exchange. Under national service, participants would be paid less than "market" wages. Even if national service is considered a tax, it is a tax that must be paid, and the idea of obligatory and universal service makes it more equitable and more legitimate.

But the argument about conscription as an economic arrangement is much too narrow to deal with the persistent questions relating to the obligations of citizenship and the effectiveness and responsibility of the Military Establishment. The ideal of the citizen soldier and national
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Service is only one type of societal obligation that derives from citizenship. It is a means by which an individual reaffirms his membership in a national society and, at the same time, contributes to his own well-being. In the contemporary context, some sources argued that duties related to community defense and, correspondingly, defense of the ecological environment must augment the obligation of military defense. Neither military defense, community defense, nor environmental defense depends on monetary exchanges alone. Therefore, national service is a continuity and an extension of the citizenship obligation linked to military service.

The essential legitimacy of any national service system that combines civilian and military duties rests on the guarantees and realities that participants will not be deprived of appropriate civil and political rights while they perform their duties. If the contemporary military, reinforced by civilian court review, can operate on such a basis, the counterpart for civilian military service should be feasible.

On the positive side, participants in national service must be assured of a personally rewarding experience because of the worthwhile tasks performed. It is also essential to reaffirm the tradition of the citizen soldier that service on behalf of the nation-state, in and of itself, is a mark of citizenship. Unfortunately, I estimate that ten years of planning, experimenting, and training would be necessary to develop a meaningful national service even if we started in earnest tomorrow. But, since we will not start tomorrow, we must ensure the success of the all-volunteer force and perpetuate the ideal of the citizen soldier as the first steps in an effective transition to national service.
Perceptions of American Power

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The Problem of Perceptions

Why should the question of "perceptions" of American power become the subject of discussion among national security policymakers? To ask that question is to get quickly to the heart of the problem.

First, a series of historical episodes in the past decade or so has altered the perceived status of US power in an evolving world political and strategic environment: the denouement of the Vietnam war, from the leveling off of American forces in March 1968 and the incoming Nixon administration's measured retreat in November 1969, to the Paris peace accords of January 1973 and the collapse of the Saigon government in April 1975; the American failure to move sufficiently to forestall a Soviet-backed government in Angola in 1975; America's weak responses to the invasions of Zaire called "Shaba I" and "Shaba II"; the passive American reaction to Russia's massive assistance to and sponsorship of the Marxist government in Ethiopia in 1977; the casual, confused response of the Carter administration to the "revelation" of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in 1979; the failure to "save" the Shah of Iran and perhaps also Somoza in Nicaragua; and now the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to shore up a complaisant government and suppress resistance by Moslem guerrilla groups.

From this sequence of events, representing America's situation in the world, we can distill a handful of trends that are of sharp concern:

—Diminished worldwide perceptions of American power, in absolute terms and in relation to the power of the Soviet Union. Though it is not possible to measure others' perceptions of US power (or, for that matter, "power" itself), most American observers would judge that our power has declined.

—The tilting of the US-Soviet central military balance in favor of the Soviet Union in several categories of arms and several theaters
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of confrontation: strategic nuclear (including counterforce) weapons; the Soviet buildup in Europe; the peripheral regional theaters; blue water naval forces; and Soviet moves into Southwest Asia, into the Horn of Africa, toward the Indian Ocean, and around China.

—Domestic constraints on the generation and projection of American military power. Despite the recent rallying around the President and the spectacle of Congress pushing money at the Pentagon, there are still justified doubts about the ability of this country to sustain support for defense preparation, for military intervention “when necessary,” and for protracted conflict in the face of sacrifices.

—Other sources of “threats,” such as oil embargoes by third parties, internal political chaos in pivotal countries, acts of terror directed against US representatives and nationals—all felt to have something to do with the absence of the credible promise of American retaliation.

—the feeling that “gaps” have opened in America’s overall strategic deterrence and in the defense of regions of the world; thus America’s alliances are impaired, and our own essential security has been diminished.

A second point in the consideration of “perceptions” is that this diminished American political and military status in the world is important, because it makes a real difference in other nations’ actions toward the United States—American allies and friends, bystanders, fence-sitters, and the Soviet Union. Unfriendly nations might take advantage of American “weakness”: friendly nations might despair of American protection and make accommodations with our adversaries. There are two variants of this:

—the feeling that “gaps” have opened in America’s overall strategic deterrence and in the defense of regions of the world; thus America’s alliances are impaired, and our own essential security has been diminished.

Deterrence—both central and theater—might be more likely to break down. Our quintessential strategic relationship inevitably depends on deterrence, since we can’t afford a real test, and in any case can’t defend if such a test occurs. We can only retaliate, and therefore need to advertise our retaliatory power beforehand and reliably.

—Formal alliances or informal networks of strategic trust might crumble through loss of confidence in the protection of the United States.

There are perhaps just three fundamental ways of dealing with the problems opened up by American strategic weakness and other nations’ reactions to it (or a mix of the first two ways): First, we could increase the actual force that the United States is capable of exerting in the world. Or second, we could maximize other countries’ impressions of that force—its magnitude, and the likelihood that it will be used, and used effectively, in contingencies that are within our range of interests.
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(Given the fact that our resources are constrained, this implies the question: how can we make the most of them and project them to greater political and strategic effect?) Or third, we could shed, in some way or other, our commitments to come to the aid of other nations with military force; we could change our orientation toward our strategic environment—expecting, hoping, planning that external events have less impact on the essential well-being of our nation and its citizens.

The Uses of History

The problem of creating and sustaining the appropriate perceptions of power in the absence of sufficient actual military force is not a new one, historically, either for us or for other countries. The incoming Nixon-Kissinger administration, in 1969, exhibited a sensitive appreciation of this problem. What it came up with was, first, the Nixon Doctrine in its primary phase—the shifting to allies, particularly front-line states, of the burden of immediate ground defense, accompanied by massive arms transfers (“Vietnamization” and “Koreanization”); Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s “total force concept,” including a healthy incorporation, for strategic accounting purposes, of the forces of allies; an emphasis on air, naval, and ultimate nuclear support; and the invention of limited nuclear war options (the selective use of strategic nuclear weapons enunciated in the Schlesinger Doctrine and prefigured in the early State of the World messages).

Actually, the Nixon Doctrine Phase I had been foreshadowed in the Eisenhower-Dulles-Radford regime, which also had to confront the problem of substituting perceptions of power for the reality of force. Surveying their options in an early National Security Council review in 1953, that administration rejected its predecessor’s concept of a target year of maximum threat, rejected also the doctrine of universal containment of communism by conventional means, rejected the near-total planned US role in local defense on the ground, rejected appropriately the emphasis on the Army and conventional tactical airpower. The Eisenhower administration stressed, rather, the “long haul” for steady, economically sustainable defense spending; stressed the “New Look” in defense budgets, with the emphasis on strategic airpower and what came to be called, crudely, “massive retaliation” (roughly the reliance on discretionary large-scale central retaliation rather than retail forward, local defense); and promoted the semblance of an unbroken wall of containment through “pactomania,” the creation of interlocking military alliances.
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The second phase of the Nixon Doctrine, roughly the "balance of power," carried the concept of manipulation of global power to further lengths, bringing forth China to redress the imbalance of the old bipolar rivalry; attempting even to create a more multipolar world, the pentagonal world of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and "Europe" (except that it turned out, as the wags put it, to be the United States, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi); dealing in fluid diplomacy over the heads of cumbersome alliance mechanisms; cultivating regional proxies (or simply dealing with the emerging regional powers—Iran, India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Brazil—as appropriate to the regional situation, the nature of the threat, the state of diplomacy); and, entrusting at least one of the putative proxies, Imperial Iran, with extensive security responsibilities and transfer of arms unprecedented in scope and sophistication.

The Nixon Doctrine, in both its phases, was rather faithfully—though grudgingly—implemented in the first three years of the Carter administration; though it has been considerably compromised in the "Carter Doctrine" of January 1980, which has reverted to a policy more reminiscent of the 1960s: planning for more sufficient direct US inputs, seeking "real" allies rather than proxies, establishing regional bases for the deployment of American forces, and generally discounting local friendly capabilities.

A searching analysis of the endemic problem of projecting power when force is lacking comes from Edward N. Luttwak, who has bracketed the problem of "perceptions" and their relation to national strategies (he would call them "grand strategies" to distinguish them from mere tactical implementation). No one has thought more extensively and more methodically about power and deterrence and perceptions; and so it will serve a useful purpose in the present essay to review some of Luttwak's theoretical conceptions—perhaps with some points of criticism of my own. The object is not to attack Luttwak's argument: as in the New York subway ad for Levy's Rye, you don't have to agree with it to love it.

In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Luttwak describes three strategic epochs in a stretch of late Roman history. Only in the first of these periods, the Julio-Claudian, is power correctly exercised—that is, exercised in a way that is appropriate to the ideal of a unitary empire.

Owing to its hegemonic nature, the sphere of imperial control is limited only by the range at which others perceive Roman power as compelling obedience. The reach of Roman power and the costs
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of its military forces need not, therefore, be proportional. Further
extensions of the empire, in a hegemonic mode, do not require
increases in the military forces maintained.

In this period, the empire enjoyed "the great economy of forces that
made the unitary empire a most efficient provider of security."

The second system, the Antonine, which lasted from A.D. 69 to
the mid-third century and continued into the reign of Constantine in the
fourth century, responded, according to Luttwak, to a different political
priority—namely, the inclusion of provincial populations in a political
and security system on the same basis as authentic earlier Romans. But
whether or not appropriate to the new political dispensation, the
new security system was less efficient. It obviated the cheap multi-
plication of power; "the military strength of the empire and its effective
power are now rigidly proportional, since this strength is now largely
used directly, not as a tool of political persuasion." Compensating for this
apparently conscious assumption of military disadvantage, however,
was the consequent gain of widespread citizen support. "A real growing
prosperity and a voluntary Romanization are eliminating the last ves-
tiges of nativistic disaffection and creating a strong base of support for
the unitary regime." Peripheral security could still be maintained eco-
nomically, if not with the same efficiency. Opponents were kept sep-
arated and divided. Threats could be kept at low intensity. Overwhelm-
ing force could still be assembled and deployed.

Finally, in the third phase, which began under Diocletian in the mid-
third century and continued into the reign of Constantine in the fourth
century, a situation is arrived at where "the output and input of the
system are finally equated. The level of security provided becomes
directly proportional to the amount of the resources expended on the
army and on frontier fortifications." Unlike the Antonine, the third system
"no longer has a 'surge' capability... since the enemies of the empire
are no longer kept on the defensive by forward defense tactics; instead,
they are only contained."

Although Luttwak's *Grand Strategy* is primarily a work of historical
description and analysis, there are at least implied lessons, in the stra-
tegic behavior of the Roman Empire in its most lucid and successful
moments, for our own country in our contemporary situation and di-
lemma. The author himself comments: "For the Romans, as for our-
selves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to provide security
for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base
and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order."
It was "a predicament that we share." Our models of one and three-
quaters millenia ago
harnessed the armed power of the empire to political purpose... clearly recognized... military force... for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle. Much better to conserve force and use military power indirectly, as the instrument of political warfare. The Romans understood all the subtleties of deterrence, and also its limitations. Above all, the Romans clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but psychological—the product of others' perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this strength.

Theirs was not only "a predicament that we share"; theirs was also, the author implies, a strategic response that we can profitably adopt.

In the more avowedly prescriptive piece, "Perceptions of Military Force and US Defence Policy," Luttwak draws out the political-psychological implications of his historical study, to the point of extending some advice to contemporary American force planners: If we can't buy the Russian army (with its multiplicity of smaller combat formations), we might at least cease to bad-mouth our own peculiar capabilities, which emphasize sustained combat (an unexceptionable and cost-free recommendation). He also advises restructuring the US ground force to yield the maximum feasible number of flags. "An example of this more drastic approach (which may turn out to entail more military-organizational costs than political benefits) would be to restructure the ground formations of the US Army so as to yield 32 smaller divisions instead of the planned 16, or even to produce 160 'divisional combat groups.' " The underlying argument is "that it is not possible to extract full politico-military benefits from the deployment of military forces unless explicit consideration is given to perceptual factors in shaping their configuration, structure and mode of deployment."

The key to Luttwak's argument is the differentiation of "power" and "force" (this appears in the Appendix to The Grand Strategy). One can take or leave the particular words, but the distinction is intuitively more than just semantic. Luttwak makes many shrewd observations about power and force:

"Power" as an aggregate of external action capabilities denotes the overall "output" of the system... Power works not by causing effects directly, but by eliciting responses—if all goes well, the desired responses... It is the actor-objects of this power who supply the dynamic "energy" through their obedience.

By implication, power is extensible to the point that there are willing subjects that can be recruited, or pacified.

In contradistinction to power, which, as a sort of public good, "does not diminish with distance" and "is not consumed by use," "force ap-
plied on one sector to impose tranquillity on one restless tribe is unavailable for simultaneous use against another, and any increase in the number of targets diminishes the amount of force that can be used against each." Luttwak continues, "We know how force is constituted: in direct proportion to the quantity and quality of the inputs." By implication, then, force is constrained, but power is unconstrained. What Luttwak is talking about, of course, is perceived power. And the logic of his argument moves him to identify perceived power as the essential ingredient in deterrence, which he further defines in terms of the special kind of deterrence represented by "credible retaliatory capabilities."

I suppose one could quibble about the postulated distinction between power and force. Though Luttwak asserts that there is a "qualitative difference between the security provided by deterrence and that provided by an active defense" (in other words, by the exercise of real force), there might in actuality be a considerable overlap of the two concepts. Consider, for example, the idea of extensibility: Force might normally, or characteristically, be "unavailable for simultaneous use against another," but its exemplary effect might well be extensible; and in that respect, how much different is it from "power"? And, on the other hand, power itself—even "perceived power"—depends on the total capability of a system, as seen, of course, by others who are continuously observing and interpreting the behavior of that system. In that sense, power—that is, the creation and maintenance of the impression of power—can conceivably be even more expensive than the creation and use of force. One example that Luttwak cites—apparently with (abstract) approbation, and apparently to demonstrate the superiority of power over force (it "reveals the exceedingly subtle workings of a long-range security policy based on deterrence")—is the Roman siege of Masada. The Romans committed one legion for three years, from A.D. 70 to 73, which proceeded to take Masada through prodigies of patient engineering. Luttwak is careful to note that this was "a place of no strategic or economic importance." Again, he refers to "the very insignificance of its objective," and the fact that the operation was conducted "regardless of cost," as being of the essence of the destructive operation.

But it is not the purpose of this extensive review to debate Luttwak's definitions. In the last analysis, definitions are properly arbitrary, and they don't matter. The point is to elucidate the possibilities of the effective use of deterrence—which must mean, restrictively, the threat of retaliation, not the promise of defense—and to explore the operational limitations of the concept and the perceptual conditions that underlie it. For the bottom line is credibility: How can a credible deterrence be created? What does it take to maintain it? Those who theorize about
power and perceived power must mean to suggest that a nation—perhaps a nation multiply constrained and yet burdened by considerable security responsibilities and also plausibly threatened in several dimensions—can avail itself of the critical force-multiplier of power generation and power projection; and further, that nation can achieve, through this strategic alchemy, a theoretically infinite extension of its more tangible quotient of force; and finally, that the critical multiplier is, at base, perceptual. The validity of this argument and the efficacy of this implicit advice remain to be seen.

A Theoretical Critique of “Perceptions”

Before we talk about the validity of prescriptions for manipulating the perceptions of others in order to extend our own power and validate our deterrence, we should comment on the underlying notion of “perceptions” from a theoretical, or a proto-theoretical, standpoint. The doctrine of perceptions is obviously a sub-field of the more general study of cognition. Cognitive theory is rather well-developed within the social sciences, and there is a considerable literature on the structure, acquisition, and operation of beliefs, images, perceptions, values, mindsets, operational codes, and the like. Indeed, the concept of perceptions—the cognitive dimension of situations—is so popular that it has infected journalistic and even common explanation.

Cognitions are real and important, of course (and in other moments and other places, including a later section of this paper, I base an explanatory framework for collective action, particularly military intervention, on what I call “strategic categories,” which are essentially cognitive in nature). But I must say that a kind of crude, intuitive doctrine of the operation of “perceptions” is abroad, within the profession of political science and among the public, that is, perhaps unwittingly, extreme in its implications. It would destroy the calculus of decision, the fundamental rationality of choice, the very sense of the reality of actions and events. True, everything we sense or “know” is filtered through some sort of screen—or multiple screens representing various functions, such as beliefs and values. We do not act in response to raw reality—whatever that is (and we need not get into metaphysics here; epistemology is quite enough). We are always interposing our own Gestalts or forms, patterns, shapes (whether aesthetic designs or ethical values), and presumably “reality” suffers correspondingly. And, of course, if we behave that way, we can presume that others—adversaries, friends, bystanders—do also. So there is some merit in in-
quiring into how our, and their, perceptions work, and how we might influence them, systematically and constructively (from our standpoint).

But it takes us pretty far from the feel of ordinary reality when we come upon a cardinal judgment such as the following, from an important cognitive theorist, Ole R. Holsti: "A decision-maker acts upon his image of the situation rather than upon objective reality, and it has been demonstrated that the belief system—its structure as well as its content—plays an integral role in the cognitive process."2

All of this sets aside, and puts down, what we might call the "reality principle." This is how that principle works. The concept of perceptions as the primal material of policy determination is either so general as to be trivial (all noumena in the real or external world are present in any individual consciousness and are mentally manipulated only as perceptions), or else it is false and misleading (insofar as it implies that decisionmaking processes are inevitably subjective, biased, and irrational). In the not-so-long run, cognitions or perceptions, if they are non-instrumental or dysfunctional or just wrong, must give way to the "reality principle."

In other words, there is a certain stubbornness about the original realities. If a decisionmaking system assumes a "model" that badly fits reality, ultimately the skewed choices of that decisionmaking system will be tested against the original, real constraints of the real world, which cannot be transcended by wishfulness, willfulness, or sheer ignorance of their existence, even though they can initially be misappraised. We may act in accordance with our perceptions, and the other side may, too, but we are affected by what they do to us. Something real and tangible is going on in the transactions between the sides. If they hurt us, we are hurt apart from the way in which and the extent to which we think we are hurt. And they are tangibly affected, too, by what we do, not just by what they think we are doing. We, or they, might interpret, distort, mistake, through conceptual lenses that are clouded by various cognitive-dissonance-resolution mechanisms. These cognitive operations are all very interesting; but we can lay down one law: Over time, if people are not crazy (and if systems are not crazy—though no anthropomorphism is implied in this), their perceptions of reality, and their responses to reality, will more and more closely converge with reality. There will be a dialectic of mental sets adjusting to external facts—particularly facts over which the perceiver has little control—a succession of cognitive stances, or successive approximations to reality. The tendency of a system is, I suppose, toward an equilibrium of its solutions with its real environment.
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The more general fault of cognitive theorists consists of looking at action systems as if they were nothing but information systems. They see policymaking as information processing. This is a very fragmentary conception of the policy process. Of course, the policy process has an information element or dimension—and by stretching the cybernetic metaphor to the breaking point, it can even be imagined that the policy process is nothing but an information system. But in any normal sense, the policy process includes both inputs and outputs that consist of events, situations, and actions that transcend their purely informational form and content. Even the “withinputs”—the internal mechanisms—of the policy process, though they more closely resemble pure information, include tangible elements such as organization structures, actual resources limits, and existential behaviors that are more than, and different from, information. Information is about these elements, not synonymous with them.

The Phenomenology of Power

Americans wouldn’t be concerned about manipulating perceptions of power, or with distinctions between power and force, if we were confident that we had enough real power (perhaps I mean, in the strict sense of Luttwak’s distinction, force, and if so, my apologies), or would always have it. Neither would we be concerned with perceptions if we were confident that the power we possessed had a sufficient deterrent aura.

How does power work? What are its elements? How do these elements grow out of society to become the usable power of the state? How does a state mobilize the elements of power inherent in “its” society? (For power, to be available to the state, must first be mobilized from the larger society that is the base of the state, society being the total framework of the activities and structures of individuals and collectives existing in certain ways in certain places. Some of these activities are economic transactions reflecting a willingness to make certain exchanges or investments rather than others, and on a certain scale. Indeed, the translation of power from society to state is far from perfect.)

The reasons that this semi-abstract inquiry might be important at all are two: first, the bases of power might be changing; and second, the US share of power might be changing, in ways that might be difficult, impossible, or at least unattractive for our government to control or remedy. All of this should inspire two kinds of questions: What should we do about it? And what can we do about it? (“We,” as used here.
is not a small segment of the executive branch of government, that is the national security bureaucracy, but the larger political system, indeed the social system in which the political system is immersed.) To what extent are changes in the allocation of power beyond our control? After all, such changes are the results of several factors: (1) the nature of the international system (the specific position and behavior of other countries, particularly challengers such as the Soviet Union, or emerging regional "hegemones"); (2) the nature of our own domestic system, including its constitutional structure; (3) the nature of technology (including nuclear weapons: long-range conventional forces and lift, logistics, and communications: subconventional instruments of resistance; and particular conventional weapons systems such as precision-guided munitions on land, in the air, and at sea); and even (4) the evolution of "moral" factors, which govern the way nations employ force.

We might not derive any instant policy advice from such inquiries, but we might get some early warnings of the unfolding of the historical process, of which we are inevitably a part.

At the outset, we should eliminate some confusion about the sources of power. Increasingly, those who are critical of military power play upon an equivocation about the identity of power, which is derived from the dual sense that US military power, at least relative to that of others in the world, is in decline; and that military power in general is more and more unusable, untranslatable into practical advantages in securing national interests and objectives. Concomitantly, critics assert that other elements (economic, social, cultural, political, diplomatic) may confer power where military means are declining. They further assert that military means are interchangeable with "nonmilitary means," implying that the substitution is a matter of choice or preference. But this proposition is not much more than a placebo. To propose nonmilitary means, or any kind of means, one must have in mind certain interests that might be served or protected by them. Of course everyone hopes, in a crisis of conflicting interest, that diplomacy, economic inducements, and sympathetic ties will help resolve the problem. But it is fair to ask: What if those nonmilitary instruments don't work? Or what if they work only because military instruments lurk in the background—that is, if they depend for their efficacy, in the last analysis, on the threat of force? Simply to ignore this problem is to be thrown back on a nonpolicy: hoping that nothing happens. So when critics talk about "the declining utility of military force," they may well be talking about a collection of real phenomena, but they have to sharpen their notion of what they mean.
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It is still possible to believe that military force is (1) declining in its effect on situations; (2) becoming increasingly cost-ineffective; and (3) becoming increasingly diffused among multiple centers of political and strategic initiative. But, in deference to the apologists for the efficacy of military force, one must admit that it is still integral to the structure of international relations, that is, military force still determines the essential relations among nations. Even the absence of military power, in general, or on one side of a conflict, is a fact that determines the nature and shape of the international system. And, of course, military power, if asymmetrically distributed, is likely to be decisive.

But it is a proposition of a very different order—and one that is more challengeable—that a nation can remedy a deficit of force, or stem a decline in the real utility of military power, by exercises in the manipulation of perceptions.

The Question of "Will"

An associated difficulty arises when we ask whether our political leaders could enhance American power in the world by mobilizing national "will." Many political commentators have—at least until recently—deplored the supposed absence of "presidential leadership" precisely because they felt that this was not only the necessary, but the sufficient condition for restoring the American status that would lead to effective influence in important international situations.

Pundit-journalists, professorial strategists, and even many national security bureaucrats talk almost obsessively about will. Foreign challenges and probes are seen as tests of our resolve: Vietnam was a "trauma" that impaired our capability to respond to threats; we are paralyzed by a "failure of nerve." But we are not talking about "will" in some primal personal sense. The responses we refer to are not subjective psychological phenomena. We are talking about the operation of a complex political and social system—not even an organism except in a partially useful but mostly misleading metaphor. National "will" represents a construct—that is, a complex resultant—which includes, as one of its interactive components, the ability of a President to generate and sustain the support of the rest of the political system for some specific purpose. What we are really describing, then, is not a mental or moral state, but the structure of a problem, and the structure of the system that deals with the problem. A President can't exercise his will for the Nation; he can only try to mobilize its resources and support. In the end, "will" is only a shorthand for the political mandate a President has to respond to some challenge.
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Behind the talk about "will" is the pursuit of credibility—not for its own sake, of course, but to enhance power and reinforce deterrence. Credibility is a very real requisite of a system that depends increasingly on deterrence because it lacks the tangible forces to execute, otherwise, its strategy of forward defense. But, just as will is a resultant of a complex political and social process, credibility can't be simply manufactured or imposed. It resides in the expectations that other nations have of the future response of the entire American system. And that response has much to do with the constraints that envelope—indeed, characterize and constitute—the policymaking system. Above all, what is not appreciated, even by those who consider themselves foreign policy "makers," is that you don't "make" foreign policy in any normal sense of the word that might be comprehensible to people who really make things such as boats or houses or gadgets or soup. The question is not even "who" makes policy, but "what" makes policy.

To determine the responses of our system, then, we can't look to factors of will, predilection, even intention. Rather, we are thrown back on the analysis of (1) the strategic orientation that is conditioned by our preparations and built into our institutions, and (2) our capabilities and constraints. Those factors constitute, respectively, the logic and the logistics of national action. They are both what makes certain responses seem "necessary," and what causes other responses to turn out to be impossible.

Deterrence

So we see that some commentators feel the need to inflate the "force" we have by means of perceptual stimulants—multipliers—to get a better yield of power per unit of actual military force. But I suspect that we would still not be so interested in "perceptions," if it were not for the fact that they underlie deterrence, and deterrence, at least at the nuclear level, is the most important "mode" of strategy in our present situation.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, in an interesting analysis, makes a pass at detailing the definitional problems involved in assessing the strength of our military forces. Beginning with the classic distinction of "perceived" versus "real" strength, he defines the components of each. Real strength, in the strategic dimension, is "an ability to destroy major Soviet targets, military and civil, with nuclear weapons at intercontinental ranges." Real strength is composed of:

(1) the performance and survivability of US strategic weapons and associated equipment. (2) the courage and character of American
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leaders responsible for decisions affecting their use, and (3) the reliability and survivability of the command, control, and communications systems linking political leaders and military commanders with weapons.

By contrast, "perceived strength" is "the net impression of strength which the appearance of our strategic forces creates in the national minds of the Soviet Union, the US, and perhaps other countries."

So far, so good. But General Taylor then muddles the difference he has sought to sharpen between "real" and "perceived" strength. Elaborating real strength, he says: "To produce this [deterrent] effect, real strength must be to some degree perceptible to the observers whom it impresses, deters, or intimidates by its destructive power." Quite so: even next-to-pure defense, if it were totally imperceptible, would not deter—that is, it would not deter initial attack, though it might stop, and therefore deter further, the pressing of the attack. And, explicating perceived strength, General Taylor comments: "Among the elements entering into a composite perception of our strength, the perceptible part of our real strength would make the most important contribution." So real strength has to be perceptible, and the most important component of perceived strength consists of real factors.

In any case, what General Taylor is worried about is that our perceived strength, in the eyes of our adversaries, may seem weaker than our actual strength. For General Taylor, perceived strength will at best equal real strength (in practical terms, though in theory it could exceed it). This is just the contrary to Luttwak, who is disappointed at the mere parity of inputs of force and outputs of power. To General Taylor, "our concern about our perceived strength arises from a fear that the other powerful countries will underestimate our strength to the detriment of its political and deterrent value." He is worried about Soviet "misjudgments" in situations of crisis.

General Taylor correctly senses that such possible line losses in our generation of perceived strength depend on (in addition to the "numbers fallacy" of our allies and adversaries, and the chaotic reporting of our own "opinion-shapers") (1) "the reputation of our leadership," (the character and personality traits . . . of those American leaders who control the weapons, assign missions, and give or withhold the order to fire); (2) "the size and readiness of our conventional military forces," (3) "the state of the economy," and (4) "our national unity."

I agree. In the end, a necessary element of national strength is bound up with the operation and character of our political and social
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(and, of course, economic) systems. These domestic systems contain what I might call attractive features but what General Taylor, from the strategic standpoint, calls "visible weaknesses" (in lamentable contrast with the Soviet system, whose "flaws are generally well concealed from foreign eyes and ears by police-state procedures and the suppression of domestic criticism," and whose "ruthless use of military force to achieve political purposes" and "steadfastness and will... to sacrifice in time of war" are all of great value in establishing the credibility of military power."

As for remedies "to offset these disadvantages," General Taylor proposes "the elimination or moderation of perceptible national weaknesses." To achieve this he recommends that we "reduce our dependence on land-based ICBMs," "launch new programs to modernize and increase our non-nuclear forces, particularly the naval forces needed to guarantee freedom of essential sea lanes in peace and war," and create a "war-sustaining capability based upon a substantial reserve of both equipment and trained manpower, the latter possible only after a return to some form of conscription." "All such actions," he says, "would require the maintenance of much larger military budgets over a decade or so." Reducing import-dependence—particularly on energy—is the cardinal suggestion in the economic area. But finally, prescribes General Taylor, "our task is to do now some of the unpleasant things left undone over the last 20 years," among which is "the purging of minority factionalism, and the revival of national unity and purpose." In this respect, I think Taylor's logic is sound and his diagnosis is revealing. But if "the purging of minority factionalism" is indeed the cost of, and the necessary condition for, the creation of adequate perceived strength, the choices that our political system will have to make are more fundamental than even General Taylor thinks.

Of course, General Taylor's analysis of the elements of strength or power is not exactly unique. In an article summing up the considerable literature on deterrence, Donald M. Snow comments upon a work from 1966 by Thomas C. Schelling. Arms and Influence:

It is generally agreed that deterrence rests on two primary factors: the physical capability to inflict awful penalties on a state doing something one has said is impermissible, and the belief by the person whom one seek to deter that one will in fact do things one has threatened to do. Put in Schelling's (1966) terms, one must be capable of wreaking unacceptable hurt, and the perception of the potential victim must be that one will inflict that hurt."

Richard Rosecrance proposes further, that the two kinds of factors, "usable capability" and "credibility," are tradeable: "[If deterrence] is
to be maintained, one of three situations must exist: (1) both elements must attain some minimal level; (2) if credibility fails, the ability to punish an adversary must be enhanced; (3) if usable capability declines, the credibility of its employment must increase." I intuit that, for Rosecrance, and for us, the most important situation is the third. Curiously, Rosecrance posits any one of these "situations" or conditions as sufficient to maintain deterrence. But surely he must mean that Situation One plus either of Situations Two or Three must jointly prevail. Even then, we must help Rosecrance by intuiting that, in his first condition, he must mean that each element—usable capability and credibility—must individually attain some minimal level. Because, in his second and third conditions, he is describing a kind of production curve, or substitution curve, between capability and credibility, and such a curve will be convex to the origin; so the trade-off of more credibility for less capability will work on reasonable terms only over a relatively short middle stretch of the curve. Toward the ends of the curve it will take an ever-increasing amount of one factor to make up for shortages of the other; indeed, at some point it will take a truly incredible amount of credibility to make up for an incremental deficiency of real capability. Without necessarily specifying where we are on that curve, I would say that it is this relationship of substitution that is of interest to Luttwak, and should be of interest to us.

There are several points I would make about the generation of deterrent effect. First, how efficient is the trade-off of credibility for capability? In other words, where do we stand on the substitution curve? There is obviously a breaking point, and at that point we will have to reconsider our real options, which may be reduced to the generation of real tangible capabilities—at some sacrifice—or default in some situation of confrontation.

Second, about internal costs: Even the "psychic" portion—the perceptual portion, if you will—of strength or power, even assuming that credibility can be substituted on reasonable terms for capability, can become very expensive. Strategic credibility is not a function of a small, identifiable leadership group—not synonymous with the "will" of an individual political or military leader. It is a total-systemic product. As such, the "costs," in all dimensions, of generating national credibility can be very high; they might include radical alteration—General Taylor's "purging of minority factionalism"—of the very society and political system we are ostensibly trying to preserve.

Analyses such as Luttwak's tend to ignore these total costs, over time, in terms of the nature of the system: the requisite type of governance, the regimentation, the internal coercion, the taxes, the

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... conscription, the manipulation of information through propaganda and censorship, the internal surveillance and suppression of dissidence and dissent, the hegemony of the Executive, even the "moral" costs to citizens of the toleration of the external acts of government in their name. Some of these might indeed be "philosophical" items. But considerations of the kind of people we are and were supposed to be might constitute the most important constraints on the practical ability of the state to generate military power (and thus might constitute some of the most important determinants of our status in the international system, and in turn of the shape of that system).

So these costs, even of the perceptual projection of power, being systemic, will be constant and inescapable. Even if they represented "efficiency," they might in themselves be unbearable for certain political systems. over time. (Why did the Roman Empire itself abandon its intelligent strategy and succumb to invasion and dissolution?) All of that bears obviously on the feasibility of generating far-reaching imperial power out of a system constituted as the United States.

Another consideration in the projection of power is the nature of the external environment in which we must operate. This will certainly affect the particular substantive validity of historical analogies ("the predicament that we share") such as one might draw with the Roman Empire—whatever may be the blank formal validity of such analogies. The question is whether the United States, in its actual environment, is immersed in the same kind of structural situation, and the extent to which the same kinds of strategic remedies might be available to us.

The key to the ideal "first" strategic era of the Roman Empire, the Julio-Claudian system, is (according to Luttwak) that "the flexibility of the force structure is such that almost half the army can be sent to a single rebellious province (Illyricum in A.D. 6–9), without prejudicing the security of the rest of the empire."

Quite so. That, in very rough structural analogy, might have been one of Rome's "Vietnams." The Julio-Claudian empire had several of them, and it coped with them admirably. But what external circumstances are we faced with?

First, the nature and shape of the international system are far from unitary, and it would take an exercise of Ptolemaic extravagance to consider ourselves its (unique) center. There are, to put it briefly: another superpower of countervailing strategic weight, and fragmentation—a multiplicity of autonomous and quasi-autonomous sources of political and strategic initiative.

Second, there are nuclear weapons, which tilt the payoff table of risks and rewards and put certain imperial exercises beyond the realm...
of prudence. Such exercises, even if our internal system could sustain them, might not be desirable or safe.

The consequences of these geopolitical and technological factors are, perhaps, offsetting. Even a nation as well-endowed as ours can no longer dominate the entire environment, as if it were an essentially unitary system with minor nuisances on its fringes. But a nation might no longer need to dominate its entire environment in order to establish the essential conditions of its own safety. (This is, however, quite a different proposition from the guarantee of others' security, or from the maintenance of desirable but not critical values in the world.)

The Paradoxes of Deterrence

At this point, we encounter what could be called the "paradoxes of deterrence." They could be defined as the "paradox of destruction" and the "paradox of credibility." They have their root in the constant temptation among military planners and foreign policy elites to get more mileage out of declining forces by depending more on pure deterrence rather than practical defense—by relying on such concepts as "sua-sion," by influencing perceptions rather than providing actual force, by leaning on the sheer rhetoric of commitment rather than the tangible and obvious instruments of defense. The flight into deterrence is a seductive notion, but it is not an ultimate remedy.

Discussions of the implications of deterrence and defense, of course, are not novel; they have been the mainstay of strategic writing for the past thirty years. But somehow the discussions of those decades fall short of being definitive or conclusive. The reason, perhaps, is that deterrence is not just maddeningly elusive, but perverse. We face not just dilemmas, not even just contradictions, but paradoxes.

Nations "choose" a posture of deterrence—or choose to emphasize the component of deterrence over the component of defense—when they can't afford defense; or when defense is not seen to be worth the cost; or when defense is clearly impossible (that is, when a nation can't limit damage to its own territory in any realistic sense); or when deterrence just seems, by comparison, to be an irresistible bargain. Otherwise, nations obviously would not choose deterrence. For defense (in the sense of denial) encompasses deterrence, at least when it promises to be successful and when that promise is well advertised—that is, when defense is both strong and conspicuous, and when it promises not just to repel the aggressor but to damage him.

But conversely, deterrence—in the sense of pure retaliation—does not always constitute defense. And this is the beginning of the trouble.
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Deterrence always contains a good measure of bluff and pretense, and even self-delusion. It seems cheaper to manipulate an enemy's perceptions than to prepare to defeat him on the ground. The aura of deterrence, once "created," seems to be infinitely extensible, at no marginal cost; the nuclear umbrella seems to cover any and all, by an exercise of will or commitment. This is the John Foster Dulles fallacy: Deterrence is fine as long as it is perfect. But what happens—in that famous and ominous contrary-to-fact phrase—"if deterrence fails...?"

That leads us to the first paradox of deterrence: the paradox of destruction. For there is a trade-off between the avoidance of destruction through deterring war and the avoidance of destruction if war happens. The terms are contradictory: they lead in opposite directions. In order to hedge against destruction in a possible war ("if deterrence fails..."), we must preserve second chances, forestalling the need to escalate, to raise the stakes of retaliation: but then the deterrence of war will be impaired, because our credibility is impugned. Avoiding the effects of war, in other words, increases the chances of war (and consequently war's "expected damage").

This is a very elusive proposition, but it goes to the heart of the difference between deterrence and its conceptual alternative, war-avoidance. Of course, in the modern era (the era of apparently unlimited "interdependence" in the strategic dimension), no one would deny that the central purpose of military forces—indeed, some would say, of foreign policy—is to avoid war. But in an earlier era (the golden age of neutrality), the obvious way to avoid war was to stay out of it. Now that simple notion seems not only outmoded but outlandish. We don't so much aim to avoid our own involvement in war: we aim to avoid war itself—by repressing it, providing seamless wall-to-wall deterrence, extending commitments, insisting on the indivisibility of peace.

It may be true that "deterrence works." It works, that is, until it fails. And then, if we have—because we have—reinforced deterrence in all the "sensible" ways (that is, by making our threatened response as automatic and lethal as possible and our protection as universal as possible), and it still fails, we will have leapt, in one catastrophic move, over all the successive damage-limiting barriers we might otherwise have interposed between dire events in the world and our own destruction. Of course, we may hope that "expected damage," the mathematical product of lesser probability of war times greater destruction in war, is lower than the higher probability of war times putatively lesser destruction; but that remains a hope and a conjecture.
The second paradox of deterrence arises from the need for exemplary exercises of force to demonstrate credibility (that is, to enhance perceptions of our power by reinforcing our reputation for using it). Aside from the obvious—almost literary—phrase that this is war to avoid war, there is the further ironic twist that, if the purpose is to buttress our credibility, we must intervene in the least significant, the least compelling, and the least rewarding cases, and our reaction must ideally be quite disproportionate to the nature of the immediate occasion.

Deterrent devices, even on the rhetorical level, such as the Truman Doctrine or the Carter Doctrine, also partake of this irony. We bind ourselves to our own belligerent threats. The more we wish to deter, the more we enunciate threats, but the better our record must be, not only in making good on these explicit threats if called, but in making good on a host of other—even functionally unrelated, even situationally irrelevant—punitive actions. Stanley Hoffmann, in a review in The New York Review of Books of Henry Kissinger’s The White House Years, put this particular point reasonably well, with reference to the peculiar economy of the Kissinger system:

Peace, or containment, is therefore indivisible. Every crisis anywhere tests our ability to stand up to the Soviets. And the credibility of the US depends on our capacity to meet every test . . . . In his design every incident must be treated seriously, since even if it has no great intrinsic significance, losing the test would encourage our adversary to test us again . . . . Indivisible credibility is a recipe for political hubris, military overextension, and moral callousness."

Give or take the "hubris," which I do believe, and the "moral callousness," which I do not believe, but which is not directly in question here, that gets pretty close to the point. A casual quotation from a lesser theorist just happens to make the point even clearer. This is Hon. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in a statement before Congress on January 26, 1976: "We must also make unmistakably clear our determination to resist any Soviet effort to upset the power balance anywhere in the world by force, regardless of whether the area is seen as one of direct security concern to the United States or not."

There is a further irony that attaches to nuclear deterrence—perhaps also a paradox of a sort: we might call it the paradox of stability. It proceeds from the previous paradox of destruction—the incentives and the disincentives we try to create to discourage escalation to nuclear war and yet limit the damage of a nuclear war. The discussion of this problem could start with the preliminary observation that the cult of perceptions has also distorted the direction of our policy with regard
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to the strategic nuclear balance: from the earlier doctrine—sensible enough but much maligned—of assured destruction, we have moved to essays in "essential equivalence." and more recently "perceived essential equivalence." Actually, the strategic nuclear offensive forces on both sides are not relevant to each other, except perceptually (unless, of course, we intend to use them for preemptive damage limiting).

We should rather pursue the objective of stability (both deterrent stability and crisis stability). That objective is best served by some variant of finite deterrence: that is, the capacity, after absorbing an imputed first strike, to destroy some portion of some enemy systems—whatever is considered appropriate to the purpose of general nuclear war (this blank formulation does not yet dispose the selection of targets—their type and location and the fraction to be destroyed). The paradox of stability arises from the fact that nuclear strategies (and targeting doctrines, in particular) wobble between countervalue (hitting cities, industry, populations) and counterforce (striking military forces, in particular the silos where the enemy’s nuclear missiles are housed—one hopes before he has a chance to fire them). The paradox is this: Counterforce reinforces deterrent stability because it increases the credibility of use; but it sacrifices crisis stability, almost precisely for the same reason. Countervalue, on the other hand, creates greater crisis stability; but it may lack deterrent stability, precisely because its use is not credible.

At this moment the paradox of stability is heightened, because our existing land-based weapons—and some other parts of our entire nuclear force—are becoming vulnerable to an enemy first counterforce strike. The paradox is put into relief by examining the remedial proposal of some hawks: to salvage from the debacle of an enemy first strike more throw-weight—that is, more surviving destructive force that we could hurl back at the enemy, at whatever target system (now including cities) we might choose at that stage in the nuclear exchange (this is roughly the proposal of Paul Nitze). We could do this, presumably, by increasing the number of our missiles, or the total yield of our force, so that the surviving remnant would be more potent. We would thereby restore deterrent stability, but we would do this at the cost of making crisis stability less stable. For our greater number of nuclear warheads (with their higher yields) would combine to threaten the other side’s land-based and other fixed nuclear forces, and perhaps inspire it to fire first, preemptively, in a crisis, or to put its nuclear forces on a hair-trigger "launch-on-warning" basis.

Our strategic purposes might be best served by concentrating on the logic of incentives, rather than the balance of perceptions, which
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is quite a different matter as well as a possibly fatal distraction from nuclear stability. The elements of our nuclear strategy—posture, targeting doctrine, and the doctrine of precedence of use—could be designed to discourage either side's first, counterforce use of nuclear weapons since escalation to nuclear war has to be initiated by someone, and such an initiative would logically be a damage-limiting counterforce strike. Nuclear war will not begin with one party's simple perception that he would be ahead, by the numbers, if he were to initiate a nuclear exchange. There would have to be circumstances in which an attack would make "sense"; and there would have to be impunity from retaliation. We can enhance crisis stability, up to a point, simply by not being threatening; but we must admit that there is a point beyond which not being threatening (in types of weapons, in readiness, in obvious doctrine, in numbers) can become, in certain circumstances, an invitation for the other side to attack.

The Game of Extended Deterrence

Just as quasi-theoretical discussions of "perceptions" would not be very interesting if they did not underpin the practical concept of deterrence, so in turn I suspect that little of this disquisition on deterrence would make much difference if it were not for the special category of "extended deterrence"—that is, the attempt to hold our nuclear retaliatory mantle over areas, and situations, of less than central or truly vital value to ourselves. The main reason for this judgment is that, despite analytic doubts—or even ethical doubts—that we might entertain about the prospect of an American President deliberately incinerating 150 million Russians—almost all of them quite innocent of the acts of their government—in retaliation for a Soviet strategic strike on part of the United States, in ordering such a counterattack an American President would be well within the margin of credibility.

It is when we attempt to do much more than that with our strategic nuclear force—either geographically or functionally—that we court the uncertainty of extended deterrence. The same calculus, or speculation, about credibility that we make with regard to strict central deterrence does not hold. Because our assumptions about deterrence apply to the peripheral areas, if at all, with much less force, and because threats to peripheral areas and less-than-vital interests will undoubtedly be the more likely, extended deterrence becomes the critical case at issue here. And extended deterrence is, in fact, the heart of the growing dilemma faced by the United States in the midst of changing political and technological parameters.
The problem of extended deterrence arises at an awkward moment for the United States. Precisely when, because of our conventional unreadiness, we are gravitating—as in the recent Pentagon study of options in the Persian Gulf—toward a lowering of the tactical nuclear threshold, allies and friends are quite rightly questioning the willingness of an American President to use nuclear weapons in a regional confrontation. The “coupling” of local aggression and the ultimate use of America’s strategic force is less secure than it has been since the invention of nuclear weapons.

At one time, in the early 1950s, it was thought that nuclear deterrence, once created by the United States, could scarcely be denied to any ally, and could be extended to all allies without incremental cost. In other words, nuclear deterrence was thought to possess the dual characteristics of a public good: jointness of supply and nonexclusiveness of distribution. Cheap and universal. It was those aspects of nuclear deterrence that underpinned the economy of John Foster Dulles’ “massive retaliation.” Combined with wall-to-wall security alliances (pejoratively labeled “pactomania”), nuclear deterrence could substitute efficiently, for a few seasons, for actual defense. We could, in theory, use the public good we had created—this product, intercontinental nuclear deterrence—and market it over and over. What was overlooked at the time was the fact that, although deterrence could be extended without marginal cost, in the strict sense, there were additional costs. These costs took the form of the proliferation of risk exposure; the multiplication of occasions for intervention in conflict; the implication in the domestic affairs of the states we had acquired as beneficiaries; and the need to reiterate the pledge of our cities in the defense of each threatened or anxious client.

The Case of NATO

The cardinal case of extended deterrence is NATO. Thirty years after the foundation of the alliance, the defense of Western Europe still rests on the proposition that an American President will invite the destruction of our cities and the incineration of 100 million citizens to repel a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum in Europe.

The key term that encapsulates all this is “coupling.” Coupling means, in the first instance, the commitment of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal to the local defense of its European allies. By extension, it connotes the integrity of the chain of escalation from conventional war in Europe to theater nuclear weapons to the final use of America’s ultimate strategic weapon.
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For deterrence in Europe to work, this escalatory chain must seem to be unbroken: coupling must be intact. But the root of NATO's troubles is precisely that the United States wants to break that chain. Hoping always to escape the destruction of nuclear war, we will try to put time and distance between the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision to escalate to the use of our own strategic nuclear weapons. The basic question—not entirely a subject of polite conversation among members of the alliance—is whether America will fight for Europe or whether it will, in some way, use the territorial depth of Europe as a buffer. Breaking the chain of escalation at various points is the concept of "firebreaks"—any device, strategy, or doctrine that makes our escalation to strategic nuclear weapons less than prompt and automatic.

This state of affairs is full of contradictions: Firebreaks are an imperative of our own security in an era of nuclear parity: but they inevitably impair alliance protection. Firebreaks are the very antithesis of coupling. But some weapons systems—such as the Pershing II's and the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles that the United States wants to emplace in Europe—seem, paradoxically, to lead to both results: They may enhance coupling by perfecting the essential link of theater nuclear weapons: but they also invoke the specter of restricting even a nuclear war to European territory, creating yet another fire-break—this one between theater nuclear war and total nuclear war.

It is an instructive irony that virtually any change in our military doctrine or posture—up, down or sideways—has made our European allies nervous. This has been the case with a series of American moves: the "MLF," the multilateral nuclear-sharing scheme for the late 1950s and early 1960s; the emphasis on "flexible response" of the incoming Kennedy-McNamara administration; the "Schlesinger Doctrine" of 1974, which contemplated the direct and selective use of the American strategic nuclear force; the recent interest in "mini-nukes," including such variants as the "neutron bomb"; and SALT II. What is clear is that our European allies deeply suspect that "decoupling" is already America's secret strategy.

Henry Kissinger had it right at Brussels on Labor Day of 1979:

Perhaps even today, but surely in the 1980s, the United States will no longer be in a strategic position to reduce a Soviet counterblow against the United States to tolerable levels. . . . If my analysis is correct, we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide. . . . And therefore I would say, which I might not say in office, that European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we
should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the
destruction of civilization.

In the bitter aftermath of his speech, Kissinger might have had reason
to regret his remarks. But he couldn’t stuff this genie back in the bottle
any more than his critics could abrogate the logic of his observations.
The game of extended deterrence is about over.

True, it can still be said that even the whiff of American nuclear
retaliation is enough to keep the Soviet Union from invading Western
Europe. But the true efficacy of extended deterrence is in keeping allies,
not just deterring adversaries. In the case of nuclear umbrellas, the
relationship is asymmetrical: It takes a lot more credibility to keep an
ally than to deter an enemy.

Perceptions: No Substitute for Real Power

Analyses of power, deterrence, and security protection along the
lines of Edward Luttwak’s Grand Strategy join hands—unintentionally.
I’m sure—with dovish critiques of the liberal left, in failing to “fund”
appropriate security strategies with sufficient confidence. They all de-
pend on strategic sleight-of-hand to demonstrate, in the one case, that
imaginative tactical and political maneuvers can create the illusion of
universal power and, in the other case, that “other means”—diplomatic,
economic, cultural, anything—can substitute effectively for military
force. The common thread of these critiques is that they allow the
perpetuation of ambitious foreign policies, while holding hope for the
maintenance of bearable defense postures. They offer assurances that
we can continue to exercise our accustomed conception of foreign
policy within the constraints that have appeared in our body politic,
economic, and social, and in the world.

But those constraints cannot be escaped or transcended for long:
they will inevitably begin to operate restrictively on our choices. Either
sufficient tangible means will have to be generated, or foreign policies
will have to be adjusted to be brought into balance with constrained
means and processes.

There is another point. In all the disquisitions on the generation of
power, the question is never asked: power for what? Why empire?
Indeed, this question has not been asked seriously, in those terms,
since 1899, when this country first annexed overseas territory. There
is an analogy from American corporate life. In the 1950s and 1960s,
an era of ambitious commercial expansion and acquisition, a goal that
was often adopted as a surrogate for corporate health and prosperity
was “share of the market.” It was at once competitive and relative, and
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yet transcendental. In this respect it was parallel to the prevalent American political-military philosophy: competition for influence, allegiance, access, control. Ours was the logic of the oligopolist, the superpower, not the autonomous, prudent, responsible enterprise. We had quite forgotten the profit and loss statement, the dividends to citizens, the balance sheet of national assets and liabilities—forgotten even how to define them. We were not asking: How would we use the access, the control? What would it cost to achieve, to maintain? What—to use a current expression—was the "bottom line"?

What, after all, is the function of foreign policy? An impertinent question—and one that will not be pursued here, substantively. But I do return, in conclusion, to the original "methodological" point—skepticism about "perceptions," about the manipulation of perceptions as a substitute for the generation of requisite force. Robert Osgood, in a recent book, *Limited War Revisited*, posed the alternatives: "Logically, the United States should either clearly devalue the nature and scope of its security interests... or else it should launch a major effort to attain limited-war forces." Those remain the real choices, though neither is attractive. If we don't choose, events will decide these matters for us, and not neatly.
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In this last chapter, we bring together and draw upon the combined experiences, education, and policymaking insights brought to our seminars by the participants listed at the end of this volume. These individuals represent a rich diversity of backgrounds and perspectives on the multifaceted dimensions of the domestic and international political environments. The problem in developing this chapter was to make these diverse commentaries somewhat coherent and useful for US national security policymakers and for others who study international affairs and US national security policy issues.

We can propose few solutions to the issues raised by our authors in their separate chapters. We can qualify the ideas of the individual authors and draw further implications for US policymakers of those issues defined by our authors.

In this summary, specific contributors will not be identified; our policy of nonattribution of ideas to particular sources remains essential to our open dialogue with responsible government officials. These policymakers often presented their personal views, as well as the positions of their institutions. This chapter combines official governmental views, private views of governmental officials, and the commentary of academics and other private citizens. It is not possible to reflect totally each nuance of opinion or dissenting viewpoint surfaced during the seminars. Notes were taken, but the speakers' comments were not taped or transcribed.

Other caveats about this summary are worth noting. Readers will not find a fully coherent, nor even standardized, reporting of ideas. We achieved, however, that the quality of our authors' ideas and those generated by the seminars required more than the usual discursive proceedings, since each paper did stimulate a unique discussion with its own direction. Each section of this concluding chapter provided by the discussion in the seminar.
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Nevertheless, it was possible to integrate the commentary around central themes in each of our discussions of recent Soviet foreign policy, US-China relations, energy and US security, economics, military manpower, and perceptions of US power. In general, these opinions are presented as alternative ways of viewing a subject, rather than as debating positions espoused during the intensity of strenuous intellectual discussion.

Soviet Behavior as a Catalyst to Choice

One of the most heated sessions developed over Professor Petrov's paper on analyzing recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives. This subject was addressed in April 1980 during our last seminar. It appears first in the volume inasmuch as the United States seems destined, once again, to focus upon competition and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as the most important national security relationship. Our group examined the motives for recent Soviet behavior, with a particular emphasis upon the most obvious initiative, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We discussed whether this Soviet behavior was a major departure point or part of a larger strategy, what the likely future was for US-USSR relations, and what possible choices faced the United States.

The discussion of patterns of Soviet behavior quickly revealed varying perspectives; there was no agreement whether the Soviet Union had a "grand strategy" or design which guided individual foreign policy initiatives, or whether the Soviets made tactical moves based upon particular situations. When we reviewed what patterns could be suggested by the invasion of Afghanistan, diverse motives were proposed.

Professor Petrov's paper provided perhaps the most provocative perspective—an uncritical analysis of the Soviet view of the world scene to explain changes in Soviet policies toward the United States and other areas of the world. In debating Professor Petrov's deliberately one-sided review of Soviet decisional perspectives, others added that the Soviet leadership might have felt somewhat cheated in that they believed they had achieved coequal status, but the US leadership sought to retract recognition of this status. Questions from the US Executive and Congress about the presence of Soviet troops and the construction of Soviet naval bases in Cuba were viewed by the Soviets as an attempt to revert to 1962, when the United States had exercised significant political leverage against a much weaker Soviet nation.

These descriptions of a defensive, almost paranoid, Soviet leadership that felt betrayed were reinforced by several knowledgeable
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Kremlinologists who reported on their discussions with officials of the Soviet Government. There has been a carefully orchestrated program to signal intent to the United States through Soviets who communicate in many US channels. From their embassy, press, and scholarly organizations, these Soviets have conveyed a common threatening message which reinforces Petrov's analysis. These important Soviets have suggested that the Soviet Union has had to change its strategy because it does not believe it can rely upon the United States and because the Soviet Union currently has the will and the intention to expand its role as a global power. In many respects, they say they are following the path taken by the United States from the 1950s through the 1970s. These USSR spokesmen suggest that the Soviets will be more aggressive because "it is now their turn" and they have the will that the United States is lacking.

When our participants reviewed the most blatant Soviet policy initiative, the move into Afghanistan, some saw it as a sign of Soviet weakness. The Soviets were hated in Eastern Europe; the Chinese had turned from them. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops was seen as a failure of Soviet policy to establish a hospitable regime in a buffer state on its borders. Others saw this as more threatening. The fact that the Soviet Union had used its own legions suggested that it no longer had to fully coordinate its policies with others and that, therefore, inhibitions had declined. Historic Soviet failures in Indonesia, Egypt, and China were viewed as suggesting to the Soviet Union that it must rely more upon its own forces. The United States may have to cope with an expanding military empire with motives as simple as those related to this type state.

There were other views of the rationale for recent Soviet policies. Some thought that Soviet aims have been emboldened recently, not by events generated by the United States and its allies, but by a Soviet view that the correlation of forces in the world had changed and that the military balance and momentum in the world arena had shifted to the Soviet Union. This view permits, indeed invites, bolder initiatives.

We also noted that Soviet leadership gains power in a difficult and ruthless process. This leadership is led psychologically to a relatively aggressive, if defensive, approach to the world. Soviet leaders are also unlikely to be willing to let any vacuum filled with a socialist government to change back to a more democratic or capitalist form of government.

When the focus turned to Soviet behavior after the Afghanistan invasion, some interesting ideas emerged. Since the Soviets had no logic or rationale prepared for explaining their invasion, it may have
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represented a tactical choice, rather than part of a grand design to move into the Persian Gulf. The Soviets were seen as trying to repair a deteriorating situation in a client state in which they had invested heavily in political and military assistance. There is a distinct possibility that the Soviets might have miscalculated the political and military situation in Afghanistan since there appears to be little supporting indigenous political and military structure for eventual control. There is some suspicion that it may take the Soviets ten to fifteen years to establish this Afghan structure and that could cause tensions between Soviet civilian, party, and military interests.

When our discussions turned to the future and to implications for the United States, the purely Soviet perspective was naturally challenged. It was noted that many of the moves by the West in general, and the United States in particular, had been stimulated by the growing dimensions of Soviet military capabilities in the strategic area, in European conventional and nuclear forces, and in the ability to project power. Soviet expenditures on and growth in military forces since the early 1960s were viewed as threatening to Western interests. Soviet aided or sponsored military moves in Southeast Asia and Africa were cited and the Soviet use of Cuban proxies noted. The most recent Soviet move toward the Persian Gulf was seen as one which severely threatened Western interests in a continuing stable supply of oil.

There was a consensus that, no matter what the motive for their recent initiatives, the Soviets now threatened and caused problems for the rest of the world. Indeed, it did not matter whether the movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was viewed as part of a larger strategy or as merely a tactical rescue. There was general agreement that it was essential to be prudent and regard this as a major departure and potential precedent for using Soviet troops outside of their East European empire. There is the distinct possibility that the Soviet Union, with a larger naval force and the ability to move troops rapidly through airlift, may be more willing to intervene directly in lands more distant from its borders.

The messages being sent by Soviet spokesmen, as read by several of the Kremlinologists at our seminar table, are not encouraging for the future. These messages suggest that the Soviet Union will not exercise as much restraint in the near term, and that it may take five years to approach the accommodation once labeled “detente.” Further, these Soviet spokesmen imply that the Soviet Union will “push” around the world, and that Southern Africa is particularly ripe, for the Soviets will not now be inhibited by earlier networks of interests with the West. By 1983, they suggest, the Soviet Union will flood Europe with short-range
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thermonuclear weapon systems as a response to NATO initiatives. In addition, the Soviets threaten to stiffen control of dissidents within their borders. The general feeling was that the Soviets are not trying to scare the United States into an early return to detente, but rather are seeking to threaten and intimidate the United States and to signal clearly that it will be difficult to deal with them.

Our panelists viewed the Middle East as a powder keg because of the latent hostilities between the states in this area, and because of potential internal political instabilities in several of these states. The Soviet Union will be searching for anti-Western trends in the Middle East and seeking to expand its influence there in order to leverage and threaten the Western Alliance.

The future seems to contain a difficult dilemma for the United States: the Soviets appear ready to pressure us; if the United States responds, the Soviet Union may press even harder. What are the implications for US policymakers in this conflicting analysis of Soviet motives and in this pessimistic perspective of future US-Soviet relations? Several less than hopeful insights were provided by our group. First, and perhaps most important, there was a consensus that it did not matter whether the Soviet Union was being defensive or aggressive, was acting out a grand design or merely responding to problems on its borders, was pursuing a strategic goal or taking tactical advantages of opportunities. The Soviet Union had to be viewed as sincerely troublesome and threatening, not only to the United States, but to the remainder of the world.

There was also relative agreement (although our panelists differed in degree and on particular aspects) that the United States has some catching up to do before it can adequately cope with an expanding Soviet empire. In particular, there was a feeling that a refurbishing was required of both the actual capability of US military forces and of the credibility of the determination of the United States to use those forces, if required.

The question of how to "get back to detente" was left unanswered, but there was a feeling that this would not happen tomorrow, nor in the next several years. There was general agreement with quotes from Soviet diplomats who thought it may take five years to readjust accommodations between the world's superpowers.

One important suggestion was that the United States had lost its middle or compromising options. The United States would either make some hard choices to increase, or at least better support, its current commitments, or to back away from those which we cannot credibly
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support. Perhaps the most pressing military choice has to do with whether or not the United States should seek to create (with some Alliance and local help?) a new military reality in the Persian Gulf. This may be the most immediate flash point in the US military relationship with the Soviet Union. Other choices to be faced in the US security relationship with the Soviet Union have to do with the status of the SALT II Treaty; concomitant planning for future US strategic force postures; expansion of NATO defense, including the modernization of theater nuclear forces; and defining the dimensions of cooperative military experiments with the People's Republic of China.

Finally, the general approach suggested for the United States was to display a pattern of behavior and negotiation toward the Soviet Union that was tough, but flexible, relatively consistent, yet still open to a continual dialogue at many levels. There was some interest in the idea that perhaps the United States needed to find minor discrete areas or “tracks” where we might consummate very limited agreements with the Soviet Union, without linking them to other more troublesome major issue areas. There was also, naturally, some interest in understanding whether the United States would be able to develop some further leverage in its relationship with China against an apparently more aggressive and better armed Soviet Union.

Difficulties in Managing US-China Relations

Professor Harry Harding's paper, “Managing US-China Relations,” stimulated significant discussion of this issue. We were fortunate to have at our seminar responsible government officials and recognized China scholars. This challenging group very soon provided thoughtful commentary on the evening's paper, on what was appropriate in US-China cooperation, on future issues facing policymakers, and on the difficulties the United States will have in “managing” this relationship. Harry Harding's paper generated critiques, much as Petrov's paper would; several individuals believed that the paper provided too static a view of a relationship operating in a dynamic world. Others were stimulated by the categories of potential relationship, but felt that US-China relations will be too complex to be neatly catalogued by any organizing scheme. In all fairness, Professor Harding never suggested that his categories were either mutually exclusive or rationally exhaustive. Finally, few agreed that the relationship between the United States and China should be described as “fragile,” although there was agreement that the relationship was complicated and delicate.
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The group turned quickly, and in substantial depth, to analyses of what “playing the China card” meant to the dominant US relationship with the Soviet Union. These questions crystallized around two central themes. There were differing views on whether the United States had achieved as much as possible from our relationship with the Chinese (was there more to be gained from the China card or not?); and there was serious disagreement about the advisability and timing of any US development of a security relationship or military cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. This question, more narrowly focused, asked whether US military cooperation with China, past a certain point, would deter the Soviet Union or provoke intemperate behavior, particularly toward the People’s Republic of China.

Previous Soviet-Chinese disagreements were viewed as tying down USSR military forces on their Eastern frontier, with some advantage to the United States. There was important disagreement about how quickly and how closely the United States should move toward the Chinese. It was generally agreed that neither the United States nor the Chinese completely understood what they wished from the growing relationship. It was noted that it was important to consider what China wants, and not just to view this from a US perspective.

Several members suggested that the United States must approach any security relationship with China very cautiously, and that the risks of a closer relationship might outweigh the potential benefits. Others, knowledgeable about the Soviet Union, suggested that there was a clear possibility that our relations with the Soviet Union would worsen if our relations with China improved, particularly in military cooperation.

There was some opposition to the sale of military materials, especially those that are called “dual purpose” gear. There was a suggestion that materials, such as trucks, could be called “non-military items.” The concern was not so much with how the materials might be used, but with the image of US-PRC cooperation that might be created. There was serious concern that a gradually developing military cooperation between China and the United States might cause the Soviet Union to further improve its own forces or to take dramatic action, perhaps even war, against China. Should events move this far, the United States would then be faced with terribly difficult major choices.

On the other hand, some members with a good view of recent US-Chinese negotiations noted that the Chinese seem to view military cooperation as perhaps the lowest of their important future priorities. In the “four modernizations” campaign, the Chinese list the military element last. Also, while we were being cautioned to take a slow, steady approach toward security relationships, the Chinese themselves have
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been cautious in developing defense relationships with the United States. An important point was made that the Soviet Union is perhaps more worried about the sale of capital plant, technology, and know-how than of particular weapon systems. The Russians will be more concerned about the development of a Chinese capability to make fighter aircraft than about the sale of fighter aircraft to them. On the other hand, the Chinese have asked why the United States has recently decided to sell major weapon systems to India, but not to China or Pakistan.

The question of whether or not there was “more to get out of playing the China card” was not totally resolved. If one assumes that a stronger China will help balance the Soviet Union and that China is currently relatively weak, then US assistance could increase the trumps available in our deck. This suggestion was accompanied with an appropriate insight—that how we develop our relationship with the Chinese is critical to our relationship with the Soviet Union.

We were left with several questions about the future of the triangular relationship between the two superpowers and China. A continuing issue will be whether or not there is any further advantage to be gained by the United States against the Soviet Union through the US relationship with the People’s Republic of China. For the future, US policymakers were cautioned to remember that in 1954, the Soviet Union probably felt about China as the United States feels today. We must recognize there are still elements of instability within the Chinese system and in our delicate relationship with the Chinese. The future is cloudy and unpredictable.

There was general agreement that we had “run off the road map” in defining how the United States and China would cooperate, and that the lessons of the 1970s had been overtaken. There were suggestions that, in the past, there had been “manipulation” of the relationship against the Soviet Union by both sides. The timing of the US opening to China and the dramatic way in which events and trips to China were played by US statesmen were viewed as threatening to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the timing of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, during the visit to the United States of Chinese leaders, was suggested as manipulation by the Chinese. There was agreement that the relationship in the past had been characterized by a Chinese need to balance off the “polar bear” on its northern frontier; there was strong suspicion that the 1980s might be characterized by a US need to redress a relatively weaker strategic and military position versus the Soviet Union. Thus, the relationship may be changing and the Chinese may seek to exact greater advantage in any future developments.
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Several knowledgeable Kremlinologists suggested that the Chinese interest lies in keeping the United States and the Soviet Union at odds; China is best able to maneuver and exercise maximum regional influence if it can keep the two superpowers on a collision course. The essential dynamic of the US-USSR relationship might thus be the major determining factor of how we and the Chinese view our interaction and treat its importance. United States policymakers were charged to constantly ask the questions: "Who is using whom?" and "What effects will our action have; what images will we create?"

We were reminded that the US-Soviet relationship must remain dominant and that, even in the Pacific, the US-Japanese relationship must remain the most important. The Chinese were seen as understanding our important ties to Japan and recognizing that eventually they must be worked into that relationship as a cooperating, or sometimes competing, partner. There was advice to look beyond immediate needs and concerns to the long-range strategic view of the world and to how China will be integrated into global US interests. A stronger China will threaten its neighbors: when the United States sells trucks to China we are telling our other Asian allies, closer to China, something about our priorities and our interests. Strengthening China today, perhaps against the Soviet Union, might create a powerful enemy for us in the future, over an issue such as Taiwan. Serious questions were asked about whether we preferred a Southeast Asia threatened by Vietnam or a Southeast Asia threatened by the People's Republic of China.

Policymakers in the United States must also be concerned with a reciprocity of views. We were warned that the Chinese seem to feel that they must treat the United States as they treat all other states, while the United States believes that China should treat the United States as the United States treats China. Policymakers must examine each US move toward China for its short- and long-range impact upon the Soviet Union, Japan, and other Asian neighbors.

Since we have received little Chinese support for US positions during the Iranian and Afghan crises, we cannot expect unequivocal Chinese support of the views of the United States. China will take a separate course as an enormous regional power and a potential superpower. In addition, we were cautioned to beware of potential changes in policy that could occur very rapidly as a result of social forces or of leadership changes within the United States or China.

Finally, we observed that the early, uncomplicated relationship with China is no longer possible, and that it would be increasingly difficult to "manage" the growing network of private, governmental, and
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commercial relationships developing between the United States and China. The process of managing major issues with the Chinese was viewed as driven by reciprocal visits of national figures. These tend to force choices and crystallize issues leading to accelerated development of particular policies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent trips of US leaders to China accelerated an already ongoing cooperation. The relationship was not seen as fragile, but rather as becoming increasingly complex and difficult. The tone of cooperation was described as having changed from one of euphoria during the 1970s, sometimes tinged by Chinese ideological rhetoric, to the current more pragmatic, relatively low key approach to issues.

It will be increasingly difficult to maintain any sort of status quo in this relationship in a world of fast moving events. The very important 1980 visit to China by Secretary of Defense Brown was viewed as a major step, but one which would require future definition of its ultimate policy dimensions. The United States must look at China from a strategic perspective, and not become lost in daily issues. Even though China has a centralized decisional process, it would become increasingly difficult to "manage" the complex issues that will develop in the future. Some suggested we might not even be able to track many of these issues as they develop. There was a final analysis that reinforced the prediction of problems in managing the tactical side of the relationship. As a pluralistic, democratic society, the United States finds it difficult to ever really "manage" relationships; some issues are bound to develop and get out of hand, outside of governmental control.

Other issues that will defy government "management" emerged in the area of energy. While less directly related to superpower relations, emerging strategic realities in the US energy picture also cut clearly across relations with the Soviet Union, and defy easy solution because of the complex nature of the domestic and international interests involved.

Energy as an Important National Security Issue

Our seminar on the implications of energy for US security met in December 1979, shortly after the Iranian seizure of US embassy personnel had caused another ripple in the world pool of oil. This meeting was also proceeding while, unknown to the United States, the Soviet Union was preparing to invade Afghanistan. In retrospect, some of the thoughts of our group about the application of military force to energy problems, and about other energy issues, are even more germane now than they were during our deliberations.
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Discussion of the appropriateness of military force to securing energy sources ranged across a wide variety of views. There was a consensus, however, that assuring a continued flow of petroleum was a confounding problem, not amenable to easy solution or even innovative approaches. At one pole was the view that the United States should adopt policies that decouple our strategic national interests from commercial considerations of petroleum supplies, particularly from the Persian Gulf. This was proposed because none of the traditional means of projecting US influence was viewed as likely to result in any significant control over the supply of oil. Another proposal was that the US Government remove restrictions on commercial deals. This was an argument for a laissez faire world where private US interests enter the world marketplace to accommodate their own needs, but they are not linked to US foreign policies. The United States was importuned not only to eliminate the perception that we would intervene militarily to protect oil interests, but also to project the impression that we have no interest in making political tradeoffs for energy concessions. All of these suggestions were shaped by the notion that other nations see our linkage of international politics and oil needs as a weakness to be exploited.

This viewpoint, which would exclude the use of military force to secure oil under most circumstances, was reinforced by another suggestion that it simply was not acceptable for the United States to go to war over oil in order to secure a more luxurious and comfortable lifestyle than that enjoyed by our ancestors. Others took a different perspective. World oil supplies were seen as being in equilibrium and as an essential ingredient of daily life in almost every society. Should oil supplies be seriously interrupted, Americans might suffer a decline in their high standard of living, but people in developing societies would suffer food shortages and threats to life itself.

Some seminar members argued that it is difficult to distinguish between US strategic and commercial interests in the Middle East. As the United States tried to prevent the use of force in the Middle East, and to foster peace through many approaches, most events ended up in the political arena. The Saudi Arabians were cited as always viewing oil as an economic, strategic, and political interest. If the suppliers cannot divorce the purely economic from the political functions of oil, then it would be virtually impossible for the United States to do so.

More finite issues about the potential use of US military force were also addressed. Several scenarios in the Middle East were suggested as occasions when US forces might be productively used or required. The primary one was a movement of Soviet forces into the region. A second purpose might insure that Israel was defended against a severe
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threat to its existence; a third purpose would avoid a major war in the area between the larger regional states; a fourth purpose might insure the stability of governments whose continued existence was important to Western oil supplies; finally, a fifth purpose might include intervention against the sort of revolutionary ferment noted in Iran. All of these proposals were qualified very carefully by the realization that it is extremely difficult and perhaps even inappropriate to suppose that military forces can secure oilfields which are a fragile resource, easily sabotaged.

Others noted that the Middle East will be difficult for the United States to affect militarily, even should such a choice be made. This region is remote from the United States and within easy reach of the Soviet Union. The historic commitments of the United States have structured our forces and pre-positioned them around the world in such a way as to be ill-equipped and ill-deployed for Middle Eastern desert warfare. The United States is currently examining and tailoring forces to meet potential contingencies in the Middle East. This rethinking involves reviewing the potential requirement for a new, large transport aircraft and rapid deployment logistic ships; the limited base structure in the Middle East; and potential allies in this area. An assessment must also be made of what the insertion of US forces might do to stability or instability in this area. Some governments do not seek direct US assistance, and our forces could create more problems than solutions.

Out of this lively discussion emerged summary suggestions. The United States must not always advocate military solutions. However, we must question whether there is a military ingredient in particular problems and whether the United States has sufficient and appropriate military force to resist pressures about oil supplies. If the United States is adequately prepared, this should lead to a more subtle influencing role, without the actual use of force. The United States requires the military capacity to act if other initiatives fail in the Middle East.

Our group also noted that energy, as a major economic issue in US national security policy, is somewhat unique. It cuts across our alliance relationships, affects, and is affected by, US thinking about almost every region of the world, and even affects our relationship with the Soviet Union. As an international issue, it uniquely impacts on and interacts with our domestic political economy.

The question of assuring petroleum supplies to our allies in Western Europe and Japan may be one of the most divisive issues facing US alliances since World War II. Although Japan and Western Europe are more affected by turmoil in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf than
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is the United States, they are less able to bring influence to bear on problems. While the United States receives its oil from a diversity of sources, US consumption is watched carefully. Our allies can increase their use of alternative energy sources and limit the consumption of petroleum; however, there is little incentive unless the United States shows initiative in this area. The United States must remain sensitive to our allies' dependence upon Middle Eastern oil, or the scramble for energy could seriously damage the cohesion of our alliance system.

Competition for energy has potential for other negative effects. The Soviet Union may currently use about 11 million barrels of oil a day and export approximately 3 to 4 million barrels a day, primarily to Eastern Europe. There is no consensus estimate of future USSR petroleum needs or confident estimates of Soviet capacity to satisfy long-term needs. There is serious disagreement whether the Soviet Union will soon become a net importer of oil. If the Soviet Union requires Middle Eastern oil, this will add to an already difficult US-USSR relationship. This could be a relatively critical variable in future superpower relations and should be given early consideration. We need more reliable data about the Soviet Union's resource base and how much oil they will be able to develop with their own or imported technology. We must also firm up future projections. Many European and Japanese experts do not agree with the US Central Intelligence Agency report that suggests that the Soviet Union will become short of oil in the 1980s.

Several questions must be asked about a potential future Soviet need for petroleum: (1) What importance does the Soviet Union attach to supplying oil to Eastern Europe? Can Soviet supply to Eastern Europe go unchanged if the Soviet Union becomes a net oil importer? Will the Soviets be willing to settle for less oil? (2) What will the Russians do about their foreign exchange shortages if they must import more oil? Will the Soviets want to increase exports of other products to the West to obtain hard currency for exchange purposes? (3) How certain is it that the Soviet Union must eventually import 3 to 4 million barrels of oil a day? What means will they use if this becomes a reality? Will they enter the world trade system and keep the whole process smooth or will they move toward some sort of dependency, surrogate relationship, or occupation of oil-rich nations? (4) What is in the US interest in the petroleum dilemma of the Soviet Union? Is it a conceit to think that the United States can significantly influence the Soviet response in this area? To what extent does the Soviet Union really need the West? Who will provide them with oil extraction and refining technology? Will it be the United States, or Germany, or Japan?
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The Soviet Union has already signaled future problems by a suggestion that it might wish to reduce the export of oil to Eastern Europe and to the West. This bears close watching since we have not yet determined whether it is in our national interest to insure that the Soviet Union has adequate oil for its own needs or whether it is in our national interest to not help the Soviet Union extract its own oil. It is unclear what they and we might do to insure that their supplies are adequate. It might be helpful to develop criteria that the United States might use in determining whether or not to help the Soviet Union in energy development.

These important questions about US-USSR cooperation or competition must be addressed. However, there were several other suggestions that might somewhat mitigate the potential impact of USSR oil needs. The United States might profitably assist Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and others in the Western Hemisphere in locating oil sources or developing the technology to extract unique forms of oil already discovered. New modes of international cooperation may be required.

Since there are serious questions about whether US forces are adequately structured, equipped, or located to affect oil resources, it was also suggested that the United States might profitably spend its time on countereconomic strategies before looking at the direct use of military force. The United States has indirectly used price increases to reduce demand, but there is no coherent strategy to deal with a suppliers' monopoly. There is a glaring gap in our capacity to organize both within our own country and with our allies to deal with this issue.

A productive approach might examine substitute technologies. A major calculus of OPEC is that oil in the ground equals a long-term asset which will increase in value. This can be reshaped by developing alternative energy sources which reduce the demand for petroleum. However, one must be observant if one pushes forward in developing these alternate sources. We must be aware that OPEC could increase production and moderate cost escalation to reduce US incentives to invest in alternative research and development options. We must keep in mind our long-term interests.

Several others saw energy issues as primarily involving US domestic skills. If the United States strengthened its dollar and curbed inflation, then the escalation of OPEC prices might decrease. Some suggested that the security aspect of petroleum scarcity could be managed through control of demand in the United States. The predictability of petroleum supply was viewed as higher than that of demand. A national problem is in reconciling the traditional view of an individual's
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right to use energy resources with the new realities. Thus, while security of energy supply was viewed as a major and somewhat neglected area of interest, we should not ignore methods for allocating the supply that we are able to secure.

National security problems generated by oil supplies will be a major factor for at least the next decade, even if the United States significantly increases its ability to extract energy from alternative sources. Since energy will remain a highly complex and almost confounding issue, it was suggested that we must tackle this issue on a variety of fronts with a variety of methods; in using a sports analogy, one of our panelists supported a "full-court press," as in basketball. Many experiments might lead to some that are ultimately productive.

The energy area will increasingly draw national security attention and require choice. As policymakers struggle with this evolving strategic reality, they will find energy issues operating as a constraint upon their choices in other areas. This will also be the case as we examine recent national experiences in trying to use economic leverage to influence the behavior of other governments on national security policy issues. Limitations in the US Government's ability to orchestrate economic events will also be a major potential frustration and constraint in the future.

**Economic Influence and US Security**

The paper by Professors James Oliver and James Nathan surfaced some useful generalizations about US attempts to use economic instruments and leverage to influence international events. We noted that we can no longer downgrade the economic component of statecraft and focus almost exclusively upon military force as the most capable means of influencing other national behaviors. New realities make international economics more important and potentially more useful to the United States in its dealings with a recalcitrant world. Military and economic power must be seen more as parts of a continuum, and should no longer be examined under separate microscopes.

This paper also prompted us to surface the rather interesting idea that tensions may develop between two normal priorities in any state's international behavior. Attempts to achieve security and well-being for a state's citizens may conflict with each other. An increased use of economics to influence international behavior requires that particular citizens, groups, and corporations may have to make sacrifices. There will be a growing tension between achieving national security and foreign policy aims and domestic economic benefits. Finally, although the
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Issues of economics and national security may be more closely intertwined than ever before, both the paper and the discussion suggested that there were major discontinuities between those US government policymakers responsible for domestic matters and those responsible for operating in the international arena.

The paper also led us to analyze the purposes, uses, and results of economic leverage; to identify future major issues and implications for US policymaking, particularly in defining objectives and in organizing to manage economics as an instrument of statecraft; and to qualify some central issues in the paper itself. For example, some proposed that there were alternatives to the paper's limited polar models of an interdependent world or one dominated by power politics. The authors even hint at a third view, of a world in which economic factors are more absorbed into strategic factors. The paper was also critiqued as delineating too narrowly the possible styles of future international relationships. There might be options other than submission to other states, dominance of other states, or detachment and disengagement.

There was argument about the description of American society as increasingly "narcissistic." An example noted that American wheat and corn growers would hardly qualify as narcissists, yet they were strenuously objecting to Presidential embargoes of grain sales to the Soviet Union. An alternative formulation proposed that the United States may have changed its social contract to permit and encourage self-interests to be more articulated and less subordinated to national or international events and choices.

In a further qualification of the generalization that military and economic instruments must be more carefully considered together, it was noted that no truly important state could be effectively coerced solely by economic means; the threat or use of military force would still be essential. While US economic boycotts and sanctions were seen as possibly contributing to the downfall of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, Iran was viewed as a much more complex and capable national society than that of Uganda and one which could survive almost any purely economic leverage exercised against it by the United States.

There was further qualification of the paper's suspicion of the abilities of the US Government to function in the economic arena. We observed that the political, psychological, and military instruments for bringing national influence to bear are within almost exclusive government purview. But in the United States, economic instruments are not a governmental monopoly and are resistant to control, and sometimes even to intelligent information gathering. A final qualification to the paper
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suggested that it is virtually impossible to maintain the purely technical nature of economic issues. In international relations, when economic benefits reach the distribution stage, they become political in nature.

Several important questions were recommended for consideration by policymakers when deciding whether to use the military or economic means at their disposal. When seeking leverage over other states’ behavior, the government must ask whether it is interested in long- or short-term effects, since economic instruments are much less thematic than other instruments and take longer to implement and have effect. We must consider whether we seek an irritant or serious damage to another political decisionmaking system. We must consider whether we need the help of others. This requires an analysis of whether US economic materials are unique, or if suitable substitutes are available from other states.

When thinking about tradeoffs between military and economic use, the questions naturally turned to potential adversaries. Should “interdependence” be extended toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? How much high technology should the United States sell to them? Is linkage politics a useful way to leverage their system? Is this approach worth the economic and political cost and is there a real possibility that we can wean the Eastern Bloc away from its historic international behavior? What criteria should be used to help decide which technology should or should not be sold? In discussing economic relationships with the Soviet Union and its allies, economic means were viewed as a useful way to signal US dissatisfaction with Soviet behavior without having to resort to drastic military action.

There was another suggestion that economic instruments do not operate solely at the coercive end of relationships between states. There is an opportunity to generate “general influence,” particularly in developing countries. Economic assistance, both private and public, provides a subtle means of influencing the opinions of government leaders. Although international economic interdependence has been in the interest of the US economic system, we were cautioned to question how best to use our power to benefit from interdependence. Our superior economic power can be used to maximize political gains, not necessarily through attempted coercion or monopoly, but rather by increasing general influence. It was proposed that it is in the US interest to integrate lesser developed societies into an interdependent world system and that countries of concern to the United States should be identified and specific economic tools employed to achieve specific objectives.
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While the participants agreed that economics need not be viewed as a punitive or coercive instrument, another interesting set of questions developed around the relative priority and cost involved in using military or economic instruments. Several members questioned the assumption that the military instrument is more costly under all circumstances. They suggested that the use of significant economic means can produce subtle domestic economic and political effects that may become cumulative over time resulting in major dislocations. Further, the time required to see results in the economic realm and the need to coordinate, and sometimes even to compel, allied participation in joint economic efforts can be counterproductive in the long run.

There was not an overwhelming desire to substitute military for economic instruments, but the point was made that there is no "free ride" and the economic instrument is not easily substituted for the military one. Some economic damage and dislocation will be inflicted upon our own society, as well as upon those we seek to punish. In particular, this could become quite difficult in petroleum allocations which, as we noted earlier, affect us both domestically and within our alliance system.

Other qualifications to the use of economic methods were submitted because, if pressures are placed on certain portions of an economically interdependent world, the fragile web of economic relationships may begin to deteriorate. Further, although economic issues eventually become politicized, they also have their own technical life and set of experts. This led us toward a somewhat pessimistic view of the future with a consensus that the United States may require a better capability to integrate its policies and to deal with a world in which mutual, but asymmetrical, vulnerabilities are managed rather than avoided as issues.

Until very recently, the US Government rarely looked upon international economic options as a mechanism for coping with major international situations. Economics, after all, is relatively functional and organized around particular issues, while the national security and foreign policy bureaucracies often view issues on a regional or country basis. Economics cuts through geography and, in the US system, cuts across dozens of Federal agencies and thousands of suppliers. It seemed important to examine the ability of the United States to manage any attempt to use economics to influence other governments.

In reviewing the US Government's ability to cope with an increasingly important component of international relations, we noted that it is a human, and governmental, instinct to defer making hard choices.
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When different groups can pursue seemingly contradictory objectives, these will be pursued. These varying objectives are generated by the complexity of international economic relations and the number of agencies involved in keeping informed of or seeking to regulate these interchanges.

The US Government was described as ill-prepared to orchestrate the international use of economics. Our system provides for competing interests—the Congress, a relatively weak Federal Government, and a plethora of private interests. There is no way either to bring together all of these varying groups in one organization, or even to coordinate their innumerable interests. The question is, can any staff organization be placed in the Office of the President to connect policies which cut across governmental and private organizations? Our knowledgeable group shied away from specific prescriptions and generally believed there is little that can, in the end, assist in this orchestration.

Ultimately, however, management of economic responses probably lies in the White House. Although we currently have informal linkages between governmental groups, it would be helpful if in the future there was more Presidential attention to these issues. Any chance for even minor success was carefully qualified in that our government is decentralized and its several agencies normally pursue contradictory objectives. Political energy at the center of decision is limited and if the staffs are not well connected to each other, they will not be able to manage economic issues in a coherent manner. Operationally, tradeoffs are difficult between choices and agencies. The creation of new economic coordinating agencies might make some sense, but unless they are connected to other centers of choice they will accomplish very little. Since the central political power's energy cannot be expended on all issues simultaneously, harmonizing international economic policy may remain as much an art as a science.

This decided lack of optimism that new organizational forms might better accomplish US economic objectives was supplemented by several other caveats to potential success. We were asked to recognize that economics will have a differential impact on various groups. When we use military force, we ask for sacrifices from individuals and from the society—even to death. Survivors of national military actions justify the deaths of their compatriots as being in the interest of national security. In the nuclear age, we might even have to ask sacrifices of large sectors of the population. In the economic realm, when we withhold grain from the Soviet Union, the Soviets will eat less meat, but US grain farmers may bear a disproportionate share of the US price. This
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differential effect will always make economic sanctions difficult policy choices.

Potential choices in the international economy are also limited by the fact that, in general, US security and economic objectives are relatively well served by an integrated, somewhat managed world economy. It becomes difficult to seek short-term, relatively unilateral benefits or punishments. When one determines objectives in the international economic realm, it is important to become situational and issue oriented, while always recognizing the potential for damage to the larger system and one's long-term interests.

The ultimate constraint on the capacity of the United States to operate effectively through the use of economic instruments in support of its national security interests was seen as being not in the lack of institutional mechanisms, but in the locus of real power. At best, the US Government can only operate "on the margin"; in our free society, the bias is toward private power rather than public power. The US "social contract" and general approach to economics is the outer limit beyond which the government cannot push. The seminar thus concluded with a relatively pessimistic view of how much the United States could realistically gain by using its economic power as a significant lever of influence on other nation-states.

When another meeting examined important aspects of our military instrument of national power, we found other constraints that would bound the choices possible for US policymakers in the 1980s. Serious restrictions might be imposed by the quantity and quality of manpower attracted to the US military and retained through the current mechanism of the all-volunteer force.

Military Manpower as a Limiting Factor

In evaluating military manpower, our discussion group divided quickly into policymakers and observers of the military as a social organization. Those responsible for manpower policies were interested in pragmatic approaches, to assist in coping with a difficult manpower reality. They were well aware of the developing problems, but felt that our two authors' papers provided only a few practical suggestions. Fortunately, the seminar discussion further clarified the emerging problems and suggested reforms and policies that might slightly improve this picture. Several policymakers were chilled at the prospect of simultaneously coping with an increasingly dangerous Soviet military threat and a declining US military manpower posture.
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The commentary developed rather naturally around qualifications of the two papers presented; this suggested further reasons for the difficulties the military is experiencing in recruiting and retaining high quality people. We also expanded our horizons to a broader focus upon societal commitments to defense, questions about moving toward a national voluntary service, and manpower as a major issue in the future.

The economic realities underlying the all-volunteer force were quickly addressed and it was suggested that perhaps the all-volunteer force was never really given much of a chance because the initial economic choices made to sustain that force have not been consistently maintained. The GI Bill was eliminated and a less generous educational benefit substituted. Real wages, particularly of lower ranking enlisted personnel, have fallen: the quality of military health care has dropped markedly; and other benefits have been slowly eroded. Further discussion suggested it was necessary to make a military career more attractive and this would require more financial support.

There was a consensus that there might be a serious disconnect between the promises made in military recruitment and the reality of military service. It was noted that the all-volunteer force was relatively successful in the beginning, but that recruitment has been affected by the large number of "negative recruiters" who passed through military service but were discharged early because of their personal failings or the failings of their military experience.

There were thoughts that youths in basic training are highly motivated, but that later daily operational experience in assigned units does not always support this early positive feeling toward military service. The military was seen as recruiting for jobs or occupations, but combat units are institutions which demand much more of their members than any normal civilian job or occupation. These initial ideas led to suggestions for recruiting and retaining more quality individuals.

One obvious recommendation was that the military must recruit with both an occupational and a service orientation, in order to attract the widest audience and to show new recruits a more accurate picture of military service. There were also admonitions that the military must learn to treat its young recruits as human resources, and not as "free economic goods." The military experience must be made as meaningful as possible for the individual and jobs should be designed to permit individuals to most fully realize their potential. This was qualified by the recognition that there are a relatively large number of military functions which require simple, arduous, and tedious tasks.
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Education was viewed as the most important single recruiting incentive available for broadening the recruitment base to include the middle class, which has basically abandoned enlisted military service as a potential career path. Educational incentives for service were almost unanimously supported, and there was a proposal that perhaps student loans under other government programs might be forgiven if repaid through limited military service. There were suggestions that experiments such as reducing the initial military commitment to two years might increase the numbers willing to serve. This discussion of recruitment led one participant to note that we must not forget the problems of retention while focusing on recruitment.

The discussion was not totally pessimistic. The Department of Defense was charged to do its military training very well: to hedge uncertainties in military training, recruitment, and retention by trying small experiments to see what works; and to employ nonmilitary people to assist in the military recruiting task. It was noted that the views of youths are changing and can change very rapidly in our current era of mass communications. Others agreed that perhaps "the tide was turning." Although the military manpower situation may be difficult in the near term, perhaps the situation would improve in the future as the public changes its orientation toward the US role in the international arena and the necessity for adequate military forces.

Current problems in the manpower area were even seen as an opportunity for careful reevaluation of several fundamental assumptions about force structuring, US commitments, allied accomplishment of supporting tasks, the fixation on youth for all military jobs, and organizational arrangements.

In the longer term, the society requires better education about military needs and commitments. Improved civic education of youth was suggested if the society is to meet its international responsibilities. Better civic education of US troops, modeled after the German system, was proposed as an additional long-range approach. The military might be called the "peacekeeping force" since today's college students were quite interested in learning about this aspect of military service.

This led to a more philosophical consideration of the world role of the United States and the societal imperatives that surround the military manpower problem. Some noted that there must be a natural tension between the demands made on a free, democratic citizenry and the requirement to maintain rather large international commitments with military forces. There is a dichotomy between the right of each citizen
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to “be free,” and the need of the society and the government to pursue national security interests.

One participant suggested that it might be time to reduce US international commitments or to adjust our national strategy to a level that would be supported by the populace in a voluntary manner. Others argued strenuously against this approach and suggested that the American public was more willing to make international commitments than we might suspect. Some suggested that we must not provide outlets for youths to withdraw from the legitimate obligations of citizenship in a free society. It was noted that the British had tried a pragmatic voluntary approach to recruiting forces, that this had not worked very well, and that the United Kingdom had drastically reduced its international involvement.

In this philosophical vein, it was held that military enlistment must be viewed as a service to the society and that we must avoid a “marketplace” mentality in recruiting youths. A clearer definition of US international commitments and objectives, coupled with able leadership, would carry the American people to assume their legitimate responsibilities. There was general support for these views that it is important to clarify what differentiates the military from other occupations and to make a clearer exposition of the threats to our society if the public is to respond rationally.

On the other hand, there was no consensus on whether the future of American military service held a draft, other forms of conscription, or a national youth service. There were serious challenges to the very notion that America was moving toward national service and questions were asked about evidence. Reservations were raised about whether this approach would be compulsory or voluntary, and about what sanctions would be used against those who choose not to participate. In a practical critique, the US Government was seen as not being able to employ several million youths productively, even if many current Federal programs were combined. If national service was indeed to be a prospect, experimentation would be required to smooth the transition.

In sum, the major concerns expressed in this seminar about manpower closely approximated the problems articulated in the seminars on energy and economics. All three were identified as evolving strategic national security realities, and all three were viewed as relatively recent major security concerns. Military manpower, too, was seen as constraining policymakers while forcing them toward hard national choices if they were to limit the potential restrictions of smaller forces manned by personnel of lesser quality. All five of the strategic realities examined
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(the Soviet Union, China, energy, economics, and manpower) were very naturally subsumed in an interesting seminar discussion of "Perceptions of American Power."

Perceptions: The Credibility of the United States in the World

While the focus on perceptions of American power was the most abstract of our seminar themes, in many ways it may best illuminate the choices and constraints that face the United States in the next decade. Professor Earl Ravenal's paper was qualified by several major proposals: we also examined linkages between perceptions and national will and perceptions and the use of power and force in the world. Some useful insights were provided on how policymakers can operationalize the difficult concept of perceptions of US capability in order to influence events. Finally, we again reviewed the basic constraints contained within the US domestic political system.

The very subject of "perceptions" was immediately seized upon as one defying rational empirical measurement. There were questions about how one determines what perceptions are and how one conditions domestic and international perceptions. Examples were suggested: in the past, the French were not worried about real US strategic deterrent power, but about whether and how we might be willing to use it. Although a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile force might increase the power of the United States, perhaps of greater importance is how the United States suggests it would use this force in the future. Some found it difficult to deal with the concept of perception without the use of actual cases; it was felt that perceptions are often situational in nature.

Another challenge to the use of perceptions was suggested, with the assertion that foreign policy should not be based upon nor measured by perceptions. Rather, a more suitable approach would be one of "management." Because of continuing power struggles in the Nation's capital, Washington was seen as a "city of piranhas." This is often accompanied by irresponsibility and, sometimes, pure and simple bad management of policy. Rather than basing US goals and actions on perceptions of power, it was suggested that we must look for "trigger" priorities and adopt management principles. Policymakers must select the most important national goals: stability in US-USSR relations was suggested as the primary national security priority and the one which should draw the most attention. The President should stake out a middle ground, carefully project that the two societies see the world very
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differently, and recognize what we will be able to do or not do with the
Soviet Union. Policymakers should communicate adequately with each
other and manage and orchestrate responses to the Soviet Union and
to the world in general. Some international issues must be viewed as
subordinate to others and set aside. An administration must normally
speak with one voice to avoid the media articulating differences between
separate organizations or individuals. Policies must be stable and
determined.

Others had alternative views. It was noted that some administra-
tions have not granted the centrality of the US-USSR relationship to
our security interests and, instead, had focused upon North-South re-
lations. Furthermore, it was argued that the US political system does
not permit the "management" of foreign policy. There are too many
diverse centers of power and too many competing interests; the US
system is, thus, not meant to be orchestrated by the government. The
opportunity to pick and choose priorities is seen as very limited and
initiatives must always remain unexploited. A "management approach"
toward foreign policy was viewed as impractical because there is no
bottom line or profit-and-loss statement and there is no central director
of the corporation.

Other qualifications were provided in a review of the linkages be-
tween perceptions and national will, and in the actual use of power or
force in inter-state relations. The ways and means employed in using
force were seen as very important in creating perceptions; a statesman,
with great art, may be able to create appropriate perceptions more often
than one less skilled. On the other hand, we were cautioned by those
very experienced in the use of national force that great damage may
ensue to nations that attempt to substitute perceptions for real power.
It was further suggested that no matter how much power a nation
possesses, if the will to use it is lacking, then that power may approx-
imate zero in the opinion of others. National will was equated with the
US national system and it was suggested that, in the long run, the
President of the United States will represent that system.

Others agreed that the symbols of action must not be confused
with ineffective action itself. Challenges, if they are to be met suc-
cessfully, must be met quickly with overwhelming military force, but this
is difficult in our democratic system which rewards consensus devel-
oped prior to choice.

The somewhat difficult discussion of perceptions became slightly
more focused when we addressed the operational use of perceptions
in the real world. For instance, crisis management was suggested as
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an area in which the President has the most latitude in expressing the national will. When perceptions of US power were viewed more broadly, it was generally agreed that separate national security issues, each treated on its own merit, may lead to problems when viewed in totality. One may make several separate and individually logical choices about security issues which together appear to others as signs of weakness, or unwillingness or inability to act. Thus, the lesson for policymakers is to view each choice about a particular event, possible intervention, or major weapons program as a part of what one of our panelists described as "a seamless web" of choices, which together suggest to allies and adversaries a future pattern that the United States is likely to follow when its interests are at stake.

If one uses this approach, it may be possible to get the most out of limited capabilities, but one must be resolute when using limited force. At times, it may be appropriate to react to a minor challenge, but the situation must be chosen with great caution, being wary of using less than credible threats. One must choose when to make these responses and not to bluff. The responses of the United States to the capture of the Mayaguez and to the tree chopping incident in the Korean border zone were both cited as examples of carefully chosen demonstrations of US will and ability. Qualifications of these suggestions were added. It was noted that it is not easy to handle these issues which are exercises in statecraft and the skills of government. Lines must be defined or drawn; clear priorities and sub-threshold threats must be carefully calculated since the media may generate threats and create an importance the event does not merit. Dealing with perceptions requires discipline, steadiness, and predictability. One must be prepared to deal with the media and with trade-offs in one's own programs. Finally, if a decision is made to act, it must be done where the grounds for action are clear; effectiveness and speed are required. A final qualification suggested that all of these principles and "rules of engagement" were potentially useful, but they provided little assistance in determining where the line is to be drawn against Soviet expansionism and what steps should be taken once that line is drawn or crossed.

Some interesting suggestions were also made about US relationships with allies and the value they place on perceptions. Distinctions must be made between the perceptions of our allies, our own, and our adversaries. Allies must retain confidence in us; consultation and consistency are important in creating appropriate perceptions within our alliance structures. When viewing adversaries, we often develop the most cautious assessment as a result of analyzing their capabilities.
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By reason of uncertainties, our view of adversaries often creates the most self-doubt within our own political system and decisionmakers.

Others suggested that our allies sometimes may view US motives somewhat suspiciously and as being based upon domestic political considerations, particularly in our Presidential election years. It was noted that one must distinguish between estimating others’ capabilities and who is estimating them. When our allies view our potential adversaries, our allies’ approaches are shaped by the fact that they have separate governments and publics from those of the United States. Perceptions are culture specific and US attempts to shape perceptions must take these differences into account.

Finally, it was noted that in operationalizing perceptions, it is necessary to calculate carefully what is intended, for it is a fundamental principle that the way in which a President first structures an issue is crucial. The instinctive reaction for an administration will be to extract a cost, or make a popular move for political reasons, or adopt a moral symbol. It must be understood that later it will be necessary to deal with competing interests, carry any choice through the divisions that exist within our own society, and be tough with our allies if they are not adequately supportive.

Our deliberations also examined domestic political constraints upon national security policy choice. In a discussion about who creates perceptions, there was a consensus that the President is the single most important articulator of American national will and an important contributor to creating American self-perceptions. Questions were raised about which other groups create and project national will or images of reality. When there is an abdication or even a brief delay of government policy choice, then the mass media enter the breach, structure the issues, and force choices in an artificial manner which may be contrary to the interests of the states involved. This phenomenon, most recently demonstrated in the intense coverage of Iran and in the inability to cover the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, leads to potentially diverse public interest and national security policymaking attention to issues. This is a trend worth watching and understanding in the future.

The manipulation of perceptions, however, was seen as hard to achieve. If it is decided to present a relatively tough image to the world, then this must be followed by congressional budget choices to strengthen force postures. Immediately, this choice will compete with all of the other legitimate political and economic interests in the United States. Indeed, the very relationship between the Executive and Congress was seen as an interesting and sometimes frustrating creator of
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perceptions of US power. The loyal opposition to an administration may portray the military forces of that administration as even weaker than they really are. However, if the Department of Defense goes to Capitol Hill and suggests that the United States is strong, then limited defense funding is the result. If it is suggested the Nation's military forces are weak and require budgetary increases, then this helps to shape an adversary's view of the Nation as being weaker than it really is. This discussion reinforced the frequently repeated refrain from our other seminars that by design the US political system does not operate in a way that permits it to be well orchestrated by the government.

There was a final, slightly optimistic note sounded about the entire subject and issue of perceptions. In the longer run, after recent events in Iran and Afghanistan, the United States might again accept the requirement to match capabilities and will to a renewed sense of international commitments. There was a feeling that several generations of Americans and their leadership had modified their views of the world and that the twelve-year slide in perceptions of American power and will might be at a major turning point. The constraints caused by perceptions of diminished American power might become catalysts for actions which would permit America to increasingly play its appropriate and necessary role as the major democratic stabilizer and balancer in the international system. By reviewing the suggestions of our authors and seminar members, can we deduce any summary thoughts to aid national security policymakers in deciding what those policy choices might contain?

Coping with a Difficult Future

In many respects, our authors and seminar groups achieved their purpose. One focus was upon major emerging strategic realities that might act as catalysts to action. We found realities that will force hard choices upon our decisionmaking apparatus in the future when we assessed recent Soviet initiatives, developing relations between the United States and China, and energy as a national security issue. These important strategic realities will also operate as brakes upon our ability to act in other areas, as well.

We also examined new realities that affect the ways in which we mobilize and use our economic, military, and psychological assets to try to influence the behavior of other nation-states. While the focus was upon constraints that had recently developed, our studies also suggested choices which might make the United States more capable of dealing with a difficult and complex world. The subjects covered in our
Dinner Seminar Series obviously could not address all major security issues that will face the United States in the future. Although there was a broad spectrum of educational, policymaking, and ideological perspectives represented in our meetings, it is possible and useful to summarize themes that emerged.

We are able to paint a partial picture of the world facing national security policymakers. We can then review the major implications and areas of choice that our seminar series seem to suggest will flow from this limited world view. We are also able to detect some of the major limitations which will constrain and frustrate policymakers in their daily efforts. Finally, despite the generally pessimistic view of this volume, out of the totality of the papers and the discussions they stimulated, one can perceive unique historic opportunities for leadership to set the ship of state on new courses in a decidedly troubled world. While the dimensions of our description of this future world are naturally limited by the number of subjects in our series, we nevertheless can portray some major highlights. The world will probably become even more complex, dynamic, and unpredictable than in the recent past. Important threats to US national security interests will come from previously ignored or peaceful geographic regions, and increasingly from the economic area. The world can no longer easily be divided into East and West, or North and South, or Communist and non-Communist.

Nevertheless, our deliberations suggest that the major security concern of the United States will once again be the military might and potential ambitions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The possibility of serious confrontation with the Soviet Union might be greater in the 1980s than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This central threat from a potentially more belligerent and confident Soviet Union will impinge upon all other US security issues. The first half decade of the 1980s is much more likely to emphasize the competitive side of the US-Soviet relationship. This unfortunate probability will take place in a world that seems even more complex and unmanageable than in the past, and at a time when the United States appears much less able to dominate events.

One aspect of competition with the Soviet Union that might be closely monitored is the continuing problem the United States will face in insuring an adequate supply of petroleum for economic and national security purposes. Potential USSR shortfalls and actions to resolve Soviet shortages must be carefully factored into our strategic equation with the Soviet Union. There will be an increase in the national security component of petroleum sources, shipment, and demand. This issue, too, will cut across several others. Besides concern about competing
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with the Soviet Union for oil, we must consider the possibility that oil-related issues could pose the most serious threat to the cohesion of our alliance system in its brief history. Oil, and the politics and instabilities surrounding its primary source in the Persian Gulf, can lead to serious strains in our relationships with Western Europe and Japan. Energy and related problems will be an important aspect of the world in the 1980s and must be carefully monitored for potential policymaking problems.

We examined US-Sino relations for their potential in mitigating concerns about the Soviet Union and stability in oil sources. But, as the United States continues to develop its relationship with the People’s Republic of China, there is also the potential for disharmony. A broad spectrum of cooperative arrangements are developing rapidly and may have already passed the point where they can be easily controlled or managed by the two governments. Major questions remain about how our relations with China will be integrated with other US policy initiatives.

All of these important security dimensions will occur during a time when world perceptions of US capability to influence events are at a relatively low point. Unfortunately, our discussions suggest that it is most difficult to substitute economic power for military power, and that economic power, even if skillfully exercised, might achieve only limited success. We also noted that America’s very ability to raise, train, and sustain an adequately sized and qualified military force may also be in question.

All US choices about the Soviet Union, oil, China, or other national security issues will thus be limited by perceptions of US power, by the ability of the United States to raise adequate forces, and by limits on the potential use of economic leverage. In all of these areas, the domestic and international factors commingle. The future appears to hold a world in which domestic and international events will be even more intertwined making it increasingly difficult for policymakers to isolate and trace the lines of separate issues.

This leads to an important dimension that surfaced again and again in our seminars. As domestic and international interests commingle, US policymakers face serious obstacles in making and implementing coherent, rational national security policy choices. Power in the United States is diffuse and the groups or individuals holding it are highly competitive. Coequal branches of government struggle to coordinate and control diverse private power which, in many cases, is able to affect or modify governmental decisions. This US check-and-balance political system normally prevents drastic abuses of domestic political power.
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But this basic strength of our system must always be considered as a potential constraint by policymakers seeking to deal with a reluctant world. Our discussions also seem to suggest that even with this necessary diversity, the United States may face several fundamental choices that have developed out of recent history and events unfolding in the world.

At stake is whether the United States will seek to reverse the trends described in this volume or, rather, to reduce its commitment to the world and bring its role as world stabilizer into balance with decreased forces and lessened potential for influence. It appears that the most pressing question suggested by the ideas in this book concerns how much the United States is willing to sacrifice in order to meet the interrelated challenges of the Soviet Union and the need to assure energy supplies for the United States and its allies. If the United States decides to increase perceptions of its power and ability to influence the world, what amount of resources will it allocate to that task? Will the Nation face up to the hard manpower choices if it seeks to again use or seriously threaten the effective use of military force?

Continuing reassessments must also be made about how much the United States can realistically expect the People’s Republic of China to help us in containing the ambitions of the Soviet Union. At each step, questions must be faced about how far the United States should proceed with military cooperation with China. It is especially important that policies toward the Soviet Union and China be carefully integrated and coordinated and weighed for their balance with other global and regional concerns.

In looking at our domestic scene, we must question whether we are adequately organized to cope with these new realities. Would new organizational forms to coordinate economic policies be in our interest? The Department of Defense, too, will continue to question whether it is organized, equipped, and manned to meet new threats. It will assess whether US forces—organized to fight strategic wars and the Soviet Union in the central plains of Europe—are relevant to other regions of the world. Priorities assigned to these varying threats will shape force structure developments and basing for the 1980s.

We must also continuously review what contributions the “home front” can make to help with energy problems. Policymakers might determine what policies will best assure petroleum at its source, protect its flow to our refineries and users, and reduce demand.

We must address the implications for our alliances of policies of the Soviet Union, US-PRC cooperation, perceptions of US ability to
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support our allies, and threats to allied interests from Third World events. In dealing with these problems, policymakers must be aware of the factor of perceptions and the summary effect that separate choices may have upon world views of the US ability and willingness to act. Finally, policymakers must understand the difficulties one faces in a democratic society when national leaders seek to mobilize a population to compete with aggressive adversaries, yet at the same time must foster a spirit of cooperation in certain areas with those same adversaries.

This requires a possibly unattainable level of sophisticated public understanding if the national leadership is to build a consensus around its international policies. As the world becomes more complex and requires more complex policies, it becomes more difficult to retain public and governmental support for policies that can no longer be defined by labels, symbols, or slogans.

This is the continuing price that US national security policymakers must pay for their privilege of serving our democratic society. Policymakers will be frustrated by the lack of support sometimes displayed by interest groups opposed to policies or by the general public. Open dialogue and efforts such as the Dinner Seminar Series may be useful in coping with this dilemma. Recognition of the complexities and frustrations facing the United States in its national security policy environments may not be totally satisfying, but perhaps can make the circumstances in which policy is made more understandable and, therefore, somewhat more manageable. That helps explain this volume flowing from our discussions under the auspices of the National Defense University and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Hopefully, the questions raised will expand our knowledge and understanding of the choices and constraints that will face policymakers. There are, in fact, more practical reasons for our discussions, although the expansion of knowledge alone is a worthy achievement. In the late twentieth century, there appear to be serious threats to the continuing existence of freedom, democracy, and our current economic system. Democratic societies control relatively less power than in the past. The major trends described in this book portend a number of changes.

Our society cannot adjust adequately without at least a minimal understanding of the dimensions and potential effects of these emerging strategic realities. Research and deliberation thus foster more than general human understanding; they also can assist through suggestions for future policy innovation. Perhaps even more importantly, major policies in a democratic society can only be effective if they are informed by public debate and adequate information. The most rational and
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broadly accepted policies often follow when problems are carefully studied and programs are then designed. Dialogues, such as those being circulated through this volume, should enhance this traditional functioning of the American democratic process and assist in responsible policy formulation.

Unfortunately, the overall content of this volume is obviously not optimistic. In many respects, this may be a unique period in US history. The United States continues to shoulder global responsibilities accepted at the end of World War II, but for the first time in its history, the US military seeks to recruit its manpower as an economic competitor in the American marketplace. Threats from the Soviet Union and from potential resource scarcities could affect our basic security and well-being. The Nation is recovering from an unsuccessful and unpopular war, and the American people have witnessed a decline in the Nation's relative international power. While policymakers have faced several of these problems before in our history, they have never faced this unique conjunction.

This volume represents an attempt to improve understanding of some of the dimensions of the new era that we enter in the 1980s. The forecast of the future might appear gloomy, but one may be certain that the 1980s will be dynamic years. During that period, national leadership will be hard pressed to help America adapt to a changing world. Only by understanding trends and defining problems can we focus the enormous resources available in our society.

The issues framed for our seminar series are challenging, and may signal that we are entering a phase of reformulation and rethinking. The United States may be facing one of those rare moments in the relatively brief history of this Nation when a series of events stimulates a new national understanding and acceptance of the challenges posed by an evolving set of realities. Our deliberations suggest that there is a potential to redefine US goals and commitments in the world. The United States may again be able to choose, perhaps even as a nation somewhat united, between several alternative views of the world. There is an opportunity, forced by the development of events in several areas, to make some fundamental choices that will guide our directions over the next several decades.

The challenge is to design policies which might again permit the building of an American consensus around a redefined set of goals for our relationship with the world. One can only hope that the best minds inside and outside the government will assist in this reassessment. The implications of evolving strategic realities seem to permit no less.
Endnotes

Chapter 5 Endnotes


2. See, for example, Robert Tucker, "A New International Order?" *Commentary* 59 (February 1975): 38–50.


5. For the classic statement of this distinction see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).


Endnotes

17. Ibid., p. 331.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 342.
22. Some, such as Waltz, are skeptical of the very concept. See his Theory of International Politics, especially pp. 129–160.
Endnotes


32. Ibid., p. 103.

33. Ibid., p. 108.


40. Ibid., p. 485.


42. Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism*, p. 53.


45. *The Governability of Democracies*, p. 4


Chapter 6 Endnotes

1. In 1979, for example, there have been major investigations by the military services into charges that recruiters may have falsified records or assisted potential recruits with their tests. For example, see “Army Expands Probe of Recruiters,” *Washington Post*, 16 October 1979, p. A3.

2. Depending upon which scenario is used, Reserve shortfalls are estimated at from 100,000 to more than 800,000. A summary, and sometimes confusing, discussion of Reserve shortcomings can be found in Kenneth J. Coffey, *Manpower for Military Mobilization* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute
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15. The complexities generated by decreased party unity and control in Congress make a clear definition of this shifting constitutional balance difficult. Although Congress as a whole seems to be increasing its staff capacities and its power to counter the executive branch, congressional leadership can no longer rely on the solid majorities once gathered by such parliamentary leaders as Cannon, Rayburn, and Johnson. Individual legislators seem much more independent, and, to a certain extent, this may diminish the capacity of Congress to take positive actions.

16. This trend may have already begun.


22. Ibid.
23. This is the central theme in his chapter in Margiotta.

24. These arguments are made by John C. Toomay, Richard H. Hartke, Howard L. Elman, and Frank R. Hunsicker in Margiotta. chaps. 15 and 16.


27. Moskos’ argument is contained in Margiotta, chap. 11; Janowitz, pp. 424–25.

28. In particular, I am grateful for the insights into the effects of technology which were stimulated by chaps. 15 and 16 in my book and written by John C. Toomay. Richard H. Hartke, Howard L. Elman, and Frank R. Hunsicker.

29. The Gates Commission, which provided the basic study and rationale that led to the adoption of an all-volunteer concept, inferred that a force of 2.5 million might be both desirable and feasible. For several years, recruitment permitted the force size to stabilize at 2.1 million which no longer seems feasible. For a review of these program changes, see Thomas Fabyanic, "Manpower, Military Intervention, and the All-Volunteer Force," in The Limits of Military Intervention, ed. Ellen P. Stern (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 281–83.

30. Ibid., pp. 297–301. Fabyanic’s suggestions for rethinking our military strategies because of a declining force size represent the only published analysis of this sort of which I am aware.

31. Moxon makes this one of his central conclusions after his analysis of problems in the Reserves.

32. This conclusion is strongly supported by the analysis contained in Blair, p. 175; and in a separate, but more detailed, analysis of similar survey data made by Faye E. Dowell, in a paper, "Gender Differences in Orientations toward Military Service," prepared for presentation at the Southeast Regional Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 3–5 June 1979.


Chapter 7 Endnotes

1. This extensive turnover in the enlisted ranks is accompanied by some limited aging and prolonged retention in the career-oriented enlisted ranks. The variation by service is striking and conforms to expectations. The standard measure is the percentage of the active-duty enlisted career force with more
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than four years of service. In fiscal year 1967, 31.3 percent had more than four years of service; by 1977, the figure had grown to 41.4 percent. In fiscal year 1977, the Air Force had the highest figure with more than four years of service, 53.5 percent. On the other hand, the Marine Corps had the lowest figure, 25.7 percent.

2. It is also true that career military personnel, both officer and enlisted, are fiercely competitive and strive endlessly for promotion. In the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville noted this trait of the military in democratic societies. Professional officers in democratic societies do not enjoy high status in civilian society. Although officers of the aristocratic mold derive their high status from their civilian origins and position, professional officers in democratic societies must be judged by their military rank, and, therefore, they struggle ceaselessly for higher rank.

3. Approximately 2,140,000 males reached the age of eighteen in 1978; 400,000 were recruited, including those who were somewhat older.

4. In February 1979, Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., introduced a bill that would deal directly with the military versus the civilian option. The high points of the proposed legislation were the following:

1. At age seventeen, every man and woman would be required to register at his or her local placement center.

2. Each individual would have four major options:

   (a) Volunteer for two years of military service, with a guarantee of thirty-six months of educational and training benefits (approximately four million individuals become age eighteen each year, and the Armed Forces require about six hundred and fifty thousand new enlistees annually):

   (b) Volunteer for six months of military service, followed by five and one-half years of Reserve obligation:

   (c) Give one year of civilian service in a community or environmental capacity, including forestry conservation, work with the retarded, aged, or handicapped, and possibly seasonal farm labor when needed; or

   (d) Join a lottery pool, become eligible for two years of conscript service between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and receive eighteen months of educational or training benefits.

Chapter 8 Endnotes

Endnotes

2. “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, September 1962. Another cognitive theorist, Michael Brecher, though he also harbors the fundamental assumption that elites act in response to their preceptions of reality, not reality, nevertheless uses a multivariate scheme, in which perceptual items such as attitudinal prisms and images mediate between an acknowledged “operational environment” and a posited “psychological environment.” (*The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

3. “Policy,” too, being an output of systems, must be seen as a contingent prediction of action.

4. To invoke the “insurance” analogy in this case, as some do, would not be appropriate: that one can in fact save the cost of the insurance, and most often nothing will happen. This, it is reasoned, is not an absence of policy, simply an assumption of risk. But a more apposite analogy is with the insurance company, not the insured. If the insurance company does not carry adequate reserves for defined contingencies, the policies it issues lose their validity.


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